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Department/Interdisciplinary Programme
Academic year 2016 - 2017
Course title
International Negotiations
SP082 - Spring - 6 ECTS
PROFESSOR
Cédric Dupont
Cé[email protected]
Office: MdP-P2-634
Phone: +4122 908 62 50
Course Description
Negotiation is ubiquitous in international affairs. It is used
to address situations of acute tensions between actors as
well as situations of standard policy making episodes. This
course aims at giving students a range of analytical tools
(formal and informal) to understand negotiation dynamics
between different configurations of actors and then to test
their ability to apply them in selected case studies as well
as in a role-play simulation. Priority will be given to recent
or on-going negotiation challenges and processes in
domains such as international trade and investment,
environmental issues, as well as within the European Union.
Syllabus
Prerequisite and requirements
This class is designed for MIS/ PhD students in political science but is open to MIS students from other
disciplines as well as to MDEV and MIA students upon seat availability (max number of participants is 25).
There are no prerequisites for this course but we expect students to be ready to decipher and experiment
negotiation. I envision this course as a kind of laboratory in which students will not only be pushed to think of
negotiation dilemmas and potential solutions on ongoing cases but also experiment with negotiation both in
small group exercises and in a six-hours long, intensive, simulation modeled along those used in our executive
programmes. It is therefore a course that will require intense participation and significant applied research work
on unsolved issues and processes.
As for requirements, students are evaluated both for individual and for group work. Individually, they must write
two short reaction papers (1000 words long) on part 1 on the course, and two analytical briefs (2000 words long)
on the negotiation cases in part 2. Collectively, they must submit a group work at the end of part 1 (2000 words
long) and participate actively in the final simulation, which includes preparatory written work. Grades for the
class will be determined as follows: 10% for each of the reaction papers, 20% for the analytical briefs, and 20%
for each of the two group works.
Reaction papers respond to one of the discussion questions for a given week of class. They should demonstrate
a good understanding of the content of the reading as well as evidence of critical thinking on those in line with
the chosen question. Analytical briefs provide personal, informed, views on unsolved, selected challenges in
ongoing negotiation cases. Given that things will continue to evolve on those cases until time of discussion in
class, the specific choice of the selected challenges will be made later on with an advance notice of 2-3 weeks.
The group work at the end of part 1 consists in an evaluation of two recently concluded agreements and of the
processes that lead to them. It aims at assessing the extent to which one can draw lessons from a “getting it
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right” perspective. Group work composition and the choice of the agreements will be communicated on March
30 and the assignment due on April 27.
Readings
There is no required textbook to purchase for this class although you may want to explore the following ones:
Dixit, Avinash K. and Barry J. Nalebuff 2008. The Art of Strategy. New York, Norton: a brilliant, ingenious, and
(above all) fun book that you will continue to enjoy for a long time. I simply wish I could one day write such a
book! It is a major revision, and extension, of Thinking Strategically first published in 1991.
Raiffa, Howard 2007. Negotiation Analysis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press. A thought stimulating book for
those who want a more technical, although still very accessible, text on decision analysis and negotiation.
Course material also includes some recent articles in the field of international relations that use game-theoretic
settings.
Given the lab orientation of this class, I do expect students to carefully go through the assigned readings before
coming to class so as to have the most hands on discussion as possible in class.
Course schedule, topics and required readings (subject to changes)
1. Teaser: What is negotiation and how to prepare for it? (Feb. 23)
No reading.
We will make use of a video on a real case of international negotiation to parse out selected dimensions of
international negotiation processes.
Part 1: Developing the analytical toolbox
2. Inspiration from some foundational work (March 2 and 9)
Cross, John 1977. Negotiation as a Learning Model. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21(4): 581-606.
Iklé, Fred 1964. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Harper and Row. (one or two chapters)
McKersie, Robert et al 1965. Intraorganizational bargaining in labor negotiations. Journal of Conflict Resolution
9(4): 463-481.
Schellling, Thomas 1956. An Essay on Bargaining The American Economic Review, 46(3): 281-306
3. Unpacking the set-up: parties, issues, interests and the sequence (March 9)
Lax, David and James Sebenius 2006. 3D Negotiation. Chap. 1-3
Zartman, William 1977 Negotiation as a Joint Decision-Making Process. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 21(4):
619-638.
NO CLASS ON MARCH 16
4. Power dynamics: coalitions and linkages (March 23)
Narlikar, Amrita (2009), A Theory of Bargaining Coalitions, in: Amrita Narlikar / Brendan Vickers (eds.),
Leadership and Change in the Multilateral Trading System, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff
Narlikar, Amrita / Odell, John (2006), The Strict Distributive Strategy for a Bargaining Coalition: the Like Minded
Group and the World Trade Organization, in: John Odell (ed.), Negotiating Trade; Developing Countries
in the WTO & NAFTA, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Post, Paul 2012. Does Issue Linkage Work? Evidence from European Alliance Negotiations, 1860 to 1945,
International Organization, 66(2): 277-310
Sebenius, James К. 1983. Negotiation Arithmetic: Adding and Subtracting Issues and Parties. International
Organization 37 (2):281-316
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5. Processes under influence: interest groups, voters, and bureaucrats (March 30)
Betsill, Michele M. and Elisabeth Corell 2001. NGO Influence in International Environmental Negotiations: A
Framework for Analysis, Global Environmental Politics, 1(4): 65-85
Elsig, Manfred and Cédric Dupont 2012. “European Union meets South Korea: Bureaucratic Interests, Exporter
Discrimination and the Negotiations of Trade Agreements,” Journal of Common Market Studies 50 (3),
pp. 492-507.
Janusch, Holger 2016 The breakdown of international negotiations: social conflicts , audience costs and
reputation in two-level games. International negotiation 21: 495-520.
Putnam, Robert D. 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games. International
organization 42(3): 427-46
6. The role and impact of information and knowledge (April 6)
Dupont, Cédric and Pascal Sciarini 2001. Seeds of discord: agriculture and the Uruguay Round. Geneva: HEI,
ms.
Haas, Ernst 1990. When Knowledge is Power. Berkeley: UC Press. Chap. 1-2
Stasavage, David 2004. Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining,
International Organization 58(4): 667-703
COMPOSITION OF GROUPS AND ASSIGNMENT FOR GROUP WORK DISTRIBUTED ON MARCH 30
7. Cognitive quagmires: subjectivity and biases (April 13)
Albin, Cecilia 2015. The many faces of justice in international negotiation. International Negotiation 20: 41-58.
Dupont, Cédric, Beverelli Cosimo and Stéphanie Pézard (2006). “Learning in multilateral trade negotiations:
some results from simulation for developing countries,” in Developing Countries and the Trade
Negotiation process, edited by John Odell (Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 145-174.
Malothra, Deepak and Max Bazerman 2008. Psychological Influence in Negotiation. Journal of Management
34(3): 509-531.
Olekalns, Mara and Daniel Druckman 2014. With Feeling: How emotions shape negotiation. Negotiation
Journal: 455-478
GROUP WORK ON PART 1 DUE NO LATER THAN APRIL 27
Part II: Negotiation Lab
8. “Three Level Game Dynamics:” Focal point CETA (April 27)
The European Union and Canada haven negotiated for more than seven years (2009-2016) a comprehensive
economic and trade agreement (CETA). The agreement was signed on October 30, 2016 and should be
endorsed by the European Parliament in February 2017. Yet, full ratification will require the endorsement of the
Parliament of each EU member state and will therefore not be completed by the end of this course. We will use
this case to explore the complexity of interactions between the international level (Canada and EU in this case)
and the domestic level (in this case both intra-EU and intra each member state) with references to other
ongoing cases. So as to ensure the most up-to-date material, the reading list on CETA will be made available
later (end of March 2017)
9. “How to prepare for complex negotiation:” Focal point Brexit (May 4)
On June 23, 2016, British citizens voted in favor of an exit from the European Union. According to EU treaties
this requires a negotiation process initiated by a formal request submitted by the British government and that
could last up to two years (art. 50 of the Treaty on European Union). As this request should be submitted in the
coming weeks, speculations on the negotiation to come are pretty intense. This session will use this case to
explore the important issue of how to prepare for complex negotiations, with an assessment of how both parties
(UK and EU) stand at the moment of the class session. So as to ensure the most up-to-date material, the
reading list for this session will be made available later (end of March 2017).
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10-11-12. It is your turn (May 12 (Friday)) (9:00 – 15:00 non stop; AJF room on Barton site)
This is a six-hours long session that simulates an international negotiation process with participants acting in
groups in light of reaching (or not) an agreement. Preparatory instructions and work will be distributed 3-5 days
ahead of the simulation. Participation to this simulation is mandatory, without any exception accepted.
Please do not register to this class if you cannot commit to this simulation. The instructor is aware that
this may mean that you will have to skip one session of another class but this can be arranged well ahead of
time with the other instructors.
13. Wrap-Up (May 18)
In this session, we will debrief extensively on the simulation and on possible next steps for work on ongoing
negotiation challenges.
CD, February 2017
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