SECURITY
AARMS
Vol. 6, No. 1 (2007) 89–95
The ESDP in the Mediterranean region
A Greek perspective
IOANNIS PARISIS*
Retired Major General
ESDP should be characterized by cooperation, cohesion, participation and respective
political will. The states of the southern region of Europe are among those member
states that actively support the development of ESDP. None among them can be
characterized as “neutral” and none has expressed the wish to remove itself from issues
related to security and defence. The Mediterranean EU countries have no choice but to
become major players on the security issues, in the region, contributing, also, in the
development of the European defence capabilities.
Introduction
Being at the centre of a volatile region comprising South-eastern Europe, North Africa
and the Middle East, the Mediterranean plays a pivotal role in the form of the
geostrategic environment of the whole of Europe. The Mediterranean is not a region by
itself but the “southern flank” of Europe. This southern flank is confronted with the
principal security concerns of the EU. The Mediterranean region faces the challenges of
an unstable environment with the well-known problems that this entails, which have
been recorded as threats in the European Security Strategy document: terrorism, illegal
immigration, unstable regimes, etc.
* Major General Ioannis Parisis graduated from the National Military Academy (Athens, Greece) in 1973
and was commissioned as Second Lieutenant in Armor-Cavalry. He attended numerous courses, among them
Armor Officer Basic and Advanced Course, and German Army Armor School (Leopard MBTs). He also
graduated from the Higher National War College and the National Defence College. He has received a BA in
Politics from the Faculty of Law of Aristotle University of Thessalonica. Currently, he is a PhD candidate in
Politics, at the University of Crete, working on the factors of power in the Mediterranean strategic envinment.
He has been assigned to all provisioned commanding and staff posts in armoured brigades and divisions,
as well as in the Army General Staff, and as Military Attaché to the Hellenic Embassy in Madrid, Spain. He
has been assigned to the Directorate General for Defence Industry, Research and Technology of the Ministry
of Defence, where he served as Director of the Technological Research and Development Directorate. Also he
served as Director of the Defence Analyses Institute of the Ministry of Defence (2004-2006).
He has written a number of articles and books on the field of defence technology, European security and
defence policy, military forces organization, etc., while seven of his books (all in Greek) have already been
published.
Received: January 10, 2007
Address for correspondence:
IOANNIS PARISIS
Retired Major General
E-mail: [email protected]
I. PARISIS: The ESDP in the Mediterranean region
The Mediterranean basin is adjacent to three high-risk combustion and conflict areas
– the Middle East, the Balkans and Caucasus. Furthermore, as the Mediterranean unites
a large number of developed and underdeveloped countries through three strategically
significant access points – Gibraltar to the west, the Suez Canal to the south and the
Dardanelle Straits and the Bosporus to the north – it provides terrorists, human
traffickers and drug and arms dealers, with easy access to the long coasts of Europe,
which are difficult to police.
The security problem in the Mediterranean
For Europe, the Mediterranean region is an endless zone that is very different from
other areas neighboring the EU.
• First of all, the countries situated on the southern and eastern coast of the
Mediterranean are not part of Europe but of two other continents: Africa and
Asia. This way, the Mediterranean de facto separates two different worlds on a
social, economic and political level.
• Secondly, the south and the east of the Mediterranean region compose a zone of
instability and conflict, something that Europe has not faced for many years.
• Thirdly, while the EU is expanding to the east with the aim of including even
Turkey in the future, there is no similar intention to expand towards the southern
Mediterranean.
It must be stressed that the security problem in the Mediterranean region acquires
two perspectives:
a. The soft perspective (“soft security”), which is referred to as “human” or
“identity” security and concerns a significantly sensitive issue in many Mediterranean
societies. The phenomena of religious fanaticism and immigration are illustrations of
this form of security.
b. The hard perspective (“hard security”), which is referred to security regarding the
military and defense sector, including political violence, international terrorism, nuclear
threat or the dispersion of WMD.1
The EU’s efforts in the Mediterranean region come face to face with three principal
obstacles in their implementation:
• the Arab–Israeli conflict in the Middle East,
• the diversity of Arab states,
• the various interests of European states in the Mediterranean region.
The accession of Cyprus and Malta has enriched Mediterranean dimension of the
EU, which is of considerable strategic importance. Unfortunately, a part of Cyprus
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I. PARISIS: The ESDP in the Mediterranean region
continues to suffer, an illegal and immoral military occupation. Nevertheless, the
accession of the country in the EU constitutes a historic example of the powerful
influence of EU values. Cyprus, a country with particularly vivid Greek characteristics,
despite the adventures it has endured, on top of which is the occupation of
approximately 36% of its territory by Turkey, has succeeded, in the form of the
Republic of Cyprus, in many development areas, has built an exemplary democratic
regime and has entered the EU as a full member. In the field of security and defence it
fully supports the corresponding EU policies and, despite its few military forces, it
contributes largely in the context of ESDP.
Confronted with these challenges and threats, the Mediterranean EU countries have no
choice but to become major players on the security issues, in the region, contributing,
also, in the development of the European defence capabilities. One might argue that the
security problems of the southern region of Europe, should be viewed as problems to the
EU as an entity. Indeed they should. In practice however, the following question arises:
Does the Mediterranean problem concern the Netherlands and Finland to the same extent
as Italy and Greece? Geography dictates that the European Union remains “essentially a
northern-central European entity” in which Mediterranean states are a minority, and this is
a reality that the Barcelona process cannot escape from, given the role of the EU as its
initiator. It is known that differences of perception and interest remain within the EU with
regard to its relations with the southern partners. Although these are fundamentally
national differences, it suggested that the northern-southern European dimension must be
considered in any analysis of EU Mediterranean policy, not least because it provides a
potential fault-line along which European disunity could develop.
Another point that should be stressed is the division of the Mediterranean region
into west and east. Certainly, this is quite logical in terms of geography or even in order
to examine individual issues in the countries of the eastern Mediterranean, such as in
the Middle East. Indeed, the eastern Mediterranean presents, from a geostrategic point
of view, significantly more distinctive and important problems than the western
Mediterranean, the Cyprus issue and the Palestinian question being the dominant ones.
Furthermore, by studying the geostrategic environment of the Mediterranean region,
we can observe that the possibility of conflict in the eastern Mediterranean is
significantly higher than in the western Mediterranean. In the latter, despite the internal
instability indicated in the North African states, a conflict between these countries does
not seem probable, while the presence of north coastal European states is strong, thus
contributing to the stability of the region. On the other hand, there are many conflict
centres in the eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East taking the lead, as the Arab–
Israeli conflict has lasted for decades.
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I. PARISIS: The ESDP in the Mediterranean region
It is however obvious, that the aforementioned problems have a direct or indirect
effect on the security of the whole of Europe. For example, the problematic peace
process in the Middle East creates difficulties in the progress of the Barcelona process
and the relevant EMP. Consequently, in terms of policy and strategy, the EU should
regard the Mediterranean as a unified geographical region. It is of course
understandable that for some European countries, the division of the Mediterranean into
west and east is defined as realistic, avoiding involvement in sensitive issues such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the Greece–Turkey dispute.
The “southern flank” of the EU
The south side of the EU has seven member-states: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy,
Greece, Malta and Cyprus.
We must stress, from the beginning, that Malta has hardly any armed forces and has
removed itself from the issues concerning ESDP. Cyprus, on the one hand, has limited
armed forces and on the other hand certain external factors render its participation in
ESDP problematic, despite the country’s wish to the contrary. Cyprus, situated at the
centre of the Eastern Mediterranean, is affected by the tensions and conflicts taking
place in its environment. Despite all this, Cyprus can contribute significantly to the
development of ESDP’s Mediterranean dimension. It is interesting to view Cyprus’
security problem not just as an intercommunity or Greek–Turkish problem, but also as a
wider problem of geostrategic balances in the region.
I believe that, ESDP should be characterized by cooperation, cohesion, participation
and respective political will. It is worth stressing that the states of the southern region of
Europe are among those member–states that actively support the development of ESDP.
None among them can be characterized as “neutral” and none has expressed the wish to
remove itself from issues related to security and defence. This however shows that
being the first to face the security problems; they do not have the luxury to be politically
neutral or to oppose the development of ESDP.
How can we achieve cohesion and cooperation? It is interesting to look at some
characteristics of the five first countries linked to ESDP. We compare the differences
between the five countries in Table 1.2
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Table 1. Comparison of the five countries
GDP
euros
Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Greece
140 bn
750 bn
1.6 tr
1.3 tr
160 bn
Defence
expenses
Euros %
3 bn
9 bn
40 bn
25 bn
6.5 bn
2.1
1.2
2.9
1.9
4.1
Armed forces
personnel
Military
Total
service
armed
forces
Profess.
45.000
Profess.
150.000
Profess.
250.000
Profess.
190.000
Mixed
160.000
Membership
%
Pop
NATO
0.4
0.37
0.4
0.33
1.5
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
PTa
NS*
EUROFOR
EUROMARFOR
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO
NO
NO
NO
NO
YES
* Perceived Threat against National Security
Table 2 indicates the differences of the five countries in some main weapon systems.
Table 2 Weapon systems of the five countries
MBTs
Portugal
Spain
France
Italy
Greece
190
550
620
1600
1720
ARTY S/P
20
200
280
260
400
Principal
surface
units
6
16
33
17
14
Submarine
2
6
10
6
8
Fighters
45
170
800
200
350
AH
–
28
300
56
20 (+12)
I will refer to an example, which proves that we are not, unfortunately, in a very
good position, at least in the southern sector: When EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR
were created, in 1995, the four participating countries, in order to exclude Greece,
among other things used as an argument the fact that these forces concerned the
Western Mediterranean. However, during the period 2002–2003, in the framework of
the fight against terrorism, EUROMARFOR was assigned an operational responsibility
area in the SE Mediterranean, that is, close to the waters of Greece and Cyprus, the only
EU member–states located at the southeastern water frontiers of the Union, without
their participation. This incident gives rise to an issue that in my opinion has a negative
effect on the capabilities of the EU and on the development of ESDP.
Yet, a similar reasoning was not used in the formation of the battlegroups. This way,
the four of the EU-member Mediterranean countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain)
constitute one, essentially Mediterranean, battlegroup.
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Main key topics on ESDP
This is so due to the various national interests as well as the particular threats against the
security of each member-state. This phrase includes three main key topics of the ESDP
agenda: the national and European interests, the threat perception and public opinion.
As national interests are concerned, unquestionably, it is very hard to unite policies
of different countries, regarding external affairs and the military sector. It has been a lot
easier to agree upon agriculture, tourism and the packaging of olive oil, even on a
common currency. Nevertheless, the passing of a generation was essential in order to
finally unite Union policies related to the economy. It may well take about two
generations before we can achieve the unification of our foreign policies and the
establishment of a genuine common security and defence policy.
Concerning the threats: there is a difference in threat perception and response within
the EU and particular within the southern side. Who is a threat, and what is a threat?
Besides the threats mentioned in the European Security Strategy (terrorism,
proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime) some
countries still face the classic military threats against their territorial integrity. Speaking
about Greece, I would like to stress that Greece is the only member state of the EU,
which has not enjoyed until now, the most important achievement of European
integration: security. Whereas a war is unthinkable for all Members of the Union,
unfortunately, this is not feasible for Greece. That is why Greece insists on the
establishment of a broader solidarity clause.
Addressing now the third point: public opinion, which is linked to what I have
already mentioned on threats. The Greek citizen, who feels the threat and to this end
spends enormous amounts on defence, when discussing the European security and
defence, poses two questions: Firstly: will it (the ESDP) ensure the security and
independence of my country from an external threat? Secondly: will the EU interfere if
the independence of the Republic of Cyprus is threatened? Sure enough, every one of
the experts is aware that ESDP’s missions are different. The average citizen however, is
unaware of the meaning of Petersberg, collective defence, Berlin Plus, etc. He is
interested in security. What is the answer we provide him with?
The broad political and public support is an absolute requirement to achieve
capabilities improvements. At least, it is a matter of political credibility of the European
governments, to give a clear and positive message to public opinion, in the most
appropriate and conceivable way, of what they have done in pursuit of the Headline
Goal and of the way ahead, in terms of military shortfalls they have to fulfill.
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In what concerns the discussion on defence economics, there is indeed a problem. A
real ESDP needs soldiers, military units and weapon systems. That means money. There
are significant differences among the European countries in their defence expenses and
the size of their armed forces. Greece is a member state of the EU, which, because it
faces an external threat, is obliged to sustain large armed forces, compared with its size,
and to spend the higher percentage on defence. The issue of defence expenditure is a
prerequisite for common defence. It is important to the European citizens to understand,
that an effective and decisive common European defence should be based on mutual
defence expenses.
Epilogue
It is certain that Europe, in regard of foreign policy, security and defence issues, has a
long way ahead in order to reach complete and reliable solutions. Those policies must
have as a main feature convergence, if not coincidence. There are many reasons that
make this path a difficult one. But there are also many that enhance unity and
cooperation, or even make it mandatory. Those are long-term factors, between which
we could point out the historical background and common values and cultural beliefs,
the common risks and threats, the established supranational institutions, the economic
transactions, the wider communication between the societies of the peoples of Europe,
the interdependence born by the need for reliable and mutual commitments.
As is well known, convergence constitutes an indispensable element of the
European unification process, which ultimately aims to achieve European integration.
Should we maybe talk about convergence in what ESDP is concerned? To what
elements could a convergence of security and defense be referring? What exactly is a
convergence in ESDP issues?
The EU is a very complex formation and encompasses extremely complex notions.
Europeanization in all action fields is a requirement in order to achieve convergence
and cooperation. In a similar way we can talk about Europeanization of security and
defence. However, despite the efforts and initiatives that have been developed, these
two terms – security and defense – mainly remain under the authority of national
governments.
References
1. For an analysis on “soft” and “hard” security perspectives see also: RAMESH THAKUR, The United
Nations, Peace and Security, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
2. Military Balance, 2004-05, IISS, London.
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