GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.1 No.1, March 2014
Contemporary Western Concepts – a Step
toward Eastern Mentality
Anna Jedynak, University of Warsaw, Poland
Abstract—Empirical evidence shows that people in the East
and the West differ in their attitudes toward the world. The East,
unlike the West, tends to perceive reality as a dynamic and
complex whole, and not as a set of isolated, static parts; it
emphasizes relations over features; community over individuality;
harmony over polemics; concreteness over abstraction; metaphor
over literalism; practical efficiency over theoretical explanations.
In spite of those differences, some concepts in contemporary
Western philosophy are more akin to Eastern mentality. The most
important include holism, contextualism, instrumentalism,
embodied embedded cognition, extended mind theory, enactivism,
non-classical logic, family resemblance, and implicature
Index Terms — context, East, holism, logic, meaning, West
I. EAST AND WEST: DIFFERENT ATTITUDES
Philosophical views or ideas are not the same as attitudes
toward the world. For instance, the skeptical attitude means
restraining oneself from asserting beliefs, while the skeptical
view is a conviction that beliefs lack justification. Attitudes
toward the world, which developed in Western and Eastern
cultures, differ significantly. Even though globalization has not
removed those differences, they are now more readily
recognized and better understood, and not as big. Moreover,
some emerging concepts in contemporary Western philosophy
seem to resemble Eastern ones. We will outline the
aforementioned differences, and then briefly present the
Western philosophical ideas that seem to be similar to Eastern
ways of thinking.
The observations presented below are not just common
stereotypes, since they have been empirically tested and there
is evidence justifying them. Of course, there are no rigid
boundaries between the “Western” and “Eastern” mentality:
evidence points rather to certain tendencies and statistical
correlations [1—12]. However, for the sake of simplicity, the
two mentalities will be presented as two different types of
attitudes.
A. The world around us
Western perception of the world focuses on the forms of
objects, while the Eastern one focuses on substance. This basic
difference is connected with many others. Forms are abstract
and have distinct boundaries, while substance is concrete and
continuous. In the first case, perception distinguishes
particular, atomistic objects, and ignores the background.
Things are primary in the ontological and cognitive order. In
DOI: 10.5176/2345-7856_1.1.8
the second case, what is most prominent is the whole, full of
mutual connections between its parts. The emphasis is on
interdependence rather than isolated parts. The Western
description of the world focuses on features of things, which
determine divisions and classifications, while the Eastern
description focuses on relations between objects. In the
Western view, what happens with an object is determined by
its qualities, and its relations to other objects are secondary. In
the Eastern view, objects are co-shaped by the relations that
connect them, and what happens to those objects depends on
the situation and the environment. The Western emphasis on
abstractions leads to static models in common thinking, while
the Eastern interest in concrete things brings out motion and
changes.
B. The individual in society
All that is related to certain social attitudes: the West
focuses on individuals, while Eastern collectivism – on
community. The West appreciates individualism and freedom,
and the East appreciates harmonious relations within the
community and cooperation.
Asians are determined by their roles in family and society,
especially their position in hierarchy. Westerners are
determined by their personal traits, seen as independent of the
environment. A person is seen as an individual, isolated from
the environment, with a sense of substantial personal agency.
In the East, a person is perceived as less rigid, more flexible,
connected with the environment and dependent on it, and with
a sense of collective agency. Americans seek the motives of
actions in the qualities of the agents, while Asians – in
circumstances. The former often describe events they
participated in impersonally, while the latter – from their own
viewpoint, often in terms of their own feelings and
preferences.
The West appreciates uniqueness, and the East – what is
typical and common. Westerners see social relationships as an
opportunity for establishing their own exceptional qualities,
excellence, or superiority. Self-esteem, independence and
personal achievements are desirable. Success is perceived as a
result of personal merit and is striven for just for oneself. The
role of authority figures and superiors is bigger in the East,
making public control of those in power more difficult. The
East appreciates perfectionism, achieved by way of selfcriticism, and the well-being of the community. Contrary to
Americans, Asians are able to summon more energy working
for the community rather than for their individual benefit.
©The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.1 No.1, March 2014
Westerners expect the status quo to last, and when changes
do come, expect them to proceed in one direction. They want
to control the world and they believe it is possible. Asians, on
the other hand, are open both to changes and to a reversal of
trends. They are not as readily surprised, for they take into
account a wider array of possibilities. They make more longterm plans, expecting the recurrence of similar situations.
Instead of controlling the world, they would rather adapt to it.
They enjoy sharing the joys of life with others and support one
another in adversity.
In the West, a deal is made according to rigid, universal
rules, and is expected to hold regardless of the course of
events, while Asians take into account that it was made in
specific circumstances, and when these change, it may be
renegotiated. Western negotiations are (or at least were until
recently) tough and short-term, while Eastern ones are gentler
and rather long-term, aiming at relative satisfaction of both
parties. In the West, justice is basically determined by rules of
law, while the East prefers mediation, compromise, and
reconciliation. The West emphasizes individual human rights,
while in the Eastern view, individuals should rather partake in
the rights of the community.
C. Language
The differences presented above are connected with
linguistic differences. Nouns are basic in Western languages,
so the world seems to be a certain state of things, while in
Eastern languages, it is verbs that are the most important, so
the world seems to be a certain process. As Asians grasp
reality in terms of verbs rather than nouns, they are less
inclined to categorize and generalize. Also, Chinese uses
abstract expressions less frequently.
Rigid Western models employ precise language, the use of
abstractions, and clear-cut definitions, while the Eastern
awareness of changeability and flux goes together with vague
expressions and fuzzy, context-dependent meanings. In
Western languages, extensions of names are usually
determined by their content, described in clear definitions. In
Eastern languages, on the other hand, extensions are more
often vague and determined by family resemblance; and
understatements are conducive to the expressive function of
language and use of metaphors.
In the West, the subject is the central part of a sentence,
while in the East, it is rather the whole situation or the theme.
In the East, more than in the West, understanding people’s
utterances depends on intuition, and not only on rules. The
same is true about comprehending the world. Contrary to the
West, the East did not traditionally emphasize the opposition
between mind and heart, and between reasoning and feelings.
The heart was perceived as the center of cognition.
D. Logic
Westerners have a predilection for dichotomies. According
to formal logic, they tend to accept the principle of
noncontradiction. Asians focus on gradual transitions and
intermediate states and do not avoid literal contradictions,
assuming there is no one truth, for its parts are spread among
opposing views. They reluctantly use formal logic and tend to
avoid decontextualizing and schematizing reasonings. What
they see as problematic are not the formal schemes as such but
rather their usefulness and applicability. Dealing with vague
expressions, whose meanings change and depend on context,
they are careful about the substitution of logical laws. Formal
logic leaves no room for identical expressions substituted for
the same variable to have different and context-dependent
meanings. However, in Asian languages, such variability often
is the case. A Western logician would describe such cases in
terms of equivocation.
In the East, the acceptance of contradictions is perceived as
a middle way leading to the whole truth. Beliefs are not
assumed to be ultimate and irrefutable. Open objection is not
approved. Refusals, as well as some other kinds of messages,
are often expressed indirectly, according to certain
conventions that tend to be unclear for Westerners. Asians are
more proficient at understanding others, their emotions, needs,
or motivations, because they are trained since childhood to
interpret indirect messages. In the West, it is the speaker who
is responsible for a clear and unequivocal formulation of his
thought. In the East, it is up to the listener to grasp properly
the speaker’s intention.
E. Science
The West does not avoid polemics and, for in the course of
a critical discussion the wrong views should be refuted. The
East approaches polemics much more cautiously, for they
could disrupt the community’s harmony. This difference can
be found in science as well, or rather could be, since nowadays
the scientific world is undergoing unification. In Asia, the
critical exchange of thoughts in science was less important.
Science was verified by practice itself, and not by debates.
Efficient predictions and applications were emphasized, rather
than theories. Inventions were more important than
discoveries. A good example of how Asian science worked is
traditional oriental medicine. On the other hand, the West was
more theoretically oriented and looked for concepts that could
explain and connect phenomena. It also looked for principles
unifying various theories, while in the East, in the face
divergent ideas, compromises were sought.
F. Spirituality and religion
Similarly, religion in the East is not so much concerned
with beliefs; it is rather a matter of personal practice [13—16].
The West emphasizes doctrinal aspects, while the East leans
towards ecumenism and eclecticism. In the West, the practical
side of religion manifests in social activities, e.g. as charity,
rather than in meditation. Asian meditative practices originate
from religion but are not necessarily limited to it. Meditation
can be combined both with religious rituals and with physical
exercises.
There is a vast number of both meditative methods and
attempts at describing their results. What all these paths have
in common are two basic aspects of meditation: a silent, clear
mind and keen attention. In meditation, the mind gradually
abandons its routine, habitual activity, and focuses on what
remains: the current experience of the present moment. Neither
the division into body and mind nor the opposition between
subject and object belong to the experience stripped bare of all
interpretation. Meditation leads beyond the boundaries of
©The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.1 No.1, March 2014
language and its ontology, and reaches the experiential
oneness beyond complexity and divisions. From this
perspective, consciousness is not different from broadly
conceived, but bare, experience.
Meditative experiences then carry over to ordinary,
complex everyday life, full of necessary divisions, and help
people put in perspective one’s own person and problems, thus
making them more manageable.
There is probably a connection between meditative
tradition and Eastern mentality. Flexibility and the
conventional character of divisions, perception of reality as a
complex, mutable whole, appreciation of community and
harmony, reluctance to theorize and engage in argument –
these are all both the results of meditative practices and
attitudes common in Eastern countries.
II. CONVERGENCE
On one hand, as a result of globalization, various aspects of
Eastern reality begin resembling Western ones. These include,
for instance, the development of scientific standards and
exchange, including critical and polemical debates. To some
degree, Eastern mentality is being affected by Western
individualism and political practice. On the other hand, certain
views in contemporary Western philosophy seem compatible
with Eastern attitudes towards the world. They emerge mainly
in cognitive disciplines, such as logic, semiotics, and
epistemology, where cognitive fundamentalism has been
abandoned.
A. Logical investigations
Non-classical logic began emerging in the beginning of the
20th century as a result of questioning the principle of
noncontradiction. In some calculi, this principle does not hold.
In the process of pursuing the truth, the West sometimes sees
pragmatic and heuristic value in contradictions. Paraconsistent
logics accept contradictions, though to a limited degree [17].
This corresponds to a situation in science, when in various
areas, inconsistent theories do have value, or to a situation,
when dialectic accepts contradictions at the stage of searching
for the truth. The concept of minimal rationality sanctions
inconsistencies if they fulfill a heuristic role, are temporary,
and are to be eventually eliminated [18].
Fuzzy logic takes into account that in empirical reality,
there are no sharp divisions, transitions are continuous and
gradable, terms are vague, and sentences can be partially true.
Fuzzy set theory is based on the concept of a gradual
membership function [19]. Vagueness is considered a
philosophical problem [20].
The discovery of logical and semantic antinomies proved
that no language can be both universal and immune to the
generation of undesirable contradictions. And according to
Gödel’s theorem, each sufficiently rich language contains
undecidable sentences [21]. These themes are close to the
Eastern conviction about the cognitive limitations of language,
although the nature of these limitations in both cases is
different.
There is non-Fregean logic that, apart from the ontology of
things, deals with the ontology of situations and functions, so
the world turns out to be something more than just a sum of
individual objects [22]. We also have temporal logics, whose
schemes allow quantification of variables representing
moments of time, so that the aspect of passing time is not
ignored [23]. All this challenges the view that Western
schematization has to be at odds with the Eastern sense of the
elusive, evanescent character of reality.
Nonmonotonic logic takes into account that enlarging a set
of premises may result in transforming a deductive inference
into a non-deductive one [24]. That seems to be a paradox.
However, examples of non-monotonic inferences often contain
a general premise which is only true if applied to typical cases.
Adding an extra premise, dealing with untypical cases, may
limit the range of the general premise and weaken the
inference. Non-monotonic logic justifies the Eastern interest in
the substitution of the laws of logic.
The multiplicity of logical calculi proves that no calculus is
valid unconditionally but only as a consequence of a certain
set of axioms. There is a view that the choice of calculus is
empirically conditioned: for instance, quantum mechanics
would require a non-classical logic without the law of
excluded middle [25]. The conviction that there are no
ironclad, trans-empirical, abstract rules that would determine
thinking about reality corresponds to the Eastern attitude
towards purely formal logic.
B. Semiotics
Of similar significance for convergence with the Eastern
way of thinking was the undermining of the boundary between
logic and facts, as well as between facts and language in
general. The sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic
components of knowledge, or between empirical content and
its presentation, was questioned [26]. Facts ceased to be
simply a given, becoming constructs within an admitted
conceptual scheme, a result of the whole cognitive situation
embedded in empirical reality [27].
In semiotic research, the role of pragmatics becomes
increasingly important. Abstract rules are replaced by contextdependence. To a large extent, this pragmatic shift is due to
the work of Wittgenstein [28]. According to his concept of
definition, based on family resemblance, it may be the case
that not a single feature is shared by all designates of the same
name. The designates can be similar to one another in pairs but
with respect to different features in different pairs. More and
more expressions are being revealed, whose meaning is due to
family resemblance. In the East, meaning is actually seen as
family resemblance, not as a constant set of features, hence the
Asian fluidity of language and avoidance of precise
definitions. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of an
expression is its use which can be investigated by scrutinizing
language-games, i.e. various custom-based linguistic social
practices. He also argued against the possibility of private
languages. He considered language secondary with respect to
the community and relations among its members. And such a
primary role of community is quite close to the Eastern
viewpoint.
Other pragmatic theories deal with indirect communication
(widely practiced in Asian countries). These include
presupposition theory and implicature theory. The former
©The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.1 No.1, March 2014
claims that explicit information can only be considered
meaningful if some other sentences, not communicated
directly, are assumed to be true [29]. The theory of implicature
describes rules governing conversation and the consequences
of their acceptance [30]. The assumption that an interlocutor
follows such rules may reveal certain understatements,
suggestions, and complementary information, implicit in his or
her message. And if the rules are clearly transgressed, it may
indicate a non-literal sense of an utterance. However, we are
so used to understatements that they may seem transparent.
And they are probably less sophisticated and subtle than
Eastern conventions of indirect communication.
What also clearly corresponds to the Eastern mentality is
contextualism. This term has many meanings. In semiotics, it
refers to the context principle claiming that it is the pragmatic
situation that shapes the meaning of an utterance and its
valuation in terms of either the truth, or consistency with the
speaker’s intention [31,32]. The role of context was originally
recognized with reference to indexicals. Later on, it became
clear that context affects the meanings not only of indexicals,
which gave rise to contextualism. Its radical version posits that
no meaning is given outside of context. And since the meaning
of an expression depends on the context, so do its truthconditions. Semantic contextualism shows the flexibility of
meanings and the role of context, especially of some implicit
assumptions. AI research could be the contributing source of
such observations, since scientists working on the construction
of a computer able to pass the Turing test have discovered that
conversation involves an incredible number of tacit,
unconscious, though obvious assumptions [33].
Assumptions similar to those of contextualism are the basis
of philosophical hermeneutics which is the art of interpretation
of texts in view of their historical and cultural context. It is its
practical character of an art or skill, rather than of a theory or a
set of views, that corresponds with Eastern attitudes.
Close to semantic contextualism is semantic holism,
according to which the meaning of a single expression depends
on the whole network of meanings of expressions in a given
language [28]. Due to mutual meaning connections, a change
in one point affects the whole network. This concept
undermines the view of separateness and isolation of
meanings, and is thus similar to Eastern views.
C. Epistemology
Contextualization of the concept of knowledge shows that
there are different standards and criteria of knowledge,
determined in a given situation by cognitive needs and
possibilities. In particular, solving problems in everyday
situations does not require standards as stringent as when
debating a skeptical hypothesis. I know that I am now sitting at
the table, though I cannot rule out that my sitting at the table is
an illusion (and in that sense I “do not know” that).
Contextualism is supposed to protect practical knowledge
against skeptical doubts. However, even in everyday
situations, cognitive standards concerning the same problems
may differ depending on the condition of the subject.
Philosophical thought strives to specify context-dependent
truth conditions of sentences, which ascribe knowledge to a
subject. Epistemological contextualism – the kind most
pursued nowadays – corresponds to the ambiguity of Eastern
criteria of cognition [34—39]. Some of its versions reject the
closure principle, in line with the reserve towards the principle
of noncontradiction [40].
Similarly, apart from its semantic version, holism also has
an epistemological formulation: sentences of a theory are not
tested individually but together with the whole theory [26]. In
case of negative results, the theory is falsified, but the tests do
not indicate which part of it – or perhaps only one of the
auxiliary hypotheses – is false. This view has no direct Eastern
counterpart, since – as mentioned – elaboration of theories was
not the most emphasized aspect in Asian thought. Still, the
holistic approach finds expression there: as emphasis on many
various connections and interdependence between observable
phenomena. This is evident both in science (e.g. in traditional
Asian medicine) and in everyday perception of the
environment.
Western instrumentalism and antirealism do not treat
scientific theories as seriously as traditional realism does, and
that resembles the Eastern approach. Theories seen not as
adequate representations of the world but as useful
constructions, seem akin to unhampered metaphorical
descriptions that used to be encountered in Asian science
[27,41].
Interestingly enough, some views in contemporary Western
epistemology correspond to traditional Eastern spirituality,
although they follow from reflection on cognition, far from any
spiritual inspiration. They include embodied embedded
cognition, enactivism, and extended mind theory. The idea of
embodied cognition emphasizes the role of sensorimotor
processes in shaping our most basic cognitive faculties and
ways of comprehending the world and ourselves. More
complex cognitive faculties and concepts are rooted in those
basic ones. So ultimately, our way of being in the world and
knowing anything about it is based on our sensorimotor
processes [42]. This concept undermines the idea of a sharp
distinction between body and mind. From this perspective,
they are not two different entities. A meditator focused on
current experience comes to a similar point, realizing the unity
of body and mind. Such a meditative experience, however, is
not the same as its verbal expression.
Embodied cognition is also considered embedded, or
situated, cognition [43,44]. Sensorimotor processes are only
possible in interaction with the environment, so they are
necessarily embedded in the environment, and consequently,
so are all cognitive processes. In terms of meditation,
deepening it leads to the realization of the unity of body-mind
and environment. From this perspective, the body-mind and
the environment, seen as separate entities, are only the results
of abstraction from indivisible, direct experience. Once again,
epistemology meets meditation, although the former is rooted
in verbal reflection, and the latter in direct, bare perception.
Enactivism goes even further, supplementing the concept
of embodied embedded cognition with an idea that
consciousness is shaped by multilevel interactions between
three dynamic systems: neural, somatic, and environmental.
The processes crucial for consciousness transcend the
divisions between brain, body, and environment, rather than
©The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.1 No.1, March 2014
being neural events limited only to the brain [45]. Enactivism
is inspired by phenomenology and based on neuroscientific
evidence. It avoids both representationalism and solipsism
[46,47]. Moreover, with reference to the simplest cognitive
processes, radical enactivism gives up the distinction between
the content and its vehicle. It maintains that basic mind,
although intentional and capable for perceptual processes, is
free of content. The differentiation between the mind content
and the subject arises later on, beyond the basic level of the
mind [48].
Enactivist views, expressed in philosophical or scientific
terms, seem close to the attempts of meditators to express their
experience of giving up mental boundaries separating them
from the world. As a natural result of their direct experience,
they tend to think about themselves less egocentrically and
more impartially. Thus these meditative methods have an
ethical and spiritual dimension, although they have nothing to
do with scientific standards.
Another theory close to the Eastern idea of unity of humans
and the environment is the extended mind theory. It stems
from the reflection on the technological background of
cognition. The extended mind transcends the limits of the
human body and involves devices supporting cognition, such
as a notebook or computer. According to the functional
criterion, objects fulfilling the same functions as those fulfilled
by the conscious mind are considered parts of the extended
mind [49]. However, the concept of the extended mind as a
collective object met with criticism [50]: why should such
different things as a thinking mind and, for instance, a pencil
be combined not only in one category but also as one
collective object? This objection was dealt with by presenting
the extended mind not as a static object but a dynamic
complex of hybrid, neurophysical cognitive processes,
occurring in a composite environment [51]. Similarly, in
Eastern thought, the mind is a process rather than an object.
A dynamic vision of mind and reality obviously attenuates
the sharpness of divisions and highlights interactions, so it is
closer to the Eastern view of the world. However, it is not
widely shared in Western philosophy. Western languages favor
ontologies of things rather than ontologies of situations or
events.
Philosophical reflection on chaos theory says that slight
differences in the initial conditions of a nonlinear dynamic
system result in widely diverging outcomes, so that long-term
predictability and control over it is impossible. This view, as
opposed to traditional, simple Western models of linear
predictability, is closer to Eastern thinking in terms of
accepting the world rather than controlling it.
One of the Western concepts dealing with cognition which
seems to be contrary to Eastern attitudes, is dual process
theory. It develops the traditional opposition between intuition
and reason, putting it in terms of two systems of thinking.
System 1 is intuitive, fast, biologically determined, effortless,
unintentional, automatic, insensitive to rational control, and
shaped by emotions, experience and memory. System 2 is
rational, slow, logical and intentional, demanding effort, and
based on reasonable control, evidence, logical rules, and
weighing of options [52]. It is considered much better and
more reliable than System 1. This opposition was not
traditionally known in the East. However, it is probable that
also in this aspect, Western philosophy will evolve and
converge with Eastern thinking. Firstly, although it has favored
reason over intuition, recently it has discovered the cognitive
role of emotions [53,54]. Secondly, it is becoming more
clearly aware of the codependence and coordination of
emotions and reason, especially since neuroscience has shown
that the centers of some emotions and of some cognitive
processes are located in the same brain areas [55]. The concept
of epistemic emotions was formulated.
The concept of epistemic truth, i.e. such truth which does
not exist beyond the possibility of its recognition [56],
corresponds to the Eastern view of the truth being scattered
among opposing viewpoints whose proponents are subject to
various conditions and have differing cognitive possibilities.
Whereas Eastern emphasis on wholeness and codependent
existence is reflected in the rules of social life, Western
epistemological equivalents of that perspective seem to have
no similar social consequences. That can hardly be expected,
however, because Western individualism seems to be too
strong a barrier. Still, one can distinguish at least one instance
of Western convergence with Eastern social practice: the
change in style of negotiations to softer ones, more oriented
towards mutual satisfaction and long-term cooperation [57].
Models of education involving cooperation rather than
competition are being currently discussed.
III. CLOSING REMARKS
Since Eastern and Western attitudes differ in many points,
and some Western views seem to converge with Eastern ones,
one might pose a question about the relationship between
contemporary Western philosophical ideas and everyday
Western attitudes. Are they compatible? Firstly, Western
philosophy is pluralistic, and the concepts mentioned above
are just a few of a wide array of others. Secondly, the Western
philosophical ideas that seem to correspond to Eastern ones
are related to a typical Western mindset in various ways. Some
of these ideas have not affected this mindset, just as relativistic
physics has not affected our everyday thinking about the
world. The same goes for holism, dynamism, the acceptance of
contradictions, antirealism, embodied embedded cognition,
extended mind theory, and enactivism. However, some other
ideas reveal aspects of Western attitudes that were previously
neither considered nor conscious. These aspects are not as
prominent as in Eastern culture, so there are still cultural
differences. They include context-dependence of the meaning
of expressions, of truth-conditions, and of standards of
knowledge; meaning as family resemblance; indirect
utterances: suggestions, presuppositions, and metaphors; and
the acceptance of emotional and intuitive cognition.
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
R.E. Nisbett, The geography of thought. How Asians and Westerners
think differently…and why. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster: 2003.
S.J. Heine, D.R. Lehman, H.R. Markus, and S. Kitayama, “Is there a
universal need for positive self-regard?” Psychological Review 1999,
vol. 106, pp. 766—794.
©The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
GSTF Journal of General Philosophy (JPhilo) Vol.1 No.1, March 2014
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
M. Imae and D. Gentner, “A cross-linguistic study of early word
meaning: Universal ontology and linguistic influence,” Cognition 1994,
vol. 62, pp. 169—200.
L. Ji, K. Peng, and R.E. Nisbett, “Culture, control, and perception of
relationship in the environment,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 2000, vol. 78, pp. 943—955.
H. Kim and H.R. Markus, “Deviance or uniqueness, harmony or
conformity? A cultural analysis,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology 1999, vol. 77, pp. 785—800.
F. Lee, M. Hallahan, and T. Herzog, “Explaining real life events: How
culture and domain shape attributions,” Personality and Social
Psychology Bulletin 1996, vol. 22, pp.732—741.
H.R. Markus and S. Kitayama, “Culture and the self: Implications for
cognition, emotion, and motivation,” Psychological Review 1991, vol.
98, pp. 224—253.
T. Masuda and R.E. Nisbett, “Attending holistically vs. analytically:
Comparing the context sensitivity of Japanese and Americans,” Journal
of Personality and Social Psychology 2001, vol. 81, pp. 922—934.
B. Morling, S. Kitayama, and Y. Miyamoto, “Cultural practices
emphasize influence in the U.S. and adjustment in Japan,” Personality
and Social Psychology Bulletin 2002, vol. 23, pp. 311—323.
R.E. Nisbett, K. Peng, I. Choi, and A. Norenzayan, “Culture and system
of thought: Holistic vs. analytic cognition,” Psychological Review 2001,
vol. 108, pp. 291—310.
I. Choi, R.E. Nisbett, and E.E. Smith, “Culture, categorization, and
inductive reasoning.” Cognition 1997, vol. 65, pp. 15—32.
A. Norenzayan, E.E. Smith, B.J. Kim, and R.E. Nisbett, “Cultural
preferences for formal vs. intuitive reasoning,” Cognitive Science 2002,
vol. 26, pp. 653—684.
P. Harvey, An introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, history and
practices. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990.
Lao Tzu, The way of life: Tao Te Ching. A new transl. and intr. by R.B.
Blakney. New York, NY: New American Library, 1955.
X. Yao, An introduction to Confucianism. Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2000.
J. Lipner, Hindus: Their religion beliefs and practices. London, New
York, NY: Routledge, 1994.
K. Tanaka, F. Berto, E. Mares, and F. Paoli, Eds., Paraconsistency:
Logic and applications. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013.
Ch. Cherniak, “Minimal rationality,” Mind 1981, vol. 90, pp. 161—
183.
M. Bergmann, An introduction to many-valued and fuzzy logic:
Semantics, algebras, and derivation systems. Cambridge: Cambridge
Univ. Press, 2008.
R. Keefe, P. Smith, Eds., Vagueness: A reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1996.
R. Smullyan, Gödel's incompleteness theorems. Oxford, New York,
Toronto: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992.
R. Suszko, “Non-Fregean logic and theories,” Analele Universitatii
Bucuresti, Acta Logica 1968, vol. 11, pp. 105—125.
P. Øhrstrøm and P. F. V. Hasle, Temporal logic: From ancient ideas to
artificial intelligence. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1995.
D. Makinson, Bridges from classical to nonmonotonic logic. London:
King’s College Publications, 2005.
W.V.O. Quine, The ways of paradox and other essays. Cambridge,
Mass., London: Harvard Univ. Press, 1977.
W.V.O. Quine, “Two dogmas of empiricism,” The Philosophical
Review 1951, vol. 60, pp. 20—43.
H. Putnam, Mind, language and reality: Philosophical papers, vol. 2.
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1975.
L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe.
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953/2001.
P.F. Strawson, “On referring,” Mind 1950, vol. 59, pp. 320—344.
H. P. Grice, “Logic and conversation,” Syntax and semantics 1975, vol.
3: Speech arts, P. Cole and J.L. Morgan, Eds. New York, NY: Academic
Press 1975, pp. 41—58.
J.R. Searle, Expression and meaning: Studies in the theory of speech
acts. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979.
Ch. Travis, “Meaning’s role in truth,” Mind 1996, vol. 105, pp. 451—
466.
[33] K. Devlin, Goodbye Descartes: The end of logic and the search for the
new cosmology of the mind. New York, NY, Chichester, Wienheim:
John Wiley & Sons, 1997.
[34] C. Cohen, “Knowledge, context, and social standards,” Synthese 1987,
vol. 73, pp. 3—26.
[35] K. DeRose, “Assertion, context, and knowledge,” Philosophical Review
2002, vol. 111, pp. 167—203.
[36] F. Dretske, Perception, knowledge, and belief: Selected essays.
Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2000.
[37] D. Lewis, “Elusive knowledge,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy
1996, vol. 74, pp. 549—567.
[38] R. Nozick, Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1981.
[39] J. Schaffer, “Skepticism, contextualism, and discrimination,”
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 2000, vol. 69, pp. 138—
155.
[40] M. Heller, “Relevant alternatives and closure,” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy 1999, vol. 77, pp. 196—208.
[41] H. Putnam, The many faces of realism. La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987.
[42] G. Lakoff and M. Johnson, Philosophy in the flesh: The embodied mind
and its challenge to Western thought. New York, NY: Basic Books,
1999.
[43] D. Pecher and R.A. Zwaan, Eds., Grounding cognition: The role of
perception and action in memory, language, and thinking. Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005.
[44] P. Robbins and M. Aydede, Eds., Cambridge handbook of situated
cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.
[45] E. Thompson and F.J. Varela, “Radical embodiment: neural dynamics
and consciousness,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences 2001, vol.5, pp.
418—425.
[46] H.R. Maturana and F.J. Varela, The tree of knowledge: The biological
roots of human understanding. Boston: Shambhala, 1992.
[47] F.J. Varela, E. Thompson, and E. Rosch, The embodied mind: cognitive
science and human experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991.
[48] D.D. Hutto and E. Myin, Radicalizing enactivism: Basic minds without
content. Cambridge, MA, London: MIT Press, 2013.
[49] A. Clark and D. Chalmers, “The extended mind,” Analysis 1998, vol.
58, pp. 7—19.
[50] F. Adams and K. Aizawa, “Defending the bounds of cognition.” in The
extended mind, R. Menary, Ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009, pp.
67—80.
[51] R. Menary, “Integration and the extended mind,” in The extended mind,
R. Menary, Ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2009, pp. 127—143.
[52] D. Kahneman, Thinking, fast and slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Strauss,
Giroux, 2011.
[53] P. Cruse and D. Evans, Eds., Emotion, evolution, and rationality.
Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.
[54] R.C. Solomon, Ed., Thinking about feeling: Contemporary philosophers
on emotions. Oxford, New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004.
[55] J. Moll and R. de Oliveira-Souza, “Moral judgments, emotions, and the
utilitarian brain,” Trends in Cognitive Science 2007, vol. 11, pp. 319—
321.
[56] M. Dummett, Truth and other enigmas. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1978.
[57] R. Fisher and S. Brown, Getting together: Building relationships as we
negotiate. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1988.
Anna Jedynak, born in Warsaw, Poland, 1956. Education: MA
1978, PhD 1983, Professor 2003 – all at the University of Warsaw,
Poland. Major fields of study: philosophy of language and science.
Employed at the University of Warsaw since 1978 till now. Books (in
Polish): Empiricism and Meaning, Warsaw 1998, Experience and
Language, Warsaw 2007, Responsibility in the Global Village,
Warsaw 2008.
©The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access by the GSTF