EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
National security is a sensitive subject. A country’s survival, growth and development
depend on a well crafted and consciously implemented national security policy. By nature,
national security implementation should always be at a competitive edge relative to internal
and external security threats. As a result, the state cannot easily disclose or expose its
national security policies and plans without sufficient cause. Zimbabwe’s national security
implementation is guided and instructed by the Public Order and Security Act, the Official
Secrets Act and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act. These acts
complement one another and are applied flexibly enough to suit the prevailing
circumstances
The Acts ensure that order, peace and stability prevail, and that the state’s secrets are
protected from those who are not entitled to them. State secrets are the preserve of
responsible authorities who implement them to control the variables that affect the
survival, growth and development of the state. While the call for the right to access to
information may sound cogent, it is important to note that it cannot be guaranteed that the
information will not be used against the interests of the state and private individuals. In the
Zimbabwean context, the phenomenon of the public demanding access to security
information is not significant. The public is aware of the sensitivity of state secrets and
security information, and it is not common to identify ordinary people craving for security
information. Those who demand the information are political malcontents bent on finding a
pretext for fomenting anarchy.
Public order is maintained by the Zimbabwe Republic Police, and national defence is
guaranteed by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, but for effective protection of the nation,
security information is the preserve of those entitled to access it and use it, and not just
anybody who might use it against the interests of the state. Peace prevails in Zimbabwe,
and all the citizens enjoy unfettered participation in the socio-economic activities of the
country. Sadly, however, sporadic occurrences of negative and unsubstantiated information
against the state are witnessed, and these tend to polarize societal groups and attract the
participation of external forces which find it as an opportunity to meddle in the affairs of a
peace loving country, especially when it invokes legal instruments to normalize unstable
situations. When this happens, detractors call it bad governance and yet no state, including
those detractors, can afford the luxury to sit and watch the security of the state and the
people deteriorating.
Against this background, this paper is poised to give an analysis of Zimbabwe’s national
security policies and their implementation in maintaining the peace and tranquillity we so
much cherish and enjoy.
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INTRODUCTION
An adequate analysis of national security and access to information requires a fundamental
understanding of the two concepts. National security refers to the protection of a nation
from attack or any other danger by holding adequate armed forces and guarding state
secrets (http://definitions./uslegal.com) The term is understood to encompass economic
security, monetary security, energy security, environmental security, military security,
political security and security of energy and mineral resources. A national security policy is a
document prepared periodically by the executive branch of the government. The right of
the public to access information alludes to disclosing state information to the public and it is
the brainchild of human rights activists, whose rationale for the quest is that it induces
transparency, accountability and non-partisan behaviour in government authorities.
Zimbabwe has a relatively conservative view of national security. Such a conception
emanates from the realist view point that national security is inevitable and that any
information that might jeopardize the security of the state must be withheld from public
scrutiny. Realist assumptions are entrenched in the nature of the international anarchic
system which they argue does not allow for careless publication of state secrets or
permitting easy access to state information. Realists believe that access to state information
is not practical. They argue that most nations are reluctant to divulge confidential
information to the public especially in an atmosphere in which trust of their adversaries is
lacking, and such trust is unlikely to be fostered as long as those adversaries do not disclose
their own confidential information. Booth (1991) and Morgan (2007) point out that realists
see states as preoccupied with their own physical safety and autonomy, in an international
system defined by anarchy.
Morgan (1991) further argues that states are in constant competition to increase their
power relative to other states, and these international interactions are more important than
states’ domestic cultures, leaders or political systems in determining behaviour. Realists like
Waltz (2008) posit that the international system requires states to operate competitively
lest they be eliminated, like corporations within a free market. It is only when national
security is assured that states seek such other goals which include access to information by
its citizens. The paper focuses on the current Zimbabwean situation, and frequent
references to national security and access to information are necessary to analyze the
context in which some of the legislation was enacted. In wrapping up the discussion, an
attempt will be made to strike a balance between the security of the state and the rights of
the citizens.
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ZIMBABWE’S EXPERIENCE WITH NATIONAL SECURITY
Historical Overview
Current regulations and practices on national security and access to information in
Zimbabwe constitute a mixture of state security and human security. National security is
seen by almost all states in the international system as the most important component of a
state which involves the actions and policies taken by a nation against all internal and
external threats to its borders, economy, and stability. Much of the literature on national
security in Zimbabwe focuses on the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), Access to
Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Official Secrets Act. These acts are
applied synergistically, and were developed from the inherited Rhodesian Law and Order
Maintenance Act, which was enacted in 1960. Over the years, some amendments were
effected to suit the dynamics of the times and situations, and this gave birth to the three
acts above. The overarching consideration was, and still is, national security, as no public
freedoms can be enjoyed when the state is under threat of instability, or war. Traditionally,
the right to access to information, particularly security information, was not an issue, and
time will tell whether our people will really commit themselves to the issue, and
adjustments to our legal instruments will be continuously made to adapt to the changing
times.
LEGISLATION CONCERNING ACCESS TO INFORMATION AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE
GROUNDS OF NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS
The Official Secrets Act (2001) (Chapter 11:09)
The Official Secrets Act contains norms about access to information and restrictions on
national security grounds. The secret documents are those directly related by content to
state security, national defence, internal public order or the security of persons. The head of
a public body shall not disclose to any applicant information whose disclosure will prejudice
the defence and national security of the country, and the safety or interests of the country.
A pertinent example is the divulging of information deemed prejudicial to the security of the
country to some countries, which was committed by Zimbabwean businessman Philip
Chiyangwa and Ambassador Dzvairo. The two breached the Official Secrets Act and were
arrested, tried and convicted.
Public Order and Security Act (2002) (Chapter.11:17)
In 1980, the newly elected Zimbabwean government inherited from the colonial regime, the
Law and Order Maintenance Act (LOMA) that had been gazetted in 1960. It was used by the
Smith regime to prosecute any journalists and individuals who made statements that had
the potential to cause “fear, alarm or despondency” in the country. In the 1990s, the
Zimbabwean government announced its intention to replace LOMA with the Public Order
and Security Bill, and it sailed through parliament in 1998, though it was not signed into law.
POSA was enacted into law in 2002, following the publication of falsehoods in the media, as
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well as violent demonstrations by civic groups and opposition political parties, which
disrupted the smooth flow of business. These demonstrations were characterized by
looting, vandalism of public infrastructure, stoning and torching of public and private
transport. Contrary to what scholars like Makumbe (2002), Bond and Manyanya (2004) said
about the repressiveness of the Act, peace and tranquility prevailed when this law became
effective. It can easily be said that national security was guaranteed as the police monitored
all political gatherings.
Article 15, Subsection 1 of POSA states that:
Any person who, whether inside or outside Zimbabwe, publishes or communicates to any other person, a
statement which is wholly or materially false with the intention or realizing that there is a risk or possibility of
inciting or promoting public disorder, or public violence, or endangering public safety … shall be guilty of an
offence … or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years.
The implication is that the right to access to information and civil liberties bears individual
and collective responsibilities and obligations. Information that is transmitted from one
person to another must be credit worthy, appropriate to the situation and purposeful. The
sender needs to convey the right information and the recipient is obliged to use that
information responsibly and appropriately. This averts the crises indicated above, and
extends the frontiers of the right to access to information.
In the late 1990s, information that a deceased uniformed member’s body had been interred
without the head made rounds, and this bizarre story hit the media headlines, leading to the
state ordering an exhumation of the body. Contrary to what many expected, the soldier’s
head was in place, and far from the speculations that the soldier had died from battle
inflicted injury, it was confirmed that he had succumbed to malaria. The false information
had the potential to ignite commotion and disorder, with the likelihood of inciting
Zimbabweans to demonstrate against the state for deploying troops into the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC), and constituting a serious national security threat. Section 15,
Subsection (1) of POSA makes it an offence for a person inside or outside the country to
communicate a statement that is wholly or materially false, and which:
Promotes public disorder or endangers public safety.
Adversely affects the defence or economic interests of Zimbabwe.
Undermines public confidence in the security forces.
Disrupts any essential services.
Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (2002) (Chapter 10:27)
The objective of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), as
highlighted in its preamble, is to provide members of the public with the right of access to
records and information held by public bodies; to make public bodies accountable by giving
the public a right to request correction of misrepresented personal information. Article 19
subsection 1(b) provides that the head of a public body shall not disclose to any applicant,
information whose disclosure will prejudice the defence and national security of the
country. The independent media in Zimbabwe has over the years been publishing what
could be called fictitious reports on various political issues, which in a way have caused
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polarization in the Zimbabwean society, and threatened national security. In 2001, Blandina
Tadyanemhandu from Gokwe was alleged to have been decapitated in front of her eight
children by alleged ‘ZANU PF thugs.’ The story stunned the public, until it was later learnt
that it was a contemptible fabrication. Basildon Peta, a journalist working for the Standard
newspaper, claimed that he had been detained and severely beaten by the police at Harare
Central Police Station, but, on investigation it was revealed that he had never been arrested,
and this is another instance of irresponsible behaviour that contributed to the crafting and
passing of AIPPA in 2002.
CURRENT POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION DYNAMICS
Access to information is a key component of the individual’s freedoms. However, basing on
the realist perspective of national security, it may be argued that the citizens’ right to access
information has actually been replaced by the authorities’ need to maintain security of the
state. While it is advocated that the public should be accorded a right to access information,
the Open Society Justice Initiative national principles, and the Right to Information Draft
Copy (2012) provide that in order to safeguard national security, information falling in the
following categories should not be disclosed to the general public:
a) the rights and reputation of others, including life, health, safety, privacy and other legitimate private
interests;
b) legitimate commercial and other economic interests, including patents, copyrights and trade secrets,
(where consistent with the public interest);
c) public health or morals;
d) environment;
e) public order, public safety and law enforcement, including the prevention, investigation, apprehension and
prosecution of criminal activities;
f) the effective administration of justice, and the equality of parties in court proceedings;
g) national security, defence and international relations;
h) future provision of free and open advice within and among public authorities, or the effective formulation
or development of policy ;
j) the economic, monetary and exchange rate policies of the State; or the legitimate financial interest of a
public authority;
k) inspection, control and supervision by public authorities, and disciplinary investigations;
l) legal privilege; and
m) academic or professional examination and recruitment processes.
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If the public is to be able to monitor the conduct of the government, and to participate fully
in a democratic society, it should have access to information held by public authorities,
including information that relates to national security. Enabling public scrutiny of
government action, not only guards against abuse by government officials, but also permits
the public to play a role in determining the policies of the government, and thereby forms a
crucial component of genuine national security and democratic participation. However, it
must be noted that national security is a pre-condition for the full enjoyment of all human
rights, including the right to information, and some degree of secrecy is appropriate in
specific circumstances. National security is a necessary evil in this context. It should be
based on legal and genuine state interests, which if disclosed, will pose a threat to state
stability.
Legitimate national security interest refers to an interest with the genuine purpose and
primary impact of protecting the specific categories of information that are highlighted
above. AIPPA and POSA have various sections which outline legitimate and genuine reasons
for withholding disclosure of some information to the public. National security interest is
therefore not legitimate if its genuine purpose or primary impact is to protect an interest
unrelated to national security, such as protection of government, or officials from
embarrassment or exposure when wrongdoing, concealment of information about the
functioning of public institutions, entrenchment of a particular ideology, or suppression of
peaceful protests are endemic. In Zimbabwe, national security and the public’s right to
know are often viewed negatively, as both the state and the public seem to be in conflict
over state and human security. While there is at times tension between a government’s
desire to keep information secret on national security grounds, and the public’s right to
information held by public authorities, some national security interests can actually best be
protected when the public is fully informed about the government’s activities, including
those undertaken to protect national security.
The whole debate on access to information should create restrictions on the types of
information that can be classified and controlled, and setting out limits on the periods for
which information can be classified. Information needs to be classified and controlled,
especially that which deals with sensitive areas of state security, such as information that
prejudices national defence and security. The Official Secrets Act, POSA and AIPPA, are quite
clear on the measures that will be taken by the state if there is any danger or threat posed
to national security by individuals or groups. Classification and control of information
safeguards state institutions from unnecessary scrutiny by the public which might result in
anarchy or despondency if such confidential information regarding state secrets gets into
the wrong hands. Such matters should become classified when their disclosure would
actually or potentially harm the State, either within the country or abroad. There’s a
genuine reason to protect certain information because the wrong people can get it and use
it to their advantage, and cause chaos or anarchy within a political system. Wikileaks
exposed American diplomatic missions all over the world, and created mistrust, hostility and
suspicion between the US government and its close allies and foes alike.
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Of interest in the discourse on national security in Zimbabwe is the Zimbabwe Initiative for
Freedom of Expression’s (ZIFFE’s) (2007) claim that few Zimbabweans working for various
Western funded civil society organizations are at the forefront of criticizing POSA and AIPPA
as draconian instruments of state repression yet most Zimbabwean citizens have not been
affected by these pieces of legislation. The major culprits are donor funded civic groups,
whose motives and interests are a genuine cause for concern to Zimbabwe’s national
security. The United States of America’s enactment of the Zimbabwe Democracy and
Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) in 2001, and the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe by
the European Union were precipitated by fabricated and deliberately distorted information
coming from civic groups and opposition political parties. Hodzi and Chikakano (2012)
acknowledge in their research paper that civil society that supposedly focuses on civic
education has often neglected this area and favoured focusing on other aspects of civil and
political rights that can easily attract funding. Mbanje and Mahuku (2011) also point out in
their research paper that from 2000 onwards, a major shift in the EU`s aid policy was
observed, as more funds were diverted towards democracy, rule of law and governance
issues. In other words, this new paradigm shift witnessed aid being used as a weapon to
change governments through EU sponsored civil society groups and NGOs. It can therefore
be argued that no state will ever tolerate a situation where non-state actors are allowed to
eclipse the power of the state and threaten its national security. This therefore calls for
enactment of legislation such as AIPPA, the Official Secrets Act and POSA. It will safeguard
the state’s core interests.
The practice of valuing national security more than the right to access information is not
confined to Zimbabwe alone; it is possible to argue that access to information measures in
the Western countries like the United Kingdom, the United States of America, France and
Germany also involve a conflict between the security of the nation and the liberty of
individuals within that nation. Articles published by the World Socialist Web Site in 2012-13
show that, since the Wikileaks disclosures, individuals like Bradley Manning have been
convicted of a range of criminal offences, including that of disclosing information which
poses a danger to national security. Spencer at WSWS.org.com on19 January 2013 points
out that:
Manning faces life in military prison under the Espionage Act. Prosecutors for the Obama administration argue
that he is guilty of “aiding the enemy” by leaking information that was subsequently made available on the
Internet to anyone, including enemies of the United States.
The US government also wants Julian Assange, the brains behind Wikileaks, to stand trial
over the leaking of information regarded as a threat to the US Government’s national
security. This appears to suggest that the measures legitimized under the clause on national
security have undermined civil liberties such as the right to access information in such a way
that it has resulted in the conviction of those who disclose or attempt to disclose
information deemed confidential by the state. This in a way suggests that legislation on
access to information does not have precedence over issues to do with national security. No
state restrains itself from punishing violation of state security norms. Auken in WSWS.org as
accessed on 11 February 2013) notes that:
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The Obama administration has gone to enormous lengths to keep documents relating to the drone killing
program from the American public. Lawsuits brought by the New York Times and the American Civil Liberties
Union under the Freedom of Information Act to force the release of these documents were dismissed last
month by a federal judge in Manhattan, who complained in her ruling, that laws and legal precedents dealing
with national security and state secrets effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim
as perfectly, lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while
keeping the reasons for its conclusion a secret.
Bettleheim and Koczsvk, as cited in Baker (2003) identify what they dub ‘limiting the flow of
information’ in the United States of America. The limits include escalated control of the flow
of information to an unprecedented degree, stripping government departments’ websites
of information, safeguarding information that could be misused and harm the security of
the nation and the safety of the people, withholding the disclosure of unclassified but
sensitive information, and resistance by the country’s Attorney General to provide Congress
with information on the implementation of the Patriot Act. This scenario speaks volumes
about the challenge of fulfilling the public’s demand for the right to access national security
information, and of safeguarding state security interests simultaneously.
In Zimbabwe, civil liberties campaigners have been at the forefront in criticizing laws related
to maintaining national security. Any state’s definition of national security is different from
that of another. The definition is so broad that the right of citizens to access information as
supported by various pieces of human rights legislation will always be at risk in any state,
especially when the state feels that its core values or interests are under threat.
ZIMBABWE’S EXPERIENCE: ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Historical overview
Access to information is vital, for it enables effective participation of citizens in the day to
day running of their country’s affairs. It is therefore the lifeblood of a country’s existence.
According to Ronning and Kupe (1999), the African Media carry contradictions which have
roots in the colonial period. First and foremost, it must be pointed out that Zimbabwe’s
experience with access to information is inextricably linked to the country’s history. Before
Zimbabwe became independent in 1980, the print and electronic media served the needs of
the colonial administrators, where the public sphere was starved of a balanced information
menu. Mukasa (2003) concurs with Ronning and Kupe by observing that the colonialists
protected their interests through suppression of free speech and a free press. The
Rhodesian Smith regime did not tolerate any dissenting voices, hence it is not surprising that
the Rhodesia Herald, the Bulawayo Chronicle and its sister papers were aligned with the
ideology and interests of the white ruling elite.
At independence, the media were then linked to either the inheritance of an authoritarian
state or to a liberation movement with a political agenda that often implied a contradictory
attitude to democratic principles. Ronning and Kupe (1999) opine that the media policies
that were adopted by the liberation movements are a reflection of this discrepancy
between a democratic and an authoritarian impetus. What mainly changed was the
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personnel and policies. The organisational forms and structures that had been established
during colonialism remained intact. The Zimbabwean mass media is not very different from
that of other countries on the African continent. It has the same post-colonial institutional
characteristics as those of other African countries. Saunders (1999) views media policies
and their operational environment in Zimbabwe as more complex than those of other
countries in Southern Africa. The Zimbabwe Mass Media Trust (ZMMT) was instituted to
give the local media an indigenous aura and relevance. The print media is an outgrowth of
dissatisfaction with a national press that was an appendage of the South African Argus
Company’s group of newspapers, which served colonial interests.
The new ZANU-PF led government undertook to make the press freer, mass oriented and
responsible to the national interest. The press had to complement the government’s efforts
in its endeavour to develop the new nation, and also had to be accessible to the majority of
the Zimbabwean populace, and had to be non-partisan. One top ZANU-PF official, the late
Minister Witness Mangwende, pointed out that the new press was part of the structural
component of the society whose interest it had to reflect, promote and indeed defend
(Mukasa 2003). From the outset, the Zimbabwean government was clear on the type of
human resources that they desired in the media institution that was being established.
Mukasa (2003) cites one other senior government official as saying that for people who had
won their independence through sweat and blood, it was imperative that they thought and
acted like Africans, as a reflection of their hard won independence from colonial rule. The
mass media had to play an effective unifying role, and for this to happen, the editors and
senior staff had to be acceptable and loyal to the government. It must be pointed out that
at its inception, the ZMMT and the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Cooperation (ZBC) were an
expression of ZANU-PF’s resolve to decolonise, nationalise and democratise the media. By
the 1990s, the Zimbabwean press had developed into three main groups, as the main
stream press was owned by Zimpapers, rural newspapers by the ZMMT, and the
independent press by the private sector. Since then, newspaper circulation in Zimbabwe has
continued to grow.
It is very crucial at this juncture to note that in this contemporary world, many governments
realise the importance of controlled access to information for security purposes. It is
important to reflect on why the Zimbabwean government saw it very crucial to control the
dissemination of information in Zimbabwe. As early as the 1990s, most government
ministers felt that there was need to control the media. The independent media, particularly
the Financial Gazette and the Standard, adopted more of a watchdog role. In this selfallocated role, they criticized government for what they perceived as insensitivity to the
plight of the war veterans, who were living in abject poverty fundamentally because of the
government’s adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. Their criticism
extended to cover alleged police brutality on student demonstrators against alleged corrupt
activities by senior government officials, which resulted in the appointment of a Commission
of enquiry that was headed by Justice Sandura.
There was sustained exchange of criticism between the government and the Civil Society
Organisations. The government noted that the independent media was becoming a loose
cannon mainly because of foreign funding, and this had the potential of destabilising
political order, and furthering opposition political agendas. Chen Chimutengwende, the then
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Minister of Information, observed that the Financial Gazette’s criticism was destructive,
negative and even subversive, for it incited the Zimbabwean people to demonise and
criticise the Police, Army, other security organizations and the government. Ronning and
Kupe (1999) confirmed the minister’s observation by highlighting articles by The Standard
Newspaper, which claimed that there had been an attempted coup by ZNA soldiers because
of their disgruntlement over their involvement in the DRC, that the soldiers had mutinied,
and also that 23 officers had been arrested for planning a coup, all which was false and
intended to damage the reputation of the ZNA and cause despondency.
On accessing such negative information, the public is bound to lose confidence in the
security sector, which poses a threat to the state’s national security. In this regard, AIPPA
seeks to control politicians’ and mass media institutions’ communication to the public on
sensitive issues. The capacity of their influence to sway public opinion, and to incite violence
is unlimited. In the 1994 Rwandan genocide, most of the Hutus who perpetrated crimes
against humanity were influenced by the media, which encouraged them to kill the Tutsis. In
Zimbabwe, POSA safeguards the public from such careless journalism. Subsections 1-2 of
Article 15 provide that whoever publishes or communicates false statements prejudicial to
the state is liable to a fine or imprisonment, depending on the gravity of the offence.
CURRENT POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION DYNAMICS
With the formation of the Movement for Democratic Change, the media became very
reckless, and independent papers became the opposition’s mouthpiece, clamouring and
campaigning for regime change. The situation has remained the same, where newspapers
like the Daily News, News Day, Financial Gazette and New Zimbabwean have taken the side
of the MDC-T party. The private media has been criticised by most Zimbabweans for lying,
fabricating stories, and misrepresenting facts. Over the years, some media houses and
journalists have been sued and arrested for publishing lies.
Mukasa (2003) reminds us that when Honourable Minister Comrade Munangagwa was
Minister of Justice he indicated that unrestricted press freedom would lead to disorder and
anarchy which would harm social and national interests. Ibid (2003) also said that the late
Honourable Minister of Defence, Comrade Moven Mahachi warned that the independent
media had a well calculated programme to destroy the country, and the ZANU-PF
government, while His Excellency, the Head of State and Government, and Commander –inChief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, Comrade Robert Mugabe, had stressed that the
independent press was thriving on selling manufactured lies to the people in the name of
freedom of the press or access to information. As the result of the independent papers’
irresponsible journalism, the country’s and government’s images were damaged both at
home and abroad. The Zimbabwean government became greatly concerned about media
reports that could lead to fear and despondency among the Zimbabwean public, and the
sequel was the passing of the POSA and AIPPA in 2002, to help restore and maintain public
order and national security in the country.
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The introduction of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, and the Public
Order and Security Act were aimed at addressing some of the above problems. The
Zimbabwean government also enacted such laws because some journalists deliberately
spread falsehoods with the intention to create fear and panic among the population, and in
the process, discredit the government. The private media published unsubstantiated stories.
As an interest group, the private media in Zimbabwe also seeks to influence the operations
of government and individual politicians to act in accordance with their own interests. It is
made up of a group of individuals who share the same political, economic and social goals.
Unfortunately, many people tend to ignore the power that media houses wield, especially in
setting political agendas.
Claude Mararike (2002) argues that owners of the media are in most cases interested in a
political agenda. Their reasons for setting up newspapers are to promote their political
agendas and those of their friends, or particular groups of people. The private media in
Zimbabwe actually supports some candidates for political office, especially those they feel
will represent their interests when they get into public office. It has to be accepted that the
enactment of such pieces of legislation was not by accident, but that it was a deliberate
response to the fabrication of information to the public with a calculated intention to cause
mayhem and despondency. The USA would never have come up with the Patriot Act, had it
not been attacked by terrorists on 11 September 2001. States always find it necessary to
come up with laws that are aimed at safeguarding their national security and sovereignty.
THE EXTENT TO WHICH ZIMBABWE STRIKES A BALANCE BETWEEN LEGITIMATE NATIONAL
SECURITY IMPERATIVES AND THE RIGHT TO AND ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Zimbabwe has gone a long way in trying to address the national security imperatives and
the right to the public’s access to information. This is evident in the pledges made by the
three principals in the Government of National Unity, among whose key tenets is the
realisation that access to information enables the electorate to enhance its interaction with
the government. This enables the electorate to make informed choices of its
representatives. The principals recognize the importance of freedom of expression and the
role of the media in a multi-party democracy. Positions have been taken to open up
airwaves and liberalise the print and electronic media. The public media is also practising
balanced reporting and fair coverage.
With all sincerity, Zimbabwe has respected several regional and international protocols that
provide for the right of access to information. Zimbabwe has ratified Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19 of the International Covenant and Civil
and Political Rights, and Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights,
which entails that each individual shall enjoy the right to receive information, and the right
to express and disseminate opinions within the law of that particular country. It must be
pointed out that such receipt, expression and dissemination of information is subject to
national legislation, and this varies from country to country.
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The discussion so far has stressed that access to information can be ignored or undermined
by states, especially in periods where they feel that their national security is under threat.
The Open Society Justice Initiative (2012) concurs that access to information may be
undermined if:
Disclosure of the information poses a real and identifiable risk of [significant] harm to a legitimate
national security interest.
The risk of harm from disclosure must outweigh the overall public interest in disclosure.
The restriction must be proportionate and must be the least restrictive means available to protect
against the harm.
The restriction must not impair the very essence of the right to information.
It could therefore be submitted that legislation on national security is enacted to maintain
citizens’ freedoms, and if this is the case, then it is possible to argue that citizens’ freedom
to access information is valued more than security. McSweeney (1999) concedes that state
security can be identified as a moral judgment about human needs. While this statement
could be linked to the realist argument that the primary need of a nation is to guarantee its
very survival, it could also be argued that the security of a nation-state rests upon its ability
to make certain that the rights of its citizens are not vitiated by any internal or external
threat. It therefore means that, for any state to buttress its security, the leadership should
respect the rights of the citizens to access information. When the state protects the rights
and freedoms of its citizens, the security of the state is guaranteed. The security of the state
and that of the people must be maintained at all times. While some might argue that the
people defining national security are the same people who have more to gain by keeping it
secret, it can be counter argued that disclosure of some information poses a real and
identifiable risk to national security, which might in the end affect even the citizens of that
state, especially when access to that information ends up causing violence within that state.
As a function of the law, there should be no conflict between genuine national security
concerns and the ability of the citizens to access information. Laws are made to safeguard
the security of the citizens within any given state.
Developing this point further, one could, like Walzer (2006), argue that what we
conventionally call inhumanity is simply humanity under pressure. This statement explains
that in moments of extreme pressure, restrictions on the right to and access to information
are justified in order to prevent mayhem or civil strife. Interpretively, there is no
contradiction between national security and the right to information. It could be possible to
argue that before the enactment of POSA and AIPPA, it was an attack on Zimbabwe’s right
to privacy and maintenance of order and national security that motivated the state to
institute the pieces of legislation, and it evinces that national security comes to the fore only
when citizens’ rights to accurate information are under threat. This point is emphasized by
Comrade Chiwewe’s observation in 1999 when he was the Secretary for Information that,
one of the dominant social phenomena in Zimbabwe at that time was the existence of a
well-orchestrated private media campaign to discredit the government of the day by the
most vicious means at their disposal in order to cause mayhem and despondency.
In this sense, it is possible to argue that if the security of Zimbabwe had not come under
threat through the publication of falsehoods and distorted information, there would have
been a vastly reduced incentive to enact such legislation. Without dissemination of
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fabricated and altered news by the private media (which in a way might have led to mass
uprisings) there would not have been any need by the Zimbabwean government to heighten
the national security threat level and place restrictions on the right to and access to
information through POSA and AIPPA. To some critics it may appear in the short-term that
the right to information has been diminished in order to maintain national security, but such
pieces of legislation as POSA and AIPPA were enacted in order to protect the citizens’
privacy and rights in the long-term. Media groups and opposition political parties may argue
that the rights to access information are being exchanged for an increase in national
security but citizens themselves do not feel that their right to information has been eroded.
These groups tend to over-exaggerate the extent to which the citizens’ right to information
is diminished by the state in pursuit of national interests.
CONCLUSION
It can be argued that there is no explicit disagreement in Zimbabwe between national
security and the right to information. Huysmans (2010) has observed that security policy is
not simply a practice of protecting and/or limiting a pre-given freedom but rather, is an
action of governmental practice attempting to mould an abstract concept (freedom) into a
concrete and legitimate practice. It is therefore clear that the argument between national
security and the right to and access to information is mainly between the state and the
citizens affected by the implementation of that policy. Many governments the world over
are facing a difficult task in balancing national security and the right to information. This in
the end means that instead of exchanging one for the other, there is a willingness to ensure
that neither enjoys a privileged status above the other. However, as has been noted above,
although governmental bodies may wish to obtain a balance between national security and
the right to information, it is not always possible for them to do so, and this results in
tension between the security of the state and the freedom of the citizens.
There is always conflict between national security and the citizens’ right to information.
This perception of incompatibility between national security and the right to information is
particularly convincing when evidence from civil society groups is used to illustrate the
argument. However, it should be noted that there are always two sides to every story, and it
is possible to argue that any mutual exclusion between the right to information and national
security in Zimbabwe is short-term and deceptive.
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