North Korean Foreign Policy
Submitted by
Robert J. Heatherly
Master of Arts in Diplomacy and Military Studies
Hawai’i Pacific University
Summer 2011
ii
We certify that we have read this professional paper and that, in our opinion, it is
satisfactory in scope and quality for a degree of Masters of Diplomacy and military
Studies.
Committee:
Approved: Pierre Asselin, PhD.,
Associate Professor, HIST
First Reader, 29 July, 2011
Approved: Patrick Bratton, PhD.,
Assistant Professor, PSCI
Second Reader, 29 July 2011
iii
Abstract
The reclusive regime of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) is
intriguing. There is a special challenge in assessing the mindset of the North Korean leadership
which, by its own choosing, has isolated itself from the outside world. In regards to the most
recent activities carried out by North Korea, which include their first nuclear test (2006), TaepoDong II test missile launches, a cyber-attack that put South Korea and the United States Forces
Korea (USFK) to their knees temporarily (2009), the sinking of the Cheonan (2010), and, most
recently, the artillery attack on Yeonpyeong Island (2010), some analysts and media experts feel
that the Korean peninsula is on the verge of another Korean War.
Through countless alerts and operational planning with the USFK as an Army Officer, I
became fascinated with how the two Koreas managed to come so close to all-out war with one
another, only to have a crisis fade away. After numerous visits and operations along the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), I quickly gained an appreciation for the tension that existed and the
importance of a US military presence in the Republic of Korea (ROK). As the two countries are
still technically at war, the importance of maintaining the armistice between them is increasingly
significant for not only the peninsula, but also the international community, as East Asia is
interdependently tied to the world.
There is more to decisions made and fielded by key leaders than just whether our military
capabilities are able to strike and defeat a less capable enemy. The armistice that exists on the
peninsula could end and a resumption of hostilities could ensue with a single event. The
incidents carried out by the North Koreans in the period 1966-1969 were unprecedented, and
could have ignited war on the peninsula. Some have labeled this period of time the “Second
Korean War” due to Kim Il Sung’s vision and techniques of carrying out guerilla warfare in an
iv
attempt to unite the Korean Peninsula. What seemed like an extreme event during the period of
my time in Korea is really small potatoes compared to events during the 1960s and 1970s. North
Korean actions and decisions are not predictable, but they are cyclical. This paper will attempt
to analyze events during this period of “low intensity conflict” and what international factors
fended off another Asian War during a time that already had the United States, China, and the
USSR embroiled in a struggle in Indochina.
v
Acknowledgments
This undertaking would not have been accomplished without the recognition of some
important folks. First, and foremost, is the faculty at Hawai’i Pacific University. Their sheer
professionalism, and passion for education, provides an amazing educational experience for HPU
students from various countries. A few notable gentlemen are Dr. Russell Hart, Dr. Patrick
Bratton, and Dr. Pierre Asselin. Dr. Hart was my lifeline with the Army’s Expanded Graduate
School Program at HPU allowing me the opportunity to pursue a Master’s of Arts degree, in
Diplomacy and Military Studies, by cutting through all the military “red tape.” His seminar in
research and writing, along with Greg Rhodes (my peer evaluator), ensured I found a path to
create this professional paper. Dr. Bratton’s seminar in National Security and Policymaking was
my first taste of what graduate classes were. He is an amazing professor who I have lucked out
by having for a few other seminars and as a reader for this thesis. Finally, Dr. Asselin has made
me truly find the value in education. His unique style of how he conducts his seminars was
challenging, yet the most rewarding educational experience I have ever had. I am also extremely
grateful for having him as my primary reader for this thesis and as an educator.
I owe a special recognition to all those that participated in the Vietnam Study Abroad
Program conducted during the summer of 2010. This was the highlight of my HPU experience.
If not for the arduous work of Dr. Asselin and Melissa Matsubara (best academic adviser ever),
this program would not have been the experience that it was. The relationships that were made
on that trip will not be forgotten. Neither will the good times, with good buddies, at the RnR
tavern in Hanoi and the Brahhouse in Saigon with Kevin Conroy, Tracee Tsui, Ed Zelczak, Greg,
Melissa, Gintare Janulaityte, and of course Dr. Asselin.
vi
Back on the island, I attribute the mentoring and networking opportunities I received to
some of the finest establishments in Chinatown. I knew I could always receive the answers I was
looking for at JJ Dolans and Murphy’s. It is also there that Chris Jones, a fellow EGSP partner
in crime and good buddy, could always be counted on for career enhancing advice and guidance
with life.
Finally, as always, I owe my deepest gratitude to my family. My wife Jen and daughters
Keira, Leila, and Kaia have endured and enjoyed life as a military family. Their love, support,
and flexibility have allowed me to focus on my career wherever it may be. For the last year and
a half, I have had the privilege of being a stay-at-home-dad on the North Shore while
simultaneously pursuing my degree. This has been the best assignment we have experienced,
and it is because of them that made it that way.
vii
Table of Contents:
Abstract:…………………………………………………….……………………..iii
Acknowledgements:………………………………………….…………………….v
Table of Contents:…………………………………………….………...………...vii
Introduction:…...…………………………………………………………….……..1
Chapter One: The Second Korean War/Low Intensity Conflict (1966-1969)……14
Chapter Two: The USS Pueblo and US/ROK Relations………………………….32
Chapter Three: Spring 1969 and Deep Sea 129…………………………………..53
Chapter Four: Turning Point for the Koreas?……………………………………..67
Conclusion:...…………………………………………………………………...…81
Bibliography:..……………………………………………………………………89
1
Introduction
“History is written backward but lived forward. Those who know the end of the story can never know
what it was like at the time.”
-Dame C. Veronica Wedgwood
British Historian
The North Korean regime has been labeled as “crazy” by many in the international
community as some of the actions it carries out are difficult to rationalize. As it turns out,
history provides valuable lessons to understand that regime and its actions. It is easy to forget
and cast aside past events that occurred on the Korean peninsula during a period of time that was
often overshadowed by much larger operations being carried out elsewhere in Asia. As South
Korea grew economically and militarily in the 1960’s and 1970’s, security and stability became
critical to its development as the United States saw itself embroiled in the Cold War, confronting
domestic changes at home, and fighting a war in Vietnam.
For over half a century, the DPRK has struggled for reunification and survival under one
flag, North Koreas, and one ruling authority, the Kim family regime. To better appreciate this, it
is central to understand the past, particularly the 1960s/70s, and how outside international factors
affected decision-makers in dealing with the North Koreans. The timing of military actions
carried out by the DPRK are problematic to predict, but they can be expected. The rationale
behind why North Koreans execute what appear to be hostile acts against the ROK and their
allies is unclear. However, through careful analysis of events during the “Second Korean War,”
similarities begin to appear.
This thesis will attempt to analyze events that occurred during the “Second Korean War,”
1966-1969, and the reasoning behind them by utilizing some major crises as case studies. In
2
addition to these crises, this thesis will explore the international environment during that period
of that time, which had a profound impact on decision-makers in regard to their military options
and how they conducted crisis management. Two particular periods, and the responses of two
different US Presidents, will be dissected. The number and severity of crises in January 1968,
while President Lyndon Johnson was in office, weighed heavily in the options he could utilize
against the Korean Communists. Additionally, the spring of 1969 gave Richard Nixon his first
chance at military action against the DPRK while trying to minimize the US role and footprint in
Asia and elsewhere. Furthermore, this thesis will explore if there was a turning point for North
Korea in the 1970s, and what the factors were that encouraged it to change how it implemented
foreign policy. Finally, this thesis will endeavor to shed some light on why the North Koreans
carry out the actions that they do, and why the US responds in the manner that it does to a
country that appears at times to have no fear about bringing hell to itself.
Kim Il Sung is one of the most fascinating leaders of the twentieth century. He wielded
his authority throughout North Korea, and became a god-like figure to those he ruled. No other
Communist leader has been able to maintain their authority as long as he had. When he died in
July 1994, at age 82, he had outlived Joseph Stalin by four decades and Mao Tse-tung by almost
two decades, and he had remained in power throughout the terms of office of six South Korean
presidents, nine US presidents, and twenty-one Japanese prime ministers.1 The Kim family
regime has maintained power for over half a century by varying its tactics and strategies. In the
1960s, the DPRK resorted to guerilla tactics and infiltrations into South Korea in order to stir
negative sentiment toward the ROK government among the South Korean masses. It hoped to
spark rebellion in the South, encourage the masses to rise up, and overthrow the “Park puppet
1
Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New York: Basic, 2001, p. 16.
3
regime.” Once the US sponsored government was overthrown, the South would be amalgamated
into the DPRKs, and thus reunification would be achieved. For the decades that followed, Kim’s
regime shifted to an aid-based society, which is “self-reliant.” His juche philosophy is the Kim
family regime’s ploy to maintain authority, under the Kim dynasty, without foreign assistance.
Realistically, the regime would collapse without outside assistance and humanitarian aid. The
ability to seal off the country, and prevent international influence, is a brilliant technique that has
allowed the Kim family to endure. While North Korea carried out various acts and operations in
the 1960s and 1970s, it was cognizant of the international events that weighed heavy on
Washington’s ability to retaliate militarily. It is critical to understand those two decades and the
manner in which the US, ROK, and DPRK conducted their decision-making, which averted
resumption of hostilities on the peninsula.
Since the armistice of 1953, North Korea has wielded multiple forms of diplomacy in
order to ensure regime survival. Often times, North Korea throws itself into the international
spotlight by initiating an event that can be labeled as a crisis. Crises generally break out
suddenly, present serious threats to states’ vital interests, and demand quick decisions under
stress.2 The DPRK has conducted a number of operations that fit these criteria. Some were as
significant as the invasion by the Korean People’s Army of the South in 1950, which thrust the
peninsula into a three year war; others were minor such as the brutal axe murder incident of two
Army Officers in 1976. According to Scott Snyder, “Crisis diplomacy is a manifestation of
North Korea’s partisan guerilla legacy and an excellent means by which weak states can enhance
2
th
Lauren, Paul G. Craig, Gordon A. George, Alexander L. Force and Statecraft, Diplomatic Challenges of our Time. 4
ed. New York: Oxford, 2007, p.221.
4
leverage against powerful states in negotiations on specific issues.”3 The DPRK exercises crisis
diplomacy in order to gain the attention of the international community and often times forces
the US into direct dialogue with them (something that the US usually tries to avoid). By igniting
a crisis, the much smaller state is capable of turning the spotlight onto itself, thus being able to
shape its agenda or objectives and give itself an advantage over the much larger power.
The ability of the North to exercise this crisis diplomacy, coupled with the ROK and US
to implement crisis management, during its military decision making is paramount to what level
of force and options are carried out on each side. During a crisis, one of the main components
that is typical of crisis management is clear communications. This is seen during the Cuban
Missile Crisis with the dialogue exchanged between President Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev
averting nuclear war. What is problematic for the Korean peninsula is that communication
during a crisis with the main actors does not always exist.
Often times North Korea communicates its intentions through signaling. International
actors often choose to use signals rather than direct communication for a variety of reasons.
Sometimes it is inappropriate for one actor to make too direct a suggestion or demand of another,
or to transmit a message in person. A message passed through signals rather than directly also
“saves face” for the receiving party. It can comply without seeming weak, or refuse to comply
without creating confrontation by simply ignoring the signals.4 An example of this is during
negotiations at meetings with the United Nations Military Armistice Commission (UNMAC) in
Panmunjom. When emergency meetings are held, North Koreans can conduct themselves in a
variety of ways in order to make their intentions known without direct dialogue. For example, as
3
Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge North Korean Negotiating Behavior. Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace, 1999, p.66.
4
Signaling. Diplofoundation, Web. 22 Apr. 2011. <http://www.diplomacy.edu/language/Signalling/main.htm>
5
accusations are listed to them, they may look “stone-faced,” presenting no emotion giving the
perception that they do not care or find irrelevant whatever charges are being brought up by the
UNMAC. The use of this body language states their position. Another example is through the
action of “walking out” of talks or negotiations. With this conduct, they are capable of forcing
the other party to make concessions in order to get them back to the table. Before a scheduled
meeting in 1976, KPA soldiers went into the UNMAC conference room and blew their nose on
the United Nations, US, and ROK flags that were aligned along the table. Additionally, they
walked all over the top of the US and their allies’ side of the table with their dirty boots prior to
talks, and then did not show.5 These actions clearly demonstrated that during that instance the
DPRK was not ready to discuss the events of the axe murder incident at that particular time.
Signaling can be dangerous, because it may not always be interpreted correctly or noticed
at all. Credibility also plays a role in signaling. For example, during the Korean War, China’s
warnings not to cross the 38th parallel were dismissed in part because they were indirect, oral,
and conveyed by an individual – Ambassador K.M. Panikkar of India – whom US decision
makers such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson and Assistant Secretary of State Dean Rusk did
not regard as credible.6 The DPRK’s rationale for carrying out acts may be its attempt to signal
to the international community that it needs something. As larger international events
overshadow North Korea, the regime triggers events such as the nuclear test in 2006. This can
be interpreted as an aggressive act for attention, or that the country is in need of something, and
is its way of reaching out to the international community. The push to bring North Korea to
5
Kirkbride, Wayne A LTC(R). "Panic on the Peninsula." Brinkmanship on the Peninsula. Camp Bonifas, Panmunjom.
Oct. 2008. Lecture.
6
Swaine, Michael D., Tuosheng Zhang, and Danielle F. S. Cohen. Managing Sino-American Crises: Case Studies and
Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006, p. 33.
6
engage in six party talks for the disarming of its nuclear program then enables Pyongyang to
have something to use as leverage in exchange for something else, such as humanitarian aid.
A very successful tool of statecraft carried out by the North is deterrence. Deterrence
consists of an effort to persuade an opponent to refrain from taking certain action, such as an
armed attack, that is viewed as being highly dangerous to one’s interests by making them fear the
consequences of such behavior.7 The rolling footage of KPA soldiers “goose stepping” and
military equipment rolling through Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang is an ever present reminder
to the world that the DPRK is a capable military force. The Kim family regime’s ability to
fortify its country and militarize its people, displaying its military capability to the world, are
intended to prevent something undesirable from happening to it.8 Over the last two decades, the
DPRK has massed artillery and rocket systems along its side of the DMZ. By 2001, it created a
capability of unleashing 500,000 rounds of artillery and rockets an hour into Seoul.9 A military
attack from the US or ROK is what Pyongyang attempts to deter. During the Cold War, the
North’s support by the nuclear-equipped Communist states of the Soviet Union and China was a
deterring factor for the US and ROK to not utilize military options during some of the crises that
will be examined later. More recently, the detrimental effect that the influx of thousands of
North Korean refugees would have on the South Korean and Chinese economy, should hostilities
resume, has impacted decision-makers and contingency planners of the USFK, with these two
countries so interdependently tied to the international world. The collapsing of South Korea’s
economy, should a military reunification attempt occur, is a consequence that would have global
7
Lauren, Paul G. Craig, Gordon A. George, Alexander L, p.177.
Art, Robert, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4, no. 3 (Spring 1980), p.6.
9
Michishita, Narushige. North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. London: Routledge, 2010,
p.193-194.
8
7
implications. Therefore, whether cognizant of it or not, the North is able to fend off resumption
of hostilities initiated by the US and ROK through the fear of the end result that may materialize.
Another common method the North Koreans utilize is coercive diplomacy. Also known
as compellence, military coercion, coercive military strategy, strategic coercion, or forceful
persuasion,10 coercive diplomacy utilizes threats of force in order to reverse an action that has
already been committed by an adversary. Unlike deterrence, coercive diplomacy can be either an
offensive or defensive tool.11 It can also be explained as the process by which one nation tries to
convince another nation to do something it would not otherwise do, through implicit or explicit
threats, and limited uses of violence, either to thwart an enemy’s action or to punish it.12 A
common, and often utilized, attempt by the North Koreans is the rhetoric they announce before,
during, and after large scale training exercises conducted by the US and ROK military. For years
now, the USFK has conducted joint US/ROK exercises every spring and fall. Just like
clockwork the DPRK announces that, “If exercises commence then they will turn Seoul into a
sea of fire.”13 This example was starting to lose its credibility, though, due to its repetitive
application whenever an exercise did occur in South Korea. However, after the shelling of
Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, the seriousness of the threat of force rematerialized. Therefore
coercion depends on two factors: credibility (whether the target believes that the coercer will
execute its threats) and persuasiveness (whether the threats will have a great impact on the
10
Bratton, Patrick C. "When Is Coercion Successful? And Why Can't We Agree on It." Naval War College Review
58.3 (2005): p. 100.
11
Lauren, Paul G. Craig, Gordon A. George, Alexander L, p.200-201.
12
Twomey, Christopher P. The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American
Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2010, p. 19.
13
Willancy, Mark. “North Korea Threatens Seoul with Sea of Fire.” ABC News. 28 Feb. 2011. Web. 22 Apr. 2011. <
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2011/02/28/3150227.htm>
8
target).14 Lauren, Craig, and George state in Force and Statecraft, that “The volatile nature of
the bargaining, when coupled with the employment of threats and perhaps the demonstration of
just enough exemplary military force to emphasize one’s determination to use more if necessary,
thus requires careful and diplomatic communication and signaling, bargaining, negotiating, and
crisis management with the opponent.”15 The key component here is the application of just
enough military force. The DPRK is able to attain a delicate balance that creates a crisis, without
full blown war, in order to regain credibility with their threats. In reality, the DPRK may be
more rational than many others believe.
The utilization of “sticks” is a means to coerce a state. The US and the international
community have used a two pronged approach in carrying out economic sanctions against the
DPRK. The sanctions, or “sticks”, are meant to be a punishment in response to an act, and also
as a tool to convince North Korea to reverse an action or behavior. Coercive diplomacy, then,
calls for using just enough force of an appropriate kind—if force is used at all—to demonstrate
one’s resolve to protect well-defined interests as well as the credibility of one’s determination to
use more force if necessary.16 Through the use of sanctions, the US and international community
are able to apply a measure of force on Pyongyang that “does something” and is also reversible.
There is also the capability to apply even harsher sanctions, if need be, should the DPRK not
perform as dictated.
Another slant on coercion is through the larger application of military force instead of
just sanctions or rhetoric. As the severity of the offensive attacks increase, coercion can be
14
Thies, Wallace, “Compellance Failure or Coercive Success: The Case of NATO and Yugoslavia,” Comparative
Strategy, 22 June 2003, p. 5.
15
Lauren, Paul G. Craig, Gordon A. George, Alexander L, p.201.
16
Alexander George, Hall David, and Simons William, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba and Vietnam,
Boston: Little, Brown, 1971, p. 10.
9
explained as the use of force to get the target to comply with the demands of the coercer, but
without completely destroying the military forces of, and occupying, the target state.17 The
aggressive guerilla attacks of the Second Korean War, which will be analyzed in the next
chapter, illustrate how the DRPK attempted to coerce the US to withdraw from the peninsula by
killing and wounding US service members along the DMZ. The North was not capable of
destroying all the US forces on the peninsula, nor was it able to occupy the South, but the
application of force on American targets was an attempt at coercing the US to leave the South.
The final method of diplomacy relative to this thesis is brinkmanship. Brinkmanship may
be the most dangerous method of diplomacy in that it involves forcing a dangerous situation,
event, or incident to the brink of war in order to achieve a desired outcome. For the DPRK, the
risk that real threats might be discounted as just empty talk coming from Pyongyang may spark
the North Korean leaders to take greater risks in order to grab the attention of its counterparts in
Washington. The risk of miscalculation can result in the potential escalation of conflict.18 As
the risks become greater, so does the chance that a small crisis can quickly escalate to a severe
one. “Operation Paul Bunyan” in 1976, which will be examined later, is an example of how two
opposing sides can quickly escalate a situation to near war. The North Koreans appear to have
become world experts at this with its actions and rhetoric. More recently, in April of 2009, the
world was on edge as a Taepo-Dong II missile was photographed on a launch pad in northeast
North Korea. The world did not know whether it was equipped with a nuclear warhead, and
where exactly it was going to be test-fired. The US moved Aegis destroyers, outfitted with
Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) systems, into the Sea of Japan and West of Hawaii in order to
intercept the missile if it posed as a threat. Additionally, mobile BMD systems were deployed to
17
18
Bratton, p. 102.
Snyder, p.77.
10
Japan’s coast in order to protect its citizens from the imminent threat. Kim Jong Il announced,
“If our sworn enemies come at us with a dagger, we will brandish a sword. If they train a rifle at
us, we will respond with a cannon - we will surely win.”19 His claim was that the DPRK was
attempting to launch a satellite into space. For days the world stood by to see what would unfold
during a few day window of when the launch was scheduled to occur. On 5 April 2009, the
missile was launched. North Koreans claimed that the outcome was a success with the
placement of a satellite into orbit, whereas the US claimed that it “fell” harmlessly into the
Pacific Ocean. Regardless, the tension on the peninsula leading up to the event quickly
dissipated soon after the affair.
One certain thing is that the DPRK wields all these methods of diplomacy in order to
achieve strategic objectives and maintain regime survival. They have coped with famine and
near economic collapse only to rise from it while still maintaining their sovereignty. A most
frustrating element for US policymakers, military leaders, and scholars is the North’s reclusive
policies and procedures which enable it to have an advantage against larger powers. The “hermit
kingdom” has utilized this leverage since the days of Kim Il Sung, and it appears to have no
plans to alter or relinquish its approach.
This thesis will utilize an assortment of sources to try and piece together the puzzle that is
North Korean foreign policy. The works of Scott Snyder20 and Narushige Michishita21 have
been instrumental in developing an understanding of why the North Koreans behave in the way
19
Quoted in: Choe, Sang-Hun, “Memo from Seoul - North Korea Perfects Its Diplomatic Game - Brinkmanship,” The
New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia, 2 April 2009, Web, 22 April 2011.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/world/asia/03korea.html>
20
Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge North Korean Negotiating Behavior. Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace, 1999.
21
Michishita, Narushige. North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. London: Routledge, 2010.
11
they do. Snyder’s work explores the cultural and psychological perceptions that influence why
Pyongyang carries out various tactics. It is necessary to understand where the North Koreans
emerged from after the Korean War, in order to attempt to make some meaning of the DPRK
leader’s decisions. The cult of personality that arose from Kim Il Sung and has now been passed
down to Kim Jong Il is identified by both these authors as serving to rationalize why the DPRK
has been so successful with controlling its masses. Michishita analyzed multiple events from the
1960s to 2006 that occurred on the Korean Peninsula and almost caused resumption of
hostilities. His observations and conclusions have been extremely useful to develop this thesis.
Daniel Bolger22 and Trevor Armbrister23 provide a wealth of information on the actual
crises that occurred in 1966-1969. Their argument is consistent with this thesis. South Korea
was in a fragile state, only thirteen years after the armistice, with a semi-militarized government
of questionable legitimacy and an aggressive northern neighbor. The ROK was vulnerable to
infiltration and insurgency, and Pyongyang attempted to cause domestic unrest in hopes of
uniting the peninsula under the DPRK regime.24 Their statistics, interviews, and other sources
serve as quantitative and qualitative reinforcement to the arguments during a particular time and
place. Armbrister’s detailed analysis on the USS Pueblo and Deep Sea 129 has been referenced
by numerous other pieces of scholarship which attribute it as one of the most comprehensive
studies for those crises. Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Wayne Kirkbride and the
soldiers stationed at the Joint Security Area in Panmunjom South Korea provide the details
through firsthand accounts of the axe murder incident of 1976 along the Demilitarized Zone.
LTC (R) Kirkbride has written numerous pieces incorporated into this thesis.
22
Bolger, Daniel P. Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low Intensity Conflict in Korea 1966-1969. Darby, PA: Diane
Publishing Company, 2001.
23
Armbrister, Trevor. A Matter of Accountability The True Story of the Pueblo Affair. New York: Lyons, 2004.
24
Bolger, p. 120.
12
Finally, this thesis relies extensively on primary source materials. Although it is near
impossible to obtain declassified documents from Pyongyang to support a justification for North
Korean actions, the scrutinizing of translated documents from the Soviet Union can assist with
assembling inferences. The Cold War International History Project, The North Korea
International Documentation Project, and (most utilized) Foreign Relations of the United States
have made available a wealth of declassified top secret, secret, and other documents from the
1960s and 70s. The value of these telegrams, memorandums, and talking points that were passed
along from US and ROK presidents to ambassadors, military commanders, and various
secretaries of defense and state provide an understanding of the political and military decisionmaking in response to crises and how domestic and international factors impacted their
resolutions.
Today, the United States is engaged in combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Libya
while undergoing advisory and counter-terrorism missions in South America, the Philippines,
and Indonesia. In addition to being spread thin militarily, its economy is trying to recover from a
recession. While currently occupied elsewhere, America has seen hostile acts being carried out
by the DPRK. In October 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test, and became the world’s
eighth atomic power. It has continued to perform missile launches with its Taepo-dong II
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile despite warnings and threats from the international community.
On March 26, 2010, the US and ROK looked the other way when a DPRK submarine sunk the
ROKS Cheonan, killing 46 sailors. On November 23,, 2010 Yeonpyeong Island (near the
disputed Northern Limit Line) was fired upon by DPRK artillery in response to a training
exercise conducted by the ROK. The attack left two ROK Marines and two civilians dead, and
scores wounded. Some ROK artillery rounds were expended in support of a counter-fire
13
mission, but no US response was carried out. This was the first attack carried out against
civilians by the DPRK military since the armistice, and it escalated tensions on the peninsula to
levels not seen since the 1960/70s.
US forces have been on the peninsula since the end of WWII either in an advisory,
combat, or now as a supporting role. If the thousands of American troops stationed there are a
deterrent against DPRK aggression against the South, then why has the US not responded
through force to prevent incidents from happening again? Besides threats, rhetoric, and “shows
of military force,” the US has not conducted an application of military power directly on the
DPRK since the armistice.
14
Chapter I
The Second Korean War/Low Intensity Conflict (1966-1969)
The ROK’s ability to normalize relations with Japan in 1965 had a twofold effect on the
peninsula. It became formally recognized by its “Asian brothers” and also opened itself up to
foreign investment (particularly for Japan). In 1966, the US provided the ROK with 70.8 billion
Korean won, which made up 82.9% of its total defense cost. This aid increased to 95.3 billion
Korean by 1968.25 Kim Il Sung realized that a new strategy was needed in order to unite the
peninsula upon termination of the South Korean government.26 As the US and ROK
conventional military balance on the peninsula shifted in their favor, Pyongyang resorted to
aggressive guerilla tactics and border intrusions in order to try and destabilize the South to win
over the “oppressed Southern masses.” These minor incidents would sometimes escalate into
full blown firefights along the DMZ. Violent attempts to wreak chaos and havoc on the South
included the Blue House Raid, the capture of the USS Pueblo and her crew, and the downing of
the US EC-121 Deep Sea 129.
The 1960s was an era of unprecedented change internationally and domestically in the
United States. The most obvious event that took center stage for the American people was the
war in Vietnam. After 1954, the year France suffered a humiliating defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the
US maintained a presence in South Vietnam. Between 1960, the last year of Dwight
Eisenhower’s presidency, and the assassination of his successor, John F. Kennedy, in 1963, the
25
Loo, Bernard Fook Weng. Middle Powers and Accidental Wars: a Study in Conventional Strategic Stability.
Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2005, p. xi.
26
Bolger, p. 1.
15
number of American advisors assigned to the Army of the Republic of (South) Vietnam rose
from 875 to 16,263.27
On August 2 and 4, 1964, North Vietnamese patrol boats allegedly fired on the US
destroyers Maddox and C. Turner Joy. President Johnson ordered airstrikes against the patrol
boats and their support facilities. Within days, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
allowing the president to use “all necessary steps to prevent further aggression.”28 The US
picked and chose its targets carefully in the North and was careful not to inject too many combat
troops close to the Chinese border. Incrementalism was necessary to keep China at bay while
attempting to persuade Hanoi to cease operations. The memory of the Korean War, with the
surge of Chinese troops, was still fresh in the minds of military decision makers.
While occupied with operations in Indochina, attacks and infiltrations along the Korean
DMZ peaked in 1968 as with US troop levels in Vietnam, with 536,100 US military personnel
deployed there.29 On January 20, 1968 approximately 20,000 North Vietnamese launched an
attack against Khe Sanh in order to draw US and ARVN combat troops to the countryside in
preparation for a larger offensive. The world was taken by surprise when on January 31, 1968
the Tet Offensive was executed by the North Vietnamese. This all out attack by the Communists
gave the urbanites in Saigon, Da Nang, and Hue a taste of the war which till then was fought in
the countryside. More devastating was the impact it had on the US public. Until then, General
Westmoreland’s strategy of search and destroy and the battle of attrition had the American
public believing that the war was being won due to the sheer disparity in casualties inflicted on
27
. Asselin, Pierre. A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina, 2002, p.1.
28
Turley, William S. The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History. Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2009, p. xxv.
29
Ibid, p.xxviii.
16
the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong, versus US combat troops. The ability for a handful of Viet
Cong sappers to infiltrate the US embassy in Saigon gave a sober awakening to policy-makers
and US citizens that the war was not being won by the Johnson administration. Over 40,000
Viet Cong Soldiers were killed during the Tet Offensive,30 which was a severe blow to their
manpower; however, the strategic victory the Communists gained over the American public paid
dividends.
Tet was the turning point in the Vietnam War as strong public opposition took stage in
the United States with the antiwar movement. This was the Achilles heel of the United States’
intervention into Vietnam. The collapse of the national will of the United States versus the fierce
nationalism of the Vietnamese people ultimately led to the strategic defeat of the most powerful
country in the world. More importantly it impacted Washington’s military options on the
Korean peninsula.
As the United States was actively engaged in combat operations in Indochina, events that
were occurring on the Korean peninsula can be characterized as “low intensity conflict.” The
U.S. Army's training manual FC 100-20 defines low intensity conflict (LIC) as follows:
"LIC is a limited politico-military struggle to attain political, military, social, economic or psychological
objectives. It is often of lengthy duration and extends from diplomatic, economic and psychological
pressure to terrorism and insurgency. LIC is generally confined to a specific geographical area and is
often characterized by limitations of armaments, tactics and level of force. LIC involves the actual or
contemplated use of military means up to just below the threshold of battle between regular armed
forces31."
30
DeFronzo. p. 170.
Field Circular "low-Intensity Conflict",FC 100-20, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort
Leavenworth/Kansas, May 30, 1986, p. v.
31
17
LIC explains itself in its name. It is conflict at a smaller scale but still deadly, with the
potential to escalate into larger combat operations. As the ROK military increased in size, Kim
Il Sung realized that to be successful he needed to find a way to rid the peninsula of the US
presence without another full blown conventional war. By utilizing guerilla tactics the North
could potentially create a situation that would encourage Americans troops to depart the
peninsula without leading to a full blown war, which would have potentially devastating effects
for the DPRK. Like the DPRK, Washington did not desire to escalate events on the peninsula,
which could have dragged the US into a two front war against Communism. Daniel Bolger’s
explanation of LIC is clearly articulated in Scenes from an Unfinished War. He conveys that:
LIC occurs when the U.S. military seeks limited aims with a relatively modest number of
available regular forces. The low aspect of LIC refers directly to the degree of American
commitment (certainly not to the level of violence or degree of enemy commitment). A few
selected U.S. reserves may participate, but there is essentially no mobilization. Even a partial
mobilization, whether formal (as in the Korean War) or informal (as in Vietnam), elevates the
conflict to the mid-intensity realm, with all the resultant political hazards both at home and
abroad. Given this comprehensive definition, LIC necessarily comprises more than
counterinsurgency. It entails almost any restrained use of U.S. military force to advance its
interests in the Third World, to include peacekeeping, combating terrorism, and handling
peacetime contingencies. Yet it is typical of the rather muddled views on this subject that
many experts employ the terms LIC and counterinsurgency interchangeably. Whatever the
Vietnam experience suggests about U.S. abilities to battle insurgents, it offers little insight into
American capacities for peacekeeping, fighting terrorists, or handling a diverse grab bag of
contingencies (i.e., everything from punitive bombings and rescue efforts to shows of force).”32
The United States conducted LIC operations in the 1960s and had been successful. US
operations in the Congo (1960-65), Thailand (1964-74), the Dominican Republic (1965-66), and
Bolivia (1966-67), with the use of Special Forces advisors, yielded positive results but were
32
Bolger, p. xii.
18
overshadowed by the more massive undertaking that occurred in Vietnam.33 As Kim Il Sung
shifted his tactics on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK and the United States would once again be
facing off with the DPRK on familiar territory with the same strategic goal in mind.
DMZ Incidents / Force Posture
After the armistice was signed on July 27, 1953, the buffer zone that would separate the
two Koreas was established. The agreement called for both sides to move their forces 2,000
meters from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). The MDL, marked by 1,291 yellow signs
in English and Korean on one side and Korean and Chinese on the other, stretches for 151 miles
from the Han River in the west to the East Sea (Sea of Japan) to the east.34 The DMZ is an area
2,000 meters on each side of the MDL that was a buffer zone of 4,000 meters total. After its
creation, both sides would conduct patrols along their respective side of the MDL under the
arrangement that they would not cross over or interfere with the other side. Bolger details the
conditions surrounding the DMZ:
Aside from the rough natural surroundings, both sides had undertaken improvements in the
neutral buffer area. These refinements facilitated early warning of any major attack. A string of
observation posts, authorized by the truce, dotted each portion of the DMZ itself. The north
prepared minefields and fighting positions just north of the DMZ; to a lesser degree, the U.S.ROK troops also readied defensive lines just south of their side of the zone. The armistice
allowed no crew-served weapons, armored vehicles, artillery, or fortifications in the zone. Each
side could send only 1,000 men into the DMZ at any one time. Once there, these temporarily
designated "DMZ police" could patrol as necessary "for the conduct of civil administration and
relief" on their side of the MDL. Both sides agreed to refrain from firing weapons across the
MDL, over flights of the DMZ, and infiltrations of any type. Joint Observer Teams (UN and
33
34
Ibid, p. xiii.
Kirkbride, Wayne A. Panmunjom. Seoul: Hollym, 1985, p. 22.
19
Chinese-DPRK) Nations Teams (Swedish, Swiss, Czechs, and Poles) based at Panmunjom
supposedly enforced these provisions.35
North Korea broke many of the provisions laid out in the agreement. Among the
violations, it fortified its DMZ outposts, incorporated machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles,
and even created a special force of permanent DMZ Police well in excess of the numbers
allowed. Moreover, they shot at any United Nations Command (UNC) soldier on or near the
MDL, including those placing markers in accordance with the armistice.36 In contrast, UN
troops generally followed the regulations. Occasionally, patrols, either intentionally or
unintentionally, would intrude into the other side’s operational space and small scale firefights
would ensue. These “skirmishes” did not occur often, until the last half of the 1960s.
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) patrols found the DMZ to be an area of opportunity as
joint US/ROK patrols provided them with a target rich environment. KPA patrols would set up
ambushes along well-traveled roads and wait for a US/ROK patrol to enter the kill zone.
Complacency was often associated with the US/ROK troops deployed along the DMZ prior to
the years of the Second Korean Conflict. However, as firefights increased from 22 incidents in
1966 to 143 in 1967 (see Table I), Americans and South Koreans took precautions. Units
assumed higher readiness postures along and behind the DMZ and in the exposed coastal
command regions.37 The firefights continued though in 1968 when their numbers reached an alltime high, 236 incidents. That same year also brought about the highest number of DPRK agents
seized by UNC forces, 1,245 (see Table I).
35
Bolger, p. 21.
Senate, The United States and the Korean Problem, Document 74, Articles 1-11, 23, 27, Korean Armistice
Agreement.
37
Bolger, p.101.
36
20
Table I - The Second Korean Conflict: A Statistical Summary, 1966-6938
1966
1967
1968
1969
DMZ Incidents
Firefight
22
143
236
39
KPA harassing fire
3
5
19
4
KPA mining
0
16
8
0
12
280
223
24
25
U.S.-ROK fire on
suspected KPA
Casualties
KPA KIA
13
KPA WIA
KPA PW
126
233
accurate totals
not available
1
4
4
17
10
5
1
DPRK agents seized
205
787
1,245
225
ROK/U.S. KIA
29/6
115/16
145/171
10/362
ROK/U.S. WIA
28/1
243/51
240/54
39/5
ROK/U.S. PW
0/0
0/0
0/82
0/33
KPA defector
3
1
This column includes 1 U.S. KIA and 82 U.S. PWs (January-December 1968) from the USS Pueblo. The PWs were released by the
DPRK.
2
This total includes 31 U.S. KIA when their EC-121 M was shot down by KPAF jets on 15 April 1969. It does not include 8 U.S.
deaths resulting from the crash of a medical evacuation helicopter on 15 March 1969.
3
These 3 U.S. Army helicopter crewmen were held from August until December 1969, then released.
Northern forces would also use the seas to outflank the DMZ with incursions via water.
South Korea had to protect almost 6,800 kilometers of irregular, island-strewn seacoast. The
narrow coastal plains (five kilometers wide to the east, up to twenty to the west) included most of
the important cities, roads, and military facilities, all well within striking distance for seaborne
raiders.39 The ability of infiltrators to slip into these coastal areas provided the US and ROK a
whole other region to defend and close off from DPRK agents.
The North Korean agents were thoroughly trained in guerilla tactics and operated in small
teams when maneuvering, making detection difficult. When engaged in direct military contact,
however, they fought with cunning and aggressiveness. The infiltrators proved adept at
38
Sources, Finley. The US Military Experience in Korea, 220; and Lieutenant Colonel Everett H. Webster, United
States Air Force, Is the Morning Calm About to Be Broken in Korea?" 8-9, Research report no. 4471, Air War
College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, March 1971.
39
Ibid, p. 23.
21
arranging violent ambushes, breaking contact, or waiting patiently for pursuers to pass bywhichever technique best suited their tactical situation. If trapped, these North Koreans rarely
surrendered, preferring suicide by hand grenade.40 They were not the same enemy the US had
grown accustomed to during the Korean War.
A major concern for the US leadership was how to counter these attacks with the troops
and equipment available. The Korean theater was not privy to the same technologically
advanced weapon systems utilized in the Vietnam War. In addition, the quality and quantity of
the troops did not exist because of the war in Vietnam and the need to base troops in Europe.
South Korea had two US Infantry Divisions stationed there. The 2nd Infantry Division
and 7th Infantry Division made up the bulk of the US combat forces on the peninsula during that
time. Both American divisions lacked the usual complement of infantry battalions; the US 7th
Infantry Division had only one tank battalion instead of the usual two.41 Assets on the peninsula
were diverted to Vietnam in order to create fully filled units in Indochina. Additionally, in
Korea, each infantry battalion, while undermanned, consisted of only three rifle companies,
whereas the battalions in Vietnam consisted of four rifle companies at full strength.42
Though they had most of their individual weapons, each division was missing its share of
authorized helicopters. General Bonesteel, Commander of United Nations Command and US
Forces in Korea, recalled: "When I got there on 1 September 1966, there were only four or five
Hueys. That was the total number of Hueys in South Korea.”43 These were utilized as expensive
40
Guthrie, William P, COL United States Army, "Korea: The Other DMZ," Infantry 60 (March-April 1970), p. 17.
Major Vandon E. Jenerette, United States Army, "The Forgotten DMZ," Military Review 68 (May 1988):40.
42
United States. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Combat Readiness of United States and South
Korean Forces in South Korea, Fourth Cong, 2d sess. Washington. DC, 7 June 1968, 4-5.
43
Wicker, Rush R, United States Army, "CH-37 Mojave Workhorse of Korea," United States Army Aviation Digest 14
July 1968, p. 32-34.
41
22
air taxies for the Corps Headquarters and not for US or ROK operations. The two US aviation
brigades that existed on the peninsula had only 20 of the required 80 helicopters per brigade in
their inventory. In addition, the brigade had to substitute the elderly and underpowered two-seat
OH-23 Raven helicopters for the more modern OH-6A Cayuse and LH-1D Iroquois (Huey)
types.44 The necessity for light infantry to conduct air assault missions with rotary winged
aircraft is essential for quick insertion operations against guerillas.
Not only was there a lack of helicopters, but outdated tanks would have also added to the
ineffectiveness if conventional war broke out. Troops in Vietnam conducted armor operations
with the new 90mm M-48A3 diesel-engine tanks. These new tanks utilized a diesel engine that
was stronger and more efficient in comparison to the gas powered M-48A2 tanks still utilized in
Korea. US tanks in South Korea were older, and the lack of and unavailability of spare parts
hampered training and exercises. Armor commanders chose to maintain their combat readiness
and not risk the chance for their equipment to break down. Therefore, they would not participate
in training exercises in case war was to break out on the peninsula.45
Like today, most units also had Korean Augmentation to US Army (KATUSA) soldiers
assigned to their ranks. If utilized correctly, KATUSAs could prove to be very beneficial to the
US units, with their knowledge of the local language, culture, and customs. This knowledge
enabled patrols to become more adept at counter-insurgency warfare through small unit training
conducted by the KATUSAs themselves. Unfortunately, many KATUSA’s lacked the ability to
speak and understand English, and therefore ended up as riflemen. They also required additional
44
th
nd
United States Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment no. 7 , 2 Infantry Division,
Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 31 March 1966, 1, 2, 10, 17, 64, 66, 72.
45
Norton, Robert F. "Armor Helps Defend the ROK." Armor 77, September/October, 1968,18-20.
23
training time in order to grasp infantry maneuvers and understand the modern technology that the
US possessed.46
Short assignment tours had a detrimental effect on the ability to build cohesion as a unit.
The typical Korea deployment lasted thirteen months.47 Similar to Vietnam, the soldiers and
leadership would rotate in, not as whole units, but as individuals that would need to be integrated
within the unit as quickly as possible. This had a negative effect on the ability of troops to
develop a good rapport with one another and build leadership within the ranks. Just as soon as a
soldier or officer would develop the experience and knowledge needed to be effective with the
situation on Korea, they would re-deploy back to the US or Vietnam. In addition, many of the
quality leaders did not want to be in Korea, feeling that it would be a “career killer” as opposed
to a deployment to Vietnam. As one general commented, "I've known of officers who chose
retirement rather than come here (Korea) because they thought it was a dead end.”48 The low
morale and poor leadership would have been destructive had the resumption of hostilities
resumed.
Even though the ROK had approximately 46,000 troops deployed in support of US
operations in Vietnam, the priority for the Korean leadership was the defense of the Korean
peninsula.49 Unlike the US, the ROK Army fielded full-strength units on the peninsula.
Quantity did not equal quality though; the ROKs did have their problems. They carried weapons
two generations behind the new models used in Vietnam by their counterparts. For example,
46
Colonel Charles L. Bachtel, United States Army (ret.), "The KATUSA Program," Signal 23, December, 1968, 42-44.
Guthrie, p.20.
48
Binder, James L. "On the Line in Korea: The Porous War." Army, 19 January 1969, 57.
49
Bolger, p. 29.
47
24
they still trained and used semiautomatic Ml Garand rifles, which were severely overmatched by
the KPA’s automatic AK-47.50
What the ROK’s lacked in firepower, they made up for in training. Draftees ordinarily
served all thirty-three months of active duty in the same company, allowing almost three times
the stability of the US system. American observers rated the ROK line soldiers as "well trained"
and praised the "high esprit de corps" in their outfits.51
As Bolger clarifies, the ROK leadership differed greatly from that of the US. Although
very competent, the South Korean officers tended to treat American field manuals as prescriptive
orders rather than descriptive conceptual approaches. When stumped, they waited for guidance.
This did not always come, as Korean officers tended to suppress embarrassing news rather than
risk offending their American superiors and advisers. According to General Bonesteel, “If things
went according to plan, the ROK Army excelled. If not, they didn't know how to operate."52
Despite all the deficiencies that US and South Korean Forces suffered during the 1960s,
the ability for them to win a decisive victory in a conventional battle remained. Although their
equipment was outdated, training inadequate, and leadership poor, it still was better than the
conventional KPA unit and soldier when conducting operations as a coalition. In addition, UNC
armed forces personnel (see Table II) nearly doubled that of the DPRK. The DPRK did
outnumber UNC Special Operations Forces almost three to one. Therefore, for these and other
reasons, Kim Il Sung chose to conduct irregular guerilla warfare from 1966-1969 instead of
facing South Korea head-on. His attempt at utilizing offensive coercive diplomacy failed to
50
Binder, p. 57.
United States Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, p. 9.
52
Crane, Paul S. M.D., "Korean Attitudes and Thought Patterns-Prepared for UNC/USFK," in the personal papers of
Colonel Walter B. Clark, United States Army (ret.), Bonesteel interview, Charleston, SC, 11 January 1967, 329, 338.
51
25
remove the US footprint from South Korea and unite the peninsula under his flag. In addition,
the buildup of North Korean forces during this period placed a heavy burden on the North
Korean economy. The DPRK allocated approximately 30% of its budget on defense during this
period, and in 1969 the gap between it and the ROK’s per capita gross national product
continued to widen.53
Table II - Balance of Conventional Military Power in Korea, November 196654
DPRK
UNC
(U.S. portion)
386,000
675,000
(55,000)
Soldiers
345,000
600,000
(50,000)1
Special Operations Forces
3,000
1,000
Border Guards
26,000
39,000
Regular divisions
24
22
Reserve divisions
102
10
Tanks
800
656
(216)
Other armored vehicles
900
1,381
(781)
Artillery
5,200
2,160
(224)
Airmen
30,000
28,000
(5,000)
Combat airplanes
590
265
(60)
Helicopters
20
65
(58)
Sailors
9,000
17,450
(450)
Marines
2,000
30,050
(50)
Destroyers/frigates
0
7
Submarines
4
0
Minor combatants
79
30
Landing craft
20
23
Auxiliaries
34
12
ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL
Army
(2)
Air Force
Navy
1
About 46,000 ROK troops (2 Army divisions, 1 Marine brigade) were deployed to Vietnam at this time. They have been included
in this table, although they were not immediately available.
At this time, little public information had been released concerning DPRK reserve divisions, Some U.S. sources later estimated
that the DPRK disposed from 10 to 17 low-strength mobilization divisions (roughly equivalent of ROK reserve units).
2
Blue House Raid
We were given the mission on January 17, 1968 by LTG Kim Chung-Tae. We [North Korean commandos]
were to infiltrate into South Korea with the express purpose of assassinating South Korean president
53
54
Hamm, Taik-Young, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital, and Military Power, London, Routledge, 1999, p.100.
Bolger, p. 14.
26
Park Chung-hee and his family. Not only were we to kill Park Chung-Hee but we were to chop his head
off and toss it into the streets of Seoul.55
- Lieutenant Kim, Shin-Jo (the lone North Korean
survivor from the Blue House Raid of 1968)
As winter fell on the Korean Peninsula, past trends reflected that violent activity
decreased as patrols along the DMZ and infiltrations fell drastically. Infiltrators were more
easily detected during the winter along the DMZ, as no foliage provided them concealment. No
one expected what occurred on January 21, 1968.
Kim Il Sung’s utilization of special forces, till this point, had been extremely successful
infiltrating into South Korea. North Korea established elite special operations units, numbering
1,200 personnel, capable of conducting subversion, espionage, agitation, and supporting or
carrying out militant guerilla action.56 The primary units involved with carrying out these
attacks were the 124th and 283rd Special Forces Units.57 The members of these teams were
hand selected and the training and indoctrination process was intense. According to Kim Shin-Jo
(the lone survivor of Team 124), “Our training in the special forces was all about survival. We
climbed a mountain higher than 1,000 meters alone and tried to survive. Of 100,000 agents who
went through such training, 31 were handpicked to form the 124th Special Forces Unit. We were
the cream of the crop, chosen to raid the Blue House.”58
55
GI Korea. "DMZ Flashpoints: The Blue House Raid." ROK Drop. 30 Dec. 2008. Web. 07 Feb. 2011.
<http://rokdrop.com/2008/12/30/dmz-flashpoints-the-blue-house-raid/>.
56
“Situation in Korea as of mid-July 1967,” Telegram from the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command,
Korea and the Commander United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp), July
21, 1967, in US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. 29, part 21, Korea,
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000, p.264.
57
Lee Hyun-taek. "A Would-be Assassin Builds a New Life." INSIDE Korea JoongAng Daily. 4 Nov. 2009.
International Herald Tribune. 28 Apr. 2011 <http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2912061>.
58
Ibid.
27
This 31-man detachment from the 124th Army Unit began training in 1967. Besides
survival training, the men were well-versed in hit and run attacks, booby traps, and even
propaganda indoctrination techniques. In January 1968, KPA Reconnaissance Bureau chief
Lieutenant General Kim Chung-tae met the men and told them, "Your mission is to go to Seoul
and cut off the head of Park Chung Hee."59 The members of Team 124 understood their mission
and realized that their actions could decide the outcome of the Second Korean War. North
Korean Lieutenant Kim Shin Jo explained that killing the ROK president "would create political
problems within the South Korean government and would agitate the South Korean people to
fight with arms against their government and the American imperialists."60
On the evening of 17 January, the team changed into ROK Army uniforms and
penetrated the US 2nd Infantry Division sector. They cut several holes through the chain-link
fence and slipped the entire group through. They moved carefully for two days and nights
through the American division's sector. The speed at which the team moved would astonish US
Commanders later. They were able to traverse the mountainous terrain with 20 kilogram packs
at a speed of about eight minutes per mile.61 The second night the North Koreans even camped
on a forested hillside within a few kilometers of Camp Howze, the US divisional headquarters.
The infiltration went smoothly until the afternoon of 19 January, when the team
accidently encountered four South Korean woodcutters going about their normal duties. Instead
of killing them and continuing on with their mission, they decided to use this opportunity to
influence them with propaganda. As the commandos consulted the woodcutters, the
59
Stefans John J. Specialist Fifth Class, United States Army, "Confessions of a Red Agent," Army Digest 23, May
1968, 17.
60
Ibid, p. 19.
61
Mullin, Max, Master Sergeant. "The Blue House Raid: North Korean Commandos Are Hardcore PT Studs |
Tactical MilSim Magazine." Tactical Milsim Magazine - The World's Premier Tactical Mil-sim Publication. 13 May
2009. Web. 07 Feb. 2011. <http://www.tacticalmilsim.com/1-military/wheels-up/the-blue-house/>.
28
assassination mission was revealed. The woodcutters were left unharmed with just a threat to
keep the mission secret.
This proved to be a fatal mistake on their part. The South Koreans went to the police that
very night. The local police chief believed them and notified his chain of command, which
reacted promptly. Unfortunately, the ROK leadership did not know the exact details surrounding
the mission of Team 124, so the police and the military tried to guard all important sites and at
the same time search all avenues of approach to Seoul. Even with massive resources employed,
the South could not cover everything.
The stealthy raiders entered the city in two and three man teams on 21 January. The
heightened security and forces in the capital were not expected and it became apparent that their
original plan would have to be altered. They took advantage of the additional military security
around the Blue House, the ROK Presidential mansion. Their ROK Army uniforms were
complete with the correct unit insignia of the local ROK 26th Infantry Division.62 They marched
right through the city and by a number of military checkpoints before arriving 800 meters from
the Blue House. It was there that the commandos encountered a final police checkpoint that
stopped the marching soldiers to question them. The North Koreans fumbled their answers to the
questions that the commander of the Chongno police station, Choe Kyu-sik, asked them.63
As Choe pulled his pistol, one of the team members shot him in the chest. Then, all hell
broke loose. The security around the Blue House had been increased as a result of the alert and
responded quickly to seize the operators and defend the President and his family. The team
scattered, abandoned its mission, and began making its way north. While fleeing, two men of the
62
63
Bolger, p. 63.
GI Korea.
29
124th were killed there, at the Blue House. ROK soldiers, police, and American troops
cooperated in the massive manhunt that followed over the next few days.
The elimination of the Blue House Raiders came at a price to both US and ROK forces.
Three Americans were killed and three more wounded attempting to capture the escaping
infiltrators. ROK casualties totaled sixty-eight killed and sixty-six wounded, mainly army and
police, but also about two dozen hapless civilians. Only two of the thirty-one northerners could
not be accounted for. They were presumed dead from trying to cross the icy Imjin River back
into North Korea.64 Albeit the cost of life was high, the US and ROK forces proved that
measures implemented in 1967 to jointly respond in the event of a crisis were successful. The
Blue House raid produced many heroes from the woodcutters along the DMZ to Chongno Police
Station Commander Choe Kyu-sik.
South Korean President Park Chung Hee was furious over the attempted assassination
and demanded immediate retribution. The speed, efficiency, and near success of the mission of
the North Korean Team amazed President Park as depicted in this telegram from the Embassy of
Korea to the US Department of State shortly after the attack:
Park said vehemently that we seemed to be more worried about reprisals by ROK Government
than we are about getting satisfaction out of North Koreans. He said he respects the UN
Command and the wishes of the American ally and he will not undertake unilateral reprisals at
this point. He wanted to make it very clear, however, that retaliation will become inevitable if
there are any more attacks by the North on South Korea. He said objective of the raid was to kill
the President and his family and they had very nearly succeeded. He knows that there are 2,400
additional men in North Korea with similar training and purpose. These men have been taken
from North Korean Army and given special training. They are located in six centers and he would
like to strike them and eliminate entire unit in one blow. He said he is convinced that this will
64
Bolger, p. 65.
30
have to be done sooner or later or they will come down here again and again, striking at many
different targets.65
Intelligence reports were confirmed by the successful interrogation of North Korean
Team 124 Lieutenant Kim Shin-Jo, that there were other units conducting arduous training for
more assassination attempts on key leaders in the South. Concern that continuous attacks on a
greater scale may occur is dictated in the following telegram from the Commander in Chief of
United Nations Troops, General Charles Bonesteel, to the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
General Earle Wheeler:
The Blue House raid on night of 20-21 January confirmed in accurate detail the previous
intelligence reported from here that North Koreans had trained and developed "30 man suicide
teams." Information obtained from the one agent captured indicates 2400 men in special units
had been under arduous training for two years and that later raids may be undertaken by teams
of company size [100-120 men]. Credibility of this sole captive was not corroborated from other
sources established but he has provided much information and retraced on the ground the
infiltration route of his team with confirmatory external evidence.66
President Park and General Bonesteel’s concerns about the North Korean Special Units
were quite valid in that this well-trained team of only 31 soldiers managed to cause such havoc
and devastation, and nearly achieved its ultimate objective. Kim Il Sung’s desire to kill
President Park and trigger domestic unrest would have created a political situation in South
Korea favorable to the DPRK’s end result – rebellion of the ROK masses and, eventually,
65
Porter, William, P. Ambassador. "Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State." Letter to US
Department of State. 24 Jan. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State
Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 7 Feb. 2011. <http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
66
Bonesteel, Charles, General. "Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of
United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)." Letter to Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Earle Wheeler). 24 Jan. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume
XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 7 Feb. 2011.
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
31
reunification of the peninsula under the Kim family regime. If not for a little bit of luck with
early alert from the woodcutters, the outcome may have been quite different. It is
understandable that the need to strike back was critical, with intelligence verifying that company
size teams, composed of three to four times the amount of personnel, were capable of carrying
out similar missions, but at a greater scale. The United States did not have much time to mull
over retaliatory options, though. Two days later another event would occur on the high seas that
put this hostile act on the back burner.
32
Chapter II
The USS Pueblo and US/ROK Relations
“This is what it is like on a typical day. We had an inadvertent intrusion into Cambodia. We lost a B-52
with four H-bombs aboard.67 We had an intelligence ship captured by the North Koreans.” 68
-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
“May I leave now?” 69
-Chairman of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board Clark Clifford
What could be argued as the most significant event on the Korean Peninsula since 1953
occurred 23 January, 1968, when President Johnson was awoken to learn that one of his Navy’s
ships had been seized by North Korea, along with her crew. The USS Pueblo was captured by
North Korean naval forces fifteen miles off the eastern coast of Wonsan (a city on the eastern
coast of North Korea). The USS Pueblo, a converted AKL (Auxiliary Cargo Light) ship, was
outfitted with electronic monitoring equipment to gather signal and electronic intelligence. The
transformation designated it as an AGER (Auxiliary General Environmental Research) class
vessel that was part of an emerging operation dubbed Operation “Clickbeetle”. There were four
of these converted vessels in the Naval inventory whose mission was to intercept critical
67
Hobo 28, a B52G Stratofortress, had an internal fire while airborne over the coast of Greenland. The five person
crew tried to contain the fire but were unable to. The pilots were unable to land the aircraft, and the crew ejected
over an ice field near Thule Air Base. All but one of the crew survived, but the real crisis was the loss of four
nuclear weapons. Recovery of Hobo 28’s missile components and verification that the nuclear weapon’s cores
were destroyed upon impact was a major cause of concern to the President. Additionally, the US and Danish
governments now had the daunting mission to clean up the radioactive contamination before the sea ice melted in
the spring causing radioactive spread through the oceans’ waters.
68
Jones, Thomas W. Notes of the President's Tuesday National Security Lunch on January 23, 1968. White House,
Washington DC. North Korea International Documentation Project, 2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean
Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical Oral History. Web. 01 Apr. 2011.
<http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NKIDP_Critical_OralHist_textL.pdf>.
69
Ibid
33
information from the United States’ enemies through subverted measures close to the sea
boundaries of designated countries.70 The 177 foot USS Pueblo went to sea with only two 50
caliber machine guns mounted on its deck. The lack of large cannons on board disguised the
ship as a pseudo-research vessel, but it also made it vulnerable to attack. There was a naval
special operations intelligence detachment designated to the Pueblo which also worked in
conjunction with the National Security Agency (NSA) in order to gather intelligence. This team
had its own operations area that was off-limits to everyone else on board, including the Captain.
From the very beginning, the Pueblo seemed doomed. It had been de-commissioned on
two previous occasions just to be re-commissioned, and suffered numerous mechanical and
structural problems during its tests at sea. According to testimony from the trial examining the
incident, many of the crew on the Pueblo were not trained proficiently in their duties, including
the two Korean interpreters assigned to the intelligence detachment. Controversy also surrounds
the Captain of the ship, Commander Pete Bucher, concerning his leadership abilities and vices.
In his autobiography, he writes that he was a naval submarine officer and had a lot of resentment
for being “surfaced” by the Navy.71 The Pueblo left Sasebo, Japan on 11 January with the
mission to conduct surveillance of North Korean ports of Songjin, Chongjin, Mayangdo, and
Wonsan, as well as Soviet naval vessels operating in the Tsushima Straits.72 Starting on 20
January, the Pueblo began being harassed by North Korean vessels while in international waters.
International waters begin twelve miles off shore; the Pueblo was fifteen miles from the North
70
Armbrister, p. 20-22.
Bucher, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher: My Story. New York: Doubleday &, 1970, p. 2-4.
72
Bramford, James, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency, New York: Anchor
Books, 2002, p.251.
71
34
Korean coast.73 23 January, the Pueblo was engaged by two North Korean sub chasers, four
torpedo boats, and two MIG fighters. With a max speed of 13.1 knots, the Pueblo attempted to
outmaneuver the aggressors, but was far too slow.74 Commander Bucher ordered the crew to
destroy classified material on board. As the Captain resisted the demands by the North Koreans
to surrender, one of the sub chasers fired its 57mm cannon at the Pueblo, killing Duane Hodges,
one of the crew. Commander Bucher ordered the ship to comply with the North Korean order.
The Captain, who was wounded, surrendered the Pueblo knowing that it could not withstand
further enemy fire, and because he did not want to risk
any more injuries to his men.
The crew on board tried destroying the
massive amounts of classified material and equipment,
but there was far too much and not enough time. The
possibility of scuttling it all overboard was not an
option because the water was only 180 feet deep,
Figure 1 - USS Pueblo reported positions and times.
Note, the Pueblo was outside the 12 mile boundary
and in open seas during time of attack.
making it easily accessible by divers.75 As the North
Koreans boarded the ship, a massive amount of
classified material was seized, which compromised top secret information to the North Koreans
and also the Soviets. The USS Pueblo compromised a cryptographic machine (KW-7) used to
decode classified naval messages. Simultaneously, John Walker, a convicted spy for the Soviets,
was selling top secret key cards that contained extremely sensitive information on naval activity
73
DefenseLink. "Detailed Known Chronology on the Location and Seizure of the Pueblo." Office of the Secretary of
Defense and Joint Staff FOIA Requester Service Center, 23 Sept. 2008. Web. 28 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/reading_room/952.pdf>.
74
Michishita, p. 34, 47.
75
Armbrister, p. 44.
35
throughout the world during the height of the Cold War decoded with the KW-7.76 Retired
Major General Oleg Kalugin, former deputy chief of the KGB station at the Soviet Embassy in
Washington, DC stated:
[We] read all cryptographic traffic between the United States Naval Headquarters and the Navy
across the world…So by keeping control of the movement of US nuclear submarines, by
controlling the coded traffic between the Navy and the units in the open seas, we could really
protect our country’s security…I think this was the greatest achievement of Soviet intelligence at
the time of the Cold War.77
At the time of capture, no attempt was made to intercept the Pueblo by sea or air. From
the initial time of the attack to docking at Wonsan harbor, over eight hours had elapsed. The
aircraft carrier USS Enterprise was conducting operations in Vietnam and was too far away to
provide support quickly enough. The quick response aircraft available to scramble from South
Korea were outfitted with nuclear missiles and were denied authorization for fear of losing a
warhead. The next closest air assets were aircraft in Okinawa, Japan. No quick response aircraft
existed in Okinawa in 1968 and the time it took for the available planes to be armed and fueled
made the attempt futile.78 The USS Pueblo was on its own.
The Pueblo’s eighty-two personnel were taken as prisoners to Wonsan, where the
Captain and crew underwent 335 days of torture and abuse at the hands of the North Koreans.
For fear that the world would react harshly to the illegal seizure of the Pueblo, the North Korean
interrogators began a reign of terror to obtain confessions from the crew admitting that they were
spying within DPRK waters. The Captain was beaten, and threatened with execution, and was
76
Lerner, Mitchell B. The Pueblo Incident A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy (Modern War
Studies). New York: University of Kansas, 2003, p. 210.
77
Bramford, p. 277.
78
Armbrister, p. 242-243.
36
told his crew would be executed if he did not confess.79 The crew were forced to write letters
back home speaking of the humane treatment they were receiving at the hands of the North
Koreans.
For the South Koreans, the perception existed that the United States reacted to the seizure
of the USS Pueblo with a greater concern than to the Blue House Raid. A telegram from the
Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of United States Forces, Korea
(General Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (General Wheeler) on 27
January, 1968 discusses this perception that those in Korea had between the two incidents:
There is an expression of strong feeling at all levels of the Republic, that the US at our
governmental level had taken no adequately drastic action following attempt attack on
President and Blue House. However, with the seizure of the Pueblo we had reacted drastically.
They all expressed views along this line, making plain their object was not obstructive but that
they were speaking as real friends of the US in whom they have great faith and trust. They
reiterated nevertheless that actions taken by US in and from Korea should stress point that we
view attack on Blue House--"The national symbol of the republic"--equally as important as
Pueblo.80
South Korean President Park was furious with the United States because of its
unwillingness to take revenge on the North after the DPRK attempted to assassinate him. Many
on the peninsula began questioning the merits of the alliance between the US and South Koreans.
US Secretary of State Dean Rusk shared his annoyance with South Korea in a telegram sent on 6
February, 1968 to Ambassador William Porter:
79
Bucher, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher: My Story. New York: Doubleday &, 1970, p. 227.
Bonesteel, Charles, General. "Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of
United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)." Letter to Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Earle Wheeler). 27 Jan. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume
XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 22 Feb. 2011.
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
80
37
As one who has been intimately involved with Korea since the drafting of Japanese surrender
terms, I am deeply disturbed by the present atmosphere of our relations. I know that we are
dealing with an especially sensitive people, sometimes called the "Irish of the Far East." I also am
aware of other moments of tension even worse than the one we have today, particularly when I
think back to the Syngman Rhee period. I think I understand fully the genuine concerns of the
South Koreans even though I get impatient about their super sensitivity.
The one thing which is not tolerable back here is their suspicion about our basic motives and
purposes. We have invested over 33,000 battle deaths, 20,000 non-battle deaths, and over
100,000 wounded in the security of an independent ROK. We have maintained large forces in
that country for 17 years. We have invested over six billion dollars (almost half the total
Marshall Plan) in economic and military assistance. We have recently massively reinforced
our air power in Korea and the immediate adjoining areas. We have carried the banner for Korea
in the UN over and over again. You should find ways to make it clear that Korean suspicion
against this record is simply incomprehensible to the American people. The danger is that it will
be deeply resented back here with potentially disastrous results for both countries.81
President Johnson’s continuous crisis management had him focused on two main events
by the end of January: the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the USS Pueblo in Korea. South
Korean President Park wanted revenge on the North Koreans for their assassination attempt on
him, but President Johnson refused to act. The US and ROK bilateral alliance was shaken even
more when President Johnson ordered the Commander of US forces in Korea, General
Bonesteel, to negotiate directly with the DPRK for a diplomatic release of the prisoners. The
South Korean government feared that the US would attempt secret negotiations at locations other
than Panmunjom. In order to prevent that from occurring, President Park hinted at removing
forces from operational control of the Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command
81
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." Letter to ROK
Ambassador Porter. 06 Feb. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State
Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 22 Feb. 2011. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
38
(General Bonesteel), and withdrawing its troops from Vietnam.82 In a telegram to the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler), Bonesteel expressed:
The ROK’s have strong feelings at all levels of the republic, that the US at our governmental level
had taken no adequately drastic action following the attempted attack on President and Blue
House. However, during the seizure of the Pueblo we had reacted drastically. They all expressed
views along this line, making plain their object was not obstructive but that they were speaking
as real friends of the US in whom they have great faith and trust. They reiterated nevertheless
that actions taken by US in and from Korea should stress point that we view attack on Blue
House-- "The national symbol of the republic"--equally as important as Pueblo. They said mere
oral protestation to this effect would not correct Korean opinion but that we should take
immediate, tangible steps.83
President Park refrained from retaliating militarily against the North, but to “save face,”
he urged the US to take steps which were more than just words. The rest of his government, on
the other hand, was utilizing the events to try and spur public sentiment. Many ROK leaders
urged Park to “go North” with or without US military support. ROK generals even went so far
as to try and find loopholes in the rules of engagement in order to have a hot pursuit all the way
to the Yalu River as soon as another engagement occurred near the DMZ.84 This is evident in
Bonesteel’s telegram to the Commander in Chief of the Pacific, Admiral Ulysses Sharp:
I have warned against keeping Korean officials, other than Park, unaware of U.S.
intentions toward the crises in Korea. He also reported having obliquely reminded the South
Koreans that the U.S. was not obligated to defend the ROK, should the latter deliberately
provoke war. Bonesteel described the atmosphere in South Korea as an "orgy of emotionalism,"
in part deliberately incited by the government. He noted that a situation was rapidly developing
"which NK commies could exploit with explosive results. If they should make one or two big raids
82
Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to Department of State, Seoul, 28 January, 1968, US Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Korea, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000, p.
541.
83
Bonesteel, Charles, General. "Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of
United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler).” 27 Jan. 1968.
Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 7 Feb.
2011.
84
Bolger, p.70.
39
with some success, it is highly probable ROKs would retaliate instantly and that would really put
the fat in the fire." 85
The South Korean leadership did not grasp that the US was in Korea for the ROK’s
defense, as a deterrent against North Korea, and not as additional combat forces for an invasion
north. With America’s deep involvement in the Vietnam War, Washington could not lose
support from the ROK and the two dedicated divisions it had committed to the fight there. If a
military operation sparked war on the Korean Peninsula, South Korean forces would have been
severely hampered with a loss of almost 20% of their best fighting men committed elsewhere.86
President Park brilliantly utilized the deployed ROK forces as leverage when dealing with the
United States. For South Korea, the presence of its troops in Vietnam actually bolstered its
economy even more. In 1966, revenues from the war made up 40 percent of South Korea’s
foreign exchange earnings, making Vietnam the country’s first overseas profit center.87 For the
United States, South Korea was its largest ally in regards to contributing combat troops to the
fight in Vietnam. In addition, the troops deployed from South Korea were extremely successful
with counter-guerilla operations against the Vietcong. The utilization of ROK troops enabled the
US to save American men from deploying to, and dying in, Indochina.
President Johnson was charged with the task to “save face” with his Asian allies, while
not committing the US to another sustained conflict in Asia. In a top secret report of a meeting
85
Bonesteel, Charles, General. "Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command and of
United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief Pacific (Sharp)." 07 Feb. 1968. Foreign
Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 22 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
86
Armbrister, p. 245.
87
Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New York: Basic, 2001, p. 35.
40
which occurred on 29 January, 1968, President Johnson’s “Wise Men” laid out eleven different
courses of action in response to the seizure of the USS Pueblo:
1) Advising Soviets of actual or possible military moves. It is agreed the US should not proceed
with an informal contact in Moscow, but might consider in the future the use of the hot line
with the proviso about the press. In general, it was judged, however, that communications with
the USSR were in pretty good shape and should be sustained during this incident.
2) The conduct of airborne reconnaissance. It was agreed that for the next several days no
reconnaissance of North Korea should be conducted. Risk of North Korean interdiction of US
aircraft ruled this option out.
3) Sail USS Banner into area where Pueblo was seized. For the time being it was felt unwise to
put the Banner (sister ship of Pueblo) on station. When the incident has been settled, it was
agreed the US would wish to assert its rights in international waters off Wonsan Bay. Depending
on the situation at that time, the US might try to assert its rights in that area via an armed
vessel—perhaps a destroyer—rather than via a communications monitoring ship like the USS
Banner.
4) Action to recover crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo. It was agreed that the recovery
of the crypto material jettisoned from the Pueblo was an almost impossible task which would put
no significant pressure on the North Koreans. Therefore, it should not be undertaken.
5) Mine Wonsan Harbor. The proposal presented involved 17 sorties dropping 83 mines. The
operation would have to be repeated as necessary to insure full denial of harbor use. It was
agreed that the impact of this operation on the North Korean economy and on North Korean
military capabilities would be minor. The prospects of recovery of the Pueblo and the crew might
be impeded. Air combat over the area would be likely; and the risk of escalation would increase
if mining were maintained over a protracted period. Enemy air defense would also create more
POW’s for downed aircraft.
6) Seize North Korean vessels. Although intelligence does not yet give us a firm basis for seizing
North Korean vessels on the high seas, it was pointed out that should the men and the ship—
or even the ship alone—not be returned, the seizure of North Korean vessels from the high
seas was a punishment that fitted the crime; that is, the North Koreans violated the rules
governing behavior in international waters and could be legitimately denied access to
international waters.
7) Selected air strikes on North Korea. It was agreed that such strikes would be an act of
retaliation: large forces required for success might give the appearance of large-scale hostilities
initiated by the US: it would be unpopular internationally; and would diminish the prospects for
early release of the Pueblo and its crew.
41
8) Raid across the DMZ. As with respect to number 7, such punitive operations were judged to
be risky, capable of leading to unsought sustained hostilities, and counter-productive with
respect to the return of Pueblo and its crew.
9) Naval blockade of Wonsan. The military and economic effects would be limited: the risks of
escalation would be high; once undertaken, the US would be committed for an indefinite period
to inconclusive, politically awkward, and potentially escalatory operations.
10) Free World economic pressures on North Korea. The Free World’s trade with North Korea is
limited. And the impact of increased controls of trade and shipping with the Free World would,
therefore, be small. With respect to a total embargo on trade with North Korea, the US would
certainly meet important opposition from France, the United Kingdom, Japan, and West
Germany. China and the Soviet Union would continue to provide aid and assistance. Taken
together, the small scale of the inconvenience involved and the political and diplomatic
difficulties within the Free World make this action unattractive.
11) US bombing practice in South Korea. This suggestion, from a member of the group, was
examined as an additional contribution to a sense of seriousness about the US military buildup in
the area. Although it was thought that, in general, the present buildup offered a satisfactory
background for diplomacy, it was agreed that the technical possibility of this line of action should
be staffed out and then the President would take a further look at it.88
The President mulled over his options with Secretary of State Dean Rusk and concluded
that any military option had the possibility of escalating the crisis into a larger scale sustained
conflict. In addition to having troops deployed in Vietnam, America also had a large presence in
Western Europe and a contingent in Taiwan. A sustained conflict elsewhere in the world would
cripple the United States’ military, particularly with its combat troops of over half a million
already embroiled with a conflict in Vietnam. In the same report, the group concluded that there
were three universal objectives during the Pueblo:
1) Get the men of the Pueblo and, if possible, the ship itself returned.
88
Rostow, Walt W. Report of Meeting of Advisory Group, January 29 1968. Rep. Washington DC: North Korea
International Documentation Project, 2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical
Oral History. Web. 29 Mar. 2011. <http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NKIDP_Critical_OralHist_textL.pdf>.
42
2) Keep the confidence of the South Koreans and, especially, their willingness to provide an
increment of force in South Vietnam.
3) Avoid a second front in Asia.89
US Deputy Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance was dispatched to Seoul by President
Johnson in order to mend relations with President Park. When Vance arrived, he described
President Park as “highly emotional, volatile, frustrated and introspective, traits compounded by
effects of his heavy drinking. The raid on the Blue House had unfortunate psychological effects
on him. He felt that both he and his country had lost face, and feared for his own safety and that
of his family.”90 President Park’s concerns were quite valid, and he shared his concern with
Vance about the ease of penetration within the US defended sector of the DMZ. Vance promised
a counter-infiltration package to the ROK Government (ROKG) in return for the following
agreements:
1. The ROKG will take no independent military actions against North Korea in response to the
Blue House Raid.
2. The ROKG will dampen down public agitation for retaliatory actions.
3. The ROKG will consent to US private bilateral discussions with the North Koreans of the
Pueblo issue in order that the crew and ship will be promptly released. (Multi-lateral
negotiations, including the ROKG, would have drawn them out).91
President Park agreed with the conditions, but also wanted assurance that the US would
keep him informed of the progress of the negotiations. Johnson, good to Vance’s word, pacified
89
Ibid.
Vance, Cyrus, Deputy Secretary of Defense. "Memorandum From Cyrus R. Vance to President Johnson," 20 Feb.
1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web.
15 Jun. 2011. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/r.html>.
91
Ibid.
90
43
President Park by increasing military aid to South Korea while at the same time utilizing a US
diplomatic approach for release of the prisoners with negotiations in Panmunjom. In a 7
February, 1968 telegram from President Johnson to President Park, Johnson pledges additional
military aid obligated to the ROK:
Unlike the Pueblo problem, for which we must have an immediate solution, the security of the
ROK against attack is a continuing problem. It will still exist after the Pueblo and its crew have
been released. It will not be solved by angry words uttered in the Military Armistice Commission,
or by negotiations. It will require tangible and continuing measures to strengthen the ROK
militarily.
Cyrus Vance already has discussed with you our willingness to provide certain equipment
to ROK forces in Korea in conjunction with the deployment to Viet-Nam of additional ROK forces.
The equipment includes.
1. A $32 million counterinfiltration `package' which was jointly devised by your Chiefs of Staff
and General Bonesteel. Certain key items in this counterinfiltration package have been
authorized for air delivery and many of these items will arrive in Korea within the next 15 days.
2. Two additional destroyers for the ROK Navy, one of which will come from the active US Navy
fleet. This destroyer is now undergoing overhaul, and will be delivered to the ROK Navy no later
than April 30. The other is being activated from the US Navy reserve fleet and will be delivered
after overhaul in 12 months or less.
3. A self-propelled 8 in. Howitzer artillery battalion.
4. A company of 12 UH-1-D helicopters.
In order to provide new programs of help, I have decided to increase military assistance to your
forces in the current fiscal year by an additional $100 million. This further amount will fund
other items of equipment which should leave no doubt either in the minds of your people or in
those of the North Koreans of our determination to see that you are in an even stronger position
to withstand and repel further aggressive acts they might contemplate92.
92
Johnson, Lyndon, US President. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." Letter to
Park, Chung Hee, ROK President. 07 Feb. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX
Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 29 Mar. 2011.
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
44
This aid package to the ROK bolstered its military forces even more while pacifying
President Park’s intent on striking back militarily in response to the Blue House Raid. With
international factors weighing in on his decision making, President Johnson opted to negotiate
with the North Koreans for the release of the prisoners. Besides conducting a more diplomatic
approach to this event, President Johnson did execute a major psychological one as well.
Throughout the course of the Vietnam War, the President had refrained from calling up the
reserves.93 During the Pueblo Crisis, he activated fourteen Air National Guard units, eight Air
Force Reserve units, and six Navy Reserve units. In total, 14,487 troops were activated back to
active duty status. 94 The call-up was the largest since the Berlin crisis of 1961. Press Secretary
George Christian hinted to the press: “That this might just be the beginning, the Army and
Marine reservists may be summoned as well.”95 The decision of the President to call up the
reserves, an act that did not even occur at the beginning of the Vietnam War, enabled the US to
get the DPRK to the negotiating table.
Twenty-seven rounds of negotiations between US Army Major General Gilbert
Woodward and North Korean Major General Pak Chung Kuk occurred at the DMZ.96 The US
demanded release of the prisoners while North Korea demanded a written apology stating
America must admit that the Pueblo had entered North Korean waters, apologize for this
intrusion, and assure the DPRK that this would never happen again.
Dean Rusk wrote a telegram to the US Embassy in Seoul on December 11th 1968, stating:
With the approach of Christmas, combined with change of Administration here shortly
thereafter, offers us opportunity to press North Koreans for release of Pueblo crew. North
93
Correll, John T. "Air Force Magazine." Origins of Total Force Feb. 2011: p. 94.
Armbrister, p. 262.
95
Ibid.
96
Michishita, p. 43.
94
45
Koreans are not likely to get more from President-elect Nixon than from President Johnson. We
hope also that recent visit of CVA Hancock (US Navy aircraft carrier) will have reminded them
that winding-down of Viet-Nam war could liberate resources to improve US-ROK military posture
and that they would be well advised to reduce sources of tension by releasing Pueblo crew.97
Securing the release of the prisoners was vital to both parties involved. The US wanted
to retrieve the crew before Christmas, after eleven months of captivity. For the DPRK, reaching
an agreement before President Nixon took office was vital. Since the start of negotiations, the
DPRK knew that the Johnson administration would not risk resumption of hostilities with a
military strike on the North. They did not know what President-elect Nixon would carry out in
order secure the release of prisoners, after he took office on 20 January, 1969.
On 17 December, 1968, an agreement was made and a written apology presented by the
US to secure the release of the prisoners in time for Christmas. On 23 December, 1968, the crew
was taken by buses to the DMZ and ordered to walk south across the "Bridge of No Return."
Exactly eleven months after being taken prisoner, the Captain led the long line of crewmen,
followed at the end by the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Ed Murphy, the last man across the
bridge. The U.S. then verbally retracted the ransom admission, apology, and assurance.98
Pyongyang seized the opportunity to claim a propaganda victory.
The US’ ability to negotiate rather than use coercive diplomacy may have fended of
resumption of hostilities on the peninsula. China had recently signed the Treaty of Friendship,
Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the People's Republic of China and the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea on 11 July, 1967. Chou En-lai and Kim Il Sung had
97
Rusk, Dean. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." Instructions for Twenty-Sixth
Meeting,” 11 Dec. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department,
20 Jan. 2001. Web. 16 jun. 2011, http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/zh.html.
98
USS Pueblo. Web. 13 Dec. 2010. <http://www.usspueblo.org/>.
46
both signed the treaty and were in agreement with the prescribed articles. Kim Il Sung relied on
the more beneficial aspects of the treaty affirming “the People's Republic of China and the
DPRK would jointly guard the security of the two peoples, and to safeguard and consolidate the
peace of Asia and the world.”99 This was a safety net whereby China pledged to immediately
render military and other assistance to its ally in the event of outside attack. Conventional
military troops, coupled with China’s emergence as a nuclear power, greatly deterred the US
with its military decisions. With the assistance provided to the DPRK by China during the
Korean War, North Korea felt secure in the event of an American military response.
North Korea’s other safety net was the Soviet Union. Nuclear weapons and the constant
threat of mutually assured destruction (MAD) between the two powers were paramount factors
in decision making during this period. Kim Il Sung had reassurance on 31 January, 1968 when
his charge d’affaires in Moscow, Kang Ch’ol-gun, met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko in Moscow. Kang expressed his hope that “the Soviet Government will support the
position of the DPRK government in connection with the capture of the American ship.”
Gromyko replied that:
The Soviet Union has already taken a series of measures in support of the Korean friends. When
approached by the Americans, the Soviet Union firmly declared that any pressure on the DPRK on
the part of the USA is unacceptable. The Soviet representative in the [UN] Security Council spoke
out resolutely in support of the position of the DPRK Government. The Soviet ambassador in
Pyongyang informed comrade Kim Il Sung about all measures that had been taken.100
99
Max, B. United States. Chinese Communism Subject Archive. Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual
Assistance. Cong. Doc. 28th ed. Vol. 4. Peking: Peking Review, 1967, 5.
100
Radchenko, Sergey. DPRK Capture of the American Spy Ship and Support by the Soviet Union. Record of
Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and North Korean Charge D’Affaires Kang Ch’olgun, USSR, Moscow. Vol. 102. Moscow: Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 31 Jan, 1968, Cold War
International History Project, Web. 29 Mar. 2011. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/.
47
Soon after the seizure of the Pueblo, the DPRK confirmed that it had the military support
it needed from its Communist brothers in the likelihood of an attack to recover the ship. Like
Washington’s agreement with Seoul, the treaty that existed between Moscow and Pyongyang
was defensive in nature. Horst Brie, an East German ambassador to North Korea, concluded:
North Korea would never decide on its own to attack South Korea or the Americans by military
force. We knew that they were able to fight a defensive war but not an offensive war without
the help from outside. They were not capable of fighting a war exceeding two to three months
on their own. We never believed in the threat of a new Korean War beginning over the actions
of North Korea.101
If this assumption is true, then it explains why the North carried out these actions against
the ROK and the US. Kim Il Sung knew well that China and the USSR would not come to his
aid if he initiated a general war on the peninsula. However, he felt certain that his Communist
brothers would support him if on the defensive from a joint US/ROK attack. The Korean War
was still fresh in the minds of the DPRK, when Chinese “volunteers” came to the defense of
North Korea. It was assumed that the same support would be rendered again. If Kim Il Sung
was able to have his country attacked, even if he provoked it, then the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and USSR would be obligated to assist against capitalist aggression.
After a few months of North Korean propaganda coupled with stalled negotiations and
walk-outs, it became evident that the Soviet Union was becoming impatient with its Korean
comrades. General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev, at
the April 1968 Plenum of Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU), in a speech stated:
101
Ostermann and Person, p. 21.
48
We are insistently advising the Korean comrades, with whom we maintained systematic contact
throughout this period, to show reserve, not to give the Americans an excuse to widen
provocations, to settle the (Pueblo) incident by political means. When it became clear to the
entire world that the attempts of the USA to make the DPRK retreat before blackmail and
military threats had failed, when the government of the USA was forced to conduct talks with
the representatives of the DPRK in Panmunjom regarding Pueblo, we expressed an opinion to the
Korean leadership that now, without any harm and even with political advantage for the DPRK,
one could finish this affair by disgraceful deportation of the crew of the USA spy vessel from the
territory of North Korea.
But the Korean comrades maintained a fairly extreme position and did not show any inclination
towards settling the incident. DPRK propaganda took on a fairly militant character, the
population was told that a war could begin any day, that the military forces of the DPRK are
“ready to smash American imperialism.” In effect, a full mobilization was declared in the
country; life, especially in the cities, was changed in a military fashion; there began an
evacuation of the population, administrative institutions, industries, and factories of
Pyongyang.102
It becomes evident during the prolonging of negotiations that the Soviet Union had no
desire to sponsor another war on the peninsula. North Korea was losing support from its
Communist brothers and if they continued to stall any longer, they may lose them entirely. The
US aversion to an escalation of hostilities that could draw them into another war in Asia, or
worse yet, a war with the potential to become nuclear, facilitated the eventual release of the
prisoners. The US accomplished its three primary objectives of securing the release of the men
of the Pueblo, keeping the confidence of the South Koreans and their willingness to provide an
increment of force in South Vietnam, and avoiding a second front in Asia. For the Communists,
Moscow and China’s subtle approach to reminding Kim Il Sung that support would be rendered
only in the event of Capitalist aggression kept the DPRK leader restrained.
102
Radchenko, Sergey. “On the Current Problems of the International Situation and on the Struggle of the CPSU for
the Unity of the International Communist Movement.” Excerpt from a speech by Leonid Brezhnev at the April 9,
1968 CC CPSU Plenum, Moscow. Cold War International History Project, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 29 Mar. 2011.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/.
49
ROK and DPRK military defenses were evenly matched along the DMZ. Both sides
fortified their respective boundaries with equipment and personnel, and it became a stalemate. A
short decisive war was not possible should the resumption of hostilities resume.103 If either side
carried out a ground, naval, or air strike, then the other would respond with equal or greater
force. Samuel Berger, Director of the Korean Task Force, elaborates on why escalation would
have been pointless:
The temptation to strike back in reprisal in understandable, but it will produce no decisive
outcome. The danger in retaliatory or punitive air attacks against North Korea is that they
would invite air attacks against the South. If Pyongyang or other North Korean sites are hit,
what is to prevent an attack against Seoul or some other site? Action and counter-action could
lead to resumed fighting along the DMZ, but both sides are too strong to move successfully
against each other in this area. The end result would be to call off the reprisal policy, after
physical damage had been done to both sides and a period of fighting within the DMZ with no
decisive result (it would not end infiltration). None of these outcomes is in the South Koreans or
our (US) best interests’.104
Narushige Michishita identifies four possible reasons as to why the DPRK seized the
Pueblo. First, it hampered US intelligence gathering operations. After Pueblo, “Operation
Clickbeetle” was suspended, and additional measures were implemented to provide security
during intelligence gathering operations. Second, it diverted resources away from Vietnam.
North Korea provided a few pilots to aid Hanoi, but not to the extent that the ROK deployed
thousands of ground troops. The Pueblo incident was a major distraction for Washington, which
may have diverted attention away from North Vietnam as its forces prepared for the Tet
Offensive a week later. Third was the impact it had on US and ROK relations. Executing the
Blue House Raid and capturing the USS Pueblo, only days apart from one another, did not give
103
Michishita, p.23.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington DC, February 12, 1968, US
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. 29, part 21, Korea, Washington DC: US
Government Printing Office, 2000, p. 372.
104
50
Washington a chance to react in response to the raid. As discussed earlier, priority was given to
rescue the crew of the ship, giving a perception to the ROKG that President Park and ROK
interests were not as important to the US, temporarily straining relations. Finally, it defended
Kim Il Sung’s position in the Party. According to the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, Kim
Il Sung wanted to sink the USS Pueblo, but his military leaders opined against it.105 Kim Il Sung
later flexed his authority within the Party by purging those military leaders, and a year later, had
his military shoot-down a Naval EC-121 intelligence gathering plane, coincidentally on his
birthday.
During the seizure of the USS Pueblo, North and South Korea’s military was almost
evenly matched. With the influx of military aid that it received from the Soviet Union the years
prior, coupled with treaties from Moscow and Peking for support if attacked, Kim Il Sung was in
a position to attempt military reunification should the situation present itself. In January 1968,
Kim Il Sung attempted a two-prong attempt at reunification. First with ROK domestic unrest, by
the assassination of President Park, which he felt would create public dissent for the ROKG,
opening the country up to revolution. Second, with a military attack on the DPRK by US and
ROK military forces, thereby opening the door for the resumption of hostilities on the peninsula.
Kim Il Sung realized the US was in no position to sustain a two-front war. If Moscow and
Peking did honor their treaties, the DPRK would have been a formidable foe for the United
Nations Command. Despite the failed outcome of reunification, the propaganda victory that
resulted from the USS Pueblo gave Kim Il Sung the support he desired, and enabled him to
enhance his authority within his country. Although Kim was unsuccessful at both attempts for
105
Michishita, p. 48-51.
51
reunification, his influence grew among the North Korean masses and the Party, thus preserving
and expanding the power of the Kim family regime within the DPRK.
If any country truly benefited from the events of the January 1968, it was the ROK.
Increased US military aid to the ROK provided additional security and equipped it with more
modern military technology. Ambassador Yoon Ha-Jung, founding director of the People’s
Unification Party, notes that “Kim Il Sung really helped us. American assistance rebuilt our
armed force into a modern armed force creating a balance with North Korea. Perhaps our
military surpassed North Korea’s at that time.”106 In reality, none of Korea’s allies supported
military action for the release of the prisoners, or the Koreans’ overarching goal which was
reunification of the peninsula. Only Korean leadership on both sides of the DMZ supported the
killing of Koreans. Today, the USS Pueblo is the only vessel listed on the Naval Registry as
“captured.” It is currently moored on the Taedong River in the heart of the capital as a symbol of
“Imperialist aggression.”
106
Ostermann and Person, p. 59.
52
Chapter III
Spring 1969 and Deep Sea 129
Soon after taking office, President Nixon announced his plan for Vietnamization in order
to begin the withdrawal of US troops from Indochina and empower the South Vietnamese to
control their own country without US involvement. At the time Nixon took over, US troops in
Indochina were at their peak with 536,100.107 He made it clear that US military involvement in
Asia would be reduced. During a visit to Guam, Nixon declared, “We must avoid that kind of
policy that will make countries in Asia so dependent on us that we are dragged into conflicts
such as the one in Vietnam. There will be no more Vietnams; we will help combat future
Communist insurgencies, but we will not fight the war for them.”108 This “Nixon Doctrine”
emphasized that internal subversion should not mean more to the United States than to the
threatened country itself. The United States would provide those countries, facing Communist
subversion, military assistance (particularly in Asia), but it would not contribute American
personnel. Although Nixon and Kissinger meant the doctrine as an assurance of continued
American involvement in Asia, many governments, including the ROK, inferred it as a notice
that the US would be pulling out.109
DMZ incidents dropped drastically in the beginning of 1969 in comparison to the years
prior – most notably in 1968 when 236 firefights were recorded and 1,245 DPRK agents were
seized (see Table I). Kim Il Sung may have utilized the US election year in 1968 to try and
leverage American public opinion in order to force Washington to extricate troops from South
107
Turley, p.xxviii.
Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarperCollins Pub., 2007, p .144.
109
Xia, p. 142.
108
53
Korea. With over half a million US personnel in Vietnam and no end in sight, coupled with the
plunge of public opinion for US involvement in Asia, and the effects of the USS Pueblo still
fresh on American minds, Kim Il Sung tried step up attacks to end US involvement in Korea.
The incidents of 1968 in Korea did not warrant as much attention as those occurring in Vietnam.
With a new US President, Kim Il Sung needed an event to bring North Korea to the spotlight
again in order to get out of the big shadow of the American war in Vietnam. Kim Il Sung’s
interpretation of the Nixon Doctrine was that a decreasing US presence in Asia was on the
horizon. By initiating another crisis on the peninsula, which would not escalate to general war,
North Korea may be able to achieve its objective of ridding the peninsula of the US presence.
The downing of Deep Sea 129 on 15 April, 1969, brought North Korea back to the “crisis table”
and gave Nixon his first chance at dealing with Pyongyang as President.
In March 1969 the US and ROK were preparing for a war-game of an unprecedented
scale dubbed “Operation Focus Retina.” More than 7,000 paratroopers (4,500 of which were US
forces based in Korea) participated in this exhibition of allied power.110 In addition to the
paratroopers, allied fighter jets and ROK Special Forces participated in the training exercise.
For Kim Il Sung and the DPRK, this exercise mimicked a dry run for a joint invasion of
the North by US and ROK forces. “Focus Retina” warranted some type of response in the minds
of the DPRK leadership. On 15 April, Kim Il Sung’s fifty-seventh birthday, two Korean
People's Air Force MiG interceptors shot down a US Navy EC-121M Constellation, codenamed
Deep Sea 129, ninety-five miles off the east coast of the DPRK.111 Deep Sea 129 was
conducting a mission over the Sea of Japan, gathering signal intelligence from North Korea,
110
111
Bolger, p. 99.
Ibid, p. 102.
54
China, and the USSR. The reconnaissance plane left its naval air station in Atsugi, Japan with 31
personnel on board. The officer in charge, LCDR Overstreet, had orders which prohibited him
from approaching closer than 50 nautical miles of the North Korean coast.112 This plane had
flown the route and orbit for two years, and the mission had been graded as being of "minimal
risk." During the first three months of 1969 nearly 200 similar missions had been flown by both
Navy and U.S. Air Force reconnaissance aircraft off North Korea's east coast, without
incident.113 For all intents and purposes this mission was routine.
Approximately six hours after take-off radars in Osan, South Korea, identified two North
Korean MiG-17s approaching Deep Sea 129’s position. Shortly after, the reconnaissance plane
“dropped off” the radar (which was normal protocol when trying to avoid radar coverage from
inbound attack aircraft). After an hour with no response from anyone in the plane, it became
apparent that the DPRK had intercepted and shot down the plane. A massive search and rescue
operation went underway, with assistance from the Soviet Union, and debris and wreckage from
the aircraft were located. Of the 31 personnel on board Deep Sea 129, only two bodies were ever
recovered.114
Immediately after the shoot down, three proposed motives were developed by South
Korean Ambassador William Porter. In a telegram sent on 16 April, 1969 to the Department of
State, Porter states:
Reports of US war-weariness over Vietnam and of a growing uneasiness about out military
wisdom may have led to the NK leadership to think such an act would encourage the US public to
112
Homan, Richard. "Lost Plane a Pueblo-Type Spy." The Washington Post 16 Apr. 1969. Print.
Bermudez, Joseph S. North Korean Special Forces. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1998, p. 239.
114
US Naval Institute - Naval History and Heritage Command. "15 April 1969: Deep Sea 129 Shootdown." Naval
History. 15 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Apr. 2011. <http://www.navalhistory.org/2010/04/15/15-april-1969-deep-sea-129shootdown/>.
113
55
wash their hand of the Korean problem. They may feel that the Pueblo hearings have done much
to expedite this sentiment and hope yesterday’s straw will prove to be the final one.
The world conference of Communist Parties is due soon. NK relations with the Soviets have
grown warmer after a brief chill following Pueblo. However, there is no doubt the Chinese are
the more compatible ideological bedfellows. At this point in time with a growing and militant
ROK/US presence in the South, the specter of a deep and perhaps irrevocable Sino/Soviet split
must be particularly foreboding. If a threat to NK could stall a final split its provocation might be
worthwhile.
A claimed intruder belonging to the mightiest Air Force in the world was shot down is a
propaganda triumph not to be disparaged, especially when achieved in close conjunction with
the Leader’s birthday.115
These proposals as to why the EC-121 was downed could be interrelated. Kim Il Sung’s
desire for the departure of US troops may have been heightened. For years the US had been
increasing aid, military personnel, and equipping the ROK’s with better technology to counter
the increasing North Korean threat. It was Vietnamization in Korea without the US troop
withdrawals. Pyongyang possibly attempted to initiate an event of such magnitude that it would
shape US public opinion to pull out of South Korea entirely. It makes sense that Kim Il Sung’s
aspiration for a united Communist Korea would become easier if the US presence in South
Korea disappears. If another surprise attack was launched to reunify the peninsula, as long as US
troops were stationed in the ROK, there is little doubt that the US would not intervene with
whatever military assets available (even if that meant diverting resources from elsewhere). Deep
Sea 129 could have been the “straw that broke the camel’s back.”
115
Porter, William, P. Ambassador. “Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State.” Letter to
US Department of State. 16 Apr. 1969. Rep. Washington DC: North Korea International Documentation Project,
2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical Oral History. Web. 26 Apr. 2011.
<http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NKIDP_Critical_OralHist_textL.pdf>.
56
Porter’s reference to the Sino-Soviet conflict is relevant in regards to the border clashes
that had occurred the month prior. Much like Hanoi, Pyongyang was able to obtain military aid
from both Moscow and Beijing. With the split occurring, it was only a matter of time before the
Communist giants were going to make Pyongyang choose a side. If North Korea was able to
initiate an offensive US response, the “bigger brothers” may put their differences aside in order
to come to their aid, as had happened in Vietnam.
Finally, propaganda was key to Kim Il Sung’s cult of personality. To quote Ambassador
Porter: “For the North Koreans, the US giant can be brought down by the concerted attacks of
the revolutionary Lilliputians; inconclusive military retaliation only enhances the desired
image.”116 The USS Pueblo and Blue House Raid were prime examples of the lack of a direct
military response to North Korean aggression. The mere perception of the North’s ability to
strike at the United States and the ROK, with no direct military response, gave an almost “David
and Goliath” mentality to the DPRK masses. Additionally, it spurred the South’s dissent over
the US presence in the ROK, for those that oppose it, and destroyed the credibility of American
military commitments in East Asia. If the US won’t fight back when their own personnel and
equipment are destroyed, why would they do so for the South Koreans? If the US was going to
“save face” in Asia, a military response was critical.
Nixon was faced with a tough decision. ROK military capabilities had drastically
improved since the Korean War. According to a “National Security Council Talking Points”
report from 1969, when the North attacked the South in 1950 it had a two-to-one superiority ratio
in ground forces over the ROK. In 1969, the ROK Army was much larger than its northern
116
Ibid.
57
counterpart.117 Years of military aid in response to the LIC occurring on the peninsula
encouraged the US to pour money into the ROK defense. Additionally, the ROK economy had
derived substantial foreign exchange earnings ($300 million per year) from its troops
deployments to Vietnam, US-Vietnam related purchases in Korea, and US deployments to
Korea.118 These “extra” earnings were utilized to grow and equip the ROK Army. At the time
of these talking points, it was concluded that the existing ROK ground and naval forces, with
only US logistical support, would be capable of defeating an attack of 25 North Korean divisions
that were supported logistically by the Chinese. However, the ROK Air Force could not, by
itself, deal adequately with a North Korean air offensive and ROK air bases remained vulnerable
to attack.119 Therefore, the ROK still remained dependent on US logistical and tactical air
support in the event that North Korea came across the DMZ. If Nixon struck militarily, and
Pyongyang countered, the US would find itself fighting a two-front war against Asian
Communists likely supported by Beijing and Moscow.
William Stueck, a distinguished research professor of the history of US/Korean relations
in the Cold War, asserts that “Henry Kissinger conveyed through Soviet Ambassador Anatoly
Dobrynin that Nixon wanted to ensure Pyongyang understood that if another incident occurred
on the peninsula, the United States would immediately and without warning retaliate with
disproportionate force.”120 With Deep Sea 129 Nixon was now faced with what to do in order to
apply disproportionate force in response to 31 US deaths. From recently released top secret
archival documents, it is now known that Nixon began preparing for “Operation Freedom Drop,”
117
NSC Meeting. “Talking Points: Korea.” 14 Aug. 1969. Rep. Washington DC: North Korea International
Documentation Project, 2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical Oral History.
Web. 26 Apr. 2011. http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NKIDP_Critical_OralHist_textL.pdf, p.3.
118
Ibid, p.5.
119
Ibid, p.3.
120
Ostermann and Person, p. 96.
58
a disproportionate attack that included three options for striking North Korea with nuclear
weapons. Option one was to engage North Korean military assets with carrier and land-based
nuclear equipped aircraft and Army “Honest John”121 tactical nukes, striking 12 pre-planned
targets. Option two utilized carrier and land based aircraft to destroy 16 targets, while option
three was the most devastating, with carrier and land based aircraft and Army “Honest John”
nuclear weapons hitting 47 targets.122
The President and Henry Kissinger preferred option three in order to destroy the North’s
“air order of battle.”123 As stated earlier, the DPRK possessed greater air superiority than the
ROK. If this was to be done, then a simultaneous mass strike would be necessary for the element
of surprise and to reduce the possibility for US casualties/POWs against the North’s air defense
assets. The rationale behind this mass attack was to limit hazardous retaliation from the DPRK.
Advisors warned that if any air attack was carried out, retaliation and escalation of hostilities
would resume. If the US could neutralize DPRK air assets, then its ability to wage a general war
would be contained to only its land-based assets. If the US was going to use military force to
attack the DPRK, then it needed to be “all out” or nothing at all.124
“Operation Freedom Drop” was never carried out, and Nixon settled for the naval show
of force instead. As known from Kissinger’s memoirs, Nixon’s National Security Advisor felt
121
“Honest John” nuclear missiles were the first surface to surface tactical nuclear missiles. They were readily
available for US forces in the ROK during the Cold War period.
122
Laird, Melvin Secretary of Defense. Review of US Contingency Plans by Washington Special Action Group.
Memorandum. National Security Archives, 25 June 1969. Web. 2 May 2011.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB322/Doc12.pdf, Tab L, p. 2.
123
McGreal, Chris. "Papers Reveal Nixon Plan for North Korea Nuclear Strike | World News | The Guardian."
Guardian.co.uk, 7 July 2010. Web. 02 May 2011.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/07/nixon-north-korea-nuclear-strike>.
124
Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. " Military Contingency Planning for Korea,” 02 Jul.
1969. Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part I, Korea, #28. State Department, 20 Jan.
2001. Web. 13 June. 2011. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d28>.
59
that, “it was the first major crisis of the new administration.”125 Neither he nor the President was
satisfied with the end result and with the performance of their staff. There are many assumptions
as to why Nixon chose not to approve the operation. The most obvious one is that he wanted to
prevent a general war on the peninsula, over the cost of 31 lives, which would enact a much
higher death toll. Around roughly the same time period as the Deep Sea 129 incident, Nixon
granted authorization to begin the secret bombings in Cambodia. In spring 1969, unbeknownst
to the general public, the US was engaged in a two theater operation being conducted with US
Air Force assets.
The air operations carried out in Indochina weighed heavily on Nixon’s utilization of
bombing options on the DPRK. In a contingency plan memorandum detailing military strike
options with B-52s on North Korea from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, all
options recommended utilizing aircraft that were not based in Southeast Asia. The
recommended aircraft were to be deployed from Anderson Air Force Base in Guam and Kadena
Air Base in Okinawa, therefore ensuring no disruption of the bombing campaign in Indochina.126
The emphasis placed on developing strike options from air bases not engaged in operations in
Indochina displayed where the administrations focus was at.
If a sustained conflict broke out in Korea, the US may have had a difficult time carrying
out and supporting air operations without diverting assets from Indochina. According to
Kissinger, “Nixon looked for some other place to demonstrate his mettle. There was nothing he
feared more than to be thought weak.”127 In May Nixon ordered the bombing of several more
125
Kissinger, p. 313.
Wheeler, Earle, Joint Chief of Staff to Secretary of Defense (Laird, Melvin), Contingency Plan for North Korea.
Memorandum. National Security Archives, 21 May 1969. Web. 21 June 2011.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB322/Doc09.pdf.
127
Kissinger, p. 247.
126
60
Cambodian bases to make all Communists understand that the US was not timid, and that it
stood by its allies. If he could not divert air assets quickly to bomb North Korea and guarantee
pilot safety, then he was determined to find a different place to put US ordinance on Communist
positions.
Another reason to not carry out a direct military strike on North Korea was expressed in a
memorandum to the President from Secretary of Defense Laird, who feared a resumption of
hostilities on the peninsula would disrupt operations in Southeast Asia. On 18 April, 1969 Laird
gave his honest estimate to President Nixon stating:
It is not clear we have the capability now to handle a major confrontation in Korea, if the North
Koreans should react with a major assault of any duration against South Korea. The Joint Staff
informs me:
128
-
sufficient ground force stocks exist for about 1 week of hostilities, after which ammunition and
equipment would have to be diverted from Southeast Asia.
-
sufficient naval and air force stocks are on hand for 30 to 45 days activity, after which diversions
from Southeast Asia would have to be made.
-
any military involvement in Korea would involve a deferral of the RVNAF modernization
program.
-
initial combat in Korea would include expenditure controls of combat supplies for U.S. forces.
-
the capability to receive and move combat supplies into Korea, at least for 30 days after the
initiation of any combat will be extremely limited.
-
increased production of major combat items, especially ammunition should be initiated, and
budget adjustments made, as soon as possible if military action in Korea is contemplated.128
Laird, Melvin, Secretary of Defense. “Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon,” 18
Apr. 1969. Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part I, Korea. State Department, 20 Jan.
2001. Web. 21 Jun. 2011. <http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d17>.
61
The tense situation between the Chinese and the Soviets could have also played an
integral part in why Nixon chose the option that he did. The month prior, Sino-Soviet border
clashes erupted, giving the Nixon administration the opportunity to close in on the two
Communists giants diplomatically. As stated earlier,129 Kim Il Sung’s internal motive may have
had him attempting to try and reunite the two by authorizing the attack in hopes that the US
would strike the North; Nixon may have chosen to do just the opposite. By showing restraint,
Nixon demonstrated to Beijing and Moscow that the US was not trying to stamp out
Communism, but instead to contain it. If the US did carry out “Operation Freedom Drop,” the
international backlash and Communist military reaction would have been warranted.
Deployment of nuclear weapons in an era when the US did not have a monopoly over them,
could have justified a retaliatory strike on bases in South Korea and even Japan (where some of
the aircraft including Deep Sea 129 originated). As part of Nixon’s strategy to develop better
relations with the Chinese and Soviets, his ability to show restraint in Korea may have enabled
him to serve his purposes better.
Another drawback to this operation was that many of the aircraft that were going to be
utilized for the attack would be departing from Okinawa. According to David Reuther, “when
looking at where the military had its assets dispersed at the time, the only way to respond
militarily to the EC-121 incident was to use equipment out of Okinawa. This immediately
involves Japan in the US/ROK response; which could open themselves up to retaliation from
Pyongyang and its allies.”130
129
Appears in: Porter, William, P. Ambassador. “Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State.”
Letter to US Department of State. 16 Apr. 1969.
130
Ostermann and Person, p.113.
62
A more speculative motive for Nixon’s decision to not authorize the nuclear option was a
personal one. According to William Stueck, “Nixon had a personal visit in 1966 to the ROK and
was treated shabbily. He was not treated to a dinner and only had tea with President Park in the
Blue House.”131 If Nixon’s visit to the ROK put a “bad taste in his mouth,” then this could be a
motivation for some of his decisions concerning the peninsula. His Nixon Doctrine contributed
directly to tensions in US/ROK relations starting in 1969 owing to his desire to remove one US
Infantry Division from South Korea. In the August 1969 summit, Nixon told President Park that
the US was not considering a withdrawal of US troops from Korea. But shortly after, Nixon sent
Kissinger a memo (dated 24 November,, 1969) stating: “We don’t want to delay anymore on this
withdrawal matter. I want to move forward with a decision for withdrawal of one division, and I
want you to give me a memo on the matter by the end of the year.”132 This contradictory nature
carried out by Nixon is just another example of his unpredictable personality, and possibly his
grievance against the ROK.
In the end, Washington reacted in three ways to the shoot-down. Armed fighter jets
accompanied all reconnaissance/intelligence gathering aircraft. Until the end of 1968, armed
escorts had always accompanied signal intelligence gathering aircraft. The deployment of air
assets in Vietnam, used to secretly bomb Cambodia, shortchanged escort availability beginning
in 1969 in Korea and elsewhere.133 According to David Reuther, an expert on North Korean
affairs at the NSA, the US and Soviets conducted similar missions off each others’ coasts in
order to gather signal intelligence. There was a tacit “gentlemen’s agreement” that existed
between the two countries, and Deep Sea 129 did not deviate from standard procedure by
131
Ibid, p. 122.
Ibid, p.95-98
133
Ibid.
132
63
remaining well over international airspace.134 Secondly, a protest of the incident in Panmunjom,
at the Military Armistice Commission, was conducted as a formality yielding no positive results
from the North Koreans. Lastly, a US naval show of force deployed to the eastern coast of North
Korea.
In the Sea of Japan, this show of force was the Seventh Fleet's Task Force 71 (see Table
III). It consolidated and held intense training maneuvers from 19-26 April. This enormous
demonstration of force intended to remind the DPRK leadership the US’s ability to quickly mass
assets in the event of a crisis. Of all the American reactions to the shooting down of the EC-121,
this probably carried the most weight. Four aircraft carriers with more than 350 warplanes
alarmed Pyongyang with the potential for a possible air attack.135
Nixon and Kissinger were not happy with the conclusion. Kissinger called it a "weak,
indecisive, and disorganized American effort in the case of the downed aircraft.” 136 Although
many in the US would have rather seen a direct military response to punish and exact revenge on
the DPRK, the fear of escalating the situation into war on the peninsula tied the hands of the
decision-makers. In the end, the US managed to flex its military muscle in the face of
Pyongyang with the naval show of force (see Table III), and maintained the US and ROK
alliance through utilization of the UNMAC to protest the incident. The North Koreans were able
to disrupt US intelligence gathering capabilities, while Kim Il Sung displayed his military
authority to the Party leaders and the masses. The actual shoot-down of Deep Sea 129 appears to
have been a target of opportunity for Kim Il Sung which showed the North Korean masses, and
134
Ostermann, Christian F., and James F. Person. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968 to 1969 A
Critical Oral History. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011, p. 112.
135
Bolger, p. 106.
136
Kissinger, Henry, White House Years, Boston. MA. Little, Brown, and Co. 1979, p. 321.
64
his own military leaders, that he exercised entire control of his military. It was not an attempt to
coerce the US or ROK for any type of concessions or demands, unlike the USS Pueblo incident.
Although possessing the most powerful military force in the world, the US looked more and
more like a “paper tiger.” The persistent refusal to unleash a forceful military response to
recurrent threats and provocations from an inferior foe was becoming extremely problematic for
the United States.
65
Table III – US Naval Response to Deep Sea 129137
Task Force 71 operations
USS Enterprise (CYAN-65) with air wing
USS Ticonderoga (CVA-14) with air wing
USS Ranger (CVA-61) with air wing
USS Hornet (CVS-12) with air wing
USS Chicago (CG-11)
USS Oklahoma City (CLG-5)
USS St. Paul (CL-73)
USS Mahan (DLG-11)
USS Dale (DLG-19)
USS Sterrett (DLG-31)
USS Lynda McCormick (DDG-8)
USS Parsons (DDG-33)
USS Radford (DD-446)
USS John W Weeks (DD-701)
USS Lyman K. Swenson (OD-729)
USS Gurke (DD-783)
USS Richard B. Anderson (DD-786)
USS Shelton (DD-790)
USS Ernest G. Small (DD-838)
USS Perry (DD-844)
USS Tucker (DD-875)
USS Meredith (DD-890)
USS Davidson (DE-1045)
Abbreviations









137
CG guided missile cruiser
CL light cruiser
CLG guided missile light cruiser
CVA attack aircraft carrier
CVAN nuclear-powered CVA
CVS antisubmarine carrier
DD destroyer
DLG guided missile DD leader
DDG guided missile destroyer
Dutcher, Lieutenant W. E. United States Naval Reserve and Strole, Lieutenant D. L. United States Navy, "Naval
and Maritime Events. July 1968-December 1969," United States Naval Institute Proceedings 96”, May, 1970, p. 14.
66
Chapter IV
Turning Point for the Koreas?
After years of hostile acts starting in 1966, North Korea toned down its attacks along the
DMZ in 1969. Aside from the EC-121 incident, it appeared that North Korean foreign policy
shifted into a less aggressive strategy. Coercive diplomacy was not working against the US. No
matter the level of the event, whether it was the seizure of a US ship on the high seas or the
destruction of a plane killing all on board, the US was not going to remove its footprint in South
Korea, or become a party to a major war. A new approach had to be developed in order to
achieve unification under the Kim family regime.
Kim Il Sung shifted his tactics to peaceful reunification of the peninsula. Seoul initiated
direct talks with Pyongyang, and Kim’s acceptance benefited his country. Prior to 1970, the
DPRK was not recognized by most countries; only 35 (mostly socialist) countries had diplomatic
relations with it. In contrast, the ROK had relations with 81 countries.138 Park Chung Hee’s
decision to open up talks with the North may have been influenced by pressure from the United
States. In August 1969, President Nixon met with President Park in San Francisco and concerns
over the ROK adopting a more conciliatory posture against the North and Communist world was
brought up.139 It appears that Nixon was trying to reduce tensions in Asia in order to begin
utilizing his Nixon Doctrine to reduce US manpower in that part of the world.
At first glance, the North-South dialogue appeared to benefit both parties. The DPRK,
once dialogue opened, gained recognition from five Western European nations and many more
138
139
Oberdorfer, p. 45.
Ostermann and Person, p. 130.
67
neutral nations. Within four years, North Korea was recognized by 93 countries, on par with
South Korea’s relations with 96.140 In the South, Park’s approval ratings allowed him to be
reelected to another six year term as President of the ROK. Additionally, in 1971, the South
Korean government proposed to North Korea talks to discuss modalities for reuniting 10 million
family members separated after the establishment of the DMZ.141 For 18 years families had been
isolated from one another due to the armistice and division of the peninsula. This was a
humanitarian initiative and not a political effort.
Unfortunately, the talks never yielded any results for the families. According to former
Korean Central Intelligence Agency Director Kang In Deok, “Kim Il Sung would only agree to
send North Korean families into the South if the ROK would eliminate its anticommunist laws,
education, and mass media. Kim claimed that in North Korea there was freedom to criticize
communists and freedom of movement throughout the country, and therefore the same should be
expected in the South.”142 Kim Il Sung’s obvious dishonesty and desire to turn the talks into a
political matter ended any hope for exchange and the reunion of family members.
After Deep Sea 129, infiltrations from the North and incidents along the DMZ
significantly dropped. In reality, it was just a shift in policy that the DPRK was implementing.
By 1974, according to US Command’s intelligence estimates, the North had increased its
military to 408,000 troops.143 The DPRK also spent 19.4% of its Gross National Product (GNP)
on military expenditures, whereas the South expended only 4.1%.144 In addition, the DPRK was
now capable of developing its own land-based military equipment, including artillery, tanks, and
140
Oberdorfer, p. 45.
"Korean Red Cross." 함께하는세상 Together. Korean Red Cross, 2009. Web. 20 June 2011.
<http://www.redcross.or.kr/eng/about/about_010101.jsp>.
142
Ostermann and Person, p. 139.
143
Oberdorfer, p.61.
144
Loo, p. x.
141
68
missile launchers. Moreover, the construction of infiltration tunnels began during this era.
During the short lived détente with the South, the North began construction of as many as 17
tunnels along the DMZ. The largest of these tunnels had the ability to pass approximately
30,000 armed troops with heavy guns and equipment an hour, arriving at an exit point 44
kilometers from Seoul.145 The North was now in a position to strike the South offensively, if the
opportunity presented itself. Much like North Vietnam’s ability to infiltrate personnel and
equipment into South Vietnam through the Ho Chi Minh Trail, the DPRK now had a means to
penetrate into the South. The true test would be if the US would honor its obligation to the ROK
in the event of an attack from the North. As the US pulled out of Vietnam and stood by as Hanoi
united the country under Communist rule, Kim Il Sung’s desire to unite his peninsula grew.
With a new US President in office, and a war weary America, Kim Il Sung was about to test the
resolve and commitment of the ROK/US alliance.
Operation Paul Bunyan
The Axe Murder Incident of 1976 demonstrated to the world the cruelty and hate
possessed by the North Koreans and directed at the United States’ military stationed on the
peninsula. Although the other significant events and clashes which occurred the decade prior
resulted in loss of life for both Americans and Koreans, none were carried out with such horror
as what took place at the Joint Security Area (JSA) in 1976.
On 18 August, 1976 a ten-man element of American and South Korean soldiers set out on
a routine tree trimming operation along the DMZ. An overgrown poplar tree was obstructing an
145
Kirkbride, Panmunjom, p. 72.
69
observation post and the element was given orders to trim the branches. Captain (CPT) Arthur
Bonifas, the JSA Company Commander, set out with the group, his last mission before he was
scheduled to change out of command and leave Korea three days later. He had his Executive
Officer, Lieutenant (LT) Mark Barrett, accompany him to familiarize him with the area prior to
his departure.146
When the small element began the tree trimming, an element of six KPA soldiers crossed
over the “bridge of no return.” LT Pak Chul, nicknamed bulldog for his abrasive attitude, told
Captain Bonifas to “halt his operation.” CPT Bonifas told the North Korean that “they were
conducting a scheduled tree trimming” and ordered his men to continue with the operation. LT
Pak called for KPA reinforcements, and soon the KPA element numbered thirty. LT Pak ordered
CPT Bonifas to “discontinue this act of aggression because this tree was planted as a sapling by
Kim Il Sung.”147 CPT Bonifas did not even respond to LT Pak and turned his back to him.
In an attempt to save face after CPT Bonifas turned his back on him, LT Pak took off his
wristwatch and wrapped it in a handkerchief. After placing it in his pocket he yelled, “Mi Kun a
Chu I Cha!” This translates as “Kill the US aggressors.”148 Bonifas was struck on the back of
the neck with a blow from LT Pak which knocked him to the ground. Immediately, five KPA
soldiers began beating CPT Bonifas. The axes were forcibly taken from the workforce and two
soldiers began striking CPT Bonifas in the head and face with them. While trying to escape, LT
Barrett was attacked and also killed with blows to the face from the axe. The remaining US and
Korean soldiers were beaten but did not receive blows from the axes. It was apparent that the
146
Bilbo, Mike. "Excerpts from 13 - Month Diary." Personal Diary. 1976. DMZ, Panmunjom, South Korea. (Mike
Bilbo was a Specialist Fourth Class during Operation Paul Bunyan. He has donated his diary to the Joint Security
Area and it currently resides in Ballinger Hall)
147
Ibid
148
Kirkbride, Wayne A. DMZ, A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder. Elizabeth, N.J: Hollym International, 1984,
p.29.
70
North Koreans were deliberately targeting the American officers. The JSA quick reaction force
arrived on scene and the KPA soldiers fled back across the bridge of no return. The two
American officers died immediately from the wounds they had received; they were the first
fatalities in the JSA since it had been established at the end of the Korean War.149
President Gerald Ford was now faced with handling Kim Il Sung and responding to the
incident. He and Henry Kissinger, now Secretary of State, were presented with only a few
options from their advisors. Those ranged from do nothing to launching an artillery attack across
the DMZ to deploying a show of force with the ability to transition to war.150 The largest
political consideration was to maintain US resolve, yet not ignite another war on the peninsula.
Vietnam was still fresh in the minds of many politicians and Americans, and President Ford was
left to “clean up” the decisions made by the two previous presidents. A year prior to the Axe
Murder Incident, the USS Mayaguez also tested the doggedness of President Ford. In order to
understand the rationale behind his decision to do something meaningful with the show of force,
it is important to analyze the options presented to the President.
The first option, “to do nothing,” would have validated North Korean propaganda to the
effect that the US was weak and feared retaliation from the North. It would also suggested that
the US was war weary from Vietnam, and that application of military force was not an option
open to it when incidents like this occurred. In order to “save face,” the US could not sit idly by
and let this event go unpunished.
149
150
Oberdorfer, p.75.
Kirkbride, Wayne A. Timber - The Story of Operation Paul Bunyan. 1st ed. New York: Vantage, 1980, p.33.
71
The next option presented was to utilize artillery or naval gunfire to attack North Korean
targets, including barracks along the coast and/or DMZ.151 The problem with this plan was that
the North Koreans could have utilized the artillery attack to justify to its masses and allies that an
all out offensive was necessary. While the US was deciding over its course of action, North
Korea’s radio broke its regular programming to announce that the entire army and reserve force
were being placed into “full combat readiness.” A strict blackout was imposed in Pyongyang,
and the populace was crowded into underground shelters as air raid sirens wailed.152 As tensions
rose on the peninsula, any direct attack on North Korea could have been the match that lit the
propaganda fuse necessary for Kim Il Sung to motivate his military to attack.
The final option was the show of force with the capability to transition to war.153 The
ability to show North Korea and the world that it would not sit idly by after such an atrocity was
paramount in Washington. North Korea’s provocative acts on the USS Pueblo and Deep Sea 129
did not bring about any type of direct military retaliation from presidents Johnson and Nixon.
The rise in tension on the peninsula over the years needed to be quelled, but not at the cost of
general war. Ford explained, “In the case of Korea, to gamble with overkill might broaden very
quickly into a full military conflict, but responding with an appropriate amount of force would be
effective in demonstrating US resolve.”154 To Ford, this third option was the most sensible.
Soon, United Nations Commander General Richard Stillwell received his orders and with his
staff began developing “Operation Paul Bunyan”.
151
Michishita, p. 76.
Oberdorfer, p. 79.
153
Yoon, Tae-Young. Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula: South Korea’s Crisis Management Towards
North Korea within the Context of the South Korea-US Alliance, 1968-1983. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of
Politics and Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities and Social Science, Manchester Metropolitan University, October
1997, p. 272.
154
Ibid, p.79.
152
72
The US/ROK alliance weighed heavily on Ford’s mind at the time he made the decision.
General Stillwell briefed the situation and his plan to the ROK President. President Park
expressed his deep personal concern over the JSA incident, which he found “beyond human
reason,” and stated that the North Koreans should be “taught a lesson.”155 He strongly believed
that Kim Il Sung should punish the murderers, pay reparations, and guarantee non-recurrence;
but he recognized that the Communists were not likely to be forthcoming. President Park’s
complete support was vital because it meant that the entire ROK military would enthusiastically
stand behind an operation with all the resources at their disposal.
The military objective was straightforward. In order to “do something meaningful”
USFK was charged with removing the poplar tree, display a show of force not seen since on the
peninsula since the Korean War, and be prepared to escalate if the situation dictates.156 Within
twelve hours of the incident, the Pacific Command was already mobilizing to assist the peninsula
with dedicated support. The assets deployed included the USS Midway (an aircraft carrier), RF4D and SR-71 reconnaissance aircraft, nuclear equipped F-111 aircraft, tank-busting F4
Phantoms, and B52 Bombers. For the Army, the entire 2nd Infantry Division and First ROK
Army moved into their combat outposts, an additional battalion of 105mm US Artillery were
moved within striking distance of the DMZ. An additional battalion of ROK heavy artillery and
a nuclear-equipped heavy artillery battery also moved within striking and response distance. The
actual tree cutting element of 813 men, dubbed Task Force Vierra, consisted of a Company of
ROK Special Forces and a Company of US Infantry, an Engineer Platoon assigned to cut the tree
down, a ROK Reconnaissance Company, and an Air Mobile Assault Troop that was hovering in
155
Delateur, Conrad A. Murder at Panmunjom: The Role of the Theater Commander in Crisis Resolution. Thesis.
United States Department of State Foreign Service Institute. Rosslyn, 1987, p.12.
156
Ibid, p.16.
73
twenty UH-1 Huey Helicopters 200 meters from the DMZ supported by 12 AH-1 Cobra
Helicopter Gunships.157 At 0700 on 21 August 1976, the most expensive tree trimming action
was conducted, codenamed Operation Paul Bunyan.
Besides cutting the tree down, engineers were assigned three other tasks: be prepared to
blow up Freedom Bridge to stop a North Korean advance; to destroy the illegal roadblocks
placed in the southern portion of the JSA by the KPA; and be prepared to conduct a hasty river
crossing to evacuate soldiers south across the Imjin River.158 A convoy of twenty-three
American and South Korean vehicles entered into the JSA without warning to the North
Koreans. A platoon of engineers ascended upon the poplar tree with chainsaws and began to cut
the limbs off. Simultaneously, another engineer platoon began its mission to destroy illegal
roadblocks. North Korea dispatched approximately 150 infantry troops with machine guns and
began setting up positions across the bridge of no return.159 No shots were fired at the work
detail and within 42 minutes the poplar tree and illegal roadblocks were gone.
The most impressive piece of “Operation Paul Bunyan” was the ability of the United
States and ROK allies to quickly mass forces from around the globe in preparation for a joint
attack on North Korea. In three days the USS Midway deployed to the southern straits of South
Korea. F-111s from Mountain Home Air Force Base were alerted, scrambled, refueled over the
Pacific Ocean, and were in Korea within a twenty hour period. F-4s from Okinawa and two B52s also increased the combat power while ROK F-5s were scrambled and used for escorts.
The horrific murders of CPT Bonifas and LT Barrett were a reminder of the tension that
exists on the peninsula. After “Operation Paul Bunyan,” an agreement to remark the Military
157
Kirkbride, Timber, 31-47; Oberdorfer, p.80-81.
Kirkbride, DMZ, p. 64.
159
Oberdorfer, p. 81.
158
74
Demarcation Line (MDL) and adjust disputed portions was established. In 1953 and 1970 the
UNC proposed the adjustment,160 but North Korea would not approve an agreement for both
sides to back off their combat troops two kilometers from the MDL. After approval by both
sides of the newly established MDL, members of opposing sides are restrained from entering the
other side’s buildings and crossing the MDL is restricted except under very strict conditions such
as repatriation ceremonies. Incidents within the DMZ fell to all time lows after the operation due
to the new alignment of the MDL. The lack of close contact with one another prevented incidents
from spontaneously erupting.
Immediately after “Operation Paul Bunyan,” a KPA senior member requested a meeting
with the UNC. North Korean Major General Han presented a message to Rear Admiral Frudden
from Kim Il Sung, stating: “it is regretful that an incident occurred in the JSA, Panmunjom this
time. An effort must be made so that such incidents do not recur in the future. For this purpose
both sides should make efforts.”161 This message from Kim Il Sung was the first in the twentythree year history of the Korean Armistice presented to the UNC. General Stilwell was not
satisfied with the content of the message, but the State Department’s analysis of it concluded that
it was conciliatory and as good an apology as they were going to get from the most authoritarian
communist dictator in Asia.
Although the perception of President Ford as a weak president exists, especially when
compared to Johnson and Nixon, he was able to display the might of the US military without
igniting a general war. The success of “Operation Paul Bunyan” showed the world that the US
was still a capable and willing force in Asia and would not sit by and be intimidated. In three
160
161
Michishita, p. 81.
Oberdorfer, p.82.
75
days the United States and ROK were able to plan, organize, and deploy assets from around the
world in preparation for all out war. Kim Il Sung was reminded that although US presidents
change, American sensitivity to its own casualties do not. Although the poplar tree is gone, the
symbol for what it stands for is evident in the circular cement memorial that now lies there, with
CPT Arthur Bonifas and LT Mark Barrett’s names inscribed on it.
Kim Il Sung’s desire to not escalate the situation during Operation Paul Bunyan is
evident in testimony by North Korean defector Pak Pyong-Yop. Pak fled the DPRK in the
1980s, after working for the Worker’s Party of Korea for over thirty years, including a period of
time in the same office with Kim Jong Il.162 He stated, “After the murder of the American
officers became a major incident, Kim Il Sung asked the Minister of the People’s Armed Forces,
“Why the hell did you do this?” In reality, after receiving word that a tree trimming operation
was going to be conducted, Kim Jong Il gave the order to, “Show them the Korean way, don’t
care about the South Korean workers and give the Yankees a lesson. And don’t use guns.”163
Kim Jong Il’s mistake in giving the order to target Americans could have carried dire
consequences to the North Koreans and the Kim family regime. According to Pak, none of the
Party members revealed the truth about who gave the order. It was evident that even after the
1968 purging of military leaders Kim Il Sung still inspired fear into the Party members.
Pak also stated, “That the Ministry of the People’s Armed Forces contemplated going to
war but realized it was not a good idea. It was a time when the US forces were withdrawn from
Vietnam, and China exercised significant influence over North Korean foreign policy. Kim Il
Sung knew very well that such an attempt would wind up in failure unless North Korea could get
162
Michishita, p. 88.
Jung, Chang-Hyun, Gyeot-eseo Bon Gim Jeong Il, rev. and enl. edn (Kim Jong Il Seen from the Side), Seoul,
Gimyeoungsa, 2000, p. 201-202.
163
76
both materiel and moral support from China.”164 This could prove problematic to Pyongyang as
the number one priority for the PRC was to pursue rapprochement with the US.
North Korea did achieve a military-diplomatic victory in Panmunjom. In the 380th
meeting on 25 August, the KPA proposed the separation of the UNC and KPA personnel along
the JSA to avoid future clashes.165 This was the first time the KPA proposed the separation,
although the UNC had done so several times before. The UNC agreed to the proposal at the
381st meeting, and extracted “all the assurances” from the KPA for the safety and security of US
personnel operating on its side of the MDL.166 With the UNC “succumbing” to the request of the
North Koreans, the DPRK was able to claim victory. For Pyongyang, the perception that the
slaying of two American officers forced the US to separate the boundaries, for its own safety,
was a major propaganda victory. Its use of coercion, “the use of force to get the target to comply
with the demands of the coercer, but without completely destroying the military forces of, and
occupying, the target state,” was a success when analyzing the event, and then the outcome, of
the axe murder incident in the minds of the DPRK.167 After Operation Paul Bunyan, targeted
attacks against Americans nearly stopped completely. The decisive US reaction to the murders
of Captain Bonifas and Lieutenant Barrett caught Pyongyang by surprise. By standing by and
not escalating the situation at the JSA, the DPRK leadership lost face, but the Kim family regime
preserved its authority while achieving a propaganda victory for the masses.
164
Ibid, p. 203.
Michishita, p. 80.
166
st
DMZ Axe Incident (1976), “381 MAC Meeting,” August 28, 1976, Korean Security Archive, The Special
Collections, (Washington DC: International Center, 2000).
167
Bratton, p. 102.
165
77
New Tactics
North Korea’s reluctance to escalate the tense situation in the JSA during “Operation
Paul Bunyan” may have been the turning point for attacks against Americans in Korea. Since
1976 only four US military personnel have been killed there,168 although attacks and incidents
continue to be directed at South Koreans on the peninsula and abroad. The US military response
to the axe murder incident demonstrated to Pyongyang that Vietnam no longer tied up assets;
Washington was now capable, and willing, to carry out a general war against them if need be.
The DPRK’s military had grown to 500,000, but the ROK army numbered 760,000 with an
additional 42,000 US personnel.169 The capability for the DPRK to launch and sustain a war for
reunification of the peninsula was not feasible for Kim Il Sung. He did convey to Bulgarian
Communist Party leader Todor Zhivkov in 1975 that “the KWP and DPRK aimed to solve the
question of Korean unification peacefully. If they attack us, we are ready to fight them.
However, we will never attack first.”170 Kim Il Sung had the ability to fight a defensive war in
North Korea. His country was militarized with underground bunkers, power plants, and factories
that would sustain the North during a potential war along with the mountainous territory to
hinder an enemy advance. However, unlike Vietnam, he did not have the advantage of slipping
into the porous borders of Cambodia and Laos if he was to launch an attack and his military
became overrun. The geography of South Korea would cause the North’s troops to become
168
Michishita, p. 199-200.
Schaefer, Bernd. Overconfidence Shattered: North Korean Unification Policy. North Korean International
Documentation Project, Dec. 2010. Web. 9 May 2011. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp, p.27.
170
GDR Embassy Sofia to Hermann Axen, SED Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central Committee
International Relations Department, Letter and Translation of Information by the Central Committee of the
Bulgarian Communist Party on Talks Between Todor Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung, 18 June 1975, p. 18-21.
169
78
surrounded and trapped if another “MacArthur Landing” occurred and sealed off avenues of
retreat or retrograde.
A conventional war launched against the South to unify the country is not a viable option
for the DPRK. Attempts to destabilize the South through the utilization of guerilla tactics in the
1960s failed, as this thesis has demonstrated. Pyongyang’s use of subversion in the South to
“educate individuals” and develop anti-state groups was not tempting enough to convert the
entire ROK population in order to overthrow the democratic ideals that the majority of South
Koreans embrace. Since the transfer of power from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il due to the
premier’s death from heart failure in 1994, North Korea has become virtually isolated from the
rest of the world. At the onset of Kim Jong Il’s reign, his country faced floods which thrust the
country into famine. It is estimated that between 900,000 and 2.8 million North Koreans died of
starvation between 1995 and 1998.171 Kim Jong Il turned a tragedy for his country into an
advantage for himself by developing the “military first policy” known as songun. He was able to
bolster the numbers of the KPA through instilling this ideal into the Korean masses. In reality, it
was a cruel recruitment tool for the State. Due to increasing food shortages, an adult worker
received 450 grams of rice while a soldier received 800 grams.172 This produced a sudden surge
of armed personnel which quickly increased the country’s military numbers, giving the DPRK
international recognition as a state capable of unleashing its force against those that opposed it,
including the US. The reality is although the KPA now numbers approximately 1.2 million
active duty soldiers (fourth largest military in the world);173 they are severely ill-equipped and
171
Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures. Rep. Washington
DC: Institue for International Economics, 1999, p. 1..
172
Ibid, Table III: Standard Rations.
173
"North Korea." U.S. Department of State. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 29 Apr. 2011. Web. 09 May
2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm#defense>.
79
not capable of sustaining a prolonged war without outside assistance. Unable to provide enough
food and support to the North Korean people, Kim Jong Il maintains his army as a “deterrent”
while conducting hostile acts in order to receive humanitarian aid and maintain the Kim family
regime. This could be an act of signaling by the regime’s leaders in order to launch North Korea
into the international spotlight. Whenever the situation looks grim in the North, it carries out
events that threaten regional security. Over the last two decades, Pyongyang has walked away
from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, tested ballistic missiles in the Sea of Japan (East
Sea), detonated a nuclear weapon, launched cyber attacks into South Korea, and continuously
initiate engagements in the Yellow Sea. These events have inflicted sanctions onto the North,
yet they still are able to maintain their regime. Non-government organizations, the ROK
(sporadically), and China continue to prevent North Korea’s starvation and collapse. Neither the
ROK nor the US has attempted to strike at them militarily in response to their aggressive
initiatives. The notion of initiating a conflict on the peninsula, which would destabilize the
North, acts as a deterrent for Washington, Seoul, and Beijing. If the DPRK regime collapses, the
influx of millions of fleeing North Koreans into northeast China and the ROK would damage the
economies of both countries, and create a humanitarian crisis in East Asia. Whether the Kim
family regime is cognizant that its own country’s poverty is deterrent itself, or that they truly are
ideologically conditioned, is unknown. Regardless, Pyongyang has developed and implemented
its own style of foreign policy that has endured in a modern world approaching three generations.
80
Conclusion
None of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without insight into the
political relations.
- Carl von Clausewitz
“Crazy”, “suicidal”, “foolish”, and “madmen” are all terms that have been used
interchangeably by the press when labeling the Kim family regime and its advisors within the
DPRK. It is easy, but also ignorant, to assume that is the case. In reality, the DPRK may be
more rational than many believe. Since 1953 North Korea has managed to survive and maintain
its sovereignty over its half of the peninsula while divided countries such as Germany and
Vietnam have been unified. Pyongyang wants a unified peninsula and to “liberate the South
Koreans,” but shifting international factors have caused it to alter their methods of going about
that change.
During the 1960s Kim Il Sung’s desire to unite the peninsula by inspiring the “oppressed”
South Koreans to rise up and rebel against the government and conduct guerilla warfare seemed
to be his best option. A general war would have been more difficult given his military capacity
at that time. More importantly, North Korea would have never succeeded in repelling United
Nations Forces during the Korean War without China’s intervention. According to Ambassador
Horst Brie: “Kim Il Sung may have feared war because if war broke out again in Korea, he
would have lost his power. Throughout the Korean War, Kim Il Sung played little role; China
and Russia were in control of everything. Nobody would have kept him in power if a renewed
81
war occurred.”174 If this was true, and he had initiated a general war, he would have had no
voice in the military decision making process for his country’s survival and would have lost his
entire power base. By carrying out his guerilla-style approach, with DMZ skirmishes and
incursions, he reminded his populace that there was still an enemy out there, which fueled his
propaganda. Secondly, he attempted to wear down US and ROK relations, serving as a means of
pressuring the US to leave the peninsula.
For the US, its position during that particular time was extremely problematic. Vietnam
took center stage for politicians, military planners, and the public when Korea was undergoing
LIC. Events on the 38th parallel were a nuisance in comparison to full-blown combat operations
in Indochina. Only when the DPRK carried out a larger affair, such as the Blue House Raid, the
seizure of USS Pueblo, or the downing of Deep Sea 129, did Kim Il Sung receive the
international interest that he wanted. Testament of where the US’ center of attention can be
found in Henry Kissinger’s memoirs. His referencing of North Vietnam 81 times versus North
Korea six times clearly shows that the priority and focus was not on the peninsula.175 Typically,
one thinks of America constrained by time in war, particularly in a protracted insurgent struggle.
It has worked for the enemy in Vietnam and looks to be working in Iraq and Afghanistan. Yet in
this case, it was Kim Il Sung who wanted quick results from his guerrillas. By simply holding on,
without cracking and without escalating the conflict, the US and ROK would be victorious. In
the Second Korean Conflict, time favored the allies.176
Kim Il Sung’s need to alter his approach to uniting the peninsula shifted from guerilla
tactics to “peaceful reunification” in the 1970’s. In reality, he used the lull in tensions to begin
174
Ostermann and Person, p. 78.
Kissinger, White House Years, p. 1511.
176
Bolger, p.31.
175
82
tunnels in preparation for a surprise attack at a later time. In reality there could be no peaceful
reunification. The US and ROK would not let unification occur under Communist rule, and the
DPRK will never agree to any method of governance other than the Kim family regime. Kim
attempted to exploit the US and ROK’s less confrontational policy towards the DPRK. If he
showed the world that he could make efforts for peaceful reunification, then maybe the US
would pull out of the South in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine. If peace was foreseeable on
the peninsula, then a US deterrent force would not be necessary. Taking note from Hanoi, Kim
Il Sung knew that if the US departed, then there was the possibility that it would not intervene
militarily should hostilities resume on the peninsula. If the ROK was attacked by the North, it
would be difficult to rally public opinion to intervene militarily, and take time for the
redeployment of American forces to Korea. The North could utilize the tunnels to launch a
surprise attack, seizing Seoul in a matter of days, before any US ground forces could arrive.
The US is extremely sensitive to its own casualties. If the DPRK struck, as long as the US has a
military presence in the South, the American public would favor military intervention into Korea
even during a period of war weariness.
Reunification of the peninsula is not likely unless the Kim family regime collapses. Even
today, China does not want a democratic Korea on its northeast border even though relations
with the US have improved since the Cold War. Nor would the DPRK be willing to unite under
a democratic government, particularly with US forces in “its country.” Pyongyang sees the
peninsula as its country, which can only be managed its leaders. It is the only true government in
their eyes. Stephen Bradner, primary advisor on North Korean Strategy to the USFK
Commander, expounds:
83
In the 4 July 1972 joint north-south declaration, the two sides pledged efforts for independent
and peaceful unification in accord with great national unity, yet by 15 July 1972 North Korean
media were again proclaiming that all Korea would be united under Kim Il Sung. More
important, Kim Il Sung himself, in interviews later that summer with Japan's daily Mainichi
Shimbun and monthly magazine Sekai and in North Korean publications, explained the meaning
of these terms. "Independent" meant "to force the United States imperialists out of South
Korea"; "peaceful" meant the reduction of armed forces and halt of military modernization in the
south; and "great national unity" meant freedom for pro-North Korean subversive and
revolutionary groups to operate in the ROK.177
On the other side, the US would not let Korea become a juche state ruled by a dictator
with all that it has provided through the course of history in blood and treasure. For unification
to occur, one of the two sides will have to give up its system. For the time being, the country has
no other choice but to be divided. The North’s actions and motives have since transitioned
towards regime and state survival.
Kim Jong Il’s aid-based survival strategy has endured, while he has maintained his
authority, since 1994. He has become extremely successful at implementing the “carrot and
stick” approach for obtaining the assistance his regime desires. It appears that diplomatic
progress is emerging when he opens the country up to nuclear inspectors, ceases nuclear
weapons development, shows willingness to negotiate between the boundaries of the Northern
Limit Line in the Yellow Sea, and invites US figures such as Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and
Madeline Albright to the capital. The “carrots” show the world that North Korea can be a
rational actor. The gates of international aid open and the easing of sanctions often occur that
reduce the suffering in the country. On the other hand, when the aid “dries up” and the regime
needs international attention in order to maintain its survival, it employs a variety of sticks to
177
Bradner, Stephen. North Korea's Strategy. Rep. Arlington, Virginia: Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
August 2001, p. 43-44.
84
throw itself back into the spotlight. The sticks, most recently, are the detonating of a nuclear
weapon, launching of Taepo-Dong II missiles over Japan and into the Pacific Ocean, sinking of
the ROKS Cheonan, and the artillery barrage of Yeonpyeong Island.
The international environment today is very similar to what it was in the 1960s, when
Kim Il Sung was in power. Combat operations in Indochina overshadowed the DPRK’s attempt
to receive the aid and assistance it needed from its Communist brothers to militarily unite the
peninsula under the DPRK flag. China and the Soviet Union were too involved with internal
issues and the support of Hanoi to throw themselves in another conflict in Korea. Today, all
eyes are on combat operations fighting the Global War on Terror. Little attention is given to the
DPRK when non-governmental organizations put the priority for reconstruction and
humanitarian relief projects to countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Haiti. Through the use of
“sticks,” Pyongyang is able to bring the peninsula to the brink of war. Then as quickly as tension
escalates, it diminishes. These bipolar endeavors portray Kim Jong Il as unstable and capable of
doing anything. As a result, the world does heed warnings when threats are issued, but over time
they lose credibility. North Korea’s greatest leverage is its potential threat, yet as it trades away
the threat to gain the benefits of aid necessary for its survival, its leverage is diminished. The
US/ROK can afford to ignore immediate North Korean unilateral demands, which reinforces
Pyongyang’s reliance on the old strategy of inducing crisis and stirring up trouble to avoid being
taken for granted.178 Only when an incident occurs unannounced, does the North regain that
authority of being a destabilizing threat. Recently with the PRC and ROK’s economic global
interdependence, the danger of regional instability often causes a mass influx of concessions
178
Snyder, p. 157.
85
such as aid, or the easing of sanctions, to provide the Kim family regime with whatever it takes
to ensure brinkmanship does not become general war.
Although South Korea has seen remarkable progress since the Korean War, the DPRK
has undergone the exact opposite. In a world where Communism is essentially dead, the DPRK
remains a self-professed Communist state seeking self-reliance and control of its masses. Ironic
as it is for the regime to preach juche to its people, the extent of the dependence on foreign aid is
really known only to Kim’s inner circle. As long as the Kim family regime is able to fend off
total collapse, the North appears to be able to continue its unusual method of diplomacy to
preserve its independence. Unless extreme circumstances present themselves, North Korea will
be able to rest assured that there will be no invasion of the North by the US/ROK military.
The world may never know why the North Korean leadership carries out the actions that
it does. According to Don Oberdorfer, “North Korea is a black hole for information.”179 This is
evident with the lack of archival documents that are locked away in Pyongyang, unavailable for
access. The validity of these documents also comes into play. James Leonard, country director
for Korea from 1968-1969, shares:
I had a good friend, who was a Soviet diplomat, given the job of taking notes in a Politburo
meeting. After he was done he showed his draft to Gromyko and Gromyko gave him hell. He
said, “You idiot! You put down exactly what happened and that’s not what you are supposed to
do. Here is what you are supposed to do.” He dictated off a couple of points that were not said
in the meeting at all and that completely misrepresented the gist of the discussion within the
meeting. Gromyko said, “Look these documents are going to become available to the capitalists,
the imperialists, and they’re going to draw conclusions from them, and you’ve got to safeguard
against that by the way you present the materials that we compile today.”180
179
180
Oberdorfer, p.60.
Ostermann and Person, p. 121-122.
86
The truth and the answer to what has been going through the minds of the DPRK
leadership is both challenging and frustrating. It will continue to haunt policymakers, strategists,
and academics for the foreseeable future. In order to understand the present, one must recognize
the relevance of the past. The difficulty to do either gives the reclusive Kim family regime an
advantage over everyone including its “allies.” The X-factor has and will continue to be China.
Ideology no longer plays any role in the support it provides. The geographical location of a
rogue nation, capable of causing severe economic instability for a neighboring country
experiencing enormous growth, is reason enough to keep it afloat.
Trying to deduce any rationale for why the Kim family regime conducts its diplomacy, in
the manner that it does, is perplexing. Stephen Bradner’s explains the mindset of the Kim
dynasty as a cross between Lenin’s “fight-talk, fight-talk” dictum and the view expressed in
Mein Kampf that an organism that does not fight dies.181 If this is the case, then it explains the
inherited tactics passed from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il to Kim Jong Un. Unquestioned loyalty
and allegiance to the Party and its leadership is essential for regime survival. Through the
exposure of this mentality, in a closed society, North Korea is incapable of altering its policy
unless the regime collapses. It is, and will continue to be, a militarized society resorting to
threats and force to achieve what it wants or needs to survive.
Korea has been a strategic area of concern situated near the big powers of China, Russia,
and Japan. None of them will sit idly by and watch one “absorb” the peninsula and make it its
own. For North Korea regime survival, under the Kim dynasty, will continue to guide its
policies and decisions. For decades, the demand for a drawdown and even a pullout of a US
presence on the peninsula has been desired for both the US and South Koreans. Today the US,
181
Bradner, p. 6.
87
although remaining with its current troop levels and equipment, is preparing to transition to a
supporting role towards the ROK military in the event that armed conflict appears on the
peninsula. This is apparent as US bases are closing near the DMZ and military personnel are
stationed in areas farther south of Seoul. It may have taken almost four decades for the Nixon
Doctrine to work in Korea, but the South Koreans will have the lead responsibility for combat
operations in their own country. Without this US presence, the DPRK’s actions would not
warrant the attention that it desires internationally. Additionally, the presence of the US in the
ROK has allowed the Kim family regime to survive. Without US influence on ROK military
decision-making, primarily during the 1960s and 1970s, resumption of hostilities would most
certainly have occurred. The makeup of the peninsula would be different today. Albeit playing
a lesser role, the US military presence has, and will continue to be, the foundation for Korea’s
means for survival and autonomy, on both sides, for the future.
88
Bibliography
Primary Sources:
Bilbo, Mike. "Excerpts from 13 - Month Diary." Personal Diary. 1976. DMZ, Panmunjom, South
Korea.
Bonesteel, Charles, General. "Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations
Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)." 24 Jan. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 19641968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 7 Feb. 2011.
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
Bonesteel, Charles, General. "Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations
Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)." 27 Jan. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 19641968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 22 Feb. 2011.
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
Bonesteel, Charles, General. "Telegram From the Commander in Chief of the United Nations
Command and of United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel) to the Commander in Chief
Pacific (Sharp)." 07 Feb. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968,
Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 22 Mar. 2011.
<http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
Bucher, Commander Lloyd M. Bucher: My Story. New York: Doubleday &, 1970.
89
Ciphered Telegram #3600 from the Embassy in Korea (US Ambassador Porter) to the
Department of State, The Pueblo and Blue House Raid were likely related and that both
events are connected to Vietnam. Seoul, January 24, 1968. Cold War International
History Project.
Crane, Paul S. M.D., "Korean Attitudes and Thought Patterns-Prepared for UNC/USFK," in the
personal papers of Colonel Walter B. Clark, United States Army (ret.), Bonesteel
interview, Charleston, SC, 11 January, 1967.
DefenseLink. "Detailed Known Chronology on the Location and Seizure of the Pueblo." Office
of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff FOIA Requester Service Center, 23 Sept.
2008. Web. 28 Apr. 2011. <http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/reading_room/952.pdf>.
DMZ Axe Incident (1976), “381st MAC Meeting,” August 28, 1976, Korean Security Archive,
The Special Collections, (Washington DC: International Center, 2000).
Dutcher, Lieutenant W. E. United States Naval Reserve and Strole, Lieutenant D. L. United
States Navy, "Naval and Maritime Events. July 1968-December 1969," United States
Naval Institute Proceedings 96”, May, 1970
Field Circular "Low-Intensity Conflict." FC 100-20, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth/Kansas, May 30, 1986.
GDR Embassy Sofia to Hermann Axen, SED Politburo Member and Secretary of the Central
Committee International Relations Department, Letter and Translation of Information by
the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party on Talks Between Todor
Zhivkov and Kim Il Sung, 18 June 1975.
90
Johnson, Lyndon, US President. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Korea." Letter to Park, Chung Hee, ROK President. 07 Feb. 1968. Foreign Relations of
the United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web.
29 Mar. 2011. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
Jones, Thomas W. Notes of the President's Tuesday National Security Lunch on January 23,
1968. White House, Washington DC. North Korea International Documentation Project,
2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical Oral
History. Web. 01 Apr. 2011.
Kirkbride, Wayne A LTC(R). "Panic on the Peninsula." Brinkmanship on the Peninsula. Camp
Bonifas, Panmunjom. Oct. 2008. Lecture.
Kissinger, Henry, White House Years, Boston. MA. Little, Brown, and Co. 1979.
Laird, Melvin, Secretary of Defense. “Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to
President Nixon,” 18 Apr. 1969. Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976,
Volume XIX, Part I, Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 21 Jun. 2011.
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d17>.
Laird, Melvin Secretary of Defense. Review of US Contingency Plans by Washington Special
Action Group. Memorandum. National Security Archives, 25 June 1969. Web. 2 May
2011. <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB322/Doc12.pdf>.
Max, B. United States. Chinese Communism Subject Archive. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Cong. Doc. 28th ed. Vol. 4. Peking: Peking Review,
1967.
91
Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. " Military Contingency Planning for
Korea,” 02 Jul. 1969. Foreign Relations of the United States 1969-1976, Volume XIX,
Part I, Korea, #28. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 13 June. 2011.
<http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v19p1/d28>.
Nixon, Richard M, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, New York: Warner Books, 1978.
NSC Meeting. “Talking Points: Korea.” 14 Aug. 1969. Rep. Washington DC: North Korea
International Documentation Project, 2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean
Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical Oral History. Web. 26 Apr. 2011.
<http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NKIDP_Critical_OralHist_textL.pdf>.
"Official (USFK) Website and Archives." United States Forces Korea Archival Data. 28 Feb.
2008. 04 May 2010. <https://.usfk.mil/usfk/archive/>.
Porter, William, P. Ambassador. "Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of
State." Letter to US Department of State. 24 Jan. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United
States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 7 Feb.
2011. <http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
Porter, William, P. Ambassador. “Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of
State.” Letter to US Department of State. 16 Apr. 1969. Rep. Washington DC: North
Korea International Documentation Project, 2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the
Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical Oral History. Web. 26 Apr. 2011.
<http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NKIDP_Critical_OralHist_textL.pdf>.
92
Radchenko, Sergey. DPRK Capture of the American Spy Ship and Support by the Soviet Union.
Record of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and North
Korean Charge D’Affaires Kang Ch’ol-gun, USSR, Moscow. Vol. 102. Moscow: Arkhiv
Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 31 Jan, 1968, Cold War International History
Project, Web. 29 Mar. 2011. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/.
Radchenko, Sergey. “On the Current Problems of the International Situation and on the Struggle
of the CPSU for the Unity of the International Communist Movement.” Excerpt from a
speech by Leonid Brezhnev at the April 9, 1968 CC CPSU Plenum, Moscow. Cold War
International History Project, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 29 Mar. 2011.
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/.
Rostow, Walt W. Report of Meeting of Advisory Group, January 29 1968. Rep. Washington DC:
North Korea International Documentation Project, 2011. Crisis and Confrontation on the
Korean Peninsula: 1968-1969. A Critical Oral History. Web. 29 Mar. 2011.
<http://wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/NKIDP_Critical_OralHist_textL.pdf>.
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State. "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Korea." Letter to ROK Ambassador Porter. 06 Feb. 1968. Foreign Relations of the
United States 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 22
Feb. 2011. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/o.html>.
Rusk, Dean, "Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea." Instructions for
Twenty-Sixth Meeting,” 11 Dec. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 19641968, Volume XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 16 Jun. 2011,
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/zh.html.
93
Schindler, B. "Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State/1/ Seoul, January
24, 1968, 2105Z." Rev. of National Archives and Records Administration. 24 Jan. 1968.
“Situation in Korea as of mid-July 1967,” Telegram from the Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command, Korea and the Commander United States Forces, Korea (Bonesteel)
to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp), July 21, 1967, in US Department of State,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, vol. 29, part 21, Korea, Washington
DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington DC, February 12,
1968, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,
Korea, Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000.
Telegram from the Embassy in Korea to Department of State, Seoul, 28 January, 1968, US
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Korea,
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 2000.
United States Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, Combat Readiness of United
States and South Korean Forces in South Korea, Fourth Cong, 2d sess. Washington. DC,
7 June 1968.
United States Department of the Army, Table of Organization and Equipment no. 7th, 2nd
Infantry Division, Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 31 March
1966.
Vance, Cyrus, Deputy Secretary of Defense. "Memorandum From Cyrus R. Vance to President
Johnson," 20 Feb. 1968. Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume
94
XXIX Korea. State Department, 20 Jan. 2001. Web. 15 Jun. 2011.
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxix/r.html>.
Wheeler, Earle, Joint Chief of Staff to Secretary of Defense (Laird, Melvin), Contingency Plan
for North Korea. Memorandum. National Security Archives, 21 May 1969. Web. 21 June
2011. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB322/Doc09.pdf.
Secondary Sources:
Alexander George, Hall David, and Simons William, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos,
Cuba and Vietnam, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
Armbrister, Trevor. A Matter of Accountability The True Story of the Pueblo Affair. New York:
Lyons, 2004.
Art, Robert, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4, no. 3 (Spring 1980).
Asselin, Pierre. A Bitter Peace: Washington, Hanoi, and the Making of the Paris Agreement.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 2002.
Atkinson, Rick. The Long Gray Line The American Journey of West Point's Class of 1966. New
York: Owl, 1999.
Becker, Jasper. Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea. New York
City: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Bermudez, Joseph S. North Korean Special Forces. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute, 1998.
95
Binder, James, L. "On the Line in Korea: The Porous War." Army, 19 January, 1969.
Bolger, Daniel P. Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low Intensity Conflict in Korea 1966-1969.
Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Company, 2001.
Bradner, Stephen. North Korea's Strategy. Rep. Arlington, Virginia: Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center, August 2001.
Bramford, James, Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency, New
York: Anchor Books, 2002.
Bratton, Patrick C. "When Is Coercion Successful? And Why Can't We Agree on It." Naval War
College Review 58.3 (Summer, 2005): 99-120.
Choe, Sang-Hun, “Memo from Seoul - North Korea Perfects Its Diplomatic Game Brinkmanship,” The New York Times - Breaking News, World News & Multimedia, 2
April 2009, Web, 22 April 2011.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/03/world/asia/03korea.html>
Colonel Charles L. Bachtel, United States Army (ret.), "The KATUSA Program," Signal 23,
December, 1968.
"A Continuous Nightmare." CGSC - Command and General Staff College - Combined Arms
Research Library. 14 Jan. 2004. 10 Dec. 2010. <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/>.
Correll, John T. "Air Force Magazine." Origins of Total Force Feb. 2011: 94-97.
Dallek, Robert. Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power. New York: HarperCollins Pub., 2007.
DeFronzo, James. Revolutions and Revolutionary Movements. Boulder, CO: Westview, 2007.
96
Delateur, Conrad A. Murder at Panmunjom: The Role of the Theater Commander in Crisis
Resolution. Thesis. United States Department of State Foreign Service Institute. Rosslyn,
1987.
Finley. The US Military Experience in Korea, 220; and Lieutenant Colonel Everett H. Webster,
United States Air Force, Is the Morning Calm About to Be Broken in Korea?" 8-9,
Research report no. 4471, Air War College, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL
March 1971.
GI Korea. "DMZ Flashpoints: The Blue House Raid." ROK Drop. 30 Dec. 2008. Web. 07 Feb.
2011. <http://rokdrop.com/2008/12/30/dmz-flashpoints-the-blue-house-raid/>.
Guthrie, William P, COL United States Army, "Korea: The Other DMZ," Infantry 60 (MarchApril 1970.
Hamm, Taik-Young, Arming the Two Koreas: State, Capital, and Military Power, London:
Routledge, 1999.
Homan, Richard. "Lost Plane a Pueblo-Type Spy." The Washington Post, 16 Apr. 1969. Print
Jin, Ryu. "Military Admits `Silmido Unit' for First Time." Korea Times [Seoul] 06 Feb. 2004.
Jung, Chang-Hyun, Gyeot-eseo Bon Gim Jeong Il, rev. and enl. edn (Kim Jong Il Seen from the
Side), Seoul, Gimyeoungsa, 2000.
Kirkbride, Wayne A. DMZ, A Story of the Panmunjom Axe Murder. Elizabeth, N.J: Hollym
International, 1984.
Kirkbride, Wayne A. Panmunjom. Seoul: Hollym, 1985.
97
Kirkbride, Wayne A. Timber - The Story of Operation Paul Bunyan. 1st ed. New York: Vantage,
1980.
"Korean Red Cross." 함께하는세상 Together. Korean Red Cross, 2009. Web. 20 June 2011.
<http://www.redcross.or.kr/eng/about/about_010101.jsp>.
Lauren, Paul G. Craig, Gordon A. George, Alexander L. Force and Statecraft, Diplomatic
Challenges of our Time. 4th ed. New York: Oxford, 2007.
Lee Hyun-Taek. "A would-be assassin builds a new life." INSIDE Korea JoongAng Daily. 4
Nov. 2009. International Herald Tribune. 28 Apr. 2011.
<http://joongangdaily.joins.com/article/view.asp?aid=2912061>.
Lerner, Mitchell B. The Pueblo Incident A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy
(Modern War Studies). New York: University of Kansas, 2003.
Loo, Bernard Fook Weng. Middle Powers and Accidental Wars: a Study in Conventional
Strategic Stability. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 2005.
Major Vandon E. Jenerette, United States Army, "The Forgotten DMZ," Military Review 68,
May, 1988.
McGreal, Chris. "Papers Reveal Nixon Plan for North Korea Nuclear Strike | World News | The
Guardian." Guardian.co.uk, 7 July 2010. Web. 02 May 2011.
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/07/nixon-north-korea-nuclear-strike>.
Michishita, Narushige. North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966-2008. London:
Routledge, 2010.
98
Miller, Debra A. North Korea. San Diego, CA: Gale Group, 2004.
Mobley, Richard A. Flash Point North Korea: the Pueblo and EC-121 Crises. Annapolis, Md.:
Naval Institute, 2003.
Mullin, Max, Master Sergeant. "The Blue House Raid: North Korean Commandos Are Hardcore
PT Studs | Tactical MilSim Magazine." Tactical Milsim Magazine - The World's Premier
Tactical Mil-sim Publication. 13 May 2009. Web. 07 Feb. 2011.
<http://www.tacticalmilsim.com/1-military/wheels-up/the-blue-house/>.
Noland, Marcus, Sherman Robinson, and Tao Wang. Famine in North Korea: Causes and Cures.
Rep. Washington DC: Institue for International Economics, 1999.
"North Korea." U.S. Department of State. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, 29 Apr.
2011. Web. 09 May 2011. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm#defense>.
Norton, Robert F. "Armor Helps Defend the ROK." Armor 77, September/October, 1968.
Oberdorfer, Don. The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History. New York: Basic, 2001.
Ostermann, Christian F., and James F. Person. Crisis and Confrontation on the Korean
Peninsula: 1968 to 1969 A Critical Oral History. Washington: Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, 2011.
Schaefer, Bernd. Overconfidence Shattered: North Korean Unification Policy. North Korean
International Documentation Project, Dec. 2010. Web. 9 May 2011.
<http://www.wilsoncenter.org/nkidp>.
99
Senate, The United States and the Korean Problem, Document 74, Articles 1-11, 23, 27, Korean
Armistice Agreement.
“Signaling”. Diplofoundation, Web. 22 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.diplomacy.edu/language/Signalling/main.htm>
Singlaub, John K. Hazardous Duty an American Soldier in the Twentieth Century. New York:
Summit, 1991.
Snyder, Scott. Negotiating on the Edge North Korean Negotiating Behavior. Washington, D.C.:
United States Institute of Peace, 1999.
Stefans John J. Specialist Fifth Class, United States Army, "Confessions of a Red Agent," Army
Digest 23, May 1968.
Swaine, Michael D., Tuosheng Zhang, and Danielle F. S. Cohen. Managing Sino-American
Crises: Case Studies and Analysis. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2006.
Szalontai, Bal zs. Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet-DPRK Relations and the Roots of
North Korean Despotism, 1953-1964. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2005.
“The Korean People Sharply Condemn the US Imperialists’ New War Plots,” Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea, No 10, 1976.
Thies, Wallace, “Compellance Failure or Coercive Success: The Case of NATO and
Yugoslavia,” Comparative Strategy, 22 June 2003.
100
Turley, William S. The Second Indochina War: A Concise Political and Military History.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
Twomey, Christopher P. The Military Lens: Doctrinal Difference and Deterrence Failure in
Sino-American Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 2010.
US Naval Institute - Naval History and Heritage Command. "15 April 1969: Deep Sea 129
Shootdown." Naval History. 15 Apr. 2010. Web. 28 Apr. 2011.
<http://www.navalhistory.org/2010/04/15/15-april-1969-deep-sea-129-shootdown/>.
USS Pueblo. Web. 17 Feb. 2010. <http://www.usspueblo.org/>.
Wicker, Rush R, United States Army, "CH-37 Mojave Workhorse of Korea," United States Army
Aviation Digest 14, July, 1968.
Willancy, Mark. “North Korea Threatens Seoul with Sea of Fire.” ABC News. 28 Feb. 2011.
Web. 22 Apr. 2011. < http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2011/02/28/3150227.htm>.
Xia, Yafeng. Negotiating with the Enemy: U.S.-China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972.
Bloomington: Indiana UP, 2006.
Yoon, Tae-Young. Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula: South Korea’s Crisis
Management Towards North Korea within the Context of the South Korea-US Alliance,
1968-1983. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Politics and Philosophy, Faculty of
Humanities and Social Science, Manchester Metropolitan University, October 1997.
Yu Shek Chang, Joseph. "China and the Korean Situation: The Challenge of Pyongyang’s
Brinkmanship." East Asia: An International Quarterly 20.4, 2003.