Professor Miso Kulic and Jovan Gagrica in RTS - TV Novi Sad broadcast:
"In the Beginning there was Language"
IN THE BEGINNING THERE WAS LANGUAGE
Professor Kulic, your recently published book, Language Be1
fore Language , did not only attract an exceptionally great interest
in philosophical circles, but also with the public in general. This is
one of the reasons for our more comprehensive discussion with regards to your work, remarkable and valuable as it is for our cultural
development. Your book Language Before Language, as much
by its structure of critical issues as by its intellectual scope, seems to
contribute an original and significant distinction with regards to
your previously published scientific analyses, such as The Culture
and Philosophy of History or The Grail of Philosophical Thought.
That is why I ask you: is it not summarized in this new philosophical
work the comprehensive intellectual foundation and effort contained in your previous books, this time on a new subject?
Your question regarding my innovative philosophical composition and its foundation opens at the same time a serious philosophical enquiry upon which stands the sense of humanity's
orientation in general. This is because it is evident that in everything,
including the spiritual world, there must always exist a basis upon
which one can stand. Therefore every creator, every intellectual
1
An interview with Professor Miso Kulic, which took place in August 2000. Its
short version was broadcast, within the frame of a scientific programme, by
the Television and Radio Station of Novi Sad on October 26, 2000. The interview was given by Jovan Gagrica.
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must incessantly search for it. In other words, they must search for
their orientation. Still, it is never an exclusively personal question for a
philosopher where their foundation is situated, for it is apparent that
only in the nature of their education, talent and experience can
they find that firm, individual ground from which they can advance
further or simply depart elsewhere. Their real question is: what is that
foundation? Does it make or does it not make any sense for the entire existence of humanity?
To be sure, the fact that they try to understand the question of
their own foundation within the question on existence as it is should
by no means be taken that the philosopher avoids giving themselves the answer about the real meaning of their own research.
Namely, they cannot evade answering to themselves the question
of whether their preceding spiritual exploration, that is to say the one
argued in their books, appears as something that in the course of
their present current work has the sense of foundation or whether all
their previous considerations are reduced only to the exploration for
meaning? As soon as the question is posed however, the philosopher is, as any other researcher, immediately faced with that irrepressible need of human beings to give their own existence a
foundation, a meaning. In other words, they cannot bear to be left
without some kind of an existential significance. Basically, this is an
encounter with that imperative of our being, known to us so well,
that all the actions and ventures we have undertaken in our past
have always subsequently been encompassed by a necessity, by
the starting point of a logical structure of our thought from where we
want to begin and which we consider has determined our path.
This subsequent relation to ourselves, which is, thus, the same
as the way in which we establish a connection of the continuity of
meaning in past events of our own being, is called understanding.
As a result, it can be observed right away that understanding is the
same as the appearance of a connection of different events as a
continuity. Through this, at the same time, it is possible to observe
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369
that the appearance of a foundation upon which the reality of our
existence rests, precisely because it rests solely with the continuity
that creates our understanding for us, our existence can perceive its
foundation, for the continuity is that foundation. Continuity is foundation precisely because it makes possible for our being to preserve in the diversity of every event the unchanged identity of itself
as something unique. In addition, continuity is always no more than
that understanding of the unique sense of ourselves in all our variety
of meaning. Such an analysis shows that understanding can never
exist outside of the idea of continuity. Therefore, the understanding
that would not be expressed as the continuation from one event to
another would be an absurd understanding, for something that
could not be connected by a common rationale would not be
comprehended. In this way, it would not be constructed as a foundation which would have the sense of a foothold for our orientation.
Certainly, the existence of an understanding cannot be denied because, from the angle of sensory logic, it is not rational. Yet, whatever the nature of the reality of our understanding, it can never
cease to exist in the sense that it is always an understanding precisely because along with existence is always given the foundation
of existence. An existence that would not have its foundation cannot even be imagined because what is existence without it existing
anywhere?
Does it mean that humanity is given the foundation of its existence in the sense of our understanding?
Yes, exactly that. Because of this, there is no human being
whose existence is without a foundation, since there is no person
who, at the same time as their being, was not given to understand
that existence as well. Thus, in the question on what is our existence,
it is not actually asked whether we have a foundation because if we
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did not have it, we would not be able to ask anything. Consequently, on the question of our foundation, we find that it is no more
than simply a question on the ability or failure to understand our own
existence. In fact, we recognize that its sense is contained in the formula, can the finality of existence be avoided by its understanding?
This is because it is exclusively in understanding that is laid the fundamental hope of existence regarding the possibility of our own
creation in a different reality, meaning the creation of the absolute
and endless existence in the finality of our own being. The reason
why I am thinking that only understanding can decide on existence
is precisely in that understanding, by its action, makes the difference in the meaning of the occurrence of existence always expressed and connected in continuity as one sense of being. This
always becomes the factor by its creation of continuity that not only
appears as something new for existence, but also as something
that by its creation simultaneously preserves the identity of our own
being. Thus, understanding incessantly creates and preserves its
own existence also as an original sense of being. As a result, it can
immediately be seen that in understanding, existence is given the
way in which being creates for itself and all its differences a new
sense of its own. In other words, that understanding is the image of
the creation of existence, not only an obscure description of it.
This is also the reason why I am sure that such an essential
need of humanity for continuity as its own comprehension of itself is
actually the one that shows our foundation is never simply something given to us. In other words, it is merely a trait that we simply inherit by birth or learn later on. Nevertheless, our foundation is, in
addition, always in the sense that we are the ones creating it and
establishing it in the idea of the continuity of our existence. With the
appearance of this sense of continuity is also associated the original presentation of the sense of understanding as that individual,
though also continuously ambiguous, foundation on which we exist.
All of this shows that understanding is the way by which our being
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371
creates its own foundation in the presentation of continuity itself and
that from this comes that which is always some original base of itself.
It is why the works that I have written, including the two books
that you mentioned previously, The Culture and Philosophy of History and The Grail of Philosophical Thought, essentially must have
even with me, as much as in my subsequent reception of total reflection, an image of continuity. Namely, it seems to me an indispensable element of development that philosophical
comprehension of humanity’s existence that was the only one to
prepare the basis from which to depart into the puzzling meaning of
various questions about the language that I researched in the book,
Language Before Language.
Could you establish more closely this sense of continuity that
links The Culture and Philosophy of History and The Grail of Philosophical Thinking with Language Before Language?
In The Culture and Philosophy of History, I was occupied
with restructuring, while at the same time rehabilitating, the concept
of historical philosophy as the most significant philosophical orientation in the 18th and 19th centuries. I was attempting to do this by
presenting the problem of culture, that is, the first appearance of
culture as a difficulty in Western European thought, that which is essentially laid down in the conception of historical philosophy. Even
today I think it was particularly important to notice that in the philosophical-historical understanding especially are created the presumptions upon whose basis the first rational steps are taken by
historiography, being followed, some time later, by sociology and
anthropology. In short, it is the philosophy of history that allows the
natural presentation of all those spiritual sciences that are known to-
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day. The tightest link with this is the observation that for the philosophical-historical conception the core of historical development,
after its own definition, was the same as the continuous progress
that was made, as an example, in the fields of science, agriculture,
education, and taste. This is what is known as culture and simply because of this the idea of historical progress was seen in that which is
known as culture. This is why I wanted to show in The Culture and
Philosophy of History how, in the mutual encounter of historical philosophy, historiography, and sociology, was shaped the enquiry on
culture. This enquiry, by its seriousness and significance for the understanding of the spiritual development of the contemporary
stage of humanity, is far from the mundane pedagogical-political
reductionist approach that formulates culture only as an art form or
a desired education.
I think that The Culture and Philosophy of History was important for my later philosophical interests even though it sometimes
went outside of my fundamental philosophical intentions. Because
of the nature of my research, it had to have a historical orientation
and, along with that reasoning, had to, in part, keep its speculative
character. Despite this, it is, in essence, a scholarly study, one which
gave me precious experience about the way in which it is possible
to defend and deepen the essence of learning without, at the
same time, making, with the sheer number of insights, an impression on independent thought. Namely, the interdisciplinary nature
of work on this problem demanded from me a mastery of a large
amount of diverse fields in the area of spiritual science. From this
came a question: how to avoid, on the one hand, the varied seductiveness of philosophical and other factual information,
namely, bibliography, while, on the other hand, make them present
in philosophical presentations? These difficulties made me comprehend clearly that philosophical thought must always be carefully
preserved from the understanding according to which it is only,
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373
more or less, a successful compilation and systematization of varied insights about this or that philosophical question. This observation, unfortunately, dominates in our philosophy or with the historians
of philosophy and, truth be told, only creates the impression that it is
about something philosophically serious. On the contrary, learning
can be, and is, useful. That is, it is that which in philosophical thought
must be taken for granted, but it alone is not enough because the
only thing that interests us in philosophy is can we and how can we
think further with an idea, though this does not mean it would be, in
the end, reduced to exemplary scholarship.
On the other hand, The Grail of Philosophical Thinking is in its
entirety a work of speculation. That is, a composition that attempted, within the framework of a speculative philosophical-historical outline, to reflect again on the term of individuality in its
major spiritual-historical moments: art, religion, and the state. In this
way, The Grail of Philosophical Thinking is a book that continues
the philosophical-historical examination contained in The Culture
and Philosophy of History, thematizing it more profoundly in terms
of a historical self-reflection of thought. If I would have to determine
the discipline that this work belongs to, it would not be wrong of me
to say that it belongs to the philosophy of history or the philosophy of
culture or, as one would like, for they are, in their summarized content, one and the same outcome. The Grail of Philosophical
Thinking is a work which marks a turning point in my philosophical
discernment, for it is there that I understood and mastered the nature of speculative thinking as the only means of philosophical
thought by which the meaning of our own existence can be profoundly understood. As for its contents, this is a book in which I attempted to show that the process of thought has two mutually
opposed principles that shape, at the same time, the dual nature
of human properties, meaning property as the possession of forms
and property as the non-possession of forms. Historically, these prin-
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ciples perpetually interchange the places of their domination,
thereby determining the sense of humanity's orientation.
I believe it would be of philosophical interest if you would
present in greater detail your understanding of the term human
properties and, at the same time, if possible, to state the reasons
that made you decide to use it.
The reason was exactly in that, as Hegel showed us, our consciousness is always also a consciousness of an object, for if the object did not exist, it would not even know that it existed as a
consciousness. Therefore, consciousness must always necessarily
have under its control an object because it is only in the object that
it belongs to itself. The control over the object is always established
as the possession of this object and by this is immediately shown
that in the notion of the possession of the object is also given the notion of human property as the possession of itself. However, in front
of us has to immediately appear the puzzling nature of human
property, meaning the insight that human property in general does
not have to be simply materialistic. In fact, that possession can be
understood even as materialistic non-possession, namely, that humanity’s possessions are affirmed in one of the meanings of possession that repudiates materialistic possessions. The way in which
these two notions of human property as two notions of possession
have left their historical trace in art, religion, and the state was examined in The Grail of Philosophical Thinking. As a result, it seems
to me that, if I now ventured to answer directly the question you
posed previously, that it is already there, in the notion of human
property as possession and non-possession, which presented a certain reflection that accurately prepared me for this spiritual orienta-
In the Beginning there was Language
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tion in understanding the existence of humanity as a linguistic
existence.
Could your book, Language Before Language, be placed in
the field of linguistic philosophy?
No, I do not think that we are talking about linguistic philosophy, even having in mind the traditional way of philosophical methodology with language, a misunderstanding about determination
is very much possible. In fact, Language Before Language is a
philosophical work that has language as its objective and, from this,
it seems natural that in a thematic sense is able to be determined
as the philosophy of language. In this sense, and only in this one, is it
agreeable, I think, to place my work. Even though I do not consider
that thematic determinations are exceptionally important for philosophy, I could not, for reasons of amalgamation, accept that the
understanding of language in this book be so labelled. This is because the spiritual principal on which rests Language Before Language is a formulated philosophical reflection that cannot be,
from my point of view, reduced to a traditional thematic philosophizing of language that we, in any case, call linguistic philosophy.
The first discernible reason is precisely in that one finds in Language Before Language that the difference between language
and thought is not expressed in a traditional way as a difference between something that is a language and something that is not or,
which is the same thing, something which by its determination as a
language would, at the same time, be determined like that which is
not a thought. Language Before Language shows that thought is
also a language and because of this language is the absolute
foundation of our existence. In this is found that original reason why I
think the given philosophical understanding of language in Lan-
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guage Before Language cannot be contained in the concept of
linguistic philosophy. This is because it would, in that sense, be necessarily taken for granted the traditional analysis according to which
philosophical thought is that which can make language, as its object, to think about something which is not a language. Nevertheless, because even philosophy can be expressed only through
language, that is, even philosophy can think in some kind of a language, shows that language is not and never can be some regional item of philosophy, such as art or religion. This is why
language is exactly that which is absolute for philosophy. In addition, the philosophical comprehension of language is possible only
because language exists, so that, according to this insight, something totally contradictory can even be said to the contemporary
philosophical tradition, namely, that language is not the object of
philosophy, but that it is actually philosophy that is the object of language. Because it is an object that is expressed as a language and
within a language, philosophy can appear as such.
Your book is by its title already unusually puzzling, metaphorical. How is it then possible to understand the basic concept and
starting point of Language Before Language?
The title may seem metaphorical and it is some kind of a metaphor for the understanding that is in the book presented, but it is, so
it seems to me, complimentary to the very idea that is found in this
book. You ask me why this title, Language Before Language?
There are many philosophical reasons. One of them is that in
this work, as I mentioned earlier, even the concept of thought is
taken as that of language, that is, it is totally different from the whole
of that spiritual tradition that in the discriminating process between
thought and language presupposes, at the same time, that
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377
thought is what creates language. Still, this traditional understanding is not only unquestionable, but is in the comprehension of the
question about a language shown to be untenable. With this, a
problem immediately surfaces: about what can that thought be
thinking if not in some kind of a language?
However, in this understanding can be found something further that is problematical. This is that thought cannot from its assumed non-linguistic meaning create linguistic meanings for a
specific language. That is, that the one previously must have some
language to be able to create some particular language or, which
is the same, that thought is language. In any case, in what way
would thought be able to create some particular language as a
means to say its thoughts unless these thoughts do not have, even
earlier and for themselves, a linguistic meaning. When the meaning of thought would really be something different from the meaning of language, then even language would not be able to express
the meaning of thought. This is because something impossible
would be asserted, namely, that language can express some
meaning that would not be its meaning and which, along with this,
language would not be able to recognize as a meaning. In this
way, it must once again be concluded that thought is not something different from language, that is, that thought is language.
To be sure, this language of thought cannot be equalled with
the image of some special language that is spoken, but it is at the
same time present in the meaning of each special spoken language. This shows that thought, even earlier, before a language
that is spoken, must have a linguistic meaning because, in the opposite sense, thought would neither be able to create nor to control
a particular language. Because of this, it is crucial to understand
that language is not only in that it is spoken, or in its significance as a
written form, but that language is exactly and solely a process of
thought that has some kind of a personal language of its own and
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that before any other spoken language. This is a grammatical language and from this only can be seen the insight that even the
grammatical meaning of language is that which is language and
not simply some non-linguistic rule for speaking a language. From
this can be understood why the meaning of humanity's existence is
found in the meaning of its linguistic existence.
What for you is actually a language or what is it not, but is usually presented on a daily basis as such?
The daily awareness of language considers unquestionable its
own comprehension that language is only a tool through which
thoughts are spoken. On the other hand, it is precisely because of
this that a reason is found why, on the question about language, it
can be understood that language is not only a tool, but an end in itself. Namely, asking the question about language, we have to notice that this question is possible to be asked only through a
language, that is, that from language there is no escape. As a result, it is simply about some puzzling and, at the same time, dual
meaning of language that would allow only a superficial evasion of
language. I say superficial because when you make your own language an object by asking, what is language, you can only superficially throw out your own language before itself. Namely, only
superficially can you state that your language is something outside
of you because when you say this, that you have thrown it out of
yourself, you can make this throwing away only through a language, for by throwing away a language from yourself, you realize
that you cannot stay without a language, for you would then be
without yourself. You would always, in other words, address a language by a language. That is why it can immediately be seen in the
question about a language that only a language is asked about it-
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379
self as a language, that is, that the question about language is always some linguistic enquiry about language. Language can be
understood only by language, so that in the comprehension of a
language is found a puzzling presentation about language that is
being produced by itself as a language. That is why a language
can never be only a tool for something else other than what it is, for it
is the absolute foundation of our existence, both a means and an
end of existence at the same time.
How does language actually produce language? Does this
refer to that impossibility, about which you speak of in Language
Before Language, of the continuation or beginning of language
as a creation of logic and its need for the diferentiation between
the real and the unreal?
In order to say anything, it is quite understandable that the
condition that something is said must be satisfied first or, simply put,
that language exists. Only after the fact is established that one can
say something, that something is being said, can we consider that
which has been spoken. From this again follows that language has
its own independent structure of meaning that proceeds even before the particular meaning we acquire in speaking. Thus, the question is: how did we acquire language in the first place? In other
words, how is language created?
We have to ask ourselves, before anything, what is the meaning of language. We will notice that for a linguistic as much as for a
grammatical meaning there is a total indifference what is said, provided that for this meaning it is only important that some structure is
begun in terms of a subject, then a predicate and ends in the position of an object. If this condition is satisfied, then also every ex-
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pressed linguistic, grammatical meaning, including the one that for
our logic does not have any real meaning, always remains a
meaning. In fact, grammatical meaning remains a meaning even
when it makes no logical sense. This is the reason why our logical
meaning refuses to accept that everything which is said through a
linguistic as much as a grammatical meaning is, at the same time,
something that which always has its logical meaning, for simply not
everything which is said has a true meaning. Nevertheless, we cannot easily accept the results of this insight, for they are contrary to
the logic of historical understanding of our existence, that is, the belief that our logical meaning is the creator of the linguistic, grammatical meaning.
Namely, there comes all of a sudden an awareness in which it
seems like this grammatical language was first created to which it is
not important what is said, but it is only vital that something is being
said, and that we are the ones that came with our logic from somewhere, beginning to use it and to orient it towards our own particular
reasoning of the truth. It seems that something opposite is not possible because the logical meaning of language cannot be stated,
even by this absolute grammatical meaning in which everything
has meaning and nothing is without meaning, so that it again follows that logical meaning cannot find a way to present itself as the
creator of the grammatical linguistic sense.
Or, on the other hand, if we consider language our own creation, then it must follow that we have, for some unclear reason,
created language that for us had no other purpose except to be
used just for the sake of speaking and then, all of a sudden, when
the meaning of speaking acquired diverse meanings of truth and
untruth, we somehow got out of it and subordinated it to that new
task of differentiating between truth and untruth. Along with this must
comes the question, why was it necessary for us to create language
when its first appearance told every reality as a reality, that is, when
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381
language did not show us the difference between the real and the
unreal. Without differentiating the real from the unreal, truth from untruth, it cannot be seen what kind of a significance language would
have for us? Why does language then exist? In addition, our logical
historical meaning can state that language comes into being
gradually, but to believe this we cannot find a confirmation anywhere, for we do not see anywhere from what would that premice
begin. Everything that we would take as the beginning of the birth of
the meaning of language, be it adjectives, verbs, nouns, etc.,
would always again pose the question on the origin of this very
meaning, so that, because we cannot establish the beginning of
meaning, we cannot even derive the gradual nature of the development of language. It can be seen that without the totality of language cannot exist even the awareness about the beginning of
language and that then points to the fact that there is no real beginning, for without a language, a beginning would not even be able
to present itself as a beginning.
In what way is it then possible to speak of the history of language?
Only from the standpoint of understanding language as
speech. Only there is it possible to determine the history of language because under the term, the history of language, is simply
perceived development as transformation, that is to say, the
meaning of one word in some language that, through time, acquires some other form or some other meaning. Also, to this belongs the installation of all those diverse forms that words acquire
during their travel from one language to another. However, from the
standpoint of linguistic meaning as it is, there does not exist any history of linguistic meaning.
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Let us take, as an example, the terms of identity and difference. You cannot say that people have first formulated the meaning of the term, identity, and then from it taken the meaning of the
term, difference, which works to the contrary as well because both
terms have to simultaneously exist in order to have their exclusive
determination as much as the determination of their mutual diversity. The historical process presupposes the image of temporal development from one meaning to another, but, given that it is not
present in the linguistic meaning, this cannot be taken from the history of language, for in the linguistic meaning exists only a simultaneous difference, not a sensory and logical difference that time
expresses as the past, present, and future. We perceive the difference in time as the only real difference because this is the distinction that gives us the indispensable difference in the reality of our
existence. On the other hand, a question must once again appear,
why are we having this simultaneous linguistic, grammatical meaning that does not heed any difference in time? Because of this, it is
the place where one can come to a valuable insight about the
dual, grammatical and logical meaning of language, in fact, the
drama of our existence that is incessantly continuing and repeating
in the fundamental meaning of our language.
In Language Before Language, you present in the perception of a discussion with oneself the self-establishment of our being,
namely, the presentation in which language produces itself as a
language. How is that presentation created and in what sense
does language have for you a non-subjective meaning?
In essence, it can be seen that in the insight that the language
itself can only be asked through a language is shown this puzzling
presentation in which language produces itself as a language. This
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383
can be one unsettling presentation, for even if we understand language as an identity of our being, we can make, understandably,
our own language our own object and, at the same time, something else, different from ourselves. From this comes the idea that
language is simultaneously our Self, provided that without it we
would not be able to have any meaning about ourselves, and, at
the same time, when we make it an object, what is not our Self,
meaning, like that which is simultaneously some foreign Self. By this
is shaped one unusual presentation in which it seems that it deals
with some simultaneous identity and difference between the two
Self, or with a mysterious presence of some foreign Self in the actual
Self. In reality, it seems that this disturbance, which is produced by a
presentation about the concurrently dual linguistic nature of our being, is something groundless because our Self cannot speak with its
presumed other Self and, as a result, cannot confirm that some
other Self in its Self really exists.
It is understandable that in this rejection of thought about the
presence of one more Self in the existing Self, our Self goes from the
sensorial logical truth that for every conversation it is necessary to
have at least two people, but, on the other hand, it must be immediately shown that this observation is not totally correct. Namely, we
are always talking with ourselves during which we never observe
some other Self in the actual Self with which this conversation is taking place, for, even in talking with ourselves, it is important that it is
some differentiated form of speech, not only a unique one. In the
conversation with ourselves, we place ourselves also as an object of
ourselves, for we advise, rebuke or warn ourselves, in other words,
establish, at the same time, a differentiation of ourselves in a way
that we are simultaneously the subject and object to ourselves. As a
result, a question follows: how can it happen, that is, how is talking to
ourselves even possible when, besides ourselves, there is nobody
else to talk to? This is where is found the meeting place with the real-
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ity of linguistic illusion as one of the realities of our concurrently dual
linguistic existence.
However, the fact that language in a conversation with ourselves is being presented as something different from our Self, but
which nowhere else shows its Self, quite the opposite, is unceasingly
only in the meaning of presence shown that language has for us a
non-subjective meaning, namely, that it has a meaning of a
non-personal presence. This is why, wishing to implicitly give attention to Christianity, I called language our original, indisputable and
absolute friend which from endless love towards humanity carries
the greatest possible sacrifice - the sacrifice of denying our Self for
the Self of humanity. Everybody can fail us and leave us to be on
our own, only language can absolutely never do this, for there is no
personal desert or such a large difficulty in which a conversation
with ourselves would be able to cease and in which language
would be able to leave us.
An entire chapter in your book is entitled, Grammar as the
Theology of Language. An impression exists, in any case, that your
thematization on the question of language, on the one hand, and
theological problems, especially those from the Judeo-Christian
heritage, on the other hand, is going, if I can put it that way, towards a reconstruction of theological thought by way of understanding the fundamental thought of language. What is the reason
for this and in what way should one understand the term, the theology of grammar?
In Language Before Language, I tried, at the same time as
defining the question about language as the central question of
humanity’s existence, to show the grammatical structure of linguistic meaning as a theological structure, that is, to present that the
In the Beginning there was Language
385
grammatical question is not simply some linguistic enquiry, that in
the grammatical meaning of language is laid and brought out the
presentation of each theology, even the Judeo-Christian one.
Namely, when we say, the grammatical meaning of language, we should certainly not perceive it in the usual manner, in
which it is implied that the grammatical sense of language is not
the language itself, but only a prerequisite for the appearance of
language. However, the requirement of language, as I repeatedly
mentioned in this discussion, cannot be outside of language and
this is why even grammar itself, as a requirement of language, is
some form of language. In truth, this is an absolute language, absolute before any other, and, in this way, is contained in it even earlier each meaning, for there is no meaning that can show itself as a
meaning except directly and having taken for granted the meaning of the subject, object, and predicate. I called this meaning the
theological meaning of grammar because it is absolute before
any other and, in this manner, in the theological meaning in which it
is coming as a representation of God. The Judeo-Christianity of God
determines that which only eternally is and in which everything only
makes sense, nothing being nonsense. That is how it is seen that this
sense of God can be recognized only in the grammatical meaning
of language, for it is only the grammatical meaning that which in itself never has anything nonsensical and in which everything simply
is. That is why the theological meaning of language is a philosophical term that marks the grammatical meaning of language as that
which is absolute before any other and, in this way, the theological
meaning as well, which is, as has already been seen, the same as
the grammatical meaning of language. On the other hand, the
truth, which opposes this absolute, divine grammatical meaning of
language in which everything, even if it is not always existing, for it is
existing in the sense of speaking, recognizes only the logical meaning of language. This is the reason why the logical meaning, in the
PHOTO: SLOBODAN POTI]
example of Adam and Eve, always has to come out from the reality
of absolute grammatical meaning into one more reality whose
meaning fundamentally rests on doubt. Nevertheless, the coming
out of an eternal, simultaneous difference of grammatical meaning does not mean that the meaning disappears, for with its real disappearance the logical meaning would have to disappear at the
same time, for the logical meaning can only be said through a
grammatical one.
This is why when it comes to the question on language as
much as with the question in which is posed to us the enquiry about
the meaning of our existence, it only deals with the way of understanding our simultaneous dual linguistic existence as well as the
concurrent grammatical and logical linguistic one.
NIN'S EDITORIAL STUFF
Professor Miso Kulic and Dragan Jovanovic during the interview
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The interview was given by Jovan Gagrica
(Translated from the Serbian by Srdjan Gligoric)