CHAPTER- III
PRINCIPLES OF NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION:
A CONCEPTUAL AND HISTORICAL MAPPING
Over the last two centuries movements for popular assertion have symbolised the
collective desires and actions of people as a powerful force that shaped the destiny
of the world. Significantly, many of these assertions were for national liberation
and traced their roots to nineteenth century Europe. In the twentieth century, they
became a wide spread phenomenon.
At the heart of national assertion was the desire for self-determination.
Such movements for self-determination gave rise to events that tore apart empires,
fought discrimination and demanded democratic participation. In the process,
many states were created and some were broken apart. However, despite being
one of the principles that had heavily influenced political developments for ages,
theoretical inquiries concerning national self-determination were not extensive or
deep. As pointed out
~y
Tamir, not much theoretical work i1ad been done on this
concept and most of these analyses have been the work of international lawyers
and therefore were highly influenced by legal and political precedents.•
This chapter is an attempt to trace the origin and development of the
principles of national self-determination and to shed light on some of the more
important theoretical issues surrounding it. The first part covers various
definitions of self-determination and examines approaches of the major theoretical
strands associated with it. The second part discusses the origin and historical
development of the principle. The third part addresses some unresolved debates
related to self-determination. These revolve around definitions of people and
questions of secession.
Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1993,
p. 57.
45
National Self-determination: Origin of an Idea
Ideas develop in historical contexts, and therefore, a thorough understanding of it
is essential. In the case of self-determination, the turbulent eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries were very significant. This period witnessed the emergence
of a new economic and social system that replaced, often very violently, the old
ones. In the economic realm, feudal modes of production gave way to the
capitalist mode; and while the influence of the landed aristocracy and the clergy
was on the wane, the importance of the bourgeoisie grew. These changes also led
to the development of new political ideas, attitudes and moral values that
questioned the ideological foundations of traditional society. The principle of
national self-determination grew out of some of these modem ideas.
In the modem era, concepts like individual autonomy, popular sovereignty
and nationality emerged and had a lasting impact, as they became the fundamental
ideas around which a new society was envisioned. The Enlightenment introduced
the notion of the human being as a rational actor who was capable of selfgovernance. According to this view, rationality enables an individual to choose his
or her beliefs and goals and take appropriate actions for their realisation; in other .
words, free individuals are capable of judging what is good for them. And, in the
modem era, a worldyiew around the rational, autonomous individual emerged
which also assumed that individuals are equal and interchangeable units. Although
the absence of constraints is regarded as a necessary condition for freedom, this
approach saw the government as an instrument for the maximisation of autonomy.
One idea that radically questioned earlier notions of legitimacy, and was to
become a fundamental element in subsequent political developments, was popular
sovereignty. Popular sovereignty signifies that a government must be based on the
shared will of the people, or in other words, in any society it is the people who
collectively hold the sovereign power. This was a revolutionary idea in a world
that considered the legitimacy of the ruler was derived from divine sanction or
dynastic rights. Rejecting all such claims and practices, popular sovereignty
accepted the people as the supreme source of power and regarded their consent to
be the primary legitimating factor of any political system. Thus, in the modem era,
the status of the people transformed into the holders of sovereign power from that
46
of the subject. The state became the institutional representation of the popular
will. This notion lies at the heart of the American and French revolutions.
The idea of nation or nationality also emerged in the same period. This
particular political unit was seen as a natural one, which had the inherent right to
have a state of its own. The result was the birth of nation-state - the time tested
political institution of the modem era. By the middle of nineteenth century, this
model had received such acceptance that people believed that such a relationship
was inevitable? This idea had enormous impact in the practical realm as people
and political units were seldom clubbed together in those days. Empires were an
amalgam of different linguistic, religious, ethnic or other groups. Further, the
same groups were divided into different political units. However, with the
emergence of ideas like nation and popular sovereignty, such identities acquired
political significance and fragmented communities began to imagine themselves
as political groups and aspired for a political institution of their own. 3 This
resulted in a number of national movements from those under alien rule or
fragmented to achieve their own state.
The principle of national self-determination derives its meanmg from all
these ideas and developments and epitomises its essence. In fact, various attempts
that try to explain self-determination focus on one or other aspect of these
concepts.
A nation's inherent right to decide its destiny is one of the most common
and recurring notions in the definitions of self-determination. 4 The normative
For example, Mill, in Considerations on Representative Government (1861) comments, "it
is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments
should coincide in the main with those of nationalities." (J. S. Mill, Considerations on
Representative Government, London, Harper and Brothers, 1973, p. 313.) Bismarck also
expressed the belief that Europe would not achieve peace until she had been sorted out into
her nationalities or her "tribes." Quoted in Lee Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Selfdetermination, London, Yale University Press, 1978, p. 3.
Lee Buchheit argues that the psychological force of the principle of self-determination lies
in a basic human desire to associate primarily with one's immediate fellows. ibid., p. 2.
There are two important aspects to self-determination-internal and external. External selfdetermination connotes the right of a people to freely determine their international status,
their right to independence and to determine their destiny in the international community.
The right to independence has two aspects-one is negative: the right of every people not to
be exchanged or ceded against their will. And the other is positive: the right of a people to
be part of the state of their choice or to form an independent state. The Independent state is
the most desired model of external self-determination. However, people, in some special
47
source of such definitions is the liberal idea of individual autonomy, which
assumes that national self-determination is an extension of personal selfdetermination. Kedourie, who defines self-determination as "a determination of
the will", is one of the early proponents of such a view. 5 Franck provides a
slightly expanded version of this idea when he defines self-determination as the
"right of people organized in an established territory to determine its collective
political destiny in a democratic fashion ... " 6
Some of the definitions of self-determination are based on the fundan1ental
equality of individuals, another basic premise of liberalism, which ensures equal
rights of all nations. Moore emphasises this aspect when she defines national selfdetermination as an "equal recognition of different national identities." 7
According to Moore, the claim of a nation to political self-expression, which is a
defensible right, is held by all nations and derives from the mere existence of a
nation. Although an independent state is not a necessary condition for the
realisation of self-determination, institutional recognition of a peoples' collective
(national) identity by other nations is a basic requirement.
The human community that emerged as the legitimate holder of selfdetermination was the nation and naturally a few explanations have evolved
focusing on the nation, especially on its rights to the protection and development
of its identity and culture. According to Anaya, self-determination may be
understood as a right of the cultural groupings to political institutions that are
6
situations, adopt other options too. The Internal aspect of self-determination focuses on the
relationship between the people and their government, which is a continuous one. This
aspect also has two dimensions. First, it means the right of the people of every state to
freely choose a system of government that fully meets the aspirations of the people. In other
words, this aspect means a peoples' right to freely determine their political, economic, and
social systems that is without any intervention from outside. Secondly, the internal aspect of
self-determination means the right to freely participate in political life and enjoy basic civil,
economic social and cultural rights. This aspect is also referred to as democratic selfdetermination and is rooted deeply in the liberal democratic traditions. Over the years, while
the second aspect received more acceptance, the first dimension has been waning under the
pressure of near-hegemonic status of liberal capitalism.
Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, Oxford and Cambridge, Blackwell Publishers, 1960, p. 76.
According to Kedourie, the idea of self-determination, which is at the centre of Kant's
ethical theory, became the governing notion in the moral and political discourse of his
successors, notably Fichte. fn Fichte's theory complete self-determination for the individual
required national self-determination. p. 137.
Thomas M. Franck, "The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance", The American
Journal of International Law, vol- 86 (1), 1991, p. 52.
Margaret Moore, "On National Self-Determination", Political Studies, vol- 45 (5), 1997, p.
900.
48
nece:ssary to allow them to exist and develop according to their distinct
characteristics. 3 Stalin's observation that only a nation has the right to determine
its destiny, and no one has the "right to destroy" its schools, violate its habits and
customs or repress its language embodies this dimension of the principle. 9
Another set of explanations focuses on the right of a nation to have
political institutions so as to freely determine its affairs. Brownline provides a
similar definition of self-determination as "the right of cohesive national groups
('people') to choose for themselves a form of political organisation and their
relation to other groups." 10 As a natural extension of this, many scholars define
national self-determination in connection with an independent state. When people
suffer under foreign rule, the most preferable option is an independent state.
During the anti-colonial period, this model became more or less synonymous with
national self-determination. In popular perception, the demand for selfdetermination has usually been the demand for independent statehood. This has
also influenced academics and some well-known definitions of self-determination
link it with an independent state. According to Cobban, self-determination is the
"right of a nation to. constitute an independent state and determine its own
government for itself." 11 Margalit and Raz also hold the same view. 12
These are widely held notions of national self-determination that appear in
the literature. However, to understand the changing nature of the principle, it is
important to discuss some of the recent explanations, which challenge many
earlier versions.
One emerging idea about self-determination which is the· focus of
academic and political attention is the relational view. This notion of selfdetermination, which takes into account multiple human associations and the
9
10
II
12
S. James Anaya, "The Capacity of International Law to Advance Ethnic or Nationality
Claims", Iowa Law Review, vol -75, 1990, p. 842.
Josef Stalin, Marxism and the National-Colonial Question, Calcutta, Burman Publishing
House, 1985, p. 16.
Jan Brownline, Principles of Public International Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
1988, p. 599.
Alfred Cobban, The Nation-State and National Self-determination, London, Collins, 1969,
p. 104.
Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz define self-determination as the right to determine whether
a certain territory becomes or remains a separate state. Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz,
"National Self-Determination", Journal of Philosophy, vol-87 (9), 1990, p. 441.
49
interconnectedness of human activities,
IS
mainly articulated by scholars and
activists who are sympathetic to the rights of indigenous/aboriginal people. This
view, however, is in contrast to the liberal individualist notion of selfdetermination that stresses on complete independence of action and noninterference. The main proponents of this view are Anaya and Marion Young.
Anaya argues that understanding self-determination as concerned only
with narrowly defined, mutually exclusive peoples is to diminish its relevance in a
world that evolves differently. Although this idea does not negate the value of
diverse cultures or local authority, it supports the fact of increasing linkages,
commonalities and interdependencies. Any conception of self-determination that
does not take into account multiple patterns of human association and
interdependency is at best incomplete and more likely distorted. 13 In other words,
in a world of high interconnectedness and interaction, unlimited independence
would, at least on occasions, negate the right of others. More importantly, in the
context of extreme inequality, this would harm weaker groups.
Agreeing with the above views, Marion Young articulates the notion of
self-determination as ·non-dominance. 14
This view maintains that nobody can
ignore the claims and interest of others when their actions potentially affect them.
Based on these two views, Young develops her views of self-determination as: a)
A people, prima-facie, have the right to set their own governance procedures and
make their own decisions about activities, without interference from others. b) In
so far as the activities o£ a group may adversely affect others or generate conflict,
self-determination entails the rights of others to make claims on the groups,
negotiate the terms of their relationship and mutually adjust their effects. c) A
13
14
S. James Anaya, Indigenous People in International Law, Oxford, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1996, p. 79.
Young bases her arguments on Pettit's views on freedom which is not equivalent to noninterference, although it is related to freedom. He argues that freedom should be understood
as non-domination. An agent dominates another when he or she has power over others and
is able to interfere with the other arbitrarily. Interference is arbitrary when it is chosen or
rejected without any consideration of the interests or opinions of those affected. In Pettit's
view, all interference may not constitute domination and it is appropriate for governing
agents to interfere in order to promote institutions that assure justice. Further, interference is
not arbitrary if it is to minimise domination and is done in a way that takes the interaction
and voice of the affected parties into account. Philip Pettit, Republicanism, Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1997.
50
world of self-determining peoples thus requires recognized and settled institutions
and procedures through which people negotiate, adjudicate conflicts, and enforce
agreements. d) Self-determination of peoples requires that the people have the
right to participate as peoples, in designing and implementing intergovernmental
institutions aimed at minimising domination. 15 This notion of self-determination
does not consider the independent state as necessary for its realisation.
In a
situation where states are highly unequal and powerful private operators are
active,
formal
sovereignty provides little protection against "dominative
relations".
Another view of national self-determination sees it as a cultural right
against widely held political interpretations. According to this view the right to
national self-determination should be understood as the right of a nation or, more
precisely, members of a nation, to preserve their distinct existence and manage
communal life in accordance with their particular way of life. 16 This idea of
national self-determination directly derives from the view that the nation is a
"particular cultural community." One of the main advocates of this view is Tamir.
Tamir introduces this version of self-determination in contrast to the
democratic one, which is understood as the right of individuals to participate in
the governance of their affairs. 17 According to Tamir, this interpretation means
self-rule rather than self-determination and both differ in their individualistic and
social aspects. In the individualistic aspect, self-rule is the right of individuals to
govern themselves without being subjected to external dictates, while selfdetermination is concerned with the way in which individuals define their
personal and national identity. 18 In the social aspect, national self-determination is
a process in which individuals try to give public expression to their national
identity. It can be defined as the right of individuals to have a public sphere, i.e.,
individuals are entitled to establish institutions and manage their social life, in
15
16
17
18
Iris Marion Young, "Two Concepts of Self-determination", in Stephen May and others,
eds., Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
2004, pp. 187-88.
Yael Tamir, no-1.
ibid., p. 69.
ibid., p. 70.
51
ways that reflect their social values, traditions and history; in short, their culture. 19
Unlike this, self-rule is concerned with the right of the individual to participate in
the decision making process of his/ her political group.
Mere participation in a political process is not a sufficient condition for
national self-determination. It is thought to have been attained only when certain
features, unique to the nation, find expression in the political sphere. 20 By
referring to Berlin, Tamir argues that self-determination is not a search for Millian
freedom and civil liberties, but for status. This is neither a struggle for the
"equality of a right" nor for the "liberty to do as one wishes", although one may
want these too, but for recognition? 1 Thus, national self-determination means that
individuals wish to be ruled by institutions informed by a culture which is
understandable or meaningful and individuals feel as the creators or carriers of a
valuable set of beliefs when they see political institutions and the political
framework reflect their traditions, norms, behaviour, etc. Members of national
minorities who live in liberal democracies like the Quebecois and Indians in
Canada, Aborigines in Australia or the Basques in France, are not deprived of
their freedom and civi_lliberties, yet feel marginalized and
~eprived
because they
are governed by a political culture and political institutions that have the imprint
of a different culture. 22
Thus, national self-determination is a particular case of the right to
culture. 23 The ability to conceive of certain social and political institutions as
representing a particular culture and carriers of the national identity is at the heart
of the yearning for national self-determination. In this scenario, national selfdetermination is fully realised when a national group is recognized by both
members and non-members as an autonomous source of human action and activity
and when a nation has its own political arrangement to develop its national life
with a minimum of external interference?4
19
20
21
22
24
ibid.
ibid., p. 71.
ibid.
ibid., p. 72.
ibiJ., p. 73.
ibid., p. 74.
52
One notable similarity in both these views is that they consider self-determination
as achievable through models other than that of the sovereign state. In other
words, in both these models, an independent state does not appear as an inevitable
goal.
Why Self-Determination
Over the last two centuries, many people have been inspired by national selfdetermination. People holding various theoretical attitudes, like liberals, Marxists
and romantic nationalists upheld the principle and often led national liberation
movements. However, different schools justify the rights to national selfdetermination on different reasons. Often, these justifying reasons are contrary to
one ·another. The next section explains the main reasons of the major theoretical
strands.
The sympathy of liberal theorists for national self-determination has its
origin primarily from its impact over individuals. Such theorists see a direct co
relation between a nation's self-determination and the well-being, dignity,
personal development. and autonomy of the individual. Such a relationship has
been explained by various liberal theorists like Raz, Kymlicka, Tamir, etc. 25 One
point that has been repeatedly mentioned to the justification of national selfdetermination by these scholars is the close association between the national and
individual identity and its impact on individual dignity.
It is noted that people's sense of identity is bound up with their sense of
belonging to groups and their self-respect is effected by the esteem in which these
groups are held. Individual dignity and self-respect require that the groups,
membership of which contributes to one's sense of identity, be generally respected
25
Although most liberals are unanimous about the primacy of individual well-being and
autonomy as the vindication for national self-determination, they differ over the role of
groups (here nation) in the purpose. While liberals like Nielsen, Philpott, Tamir give only
instrumental value to nation and nationality, scholars like Raz consider group interests as
"non reducible" and groups as "intrinsically valuable" and uphold "collective good" against
contractarian individualistic approaches.
Kai Nielsen, "Liberal Nationalism and
Secession", in Margaret Moore, ed., National Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford
and New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. I 03-133. Daniel Philpott, "SelfDetermination in Practice", in Margaret Moore, ed., National Self-Determination and
Secession, Oxford, New York and Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 79-102.
53
and not be made a subject of ridicule, hatred, discrimination, or persecution. 26
Thus, national self-determination rests on the appreciation ofthe great importance
that membership and identification with groups has in the life of individuals, and
the importance of the prosperity and self-respect of such groups to the well-being
of their members. 27 Tamir also cites the same reason for the justification of
national self-determination. 28
Another aspect that has been emphasised to justify national selfdetermination is the importance of a national culture in providing meaningful
options. In other words, national culture provides or helps individuals to choose
their views, goals and norms. According to Kymlicka, national culture provides
the most important context within which people develop and exercise their
autonomy. 29 In this view, freedom involves making choices amongst various
options, and one's societal culture not only provides these options, but also makes
them meaningful. Hence the gradual erosion of one's societal culture leads to a
gradual erosion of one's individual autonomy. 30 Agreeing with these views, i.e.,
individual well-being depends on the successful pursuit of worthwhile goals and
relationships, and that _these are culturally determined, Raz
~d
Margalit add that
"fan1iliarity with culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable. Sharing a
culture, being part of it, determines the limits of the feasible." 31
Apart from these, issues like justice and morality have also emerged as
important concerns among liberal thinkers. After describing the social welfarist
and cultural reasons for self-determination, Miller observes that national selfdetermination is valuable only to the extent that its exercise leads to greater justice
26
27
28
29
30
31
Avishai Margalit and Joseph Raz, no-12, p. 449.
ibid., p. 457.
According to Tamir, membership in a nation is a constitutive factor of personal identity and
the self-image of an individual is highly affected by the status of the national community.
The ability of individuals to lead a satisfying life and to attain the respect of others is
contingent on, although not assured by, their ability to view themselves as active members
of a worthy community. A safe, dignified and flourishing national existence thus
significantly contribute to their well-being. Yael Tamir, no-1, p. 73.
Will Kymlicka, "Modernity and National Identity", in Shlomo Ben-Ami and others, Ethnic
Challenges to Modern Nation States, Houndmills, Macmillan, 2000, p.12.
ibid., p. 22.
A vishai
Marga lit and Joseph Raz, no-12, p. 451.
54
in the world. In other words, to Miller, national self-determination is valuable only
as long as it remains within the bounds laid down by a just order. 32
Romantic/organic nationalism justifies national self-determination on quite
different grounds. They believe in the greatness of the nation and aspire for strong
national communities. According to this view, the whole precedes and is greater
than its parts. Individuals are considered as a mere part of the whole which they
are bound to safeguard and ensure the well being of. The freedom of the
individual will be realised only by identifying and subordinating it to the national
will, that is, one achieves this complete freedom through total absorption in the
whole. Thus, for romantic nationalists, self-determination is valuable in itself as a
nation's passage to glory. This idea of national self-determination lies at the heart
of right wing nationalist groups.
Marxists generally view national self-determination in an instrumental
sense. And the Marxist approach towards the claims of national self-determination
is largely influenced by its impact over the revolutionary mission of the
proletariat.
Since Marxists view the nation as a class-divided society,
unconditional/universal support for national self-determination would sometimes
result in supporting the dominant classes. Apart from this, Marxists also believe
that complete self-determination can be realised only in a socialist system. Thus,
the priority of the socialist cause, over the national cause is unambiguous in
Marxist thinking. Marx and Engels offered their support to the Irish and Polish
cases only after they became convinced of its importance to the advancement of
the revolutionary cause. 33 Perhaps the only exception to this view in which claims
32
33
David Miller, Citizenship and National identity, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000, p. 164.
On the Polish question, Marx and Engels believed that struggle of Poles against Imperial
Russia, which they considered the bastion of reactionary forces in Europe, would weaken it.
In the Irish case, they believed that the colonization of Ireland furthered the proletarian
revolution not only due to the surplus from Ireland but also by stabilizing aristocratic
reaction in England by dividing the working class in England on national lines, i.e. as
English and Irish, and diverting the loyalty of English workers towards their ruling class
by picturing Irish workers as competitors in the job market. However, there was some
evidence that Marx accepted the submergence of the class question in the context of foreign
occupation. Regarding the Polish question Marx commented: "As long as the independent
life of a nation is suppressed by a foreign conqueror it inevitably directs all its strength, all
its efforts and its energy against the external enemy; during the time, therefore, its inner life
remains paralysed, it is incapable of working for social emancipation." Speech made at a
meeting in London commemorating the anniversary of the Polish uprising of 22 January
55
for self-determination gained support by itself, is given by Lenin in the context of
oppressed nationalities.
Lenin argued that national assertions of the oppressed
people deserve the support of the proletariat on its own merit due to its democratic
content and he defended the national assertions in the colonial world in spite of its
bourgeois character. 34 But Marxists always prioritised the revolutionary politics of
the proletariat over national self-determination. In spite of the instrumentalist
approach, uncompromising support to national liberation movements, for long,
came only froin this camp.
National movements, in accordance with the ideological lineage of the
leading component, develop their goals around issues like national dignity and
glory of the nation, identity, creation of democratic society, etc. Whenever such
movements are led by the communists, the issue of social change also becomes an
equally important goal along with the national liberation.
Self-Determination: Origin and the Evolution
The principle of national self-determination emerged, as noted earlier, in Europe
in the late eighteenth century. The period experienced a ser-ies of economic and
social developments which had immense impact on various spheres of human life
and gave birth to new social classes .and ·systems and new ideas that challenged the
old socio-political order and its convictions. Thinkers like Locke and Rousseau,
sensing the dynamics of the period, developed new ideas that had long lasting
influence on human history. The inalienable individual right, limited government,
and popular sovereignty, etc., recurrent themes of Locke (1632-1704), became the
basic principles of liberalism. However, the political thinker who became the most
influential in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was Rousseau ( 1712-1 778).
It has been observed that the Rousseaunian concept of General Will contains the
essence of
popular sovereignty and national self-determination.
traditional sources
34
Rejecting
of power, Rousseau introduced the idea of general will that
1883. Quoted in John Glenn, "Nations and Nationalism: Marxist Approaches to the
Subject", Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, vol-3 (2) summer 1997, p. 58.
V.I. Lenin, "Report of the Commission on National and Colonial Questions", in V.I. Lenin,
On National Liberation and Social Emancipation, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1986, p.
285.
56
considered the people as the source
o[
political authority and viewed state as the
institutional representation of popular will.
The emergence of the principle of self-determination is often associated
with the French Revolution (1789). The Revolution was inspired by the ideas of
liberty, equality and fraternity and symbolised the fall of a society that was
controlled by nobles, feudal lords and the clergy; it also marked the ascendancy of
the bourgeoisie and the transformation of France into a modem nation-state. This
radical change was proclaimed in the Rights of Man, which declared that "sources
of all sovereignty reside essentially in nation." The state was transformed into the
collective political institution of the people rather than a mere territory that
belonged to a king or a dynasty. Thus the French Revolution was a turning point
in the history of national self-determination: it helped infuse the principle in
political rhetoric and popular imagination. Another event that advanced the idea
was the American Revolution (1776). 35
The principle of self-determination was often invoked after the French
Revolution.
In France, this principle became an instrument to incorporate
territories. The French Assembly, upon the urging of many' members, stated that
the clearly expressed will of the people was essential to change sovereignty and
decreed that a formal expression of the people should be obtained, by holding
plebiscites, before annexation. 36 The new French government skilfully used this
concept to annex territories; Avignon was annexed in 1791 and Belgium and
Palatinate in 1793. 37 Plebiscites were held in these cases and the territories were
united with France in accordance with 'popular opinion'. Thus, after the
Revolution, self-determination was taken as an essential step before the transfer of
territory. However, in France, this principle was short-lived and force soon
became the main method to annex territories. The Napoleonic wars (1796-1812)
35
36
37
The term 'self-determination' did not appear in the political vocabulary of this period.
According to Umozurike Oji Umozurike, the phase 'right to self-determination' receives its
first specific treatment in a resolution of London International Socialist Congress in I 896.
Quoted in Gerry J Simpson, "The Diffusion of Sovereign Self-determination in the Post
Colonial Age", Stanford Journal in international Law, vol- 32 (I), 1996, p. 262.
Alfred Co~ban, no-ll, p. 141
Antonio Cassese, Self-determination of People: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 12.
57
also played a significant role in the growth of
national consciousness in the
European continent.
In the nineteenth century, the idea of self-determination spread all over
Europe. The Industrial Revolution was bringing about major changes in the
continent. There was tremendous growth in areas like commerce, industry,
communication and transportation. The social power of the landowners and
aristocracy was challenged and gradually replaced by the new bourgeoisie.
Bureaucratic activities and the penetration of the governments also grew into
almost all spheres of life in the same period. Urban centres developed rapidly and
the urban working class became politically active.
The nineteenth century was also known as the century of national
assertions. Many oppressed national groups like the Irish and the Polish as well as
people divided into many principalities, like Italy and Germany, gave birth to
powerful national upheavals. 38 The Young Italy movement, started by Mazzini
(1805-1872) had its reverberations across Europe. Mazzini and Garibaldi emerged
as leaders with a pan-European appeal. The writings of Mazzini and German
nationalists like Herder and Fichte contributed to the development of nationalism
as a political doctrine. National consciousness also grew among the peoples in the
Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian Empires. During the revolution of 1848,
numerous national groups came up all over Europe hoping for the emancipation of
their nations.
By the second half of the nineteenth century, national feeling intensified in
the European continent. The unification of Italy and Germany were the important
events of this era. Various national groups in the Balkans - Serbia, Montenegro,
Romania and Bulgaria - tried to shake off the yoke of oppressive Ottoman rule
and attain freedom. The Congress of Berlin (1878) accepted the independence of
Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, previously tributary principalities of the
38
The pan-European impact of these national aspirations and the growing sympathy toward
their causes was evident in the support rendered by the intellectuals of that period. Rousseau
supported Polish nationalism. Marx and Engels not only supported the Irish and Polish
people, but also condemned colonial domination.
58
Ottoman Empire, and confirmed Bulgaria as a self-governing princedom. 39 The
idea of plebiscite was also increasingly accepted. 40
Thus, in the nineteenth century, aspirations for self-determination and
national movements became a crucial issue in the European political milieu. The
period also witnessed the emergence of divergent notions about nationalism.
While the French Revolution was based on the ideas of human freedom and the
civic nation, the German version was romantic and based on racial superiority,
which was less concerned about individual rights. According to Hobsbawm, most
of the national movements in the second half of the nineteenth century had a
linguistic and ethnic characteristic. 41 Another notable development was the
conscious effort of imperial states to impose a uniform national identity over
diverse populations. Anderson refers to this version as "official nationalism" and
refers to Tsarist Russia as an example. 42
Responses from the Left Camp
From the second half of the nineteenth century, the influence of socialist ideas and
the presence of sociaHstic groups grew rapidly in Europe. The growth of
capitalism created its own problems. Socialist groups, which became a major
component of European political spectrum, addressed the injustices of nascent
capitalism and the question of self-determination.
Marx and Engels were witness to the development of nations and the
growth of national consciousness in Europe. But, in the early stages of their
activism, they gave comparatively less importance to this issue and the nation was
seen as an anti-thesis to the revolutionary programme, a "false consciousness",
which could divert the proletariat from their revolutionary mission. Later,
39
40
41
42
Mikulas Fabry, "The Idea of National Self-determination and the Recognition of New
States at the Congress of Berlin ( 1878)", paper presented at the !SA Annual Convention
New Orleans, March 24-27, 2002, available atwww. isanet.org/noarchivelberl incongress.htm I.
Plebiscites were conducted in Italy in 1860 and Ionian Isles voted for union with Greece
in 1862. These plebiscites were held with very rudimentary democratic procedure and
narrow franchise. For example in the Ionian island only 13419 out of 250,000 people
voted. Alfred Cobban, no-ll, p. 42.
Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780, Cambridge, New York and
Melbourne, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. I 02.
Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of
Nationalism, London, Verso, 1991, p. 88.
59
however, they were unambiguous in their suppurt to national assertions in Poland,
Ireland and in the colonies.
National self-determination occupied a prominent place in discussions
among socialists. Many resolutions and programmes were adopted at various
conferences. The International Socialist Congress of London (1896) passed a
resolution recognizing the right of peoples to self-determination.
44
Social Democratic Party adopted the 'Brunn Programme' ,
43
The Austrian
at the Brunn
Congress in 1899, which was later also adopted by the South-Slavic Social
Democratic Party.
The question of self-determination was an issue of great importance to
Russian communists as Russia was not only a multi-national state but also an
empire, which had colonised many national groups. In 1903, the Russian Social
Democratic Party amended its programme to guarantee the right of selfdetermination to all nations that were part of the Russian state. Being a significant
question, it repeatedly surfaced in the discussions of the Russian Social
Democratic Party. Later, in 1913, Stalin wrote Marxism and the National
Question, which is one of the most widely discussed and influential of all Marxist
texts on nationalism. 45
To Stalin, the right to self-determination meant "only the nation itself has
the right to determine its destiny, that no one has the rightforcibly to interfere in
the
life of the nation ... " 46 In other words, the right of self-determination means
that a nation can organise its life according to its own will. It has the right to
43
44
45
46
Gerry J Simpson, no- 35, p. 262.
This programme, aimed at preventing the disintegration of the multi-national AustroHungarian state, consisted of provisions to establish a "national order" in Austro-Hungary
that would transform it into a "democratic federation of nationalities". The Programme
also planned to establish "nationally delimited self-governing bodies", "national
parliaments", and to guarantee rights to national minorities. The fundamental aspect of
this programme was the idea of "national autonomy", which was the result of division of
Austria on the basis of language. And various nations could achieve self-determination
through constitutional guarantees within a state. The programme tried to resolve the
national question by allowing each national group to present their own national demands,
while economic struggle would be waged at the supra-national state. Austro-Hungadan
Marxists-Karl Renner and Otto Bauer later advanced these ideas by arguing that national
cultural autonomy can be based on the principles of personality rather than territoriality.
Even though Trotsky commented that the article was inspired, supervised and corrected
"line by line" by Lenin, it is believed that Lenin had high regard for the "big article"
written by the "marvellous Georgian".
Josef Stalin, no-9, p.l6. Emphasis in the original.
60
autonomy, to enter into federal relations with other nations and the right to
complete secession. Nations are sovereign and equal. 47 According to Stalin, it is
to put an end to national oppression that social democrats entered in the battle for
self-determination. 48
The key Marxist contribution to the subject carne from V. I. Lenin: and his
writings explain the basic Marxist approach. 49 Interestingly, Lenin viewed the
question of self-determination by linking it with democracy. According to Lenin,
"there was only one solution of the national question, viz. through consistent
democracy. " 50 On another occasion Lenin commented that, "It would be ·no less a
mistake to remove one of the points of the democratic programme, for·example,
the point on the self-determination of nations, on the ground of it being
"impracticable" or
"illusory" under imperialism. " 51 According to Lenin self-
determination means;
The right of nations to self-determination implies exclusively the
right to independence in the political sense, the right to free
political separation from the oppressor nation. Specifically, this
demand for political democracy implies complete freedom to
agitate for secession and for a referendum on secession by the
seceding nation. This demand, therefore, is not the equivalent of a
demand for separation, fragmentation and the formation of small
states. It implies only a consistent expression of struggle against all
~:·
national oppression. " 52
One of the significant contributions of Lenin was the shaping of the )v~arxist
approach towards anti-colonial nationalism. Lenin's understanding of imperialism
made him fervent in his support for. anti-colonial movements in spite of their
bourgeois character. Lenin believed that the characteristic feature of imperialism
was the division of the whole world into a large number of oppressed nations and
47
48
49
so
51
52
ibid.
ibid.
Important writings of Lenin in this subject are: Socialist Revolution and the Right of
Nations Self-Determination ( 1916), Draft Thesis on the National and Colonie/ Question
( 1920), and Report of Commission on National and Colonial Question ( 1920).
V.I. Lenin, "Critical Remarks on Natioi-tal Question", in V.I. Lenin, On National
Liberation and Social Emancipation, Moscow, Progress Publishers 1986, p. I 06.
Emphasis added.
VJ. Lenin, "The Socialist Revolution and the Right ofNations to Self-determination", in
V.I. Lenin, On National Liberation and Social Emancipation, Moscow, Progress
Publishers, 1986, p. 151. Emphasis added.
ibid., p.I53.
61
a small number of oppressor nations. And under imperialism, the contradiction
between the oppressor nations and the oppressed nations became one of the main
contradictions. In such a situation, even if national movements in the colonial
world were bourgeois-democratic, the Communist International and communist
parties had to help them. 53
In Lenin's view the proletariat, in such situations, had to demand the
freedom of the colonies and nations oppressed by their own state. Without this
approach, Lenin argued, the mutual confidence and class solidarity between
workers of the oppressed and oppressing nations would be an impossible task
making proletarian internationalism a meaningless phrase. Lenin also clarified the
attitude of social democrats towards oppressed nationalities in Tsarist Russia. He
wrote, "recognition of the right of nations oppressed by tsarism to free secession
from Russia is absolutely obligatory for social democrats, for the furtherance of
their democratic and socialist aims. " 54
Thus, Lenin provides a comprehensive approach to the question from the
Marxist point of view. According to Lowy, Lenin's ability to "put politics in
command" provides superiority to his approach ·over most of his contemporaries. 55
And Lenin's insight into the complexities of the question puts socialist theory and
the socialist camp way ahead of other contemporary political forces.
Lenin's views, however, were not unquestioningly accepted in the socialist
camp. The main criticism came from none other than the most uncompromising
proletarian internationalist-Rosa Luxemburg. First of all, she questioned the claim
that all national assertions are bourgeoisie democratic. 56 Based on the Polish case,
she maintained that the demand for self-determination often would be the demand
53
54
55
56
Lenin, "Report of Commission on the Right of Nations to Self-Determination", in V.I.
Lenin, On National Liberation and Social Emancipation, Moscow, Progress Publishers,
1986, pp. 284-85.
V.I. Lenin, no-51, p. 161.
Michael Lowy, "Marxists and National Question", in Michael Lowy, On Changing the
World: Essays in Political Philosophy from Karl Marx to Walter Benjamin, London,
Humanities Press, 1993, p. 17.
Luxemburg points out that in Poland, for many years, the landed nobility led the
nationalist movement. Industrial development and the economy in Poland were closely
related to the Russian market and the Polish bourgeoisie was not interested in a separate
Polish state. Nor were the Polish proletariat whose politics was linked to the revolutionary
alliance with the Russian working class interested in it. ibid., p. 60.
62
of the petty bourgeoisie and some elements of the pre-capitalist feudal nobiiity.
Based on economic factor, she also believed that the independence of small
nations like Poland was utopian. 57 Questioning the ideas like 'absolute right' or
'right for all' which she regarded as non-Marxian, Luxemburg stated that only
through an analysis of the concrete historical situation one could think about
national rights.
58
Luxemburg also argued that in a class-divided society, abstract ideas like
'self-determination of the people' would only mean the self-determination of the
ruling classes. In her view, for the proletariat, issues like national selfdetermination were not significant. Instead, the problem of national oppression
had to be solved with the abolition of oppression in general. 59 True to her beliefs,
Luxemburg remained proletarian international despite the wave of patriotism that
swept Europe during World War-1.
Woodrow Wilson
US President Wilson was one of the important world leaders who articulated the
principle of self-determination in the early decades of the twentieth century. It was
his commitment to this principle that made it an important international question
during World War-1 and a serious issue during the deliberations of the Versailles
Conference. President Wilson believed that the implementation of selfdetermination would substantially reduce global conflict and open the gates to a
new international order based on liberal democratic values.
President Wilson's idea of self-determination has its roots in.· western
democratic tradition, which carried the legacy of the American and French
revolutions. The ideas of popular sovereignty, consent, democracy and selfgovernment repeatedly appear in his speeches and writings. In Cobban's opinion,
President Wilson's conception of self-determination was entirely a corollary of
57
58
59
Luxemburg supported the self-determination of the Balkan nations on the basis that these
nations had reached a degree of economic, social and cultural development superior to
Turkey. Later in the Junius Pamphlet Luxemburg noted, "Socialism gives to every people
the right of independence and freedom of independent control of its own destinies." ibid.,
p. 61.
ibid., p. 60.
Ephraim Nimni, "Great Historical Failure: Marxist Theories of Nationalism", Capital &
Class, no-25 (1), spring 1985, p. 69.
63
.
.
democratic theory or it was "almost another word for popular sovereignty". 60
Wilson's speech in the US Congress on II th February. 19I8 (The Four Principles)
embodied these ideas:
"National aspirations must be respected; peoples may now be
dominated and governed only by their own consent. "Selfdetermination" is not a mere phrase. It is an imperative principle of
action, which statesmen will henceforth ignore at their peril ... [All]
well-defined national aspirations shall be accorded the utmost
satisfaction that can be accorded them without introducing new or
perpetuating old elements of discord and antagonism that would be
likely in time to break the peace of Europe and consequently of the
world." 61
Thus, President Wilson's views on self-determination were based on
democratic principles. Nevertheless during World War-I this aspect lost primacy
to the external aspect of self-determination.
According to Cassese, President Wilson's idea of self-determination
contains four important postulates. First, the democratic aspect-the rights of a
people to choose the form of government under which they would live. 62 Second,
the restructuring of Central Europe, mainly the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian
empires, in accordance with national
aspirations. Third, a criterion that governs
the territorial changes. 63 Eourth, the settlement of anti-colonial claims. 64
However, President Wilson's postulates had their own limitations. First of
all, some scholars have commented that President Wilson's ideas lacked
coherence and were loose and indeterminate. In Ronen's opinion, President
Wilson's conception of self-determination was not easy to analyse as none of his
writings or speeches contain a comprehensive statement of his ideas, and his
references and allusions were scattered. 65 Secondly, it was widely believed that
60
~I
63
64
65
Alfred Cobban, no-11, p. 63.
Quoted in Hurst Hannum, "Self-determination in the Post-colonial Era",:in Donald
Clarke and Robert Williamson, eds., Self-determination International Perspectives,
Houndmills, Basingstoke, London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996, p. 13.
This is the basic spirit of the sixth principle of the Fourteen Points.
This is the spirit of third principle in the Four Principles, "Every territorial settlement in
must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the populations concerned,
this war
and not as a part of any
mere adjustments or compromise of claims amongst rival
states."
Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 20-21.
Dov Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination, London, Yale University Press, 1979,
p. 31.
64
President
Wilson
spoke
about
implications of his pronouncements.
self-determination
66
without
grasping
the
Thirdly, President Wilson failed to realise
his ideas at the international level. In Versailles, in spite of his enormous
bargaining power, he gave in to the geo-political interests of the victorious states
including Britain, France and Italy. Fourthly, and more importantly, President
Wilson was ambivalent in his approach towards colonialism. For example, the
fifth of his Fourteen Points states, "A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial
adjustment of colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations
concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government
whose title is to be determined." Thus an analysis of President Wilson's approach
validates the comments of Hannum that President Wilson carefully balanced real
political concerns with the ideals of democracy and the nation-state. 67
In spite of these limitations, the principle of self-determination got an
enthusiastic ambassador in President Wilson. However, the vastness of the
practical issues and the narrow geo-political interest of the states were much more
complex and stronger t!1an the wishes of an idealist.
World War-1
During World War-1, the principle of national self-determination emerged as an
important political question. The Allies claimed that the primary purpose of the
war was to build a world based on the principle of nationality, the right of people
to decide their destiny, and the right of small states. President Wilson's insistence
was the mai'h factor that brought these principles into the official policy of the
Allies. Wilson announced his Fourteen Points on 81h January 1918 and Four
Principles on 11th February 1918, which contained his vision of a new world
66
67
Even Wilson later admitted that, "When I gave utterance to those words [that all nations
had a right to self-determination], I said them without the knowledge that n,ationalities
existed, which are coming to us day after day ... You do not know and cannot appreciate
the anxieties that I have experienced as a result of many millions of people having their
hopes raised by what l have said." H.W.V. Temperley, ed., A History of Peace
Conference 1920-1924, vo-1V, London, Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1921,
p. 429.
Hurst Hannum, no-61, p. 13.
65
based on the principle of self-determination. 68 Lloyd George, the then Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, declared on 5th January 1918 that the principle of
national self-determination was equally applicable in the case of the colonies as in
those of the occupied European territories. 69 The Inter-Allied Parliamentary
Commission, comprising French, ·Belgian, Italian, and British representatives,
proclaimed their acceptance
of the principle of nationality and "the right of
people to dispose of their own destiny" in October 1918. 70 And in reply to the
German proposals for an armistice, the Allies again upheld these principles when
they declared their willingness to make peace on the terms of President Wilson's
address of 8111 January 1918 and his subsequent speeches. Although the Central
Powers, by pointing to the Irish and Finish cases in Europe and the .colonial
possessions,
questioned
the
genuineness
of these
claims,
the
repeated
proclamations of the Allies created an impression that they were sincere to the
principle and would practice it once the war was over. 71
However, the Allies conveniently forgot these pious declarations during
the peace process. The gee-strategic and economic interests of the victors, rather
than the principle of _self-determination, dominated the Versailles Conference.
Many of the post-war territorial settlements were based on secret agreements
reached .during the war. Even the main sponsor of the principle - the United
States -
was quite suspicious of the implications of the national self-
determination. For example, Robert Lansing, the then US Secretary of State,
stated that the principle was loaded with dynamite and would raise hopes that
never could be realised. 72 The self-determination of colonial countries even failed
to become a serious issue in the discussions. President Wilson sacrificed the
principle of self-determination on several instances.
During the Peace
Conference, President Wilson stated that "it was not within the privilege of the
Conference of Peace to act upon the right of self-determination of any peoples
68
69
70
71
72
In the Fourteen Points, the word self-determination was absent, even though it was
embedded in it.
Lloyd George, Quoted in Alfred Cobban, no-ll, p. 61.
ibid., p. 58.
J. B. Scott, ed., Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals, Dec 16 to Nov.
1918, Washington, 1921, p. 44.
Robert Lansing also claimed that both the United States and Canada continue to exist
because of the denial of the principle and the considerations of national safety, historic
rights and economic interests should have predominance over the principle of selfdetermination. Quoted in Alfred Cobban, no-ll, p. 62.
66
except those which had been included in the territories of the defeated empires.'' 73
President Wilson also refused to meet representatives of many national
movements, including the young Ho Chi Minh. Thus, at the end of the World
War-I, the national aspirations of most people remained unfulfilled. And finally,
the principle of self-determination was not incorporated in the Covenant of the
League ofNations.
However, the Peace Conference did take some important steps that
furthered the spirit of the principle. Significant among them was the recognition of
new states in Central Europe. During the last phase of the war, national armies
emerged in various places and national governments were set up in some of those
areas where old powers fell. The Peace Conference reluctantly recognised some
and states like Romania, Poland, and Czechoslovakia emerged on 'national'
I ines. 74 Plebiscites were conducted in some areas to make territorial changes in
accordance with the popular will.
Another notable outcome of the Conference was the implementation of
minority rights. Most of the new states had sizable minority population: in Poland
it was 3 0 per cent and in Romania it was 25 per cent. 75 Such 'a large proportion of
a minority population meant that legal steps for their protection had to be taken.
For this, the Peace Conference insisted that new states should adopt
legal
guarantees, which were accepted, though with the some reluctance. 76
These
guarantees, on the whole, sought to protect cultural and linguistic identities but
they fell short of meaningful political rights or ensure participation in the
government. 77
One event of momentous significance during the War was the fall of
Tsarist government in Russia. The newly installed Russian provincial government
of Kerensky, in March 1917, declared its intention to establish peace on the basis
73
7~
75
76
77•
Woodrow Wilson, Speech on 17 September 1919, Quoted in Alfred Cobban, no-11, p. 66.
ibid., p. 55-56.
ibid., p. 87. According to one estimate, the number of the minority population in Central
Europe was reduced from over 50 million in the former Empires to less than 20 million in
the new states.
Geoff Gilbert, "Autonomy and Minority Groups: A Right in International Law", Cornell
International Law Journal, vol- 35 (2), 2004, p. 317.
Hurst Hannum, no-61, p. 14.
67
of the "right of the nations to decide their own destiny." 78 The Bolshevik
government, which took over in October I 917, also announced their decision to
sign the terms of peace based on the principle of equal justice for all nationalities.
At Brest-Litovsk the principle of self-determination became a dominant factor.
79
In the Conference, however, the Soviet commitment to the principle confronted
the stark gee-strategic interest of Germany who wanted to bring Eastern Europe
into their sphere of influence. Later, the Soviet constitution incorporated the right
to secede and recognized the independence of Finland.
In fact, World War-1 and the developments that immediately followed it
were highly significant in the history of the principle of self-determination. For
the first time the right to self-determination for a people occupied a prominent
position in the proceedings of an international conference. A few states emerged
mainly on national lines, plebiscites were conducted and minority groups were
assured of some legal protection. More significantly, as commented by Buchheit,
the crucial innovation after the World War I was the elevation of national selfdetermination to the status of an international touchstone of legitimacy that could
be properly encouraged or enforced by the international
international blessing.
co~unity
or even some
80
Aaland Islands Case
The question of Aaland Islands was one of the important issues that was referred
to •the League of Nations immediately after the war. Sweden claimed that the
inhabitants of the Aaland Islands had the right to self-determination (and could
secede from Finland and join Sweden) and this should thus be implemented
through a plebiscite. On the other hand, Finland claimed the Aaland case was a
domestic question (i.e. it did not come under international law and the League).
The League appointed two committees of Jurists, one to look into the question of
whether the Aaland Islands came under the League and the second to inquire into
whether the Aaland Islands had the right to self-determination. According to the
first Committee, the dispute was within the jurisdiction of the League as Finland
78
79
80
H W V Temperley, no-66, p. 183.
V.I. Lenin, "Decree on Peace October 26 (November- 8)", in V.I. Lenin, On National
Liberation and Social Emancipation, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1986, p. 255.
Lee Buchheit, no-2, p. 4.
68
had only been liberated recently and "had not yet acquired the character of a
definitively constituted state," and therefore was not an independent member of
the international community. 81 However, the report rejected the Swedish claim for
a plebiscite. According to the jurists, "positive
International
Law does not
recognize the right of national groups, as such, to separate themselves from the
state of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it
recognises the right of other States to claim such separation'. 82 But, the report
urged Finland to increase the guarantees granted to the Islands by the Autonomy
Law of May 1920.
Committee of jurists also made two important comments, which referred
to the future. Firstly, the Committee acknowledged the relationship between
protection of minorities and that of self-determination. According to it, both have
a common object, to assure some national group the maintenance and free
development of its social, ethnic and religious characteristics. 83 However, the
Committee did not approve the right to self-determination as an unconditional
right. 84 The Committee also commented that in situations when states failed to
guarantee protection
t~
minorities or when it abused its power to oppress and
prosecute them, the dispute would no longer come· under the domestic jurisdiction
and the right of the minority national group to secede would become an option. 85
In the colonial world, the post-war period saw the intensification of
national liberation movements. It was believed that the Allies would be
sympathetic to the peoples' right to self-determination after the war. However, the
81
82
83
84
85
Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of League of
Nations with the task of giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the
Aaland Island questions', (Official Journal of the League of Nations, Special
Supplement No.3, October 1920, p. 14.) Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 29.
ibid., p. 28.
ibid., p. 30.
"Even though it [self-determination] be regarded as the most important of the principles
governing the formation of states, geographical, economic and other similar consideration
may put obstacles in the way of its complete recognition. Under such circumstances, a
in the nature of a compromise, based on an extensive grant of liberty to
solution
minorities, may appear necessary according to international legal conception [sic] and
may even be dictated by the interest of peace." ibid., pp. 30-31.
The report says; "the separation of a minority from the State of which it forms a part and
its incorporation in another State can only be considered as an altogether exceptional
solution, as a last resort when the State lacks either the will or the power to enact and
apply just and effective guarantees." ibid., p. 31.
69
result of the Peace Conference was a big disappointment to people in the colonial
world and they intensified their movements. 86 National consciousness among
minority national groups in Europe like the Welsh, Catalans and the Basque was
also growing.
However, the main forces that kept alive questions of freedom,
self-determination and democracy in the inter war period were the anti-colonial
movement. Interestingly, the principle was used by the Nazis in their political
campaign. Since a large number of Germans was included in other states after
Versailles, the people's right to self-determination became a handy weapon in the
hands of Hitler in his quest to regain these areas.
World War-11
The principle of self-determination resurfaced as a major issue during World War
II as well. It received an important place in the vision of the post war world
propounded by US President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill as it was included in the Atlantic Charter (1941) as a general standard
governing territorial changes and a principle concerning the free choice of rulers
in every state. 87 In the same period, the Allied states were engaged in discussions
to set up an international organization after the war. A draft Charter of such an
organization had come out of the Dumbarton Oaks talks (1944), held among the
··US, UK, China and USSR, in which the principle of self-determination was
absent. However, in the San Francisco Conference (April, 1945), on the insistence
of the Soviet Union, the principle of self-determination was incorporated as one of
the goals of the organization.
86
87
Countries like India and China saw new waves of national assertion after the World
War I.
The Charter reads, "they (the two leaders) desire to see no territorial changes that do not
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned; ... they respect rights
of all peoples to choose the fonn of government under which they will live; and they wish
to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly
deprived of them." Text in J.A.S. Grenville, The Major International Treaties /914-1973,
A History and Guide with Texts, London, 1974, p. 198. However, the hollowness of these
loud claims came out sooner than later. Just one month after Churchill stated, in the
House of Commons on 9"' September 194 I, that the self-determination mentioned in the
Charter was not applicable to the colonial people, but to restore "the sovereignty, self
government and national life of the States and nations of Europe under the Nazi Yoke",
besides providing for "any alternations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be
made." Parliamentary debates, s•h series, vol-374, House of Commons, Official Report,
81h vol ofsession-1940-41, p-68-69. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 37.
70
The suggestion to include the principle of self-determination in the Charter was
not appreciated by all and many states had considerable reservations about its
implications. One important area of concern was over the term 'people', which
was seen as a departure from the state-oriented approach in international relations
in which the equality of states rather than that of people mattered. The extent of
power entrusted to international bodies was also a matter of serious concern and it
was asked whether the provision permitted for the intervention of the UN or other
states to implement self-determination. 88 Other apprehensions were about the
possible encouragement to civil strife, secessionist aspirations and the potential
misuse of the principle for revanchist purposes as was done by Nazi Germany.
It was only after extensive discussions that the drafting committee arrived
at a consensus over four points. These are; (a) the principle of self-determination
corresponded closely to the will and desire of people everywhere and should be
clearly enunciated in the Charter. 89 (b) The principle conformed to the purposes
of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of the people
and not the right to secession. 90 (c) The principle of self-determination as one
whole extends as a
~eneral
basic conception to a
possi~le
amalgamation of
nationalities if they so freely choose. 91 (d) An essential element of the principle is
the free and genuine expression of the will of the people, which avoids cases of
the alleged expression of the popular will, such as those used by Germany and
Italy for their own ends in later years. 92
In the UN Charter, self-determination appears in two articles. 93 Article
(2) explains the UN's purpose as, "To develop friendly relations among nations
based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace."
Article 55 states; "With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well88
89
90
91
92
93
UNCIO, Vol. VI, 1945, p. 296. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, pp. 38-39.
UNCIO, Voi-VI, p. 296. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 40.
ibid., p. 298.Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 40.
ibid., p. 704. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 40.
ibid.,. p. 455. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 40.
Even though the word self-determination was not used, while explaining the basic
objectives of the Trusteeship system, Article 76 (b), states, " ... and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the
particu Jar circumstances of each territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes
of the peoples concerned .... "
71
being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based
on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
The incorporation of self-determination in the UN Charter was a big step
forward as it was for the first time that the principle becan1e part of a multilateral
treaty. This was a milestone because it was a transition of the peoples right to selfdetermination from a political postulate to an international legal principle.
It was generally agreed that at the time of its incorporation in the UN
Charter the status of the principle of self-determination was extremely weak.
Cassese, after analysing debates on self-determination and the report of the Syrian
Rapporteur, suggests some primary constrains regarding the principles in the
Charter. First of all, he observes, the principle of self-determination can only be
negatively inferred from the debates rather than positively defmed. And Article 1
(2) of UN Charter does not support (a) the right of a minority, ethnic or national
groups to secede from a sovereign state; (b) right of a colonial people to achieve
independence. For them self-determination means only self government. 94 (c) The
right of the people of a sovereign state to freely choose its rulers through regular,
democratic elections;· (d) right of two or more nations belonging either to a
.
.
.
sovereign country or two sovereign countnes to merge.
95
Moreover, self-determination was included in the Charter as one of the
many goals of the organisation rather than a right that had a legal validity.
96
More
importantly, the UN Charter failed to denounce colonialism, which was the most
important violation of the principle. Apart from this Article 73 (b) and 86 (b),
which address the trusteeship system, even allowed the mandate powers to choose
their own pace in allowing the formation of an independent state. 97 Thus, as
commented by Simpson, the whole trusteeship scheme legalized colonial
94
95
96
97
Self-government, in this contest does not mean independence. Art 76 of UN charter
clearly mentions that self-government and independence as two different options.
Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 42.
Scholars like Irene Daes observe that the inception of self-determination in the UN
scheme did not include any general right to self-determination. Erica Irene Daes, "The
Right of Indigenous Peoples to "Self Determination" in the Contemporary World Order",
in Donald Clark and Robert Williamson, eds., Self-determination: International
Perspectives, Houndmills, Basingstoke and London, Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996, p. 4 7.
Art 73 (b) states, "to develop self-government, to take due account of the political
aspiration of the peoples ... according to the particular circumstances of each territory and
its peoples and their varying stages of advancement." UN Charter 73 (b).
72
paternalism. 98 Finally, the term 'people', who were entrusted with the right of
self-determination, remained undefined.
Post-Charter Developments
In the post war period, national liberation movements intensified and spread all
over the colonial world. The newly independent Afro-Asian states became the
uncompromising champions of the right to self-determination and decolonisation.
And with the increase in their number, these states became a deciding factor in
various international forums. The Asian Conference of 1949 and the Bandung
Conference of 1955 strengthened their solidarity and confidence.
Afro-Asian
states were focused on the external aspects of self-determination, i.e.,
independence
of the colonial states. And in the post-war period, they played a
crucial role in realising international recognition of the right of peoples to selfdetermination.
The newly emerged socialist states also ardently supported the right to
self-determination and in the post-war period, the socialist bloc stood solidly with
the Afro-Asian states for its realization and for decolonisation.
The socialist
camp, like the Afro-Asian states, focused on the external dimension of selfdetermination and generally ignored the internal aspect or considered it the right
of the people to achieve a socialist system. 99 They also asserted that national
liberation was a mere stage and complete realisation of the self-determination
could happen only in a socialist society.
The Western states, confronted by a situation when the moral support for
colonialism was at its lowest, were on the defensive. They did not like the break
up of their empires and tried to bring on legalities to limit the application of the
principle. The Western states also tried to prevent its incorporation in new
resolutions and human rights Covenants and, as a tactic, brought the internal
aspect to the forefront and argued for the universal application of the principle,
98
99
Gerry J. Simpson, no- 35, p. 266.
B.Graefrath, "A Necessary Dispute on the Content of the Peoples Rights to selfdetermination-Rejection of an Old Concept in New Guise", Bulletin of the GDR
Committee ofHuman Rights, vol.1 ( 1 1), 1981, p. 14.
73
linking it with civil, political and human rights and to demo-cratic governance, 100
Although the United States had showed its displeasure towards colonialism, Cold
War strategic considerations made it soft towards allies.
These divergent views clashed in the UN and m other multilateral
organizations in the post-:war years. The changing scenario was reflected in the
UN General Assembly, which adopted a series of resolutions approving the
peoples right to self-determination. Key among them was the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples-1514 (XV), adopted
at the 15th session ofthe General Assembly on 14th December 1960. Article 2 of
the Declaration states,
All people have the right to self-determination, by virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social and cultural development.
This Declaration stands as a milestone in the struggle against colonialism
and all forms of alien subjugation and oppression. It was also a radical departure
from the ambivalent tone of the UN Charter, and drastically transformed the
international status of .the principle. It called for a speedy and unconditional end to
colonialism in all its forms and manifestations and stated that the inadequacy of
political, economic, social or educational preparedness, which was one of the
major arguments of the West, should never serve as a pretext to delay
independence. Thus, in many ways, the resolution was 'revolutionary' and marked
a real turning point, which laid the foundation stone of a "new law of selfdetermination."101
After this declaration many important international instruments affirmed
the peoples right to self-determination. Most important among them were the
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which were adopted by the
General Assembly on 16 December 1966. Adoption of the Covenants in their
present form was the result of a long and intensive discussion in the UN.
100
101
This line was adopted due to the fact that many of the Third World states were under
authoritarian rule, and was facing unresolved national issues. The socialist states,
obviously, did not have a democratic system.
Erica Irene Daes, no-96, p. 48.
·
74
In 1950, the Commission on Human Rights decided that the declaration sho~ld be
followed by a treaty setting out in legally binding terms the rights proclaimed in
the Declaration. The rationale for the inclusion of the self-determination in the
Covenant was stated as, a) the right was the source of or an essential pre-requisite
for other human rights since there could be no genuine exercise of individual
rights without the realisation of the right to self-determination. (b) In the drafting
of the Covenant, the principles and purposes of the Charter, which included the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, should be applied and
protected. (c) Many provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights had
a direct bearing on the right to self-determination, and (d) unless the Covenant
embodied that right, it would be incomplete and inoperative. 102 And on 51h
February 1952, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 545 (VI) entitled,
Inclusion in the International Covenants or Covenant on Human Rights of an
Article Relating to the Right of People to Self-determination. 103
But, the adoption of such a covenant was not a smooth process. Due to the
concern
over their colonial possessions and foreign investments, the Western
states opposed the moye vehemently. And they raised a
se~ies
of objections that
were, in most cases, technical in nature. First of all, it was argued that selfdetermination was a political principle, i.e., not a justifiable right, and it was too
vague to be included in an international treaty. 104 Another objection was that it
being a collective right, self-determination could not be incorporated in the
Covenant, which was concerned with the rights and freedoms ofthe individual. 105
102
103
104
105
Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth session, Third Committee, 309th meeting
para 60; 310 meeting, paras 6, 16, 19, and 35 and 311 meeting, para-4. Quoted in Aureliu
Cristescu, The Right of Self-Determination: Historical and Current Development on the
Basis of the United Nations Instruments, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/404/Rev.l, 1981, p. 4.
The resolution read as: "Whereas the violation of this right has resulted in bloodshed and
war in the past and is considered a continuous threat to peace,
The General Assembly
(i) to save the present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war, (ii) to
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights and, (iii) to take due account of the
political aspiration of all peoples and thus to further international peace and
security, and to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of people,
I. Decides to include in the International Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights
an article on the rights of all peoples and nations to self-determination in
reaffirmation ofthe principle enunciated in the Charter of U.N.
U.K. Statement of2"d July 1955, UN DOC., A/2910/ Add. 1, X th Sec, 1955, Annexure
- 5. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 50.
Sweden, UN Doc. A/C. 3/ SR. 641, para 13. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-3 7·,.·p. 51.
75
Britain even argued that self-determination was necessarily a slow and gradual
process, which should not be furthered by incorporating it in an international
treaty. 106 It was argued that a legal right to self-determination would encourage
secession and the proliferation of new states. 107 Some Western states also argued
for the inclusion of internal aspect of the self-determination, i.e. it was to be
applicable to peoples in independent states too.
In spite of all these objections, owing to the numerical superiority of the
socialist and the Afro-Asian states, the right to self-determination was
incorporated in the Covenants. The UN General Assembly adopted Resolution
2200 (XXI) on 16th December 1966 and opened for signature and ratification the
International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and Civil and
Political Rights. 108 The International Covenants were another high point in the
growing international recognition of the peoples right to self-determination and a
milestone in its transformation into an international legal right.
Another landmark resolution that reflected the recognition of the principle
was the Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance wi'th the Charter of UN2625 (XXV) adopted by the UN General Asserpbly on 24 October 1970) 09 This
106
107
lOS
109
UK. U.N. Doc. A/C. 3/SR 309. para 59. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p. 51.
Belgium, UN Doc., A/C/3/ SR. 361, Para 10-13. Quoted in Antonio Cassese, no-37, p-51.
The covenants read as follows:
I. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and
cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international
economic co-operation, based on this principle of mutual benefit, and international
law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including
those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-self-Governing and Trust Territories,
shall promote the realisation of the right of self-determination, and shall respect
that, in conformity with the provision of the Charter of the United Nations.
The resolution read as:
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in
the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without
external interference, their political status, and to pursue their economic, Social and
cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accord.ance with
the provision of the Charter.
Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination ofpeoples ........ .
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action, which deprives peoples
referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-
76
resolution was viewed as a major step in the progressive development of the
principle of self-determination. Many scholars regarded this resolution as the
apogee of UN law concerning self-determination. 110
Importance of this declaration was in emphasising the internal aspect of
self-determination. The Western states were arguing for the incorporation of the
internal aspect in the UN resolutions as they believed that this would not only be
analogous to western liberal democracy but also de-legitimise the socialist and
authoritarian regimes in the third world. Nevertheless, the socialist and the third
world states succeeded in rejecting this demand in the previous resolutions.
However, for the ·first time the internal aspect of self-determination was
incorporated in this resolution. The resolution reads:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally
or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and
independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as
described above and thus possessed of a government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or colour.. (Emphasis Added)
Many scholars interpret this paragraph as an indication of the recognition of
the link between internal and external self-determination. In other words, where
f"
governments are not representing whole people, the resolution ambiguously
, states
that other options are open. But what is unambiguous in it is the advancement of
democratic aspect of self-determination. This is seen as a radical shift from the
earlier UN instruments.
The right of people's self-determination has been incorporated in many
UN instruments in later years. Apart from the political aspect, economic, social
and cultural aspect of the self-determination also received international
recognition. The principle has also appeared in the documents of the regional
organisations like the OAS and the OSCE. Some of the verdicts ofthe ICJ such as
that over Western Sahara and East Timor also recognise the same. Thus,.~over the
years, the principle of national self-determination has grown to a right ¢at has
110
determination and freedom and independence... GA Res 2625, UN GAOR, 25 sess.
Suppl No. 28, at 121, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).
Gerry J. Simpson, no-35, p. 27.
77
universal acceptance and is one of the essential principles of contemporary
international law.
Who are the People?
One of the most controversial issues related to self-determination is about the
holders of the right. 111 Article I of the UN Covenants of 1966 says, "All peoples
have the right of self-determination." Now who are 'people'? Is it a nation? An
ethnic group? Or all people in a territorial unit? This question remains unresolved
even fifty years after the incorporation of self-determination in UN instruments.
Neither the UN Charter nor any other UN instrument clarifies or defines 'people'.
And ever since self-determination became an international legal principle, the
term 'people' has generated numerous debates among scholars, national groups,
and states. This ambiguity creates enough confusion in the practical
rea~m.
As
pointed out by Jennings, "on the surface, it [principle of self-determination]
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because people
cannot decide until somebody decides who the people are." 112 Any decision
regarding who should have the right results in the simultaneous rejection of
others.
This question, however, was not serious until World War-1. Because the
demand for self-determination was raised, as we have seen, by national groups
who were under alien rule. When Stalin defined self-determination, he made it
clear that "only the nation itself has the right to determine its destiny." 1 1 ~ Lenin
Ill
112
113
There is a debate, mainly among liberal theorists, whether self-determination is an
individual right or group/collective right. While scholars like Tamir, Ronen and Beran
view it as an individual right, Raz and Margalit and Miller consider it a collective/group
right. The scholars who consider self-determination as an individual right do not give any
special value to groups other than as a collection of individuals. To them, nationality is
constitutive of individuals and is only one of the many identities to which individuals
associate. Generally self-determination is nothing more than an extension of an
individual's autonomy to groups. Liberal scholars who consider self-determination as a
group right argue that the question of national identity can only be addressed in terms of
the collective as opposed to the individual basis of self-determination. And the right to
self-determination in cultural corporate sense transcends the will and participation of the
particular individuals. This view has its roots in the Rousseaunian concept of General
Will. Generally Marxist/left scholars consider self-determination as the right of the
nation. The Romantic nationalists also have seen self-determination as the unique right of
a nation.
I. Jennings, The Approach to Self-Government, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1956, p .56.
Josef Stalin, no-9, p. 16.
78
also regarded self-determination as the right of nations. President Wilson was also
unambiguous that self-determination belongs to national groups and when the
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires crumbled after World War I, he argued
for the creation of new states largely on national principles. Thus, until World
War I, national groups were seen as the legitimate holders of the right.
Anti-colonial nationalism significantly diverged from this view. Colonial
states invariably consisted of a large number of linguistic, religious or ethnic
groups and anti-colonial nationalism emerged among this diverse population
within the territorial boundaries that, in most cases, were arbitrarily drawn by the
colonialists.
In
other
words,
anti-colonial
nationalism
demanded
self-
determination for a people within a territory regardless of the differences among
people. And uti-possiditis, i.e. respect and maintenance of colonial boundaries,
was the general norm at the time of independence. 114 Thus, during the
decolonisation period, the territorial interpretation emerged as the predominant
one and national self-determination meant the right of a diverse population inside
political units, however artificial their boundaries may be.
When self-dete.rmination was incorporated into the DN charter it was this
(territorial) interpretation that received the greatest support from states. And,
according to UN instruments, self-determination is ,the right of people under
colonial rule or those under military occupation. In other words, people within
independent states are not entitled to this right. But the term 'people' remained
undefined and this has given rise to debates and conflicting claims. Many states,
as we have seen before, expressed their apprehension about the term 'people'
.
.
during the discussions of the UN Charter and whenever the question of selfdetermination arose. The major concern was whether 'people' would ··allow
minority national groups to interpret the right to self-determination in. their
favour. 115 And in a context where most states comprise of diverse population, the
I 14
115
India and Pakistan, British Cameroon, Rwanda, Burundi-are exception to the general
norm of uti-possidits.
India's reservation to Article I of the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was the
same .... with reference to Article I. .. , the government of the Republic of India declares
that the words "the right to self-determination" appearing in this article apply only to the
peoples under foreign domination and that these words do not apply to sovereign
independent states or to a section of people or nation which is the essence of national
integrity". Quoted in James Anaya, no- 13, p. 90.
79
conferring of right to self-determination to minority groups was seen as a
disastrous move. It would challenge the territorial integrity of a large number of
states, destroy international peace and promote unrest. Understandably, states
were unanimous on the view that people did not mean minority national groups or
a segment of population of a state occupying a particular area.
Being an organization of independent states, the UN was cautious enough
to avoid references that would encourage minority national groups and limited its
application in the context of colonial rule or alien occupation. Most scholars, who
examined UN instruments, have confirm this view and emphasise that 'people'
does not mean minority national groups. Eide, after a careful reading of UN
resolutions on self-determination commented, "By "the people" ... is meant the
population as a whole living in a non self-governing territory or in an occupied
territory. The "people" is defined by the territory in which the population lives,
not by the ethnicity, language, or religion of the different groups that constitute
the population." 116 Cristescu also observes that people should not be confused
with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. 117 The demand of Western states for
the universal
applicat~on
of self-determination does not, in, most instances, mean
the extension of self-determination to minority ·national groups. They are more
concerned about the democratic aspects of self-determination.
Thus, the present interpretation of the peoples right to self-determination
under the international law supports the status-quo and protects the interest of the
states. Various scholars have criticised this narrow interpretation of 'peoples'.
Moore considers this conception of the principle as inconsistent and ethically
problematic. She points out that it is difficult to justify why the right to selfdetermination of peoples living under colonial rule can only be exercised once,
but can never be used again. As the moral justification for decolonisation is that
political power should be in the hands of the people over whom it is exercised,
this should be applied in situations where the state is dominated by particular
116
117
Asbjom Eide, "Peaceful Group Accommodation as an Alternative to Secession in
Sovereign States", in Donald Clark and Robert Williamson, eds., Self-Determination
international Perspectives, Houndmills, Basingstoke and London, Macmillan Press Ltd,
1996, p. 90.
Aureliu Cristescu, no, I 02, p. 41.
80
national groups, which negates the genuine rights of others. 118 If the right is
applicable only in colonial context, it is obsolete as that type of subjugation is part
of history. Secondly, Moore asks, why should a majority suffering racist
discrimination, like Blacks in the apartheid regime of South Africa, be entitled to
self-determination but not the minorities in a state who are suffering under racist
or discriminatory policies? 119 According to Heraclides, as per this interpretation,
the right stands for the welfare ofthe majority population of the states. 120
This rigid view of people shows the influence of colonial interpretation,
which equated an independent state with the principle of self-determination. In
such a situation, widening of the scope of the principle would provide legal
validity to the ethno-national claims and that might, eventually, threaten territorial
integrity of states. But in the current scenario an independent state is just one
among various models of self-determination. And in most cases those demands
are settled by adopting self-determination models other than independence, which
drastically reduce the possibility of territorial division of states. It is also
important to remember that the unresolved national questions cannot be settled
through a narrow interyJretation of the self-determination
b~t
have to be resolved
by developing novel models of the principle that accommodate aspirations of the
discontented people as well as peace and justice in the world.
Question of Secession
Perhaps the most controversial question related to self-determination is that of
secession. As territorial integrity is considered as a foremost national interest, no
state can think about this option lightly. But with the emergence of several
national assertions, and protracted and bloody wars fought over it, secession
becomes a feasible reality. Secession means the formal withdrawal of a
constituent unit from an established, internationally recognized state and the
creation of a new sovereign state, 121 or the unification of secessionist entity with
118
119
120
121
Margaret Moore, no-7, p.902.
ibid., pp.902-3.
Alexis Heraclides, "Secession, Self-determination and Non-intervention: In Search of a
Normative Symbiosis", Journal of International Affairs, vol-45 (2), 1992, p. 407.
Viva Ona Bartkus, The Dynamics of Secession, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1999,p.9.
81
its kin state. Since the majority of states are multinational, the spectre 0f secession
is a serious issue to many.
Ever since self-determination became an international legal principle,
states were concerned about its application in the secessionist context. However,
for a long period, secession received scant attention in theoretical discussions of
political science or international relations. But the emergence of several ethnonational movements and the challenges it posed to a large number of states
transformed it into a crucial contemporary issue. The disintegration of Yugoslavia
and the disturbing events that followed it also forced scholars to pay attention to
the principle. Currently, a serious theoretical debate is taking place over the issue,
the major point being whether secession is a desirable model of selfdetermination, and in what context would secession be a justifiable option?
One of the notable views regarding secession is that if majority of
population wishes to secede, they should have the right to do so. This approach,
known as choice or primary right theory, is based on liberal ideas of autonomy,
free association and consent. Beran and Philpott are some of the proponents of this
view. This approach ·maintains that the state sho_uld be a voluntary association of
citizens and there can be no political authority without the consent of the
governed. 122 If the state were based on coercion it would weaken th~ legitimacy
of the states. This in tum would create a situation where only a few people would
have a role in politics, and the rest would be alienated from the state. Secession
would be allowed because it should promote the democratic autonomy of its
members. Those who go by this view insist that members' autonomy alone
sufficient to justify self-determination. 123 According to this view, there is nothing
natural and pre-given about existing state boundaries.
Although this approach sanctions secession, it sets forth some conditions
that should be met by secessionist groups. Most important among them are: a)
majority or overwhelming majority in a democratically held plebiscite, b)
assurance of basic human and cultural rights of all of the population in the new
122
123
Harry Beran, "A .Liberal Theory of Secession", Political Studies, vol-32 (I), 1984,
pp. 24-25.
Daniel Philpott, no-25, p. 82.
82
states - including anti-secessionist minorities, c) sharing of resources, i.e.,
secessionist should not secede with a disproportionate share of goods generated in
common by the citizens of the original state or natural resources explored
commonly. 124
A second view contends that the right to secession is applicable only to
national groups. Unlike primary right theorists, who consider the right to selfdetermination an individual right, this approach maintains that nations collectively
hold the right. Nations derive this right from the importance of national identity
· and membership to individuals. Miller, one of the main proponents of this view,
believes that national attachment has an intrinsic ethical significance for its
members and that it has an instrumental value in helping them to achieve other
goods. According to him when a nation, which is a community of obligation, has
a state of its own it must promote distributive justice and its culture. And where
the inhabitants of a territory form a national community, they have a good claim
to political self-determination. Since a sovereign state is the main institution to
realise self-determination, a territorially compact nation has the right to secede. 125
Nielsen is another
sc~olar
certain circumstances.
who maintains that nations have a right to secession in
126
Another approach concerning secession maintains that there is no primary
right to secession. Buchanan, Birch and Norman, are the main proponents of this
view. This approach, which is known as "just cause" theory, traces its roots to
Locke's theory of revolution and suggests that secession is an option only in
response to injustice. According to this view, democracy provides a fair procedure
124
125
126
Beran sets six conditions that may justify the denial of secession: a) the group that wishes
to secede is not sufficiently large enough to assume the basic responsibilities of an
independent state, b) it is not prepared to permit sub-groups within itself to secede
although such secession is morally and practically possible, c) it wishes to exploit or
oppress a subgroup within itself which cannot secede in tum because of territorial
dispersal or other reasons, d) it occupies an area not on the borders of the existing states
so that secession would create enclaves, e) it occupies an area which is culturally or
militarily essential to the existing state, f)
it occupies an area which has a
disproportionably high share of the economic resources of the existing state. However
Beran also comments that conditions mentioned in d, e, and f need not be insuperable
barriers to secession, and may be .solved through some agreements. Harry Beran, no-121.,
p. 30-31.
David Miller, "Secession and the Principle of Nationality'~, in Margaret Moore, ed.,
National Self- Determination and Secession, Oxford and New York, Oxford University
Press, 1988, p. 65.
Kai Nielsen, no-25, p. 103.
83
for reaching collective decisions about government policy, and an
~nconditional
right to secession would allow territorially concentrated groups to withdraw from
the state whenever they lose an election or when some decisions go against them.
In Birch's view, the balance and tolerance of the system would be upset if losing
groups, provided they are territorially concentrated, can threaten to withdraw any
time they dislike the decisions favoured by the majority. 127 Such actions would
encourage even just states to act in ways that would prevent groups from
becoming claimants to the right to secede, and this might lead to the perpetration
of injustice. It is also pointed out that most cases of secession have engendered
enormous violence.
Just Cause theorists limit the permissible cases of secession to as few as
possible. 128 According to Buchanan, secession is permissible only on two
occasions. The first is for rectificatory
j~stice
- here secession is simply the re-
appropriation by the legitimate owners of stolen property. 129 This applies in
situations in which the people attempting to secede are literally the same people
who had held a legitimate title to the territory at the time of its unjust annexation,
or at least are the indisputable descendants of those people.
~his
can also be called
the historic grievance version of territoriality thesis. Buchanan argues that a valid
claim to a territory is a necessary pre-requisite for any sound justification for
secession and must be grounded in an historical grievance concerning a preexisting right to territory. 130 The second reason that justifies secession is
discriminatory re-distribution. A state engages in discriminatory re-distribution
whenever it implements taxation schemes, regulatory policies or economic
127
128
129
130
Anthony H. Birch, "Another Liberal Theory of Secession", Political Studies, vol-34
(3), 1984, p.599.
Birch points out four situations in which secession is permissible: a) incorporation of the
region by force, b) the national government has failed in a serious way to protect the basic
rights and security. of the citizens of the region, c) tqe democratic system has failed to
safeguard the legitimate political and economic interests of the region, either because the
representative process is biased against the region or because the executive authorities
contrive to ignore the result of that process, d) the national government has ignored or
rejected an explicit or implicit bargain between sections that was entered into as a way of
preserving the essential interest of a section that might find itself outvoted by a national
majority. ibid., pp. 599-600.
Allen Buchanan, "Self-determination and the Right to Secede", Journal of International
Affairs, vol-45 (2), 1991, p. 353.
ibid.
84
programmes that systematically work to the disadvantage of some groups while
benefiting others. 131
Some scholars believe that secession is an undesirable option and is to be
avoided as much as possible. Secession rarely produces a homogenous state and
neither secessionist nor rump states are going to be homogenous. In fact such
homogeneity can be achieved only through the unsavoury methods like expulsion,
ethnic cleansing, etc. 132 Horowitz, a proponent of this view, observes that on
occasions secession may simplify inter-group confrontations and this could lead to
the worsening of ethnic relations. He argues that clean break theorists have not
noticed the contextual nature of the ethnicity due to an inadequate analysis of
ethnic affiliations. 133 In Horowitz's view "what is needed is to substitute interethnic accommodation within borders for a self-determination that either creates
new borders or legitimates ethnic exclusion within old one." 134
The brief survey of theoretical discussion on secession shows that most
scholars do not deny the secessionist option completely. Whether secession is a
permissible right under UN instruments is another disputed issue. From the very
beginning, the UN has been sensitive to the potential dangers inherent in the
principle of self-determination. And the unity and territorial integrity of states
have always been more valued in the international system rather than the people's
right to self-determination. The UN instruments on self-determination are, as we
have seen before, applicable to peoples under colonial rule and alien occupation,
without disturbing existing territorial boundaries.
In other words, under the
existing UN instruments, secession from a sovereign state is not permissible.
Invariably all UN resolutions concerning self-determination explicitly state this
point. For example, Article 6 of the UN General Assembly resolution 1514 states,
"Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and
131
132
133
134
ibid., p. 354.
Donald L. Horowitz, "Self: Determination: Politics, Philosophy and Law", in Margaret
Moore, ed., National
Self-Determination and Secession, Oxford and New York and
Oxford University Press, 1988, pp: 190-191.
ibid., p. 191. He also observes that the view that considers ethnic self-determination as the
collective equivalent of the moral autonomy of individuals is fairly sweeping. p. 197.
ibid., p. 206.
85
territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations." 135
A clear indication of the UN' s position is the statement of U Thant, UN
Secretary General in 1970, in the context of the Biafran secessionist conflict in
Nigeria. "The United Nations' attitude is unequivocal. As an international
organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept and I do
not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member
state." 136 This shows that the UN's approach on this question was undoubtedly
against secession. During 1955-1989 the only successful case of secession was
that of Bangladesh.
However, a few recent developments have raised doubts, at least among
some sections of scholars that right to secession exists in limited circumstances.
One of the developments is the growing recognition of the democratic aspect of
self-determination. It has been observed earlier that the democratic dimension of
self-determination has been increasingly recognized over the years. The Western
states have been demanding the inclusion of this aspect into the UN instrUments in
the post Second World War period and finally UN General' Assembly resolution
on Friendly Relations and Co-operation and the .Vienna Declaration adopted by
the World Conference on Human Rights El993) incorporated democratic aspect in
their resolutions.
Vienna Declaration points out that it shall not be "construed as authorizing
or encouraging any action which could dismember or impair, totally or in part,
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states
conducting themselves in.compliance with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of
people~
and thus possessed of a Government representing the
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction of any kind."
137
One
section of scholars believes that these lines link the denial of democratic selfdetermination to the right to external self-determination or more precisely they
135
136
137
This view is not different from the position taken by the Jurists in the Aaland Islands case::.
U Thant, Quoted in Emerson R, "Self-determination", American Journal of International
Law, vol- 65 (3), 1971, p. 464.
The Vienna Declaration (1993). Emphasis Added. Friendly Relations and Cooperation
states that there should not be any discrimination on the basis of race, colour and creed.
86
bestow limited right to secession. According to Kirgis, from about 1970 on, there
could be a right to secede from an established state whose government excludes
people of any race, creed or colour from political representation and have claims
to a defined territory. 138
Cristescu also observes that, "the right of secession
unquestionably exists, however, in a very special, but very important case: that of
peoples, territories and entities subjugated in violation ofinternationallaw." 139
The second development was the disintegration of former socialist states of
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia on national lines. More than
twenty new sovereign states emerged in this way. The speedy international
recognition of the former republics raised questions as to whether the world
community was showing a new openness towards secession. ·Scholars like
Heraclides commented that the existing taboo against secession is weakening. 140
Nevertheless this new enthusiasm over secession died down soon. The
Badinter Commission, constituted by the EU after the disintegration of
Yugoslavia, made a significant observation on the rights of the Serb minorities in
Bosnia and Croatia: "it is well established that whatever the circumstances, the
right to self-determination must not involve cha!Jges to existing frontiers at the
time of independence (uti possidits juris) except where the states concerned agree
otherwise." 141 This shows that the international community again uphold the
territorial notion of self-determination as before. The European Union's position
on the Kosovo issue also reinstated 'that secession from an existing state does not
have the support of international community.
As far as the resolution on Friendly Relations and Co-operation and the
Vienna Declaration are
concerned, the most prevalent understanding is that the
issues of democratic governance should be resolved within the states with
necessary changes in the system. According to Eide, it is (the clause in the above
mentioned
resolutions)
for
an
inclusive,
democratic
and
representative
government which on the behalf of the population as a whole freely can pursue the
138
139
140
141
Frederic Kirgis, "Degrees of Self-determination in the UN Era", The American Journal of
International Law, vol. 88 (2), 1994, p. 306.
Aureliu Crist~scu , no-102, p. 26.
Alexis Heraclides, no-120, p. 403.
Badinter Commission 1992,31 ILM 1488.
87
economic,
~ocial
and cultural development of the country. The political status has
already been settled by becoming a sovereign, independent state. 142 Thus, growing
recognition of the democratic aspect is about the internal aspect of selfdetermination rather than the external, in almost all situations.
However, it has already been pointed out that, the question of national
groups is seldom solved through such measures. Some liberal scholars like
Kymlicka, Tamir and Moore observe that rights such as formal equality of
citizenship or political participation may not be an answer to a national question.
Their grievances are related to the political recognition of their identity and
this
question has not yet been addressed in international instruments. For what the UN
instruments does is to insist that
such issues should be settled within states
without disturbing existing boundaries.
The general, overarching ideological environment of the world will reflect
in the decision of all actors-states, international organizations, etc. And in the
present world it is widely accepted that in a democracy, people have to express
their aspirations through the national political system. Consequently, secession
receives some support from scholars when there is denial of democracy and
.
.
justice. However, it would be too unrealistic ,.to assume that UN instruments,
which are adopted by states, validate secession that may pose a serious challenge
to their own existence.
Conclusion
This chapter has made an attempt to illustrate the origin and the historical
evolution of the idea of self-determination that may help us to understand the
principle. This radical principle originated from the aspirations of oppressed
people in the late eighteenth century. In subsequent years, numerous popular
assertions emerged from the subjugated
and colonized people for the realization
of _this principle. In the process many regimes crumbled, boundaries were
redrawil;-?Jld new states emerged. In the second half of the twentieth century, with
the incorporation-, of the principle of self-determination in the UN instruments,
what had been a mere political postulate was transformed into an international
legal principle. However, in this long process, radical elements were diluted and
the principle had yield to the demands of the state system.
142
Asbjom Eide, no-116, p. 91.
88