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Soviet Satellite Defense
Against the US Miniature
Vehicle Antisatellite Weapon
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. An latelllaenee Assessmeat ~
APPROVED FOR RREASE
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Soviet Satellite Defense
Against the US Miniature
Vehicle Antisatellite '_Veapon.
The Soviets will have only a limited capability to defend their satellites
a2ainst an attack by the air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV), the US
antisatellite (ASA T) weapon system that is scheduled to be deployed in
1987; The ASAT weapon will be capable of attacking low-altitude
satellites, including most of the Soviet reconnaissance satellites. Once the
SovietS detect an attack, the most likely tactic they would
to defend
. their-satellites is maneuverinR to avoid interception,
,technological
indicate· a iilOdeiiie . , ,__ ,,.._ ___ ..,
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'.·. develop additional
· ~by the late
these
nu~rm1·~
\•· ~obability of satellite survival, they can only be
implemented after major technical problems have been solved. The weight
of countermeasure packages added_ to present satellites probably would
· , c; require .the use ·ora new launch vehicle, and the SoViets have a suitable
'': launch vehiCle under development. Alternatively, the
inay choose to
:incorporate countermeasures in
_
we
that the Soviets may attempt to increase
?·maneuver-caPabilities by increasing propellant capacities, we see no new·
:-.~- sp~cecraft designs
include this or other modifications for defensive
W~ believe .the Soviets know enough about the ASA T system to develop
·countermeasures designed to increase the survivability of their satellites.
Open-source reports about the ALMV contain data on the probable Soviet
target satellites, physical dimensions of the ALMV, main components of
the system, initial basing of the F-15s modified for ALMV launch, prime
contractors and budget, and even a detailed design drawing ofthe ALMV.
We believe this information would allow the Soviets to model the ASA T
system accurately enough to predict at'ack geometries and to identify
threatened satellite targets during an attack . •
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Contents
Page
Summary
The Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle Projlram
Soviet Knowledie of the ASAT System
Soviet WaminK and Countermeasure Command
Possible Countermeasures
Maneuverin&
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Soviet Satellite Defense
Against the US Miniature
Vehicle Antisatellite Weapon.
The Air-Launched Miniature Vehicle Program
The US air-launched miniature vehicle (ALMV) is
part of a direct-ascent, hit-to-lcill antisatellite (ASA T)
. weapon that is scheduled to be deployed in 1987. The
weapon consists of the ALMV payload and a twostage booster. It is carried to launch point by an F-15
aircraft that has been modified to carry cooling and
computer interface support equipment on a pallet in
· the ammunition bay and the ASAT weapon beneath
· · the fuselage. (s)
a
... , , In typical intercept plan, the F-15 carries the ASAT
weapon to an altitude of about 13 lcilometers (km);
then it performs a supersonic dash and ejects the
ASA T "'""""""
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A larg.eamountof open-source informatio~ on the
· ALMV and its subsystems is available to the Soviets,
and they have recently published a detailed descrip.tion of the ASAT S}stem in one of their military
_journals. The major source of information is Aviation
-~~:~:;~ ____Wrek and Space Technology, along with technical
· ''"·:.~ journals. Congressional and Defense Department reports. and Jane's Weapons Almanac. Information
about the
tractors, ASAT mission. physical di-mensions (inchidine detailed desiin drawings), sen- sors, basing, and probable Soviet targets is available
in these "pul)Jicatidhs. The' esthnated budget, the in.. tended date for initial operational capability, and the
_. C 1 (command, control, and communications) and
tracking support provided by NORAD also have been
· reported. Proposed plans to update tracking and tar··· geting capabilities of
radars have also been
published.
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Soviet w"arnina and. Cowitermeasure (:ommand
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Defensive Countermeasures again~t an att~ck on an
. individual satellite will depend on the Soviets' capabil·
ity to obtain a warning of the attack and direct the · ·
satellite's response. A control center may receive the
warning and relay commands to the satellite; or the
satellite could be equipped with onboard sensors to
Once a warning has been received and the decision to
detect the attack and could be programed to initiate
__ __ __ _________ _ imple111~'!t a ~!lntermeasure has been made, the new
defensive options..
programing data must be sent to the satellites.
4
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for defense·a,ainst the ALMV .
1-10
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40-60
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60-90
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High .:--. ·
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.. :-~·. Thi:-&;vieti have at' l~sf.rilrie-JX>ssr6it"ruture optic·~~· .
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The maneuver capabilities of Soviet satellites could be
incr~ased by using larger space launch boosters, higher energy propellants, lighter subsystems, or increased
satellite propellant
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RORSATs and EORSA Ts to be deployed by 1990,
and they might have increased maneuver capabilities.
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: Although-Soviet knowledge of the ALMV system
·probably is not complete enough to calculate the exact
·magnitude of maneuve-r necessary to avoid an ASAT
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