Child maintenance charging

Child maintenance charging: evidence summary for
the 30-month review
September 2016
Child maintenance is a vital source of income for separated families. The risk of poverty for
children in single parent households is almost twice that for children in couple parent
households1 – maintenance is therefore of particular importance to single parent families.
Child maintenance alone lifts a fifth of low income single parent families out of poverty. 2
When welfare support is being withdrawn and child poverty predicted to dramatically
increase, it is more important than ever that children do not miss out on financial support.
Why reform?
Since 2012, the UK child maintenance system has been undergoing significant reform. The
reforms are based on the idea that ‘behavioural change’ is needed to encourage
separating parents to make private arrangements (‘family-based arrangements’ (FBAs)) or,
at the very least, direct payments within the statutory service (‘Direct Pay’; see box), to:
 Encourage more collaborative relationships between separated parents
 Deliver a more efficient and effective statutory service “to those who really need it”. 3
The new child maintenance system
 Child Maintenance (CM) Options: A telephone and web-based information service to
help make informed choices about maintenance, opened 2008 as an optional service
 Child Maintenance Service (CMS): The new statutory system, opened in limited form
in December 2012 and to all new cases from November 2013, replacing the Child
Support Agency (CSA)
 ‘Direct Pay’: After the CMS calculates how much should be paid, payments are
made directly (eg by direct debit); the CMS does not check if payment is made
 ‘Collect and Pay’: The CMS collects maintenance on behalf of the receiving parent –
cases are transferred from Direct Pay if a receiving parent notifies the CMS that
Direct Pay maintenance has not been paid and certain conditions are not met
Key reforms since 2012
 Compulsory CM Options contact before applying to the statutory service (CMS) – a
“mandatory gateway conversation” to ensure FBAs are considered
 A £20 application fee to use the new ‘light touch’ CMS, to encourage FBAs rather
than a statutory arrangement
 Collect and Pay charges (paying parents pay 20 per cent on top of maintenance paid
and receiving parents deducted 4 per cent of money received) to encourage Direct
Pay compliance (and therefore Direct Pay use)
 The phased closure of all Child Support Agency (CSA) cases by the end of 2017.
1
DWP (2016) Households below average income (HBAI): 1994/95 to 2014/15.
Bryson, C. et al. (2013) Kids aren't free: the child maintenance arrangements of single parents on benefit in 2012 , London:
Nuffield Foundation.
3
DWP (2014) Child maintenance reforms evaluation strategy.
2
September 2016
30-month review
The Welfare Reform Act 2012 commits the government to reviewing the impact of charging
30 months after it was introduced – the review is due to be completed by December 2016.
There is still some way to go before the current reform programme is complete. A large
cohort of parents is yet to be affected by charging, due to ongoing CSA case closure.
Cases still to be closed are those most in need of the statutory service, and therefore most
likely to be affected by reforms. As a result, the 30-month review provides an opportunity
for reflection and early learning, but the full impact of the reforms is yet to be seen.
Gingerbread’s evidence on the impact of charging
Our evidence to inform the review draws on analysis of DWP data and qualitative feedback
from Gingerbread’s ongoing data collection exercises with single parents. Qualitative
feedback is illustrative rather than statistically representative; we focus on key emerging
themes and nuances not revealed by the DWP’s largely quantitative evaluation data.
Gingerbread will follow up this evidence with further research to explore the impact of
reforms in more depth, for a report to be published at the end of 2016.
Key findings
Charging has little impact on encouraging FBAs or collaboration
 The annual rate of FBAs after calling CM Options has remained unchanged at 12 per
cent in 2014/15 and 2015/16
 There is little evidence that Direct Pay encourages collaboration in itself, calling into
question the purpose of Collect and Pay charges – direct payment can in fact be
intrusive and increase tension between parents; worse, it can mask domestic abuse.
Charges are an unfair and unequal barrier to access a necessary
statutory service
“I would have loved to have just stuck to a FBA, which failed due to the actions
of the [other parent]…I have to take a hit because of his non-compliance”
 Charges are inherently unfair to receiving parents, penalising them for paying parents’
non-compliance; parents do not choose to enter the statutory service or use Collect and
Pay lightly, but out of necessity – yet they are now expected to pay for both
 The application fee is a particular barrier for single parents on low incomes, who can find
it hard to afford – some have to postpone applying, forgoing maintenance
 The fee is also a barrier to those with an understandable lack of trust and expectations
regarding the statutory service – namely those who have had a poor experience and/or
complex case with the CSA, who are reluctant to pay for a service that may not deliver.
Domestic abuse is poorly recognised and dealt with within the CMS
“[My] ex-husband …wants to pay by standing order …which I didn't want to do
as he isn't allowed any contact with myself or his children”
Child maintenance charging: evidence summary for the 30-month review
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September 2016
 While the domestic violence exemption for the application fee is welcomed, the reliance
on parents self-declaring domestic abuse means some – as the DWP itself forecast – do
not receive the exemption they are owed
 Staff refuse the domestic violence application fee exemption on grounds which
contradict the cross-departmental definition of domestic abuse accepted by the DWP
 The inherent risks of Direct Pay and encouraging contact between parents – particularly
financial coercion – are poorly understood and managed; this allows non-compliant
arrangements to persist and raises security fears, risking exposure to further abuse and
parents exiting the system altogether
 The lack of staff training on domestic abuse compounds the risks created by a statutory
system that promotes direct arrangements between parents, as evidenced by the lack
of clear processes and protocol to ensure safe maintenance arrangements for survivors.
The emphasis on Direct Pay and a ‘fresh start’ can supersede proper
enforcement
“[The CMS staff] suggested I tried to make a reduced settlement with him…he
has faced no ‘discipline’ procedures”
 Inconsistent enforcement in Direct Pay means Collect and Pay charges are of limited
use as a deterrent to non-compliance – the policy drive to promote Direct Pay
encourages staff to place more weight on allowing the paying parent a further chance to
pay (and pressure receiving parents to do the same), than tackling non-payment swiftly
 The high Collect and Pay charge for paying parents also creates a perverse incentive to
stick with non-compliant Direct Pay arrangements – both for staff reluctant to impose a
severe penalty, and receiving parents reluctant to risk conflict with the other parent
 Unclear Direct Pay enforcement rules compound inconsistent treatment of Direct Pay
cases, with the threshold for bringing cases into Collect and Pay open to staff discretion
 The wholesale push to make a fresh start can be misplaced and frustrating for CSA
cases where months or years were spent to get an effective arrangement in place
 It is unclear whether the ‘compliance opportunity’ pushing parents towards Direct Pay is
appropriate given a clear history of non-payment or enforcement action.
Despite a small caseload and charging income, the promised service
quality and value for money have yet to materialise
“It seems that if you have an ex-partner who is self-employed…you are told to
more or less give up any hope on getting the maintenance owed to your children”
 Introducing charges raises expectations of a proper exchange, as with any financial
transaction – payment in return for good customer service and maintenance paid;
however, parents in the CMS are reporting familiar problems found under the CSA
regarding enforcement, maintenance avoidance and case management
 There are limited signs of improved efficiency – the small CMS caseload and charging
revenue have not led to the intended ‘freeing up’ of resources to tackle difficult cases
 The push for a ‘fresh start’ with CSA cases represents poor value for money where
previous case information (eg on paying parents’ income) and successful enforcement
action (eg a court order) are ignored.
Child maintenance charging: evidence summary for the 30-month review
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September 2016
Recommendations
Child maintenance reforms present an opportunity to deliver a genuine fresh start, by
designing a statutory system that is accessible and effective for those who need it. Yet the
evidence to date shows there is clearly a gap between the ambition to create a system “fit
for the 21st century” and the reality of implementation.4 As the last CSA cases – those most
reliant on the statutory system – are closed, concerns will only get more acute.
To address these findings, Gingerbread calls for the DWP to implement:
 A fairer charging system that ensures receiving parents have equal access to the
statutory system and are not unfairly penalised for non-compliance:
- Explore further exemptions to the £20 application fee, such as a means test to
ensure low income parents are exempt, for example those eligible for universal credit
(or the equivalent threshold under the original benefits system)
- Scrap the 4 per cent charge for receiving parents using Collect and Pay, to ensure
receiving parents are not penalised for non-compliance
- Review the Collect and Pay charge for paying parents, to ensure the level does not
dissuade enforcement of non-compliant Direct Pay arrangements
 A more sensitive system for domestic abuse survivors:
- Revise CM Options and CMS conversation scripts and training to enable staff to raise
the question of domestic abuse, rather than relying on parents to self-declare
- Review whether the domestic violence application fee exemption is being applied to
all instances of domestic abuse, as per the cross-departmental definition
- Offer survivors an option to ‘fast-track’ to the Collect and Pay service
- Implement mandatory domestic abuse training and robust processes to ensure staff
understand, recognise and respond safely and appropriately to abuse
- Work with survivors and domestic abuse experts to review processes and systems in
more detail to develop best practice
 A more responsive Direct Pay system that recognises the need for timely and
consistent enforcement, particularly for non-compliant CSA cases being transferred:
- Ensure there is a full transfer of information between CSA and CMS systems to
properly assess likely compliance under new cases
- Review whether there are circumstances where the ‘compliance opportunity’ given to
paying parents is inappropriate (ie where enforcement action should be transferred)
- Clarify guidelines for staff and parents as to when Direct Pay enforcement action will
be taken, and introduce performance monitoring to ensure consistent implementation
 A more transparent and accountable system, with more robust monitoring data:
- Publish data on Direct Pay enforcement, including on completeness of payments,
regularity, late payments and warnings raised5
- Data should be provided by cases, not (just) case groups, to ensure performance
from the perspective of receiving parents and children can be understood.
4
DWP (2014) ‘New child maintenance system fit for the 21st century starts today’ .
The DWP’s commissioned survey on Direct Pay should provide more information once published, but this covers a finite time
period rather than being an ongoing performance measure.
5
Child maintenance charging: evidence summary for the 30-month review
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