April 1 2015
Political Studies Association 2015 Annual Conference (Sheffield, UK)
Political dynamics of Mozambican economic growth strategy without
natural resources development and its implications on applying East Asian
developmental state model to Africa 1
Hye-lim Yoo (Seoul National University)
I. Introduction
This study proposes to show why Mozambique, where natural resource is abundant, has chosen heavy
chemical industry manufacture as its economic development strategy. To be more specific, the study
tries to explain why democratized Mozambican government FRELIMO (Frente de Libertação de
Moçambique. Mozambique Liberation Front) after 1994, who faced a strong opposition party
RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. Mozambican National Resistance) based on rural
farms and mines, has nurtured manufacturing industry in Southern capital urban region which was
already overdeveloped. At the same stance, the study also aims to examine why the Mozambican
government selected long-term and relatively low rent-seeking growth strategy through heavy
chemical industrial development rather than natural resources development. The study focuses on
historical legacy of Mozambique from pre-colonial age to the present that has allowed governmental
capacity to lead its own industrial policy.
Why Mozambique?
Many scholars have been doubtful that Sub-Saharan Africa would achieve both political stability and
economic development at the same time due to its high level of political, economic, social instability
such as governmental and bureaucratic corruptions, weak economic and social infrastructures, states
isolated from societies, and ethnic or religious conflicts. Nonetheless, Mozambique enjoys relatively
stable political circumstances after 1994 democratization and continuously high level of economic
growth since early 2000s. 2 It is still a poor country, but in 2000s it keeps showing 6~8% economic
growth rate (see . In 2011, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasted Mozambique would
become one of the world’s top 10 fastest growing economies for next five years. Mozambique seems
it fulfils IMF’s expectations as it marked 8.3% GDP growth in 2014. The amount of GDP in 2014 was
almost four times larger than in the immediate post-independence period.
1
This paper is not a complete research. Please do not quote or circulate. Contact: [email protected]
In 1994, Mozambique held the first democratic election. Although the ruling party since independence of 1976,
FRELIMO, won again, the opposition party accepted the result with “politeness” in peace. International election
monitoring agencies reported that the elections were fair enough although several wrongdoings were found such
as representativeness problem due to significant disparities between the central and local governments. At the
same time, meaningful political trade-off between FRELIMO and RENAMO has been detected in several ways
2
even if FRELIMO has never been overthrown or defeated in elections (Castel-Branco et al. 2001; 왕선애
2007). In 2012, Global Peace Index ranked Mozambique as the 48th peaceful nation in the world (South Korea
was 42nd) (전혜린 and 장종문 2012, 17) .
1
Index
Units
(Year measured)
(Scales)
GDP
USD
(2012)
(Billions)
GDP per capita
USD
(2010)
GDP Growth rate
Percent
(2012)
Change
Inflation, average
Percent
consumer prices
Change
(2012)
Current account
Percent
balance
of GDP
(2011)
General
government net
Percent
lending/borrowing of GDP
(2012)
Population
Persons
(2010)
(Millions)
1980*
1983*
1987*
1994*
2000*
2004*
2006
2008
2010
2012
2014
4.6
3.3
2.4
2.2
4.1
5.7
7.2
10.0
9.6
14.3
17.4
370
243
168
139
229
279
334
437
399
567
655
4.2
-15.7
14.7
6.16
1.5
7.9
8.7
6.9
7.1
7.2
8.3
2
28.2
164.1
63.1
12.7
12.6
13.2
10.3
12.7
2.1
5.6
-8.2
-13.3
-19.2
-14.7
-17.9
-11.6
-8.6
-12.9
-11.7
-45.6
-42.8
-1.5
-15.8
-7.2
-5.4
-1.7
-4.4
-4.1
-2.5
-4.3
-4.0
-12.4
12.5
13.5
143.
16.0
18.3
20.4
21.6
22.8
24.0
25.2
26.5
. <Table 1> Macro-economic indicators of Mozambique
Source: International Monetary Fund (2014), “World Economic Outlook Database 2004”
Note 1: GDP is converted according to the exchange rate of Mozambican metical (MZM) on US dollars each year.
2
However, although it is remarkable that Mozambique, one of the poorest countries, keeps
growing rapidly in 2000s, this kind of story is not brand new in sub–Saharan Africa. Great economic
potential of those countries have been mentioned in various ways by many sources such market
analysts, journalism, and academics. Mozambique became a typical of those countries. With its
political stability, relatively low ethnic or religious conflicts, proximity to South Africa, long coast
toward the Indian Ocean, vast cultivable land, and abundant natural resources, it seems natural to take
Mozambique as a rock star when we discuss about Africa’s way to develop in 2000s.
What is so interesting and special about Mozambique is not about its rapid economic
development, but its strategy choice on development path. Despite Mozambique has abundant natural
resources and favorable conditions to agriculture – agriculture used to be the biggest industrial sector
and the biggest export item, it chose non-natural resources development strategy. To be more specific,
it highly depends on manufacture product export through Mega-project. The Mozambican government
enticed Mozal, an aluminum smelting company. It became one of the super-excellent corporations in
African with a net profit of 4000 million US dollars. With several mega projects and political stability,
Mozambique is the 6th biggest economy in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP; World Bank). This certainly
differentiates Mozambique to other natural resource abundant sub-Saharan Africa countries which
have been suffered from severe rest-seeking behaviors. Contrast to those countries, Mozambique has
been safe from ‘the trap of natural resources’.
Is Mozambican experience applicable to other sub-Saharan countries? To induce a comparative
implication from Mozambican case, it is important to provide the context of policy decision-making.
Unfortunately, only few academic scholars discuss about how Mozambique’s preference on
manufacture-oriented economic development strategy economic has been formed. Most studies about
Mozambique are limited to examine its industrialization process or determinants for economic success.
Their studies of course contribute to understand general factors of Mozambican political economy,
however, it does not explain why Mozambique chose this kind of path and its success can be
replicable for other sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, this study tries to show how decision makers’
policy preferences have been formed and have appeared in policy. To achieve this aim, the study will
describe how historical legacy of Mozambique such as industrial structure under the Portuguese
colonial rules and close relationship with South African and the Britain have affected on its nonnatural resource economic development strategy.
This study is expected to contribute theoretical development of historical institutionalism and provide
applicable economic development model to sub-Saharan Africa and any other underdeveloped states.
Finally, the study suggests overcoming contention between 1st industry- and 2nd industry-oriented
development strategy by reflecting each state’s institutional context.
II. Approaches
1. Overcoming Dichotomized Development Strategy of Sub-Saharan Africa
Between natural resource exploitation and manufacture-oriented industrialization, what is more
suitable development strategy for Africa? This has been a long debate among not only Africa
specialist but many political economists.
Scholars such as Owens and Wood (1997) and Wood and Mayer (2001) argue that primary food
3
production and natural resource development are more advantageous to sub-Saharan Africa as usual.
For improvement, they suggest industrialization of agribusiness. Owens and wood (1997) broad
concept of industrialization beyond manufacture sector. They argue that as Africa have vast cultivable
lands and natural resources, industrializing primary food process and mine exploitation would give
them more competiveness in global markets than East Asian style manufacture industrialization.
Wood and Mayer (2001) add more reasons why sub-Saharan Africa should concentrate more on
utilize its raw an crude materials: unskillful human resources, increasing low-price merchandise in
global manufacture market, and strong export competiveness of Southeast Asia.
This approach helps us to understand current Africa economic structure. The problem is,
however, these scholars confer hierarchy of state in global economic structure and consider subSaharan Africa as understrappers. According to them, the countries lack of cultivable lands or natural
resources would face severe challenge to achieve economic development. This view not only neglects
Africa’s undiscovered economic potential, but fails to explain how a country like Rwanda – small,
unfavorable for primary commodity production, and lack of natural resources – was able to achieve
significant economic growth based on IT industrial development. Moreover, the approach can not
explain how a country like Mozambique chose manufacture-oriented economic growth strategy.
In the meantime, scholars such as Lall and Latsch (1999) and Stein (2003) argue that
manufacture industrialization is the very strategy to achieve fundamental change of African economic
structure. In other words, by establishing industrial policies, African states can minimize structural,
technological, infrastructural, and institutional constraints that they would face in global manufacture
market (Warren-Rodriguez 2010, 172). Then, backed by the industrial policies, they would produce
more delicate goods to gain more competiveness. Nonetheless, as we have observed so often in subSaharan Africa, manufacture industrialization is not always coupled with national development. Even
successful industrialization is not guaranteed because African states are usually short or lack of
capacity to resolve constraints they would face on the way to enrich manufacture.
In sum, the debate over which industry is more appropriate to deliver economic development in Africa
ignores institutional context of each country. It also generalizes sub-Saharan Africa as one entity and
possibly misunderstands outcomes of such growth strategy. In case of Mozambique, it seems to be a
good example to confirm the superiority of manufactural industrialization, however, in reality, it faces
worsened disparities between the rich and the poor, urban and rural, and regions. 3 Therefore, before
examining outcomes of Mozambican economic policy, clarifying mechanism and causes of this
dualism should be preceded. In addition, analyzing Mozambique would be helpful to design a new
perspective on development path debate as it chose manufacture-oriented industrialization rather than
enhancing its traditional industry or dig up natural resources.
2. Growth Strategy Decision-Making Process: Endogenous rather than Exogenous
(to be updated)
3. Importance of Historical Legacies
(to be updated)
3
The disparities will be more discussed in Chapter 3.
4
III. History Legacy
Development Strategy
of
Mozambique
and
Non-Natural
Resource
1. Historical Legacy of Mozambique
1) Geopolitical Conditions: Colonial Rule and Disparity of the South and Mid/North
<Feature 1> Map of Mozambique
Source: Worldatlas website
As we can see on <Feature 1>, Mozambique is next to South Africa, the most developed country in
Africa, with long coastline on the Indian Ocean. Its economy has been largely incorporated into South
Africa and all neighboring countries were under British colonial rule. Therefore, although
Mozambique was under Portuguese colonial rule, it has a close political and economic relationship
with the Britain. The Capital of Mozambique is located in the southern end of the land. Once it had
been located on middle part to maximize effective trade with neighbor states and local governance,
but Portugal colonial rule moved it to current location, Maputo, for its proximity to South Africa and
favorable conditions for exports via the Indian Ocean.
The land of Mozambique is extended from North and South. Most cultivable land and natural
resources are located in mid and northern part. Agriculture is possible in the southern part too, but
fertility of the land is relative low and agrarian land is also limited. This means that, traditionally, the
civilization was built around agrarian area in mid and northern region, and big cities were established
along with the coastline. The current capital, Maputo, is a port at the southernmost. It had been
recognized tis significance until Portugal colonial rule. In colonial time, after the capital had been
relocated to Maputo, it immediately became a key economic point for Mozambique and neighboring
states. South Africa, Botswana, and Zimbabwe used Maputo port for trades with the Middle East and
Asia. Enormous inputs of South Africa’s economic powers changed the economic structure of
Mozambique fundamentally: imbalance developments of region.
Capitals were so concentrated to the south that income disparity between regions increased.
Southern part became political and economic central and attracted more capital and human resources.
Due to lack of roads to connect south and middle/ north, the regional disparities grow significantly
after the independence. Although recent human poverty index amid regions became more leveled off,
most GDP contribution is come from the south, especially, Maputo city (UNDP 2006).
The geopolitical aspects of Mozambique not only brought imbalance development between the south
and the non-south, but also provided favorable circumstances to upbridge manufacture industries in
5
<Feature 3> GDP contribution by regions
(2000~2004)
Source: UNDP (2006, 28)
<Feature 2> Human Poverty Index by Region
(1997~2003)
Source: UNDP (2006, 25)
South. Because not only cultivable land and natural resources were concentrated in mid and north
regions, but also factories of South Africa gathered to southern Mozambique for its low land rent and
cheap labor, manufacture industry could be built in Maputo. Moreover, white Portuguese from poor
and rural Portugal came into southern Mozambique looking for jobs. Concentration of white
immigrants onto southern cities accelerated expansion and industrialization of the south. 4 One of the
reasons that manufacture industry was underdeveloped in non-southern areas was that these regions
were more favorable to other industries such as agriculture and mining. Another reason was lack of
production network as most neighbors of mid or northern Mozambique such as Zimbabwe, Malawi,
and Tanzania were low industrialized countries.
Mozambique’s geopolitical characteristic also influenced central authority over the south and
middle/north. The central authority was well accepted in southern parts where the capital was located,
but not in the middle and north. Therefore, traditional regional leaders took important roles in the
middle and the north. Under the colonial rule, they were the real authorities in mid and northern
regions, and then after the independence, they became the center of supporting resistance (RENAMO)
against the central dictatorship. The next clause will discuss more details about several results from
those Mozambican geopolitical factors such as Regulado system by Portugal colonial rule, pre- and
post- democratization and privatization.
2) Limited Central Authority over the Local and Civil War: South-Centered
Industrialization and Northern Regions and Non-Natural Resources Development
The post-independence relationship between the central and the local in Mozambique can be traced
from the pre-colonial period. Traditional local leaders performed as a central authority over the region.
However, under the Portuguese colonial rule, as the capital was moved to the south, power vacuums
were appeared in the middle and northern regions. Unlike British or French, Portuguese colonial
4
Imbalanced industrialization in southern parts deepened Mozambique’s economic dependency on South Africa.
6
administrative capacity was not assertive. Several reasons can be stated as: Portugal was
inexperienced in terms of colonization; had only few colonies; was suffered from its own domestic
issues; finally, Portugal itself did not have sophisticated political or economic system (왕선애 2007).
To overcome its lack of capacity, Portuguese authorities in Mozambique established one unique
indirect control system called “Regulado.” Regulado can be referred to as a combined result of
geopolitical aspects of Mozambique and Portugal’s lack of capacity. At first it was designed to impose
taxation and forced labor more effectively by hiring traditional Mozambican local leaders so called
“Regulo” as local administrative authorities. The appointed Regulo and native Mozambican junior
officers usually obeyed to the colonial rule and reigned over Mozambican local people (왕선애 2007,
57). Most farmers understood Regulos as who had legitimacy and traditional African authorities
(Alexander 1994). Regulo performed huge influence especially in middle and northern parts because
the central authority of Portuguese colonial government could not be perpetuated.
Regulado system enormously affected post-independent Mozambique in politics, economics,
and society, too. Regulos had never tried to organize themselves as an independent political force.
However, they had been influential to the middle and northern regions and, more significantly, they
became major supporters of anti-government army, RENAMO. For more details, we need to look at
the independence process of Mozambique.
Mozambique achieved relatively peaceful independence in 1976 because the Portuguese colonial
administration withdrew in sudden as a coup d’état occurred in mainland Portugal. Portuguese
political and economic systems were not so well established that it was forced to give up a large part
of the colony. It was FRELIMO which Portuguese turned over the reins of government. Immediately
FRELIMO declared a socialist Mozambique under a one party system. Other independence forces in
Mozambique expressed disagreements, but the influence was insignificant. 5 Therefore, there was no
significant anti-government in the immediate post-independence.
However, the government of South Africa was no so happy with what was going on in
Mozambique. When Mozambique celebrated a government ruled by the black, South Africa’s white
government was struggling with increased anger from the black communities along with Mandela.
The South Africa administration feared if the black socialist government in neighbor would have
encouraged anti-apartheid movement (왕선애 2007). In hence, the South African government started
pushing Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) to support another independence group in Mozambique, RENAMO, as
an anti-government force. RENAMO were widely supported by many neglected or isolated groups
after the independence such as Regulo, elites and riches in the middle and northern parts, and rural
peasants. Immedately, it became huge opposition group against FRELIMO.
After the independence, the socialist FRELIMO was unstable in many ways. Administrative
skills were extremely poor because Portuguese colonial administration left without sharing or
handover of governing skills. During the 15-year-long civil war, most state administration did not
work. Things were even worse in the middle and northern parts. Regulo was more influential than the
central governments, and RENAMO took those regions as their military bases. The central
government faced serious difficulties to access to the mid and north that hindered to pursue organized
rural or natural resource development policies. For example, if a government planned to a mine in a
certain region, the local and RENAMO got together to attack the authorities from the central
government or even exploded the cave gate.
5
Relatively late development of nationalism in Mozambique was one of the reasons why Mozambican
independence forces except FRELIMO were not recognized very much. Mozambican nationalism was delayed
because Portugal had not performed discrimination policy over different ethnic groups (왕선애 2007, 64-66).
7
As a result, the central government had not many choices except concentrating ono southern
area development.
3) Close Relationship between the Britain/ the Commonwealth
The close relationship with the Britain is one of the key historical legacies to understand current
Mozambique. In 1995, a year after its democratization and privatization, Mozambique voluntarily
joined to the Commonwealth. It has been the only case a country which has never been under British
colonial rule nor used English as an official language become a member of the Commonwealth. This
is very exceptional. Recently Mozambican case was regarded as an important criterion for entry
conditions of the Commonwealth (McIntyre 2008).
The close relationship between two countries is based on geopolitical conditions of colonial
Mozambique. It was surrounded by six British colonies and Portugal was in limit of ruling capacity.
The middle and northern regions were not only far from the central to rule over effectively, Portugal
was in poor financial conditions and lack of human resources to manage them (왕선애 2007). In
hence, the Portugal colonial government turned over rights to control of plantations of sugar cane or
cashew to British or French capitals. Those British and French now became not only managers but
owners of essential economic resources of colonial Mozambique.
Moreover, Portugal was also lack of capacity to arrange fianancial system in Mozambique while
the British hold real power with advanced financial institutions and plentiful capital (Pitcher 2002; 왕
선애 2007). Most major banks during the colonial time were British and yielded more British
influence over Mozambican economy. Economic administrative vacancy after Portugal’s leave was
filled with British corporations and financial agencies.
Mozambique was important to the Britain in several ways. Rhodesia, a neighbor and landlocked
country, exported 2/3 of total amounts of goods via Mozambique (Akinriande 1992). Around
Mozambican independence, the white governor of Rhodesia, Ian Smith, declared independence
against the Britain, so it was important for the British government to have friendly relations with the
FRELIMO of Mozambique to cut off any cooperation with Smith. Close cooperation between
FRELIMO and the Britain became more sincere by each other’s call. As many fianancial institutions
and agencies had been from the Britain, FRELIMO often asked advices or discusses about economic
policies. High economic dependency on South African also increased political and economic intimacy
between two countries. As we are going to discuss in the next clause, this intimacy between
Mozambique and the Britain played significant role on democratization and privatization in
Mozambique.
2. Path-Dependency of Non-Natural Resources Development after Democratization and
Privatization in Mozambique
1) Democratization and Privatization in 1994, and Increased Demand on Natural Resource
Development
By constitutional reform in 1994, FRELIMO reformed political and economic system massively. The
socialist FRELIMO declared democratization with multi parties and privatization of liberalizing many
state assets in peace. Several factors influenced this declaration. First of all, economic failure such as
rural collapse and severe poverty of the mid and north increased anti-governmental sentiments. In
8
1980s several side effects of centralized system appeared and demands for democratization and
localizing increased. Since moderate Joaquin Chissano became the President was elected in1986,
Mozambique became more pro-western and shed off the Marx-Leninism. However, this kind of
arrangement could not spread over the whole country during the civil war. Fortunately, when
FRELIMO realized they were in trouble, RENAMO also indicated they would have not been able to
reign over through violence (왕선애 2007, 100). International society was also concerned to achieve
peaceful resolution in late 1980s. Finally, in 1992, FRELIMO and RENOMO agreed to end the war.
In 1994, the first democratic election was held in peace and spurred privatizations.
In early 1990s, Mozambique ended the civil war, abandoned socialism, turned toward democracy and
market economy. There have been several Presidential and Parliament elections. FRELIOMO has
always been both ruling and majority party. However, we could detect check and balance from
Parliament composition. From the first Parliamentary election, out of 250 seats, FRELIMO won 129
seats while RENAMO wons 112. Voting turn out showed economic disparities between regions: south
and urban for FRELIMO; mid/ north and rural for RENAMO(Insituto Nacional de Estatistica 1997,
51; 왕선애 2007, 107).
To manage economic disparity and to compete strong alignment toward RENAMO in the middle
and northern parts, the FRELIMO government needed to took care of the region more than ever. The
regions were even worth to develop as they were natural resources abundant and lands were fertile.
Nonetheless, post-1994 dependent economic plans of Mozambique tended to focus even more on
manufacture industrialization in urban south rather than building infrastructure in non-south. These
industrializations, so called mega-projects, were accompanied with massive foreign debt or
investment. All the plans for rural empowerment were not funded as much as manufacturing around
the capital. Until late 2000s, the rural development or mining industries have not received enough
attentions from the governments.
2) Manufacture-oriented Urban Industrialization
Mozambican choice on industrialization via urban manufacture development is exceptional
growth strategy in Africa, especially one with plentiful natural resources. At the same time, this is
natural with Mozambican historical legacies.
First of all, the governments had no choice because infrastructures for industrialization in mid
and north were too poor. Roads were not enough to connect cities to ports and electricity providing
system was almost not established. One example is Mozal, the aluminum smelting factory. The Mozal
Company is one of the biggest contributors of recent economic development in Mozambique. To run
the factory, it required enormous amounts of electricity. In northern Mozambique, there is one big
hydraulic power plant which could provide enough electricity, but there was almost no infrastructure
such as roads to deliver in raw materials and out aluminum bulk to the ports. There was no electricity
transportation either. No ports were managed good enough to handle natural resource exports.
Therefore, Mozal is built in Maputo province near the capital. The electricity is imported from South
African in low price. In other words, the government of Mozambique was looking for a economic
development through active foreign investment attraction. The south must have looked more rational
and attractive with its accumulated industrialization infrastructure.
Secondly, South Korea’s preference was reflected on Mozambicna economic policy because the
southern part was highly dependent to South African economy. There were various kinds of South
Africa related corporations in south. Therefore, as these corporations tried to expand or to diverse
products, or to look for high value added under the new privatized Mozambique, capital and human
resources were increased rapidly. The geological proximity with South Africa also contributed the
9
dependency.
Thirdly, Britain’s advice on economic strategies was influential Mozambique’s faith in Britain
can be traced back to 1980s when socialist economy was on crisis (. Since mid-1980s, the
Mozambican governments actively communicated with the Commonwealth, and even in 1995, they
joined it voluntarily (Akinrinade 1992; Collinge 1996; Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation 1991; Manning 2002; McIntyre 2008; Power 2009). The Britain, as well as other Western
states, has intervened natural resource development if Africa. At the same time, it has seen how the
developments has caused various kinds of side effects such as only few power elites monopolize the
profit which is supposed to support the domestic economy. Countries with affluent natural resources
such as Nigeria, DR Congo, Kenya, and Tanzania, have been suffered from severe rent-seeking.
Therefore, the Britain is supposed to recommend East Asian style manufacture-oriented economic
growth strategy rather than primary industry.
IV. Conclusion
(to be updated)
10
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