The EU external policy and the South Caucasus
Dr. Najiba Mustafayeva, research fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies
(Azerbaijan)
Abstract
It is now more than 25 years on since the new independent states of Azerbaijan, Georgia
and Armenia gained their independence. The region in which these countries are located is
known as the South Caucasus. After the restoration of independence, these states began actively
seek ways of forming relations with other actors of international law. In light of recent
developments in the Eurasian area, the subject of relations between the EU and South Caucasus
has become more urgent and acute. The beginning of the formation of relations with the EU
coincided with the period of the formation of EU, created in 1992 at the Maastricht summit. In
this case, both the EU and the republics of the South Caucasus were new actors in international
relations.
At the same time, their relationship is not an interaction in the classical sense, as it usual
between states, since the EU is not a nation state. Moreover, the EU is not an international
organization in the classical conception. In fact, an international entity such as the EU today is a
unique in modern history.
As soon as the EU had shaped its policy, one of the regions with the countries of which this
international entity of states developed relations was the former Soviet Union or the Newly
Independent States. Relations between the EU and these states formed in accordance with the
geopolitical realities and New World Order that evolved following the collapse of the Eastern
bloc and Soviet Union.
Key words: Azerbaijan, Armenia, European Union, Eastern Partnership, European
Neighborhood Policy, foreign policy, Georgia
Introduction
It is now little more than 25 years on since the new independent states of Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Armenia appeared on the world map. The region in which these three countries are
located is known as the South Caucasus. Despite the fact that this region has quite clear
geographical boundaries, it is also very difficult to characterize as a region from the political and
economic points of view. Immediately after the restoration of independence, these countries
began to actively seek ways of forming relationships with other actors in the international arena.
In light of recent developments in the Eurasian area, the subject of relations between the EU
and South Caucasus has become more urgent and acute. Such relations and the degree of
political will on both sides will determine the future direction of development of the South
Caucasus states. For small countries, forming foreign policy largely depends on external factors
and on how and with whom international political alliances are formed. Room for maneuver for
action in these countries is very limited, and the South Caucasus region can be seen as a unique
case where the example of each of the three countries can be traced back to their limited foreign
policy options, with their success depending on their level of pragmatism, their goals and
capacities.
In general, it should be noted that immediately after regaining their independence, all three
regions countries have been looking for ways to achieve closer cooperation with, and in the long
term integration into, the Euro-Atlantic region. Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia became full
members of the OSCE and the Council of Europe and actively collaborated in different programs
with NATO and the EU. The beginning of the formation of relations with the EU coincided with
the period of formation of this structure, created in 1992 at the Maastricht Summit. In this case,
both the EU and the countries of the South Caucasus were new actors in international relations
and began to establish their relationship with a blank sheet.
In 1992, the EU launched the formation of its overall foreign policy. Despite the fact that
this policy is established at the intergovernmental level, the main objective was the development
of a common perception of the external world and coordinated actions in the international arena.
In connection with this approach, appropriate tools were produced that would be used to achieve
these goals.
As soon as the EU had shaped its policy, one of the regions with the countries of which this
organization developed relations was the former Soviet Union or the Newly Independent States.
Relations between the EU and NIS formed in accordance with the geopolitical realities and New
World Order that evolved following the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union.
Relations with these countries, which include the countries of the South Caucasus, developed
very carefully, having some reflexivity to events occurring both within the EU and in Eurasia in
general.
1. The EU`s policy towards the New Independent States and South Caucasus republics
1.1. The Priority of Preferences of the Foreign Policy of South Caucasus states in The
Development of Relations with the European Institutions
The South Caucasus region, which gained independence following the collapse of the Soviet Union,
is composed of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. The region is separated from Russia by the accepted
natural border of the Caucasus Mountains, a range forming part of the Alpine-Himalayan mountain
system. These mountains begin on the west coast of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea,
stretching up to the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea, a distance of almost 1200 km. The eastern
and western sides of the South Caucasus region are surrounded by the Caspian and the Black
Seas.1
In the period of the Soviet Union, the region in which these three states are located was
named the Transcaucasian region. Because of the historical development of the countries and
differing priorities and problems among them, it is difficult to give any common political or
economic definition except for geographical area. Today, to combine all three states under the
same roof is impossible and at the same time politically inaccurate. The countries of the South
Caucasus, because of its geographical location and historical development tend to have close
relations with the Euro-Atlantic area. All three countries are considering the prospects of their
development and future with this region, with different aspirations among the three countries of
the South Caucasus. This is due to the capacity to conduct independent foreign policy and the
opportunities from which these countries could benefit.
Looking at the foreign policy priorities of the countries, Georgia, during the Saakashvili
period, operated a decisive integration policy towards the European and Euro-Atlantic
institutions. As a result, Georgia has paid great attention to the development of relations with the
West, and thus completely ruined its relationship with Russia, which eventually led to undesired
results. It might be said that Azerbaijan, in comparison with Georgia, is progressing with a much
more balanced policy. Azerbaijan's priority interests in the South Caucasus region are:
improvement of the mutual and well-intentioned relations with neighboring countries; security
and stability in the whole region; and prevention of illegal and other transfers of military
equipment in the area, to support global arms limitation policies.2 As for Armenia, although it
professes a desire for European integration based on a Christian culture and lobbying with the
help of 500,000 Armenians already in France, the country has already established wide-reaching
relationships with Russia in all areas. Nevertheless, despite such wide-ranging relations with its
northern neighbor, this situation does not completely remove Armenia’s aspirations in the
direction of Euro-Atlantic integration3.
Although each of the three South Caucasus states has different foreign policy priorities for a
variety of reasons, each of the states has explicit or implicit plans to enter the process of
integration and developing relationships with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions. In this
case, each of the three states have implemented measures for the enlargement and deepening of
these relations to the extent permitted by their current positions. However, the steps taken must
1
Güney Kafkasya’nın Yeri, Sınırları ve Özellikleri, No 17, Avrasya Etütleri Dergisi, Ankara, TİKA, SpringSummer, 2000, pp. 21–22.
2
Foreign Policy Priorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan, http://www.azembassy.com/new/pages.php?name=FPP.
3
Ibrahimov, R. The EU external policy towards the South Caucasus: how far is it from realization? Baku, 2014.
be aligned with the countries’ own interests. If they are unable to find hope with the EU and
other institutions, these states will act more cautiously in their relations with the EU and will
refrain from taking on additional unpaid liabilities on behalf of this institution.
1.2. The Historical Development of Relations between the EU and the NIS. The
Beginning of Relations between the EU and the NIS
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a brief period of uncertainty and the
European Community and then EU continued to pursue a Russia-based policy towards relations
with the countries of the region and the NIS. The EC officially recognized the independence of
all three South Caucasus states together with the other former Soviet Union states on 31
December 1991. In 1993, the EU began to assist countries in the region which were in
difficulties. This was of great importance for countries which were suffering economic distress,
which had begun in the latter days of the Soviet Union and deepened further after independence.
The importance of this aid for the EU lay in developing the stability and confidence of states in
the Caucasus and Central Asia region.
The EU's relations with the South Caucasus states progressed through a similar process to
that with other NIS, and it is appropriate to consider relations with Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Armenia in comparison to the similar process between the EU and NIS as Brussels implemented
a similar foreign policy in each case. In addition, the European Communities initiated its
relations with the states of the South Caucasus region in the period of Soviet Union and at that
time the way these relationships were conducted was Moscow-based. In the forty years between
the establishment of the European Communities in 1951 until the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, there was only a relationship between the two entities for the three years from 1988. The
negative attitude of the Soviet government towards European integration was determined
according to the logic and climate of the Cold War era.
Before the opening up of relationships, the approach of Western countries to any subject
was perceived as an attempt to strengthen their position, as part of world imperialism, in the
ongoing conflict situation with the Soviet Union, the socialist countries, the international
workers' movement, and the libertarian national movement.4 On the other hand, the European
Economic Community exhibited apathy to COMECON, which represented the economic unity
of the Eastern bloc, and did not include any provisions on relations with the Soviet Union and
Eastern European countries in the founding treaties.5 The Common Declaration of the EC that
was signed in June of 1988 was the first concrete example of the establishment of formal
4
Avrupa Birliği El Kitabı, 2003, p.19.
Esra Hatipoğlu, “Rusya-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri”, Marmara Avrupa Araştırmaları Dergisi, Istanbul, Volume 9, No
1, 2001, p. 116.
5
relations between the EC and with each member-state of COMECON separately.6 In the summer
of the same year, relations were established between the parties and representations from these
states were accepted at the Commission of the European Communities. In the same period, the
EC started negotiations with these countries in order to sign the Trade and Economic Treaty.
The Trade and Economic Treaty with the USSR was signed in 1989 and entered into force
on 1 June 1990, valid for a period of 10 years. Some of the quantitative restrictions which
applied to the imports from the USSR were abolished on 1 August 1991 by the European
Communities. These restrictions continued to apply only to certain sensitive goods. In return for
this, the Soviet Union organized a release program on issues such as quotas, licensing, and
foreign exchange limits for the European Communities. The Treaty envisaged carrying out
international trade according to market prices and a dialogue on defense measures. 7 Towards the
end of 1990, the European Communities and the USSR intended to begin discussions to expand
the content of the treaty. These talks never occurred due to the collapse of the USSR in 1991.
In December of the same year, the Commonwealth of Independent States was established,
creating a completely different situation. The European Communities and its member-states
announced their recognition of the NIS with joint declarations on 31 December 1991.
In the first stage, the European Union's policy towards these countries was based on the
decision of the European Council adopted on 16 March 1992, which assumed that relations with
the CIS and the Baltic countries would be based on the continued legal validity of the treaty
which was agreed with the USSR on 18 December 1989.8 However, these arrangements were
inadequate for the development of new relations with these countries. Therefore the EU decided
to prepare a new type of contract. Thus, for the development of new relations between the
parties, a new program, TACIS, was established.
1.3 EU's TACIS Program. Formation and Objectives of the TACIS Program
In its initial stages, the TACIS9 Program was seen as the most basic and the most important
tool for the development of relations between the states of the former Soviet Union and the EC.
This program is one of the EU's most important external programs along with the PHARE and
CARDS programs, and covers 285 million people across 23 million square kilometers. This
program was conceived with the main objective of assisting the newly independent states which
were passing through a very difficult period following the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the
transition phase to democratic government and the market economy. At the Rome and Dublin
6
Avrupa Birliği El Kitabı, 2003, p.33.
Eвропейское Cообщество-Bаш Сосед, Kомиссия Eвропейских Cообществ, European Commission, Brussels,
1992, p. 41.
8
Avrupa Birliği El Kitabı, 2003, p. 203.
9
Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of the Independent States.
7
Summits in 1990 it had been decided to establish the technical assistance program to the Soviet
Union to support economic development.10 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the European
Union's TACIS program offered financial incentives for the transfer of know-how to the 12
states of the former Soviet Union and Mongolia.
The legal structure for providing assistance was regulated through Regulation of Council
No1279/96; this regulation was then repealed on 31 December 1999 in favor of prepared
legislation covering the years 2000–2006 years. This new legislation established a "broad
horizons" approach towards achieving the objectives, bringing together past regulations and
future work in the TACIS program.11 The EU allocated a budget of 3,138 million Euros to the
program for this period.12 After that, no new regulations were required for the TACIS Program.13
The new regulations planned to provide aid to the NIS during the period of transition to a
market economy and democracy in these states. The program adopted criteria for assistance
developed in line with an ongoing determination of the changing needs and priorities of the NIS
at both country and regional levels, including ensuring sustainable economic development,
researching the social aspects of reforms, providing equal opportunities for women, and ensuring
environmental protection and ensure sustainable use of natural resources.14 At the same time, the
TACIS program encouraged cooperation on inter-regional, interstate and cross-border issues
between the EU, Central and Eastern European states, and NIS.
In addition, activities were
foreseen related to financial and investment activities. Aid could be in the form of technical
assistance for the promotion of investment. Financing was expected to be used in areas such as
cross-border cooperation, support to small and medium enterprises, and environmental
infrastructure issues. Identification and preparation of projects would be carried out at local and
regional levels. Some projects may be carried out gradually. In order to avoid interruption
between the stages, it was necessary to take measures to ensure effective transition to a new
phase, if the previous stage was seen to be successful.15
Two initiatives, the TRACECA and INOGATE programs, are of great importance to this
subject within the framework of the TACIS program and it is useful to look at these in more
detail.
10
Ali Faik Demir, AB’nin Güney Kafkasya Politikaları, Dünden Bugüne Avrupa Birliği, Beril Dedeoğlu (ed.),
Istanbul, Boyut Yayınları, 2003, pp. 378–379.
11
Avrupa Komisyonu: TACIS Programı, 1997 yılı Raporu, 1998, p. 57.
12
Avrupa Birliği El Kitabı, 2003, p. 206.
13
TACIS, http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/ceeca/tacis/index.htm.
14
Vişne Korkmaz, “Avrupa Birliği’nin Güney Kafkasya Bölgesine Yönelik Politikaları”, Stratejik Öngörü Dergisi,
Istanbul, Tasam Yayınları, No 3, Autumn, 2004, p. 163.
15
Korkmaz, ibid., 2004, p. 163.
1.4. The importance of TACIS TRACECA program
The TRACECA16 Program was one of the programs within the framework of TACIS and it
was an inter-state regional improvement program initiated by the EU in 1992 and projected
towards CIS states to facilitate economic restructuring and transition to a market economy.
The major objective of this program was the formation of an international network which
would create infrastructure (both national and international), develop common standards and
facilitate the application process in the areas covered by the program and which could be done at
minimal cost. This covered networks in transport, energy, and telecommunications fields. In
May 1993, in Brussels, the basic principles of the TRACECA were determined at the conference
at which the Transport and Trade ministers of eight of the states (five Central Asian and the three
Caucasus republics) came together. This conference established objectives as part of the EU's
global strategy for these states, which included the development of an east-west transport
corridor from Europe via the Black Sea, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea up to Central Asia,
with the TRACECA transport corridor connecting to the Trans-European network available in
the EU.17 TRACECA provided support for the political and economic independence of these
republics with the development of alternative trade routes to European and world markets,
promoting the development of cooperation between the republics; this program also encouraged
international financial institutions and private investors to invest in these states.
The importance of this corridor is that a flow of trade was established with, on the one hand,
Western and Central Europe, and on the other, Central and South-East Asia, passing through the
South Caucasus region.18 The TRACECA corridor stretches from the west, starting in Varna
(Bulgaria), passing through Odessa (Ukraine) and Costanta (Romania) and continuing on
through the Black Sea to the ports of Poti and Batumi, and into the transport network of the
Southern Caucasus. The route then heads up the Caspian Sea by boat (Baku-Turkmenbashi,
Baku-Aktau) to reach the railway networks of the Central Asian states Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan, the transportation networks of which are connected with Uzbekistan, Kirgizstan and
Tajikistan, and reaches the boundaries of China and Afghanistan.19
Within this framework, the TRACECA program aimed to strengthen links between Western
Europe and the states of the region and to create an alternative to the northern corridor through
Russia, and the southern corridor through Iran, thereby attempting to consolidate and strengthen
of regional cooperation and the stability and independence of the newly established republics.
16
Transit Corridor Central Europe-Caucasus-Central Asia.
Avrupa Komisyonu: TACIS Programı, 1997 yılı Raporu, 1998, p. 43.
18
TRACECA, see <http://www.traceca-org.org/en/traceca/.
19
Rovshan Ibrahimov, "Link in the Chain: South Caucasus as a Transport and Logistics Hub between Regions",
Interregional Cooperation in Eurasia: Transport and Logistics Projects as an Accelerator of Integration Within and
Between the Black Sea Region, the South Caucasus and the Central Asia”, SAM, Baku, 2013, p. 64.
17
Overall, the TRACECA was developed in order to develop the potential of the region's
energy and natural resources and operate new projects intended to lead to the formation of new
trade corridors on an east-west axis. To accomplish this required, under the framework of
TRACECA, the restructuring of railways, roads, and pipelines, the airports in the Caucasus
region, the Caspian sea port of Baku and facilities on the Black Sea. 20 The work conducted is of
the utmost importance in terms of geopolitics to form a “tangent line” between Russia and Iran
and success in this project would lead to increased importance of the South Caucasus region,
which is in the position of a geographical monopoly, in creating a firm bond between Central
Asia, the Far East, and the EU. Another important project arising from the delicate balance of the
Caucasus region and foreseen to be realized in the framework of the program is to develop the
railway which begins in the city of Almaty in Kazakhstan and runs to Mari (Merv) Turkmenistan
and continues by a land route through Iran and Turkey, ending in Russia.21 Through this project,
countries of the region that are geographically distant from the EU and to not have the financial
ability to develop such projects alone will have the chance to benefit from new opportunities for
economic relations with the Union. For this reason, both the EU and countries of the region have
shown the utmost precision in the development of smooth relations. To date, the projects which
have been developed under the framework of the TRACECA have not developed to the desired
levels due to the lack of coordination among member states on various issues. In this case,
different initiatives in the development of transport corridors in the region are also supported
within the framework of the TRACECA program.
One of these projects was proposed at the conference organized by OSCE on 23–24
September 2007 in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan, on the possibilities for the development
of trans-Asian and Eurasian transport corridors which would pass through the Central Asia
region and could be completed by 2015. The partner states of the TRACECA program attended
this conference, and representatives of the TRACECA General Secretariat also participated as
the OSCE initiative coincided with the objectives of TRACECA. One of the most important
issues discussed at the conference was the need for the creation of even deeper coordination
among states in the region for the development of transport policies.22
TRACECA is developing in parallel with the increase in economic activity and cooperation
in the region covered by the program. In June 2009, in Kyrgyzstan, five TRACECA members –
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan – signed an additional agreement on
the development of a multimodal transport network.
20
Vişne Korkmaz, ibid., 2004, p. 163.
Vişne Korkmaz: ibid., 2004, p. 162.
22
Conference on Prospects for the Development of Trans-Asian and Eurasian Transit Transportation through
Central Asia up to 2015, http://www.traceca-org.org/default.php?l=en.
21
On 28 November, during the International Conference in Izmir to facilitate international
trade and transport in the Black Sea, Central Asia, and Middle East regions, a memorandum was
signed between Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. According to the memorandum,
these four states intended to implement the Silk Wind project. With the implementation of this
project, it is planned to create a multimodal transport route with the preliminary exchange of
information between the customs and railway systems of the participating countries. Thus,
optimization and capacity improvement of the TRACECA corridor and an increase in freight
transportation in the region will be achieved. This memorandum was signed with the support of
the TRACECA intergovernmental commission.
In April 2013, a TRACECA coordination meeting was held in Kiev. The main subject of
discussion was consideration of the Action Plan for the period of 2013–2015. During this period,
the main strategy will be continuation of the formation and development of the integrated
network of logistic nodes, creation of conditions for multi-modal and transit transport, railwayshipping terminal development in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea, and improvement of the
infrastructure of the corridor. Development of these components will allow diversification of the
international transport routes in the face of existing severe competition.23
1.5. The INOGATE24 Program25
This program is one of the long-standing initiatives of the European Union towards raising
the level of welfare of the region’s states and improving the effectiveness of oil and gas
operations in the Caspian Sea region. A conference on issues of oil and gas management was
organized by the European Commission in 1995, at which regional cooperation strategies
towards oil and gas fields in the Caspian Sea region were identified. Since that date, the
Commission has promoted active cooperation with regional states to assist in modernizing the
energy sector.
The INOGATE Program, initiated by the European Union in 1997, is the best example of
the initiatives in this direction.26 INOGATE is the EU main regional program for implementing
technical assistance to NIS. In addition to the TACIS Program partner states, the Central and
Eastern European Countries involved in the PHARE Program also participated in this program.
INOGATE is an international energy cooperation program between the EU and partner countries
from the Black Sea, the South Caucasus and Central Asian regions such as Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. The main
23
Rovshan Ibrahimov, Link in the Chain: South Caucasus as a Transport and Logistics Hub between Regions, ibid.,
p. 65.
24
Interstate Oil and Gas Transport To Europe.
25
About INOGATE, www.inogate.org/en/.
26
INOGATE Newsletter, No 1, Brussels, Summer, 1998.
objective of the program is to identify alternative routes for a regional gas transportation system
and the restructuring of transport systems for petroleum products, modernizing and increasing
the efficiency of the transport of oil and gas from the Caspian Sea and Central Asia regions.27
The program aimed to develop energy markets based on the principles of the EU internal energy
market, taking into account the particularities of the involved countries; to enhance energy
security by addressing the issues of energy exports/imports, supply diversification, energy
transit, and energy demand; to support sustainable energy development, including the
development of energy efficiency, renewable energy and demand side management; and to
attract investment towards energy projects of common and regional interest.28
In addition, the program included provisions for performing medium-sized investments in
infrastructure in high-risk cross-border regions, e.g. implementation of modern technological
methods for international standards and environmental protection. These types of investments
will be managed as example projects on the infrastructure issues of oil and gas transportation in
the international arena.29
As can be seen, INOGATE is concentrated more on the development of an appropriate legal
and business framework for cooperation between partners in the energy field, related to the
existing and planned transmission pipelines that pass through the South Caucasus and Eastern
Europe regions. A further step for developing this program was the Baku Initiative, announced
on 13 November 2004. It is expected that this initiative will encourage the integration of the
energy markets of the INOGATE member states into EU markets. It is also intended for the EU
to provide sustainable and secure transportation of oil and gas from the Caspian region to its
markets, with the purpose of improving the security of supply by creating alternative transport
corridors. The number of partner states who joined this initiative has increased: apart from the
existing INOGATE program member states, Romania signed the document and Russia and Iran
participate as observers. With the participation of Russia and Iran, all Caspian littoral states are
involved in the process either directly or as observers. The participants agreed to support the
gradual development of regional energy markets in the Caspian littoral states and their
neighboring countries. A road map towards achievement of these and allied objectives was
adopted at the Ministerial Conference held in Astana on 30 November 2006. Despite the
ambitious goals, INOGATE program implementation is very slow. The integration processes in
the energy sector between the partner countries have still not reached the expected level.
27
What is INOGATE? http://www.inogate.com/russ/rdefault.htm.
Rovshan Ibrahimov, Link in the Chain: South Caucasus as a Transport and Logistics Hub between Regions, ibid.,
p. 63.
29
About INOGATE, ibid.
28
However, this initiative is a good opportunity to identify some of the common formats and
standards for the states of the Black Sea region, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.30
An example of the types of projects intended to be supported through the framework of the
INOGATE program is the Northern gas pipeline via which gas – mainly from the Russian
Shtokman field – would be transported through the Baltic Sea to Germany. This project is
planned and accepted as an alternative to the Russia-Turkey-Greece-Italy natural gas pipeline via
which it was planned to transport natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field in the Caspian
Sea to European markets.31 Another of the important projects in the framework of the INOGATE
program was the construction of the Nabucco natural gas pipeline. It was expected that gas from
the Central Asian states would be transported to Baku via the planned Trans-Caspian pipeline
and then transferred to the Nabucco pipeline via the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline. While there
were many problems related to the realization of this project, it played an importance role in the
formation of the EU Common Energy Policy.32
Other oil pipelines supported by this program include the Odessa–Brody oil pipeline, which
will run from a Ukrainian port on the Black Sea to Poland and will alleviate tanker traffic in the
Turkish Straits; and also the Constanza-Omisalj-Trieste oil pipeline from the Romanian Black
Sea port, through Croatia to Trieste in Italy.33
As can be seen from these examples, the implementation of projects under this initiative has
been largely unsuccessful. The proposed projects, although very ambitious, have not so far been
implemented. These projects have remained only on paper, as the EU has shown insufficient
political will to achieve them. Energy policy in the EU is still in its formative stages and national
interests generally take priority.
2. New Phase of Formation of Relations with NIS: Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement
2.1. Characteristics of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
The EU signed Partnership and Cooperation Agreements separately with the countries of
the former Eastern bloc in 1994. In 1992, the European Council had decided to sign a new
agreement with NIS as the result of the formation of a new political and economic situation. This
treaty was named the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and replaced the Trade and
30
Rovshan Ibrahimov, Link in the Chain: South Caucasus as a Transport and Logistics Hub between Regions, ibid.,
p. 63.
31
INOGATE Map of Natural Gas Pipelines, http://www.inogate.org/en/resources/map_gas,
32
Rovshan Ibrahimov, Nabucco: Project with Strange Name and Mysterious Intentions, 25.03. 2007,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2547.
33
Rovshan Ibrahımov, Energy Policy in EU Region-National Priorities vs. Common Policy, 16.05.2007,
http://www.turkishweekly.net/comments.php?id=2569
Cooperation Agreement signed in 1989 with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the Trade and
Cooperation Agreement, as the basis of relations between NIS and EU, provided for a smooth
transition to PCA for the development and deepening of these relations. This Agreement was
signed with all NIS. The first PCA, which was signed with Russia, entered into force in
December 1997. PCAs signed with Ukraine and Moldova entered into force in 1998.34
PIA’s have different characteristics for each state based on differences among NIS. Each
PIA is not only an agreement between the NIS and not only the EU, but also all of the memberstates that make up the EU, with the partnership holding the distinction of being a bilateral
agreement between the states. PCA is a framework that allows for the possibility of development
of relations between the EU and partner states. Developing cooperation in accordance with PCAs
includes TACIS Program, but the PCA builds on the experience of TACIS. In early 2003, PCA
came into force in the nine of the eleven signatory countries. Signed agreements did not enter
into force due to the constant violations of human rights and democratic principles in Belarus
and Turkmenistan.
All PCA’s have common aspects. Each agreement forms the basis of trade in goods and
services and includes political dialogue, intellectual property rights, and the promotion of
investment in companies that conform to the rules and will be subject to the regulations, thus
promoting powerful and comprehensive political and economic relations between the EU and the
relevant government. This allows cooperation on issues ranging from transportation to higher
education. These agreements play an increasingly important role in increasing trade and
investment. PCAs are arranged according to internationally accepted norms of human rights and
democracy. These agreements help each participating state in the process of democratization,
with an emphasis on political independence and parliamentary democracy.35 PCAs help to enable
the development of trade relations and political dialogue and to prevent discrimination between
partner states the EU and the U.S. There is a possibility of the establishment of free trade zone in
the future between the EU and the western part of NIS. The agreements also include education,
employment, and a wide range of new areas such as science and technology. 36
According to the agreement, parties mutually recognize most-favored-nation trading
status. All quotas which can prevent trade relations with one another have been removed. In
addition, the parties have committed themselves to include in the economic mainstream issues of
34
TACIS Annual Report 1998, Brussels, European Commission, 23.07.1999, p. 6.
TACIS Annual Report 1998, 1999, p. 6.
36
Proposal for a Council Regulation Concerning the Provision of Assistance to Economic Reform and Recovery in
the New Independent States and Mongolia, Brussels, European Commission, 08.01.1999, p. 5.
35
environmental protection, higher and vocational education, the fight against crime, illegal
immigration and public issues the for the development of cooperation.37
2.2. Importance of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in Relations between
EU and the South Caucasus States
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements, which will confer a new impetus on the
development of relations, were signed between the European Union and Azerbaijan, Georgia,
and Armenia on 22 April 1996.38 The most important reason for the EU signing the PIAs with all
region countries on the same date is to avoid the perception of privilege or discrimination
towards any of the states in the South Caucasus, which are a sensitive political conjuncture. The
region countries succeeded in riding out periods of uncertainty immediately after independence,
and they succeeded to a certain extent in the establishment of government schemes.
The necessity to develop such kind of a tool has arisen due to the fact that the EU was in
the process of integration with Central and Eastern Europe. As a result of this process, the South
Caucasus countries would become neighbors of the enlarged EU. For this reason, the
organization had to review its relationship with these countries, to which end the necessary steps
were taken in December 1995 in Brussels to determine the strategy of the European Commission
towards the South Caucasus states. The Commission issued statement that acknowledged the
ongoing tension between the three states of the region because of the continuing disputes over
Nagorno-Karabakh and Abkhazia, in spite of the ceasefire agreements signed between the parties
in 199439.
The same notification emphasized that the region has an important geopolitical position.
Here, the proposed strategy of the EU towards the region states, acknowledged as facing
extremely severe economic problems and potentially murderous threats to stability and security,
focused especially on interests in the energy sector, which resulted in the signing of the
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.40
The important characteristic of PCA is that it was signed not only between the South
Caucasus states and the European Commission, but also on a bilateral basis with all the EU
member-states.41 In other words, this agreement is not a document that was signed directly with
and on behalf of the EU alone, there is also the consent of the members of the EU in the creation
of this kind of partnership within the union. The main reason for this is that the EU CFSP still
bears the characteristics of an intergovernmental agreement.
37
Avrupa Komisyonu: TACIS Programı, 1997 yılı Raporu, 1998, p. 57.
Annotated Summary of Agreements Linking with Non-member Countries, 2000.
39
Ibrahimov, R. The EU external policy towards the South Caucasus: how far is it from realization? Baku, 2014.
40
Demir, ibid., 2003, p. 366.
41
EU Cooperation with Armenia, http://www.delarm.ec.Europa.eu/en/eu_and_armenia/cooperation.htm.
38
Within the framework of PCA were similar objectives for each of the three South
Caucasus states. The first article of the agreement included provisions promoting the creation of
a dialogue framework for the development of political relations between countries in the region,
the development of democracy in the South Caucasus countries, economic development and the
provision of assistance by the EU to these states to complete the process of transition to a market
economy, promotion of the development of trade and investment, harmonious economic
relations between the agreement parties, the provision economic sustainability and cooperation
in legal, economic, social, financial, scientific, technological, and cultural fields.
The important second, third and fourth articles of the agreement were collected under the
title of the "General Principles", which formed the first part of the Treaty: In accordance to the 2.
Article the partner states should: Respect to democracy, principles of international law and
human rights, as defined in particular in the United Nations Charter, Helsinki Final Act and a
Charter of Paris for New Europe, as well as the principles of market economy, including those
enunciated in the documents of the CSCE Bonn Conference, underpin the internal and external
policies of the Parties and constitute essential elements of partnership and of this Agreement.
According to the third article, the Parties: Consider that it is essential for their future
prosperity and stability that the newly independent states which have emerged from dissolution
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter called "Independent States", should
maintain and develop cooperation among themselves in compliance with the principles of the
Helsinki Final Act and with international law and in the spirit of good neighbourly relations and
will make every effort to encourage this process42.
Also, according to the fourth article of this agreement, the Parties were to implement
market-oriented economic reforms.43
As can be seen from the "General Principles" of the PCA, which are common to all three
South Caucasus countries in the form of the EU agreements, the legal basis for the relationship
was referred to generally accepted international legal principles. Thereby the EU on the one hand
commits the partners to follow these principles, and on the other hand indicates the direction in
which these countries should implement their reforms. In addition, the countries were obliged to
carry out reforms to accelerate the transition to a market economy, which would also form a
common platform for further economic cooperation between the parties.
Importantly, these agreements show the regional approach of the EU to the South
Caucasus and creating in these countries an obligation to promote cooperation. This regional
42
Ibrahimov, R. The EU external policy towards the South Caucasus: how far is it from realization? Baku, 2014.
The European Union and Azerbaijan Republic: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, ibid., pp. 4–5; The
European Union and the Republic of Georgia: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, ibid., pp. 4–5; The
European Union and The Republic of Armenia: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, ibid., pp. 4–5.
43
approach of the EU to the South Caucasus will be central to its relations with the countries of the
region. The EU is aware that in the South Caucasus, there is a problem with the development of
the regional cooperation because of the presence of conflict. Not wanting to be directly involved
in theirs conflicts’ resolution, the EU hopes that through the promise of further development of
relations within this structure, the countries of the region will be motivated to quickly resolve the
differences between them.
One of the major concerns of PCAs that have been signed with the states of the South
Caucasus on the basis of the development of cooperation is the development of economic
relations, and this issue has been included in the treaty under the heading of Economic
Cooperation. The EU requires the creation of economic cooperation for structuring long-term
assistance in the process of the economic reforms, and restructuring needs to be realized in all
three of these states. Accordingly, achieving the objectives envisaged requires the preparation of
a number of policies and other arrangements for economic and social reforms in each of the three
states and the restructuring of their economic and commercial systems. In this regard, the
policies to be followed must be prepared in accordance with the requirements of sustainable and
harmonious social development. Realization of these objectives, foreseen in the framework of
economic cooperation, is of great importance in the TACIS Program. 44 The EU, in order to
improve economic relations with the states of the South Caucasus, also requires measures to
protect property rights and the removal of trade quotas, as foreseen in the agreement signed. The
parties mutually agreed on the implementation of most-favored-nation status.45
PCA also envisaged the necessity to create mechanisms for political dialogue between the
parties. Accordingly, regular meetings will be established at ministerial level in the Cooperation
Council, on the level of state parliamentarians in the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, and
in meetings organized between senior officials.46
After the signing of the PCA, the foreign ministers of the South Caucasus states came
together and issued a joint statement showing their intentions in this regard. In the statement, the
common values, principles, and common objectives which were set out in the first four articles in
PCA and which provided for the development of relations between the parties, were confirmed.47
For three years, the relations between the parties which were emerging along developmental
lines experienced a new turning point with the enactment of the PCAs in Luxembourg on 22
June 1999. The relationships among the parties were given legal grounding with the entry into
force of the PIAs.
44
EU-Azerbaijan Partnership and Co-operation Agreement, TACIS, Baku, July, 2002, p. 23.
The EU & Georgia: Bilateral Relations,
http://www.delgeo.ec.Europa.eu/en/eu_and_georgia/bilateral_relations.html.
46
Demir, ibid., p. 368.
47
Demir, ibid., p. 368.
45
The entry into force of the PIAs was also a turning point in relations between the South
Caucasus states and the EU. In general, with the ratification of PCA, a clear framework was
established for relations between the parties which expressed – at least in the short-term – the
dimensions according to which relations would be developed. The agreements determined which
tools to use for the development of political and economic relations between the parties.
However, in some respects, the EU is inadequate due to a shortage of available tools and
limitations on certain issues on which no common will and attitude has been established among
the member-states. At least for a certain period of time, the EU needs to collaborate with other
regional institutions to address this deficiency.
After ratification, the EU held a conference within the framework of the "Caucasus
Summit," at which the EU exhibited active support for the development of regional cooperation
in order to strengthen stability and security in the South Caucasus. 48 The EU gives first priority
to the development of cooperation between states of the region. Despite such EU intentions, its
implementation is problematic, since the development of regional cooperation is hindered by
existing conflicts. Moreover, to put pressure on Armenia to withdraw from the occupation of
Azerbaijani lands (Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjacent regions), Azerbaijan intends to pursue
a policy of exclusion of Armenia from regional projects. In this case, for the successful
development of regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, the EU should pursue a policy of
conflict resolution. Only in the case of conflict resolution is any cooperation between Azerbaijan
and Armenia possible.
3. The EU's New Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership program
3.1. The Role of the EU's New Neighborhood Policy in the Development of Relations
with the South Caucasus
Another tool of foreign policy developed by the EU is the New Neighborhood Policy, which
has been introduced in order to establish the stability, security, and welfare of the surrounding
areas of the EU. The enlargement process cannot continue forever, therefore the EU, which aims
to complete its political alliance in the future, was in need a new vehicle to support political and
economic reforms in order to develop prosperity, stability, and security in the neighboring
countries.49 The New Neighbourhood Policy has been developed as such a tool for the EU.
The EU’s expanded “New Neighbourhood Policy” was formally approved by the Council in
June 2003. This policy was accepted in accordance with a paper "Wider Europe-Neighbourhood:
48
Chronology of Basic Events in EU - Georgia Relations,
http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?sec_id=125&lang_id=ENG.
49
Benita Ferrero-Waldner, “The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU’s Newest Foreign Policy Instrument”,
European Foreign Affairs Review, Volume 11, No 2, Holland, Kluwer Law International, Summer, 2006, pp. 139140.
A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours" which offered by
the European Commission in March. The aim of this new initiative is the creation by the EU of a
“zone of development and good neighborliness", which includes Russia, Ukraine, Moldova,
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, and the states located on the southern shores of the
Mediterranean Sea.
Deeper economic integration between the EU and its neighbors requires consideration of
the application of new financial instruments, a strengthened political dialogue, simplification of
the visa regime, preventing crises and regional conflicts, cooperation on issues such as justice
and home affairs, cross-border and regional co-operation, transport, energy, telecommunications,
culture, science and education, and further cooperation such as environmental protection in the
Neighbourhood .50
Successful implementation of the New Neighbourhood Policy will provide similar status for
participants as for the member of the European Economic Area with the aim of full realization of
economic integration with neighboring countries without the prospect of political integration.51
The basis of this initiative lies in a differentiated and step-by-step approach. Accordingly, a
proposed individual action plan will be developed with each of the neighboring states and this
plan will aim at the realization of the common criteria determined in the process of integration
into the EU common market. This system is similar to the three-step convergence formula which
the EU is applied to the Central Eastern European Countries. These stages consist of annual
inspections carried out by the Commission, the EU Action Plan, and national programs prepared
by the Neighboring States in order to realize these plans. However, the main differences between
these two EU initiatives is that at the finishing point of implementation for CEEC will be full
membership of the EU, while the result for the Neighboring States is only deepened
integration.52
The Policy considers priority areas of cooperation to be:
The expansion of the EU's common market and control structures, primarily opening up of
commercial relations and markets; prevention of illegal circulation of persons and illegal
migration; prevention of threats, which is directed to public security and threat elimination in
order to ensure cooperation; conflict prevention and development of crisis management
protocols; protection of human rights; the development of cultural cooperation and mutual
understanding; provision of integration in the field of European scientific research and with the
EU's transport, energy and telecommunications networks; the development of new tools for the
50
This initiative provide, as expressed at those period the EU Commission President Romano Prodi: “everything but
institutions”.
51
Robert Aliboni, “The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy”, European Foreign
Affairs Review, Volume 10, No 1, Holland, Kluwer Law International, Summer, 2006, p. 3.
52
Достижения и Иллюзии Концепции Расширенной Европы, http://dialogs.org.ua/ru/print/material/5/322.
promotion and protection of investments; provision of support in the integration of the world
trading system; determination of new sources of financing; and the identification and provision
of improved varieties of aid.53
The joint initiative. The ENP is a jointly owned initiative and its implementation requires
action on both sides, by the neighbors and by the EU. The ENP benefits from greater coherence
thanks to the creation of the European External Action Service which supports the High
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the
European Commission Federica Mogherini and the involvement of the Commissioner
specifically dealing with European Neighborhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations
European Neighborhood Policy, Johannes Hahn. Of the 16 ENP countries: 12 are currently are
already fully participating as partners in the ENP, having agreed on ENP action plans.
Algeria is currently negotiating an ENP action plan. Belarus, Libya and Syria remain outside
most of the structures of ENP.
Multilateral partnership. The ENP is chiefly a bilateral policy between the EU and each
partner country. But it is complemented by regional and multilateral cooperation initiatives:
Eastern Partnership (EaP) is a joint initiative involving the EU, its member states and 6 eastern
European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
53
Н. Куликова, Новая Концепция Отношений Между ЕС и Европейскими Государствами, Входящими в
СНГ, Европейский Союз: Факты и Комментария, Moscow, RAU i AEİ, No 32, March 2003-May 2003, p. 8.
The Union for the Mediterranean Partnership promotes economic integration across 15 neighbors
to the EU’s south in North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans region.
Black Sea Synergy – by encouraging cooperation between the countries surrounding the
Black Sea, the synergy offers a forum for tackling common problems while encouraging political
and economic reform.
3.2. The Eastern Partnership (EaP) program: an attempt to deepen relations
The Eastern Partnership is a joint initiative involving the EU, its member states and 6 eastern
European partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The project
was initiated by Poland and a subsequent proposal was prepared in co-operation with Sweden. It
was presented by the foreign ministers of Poland and Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and
External Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008. The Eastern Partnership was
inaugurated by the European Union in Prague, Czech Republic on 7 May 2009. The first meeting
of foreign ministers in the framework of the Eastern Partnership was held on 8 December 2009
in Brussels. It is based on a commitment to the principles of international law and fundamental
values - democracy, the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. It also
encompasses support for a market economy, sustainable development and good governance. The
EU and partner countries leaders meet every other year in Eastern Partnership Summits.
The EU is committed to building strong and mutually beneficial relations with all six
partners, irrespective of their individual level of ambition in their relations with the EU. The
Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (AA/DCFTAs ), concluded
in 2014, have brought the relations between the EU and Georgia, the Republic of Moldova and
Ukraine to a new level. These agreements aim at strengthened political association and economic
integration. They constitute a plan of reforms that will bring the partner countries closer to the
EU by aligning their legislation and standards to those of the EU, and improve peoples' lives in a
tangible way.
A more tailored approach to relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus will help
ensure the inclusive nature of the Eastern Partnership. A new agreement is being negotiated with
Armenia, whose political and economic cooperation with the EU will take account of Armenia's
other international commitments. The EU is also considering entering a closer relationship with
Azerbaijan, to better reflect our respective interests and values. With Belarus, the EU is
deepening its critical engagement in carefully calibrated mutual steps.
The aim is to help partners develop greater resilience in facing the challenges to their
stability. Particular priorities are:
 the rule of law and an independent judiciary
 preventing and tackling corruption
 reforming public administration
 developing an integrated approach to border management
 cooperating with interested partner countries on Common Security and Defense Policy
(CSDP) matters.
 civil protection and disaster management.
 Mobility and people-to-people contacts
 The enhanced mobility of citizens within a secure and well-managed environment
 Moldova - citizens holding biometric passports can travel visa-free to the Schengen area
since April 2014.
 Georgia and Ukraine - the European Commission has recommended introduction of the
visa free regime with the Schengen area.
 Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements in place with Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, allowing for more affordable visas and simpler
application. Negotiations of a similar agreement with Belarus are in final stages.
Market opportunities. The Association Agreements/Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Areas (AA/DCFTAs) provide for a number of actions and instruments meant to boost the trade
between EU and the partner countries concerned. For Georgia and Moldova trade with the EU
registered increasing trends following the provisional application of the free trade areas.
In Ukraine the provisional application of the free trade area started from January 2016. Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine benefit from the EU's DCFTA Facility, focused on support to small and
medium businesses in adapting to the new requirements and increase their exchanges with the
EU. The EU aims at promoting sustainable and inclusive economic development in the partner
countries by improving the business environment and legal certainty. This benefits both local and
European SMEs and businesses, raises their competitiveness, and attracts investment. The EU
has also opened its programme for the Competitiveness of Enterprises and Small and Mediumsized Enterprises (COSME) to participation by partner countries. Moldova is already a full
participant, with Ukraine and Armenia following soon. The EU also aims at promoting the
economic opportunities deriving from the green economy and the cooperation towards
preserving the environment through a sustainable use of the resources and for preventing climate
change. A new area of cooperation was started in November 2015 aimed at harmonising the
Digital Markets between partner countries and the EU.
Interconnections. Improving energy security, including energy infrastructure and enhancing
the energy efficiency is central to EU cooperation. Examples are:new electricity and gas
connections between Romania & Moldova, the Southern Gas Corridor, made possible by
Azerbaijan & other countries. The Eastern Partnership transport network means to facilitate and
improve connections by road, train, sea or plane between the EU and the partner countries,
increasing the sustainability and the safety of all transport modes.
With the development of relations under the framework of the Neighborhoods Policy, the
EU made it clearly understood that the countries of the former Soviet Union which are located in
Europe and are theoretically eligible for membership in the organization should have quite
different mechanisms for the formation of cooperation than those from Africa and Asia that were
also participating in the New Neighborhood Policy. The initiative includes the development of
relations with countries such as Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia.
Since the EU was not ready to begin the process of integration with these countries, it was
necessary to create a framework of relations at a level superior to that of all earlier proposed
programs, while not offering to these states membership in the organization.
As a result of all of these developments, the new Eastern Partnership program was proposed
by Poland with the support of Sweden at the Prague Summit in May 2009. The Eastern
Partnership is an upgraded form of the New Neighborhood Policy. Despite the fact that the
practical main goal of this program, as in the case of the New Neighborhood Policy, is the
export of EU rules and regulations to these countries, this program aimed to reach its goals
without offering the prospect of full membership. This fact is very important because a number
of states associated with the EU within the framework of the partnership have expectations
regarding their full membership in the organization.
In addition, countries such as Ukraine and Georgia are considering cooperation within the
Eastern Partnership as one of the stages towards EU membership. As a consequence, countries
included in the Partnership have seriously criticized this policy, due to the lack of new proposals
and the prospect of membership. This discontent was expressed during the second Eastern
Partnership Summit held in September 2011 in Warsaw. In short, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova
were not satisfied using the terms “neighbor” or “partner”, considering them excessively neutral
and not implying the prospect of integration.
The Eastern Partnership provides opportunities for partner countries to increase political,
economic, and cultural links. The Partnership is intended to help promote political and economic
reforms and assist the countries of the region to move closer to the EU. At its heart lies a shared
commitment to international law and fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law,
and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as commitment to market
economy, sustainable development, and good governance.
In order to achieve the objectives of deepening relations between the parties, the EU offered
policy instruments, a new Association Agreement, and far-reaching integration into the EU
economy by forming the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with partner
states. In addition, this program intends to encourage mobility of partner states’ citizens, and to
this effect the Eastern Partnership initiative offers in its first stage visa facilitation and
readmission agreements, to be followed later by a visa-free regime. It is worth noting that every
partner state conducts negotiations regarding the context of Association Agreements, which
should succeed PCA, on a bilateral basis, defining its priorities in accordance with the national
interests. So it allows countries having the greatest desire for closer cooperation with the EU to
implement it, which does not depend on the situation with other partners. Besides this, the
initiative looks for opportunities to develop more in-depth cooperation in energy security and to
increase financial aid to support economic and social policies, in order to reduce disparities. As a
result, it is expected that the partner country, after successful implementation of the conditions,
should achieve political association and economic integration with the EU.
In short, by the time of the third summit of the Eastern Partnership in Vilnius, the six
countries of the former Soviet Union had advanced different distances in their relationships with
the EU. This is due to the fact that the expectations and desires of these countries were very
different from each other. In more than twenty years since independence, these countries have
progressed quite a long way, which eventually led to distinguishing features to appear between
them.
Such was the situation on the eve of the Vilnius Summit, which was held from November
th
28
th
to 29 , 2013. Without a doubt, the state of affairs and the perceptions of the partner
countries affected the work undertaken and results achieved by this program. Summit results for
partner countries were not identical and each partner country defined its own roadmap in
relations with the EU. Without any doubt, this fact was influenced by several factors: the EU's
readiness to offer a broader perspective to partner countries, besides the correspondence between
the proposals and expectations, and Russia's position.
As a result, only Georgia and Moldova signed Association Agreements, including DCFTAs,
with the EU. Two other countries, Armenia and Ukraine, which originally intended to sign the
agreement, refused to do so literally on the threshold of the summit. Ukraine signed association
agreement with the EU in 2014. Belarus, would not sign any agreements with the EU, due to the
fact that Belarus has close integration with Russia and is a member of the Eurasian Economic
Union with Russia and Kazakhstan. This precluded the possibility of participation in the two
opposing integration processes simultaneously. Belarus in this case has made its choice, and in
relations with the EU, Belarus is interested primarily in enhancing economic cooperation and
obtaining financial aid from the West.
The most pragmatic approach in its relations with the EU position was taken by Azerbaijan.
This country, in pursuing a balanced foreign policy, tried to negotiate appropriate deals without
overestimating their values and opportunities. Taking into account the potential geopolitical
problems that may arise from signing the agreement with the EU, Azerbaijan agreed to limited
cooperation that suits its national interests. The EU and Azerbaijan signed an agreement on visa
facilitation at the Vilnius Summit, and shortly thereafter, on 3 February 2013, the Azerbaijani
parliament ratified the agreement.
In 2016 the European Council adopted a mandate for the European Commission and the
high representative for foreign affairs and security policy to negotiate on behalf of the EU and its
member states, a comprehensive agreement with Azerbaijan. The agreement will follow the
principles endorsed in the 2015 review of the European Neighborhood Policy and offer a
renewed basis for political dialogue and mutually beneficial cooperation between the EU and
Azerbaijan.
As it already mentioned, the main priorities of the EU in South Caucasus are to maintain
stability and to create favorable conditions for the implementation of transport and energy
projects. In order to achieve these goals a regional approach is a key condition. At the same time
the regional approach is the reason that the EU has been unable to achieve its goals in this
region, due to the presence of unresolved conflict. Hence, the EU should actively demonstrate its
political will and make efforts to resolve the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in
the framework of universally recognized norms and principles of international law54.
The EU is aware that in the South Caucasus, there is a problem with the development of the
regional cooperation because of the presence of the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict, as the key threat to security and cooperation in the South Caucasus region. Moreover,
to put pressure on Armenia to withdraw from the occupation of their lands, Azerbaijan intends to
pursue a policy of exclusion of Armenia from regional projects. In this case, for the successful
development of regional cooperation in the South Caucasus, the EU should pursue a policy of
conflict resolution. Only in the case of conflict resolution any cooperation between Azerbaijan
and Armenia is possible.
The EU recognizes the territorial integrity of all three states of the South Caucasus –
Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia within the framework of PIAs, but refrains from direct
54
Mustafayeva, N (2017) Azerbaijan-Europe cooperation: Towards a deeper dialogue // The New Eastern Europe.
URL: http://neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/2258-azerbaijan-europe-cooperation-towards-a-deeperdialogue/
involvement in the resolution of the Armenian-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which
obstructs the development of regional cooperation in the South Caucasus region.
Conclusion
Disintegration of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union coincided with the formation of the
European Union. Simultaneously developing among EU members was the issue of coordinating
a number of areas, including foreign policy. Despite the fact that foreign policy has still not
moved to the supranational level, a general perception was formed in relation to international
events. This played an important role in shaping relations with the member states of the former
Eastern bloc and Soviet Union. Thus, in the newly created EU Common Foreign and Security
Policy, instruments were designated that contributed to the formation of closer relations.
As for the countries of the former Soviet Union, initially no clear policy was formed in the
EU towards this region. Only over time have new legal instruments been established in relation
to the NIS to regulate relations with the countries of the region. The EU perceived a need to
create a new tool was that was not going to offer full membership to the countries of the region.
With the consolidation of statehood of the NIS countries and to enhance the political and
economic capacities of these nations, as well as with the completion of its expansion eastwards,
the EU realized the inadequacy of existing tools and the need to create new ones. The new
objectives would be achieved using such programs as the New Neighborhood and Eastern
Partnership. Nevertheless, even the successful implementation of these programs in the region
held out no hope to the NIS for full membership of the EU. Despite this fact, a number of postSoviet partner states hoped that the prospect of EU membership still existed.
It should be noted that the EU's approach in establishing relationships in the eastward
direction was initially based on a multilateral approach, in which relationships would develop
with a distinct region. Even after the EU developed the New Neighborhood Policy and Eastern
Partnership, this trend has not changed. Regarding the NIS, the six countries of the former Soviet
Union which are located in the Europe – Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Armenia – are viewed as a whole, and the programs offered in relation to them are almost
identical. At the same time, despite the similarity of the used tools, the foreign policy goals that
the EU wants to achieve may be different.
The same approach has been applied to the South Caucasus region. The main priorities of
EU foreign policy in the region were to maintain stability and to create favorable conditions for
the implementation of transport and energy projects. At the same time, in order to achieve these
goals, a regional approach was again used; that is, programs were prepared in the context of the
perception of the South Caucasus as an integral region.
Such a regional approach is one of the reasons that the EU has been unable to achieve its
goals in the South Caucasus. First of all, due to the presence of conflicts, the South Caucasus
does not form a cohesive political or economic region. In this case, in order to apply a regional
approach, the EU should first actively participate in the resolution of those conflicts. However,
the EU chose to step aside from active conflict resolution, preferring to support the initiatives
and actions of other mediators.
In addition, the fragmentation of the South Caucasus is also reinforced by the different
perceptions and capabilities of the region’s three countries. Thus, expectations from the Eastern
Partnership regarding each of the three countries were different.
As a result, among these three South Caucasus countries, only Georgia has signed
Association Agreements, in the hope of more in-depth cooperation and further integration with
the EU. Armenia abandoned from the desire to form the relations with the EU within the
framework of the Eastern Partnership, preferring the other integration process – Eurasian
Economic Union. Azerbaijan’s desire for participation in the EU integration processes is directly
related to the appropriateness of any delegation of political and economic sovereignty in
accordance with its national interests. The Eastern Partnership does not offer such a format,
whereby the interests of Azerbaijan may be achieved within the realities of the geopolitical
situation in which this country is situated. This is why Azerbaijan prefers multilateral programs
to bilateral development of relations, defining the scope of its involvement according to areas in
which the EU and Azerbaijan have mutual interests. Through the development and strengthening
of relations in technical fields, in the long term there is the possibility of a spillover effect into
cooperation in other areas of activity between the parties.
In general, it is worth declaring that political and economic realities in the South Caucasus
region must be acknowledged, forcing the EU to review its holistic approach in its foreign
policy. This will deepen relations through showing willingness to develop more effective levers
of policy implementation and readiness to participate more actively as a regional actor in the
events taking place in the South Caucasus.