Cohabitation and Political Wrestling between President and Prime Minister in
Semi-presidentialism
Jung-hsiang, Tsai
[email protected]
Abstract
In semi-presidentialism, cohabitation is a special arrangement for coping with the
divided situation between the president and parliament. If cohabitation in
semi-presidentialism works as a parliamentary system, then there is no variance
among different cohabitations. However, when various semi-presidential countries
authorize the president different constitutional powers, then the scenarios of
cohabitation can be varied. There are some situations where the popular elected
president is not entirely sidelined even during the period of cohabitation. What factors
affect the degree of conflict between the president and prime minister during the
period of cohabitation deserves a full investigation. This paper identifies two factors
(presidential constitutional authority and prime ministerial power composition) which
are contributory in explaining the interactions between the president and prime
minister during the period of cohabitation in semi-presidentialism. This paper also
constructs four types of cohabitation: shared cohabitation (France), premier-tilt
cohabitation (Portugal), unbalanced cohabitation (Poland), and balanced cohabitation
(Sri Lanka) and argues that the degree of conflict increases progressively from shared
cohabitation, premier-tilt cohabitation, unbalanced cohabitation to balanced
cohabitation.
1
Introduction
In semi-presidentialism, cohabitation is a political arrangement for coping with the
divided situation between the president and parliament. Sulieman (1994: 151) argues
that it contains a safety valve that avoids the clash and crises of two popularly elected
legitimacies by permitting the political system to function now as a presidential
system, now as a parliamentary system. If cohabitation in semi-presidentialism works
as a parliamentary system, then there is no variance among different cohabitations.
However, when various semi-presidential countries authorize the president different
constitutional powers, then the scenarios of cohabitation can be varied. There are
some situations where the popular elected president is not entirely sidelined during the
period of cohabitation. How the president armed with considerable powers interacts
with the prime minister commanding an opposing majority and what factors affect the
degree of conflict between the president and prime minister during the period of
cohabitation deserve a full investigation. The goal of this paper is not only to classify
different types of cohabitation, but also to specify different mechanisms that drive
disparate interactions between the president and prime minister during the period of
cohabitation.
With the trend of more newly democratic countries operating
semi-presidentialism, cohabitation as the prominent characteristic of
semi-presidentialism has shined its spotlight in the field of comparative politics
recently. One school of thought stresses on the demerits of cohabitation. It suggests
that the institutional lock-in conflict between the president and prime minister can
endanger democratic stability by furnishing the intervention of military (Linz, 1994).
Empirically, intense political conflicts during the phase of cohabitation in some
African semi-presidential countries have reversed the course of democracy into
authoritarianism (Kirschke, 2007). However, in some large-scale studies of the
semi-presidential countries, they show that the negative correlation between
cohabitation and democratic breakdown or performance is not statistically significant
(Elgie, 2008; Elgie and McMenamin, 2009) or just one or two cases where
cohabitation or the threat of cohabitation directly triggered the collapse of democracy
such as Niger in 1996 and Guinea-Bissau in 1993 (Elgie, 2010).
The other line of research centers on the merits of cohabitation, arguing that
cohabitation (bicephalous executive) is a delicate mechanism for solving the problem
of divided situations between the president and parliament with an opposing majority
in semi-presidentialism (Sartori, 1997). Cohabitation has passed the acid test in
France since the conflict between the president and prime minister did not necessarily
threaten democracy (Skach, 2005: 116). Dual leaders (president and prime minister)
in the periods of cohabitation have exercised self-control not to cause a serious
2
deadlock in order to accumulate popularity for their prospective elections on
presidency, as the cases in France and Portugal (Pasquino, 1997; 2007).
Taken together, the experiences of cohabitation in semi-presidentialism have
presented mixed results. As the cases of cohabitation have proliferated in
semi-presidential countries, it accumulates abundant data and scope for sorting
cohabitations out.1 Past comparative work has probed more on cohabitation and its
effects on democratic survival and less emphasized are cohabitation and its effect on
the interactions between the president and prime minister. This paper aims to fill in
the lacuna of the current work by analyzing how different constitutional structures and
political features entail diverse types of cohabitation, and how different types of
cohabitation bear fruits to political wrestling between the president and prime minister.
This paper sets out to explore what institutional and structural factors affect the
operation of cohabitation and its variance on political struggles between dual leaders,
aiming to detect more types of cohabitation beyond the prototypical case, France.
Cohabitation can be defined as the situation where opposing parties separately
control the president and prime minister or government in semi-presidentialism. Elgie
(2010) offers a more refined definition by adding that the president’s party is not
represented in the cabinet. This paper applies to Eglie’s broad definition in order to
contain more cases in comparison. Cohabitation is a singular arrangement in
semi-presidentialism for coping with the result of splitting votes of the electors. The
president losing majority support in parliament chooses to cohabit with the prime
minister commanding an opposing majority. Cohabitation in semi-presidentialism is
analogous to divided government in presidentialism but the nuance between them is
that cohabitation stands out as the executive is divided rather than unified. This
institutional conformation is doomed to have unavoidable conflicts between the
president and the prime minister if both of them choose to push the envelope. Do all
cohabitations in semi-presidential countries operate in a similar way or differ in any
systematic manner? What factors can explain different degrees of conflict between the
president and prime minister caused by different types of cohabitation? This paper
aims to systematize different types of cohabitation through the prisms of presidential
constitutional power and prime ministerial power composition. In so doing, it can
increase analytical differentiation to adequately characterize diverse cohabitations in
semi-presidential countries that have emerged in recent years. This paper uses the
method of controlled comparison as an analytical wedge to explicate the
consequences of different cohabitations. Why do some presidents in the period of
1
Elgie and McMenamin (2011) focus on exploring the conditions of producing cohabitation, based on
the data of the cases of cohabitation in semi-presidential countries.
3
cohabitation grant concessions in some cases and not in others? How can we explain
the diversity of prime minister-president interactions in the period of cohabitation?
The first effort of this article is to fully elaborate the relationship between different
types of cohabitation and different degrees of conflict between the president and
prime minister. The second effort of this article is to analyze empirical cases and their
implications.
The Cases of Cohabitation
Table 1 shows the cases of cohabitation in premier-presidential systems and in
president-parliamentary systems.2 It also presents the information of party system in
each semi-presidential country. In 18 semi-presidential countries with cohabitation,
premier-presidential systems achieve 83.3% and president-parliamentary systems get
only 16.7%。Cohabitation occurs more in one subtype of semi-presidentialism
(premier-presidential systems) than in the other subtype of semi-presidentialism
(president-parliamentary systems) (see also Samuels and Shugart, 2010, chapter 2;
Elgie and McMenamin, 2011). Since the president does not have formal authority to
dismiss the cabinet in premier-presidential systems, if elections produce an opposition
majority, then the president has to cede executive power to the prime minister
controlling that majority; on the contrary, when the president in
president-parliamentary systems has the authority to dismiss the cabinet, then
cohabitation would occur less (Samuels and Shugart, 2010: 44-5).
Table 1. Cohabitation in Semi-presidentialism and Party System
Two-party
Multiparty
2
Premier-presidential
Portugal
President-parliamentary
Sri Lanka
Bulgaria
Finland
France
Iceland
Ireland
Lithuania
Macedonia
Mongolia
Niger
Poland
Romania
Austria
Sao Tome and Principe
Premier-presidential systems and president-parliamentary systems are two subtypes of
semi-presidentialism. Related discussions see Shugart and Carey (1992) and Shugart (2005). We will
explicate these two subtypes of semi-presidentialism in the later section.
4
Total
Serbia
Slovakia
Slovenia
15
3
Source: Elgie (2011a); Samuels and Shugart (2010).
Metaphorically speaking, the relationship between the president and prime
minister in semi-presidentialism is like riding a tandem bicycle. In the phase of
unified government, the president is the captain of the bicycle, controlling the
direction and speed while the prime minister is the stoker of the bicycle, providing
strength by tramping the pedals and keeping balanced during the cruising. In the
phase of cohabitation, the prime minister is the front rider (captain) of the bicycle
while the president is the rear rider (stoker) of the bicycle. As the captain, the prime
minister leads the direction of the bicycle, but the president as the stoker can tighten
the brakes or do not tramp the pedals on the bike at times. How the president interacts
with the prime minister depends on what constitutional weapons the president
possesses. In some types of cohabitation, the president granted with unilateral
constitutional powers can have a bout with the prime minister controlling a majority
in parliament. For example, if cohabitation occurs in a presidential-parliamentary
system, then we can expect to see open conflicts between the president with a popular
vote and the prime minister with a legislative majority. Two variables especially
accounts for the differentiation of types of cohabitation in semi-presidentialism:
unilateral authority of the president and power composition of the cabinet led by the
prime minister.
When the president in semi-presidentialism possesses some unilateral
constitutional powers such as decree power, dissolution power, and veto power, he has
the levers to confront with the prime minister controlling an opposition majority. First,
the president with decree authority can establish law in lieu of action by the assembly
(Carey and Shugart, 1998: 9). This power gives the president a considerable say in
policy making. Given the parliament controlled by the prime minister, both the
president and prime minister have legislative authority which can ignite a war of laws.
For example, Russian President Yeltsin had a tug-of-war of issuing decree and
rescinding decree with the Duma (Parrish, 1998). Second, when the president in
semi-presidentialism holds dissolution power, he can use it as a weapon to turn down
the prime minister and cabinet. In the following election, if the outgoing prime
minister can garner a majority in parliament, he can become the acting prime minister
again. If not, the president can nominate another prime minister who may not oppose
him or even support him. Nevertheless, in this situation, the president can terminate
5
the tenure of the cabinet and let the public decide whether the prime minister has the
latest mandate or not. Third, when the president is armed with veto power and the
parliament may override the veto only by super majority of deputies, then the
president can use that power to affect the outcome of legislation. On the other hand, if
it only needs the parliament to override any veto by simple majority, then the
president only can stonewall the pace of legislation since the prime minister can
muster a legislative majority in the parliament to override the president’s veto. In a
nutshell, the president with more unilateral authority in the constitution can have more
discretion than the president with less unilateral authority. If the president in
semi-presidentialism does not have any unilateral power, he can only play second
fiddle to the prime minister.
The composition of cabinet is very crucial to the operation of the prime
minister’s power. If only one party forms the cabinet, the prime minister can call the
shots as the leader of the party. If the cabinet is a coalition cabinet and the prime
minister’s party has a dominant position such as the largest party in the cabinet, the
prime minister can be preponderant only when other coalition parties do not oppose.
If the cabinet is a coalition one and two or three or more parties almost equally share
seats in parliament, the prime minister has to proportionally share executive power
with other coalition parties and the prime minister is less powerful than the prime
minister in a single-party cabinet or than the prime minister in a coalition cabinet
where his party has a plurality of seats. Furthermore, there are some situations where
the multiparty cabinet can be quite unstable. For example, the prime minister cannot
coordinate with the coalition parties or some coalition party threatens to depart the
cabinet as its policies are not accepted or enacted. Simply put, the prime minister in
the coalition cabinet is less powerful than the prime minister in the single-party
cabinet. Taken together, we can create a two-by-two table which demonstrates four
different types of cohabitation and different degrees of conflict, as shown in Table2.
The typology used here is an explanatory typology in which the rows and columns are
explanatory variables, and the cells contain hypothesized outcomes (see Collier,
Laporte, and Seawright, 2008: 153).
6
Table2: Typology of Cohabitation
High
Unbalanced
Balanced
Cohabitation
Cohabitation
Shared
Premier-tilt
Cohabitation
Cohabitation
Unilateral Authority
Low
Coalition Party
Single Party
Power Composition
The experiences of cohabitation in the constitutional trajectory of the French
Fifth Republic were emblematic in semi-presidentialism. Has France as a paragon of
semi-presidentialism run the whole gamut of cohabitation experiences? Or the
operation of French cohabitation only manifests one possible type of cohabitation.
The crux here is that if the president in some semi-presidential countries has more
unilateral authority than the president does in France, then we can find some other
types of cohabitation beyond French experiences. First, when the president does not
have unilateral constitutional powers such as decree, veto, and dissolution power and
when the president’s party only has a minority in parliament, he has to give executive
ground to the prime minister with an opposition majority. If the cabinet is composed
of more than one party, the prime minister has to share executive power with coalition
parties. This is called shared cohabitation. In this scenario, the president retreats to the
second line and the prime minister leads the way on day-to-day matters of
government. The president may delay the process of decision-making by way of
expressing his disagreement in public but cannot stop it becoming laws. Second, when
only one party forms the cabinet, the prime minister as the party leader is more
paramount than the prime minister in the coalition cabinet. That said, the supporting
base of the prime minister is more unified. When the president and prime minister
have divergent views of policy, conflicts between them can arise, but the prime
minister still can gain the upper hand with a coherent majority in parliament. This
scenario is called premier-tilt cohabitation.
Third, in some semi-presidential countries, the president holds some unilateral
authority in some reserved domains. For example, the president can issue a decree or
cast a veto or launch dissolution of parliament or the president can nominate the
portfolios of foreign affairs and defense. In other words, the president can act
independently in some reserved domains and to serve a rallying point for the
7
opposition majority. The prime minister still pilots the government but the president
can have discretion on certain spheres. In addition, since the cabinet is a coalition
government, if the coalition cabinet fails to act in unison, it can weaken political
power of the prime minister. This is called unbalanced cohabitation. Fourth, if the
president is granted some unilateral authority and the opposing cabinet is only made
up of one party, it is more likely to see grandstanding between the president and prime
minister. This scenario is called balanced cohabitation which is in stark contrast to the
first scenario. The occurrence of cohabitation has really put the constitution and its
practice into an acid test. During the period of cohabitation, the president and prime
minister have to enact their authority according to the competencies of the president
and prime minister demarcated in the constitution. The ambiguity of constitutional
articles pertaining to the prerogatives of presidents and prime ministers can trigger
clashes between the president and cabinet (Raddt, 2009). Institutional combat grows
fiercer as the president and the prime minister clash over some policies. This kind of
cohabitation makes strange bedfellows who jockey for the upper hand in the power
game. Overall, balanced cohabitation is the most conflict-prone type, unbalanced
cohabitation is the second-most unstable scenario, premier-tilt cohabitation is the
third-most unstable scenario, and shared cohabitation is the least unstable scenario. In
what follows, we will delve into the empirical cases of cohabitation. Simultaneously,
we will provide an overview of constitutional articles that underpin presidential
powers and how the president interacts with the prime minister with an opposition
majority. Finally, we will explicate the implication of various cohabitations in
semi-presidentialism.
Shared Cohabitation in France
The experience of cohabitation occurred in the French Fifth Republic three times.
First, from 1986 to 1988, Leftist President Mitterrand governed with Rightist Prime
Minister Jacques Chirac, second, from 1993 to 1995, Leftist President Mitterrand
worked with Rightist Prime Minister Édouard Balladur and third, Rightist President
Jacques Chirac cohabited with Leftist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin, from 1997 to
2002. Due to the limitation of a paper’s length, here we furnish an explanation of a
left-right cohabitation, Mitterrand vis-à-vis Chirac and an explication of a right-left
cohabitation, Chirac vis-à-vis Jospin.
In 1986, France experienced the first cohabitation in the history of the Fifth
Republic. In the 1986 parliamentary elections, the rightist coalition (Rally for the
Republic and Union for French Democracy, and other parties) gained totally 290 seats
and the leftist coalition (Socialist Party, French Communist Party, and other parties)
grasped 248 seats. The total of parliamentary seats was 573. The rightist coalition
8
passed the threshold of a majority (287) in the National Assembly although it was a
razor-thin majority, as shown in Table 3. In that time, the president was François
Mitterrand from the socialist party. Facing an opposition majority, President
Mitterrand opted to nominate Jacques Chirac, the leader of Rally for the Republic, to
be prime minister, bringing forth the episode of cohabitation. This cohabitation was
the first case in the Fifth Republic, but it was not new in the past French constitutional
development. In 1877, President Mac Mahon dissolved the opposing parliament but in
the following election, the opposition still won a majority; there were two possible
solutions: the president resigned or the president respected the new parliamentary
majority; President Mac Mahon backed down to nominate a prime minister the
parliament endorsed (Stevens, 2003: 10). Basically, President Mitterrand followed the
constitutional precedent set by President Mac Mahon in the Third Republic of France.
Table 3: Results of the French 1988 Parliamentary Elections
Party or Coalition
Rally for the Republic
Union for French Democracy
Miscellaneous Right-wing
Seats
149
127
14
Rightist Coalition
290
Socialist Party
French Communist Party
Miscellaneous Left
Movement of Left Radicals
206
35
5
2
Leftist Coalition
248
National Front
35
Total
573
Source: derived from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_legislative_election,_1986, accessed June 1,
2012.
In 1986, the interactions between President François Mitterrand and Prime
Minister Jacques Chirac had to comply with the separation of power in the
constitution. According to the 1958 French constitution, the Government shall
determine and conduct the policy of the Nation and it should be responsible to
Parliament (Article 20). The Prime Minister shall direct the operation of government
9
(Article 21) and can enact decrees without the president’s countersignatures (Elgie,
2001: 107). The president in the Fifth Republic has nominating power, parliamentary
dissolution power, and veto power. First, the president enjoys the right to appoint the
prime minister (Article 8). Second, the president may dissolve the National Assembly,
after consulting the prime minister and the presidents of the assemblies but this power
is restricted by frequency such as no further dissolution shall take place within a year
following this election (Article 12). Third, the president can ask the parliament to
reconsider the whole act or sections of the act (Article 10). This power of
reconsideration is known as veto power. Taken together, the president in the Fifth
Republic has some reactive powers but does not have proactive power such as decree
power. The president can dissolve the parliament but cannot exercise this power
unrestricted. The president in France has package veto power and item veto power. In
America, the president only has package veto power and do not possess item veto
power. However, during the period of cohabitation, with an opposition majority in the
parliament, presidential veto power cannot succeed to overturn the passed bills by the
government if the overriding threshold is simple majority. Lastly, the French president
does not have unilateral decree power like the Russian president who can use it to
bypass the opposing parliament (see Parrish, 1998).
According to the drafter of the 1958 constitution, the content of the constitution
demonstrates three attributes: an executive with its own authority stemming from both
its mode of selection and its powers; a parliamentary system, meaning on one hand a
cabinet backed by a majority within an assembly and thus able to guide this majority
as well as head the administration, but also on the other hand, a parliament that could
carry out its legislative duties and act as a control without infringing on the executive:
and third, an election method as close as possible to the British-American system, the
one used by the first French republicans, election by majority vote (Debré, 1981 : 17).
Simply put, the orginial constitutional design is revised parliamentarism which
strengthens the executiven branch on one hand and weakens the legislative branch3
on the other hand. The critical juncture of adopting the direct election of president in
1962 has tranformed the parliamentary system into a semi-presidential one (Duverger,
1980). President de Gaulle capitalized on controlling a legislative majority in the
National Assembly and operated the system tilt toward a super-president one
（Suleiman, 1980）. President de Gaulle depended on his partisan strength in the
National Assembly rather than formal presidential powers in the constitution.
Afterward, President Pompidu and President Giscard, followed suit when their party
3
It is called as rationalized parliament and related discussions see Huber (1996).
10
or coalition still commanded a majority in the National Assembly. As partisan
strength in the legislature ebbs, the president’s authority has shrunk into the scope of
constitutional articles which are specifically reseved for the president.
During the period of cohabitation from 1986 to 1988, the prime minister
controlling a legislative majority had primacy while the greatest power of the
president in this period was often the power to say no. President Mitterrand refused to
sign the ordonnances proposed by the government over the privatization of some
industries and firms but in the end Prime Minister Chirac won the battle with the
president over legislation (Poulard, 1990 : 259). However, President Mitterrand still
could have a say on certain reserved domains. President Mitterrand turned down
Chirac’s initial choices for the ministries of foregin affairs and defense, but the two
men quickly agreed on alternates (Pierce, 1991 : 279-80). On the whole, the prime
minister had an edge over legislation or policies while the president could wield his
infulence on some reserved domain such as foreign affairs and defense.
In 1986, Prime minister Chirac led a coalition government which consisted of
two major parties : Rally for the Republic (RPR) and Union for French Democracy
(UDF). Prime Minister Chirac had to reconcile the differences within the coalition
cabinet. There was a high level of conflict between Raymond Barre of the UDF (a
party of the right in coalition with the Gaullists) and Jacques Chirac, the Gaullist
prime minister, both of whom were jockeying to become the leader of the right in the
1988 presidential election (Huber, 1996: 6). In order to solidify a majority in the
parliament, Prime Minister Chirac frequently used the procedures of package vote and
confidence vote. The package vote is based on Articles 44.3, which says “If the
Government requests it, the assembly considering a bill decides by a single vote on all
or part of the text under discussion, retaining only the amendments proposed or
accepted by the Government while the procedure of confidence vote connotes “The
Prime Minister may, after deliberation by the Council of Ministers, engage the
responsibility of the Government before the National Assembly on the vote of a bill;
In this case, the bill is considered adopted unless a motion of censure, introduced
within the next 24 hours (Huber, 1996: 3). Prime Minister Chirac invoked 8 times of
the confidence vote and employed the package vote 68 times (Elgie, 2001: 121).
While powers were shared in some policy sectors, the senior of the two reluctant
partners was usually the Prime Minister, the President often being able only to prevent
some decisions and delay others (Hayward and Wright, 2006:32). On the one hand,
aspiration to a presidential hopeful and challenges within the coalition have made
Prime Minister Chirac more moderate. On the other hand, the odds of reelection and
11
the restriction of constitutional authority also have enabled President Mitterrand not to
be out of the orbit during the period of cohabitation.
In 1997, the situation turned round. It was Rightist President Jacques Chirac
cohabiting with Leftist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. The result of French legislative
elections in 1997 manifested a majority of the left coalition, controlling 320 seats
while the right coalition commanded only 253 seats, as shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Results of the French 1997 legislative elections
Party or Coalition
Socialist Party
French Communist Party
Radical Socialist Party
The Greens
Citizens’ Movement
Miscellaneous Left-wing
Seats
255
35
12
7
7
4
Left Coalition
320
Rally for the Republic
Union for French Democracy
The Independent Right
139
112
2
Right Coalition
253
National Front
Miscellaneous
1
3
Total
577
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_legislative_election,_1997, accessed on June 1, 2012.
The left coalition was made up of the PS (Socialist Party), PCF (French
Communist Party), PRS (Radical Socialist Party), Greens (Green Party), and
MDC(Citizens’ Movement). It was a multiparty coalition which consisted of 5 parties.
Maintaining a coherent coalition and a workable legislative majority was not an easy
job for Prime Minister Jospin. Especially when the next election approached, the
coalition government became more precarious. The Left was more divided than it had
been previously; the government had failed to propose any new and popular reforms
(Elgie, 2002: 309). For example, Prime Minister Jospin failed to coordinate the
12
governing coalition to enact pension reform, family policy reform and education
(Willerton and Carrier, 2005: 61). Political conflicts between President Chirac and
Prime Minister Jospin were unavoidable during this period of cohabitation. President
Chirac employed his constitutional power to veto the judicial reform which Jospin’s
government endorsed to push forward (Elgie, 2002: 303). On the whole, Chirac could
not stop the government and its parliamentary majority from legislating, though
Jospin could not stop Chirac from the latter’s critical commentary on government
action (Willerton and Carrier, 2005: 53). All told, President Chirac was willing to give
way to the Jospin government with the mandate on steering legislation or policy but
still was unwilling to be sidelined in the political stage.
Considering the two cases of cohabitation together, we can conclude that French
experiences are the mode of shared cohabitation. The prime minister sets the direction
and content of policy, while the president can hamstring or delay the pace of
legislation but not the content of legislation. The separation of power in the
constitution of 1958 does not allow the president or the prime minister to come to a
deadlock.
Premier-tilt Cohabitation
When only one party forms a cabinet, the prime minister as the party leader is more
paramount than the prime minister in the coalition cabinet. If the president and prime
minister express disagreement over some policies, conflicts between them can arise,
but the prime minister still can gain the upper hand with a coherent majority in the
parliament. This scenario is called premier-tilt cohabitation. The experiences of
cohabitation in Portugal can be illustrative of this scenario. First, we offer an
overview of the constitutional articles that underpin presidential powers in the
Portuguese constitution. Second, the experience of cohabitation from 2006 to 2009 is
analyzed.
The president in Portugal possesses the power to nominate the prime minister,
the power to dissolve the parliament, and the veto power. According to Article 187,
the President of the Republic shall appoint the Prime Minister after consulting the
parties with seats in Assembly of the Republic and in the light of the electoral results.
This article presents that the president only can nominate a prime minister from any
party in the parliament, but not a non-partisan person who is not a deputy member of
the parliament. If a party or coalition controls a majority in the parliament, the
president cannot help but nominate the leader of that party to be prime minister who is
from a rival party to the president. In addition, the constitution stipulates that the
Government shall be responsible to the President of the Republic and the Assembly of
the Republic (Article 190). This article shows the double responsibility of the
13
government and the authority of the president. With regard to the power of dissolution,
the constitution grants the president the power to dissolve the parliament after
consulting both the parties with seats in the Assembly, and the Council of State4
(Article 133). As for veto power, the constitution stipulates that within twenty days of
the receipt of any decree from the Assembly of the Republic for enactment as a law,
or of the publication of a Constitutional Court ruling that does not declare any of the
decree’s provisions unconstitutional, the President of the Republic shall either enact
the decree or exercise the right of veto (Article 136-1). In short, the president in
Portugal possesses considerable powers in the constitution.
In March 2005, the parliamentary elections were held in Portugal. The result of
elections displayed that the socialist party (PS) won 121 seats of the total 230 seats
which passed the threshold of a majority while the social democratic party (PSD)
attained only 75 seats. In March 2006, Aníbal Cavaco Silva from the opposition party
in parliament, social democratic party-PSD, was elected as the president. In this
situation, President Cavaco Silva cohabited with the leader of the socialist party (PS),
José Sócrates as prime minister.5 Owing to the unified control of one party in the
assembly, Prime Minister Sócrates did not have the worriment of the back-up
problems and could make the advantage in position when facing an opposing
president. Over the reform of social security, Prime Minister Sócrates endorsed the
proposal of social security remaining in the public sector while the opposition
supported a mixed approach to enact social security in the public sector and private
sector; President Cavaco Silva advised Prime Minister Sócrates to negotiate with the
PSD, but Prime Minister Sócrates refused to embrace; finally the Sócrates
government went its own way to pass the reform of social security (Magone, 2007:
1079). In addition, President Cavaco Silva also clashed with Prime Minister Sócrates
over the reform of the Divorce Law. In 2009 September, Prime Minister Sócrates and
his supporting deputies passed a law to facilitate divorce by not applying the guilty
principle while President Cavaco Silva refused to sign the bill into law and enacted
his veto power to ask the bill to be reconsidered in the parliament; subsequently, the
4
In December 2004, Portuguese President Jorge Sampaio enacted his nuclear option as the power to
dissolve the parliament and in that time, Prime Minister Pedro Miguel Lopes who formed a coalition
government against the president (Jalali, 2011: 167). This case shows that the president in Portuguese
semi-presidentialism holds considerable powers which can be used to react against the government
with an opposition majority during the period of cohabitation. Regarding the important role presidents
play in policy making in Portugal, please see Amorim Neto and Lobo (2009) and Martins (2006).
5
Cohabitation occurred in Portugal very frequently. From March 1986 to October 1995, President
Mário Soares (PS) cohabited with Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva (PSD); from April, 2002 to July,
2004, President Jorge Sampaio (PS) cohabited with Prime Minister José Manuel Barroso; from July
2004 to March, 2005, President Jorge Sampaio (PS) cohabited with Prime Minister Pedro Miguel
Lopes (PSD). Related information sees Professor Robert Elgie’s website of semi-presidentialism
(www.semi-presidentialism).
14
PS controlled parliament overrode the veto and passed the bill of new Divorce Law
(Magone, 2009: 1083). In brief, during the period of cohabitation, the president and
the prime minister were wrangling for the upper hand over legislation. However, the
prime minister with a solid majority could exert a will that independent of the
president. The power and responsibilities weighed heavily in prime minister’s favor.
In this kind of cohabitation, the government and legislation in the parliament are
sealed off from the president’s influence, but the president is not entirely sidelined
since he owns some unilateral authority. In this mode of cohabitation, executive
power does change partisan hands in Portugal, from the president to the prime
minister.
Unbalanced Cohabitation
In some semi-presidential countries, the president holds constitutional unilateral
authority in some reserved domains. For example, the president can issue a decree,
cast a veto, launch dissolution to parliament, and nominate the portfolio of foreign
affairs and defense. In other words, the president can act independently in the reserved
domains and to serve a rallying point for the opposition majority. The prime minister
still pilots the government but the president can have discretion on certain ambits. In
addition, since the cabinet is a coalition government, if the coalition cabinet fails to
act in unison, it can weaken political power of the prime minister. This is called
unbalanced cohabitation. Semi-presidential practice in Poland can furnish an
explanation of this mode6.
The president in the 1997 Polish Constitution is armed with considerable powers
such as decree power, dissolution power, veto power and appointing power. The
President of the Republic shall issue regulations and executive orders in accordance
with the principles specified in Articles 92 and 937 (Article 142). The President of the
6
Another typical case of unbalanced cohabitation is semi-presidential practice in Niger from 1993 to
1996. The clashes between President Mahamane Ousmane and Prime Minister Hama Amadou during
the period of cohabitation had enticed the intervention of the military and a democratic breakdown
ensued afterward (Moestrup, 2007). The president during the period of cohabitation is powerful since
the president may veto laws and the parliament can only veto only by a two-thirds majority (Article 49).
The government during that period of cohabitation only controlled forty-six of the eighty-three
parliamentary seats (Moestrup, 2007: 111). When the president launches a veto, the parliament
controlled by the opposition cannot muster a two-third majority. This is one of the reasons why the
cohabitation is easy to produce a deadlock in Niger. Regarding semi-presidential practice in Niger, see
also Villalón and Idrissa (2005).
7
Article 93 stipulates that regulations shall be issued on the basis of specific authorization contained in,
and for the purpose of implementation of, statutes by the organs specified in the Constitution; The
authorization shall specify the organ appropriate to issue a regulation and the scope of matters to be
regulated as well as guidelines concerning the provisions of such act. In addition, Article 94 says that
on the basis of and within limits specified by statute, organs of local government and territorial organs
15
Republic shall nominate a Prime Minister who shall propose the composition of a
Council of Ministers (Article 154). The president has the power to dissolve the
parliament under certain conditions. If the Sejm’s candidate fails to gain an absolute
majority, the president can nominate a candidate, whose cabinet can be approved by
simple majority; if this candidate is unsuccessful the president is obliged to dissolve
the Sejm (McMenamin, 2008: 124; Article 155). The president may refer the bill, with
reasons given, to the Sejm for its reconsideration and if the bill is overridden by a
three-fifths majority vote in the Sejm, then the president has to sign it into a law
(Article 122.5). This article grants the president a powerful veto power. The threshold
of three-fifths majority is almost commensurable with the threshold of overriding in
American presidential system which requires two-thirds approval of each house of
Congress. The president shall cooperate with the prime minister and the appropriate
minister in respect of foreign policy (Article 133.3) and the president shall exercise
command over the Armed Forces through the minister of national defense in time of
peace (Article 134.2). Coupled with these two articles, it shows that the president can
have a say over defense and foreign affairs. The president in Poland bears significant
powers in the semi-presidential constitution8. Taken together, while the president and
prime minister represent the executive, the Polish constitutional model allows for a
dualism of presidential and government authority, which means that they remain
separate from one another.9
In the 2007 October parliamentary elections, the Civic Platform (PO) won 209
seats, the Law and Justice Party (PiS) gained 166 seats, the Left and Democrats
acquired 53 seats, and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) got 31 seats, and the
independent had one seat. The total number of seats in the Sejm is 460 and a majority
needs 231 seats. The Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) merged
to form a majority coalition with 240 seats in the parliament. During that period,
President Lech Kaczyński was a member of the Law and Justice party (PiS). Since the
Law and Justice party lost a majority in the parliament, President Kaczyński
nominated the party leader of the Civic Platform, Donald Tusk as prime minister,
causing a situation of cohabitation.
Tussles arise between President Kaczyński and Prime Minister Tusk over foreign
policy, over the attendance at EU summit in Brussels, and over the ratification of the
of government administration shall enact local legal enactments applicable to their territorially defined
areas of operation; the principles of and procedures for enacting local legal enactments shall be
specified by statute.
8
With regard to the 1997 Polish constitution and its practice, see Wyrzykowski and Cieleń (2006).
Associated Press. 2007. President versus PM: Cohabitation or Open Conflict?, Polish News Bulletin,
November, 22.
16
9
Lisbon Treaty. First, Prime Minister Tusk insisted he was responsible for foreign
policy and declared that Poland would pull out of Iraq in 2008 and institute a fully
professional army in 2009 and would cease blocking Russia's accession to OECD
while President Kaczyński opposed against those polices and planned to ask the
Constitutional Tribunal for an official definition of the president's and prime minister's
competencies in such matters. 10 Second, the dual leaders squabbled about the
attendance of EU Summit. The EU summit only offered two delegates for each
member state. President Kaczyński insisted to participate in the discussion of the
Lisbon treaty at EU summit but Prime Minister Tusk responded that the prime
minister was entitled to lead the delegation in this occasion and either the foreign
minister or the finance minister took the other seat11. Third, President Kaczyński
crossed swords with Prime Minister Tusk over the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty.
After the treaty was rejected in the referendum of Ireland, President Kaczyński was
reluctant to sign the Lisbon Treaty while Prime Minister Tusk and his allies in the
coalition government had a supporting stance of ratifying the Lisbon Treaty
(Jasiewicz and Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2009: 1076-7). To gain the upper hand over
policymaking, President Kaczyński enacted his veto power frequently. Over the
course of 2008, President Kaczyński vetoed 13 bills but nine vetoes were maintained,
three vetoes were overridden and one was pending （ Jasiewicz and
Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2009: 1077）. Due to the threshold of three-fifths majority, the
proportion of the maintained vetoes to the total vetoes was very high. Engaged in a
tug of war with Prime Minister Tusk, President Kaczyński strategically fulfilled his
constitutional authority to obstruct the legislation or polices which the government
endorsed.
All in all, in the mode of unbalanced cohabitation, the prime minister in the
coalition for the most part can decide preferred policies, but the president can pull
strings over the issues of defense and foreign affairs and some policies he opposes.
Since the prime minister has proactive power and the president gains reactive power,
we call it as the mode of unbalanced cohabitation.
Balanced Cohabitation in Sri Lanka
Semi-presidentialism can be broken down into two subtypes: premier-presidentialism
and president-parliamentarism (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Shugart 2005).
Premier-presidentialism contains three features: the president is elected by popular
10
Associated Press, 2007. Polish premier insists he is responsible for foreign policy. BBC Monitoring
Europe, November 28.
11
http://www.wbj.pl/article-42954-polands-leaders-in-conflict-at-eu-summit.html, accessed on June 13,
2012.
17
vote, the president possesses considerable powers, and there also exist a premier and
cabinet, subject to assembly confidence, who perform executive functions (Duverger,
1980: 161; Shugart and Carey, 1992: 23). President-parliamentism includes four
criteria: the popular election of the president; the president appoints and dismisses
cabinet ministers; cabinet ministers are subject to parliamentary confidence; and the
president has the power to dissolve parliament or legislative powers or both (Shugart
and Carey, 1992: 24). In president-parliamentary systems, the president and
parliament are co-equal players in controlling the government. The major nuance
between these two subtypes is that the president in president-parliamentarism is more
powerful over the termination of cabinet and agenda-setting of legislation than the
president in premier-presidentialism.
Based on this classification, Sri Lanka is a president-parliamentary system. The
executive function which carries out or executes the laws is given to the president.
According to the Sir Lankan constitution, the executive power of the people shall be
exercised by the president of the Republic acting on the advice of the prime minister
and the cabinet of ministers, and by the governors acting on the advice of the
respective chief ministers and regional boards of ministers to the extent hereinafter
provided (Article 2). Also, in Article 30 of the constitution, it stipulates that the
president is the head of the state, the head of the executive and government, and the
commander-in-chief of the armed force and in Article 43, it says that the president
shall be a member of the cabinet ministers and shall be the head of the cabinet of
ministers. If we only focus on this part of the constitution, Sri Lanka is a presidential
system where the president takes the helm of government. However, the president in
Sri Lanka possesses some other constitutional powers which the president in
presidentialism does not have. The president can dissolve the parliament (Article 70).
Since the president has the power of dissolution to parliament, the Sri Lankan
constitution is a president-parliamentary system. In addition, the president can also
have the power of referring any bill or provision to referendum (Article 85). In
addition, other features of semi-presidentialism in Sri Lanka are the president can
nominate the prime minister (Article 33) and there shall be a cabinet of ministers
charged with the direction and control of the government of the republic which shall
be collectively responsible and answerable to the parliament (Article 45).Taken
together, the constitution empowers the president greater leeway than the prime
minister. If the president and prime minister from rival parties as the situation in the
period of cohabitation, we can expect the severity of conflict between the dual
leaders.
In the 2001 Sri Lankan parliamentary elections, the United National Party won
109 seats and the People’s Alliance acquired only 77 seats in the total 225 seats.
18
President Chandrika Kumaratunga and her party, People’s Alliance lost a majority in
the parliament and had to nominate the opposition leader in the UNP, Ranil
Wickremesinghe to be prime minister (Shastri, 2002). This was the first time for Sri
Lanka to emerge the cohabitation experience in the trajectory of semi-presidentialism.
President Kumaratunga skirmished with Prime Minister Wickremesinghe over several
issues. President Kumaratunga carried on the campaign against the appeasement
strategy which Prime Minister Kumaratunga proposed to interact with the separatist
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (DeVotta, 2004). Prime Minister
Kumaratunga with a legislative majority enabled him to direct the contours of
lawmaking against the president. His government introduced a controversial
amendment in the parliament to curtail presidential powers over dissolution of
parliament; however, the Supreme Court overruled the amendment and the parliament
launched an impeachment to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for retaliation
(Jayasuriya, 2005: 89).
Facing a confrontational cohabitation government, President Kumararunga and
her party, the UNP were trying to clinch a deal with a small party, the communist
party (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna-JVP) and threatened to dissolove the parliament in
order to topple the government led by Prime Minister Wickremasinghe.12 Afterward,
President Kumaratunga suspended parliament, fired the ministers of defense,
information and the interior, and deployed troops around the capital.13 Furthermore,
President Kumaratunga also used her executive powers to appoint two members of
her party, which is in opposition in parliament, into the cabinet, just before dissolving
the legislature.14 The measures of calling emergency and suspending parliament were
not ratified by the opposition majority in parliament (Jayasuriya, 2005: 90). The
lock-in conflict between the president and prime minster from rival parties resulted
from one of the features of Sir Lankan Constitution. The president is not only the head
of the state, but also is the head of the government (Article 30). For example,
President Kumaratunga said under Sri Lanka's constitution, she is the executive
president having all the power except changing a man into woman and a woman into
a man.15 When the opposition grasps a majority in the parliament, the president has to
share executive power with the prime minister commanding a legislative majority. It
becomes an odd situation of the head of the government being at loggerheads with the
12
Associated Press. 2003. Sri Lanka: President said closer to ousting Wickremasinghe government.
Press Trust of India. Feburary 28.
13
Associated Press. 2003. Shake-up roils Sri Lanka; Prime minister rips president for dissolving
parliament. The Washington Times. November 5.
14
Associated Press. 2004. Sri Lankan parliament axed. The Australian. Feburary 9.
15
Associated Press. 2003. Sri Lankan president in Bangladesh says no plans to dissolve parliament.
The Independent Web Site, Dhaka. April 21.
19
head of the cabinet. Cohabitation in this case is a recipe for gridlock and institutional
combat. The president and the prime minister pushed their constitutional powers to
the point of paralyzing conflict. In this scenario, it is balanced cohabitation which
demonstrates the severity of political clashes between dual executive leaders.
Conclusion
There are four types of cohabitation in semi-presidentialism. First, when the
president does not have unilateral constitutional powers such as decree, veto, and
dissolution power and when the president’s party only has a minority in the
parliament, the president has to give executive ground to the prime minister with an
opposition majority. If the cabinet is composed of more than one party, the prime
minister has to share executive power with coalition parties. It is called shared
cohabitation (France). In this scenario, the president retreats to the second line and the
prime minister leads the way on day-to-day matters of government. Second, when
only one party forms the cabinet, the prime minister as the party leader is more
paramount than the prime minister in the coalition cabinet. When the president and
prime minister have divergent views of policy, conflict between them can arise, but
the prime minister still can gain the upper hand with a coherent majority in the
parliament. This scenario is called premier-tilt cohabitation (Portugal). Third, in some
semi-presidential countries, the president holds some unilateral authority or reserved
domains. For example, the president can issue a decree or cast a veto or launch
dissolution power to parliament or the president can nominate the portfolios of foreign
affairs and defense. In other words, the president can act independently in some
reserved domains and to serve a rallying point for the opposition majority. The prime
minister still pilots the government but the president can have some discretion on
certain domains. In addition, since the cabinet is a coalition government, if the
coalition cabinet fails to act in unison, it can weaken political power of the prime
minister. This is called unbalanced cohabitation (Poland). Fourth, if the president is
granted considerable unilateral authority and the opposing cabinet is only made up of
one party, it is more likely to see grandstanding between the president and prime
minister. This scenario is called balanced cohabitation (Sri Lanka).
Take together, the degree of conflict increases progressively from shared
cohabitation, premier-tilt cohabitation, unbalanced cohabitation to balanced
cohabitation. Our task here is to outline a framework capable of explaining the
features that subtend different types of cohabitation. The interactions between the
president and prime minister are best conceptualized by degree along a bounded scale.
At one end of the spectrum is the prime minister holding the final authority over the
operation of government while the president has a free hand to interpret his power at
20
will on certain reserved domains. On the other end of the spectrum is balanced
between the president and prime minister sharing some constitutional authority,
where either the president or prime minister can tip the scales on each specific issue.
This article claims that cohabitation in semi-presidentialism does not work as a
parliamentary system and the president’s authority depends on the weight of his
constitutional prerogatives in different types of cohabitation. During the period of
cohabitation, the prime minister has few incentives to follow the president’s lead.
However, the president can still wield his influence by reserved constitutional powers.
This study clarifies the nexus between presidential powers, party composition of the
cabinet and the degree of conflict between the president and prime minister. In
conclusion, this paper illustrates that the construction of different types of
cohabitation and different consequences over the degree of conflict can contribute to
the literature of comparing semi-presidential countries.
21
Reference
Amorim Neto and Marina Costa Lobo, 2009. “Portugal’s Semi-presidentialism (Re)
considered: An Assessment of the President’s Role in the Policy Process,
1976-2006, European Journal of Political Research, 48: 234-55.
Collier, David, Jody Laporte, and Jason Seawright. 2008. “Typologies: Forming
Concepts and Creating Categorical Variables.” in Janet. Box-Steffemsmeier,
Henry Brady, and David Collier eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political
Methodology. Oxford: Oxford University Press,152-73.
Debré, Michel. 1981. “The Constitution of 1958, Its Raison D'être and How It
Evolved.” in William G. Andrews and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., The Fifth
Republic at Twenty. Albany: State University of New York Press, 11-24.
DeVotta, 2004. “Sri Lanka in 2003.” Asian Survey, 44(1): 49-55.
Duverger, Maurice. 1980. “A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential
Government.” European Journal of Political Research, 8: 165-87.
Elgie, Robert. 2001. “Cohabitation: Divided Government French-Style.” In Robert
Elgie, ed., Divided Government in Comparative Perspective. New York: Oxford
University Press,pp.106-26.
Elgie, Robert. 2002. “La Cohabitation de longue durée: Studying the 1997-2002
Experience,” Modern & Contemporary France. 10(3): 297-311.
Elgie, Robert. 2008. “The Perils of Semi-presidentialism. “Are They Exaggerated?.”
Democratization, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 49-66.
Elgie, Robert. 2010. “Semi-presidentialism, Cohabitation and the Collapse of
Electoral Democracies.” Government and Opposition. Vol.45. No1, pp.29-45.
Elgie, Robert. 2011. “Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Semi-presidentialism:
Bringing Party Back In.” Government and Opposition 46(3): 392-409.
Elgie, Robert and Iain McMenamin. 2009. “Semi-presidentialism and Democratic
Performance.” Japanese Journal of Political Science, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 323-40.
Elgie, Robert and Iain McMenamin. 2011. “Explaining the onset of cohabitation
under semi-presidentialism.” Political Studies, 59: 616-35.
Hayward, Jack and Vincent Wright. 2006. Governing from the Center: Core Executive
Coordination in France. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Huber, John 1996. Rationalizing Parliament: Legislative Institutions and Party
Politics in France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jasiewicz, Krzysztof and Agnieszka Jasiewicz-Betkiewicz, 2009. “Poland.” European
Journal of Political Research 48: 1073-79.
Jayasuriya, Laksiri, 2005. The Changing Face of Electoral Politics in Sri Lanka
(1994-2004). Singapore: Marshall Cavendish International.
Kirschke, Linda. 2007. ‘Semi-presidentialism and the Perils of Power-sharing in
Neopatrimonial States.’ Comparative Political Studies, 40(11): 1372-1394.
Magone, José. 2007. “Portugal.” European Journal of Political Research 46:1075-81.
Magone, José. 2009. “Portugal.” European Journal of Political Research 48: 1080-86.
Martins, Ana. 2006. ‘The Portuguese Semi-presidential System about Law in the
Books and Law in Action.’ European Constitutional Law Review, 2(1) : 81-206.
McMenamin, Iain. 2008. ‘Semi-presidentialism and Democratization in Poland.’ in
Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup eds., Semi-presidentialism in Central and
Eastern Europe. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 120-37.
Moestrup, Sophia. 2007. “Semi-presidentialism in Niger: Gridlock and Democratic
Breakdown-Learning from Past Mistakes.” in Robert Elgie and Sophia
Moestrup. eds., Semi-presidentialism outside Europe. Oxon: Routledge, 105-20.
22
Parrish, Scott. 1998. “Presidential Decree Authority in Russia.” in John Carey and
Matthew Shugart.eds., Executive Decree Authority, New York: Cambridge
University Press, 62-103.
Pasquino, Gianfranco. 1997. “Semi-presidentialism: A political Model at Work.”
European Journal of Political Research 31:128-137.
Pasquino, Gianfranco. 2007. ‘The Advantages and Disadvantages of
Semi-presidentialism: A West European Perspective’, in Robert Elgie and
Sophia Moestrup, eds., Semi-presidentialism Outside Europe, London:
Routledge, 14-29.
Pierce, Roy. 1991. ‘The Executive Divided against Itself: Cohabitation in France
1986-1988.’ Governance 4 (3): 85-98.
Poulard, Jean V. 1990. “The French Double Executive and the Experience of
Cohabitation.”105(2): 243-67.
Raadt, Jasper de. 2009. “Contestable Constitutions: Ambiguity, Conflict, and Change
in East Central European Dual Executive Systems.” Communist and
Post-Communist Studies 42(1): 83-101.
Samuels, David, and Matthew S. Shugart. 2010. Presidents, Parties, and Prime
Ministers: How the Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and
Behavior. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Shastri, Amita. 2002. “Sri Lanka in 2001.”Asian Survey, 42(1): 177-82.
Shugart, Matthew S. and John M. Carey. 1992. Presidents and Assemblies:
Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Shugart, Matthew S. 2005. “Semi-presidential Systems: Dual Executive and Mixed
Authority Patterns.” French Politics 3(3): 323-51.
Skach, Cindy. 2005. Borrowing Constitutional Designs: Constitutional Law in
Weimar Germany and the French Fifth Republic. New Jersey: Princeton
University Press.
Stevens, Anne. 2003. Government and Politics of France. New York: Palgrave
Macmillian Press.
Suleiman, Ezra. 1980. “Presidential Government in France.” in Richard Rose and
Ezra N. Suleiman. eds., Presidents and Prime Ministers. Washington, D.C.:
American Enterprise Institute, 94-138.
Suleiman, Ezra N. 1994. “Presidentialism and Political Instability in France,” in Juan
J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: the
case of Latin America (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994),
pp.137-162.
Villalón, Leonard A. and Abdourahmane Idrissa. 2005. “Repetitive Breakdowns and a
Decade of Experimentation: Institutional Choices and Unstable Democracy in
Niger.” in Leonard A Villalón and Peter VonDoepp. eds., The Fate of Africa’s
Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions. Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indianan University Press, 27-48.
Willerton, John P. and Martin Carrier. 2005. “Jospin, Political Cohabitation and Left
Governance.” French Politics, Culture and Society, 23(2): 43-70.
Wyrzykowski, Mirosław and Agnieszka. Cieleń. 2006. ‘Poland-Semi-presidentialism
or Rationalised Parliamentarianism’?.’European Constitutional Law Review,
2(1): 253-67.
23