Parties and Voting in Parliament
Jean-François Godbout§† and Bjørn Høyland‡
§
Center for the Study of Democratic Politics, Princeton University∗
† Département de science polititque, Université de Montréal
‡ Department of Political Science, University of Oslo
Paper presented at the Center for Study of Democratic Politics workshop
Princeton University
December 12, 2013.
Abstract
This paper analyzes the development of party voting unity in the Canadian House of
Commons. Our data includes more than 10,893 divisions recorded between 1867 and
2011. We use several different empirical models to determine whether the increase
in party voting unity observed during this period is explained by cohort/replacement
effects, career ambition, electoral incentives, or by the modification of the rules and
regulations governing the legislative agenda. Overall, we find little evidence to support
the claim that electoral, cohort, or career specific effects increase partisanship in the
legislature. Rather, the results suggest that partisan sorting and the government’s ability to control the legislative agenda explain the consolidation of parties in the Canadian
Parliament during the 20th century.
∗
Corresponding author: [email protected]
It is often argued that legislative organization promotes electoral accountability, especially
when parties are highly cohesive in the legislature (Carey, 2009; Scarrow, 2009; Tavits, 2008;
Mainwaring, 1999). The logic here is that voting unity greatly increases a party’s ability to
control the government, change public policy, and ultimately win elections (Tavits, 2011, p.
411). What is less understood, however, is how a disorganized rump of elected representatives
can be transformed into a well-disciplined group of parliamentary actors over time.
So far, most of the work related to the development of legislative party organization and
voting unity has either focused on the United States Congress (e.g., Poole and Rosenthal,
2007, 1997), or a handful of assemblies where free and fair elections have only been recently
introduced (e.g., Morgenstern, 2004; Tavits, 2008; Carey, 2009). There are quite a few more
established democracies across Europe that have experienced similar changes during the late
19th and early 20th centuries (e.g., Cox, 1987; Bowler, Farrell, and Katz, 1999; Aydelotte,
1977). However, empirical studies of these older cases usually offer an incomplete picture of
the evolution of partisanship, primarily because they are limited to a few legislative terms (a
notable exception here is the analysis of Eggers and Spirling 2013).
The work presented here contributes to this literature by analyzing legislative voting in
the Canadian Parliament. Our data includes all of the recorded divisions in the House of
Commons between 1867 and 2011. The primary objective is to identify what factors are
capable of explaining the development of party unity over the whole life-span of this legislature. With this empirical strategy, we can take full advantage of the occurrence of specific
events—such as the expansion of the suffrage, the development of legislative committees, or
major rule changes affecting agenda control—to disentangle between several variables that
have been known to influence partisanship over time.
Canada represents an interesting case because this country is often associated with several
of the characteristics usually found in more unstable democratic regimes. To begin, the
Canadian House of Commons has always experienced a very high level of incumbency turnover
(Kerby and Blidook, 2011; Matland and Studlar, 2004). The party system is also very
fluid, with the cyclical emergence of third parties throughout most of the country’s history
1
(Johnston, 2013). In addition, the Canadian political landscape was greatly influenced by
the historical conflict between Catholics/Protestants and French/English speakers, while the
economic interests of different regions was also often in direct opposition, such as over the
development of agricultural and industrial policies (Johnston and Blais and Brady and Crête,
1992). Although the federal structure of the state has somewhat helped to alleviate these
problems at the national level, we find several important crises in which sectional divisions
have threatened to destroy national unity. Yet, despite all of this, Canada is one of the
oldest continuous democracies in the world today; and it is safe to assume that most of the
country’s major political crises have been dealt with and settled in the federal parliament.
If party unity promotes legislative accountability and political stability (Tavits, 2011;
Carey, 2009), then understanding what factors contributes the most to the development of
organized parties in more established democracies is essential, especially since their institutional and electoral arrangements have been in place for some time. Once again, Canada
provides us with an interesting example to further investigate this claim, mostly because the
level of party unity observed in this country has remained relatively high in recent years
(Kam, 2009; Godbout, 2013; Godbout and Høyland, 2011a,b). However, this was not always the case, especially in the years following Confederation (Carty, 1988). Godbout and
Høyland (2013) have shown that there was a sharp increase in the level of partisan behaviour
in parliament around the turn of the 20th Century. These authors explain this change by
a conflict over religious issues that divided Catholic and Protestant representatives. Once a
majority of Catholic Members of Parliament (MPs) sorted into two distinct groups, the level
of intraparty opposition within the ranks of the Conservative and Liberal parties declined
and voting unity increased dramatically in the legislature.
Still, the consolidation of parties in the Canadian Parliament was far from being over.
Other studies have identified several more recent terms where voting unity broke down (Malloy, 2003; Kam, 2001; Kornberg, 1967; Kornberg and Mishler, 1976). The presence of an
important number of parties that did not enforce strict discipline, such as the Progressives
in the 1930s (Morton, 1950), the Reform Party in the 1990s (Docherty, 1997), or the Liberal
2
Party in the 2000s (Godbout and Høyland, 2011a), clearly shows that the trend toward unified caucuses has never been consistent over the years, and that the independence of members
remains salient today.
To illustrate the importance of this change, Figure 1 reports the level of party unity of
Canada’s two major parties, the Conservatives and Liberals, as measured by the average
proportion of divisions where all of the MPs from a given party supported the majority of
their caucus. The top plot of Figure 1 highlights the median of this unity score over the
whole period, whereas the bottom plot displays the change in the median value in every
term.1 Both plots confirm that there was a marked increase in the level of unity in the first
ten Parliaments. However, we can also see that the deviation from the median value does
not converge toward zero until much later. If anything, the plots suggest that near perfect
cohesion was not achieved until the second half of the twentieth century.
[Figure 1 about here.]
This overall change in partisanship raises several important questions about the origins
of party unity in Canada and in parliamentary systems more broadly. First, how can we
explain the variations in the levels of party voting over time? Do cohort or replacement effects
explain the development of partisanship in the legislature? Can we link this trend to electoral
pressures or to the gradual expansion of the suffrage more broadly, as in the British case
(Lowell, 1908; Cox, 1987)? This observed trend could also be a consequence of the changing
organization of the legislative agenda. Following the work of Cox and McCubbins (1993,
2005), we also consider the possibility that party leaders strengthened their influence over
time by limiting the rights of individual private members to introduce motions or legislations
in the House. Thus, by making sure that most of the votable items were related to government
business—and thus implicitly linked to the confidence convention—party leaders could have
found an effective way to lower the costs of imposing discipline within their ranks.
Our goal in this paper is thus to determine if one or more of the previous accounts explain
1
We use the median absolute deviation change here because it is a more robust estimator and less influenced
by extreme values.
3
the development of party voting in Canada. Although the sharp growth in partisanship
observed in this country occurred almost forty years after the British House of Commons
(Eggers and Spirling, 2013), we suspect that different mechanisms were involved in both of
these cases. Canada was still very much a rural nation until the end of the First World War,
and the size of the electorate remained relatively limited before suffrage became universal
in the 1920s. The rules and procedures of the Canadian House were also very basic; the
government’s struggle to control the legislative agenda was pretty much over by 1913, and
the next wave of important reforms occurred more than fifty years later, in 1968 (Dawson,
1962). This is in sharp contrast with the British case, where electoral and legislative reforms
occurred in the second half of the 19th century and preceded the consolidation of parties in
the legislature (Cox, 1987). In the conclusion of this paper, we return to this comparative
analysis to determine whether there is a set of common factors to explain the increase of
party voting unity in Westminster-style parliamentary systems.
The study is organized as follow. In the first section, we review the comparative work on
legislative voting and party discipline in Canada and other legislatures. In the next section,
we present the data and measures used in the study. In the third section, we report the
results of three different empirical analyses to explain party voting unity between 1867 and
2011. In the final two sections, we review our findings and conclude.
Legislative Voting and Party Unity
The historical development of legislative parties in parliamentary systems is not fully understood by scholars today. Authors, such as Cox (1987), Ozbudun (1970) and Lowell (1908),
have provided some compelling evidence to explain the motivations behind the development
of party discipline and voting unity in the British House of Commons, an institution that
shares many similarities with the Canadian case. For example, Cox (1987) argues that the
increase in the level of partisanship observed in Westminster during the Victorian era was
primarily the results of a combination of intra and extra-parliamentary incentives controlled
by the parties (also see Bowler, Farrell, and Katz, 1999). Probably the most important of
4
these is related to the expansion of the suffrage in the United Kingdom. Cox (1987) explains
that as the size of the electorate grew, MPs had to rely more on party labels to get elected.
Thus, members of the same party developed a collective incentive to protect their party’s
brand in the legislature: first by promoting a common set of public policies; and second, by
supporting party leaders in the legislature. In the Canadian case, there was an important
expansion of the electoral franchise in 1898 when universal male suffrage was introduced,
and later again in 1918 when women were allowed to vote, so the size of the electorate could
potentially have played a role in this country as well.
Another example of the importance of parties in the electoral arena is linked to the
selection of candidates. Parties that do not fully control the nomination process during an
election run the risk of having more independent minded candidates on the ballot. However,
if parties have the power to remove undesirable candidates from their rank, then we should
expect an increase in voting loyalty among newly elected members (Morgenstern, 2004). In
Canada, the full control over the selection of candidates by party leaders did not occur until
1972 (Carty, 1988). Prior to this, only the name and profession of candidates were reported
on the ballots. Consequently, this factor should have a limited impact on the development
of party unity over time, especially given that it was already relatively very high before this
change.
The second set of incentives that could account for an increase in the level of partisanship
over time is related to intra-parliamentary factors and the organization of the legislature
more broadly. To begin, the fact that the Canadian House of Commons operates under a
Westminster-style parliamentary system probably explains why party discipline is so high in
the first place, particularly when a party controls the government (Diermeier and Feddersen,
1998). However, this system was already in place after Confederation, when party unity
was significantly much lower. Another important factor identified by Cox (1987) relates to
the rewards given by the executive in exchange for loyalty. Most likely, the biggest prize is
to be named to the Cabinet, followed by other promotions in the House, such as becoming
a committee chairman or a parliamentary secretary. In Canada, loyal members could be
5
awarded judgeships, provincial governorships, or senatorial seats (Ward, 1963). One must
not forget the important influence of party whips who can also use their power to promote
discipline within their ranks.2
The final group of intra-parliamentary factors that can be used to increase the level of
party voting unity relates to negative agenda control and the individual policy preferences of
members. According to Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005), party leaders can always maintain
unity by preventing debates over bills or motions that could potentially divide their caucus.
This is most likely to be true when the leadership can decide the content of the legislative
agenda. In the very first Canadian Parliament, the House of Commons’s agenda was roughly
divided equally between government and private member business. However, over time, the
amount of government activities increased dramatically in the legislature. The rules governing
the legislative agenda were also modified to reflect this new reality between 1906 and 1913
(Godbout and Høyland, 2013; Stewart, 1977; Dawson, 1962). And once the government
won the right to control most of the legislative agenda, it became easier to prevent private
members from debating issues that could weaken party unity—such as divorce, prohibition,
abortion, capital punishment, or religious and language rights.
Another related explanation for the increase in voting unity observed in the Canadian case
is linked to the ideological distribution of the preferences of party members. When looking at
Figure 1, we must consider the possibility that the growth in partisanship could simply be a
consequence of the increasing ideological polarization of Liberal and Conservative legislators.
As Ozbudun (1970) and Krehbiel (2000) explain, party members who have similar preferences
can consistently vote together in a legislature, not because of party discipline, but because
they share common beliefs on a wide range of public policy issues. Unfortunately, it is very
difficult to disentangle between the influence of party discipline and ideological cohesion when
analyzing the sources of party loyalty. In this study, we circumvent this problem by using
language, profession, and geography to identify factions within the two major parties who
2
In Canada, whips control the allocation of office space, committee assignments, and official international
travel opportunities. They also decide the duty roster of MPs and who will be allowed to speak during the
debates (Westmacott, 1983).
6
have been know to hold strong preferences on an important set of controversial issues over
the years.
So far, in the British House of Commons, the focus has generally been on measuring the
effects of electoral pressures on legislative voting (Cox, 1987) and on determining whether
cohort or replacement effects can account for the development of party unity in this country
(Eggers and Spirling, 2013). In the Canadian context, we find no clear evidence that elections
matter in explaining the increase in party voting unity during the first ten Parliaments (Godbout and Høyland, 2013). However, it is possible that the increasing partisanship observed
in later terms will be related to the gradual replacement of more independent members in the
legislature and to the professionalization of the legislature more broadly (March, 1974). It
could also be linked to the partisan preferences of members or the ability of party leaders to
control the legislative agenda. In the next section, we outline an empirical strategy to identify
which of these factors can best explain the development of party unity in this country.
Data & Method
This section describes the data and methodology used in the empirical analysis. The data
was collected from the Canadian Parliamentary Debates (Hansard Journals) of the House of
Commons between 1867 and 2011. Each recorded vote was hand coded by a team of research
assistants for the first thirty-four Parliaments. The votes were identified from the Journals
and transcribed directly into the data set. For the subsequent Parliaments (thirty-fifth to
fortieth), an automated coding scheme was used to transcribe the votes from the online
published records available on the Canadian Parliament website.
Because divisions are recorded by names only (and sometimes with the riding name when
MPs have the same last name), we matched the recorded votes with a biographical file built
directly from the historical listing of the Members of the House of Commons available on the
Parliament website. This data was supplemented by the online records of Election Canada’s
Historical Election Results in Federal Electoral Ridings.3
3
Elected Members of Parliament were assigned two specific identification number. The first number is the
7
Overall, the data contains 4,093 unique Conservative and Liberal Members of the House
of Commons and a total of 10,893 recorded divisions between 1867 and 2011. This gives
us 1,979,233 individual voting decisions. In the Canadian House of Commons, a division is
included in the Hansard if a request is made to the Speaker by at least five members. This
rule has been in place for the whole period under investigation.4 A sitting member can either
vote Yay, Nay, or be paired.5 Abstentions are not recorded, therefore we cannot differentiate
between members who abstained from voting voluntarily or involuntarily—although in the
first few decades after Confederation, a strict attendance rule was maintained in the House
(Dawson, 1962, p.89).6
[Figure 2 about here.]
There is an average of 272 divisions in each parliament between 1867 and 2011 (standard
deviation of 370).7 The first plot of Figure 2 shows the distribution of divisions by legislative
terms for both the House and Senate, whereas the second plot of Figure 2 reports the mean
number of votes per sitting days in the House only. On average, each parliament sat for 1,178
days, and the mean number of vote per sitting day was 0.22. The highest number of votes
(472) in a single day was recorded on December 7, 1999, when the Reform party attempted to
html tag used by the Parliament of Canada online database to uniquely identify each member that served in
the House of Commons. We supplemented this code by creating a separate numerical identification number
to account for members who crossed the floor or became independent during a legislative session.
4
Rule 84 in the 1868 version of the “Rules, orders and forms of proceeding of the House of Commons of
Canada” adopted by the House, in the first session of the first Parliament.
5
According to O’Brien and Bosc (2009):“Pairing is the arranging, by the party Whips, for two Members,
one of them from the governing party and the other from one of the opposition parties, to agree to abstain
from voting on a particular occasion in order to permit one or both to be absent from the House”. Paired
members were not reported in the Journals before 1991, although the practice was commonly used in the
House of Commons before this change, and sometime even reported in the more extensive Journals of the
Debates.
6
There are several instances where a member was listed as paired, but still voted Yay or Nay in a division.
There is no way for us to determine if this was a clerical error in the recording of a vote, or if a member really
voted twice, see Dawson (1962) for a discussion on recorded divisions. A pairing error even brought down a
government in 192X, when a member of the opposition who was paired with a member of the government
voted by accident. There are other instances where Members voted Yay and Nay in one division. All of
these instances were noted in the coding scheme of the votes. Overall, these coding errors represent less than
0.002% of the total recorded individual votes.
7
The thirty-first minority Parliament saw the lowest number of votes with only eight recorded votes,
whereas the thirty-sixth Parliament saw the highest number of divisions with 1,990 recorded votes.
8
filibuster the adoption of a First Nation treaty. We also note that more than 57 percent of all
the divisions occurred between the thirty-second and the fortieth Parliaments (1988-2011).
As we indicated earlier, we are interested in identifying what factors best explain the
increase in partisanship over time in the House of Commons. Our investigation is primarily
centred around the two parties who controlled the government between 1867 to 2011—the
Conservatives and Liberals. Although, as we will see, the arrival of third parties in the 1920s
played an important role in consolidating party unity in later terms.8
The analysis presented below also focuses on two different aspects of party unity. The
first is related to the legislator and measures individual party loyalty. It is calculated for
each individual MP and reports the average proportion of vote in which a member voted
with a majority of his/her caucus in a given parliament.9 We use two slightly different
specifications for this variable: one that is based on all of the recorded divisions in a specific
term; and another that considers only government related divisions (or whipped divisions).
This last category includes all of the motions/bills introduced by the government and all of
the amendments made by the opposition over government motions/bills.
The second unit of analysis focuses on the outcomes of legislative votes, where the results
are aggregated at the party level. The dependent variable here is either a Rice or a weighted
Rice index (e.g., Hix, Noury and Roland, 2006). The Rice index for each division is obtained
by taking the difference between the number of votes cast by the majority position of party
i (either Ayes or Nays), minus the number of votes cast by the minority position of party i
(either Ayes or Nays). The difference is then divided by the total number of votes recorded
by party i (minority + majority votes of party i) in the division. The weighted Rice index
takes into account the number of abstentions in a recorded division.
8
10
Consequently, we
Canada was a two-party system until the fourteenth Parliament (1921). After this point, third parties
became a permanent fixture in the House of Commons. However, we leave the study of third party voting for
another project. Note also that the Conservative Party of Canada has had several different names over time.
First, Liberal-Conservative and Conservative party MPs sat together after Confederation. The Conservative
party merged with the Progressive party in 1942 to become the Progressive-Conservative party of Canada. Finally, the Progressive-Conservative party of Canada merged with the Canadian-Reform-Conservative-Alliance
in 2003 to become the Conservative party of Canada.
9
If a member sits in more than one parliament, we have multiple records of loyalty for this MP.
10
With this index, abstentions are added to the minority position. Thus, the total number of votes (the
denominator) corresponds to the sum of the majority, minority, and the number of absent members in a
9
obtain for this measure an index of party unity by either including or excluding abstentions
as a relevant vote choice.
Our analysis begins by looking at the determinants of individual party loyalty and then
move on to explain aggregate shifts in voting unity for both the Liberal and Conservative
parties. In the section that follows, we focus on identifying what are some of the common
factors that influence legislative voting across all of the different specifications and provide a
brief historical narrative to explain the consolidation of parties over time in Canada.
Results
We present in Figure 3 a summary of the loyalty scores for the Liberal and Conservative
parties in each parliament. We report the distribution of individual loyalty scores, a variable
ranging from 0 to 1, where 1 implies that an MP always voted with the majority of his/her
party during a term. The Figure contains four boxplots outlining the distribution of loyalty
scores for all recorded divisions (top row), and for government related divisions only (bottom
row). In this analysis, government divisions strictly include recorded votes related to motions
or bills introduced by a member of the Cabinet.
[Figure 3 about here.]
The box plots show that the median loyalty score is more or less always in the range
of .75 to 1 for both parties when we consider all the votes. It is lowest in the first terms,
and reaches 100 percent by the tenth Parliament (1904). After this point, the median level
loyalty never falls below 95 percent. However, this last result does not imply that all members
are systematically loyal to their party. In fact, we only find three terms where all member
follow the party line perfectly: the Liberals in the fifteenth and twenty-fifth Parliaments,
and the Conservatives in the twenty-fifth and the thirty-first Parliaments.11 We can also
given vote. We specifically use the Hix, Noury and Roland (2006) index which adds an additional weight to
the total number of negative votes (minority + abstentions) by multiplying this sum by .5. This is done in
order to avoid negative values.
11
Note that the most recent of these two terms were very short with a limited number of votes, only 17
and 8 respectively.
10
see that the variation in the loyalty scores is decreasing over time, especially for government
related business. The standard deviation is never above 10 points for both parties after the
twentieth Parliament. Note that the distribution of our second dependent variable, the party
unity scores (not reported here), follows a similar pattern.12
It should be clear from these descriptive statistics that there are many Members of Parliament who have perfect or near perfect loyalty scores, especially toward the later part of
the twentieth century. The same is true for our aggregated measure of party unity. The
distribution of these indexes implies that a standard linear model will be problematic because it assumes that the dependent variable will be free from upper or lower bounds. In our
case, the dependent variables—either party unity (Rice and weighted Rice) or the individual
loyalty score—cannot be above 1 or below 0. Failure to take this into account could bias the
results of our analysis. Consequently, in the next three sections, we estimate two-limit Tobit
regressions, which account for censored observations (Long, 1997, 197 - 216).
Party Loyalty
The empirical analysis of partisanship in the Canadian House of Commons begins by focusing
on the individual determinants of legislative behaviour. Aside from individual loyalty score,
which represents our dependent variable, we control for the turnout rate of each member in
the regression models.13 We determine the level of voting competition in a district by using
a measure of the effective number of candidates during an election: the index of Laakso and
Taagepera (1979).14 This index ranges from 1 to 6.29 in the data (a mean of 2.31 for the
whole period), where 1 represents an election in which there was only one candidate who won
100% of the votes (i.e., the candidate won by acclamation). Therefore, a value greater than
12
For example, we find that the Rice index for both parties converges toward 100 during the first half of
the 20th century. In fact, more than 76 percent and 68 percent of the total number of votes for the Liberal
and Conservative parties have a Rice index greater than 99 on the scale when we consider all of the 10,893
recorded divisions between 1867 and 2011.
13
We standardize this value so that zero represents the mean level of participation in recorded divisions
for a party in a given term. Following Gelman and Hill (2007), we set the standard deviation of this value
at two.
14
This index is calculated by dividing 1 over the sum of the squared proportion of votes obtained by each
candidate in the district, see also Gaines (1999).
11
one implies that competition in the district increases.15 Finally, in order to control for the
size of the electorate in each riding, we also include a variable that reports the total number
of voters during an election (this variable is standardized as well).16 These last two measures
evaluate the effects of electoral pressure on partisan loyalty in the legislature.
The models contain several parliamentary status variables as well, such as Cabinet membership (coded 1-0), since those MPs are more likely to be loyal. Following the same logic,
we also determined if an MP was a member of the governing party, elected during a minority
government, or if an MP was in the first or last term of his/her legislative career in the House
(coded 1-0).17 This group of variables was added to control for career specific effects and the
benefits of being a member of the government. The models contain regional dummy variables
(coded 1-0) as well to control for geography (Quebec, Ontario, and Maritimes and Western
provinces).18 Finally, we identified the 40 election cohorts for every sitting MP in the data
set and added a term component to the models representing the parliament number. These
last two variables were included to measure the effects of time and replacement on legislative
behaviour.
We present the results for Liberal MPs in table 1 and Conservative MPs in table 2. This
analysis uses several different specifications: Models 1–2 are simple Tobit regressions, whereas
models 3–4 use fixed term effects, while models 5–6 use fixed cohort effects. As we indicated
earlier, we calculated the loyalty scores of individual MPs for all recorded divisions (columns
1, 3 and 5) and for government related divisions only (columns 2, 4 and 6).
[Table 1 about here.]
[Table 2 about here.]
15
In a first past the post electoral system, an index of two also indicates that the threshold needed to win
a seat in parliament will be lower than 50%; any value above this point should raise competitiveness in the
district (because fewer than an absolute majority of votes will be required to win).
16
In cases were an election was won by acclamation, we substituted the total number of voters by the
average number of voters for all the districts in a given election. Because the franchise is not constant across
time, we used the total number of voters in an election, as opposed to the population size of the electoral
district.
17
We controlled for the number of terms and number of terms squared, but the results do not change.
18
The baseline category is Ontario.
12
One of the most important finding to take away from all of these models relates to the
influence of the government and Cabinet variables. Not only are members of the Cabinet more
likely to vote with their own party, backbench members who sit with the government are also
more likely to be loyal as well. The results show the clear impact of time on partisanship as
captured by the parliament variable. The quadratic term indicates that loyalty increases over
time, but at a decreasing rate. Furthermore, it appears that cohort effects are not strongly
related to the rising level of voting loyalty observed in the data. Although the cohort effect
is negative (and decreasingly so), the relationship between this variable and party loyalty
disappears once we use the fixed effects models for both Conservative and Liberal MPs. On
the other hand, when we add cohorts as fixed effects in models 5–6, we find some evidence
that this variable matters, especially for MPs elected in the first few terms. The results show
that the election of a new Liberal cohort increases the loyalty of members before 1900 (note
that the results for the 39 different cohorts are not reported in the table). There are other
idiosyncratic cohort effects as well, but they are not systematic across time, as certain class
of MPs can sometime be more/less loyal when compared to their predecessors.
Another significant determinant of individual party loyalty relates to the influence of
legislative careers. Indeed, the results from table 1 confirm that MPs who are exiting the
House of Commons are less likely to be loyal during their last term.19 Note, however that
this is true for Liberal MPs only. Furthermore, it appears that individual loyalty does not
increase under minority governments.
Similarly, we only find some evidence that electoral pressure matters. For the Liberals,
the impact of competition appears to be negative, but only when considering all types of legislative votes (Models 1–3–5). This result implies that an increase in the number of effective
candidate during an election reduces the level of party loyalty for Liberal party members.
Thus, the analysis suggests that there is some level of electoral responsiveness for the Liberals, as the number of viable challengers increase in the district. For the Conservatives, the
influence of this variable is indistinguishable from zero across all of the specifications. Partic19
Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between members who retire out of free will from those who are
forced out.
13
ipation in House votes also does not appear to be systematically associated with loyalty. In
other words, MPs who are regularly absent from the House of Commons do not vote against
their caucus more frequently. Finally, and contrary to Cox (1987), we do not find that the
size of the electorate increases loyalty to the party in the legislature. If anything, a higher
number of total voters in an election seems to promote the independence of both Liberal and
Conservative members.20
Overall then, this first set of analysis demonstrates unequivocally that being a member
of the governing party (or the Cabinet) is the best predictor of individual party loyalty.
However, we also find that over time, there is an important increase in the average level of
loyalty in both parties. Unfortunately, cohort or career effects cannot completely explain this
trend, and it does not appear to be systematically related to electoral pressure as well. In
the next section, we investigate how the legislative agenda influences voting by considering
in greater detail the topics of recorded divisions. This new set of analysis should allow us
to determine how the content of the legislative agenda changes over time and affects party
unity more broadly.
Party Unity
We report in tables 3 and 4 the results of four different regression models to explain the
determinants of voting unity for the Liberal and Conservative parties. Recall that this
analysis is conducted at the party level, and that the unity scores are computed for each of
the 10,893 recorded divisions. In both tables, the model specification of columns 3 and 4
includes abstentions, whereas the specification of columns 1 and 2 exclude non-voters from
the index. Like before, models 2–4 have fixed term effects, whereas models 1–3 control for
time by including the parliament number.
Since we want to understand the outcome of aggregate party unity scores for each recorded
division, we include several variables to control for the content of the division in the models.21
20
Note that this variable is not included in the fixed effect models because of multicoliniarity issues as the
total number of voters in each term is highly correlated with time and the level of electoral competitiveness
in the district.
21
All the variables in the models are dichotomous (coded 1-0), unless otherwise indicated.
14
For example, we specify whether the vote is related to a motion introduced by a party
member, whether a member of the government sponsors it, or if it occurred during a minority
parliament. We also control for the size of the party in the House as a proportion of all the
seats. Note that we classify each motion according to six categories—i.e., general motion,
second reading of a bill, third reading of a bill, supply motion, reply to the speech of the
throne, and a residual or baseline category. Finally, in order to distinguish between the
influence of government activities, we separate motions that originate from the Cabinet from
those sponsored by private members (i.e., the interactive terms).
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
The results presented in tables 3 and 4 confirm that there are important differences
between the determinants of voting unity across the two parties. To begin, the Liberals are
more likely to be unified when a division is related to a motion introduced by a member of
their own caucus. This is not the case for the Conservative party. In fact, Conservative party
members are less likely to be unified when a division is related to a motion introduced by
one of their own. However, this relationship is not robust and disappears in the fixed effect
model (column 2) and when we include abstentions in the analysis (columns 3 and 4).
We also note that the parliamentary term and squared term effects are consistent across
both parties, but inconsistent when we consider abstentions in the analysis. While it is
positive and decreasing if non-voters are excluded, it becomes negative and increasing when
abstentions are counted. The same type of reverse relationship occurs if we consider the
government status variable; it is positive without abstentions, but negative when they are
added in the regression. Both of these results suggest that government status and time
increase party unity, but only when we exclude abstentions. In other words, we find that
abstentions matter more when a party controls the Cabinet, and that they are more frequent
over time (and thus reduce the level of party unity when they are counted).
15
The most significant results found in tables 3 and 4 are related to the relationship between
party unity and the type of division being recorded. For each party, voting unity is almost
always lower when a private member introduces a motion, and this is true for most model
specifications. The only exception here is when we look at amendments to the throne speech
and regular motions, which can have a positive effect on unity. However, these last findings
are not robust across specifications. Nevertheless, because a successful amendment made to
the throne speech implies a loss of confidence in the government, party unity is generally
very high for these votes.22
From this last set of results, we can conclude that an important determinant of party
unity is related to the origin of the motion under consideration. For example, supply motions
sponsored by non-Cabinet members systematically reduce voting unity, and this is true for
both parties. The content of these motions is often related to controversial issues because
they give backbenchers an opportunity to decide the topic of parliamentary debates (O’Brien
and Bosc, 2009). Between 1867 and 1968, there were more than 615 of these motions recorded
on a vote, but their frequency gradually declined over time, as the government increasingly
won the right to control the legislative agenda.23
It is not surprising, then, to find that governing parties have, over the years, reduced
the influence of private members in the Canadian Parliament. Indeed, the results show that
most of the legislative initiatives sponsored outside of the Cabinet systematically weakens
the unity of both major parties. The most important of these reforms was introduced in
1913 when the Conservative government adopted a cloture rule and restricted the number of
supply motions that could be introduced during a legislative term. This new rules effectively
limited the opportunities for opposition members to air their grievances in parliament.24
22
Although the debates can last several days, only one amendment (and one vote) was permitted before
1927. This amendment (or later sub-amendment for third parties before 1968) is always introduced by leaders
of the opposition parties against the government.
23
In 1968, this procedure was completely abolished and replaced by a fixed number of supply or allotted days
(usually around 25 in the calendar) when opposition parties were allowed a limited number of opportunities
to introduce motions (such as a vote of no-confidence) to be considered in the House.
24
O’Brien and Bosc (2009) note that “[...] the effect of the adoption of the change was that from 1913 to
1955 only 132 amendments to the motion were moved, while in the period 1867 to 1913, 271 amendments
had been moved.”
16
Likewise, there was a push over the years to centralize backbench activities in the hands
of opposition party leaders. Prior to 1906, private member’s business had precedent over
government motions during several days of the week (O’Brien and Bosc, 2009). However,
after the rules were permanently modified in 1906, not only did the number of days in which
the legislative agenda was controlled by the government increase dramatically, the remaining
time allowed for debates also became increasingly controlled by opposition party leaders as
well (Dawson, 1962).
25
[Figure 4 about here.]
The plots in Figure 4 illustrate this trend by showing, on the left hand side, the important decline in the number of divisions over motions introduced by private members and, on
the right hand side, the Rice index for both government and private member related divisions (note that the data measuring voting unity only reports the values associated with the
governing party). The results confirm once again that motions sponsored by private members reduce party unity. In addition, the second plot also shows that the bulk of voting in
the Canadian House of Commons generally occurred over government related business after
World War I. As we previously explained, this trend is a consequence of the modification
of the rules of the House which significantly reduced the time allotted for private member
motions after 1913 (Stewart, 1977). Finally, we note that the rules governing the legislative
agenda were modified once more in the 1980s, but this time to increase the time allotted for
private member business in the debates (O’Brien and Bosc, 2009). Both plots illustrate that
this last change was associated with a rise in the amount of private member business, but
also a slight reduction in voting unity for the governing party.
Overall, these findings suggests that the Cabinet was able to increase its influence in the
legislature by simultaneously reducing the number of private member bills and motions under
consideration, and by allowing party leaders to set the agenda during opposition debates.
25
Before 1921, about 10 percent of the supply (or opposition) motions were sponsored by members of
the governing party. Obviously, voting over these motions were more likely to divide the majority party.
However, this practice was gradually modified between 1913 and 1925 when it was decided that the leaders
of the opposition would control the amending procedure during the budgetary process.
17
Partisan Sorting
So far, our main argument has been that the ability of the government to control the legislative
agenda is an important tool for preventing intra-party divisions in the Canadian Parliament.
However, we have not yet considered the possibility that the distribution of the preferences
of members consolidated over time to produce more cohesive parties in later terms. Recall
that in the context of a parliamentary system, it is very difficult to disentangle between the
effects of individual preferences (which can vary across time) and the ability of party leaders
to enforce discipline within their own rank (which can also change) (Ozbudun, 1970; Krehbiel,
2000). To address this issue, we develop in this section an empirical strategy to identify two
distinct factions of parliamentarians who have been known for their independence in the
House: Western Farmers and French-Canadian nationalists. Of course, we cannot directly
observe the preferences of these members in the legislature. Rather, we use three proxy
variables—language, occupation, and geography—to determine how MPs in these groups
may have contributed to weaken the cohesiveness of the Conservative and Liberal parties
over time.
French Canadians represent roughly 26% of the lawmakers in the data. Most are from
Quebec, however, around 15% got elected outside of this province. It is relatively easy to
identify the preferences of these members on several important issues that have created internal divisions within both major parties between 1867 and 2011. These conflicts are primarily
related to religion (e.g., catholicism, education, prohibition, or divorce), and provincial or
language rights in the federation.
In the years following Confederation, French Canadians MPs were more or less equally
divided between the Conservative and the Liberal parties. However, several incidents occurred while the Conservatives were in power that contributed to the realignment of French
and Catholic voters toward the Liberal party (Godbout and Høyland, 2013). This realignment culminated during World War I when conscription was imposed in Canada, despite the
opposition of all French Canadian MPs in parliament. Although the Liberals were known historically to support the French language and the catholic religion in parliament, the party’s
18
positions on several issues, such as imperial relations and education, were often perceived by
many Quebec nationalists to be insufficient compromises for protecting their rights in the
federation.
As a consequence, in several elections where conflicts over culture and language became
salient, Quebec voters elected a large number of nationalist candidates in parliament. These
candidates often ran under the Conservative party banner, such as in the 1911, 1930, 1958,
1984 and 1988 elections. Generally, nationalist candidates won a seat by campaigning against
the French elements of the Liberal party, rather than by directly supporting the national
leader of the Conservative party or their platform. Not surprisingly, this group often clashed
with English speaking Conservative MPs who held different views about the role of Canada
in the British Empire or the place of Quebec within the federation. It follows that we should
find that the unity for the Conservative party will be lower whenever a strong contingent of
French Canadian nationalist MPs is present in this caucus.
A similar dissenting group of MPs can also be associated with the Liberal party. Historically, Western Canadian farmers were more likely to favour lower tariffs and free trade, a
position that was championed by the Liberals, but strictly opposed by the Conservative party
until the end of the twentieth century. Thus, as the number of Western representatives in
the House of Commons grew (from 11 to 72 members between 1867 and 1921), the question
of trade became an increasingly important issue and provided the Liberal party with an electoral advantage. However, just like with Quebec nationalists, a group of MPs representing
farming districts argued that the position of the Liberals did not go far enough on tariffs.
This faction, influenced by the Grain Growers’ Association, and the American Granger and
Progressive movements, advocated for free trade, even if it meant a radical modification of
Canada’s national industrial policy.
At first, farmer and Western leaders favoured electing MPs inside the Liberal party structure. Their goal was to try and influence politics from within. However, several of these
representatives were either co-opted by the leadership of the Liberal party, or subjected to
strict party discipline, which became increasingly easy to impose after the government won
19
the right to control the legislative agenda. Eventually, the farmers rebelled and constituted
their own Progressive caucus during the thirteenth Parliament. These Progressive MPs refused to impose any form of discipline; they were also in direct opposition to what they
perceived as a corrupt party system which failed to represent the interests of westerners and
farmers more broadly.
The progressive era was short lived in Canada. By the late 1920s, most of the progressive
MPs had either rejoined the Liberal caucus or integrated several new parties, such as the
United Farmers, the Social Credit, or later the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. As
in the case of Conservative nationalists, we should find that the unity for the Liberal party
will be lowered whenever a strong contingent of Western and farmer MPs is represented in
the caucus.
[Table 5 about here.]
In order to measure the influence of these factions on party unity, we present in table
5 the results of an analysis replicating the models included in tables 3 and 4. However, we
add two new variables to identify farmers and French Canadian MPs.26 We only report the
results from the baseline models for both major parties, however the findings are consistent
across the previous specifications, unless otherwise indicated.
Like before, the analysis shows that Western MPs are indeed less likely to be loyal when
they are elected under the Liberal party banner. MPs who list their profession as farmers
are also less likely to support their caucus, although this result is not robust across specifications. If we introduce an interactive term in the model (Farmer × West), we also find that
this relationship is negative and significant. Likewise, we find the same negative relationship
for French Canadian MPs and the Conservative party. As we can see in table 5, being a
representative from a Western province or from Quebec significantly reduces the level of individual loyalty, irrespective of occupation or language. Thus, we find some confirmation that
26
Farmers were identified by the occupation of elected MPs, as listed on the ballots by Election Canada.
The French Canadian MPs were identified with their first and last names. Additional steps were taken to
identify the origin of certain MPs (such as schooling or spouse name) who’s names were not easily classifiable.
20
the removal of Western and French Canadian MPs from both the Liberal and Conservative
caucuses should increase the unity of their respective caucuses.
[Figure 5 about here.]
Figure 5 confirms that the representation of these two groups in the Conservative and
Liberal parties was gradually reduced over time. The first plot clearly shows that the proportion of French Canadian MPs declined steadily within the Conservative party, to eventually
reach zero in 1917. A similar trend is also observed with the farmers and Western Liberal
representatives, although the definitive reduction in their number occurred somewhat later,
after World War II.
Discussion
With this last piece of the puzzle in place, we can now outline a narrative to explain the
increase in party voting unity observed in the Canadian Parliament over time. We believe
that this transformation can be linked to three consecutive changes in the organization of
the House of Commons. First, by the gradual sorting out of French Canadian members
toward the Liberal party before the end of World War I. Second, by a reduction of the
influence of backbench members following several modifications of the rules of the House
which increased the government’s ability to control the legislative agenda between 1906 and
1913. And finally, by the break up of the two-party system, and the realignment of Western
MPs toward alternative regional parties after the 1921 election. In the previous analysis, we
have shown that each of these change is a consequence of the institutional context of the
Canadian House of Commons and of the behaviour of its members.
Now, one could be tempted to explain the transformation of the Canadian party system
strictly in terms of electoral changes. However, our analysis did not confirm the systematic
influence of cohort or election effects on individual behaviour. Rather, the results suggest that
party voting is influenced more by the content of the legislative agenda. Once the government
took control of business of the House, it reduced the opportunities to debate private member
21
motions in the legislature. As a consequence, party unity subsequently increased because
there were simply fewer opportunities for backbenchers to dissent. Most of the voting now
occurred over government sponsored motions, where party discipline was expected to be high
because of the confidence convention of the Canadian parliamentary system.
Members who often found themselves in direct opposition with the views of their party
could no longer express their grievances in the legislature. Our argument has been that the
development of third parties increased party unity even more, precisely because it liberated
the ranks of Conservative and Liberal caucuses from an important group of dissenting MPs.
These factions—represented by French Canadian nationalists and Western farmers—have
over the years found a voice in several new parties, such as the Bloc Populaire, Bloc Quebecois, Progressives, Social Credit, United Farmers, Cooperative-Commonwealth Federation,
Labour, New Democratic Party, and Reform/Canadian Alliance.
Conclusion
This study has shown that the increase in party unity observed in the House of Commons is
the results of two changes: one is institutional while the other one is electoral; both ultimately
influenced the structure of the Canadian party system.
In the first part of the analysis, we demonstrated that being a member of the governing
party (or the Cabinet) promotes party loyalty in the House. Unfortunately, this finding
does not tell us much about the consolidation of party unity over time. In fact, after the
third Parliament, both the Liberal and Conservative parties had already won a majority of
seats in the legislature. Therefore, all of the subsequent increases in unity after this term
have to be explained by something else. It is possible that the availability of patronage or
the distribution of other office perks contributed to strengthened the loyalty of government
backbenchers. However, this cannot be the whole story either since these benefits were also
available in earlier parliaments as well.
Most of the other factors identified to explain the rise of partisanship in the House of
Commons also failed to be confirmed empirically. First, we found little evidence that electoral
22
pressures affects legislative behaviour. Both the size of the franchise in the district and the
effective number of candidates did not appear to influence legislative voting systematically.
Similarly, our results demonstrated that cohort and replacement effects had only a minimal
impact on the growth of party loyalty. We did find that voting unity significantly increased
over time, but at a decreasing rate for both parties.
In order to understand this last effect, we focused on the content of the legislative agenda
in the second part of the empirical analysis. Here, our investigation centred on the aggregate
determinants of party voting unity in recorded votes. This new set of analysis confirmed that
one of the primary explanation for the rise of partisanship in the House of Commons relates
to the type of motion under consideration during a vote. Our results demonstrated that
motions introduced by the Cabinet generated much more unity when compared to motions
sponsored by members of the opposition (including government backbenchers). We have
concluded from these findings that the observed consolidation of party unity is most likely
related to the ability of the government to control the legislative agenda. This doesn’t imply
that the agenda explains everything, just that the variations in the data are more closely
associated with the reduced influence of backbenchers in the legislature.
In the last part of the study, we have considered whether the preferences of legislators
could also influence party unity. We identified two group of MPs, French Canadians nationalists and Western Farmers, who have historically been at odds with the position of the
Conservative and Liberal parties on several issues, but nevertheless found a temporary place
within the two-party system. Although the arrival of the Progressive party signified the
beginning of multipartism in Canada, the presence of a parliamentary faction of Western
farmers prior to 1921 suggests that the two main parties did not have the capabilities to
broker the interests of this group in the legislature. In fact, our argument has been that once
third parties emerged from the House to defend the regional concerns of different segments
of the electorate more directly, it became a lot easier for both major parties to maintain
discipline within the ranks.
Ultimately, our findings carry important implications for the comparative literature on
23
legislative organization. First, we have demonstrated that the conventional theory to explain
the development of party unity in the British case is not totally in line with the Canadian
experience. Indeed, we saw that electoral pressure, the size of the franchise, and the professionalization of the House only had a limited impact on the development of party unity in
Canada. Rather, our results highlighted the important of institutional rules and the content
of the legislative agenda as a tool to promote loyalty in parliament. Our results also suggest
that the reduction of private member business and the increasing influence of party leaders
also contributed to the emergence of third parties in the House of Commons.
The counterfactual to this argument is that looser party discipline should lower the incentives to create third parties in a (comparable) legislature. This is explained by the fact
that greater member independence should permit a more diverse representation of interests
within the existing party system (Epstein, 1964). The historical case of Australia where
party discipline is very high seems to support this claim. Although more work is necessary to
understand the transformation of this federal legislature, a third party emerged (the agrarian
National party) around the same time as the Progressive party in the Canadian Parliament.
Our analysis has also confirmed that the negative agenda control theory of Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) works differently in the context of Westminster parliamentary systems.
The confidence convention implies that the costs of imposing party discipline is much lower
for government sponsored motions since a failure to support the leadership on these votes
can mean being expelled from the caucus. Consequently, party unity should increase as government related business takes precedence over private member business in the House, even
when the majority is divided on an issue. This conjecture should hold for an individual MP
as long as the cost of supporting the government is less than the cost of sitting with the
opposition.
Hopefully, the Canadian experience has demonstrated that in order to make sense of the
development of party unity in a legislature, one needs to consider the relationship between
institutional rules, the party system, and the preferences of elected representatives.
24
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27
0.8
0.7
0.6
Median Loyalty Score
0.9
1.0
Development in Median Level Party Loyalty
0.5
Liberal
Conservative
1
3
5
7
9
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Parliament
0.05
0.10
0.15
Liberal
Conservative
0.00
Median Absolute Deviation
0.20
Development in Median Absolute Deviation
1
3
5
7
9
11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39
Parliament
Figure 1: The first plot of Figure 1 reports the evolution of the median level of party voting
unity for both the Conservative and Liberal parties. The second plot reports the value of the
median absolute deviation for each party.
28
2.0
Average Number of Divisions per Sitting Days
1.0
1.5
House of Commons
0
0.0
0.5
1000
1500
Number of Recorded Votes / Sitting Day
House of Commons
Senate
500
Number of Recorded Votes
2000
Total Recorded Votes by Legislature
1
3
5
7
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
39
1
Parliaments
1st-40th (1867-2011)
3
5
7
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
39
Parliaments
1st-40th (1867-2011)
Figure 2: The first plot of Figure 2 reports the total number of recorded divisions in the
House of Commons and the Senate in each parliament between 1867 and 2011. The second
plot indicates the average number of division per sitting day of the House.
29
Conservative MPs: All Divisions
26
22
14
7 10
11
4
7
1
4
1
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Loyalty
1867-2011
Loyalty
1867-2011
Liberal MPs: Government Divisions
Conservative MPs: Government Divisions
1.0
1
22
18
1
4
4
7
7 10
11
14
15
19
23
Parliament
26
27
30
31
34
35
39
39
0.0
Parliament
18
Parliament
23
19
15
Parliament
27
30
31
34
35
39
39
Liberal MPs: All Divisions
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
0.0
Loyalty
1867-2011
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Loyalty
1867-2011
Figure 3: The box plot represents the distribution of individual loyalty for both Conservative
and Liberal party members in each Parliament. The top two plots include all recorded
divisions, whereas the bottom two plots are computed from government related divisions
only. The lines in the boxes correspond to the first, second (median), third quantiles of the
distribution.
30
Government Motions vs. Other Motions
1500
Total
Government motions scaled by total
Other motions scaled by total
500
1000
Number of motions
0.6
0.4
0.2
Rice Index
0.8
1.0
2000
Rice Index for the Governing Party Only
1
3
5
7
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
0
0.0
Government Motion
Private Member Motion
39
1
Parliaments
1st-40th (1867-2011)
3
5
7
9
12
15
18
21
24
27
30
33
36
39
Parliament
1st-40th (1867-2011)
Figure 4: The first plot represents the distribution of party unity scores by types of motions
for the governing party only. The unity score represents the average Rice index for all the
recorded divisions in each term. The second plot represents the distribution of the evolution
of divisions over government and private member sponsored motions. These two types of
motions are scaled by the total number of divisions in a given term. The lines are Loess
curves that follow the trend of the data.
31
0.8
0.6
Liberal
Conservative
0.4
0.4
0.6
Percentage of Total Caucus
Cloture
Liberal
Conservative
0.2
Percentage of Total Caucus
0.6
0.4
Hanging of Riel
Proportion of Western MPs in the Caucus
0.2
0.8
Proportion of Farmer MPs in the Caucus
Liberal
Conservative
0.2
Percentage of Total Caucus
0.8
Proportion of French MPs in the Caucus
1
4
7
10
14
18
22
Parliament
26
30
34
38
0.0
0.0
0.0
Depression
1
4
7
10
14
18
22
Parliament
26
30
34
38
1
4
7
10
14
18
22
26
30
34
38
Parliament
Figure 5: The first plot represents the distribution of French Canadian MPs within the entire
Liberal and Conservative caucuses. The second and third plots present the same information
for Farmers and Western representatives.
32
(Intercept)
Turnout in House Divisions
Effective no. of Candidates
Total no. of Voters
Cabinet
Governing Party
Minority Government
Last Term
West
Quebec
Maritime
Parliament
Parliament^2
Cohort
Cohort^2
Log(scale)
Total N
Censored N
log L
p(Wald)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
0.808∗∗∗
0.846∗∗∗ 0.747∗∗∗
0.739∗∗∗ 0.762∗∗∗
0.762∗∗∗
(0.013)
(0.020)
(0.026)
(0.032)
(0.018)
(0.026)
−0.007
−0.007
−0.002
−0.011
−0.001
−0.009
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.008)
†
†
∗
−0.009
−0.013
−0.008
−0.005
−0.009
−0.006
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.008)
∗
∗∗
−0.000
−0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
∗∗∗
0.019
0.017†
0.024∗∗∗
0.051∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
0.044∗∗∗
(0.005)
(0.009)
(0.004)
(0.008)
(0.004)
(0.008)
0.016∗
0.049∗∗∗
(0.006)
(0.009)
0.008
0.010
(0.007)
(0.012)
†
−0.009
−0.004
−0.012∗∗ −0.011
−0.010∗
−0.010
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.007)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
−0.063
−0.047
−0.055
−0.059
−0.055
−0.057∗∗∗
(0.009)
(0.014)
(0.007)
(0.013)
(0.008)
(0.013)
∗∗∗
†
∗∗∗
∗
∗∗∗
−0.020
−0.014
−0.022
−0.015
−0.026
−0.020∗
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.008)
−0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗
(0.007)
(0.011)
(0.006)
(0.010)
(0.007)
(0.012)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
0.027
0.034
0.027
0.033∗∗∗
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.005)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
−0.001
−0.001
−0.001
−0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
†
−0.003
−0.008
−0.002
−0.001
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.004)
0.000
0.000†
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
−2.029∗∗∗ −1.779∗∗∗ −2.284∗∗∗ −1.858∗∗∗ −2.256∗∗∗ −1.813∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.056)
(0.042)
(0.048)
(0.047)
(0.053)
4695
4695
4695
4695
4695
4695
1866
2977
1866
2977
1866
2977
1070.300 −715.005 1539.301 −361.402 1336.175 −617.622
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
†
significant at p < .10; ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01;
∗∗∗
p < .001
Table 1: Member loyalty for the Liberal party. Tobit models (1 and 2), with fixed term
effects (model 3 and 4), and fixed cohort effects (model 5 and 6). Models 1, 3 and 5 use all
votes. Models 2, 4 and 6 use government votes only. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors.
33
(Intercept)
Turnout in House Divisions
Effective no. of Candidates
Total no. of Voters
Cabinet
Governing Party
Minority Government
Last Term
West
Quebec
Maritime
Parliament
Parliament^2
cohort
Cohort^2
Log(scale)
Total N
Censored N
log L
p(Wald)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
0.798∗∗∗ 0.856∗∗∗ 0.874∗∗∗ 0.912∗∗∗ 0.844∗∗∗ 0.898∗∗∗
(0.011)
(0.017)
(0.011)
(0.015)
(0.011)
(0.016)
−0.005
−0.010
−0.001
−0.006
0.001
−0.003
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.007)
−0.000
−0.002
−0.000
−0.000
−0.003
−0.005
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.005)
†
−0.000
−0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
∗∗∗
0.024
0.003
0.030∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.006)
(0.009)
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.008)
0.052∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗
(0.006)
(0.010)
−0.001
0.031∗∗
(0.006)
(0.011)
†
−0.008
−0.008
−0.006
−0.010†
0.007†
0.005
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.006)
(0.004)
(0.006)
−0.008† −0.004
−0.008† −0.010
−0.011∗ −0.016∗
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.004)
(0.007)
(0.005)
(0.008)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
−0.048
−0.068
−0.044
−0.057
−0.044
−0.050∗∗∗
(0.007)
(0.010)
(0.007)
(0.010)
(0.008)
(0.011)
−0.007
−0.009
−0.006
−0.010
−0.009† −0.007
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.008)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
0.024
0.031
0.018
0.020∗∗∗
(0.002)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.003)
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
∗∗∗
−0.000
−0.001
−0.000
−0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
∗
∗∗∗
†
−0.006
−0.013
−0.005
−0.005
(0.002)
(0.003)
(0.002)
(0.003)
0.000∗∗
0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
−2.169∗∗∗ −1.920∗∗∗ −2.404∗∗∗ −2.099∗∗∗ −2.362∗∗∗ −2.038∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.062)
(0.064)
(0.062)
(0.062)
3820
3565
3820
3565
3820
3565
1296
1973
1296
1973
1296
1973
1497.866 −47.158 1779.194 260.631 1594.916
46.358
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
†
significant at p < .10; ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01;
∗∗∗
p < .001
Table 2: Member loyalty for the Conservative party. Tobit models (1 and 2), with fixed term
effects (model 3 and 4), and fixed cohort effects (model 5 and 6). Models 1, 3 and 5 use all
votes. Models 2, 4 and 6 use government votes only. Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors.
34
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.552∗
0.484∗
0.786∗
0.764∗
(0.069)
(0.037)
(0.014)
(0.006)
Own Party
0.111∗
0.096∗
0.022∗
0.015∗
(0.019)
(0.018)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Governing Party
−0.061
0.031∗
(0.050)
(0.009)
Minority Government
−0.015
0.024∗
(0.031)
(0.006)
Percentage Seats
−0.035
0.017
(0.160)
(0.028)
Regular Motion
0.053
0.056
0.033∗
0.032∗
(0.029)
(0.032)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Second Reading
0.027
0.047
0.012∗
0.016∗
(0.028)
(0.029)
(0.004)
(0.004)
Supply Motion
0.139∗
0.131∗
0.037∗
0.042∗
(0.029)
(0.031)
(0.006)
(0.006)
Third Reading
0.048
0.047
0.012∗
0.013∗
(0.027)
(0.028)
(0.004)
(0.004)
Throne Speech
0.010
0.087
0.072∗
0.072∗
(0.064)
(0.049)
(0.012)
(0.010)
Parlement
0.054∗
−0.003∗
(0.004)
(0.001)
Parlement^2
−0.001∗
0.000∗
(0.000)
(0.000)
Private Member
−0.135∗
−0.157∗
0.009
0.012
(0.063)
(0.066)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Private Member × Regular Motion
0.069
0.098
−0.016
−0.018
(0.066)
(0.069)
(0.009)
(0.010)
Private Member × Second Reading
−0.147∗
−0.136
−0.029∗
−0.036∗
(0.069)
(0.071)
(0.010)
(0.010)
Private Member × Supply Motion
−0.212∗
−0.206∗
−0.041∗
−0.045∗
(0.104)
(0.095)
(0.019)
(0.018)
Private Member × Third Reading
−0.192∗
−0.178∗
−0.028∗
−0.033∗
(0.071)
(0.069)
(0.010)
(0.011)
Private Member × Throne Speech
0.333∗
0.312∗
−0.029
−0.026
(0.111)
(0.096)
(0.016)
(0.014)
Log(scale)
−1.165∗
−1.226∗
−2.875∗
−2.945∗
(0.037)
(0.041)
(0.016)
(0.020)
Total N
10831
10831
10861
10861
Censored N
8269
8269
33
33
log L
−3132.859 −2799.070 15713.449 16471.929
p(Wald)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05
(Intercept)
Table 3: Party level unity for the Liberal party. Tobit models (1 and 3) with fixed term effects
(2 and 4). Model 1 and 2 exclude abstentions (Yay + Nay votes). Model 3 and 4 include
abstentions (Yay + Nay + Abstentions). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent
standard errors.
35
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
0.822∗
0.654∗
0.817∗
0.800∗
(0.055)
(0.046)
(0.011)
(0.007)
Own Party
−0.032
0.033
−0.003
0.001
(0.018)
(0.020)
(0.003)
(0.003)
Governing Party
0.114∗
0.023∗
(0.041)
(0.010)
Minority Government
0.062
0.074∗
(0.034)
(0.008)
Percentage Seats
−0.481∗
−0.035
(0.103)
(0.025)
Regular Motion
0.112∗
0.105∗
0.016∗
0.014∗
(0.031)
(0.032)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Second Reading
0.087∗
0.074∗
0.008
0.009
(0.029)
(0.032)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Supply Motion
0.162∗
0.167∗
0.042∗
0.038∗
(0.033)
(0.036)
(0.007)
(0.006)
Third Reading
0.032
0.031
0.004
0.004
(0.030)
(0.032)
(0.005)
(0.005)
Throne Speech
0.168∗
0.177∗
0.057∗
0.053∗
(0.063)
(0.062)
(0.013)
(0.011)
Private Member
−0.048
−0.065
0.012
0.008
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.007)
(0.007)
Parlement
0.037∗
−0.002∗
(0.004)
(0.001)
Parlement^2
−0.001∗
0.000∗
(0.000)
(0.000)
Private Member × Regular Motion
−0.033
−0.030
−0.013
−0.010
(0.054)
(0.052)
(0.008)
(0.008)
Private Member × Second Reading
−0.245∗
−0.253∗
−0.030∗
−0.036∗
(0.057)
(0.057)
(0.008)
(0.008)
Private Member × Supply Motion
−0.251∗
−0.289∗
−0.059∗
−0.056∗
(0.095)
(0.103)
(0.014)
(0.014)
Private Member × Third Reading
−0.224∗
−0.246∗
−0.031∗
−0.035∗
(0.061)
(0.058)
(0.009)
(0.009)
Private Member × Throne Speech
0.057
0.056
−0.020
−0.013
(0.091)
(0.085)
(0.016)
(0.014)
Log(scale)
−1.150∗
−1.199∗
−2.793∗
−2.860∗
(0.051)
(0.048)
(0.024)
(0.023)
Total N
10104
10104
10128
10128
Censored N
7484
7484
186
186
log L
−3068.746 −2628.365 13423.685 14097.183
p(Wald)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
∗
indicates significance at p < 0.05
(Intercept)
Table 4: Party level unity for the Conservative party. Tobit models (1 and 3) with fixed
term effects (2 and 4). Model 1 and 2 exclude abstentions (Yay + Nay votes). Model 3
and 4 include abstentions (Yay + Nay + Abstentions). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation
consistent standard errors.
36
Liberal Party
Conservative Party
Model 1.1 Model 1.2 Model 2.1 Model 2.2
(Intercept)
0.811∗∗∗
0.848∗∗∗
0.798∗∗∗
0.858∗∗∗
(0.013)
(0.020)
(0.011)
(0.017)
Turnout in House Division
−0.006
−0.006
−0.004
−0.009
(0.006)
(0.008)
(0.005)
(0.007)
Effective no. of Candidates
−0.009†
−0.013†
−0.000
−0.003
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.003)
(0.005)
Total no. of Voters
−0.000∗
−0.000∗∗
−0.000
−0.000†
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Farmer
−0.015†
−0.012
−0.000
−0.008
(0.008)
(0.012)
(0.006)
(0.009)
French
−0.001
−0.008
−0.022∗∗
−0.026∗
(0.005)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.011)
Cabinet
0.019∗∗∗
0.017†
0.024∗∗∗
0.003
(0.005)
(0.009)
(0.006)
(0.009)
Governing Party
0.016∗
0.049∗∗∗
0.053∗∗∗
0.074∗∗∗
(0.006)
(0.009)
(0.006)
(0.010)
Minority Government
0.008
0.010
−0.001
0.032∗∗
(0.007)
(0.012)
(0.006)
(0.011)
Last Term
−0.008†
−0.004
−0.008†
−0.008
(0.005)
(0.007)
(0.004)
(0.006)
West
−0.061∗∗∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.008†
−0.003
(0.009)
(0.014)
(0.005)
(0.008)
Quebec
−0.020∗∗∗ −0.009
−0.032∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗
(0.006)
(0.009)
(0.007)
(0.010)
Maritime
−0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗
−0.007
−0.009
(0.007)
(0.011)
(0.005)
(0.008)
Parliament
0.027∗∗∗
0.034∗∗∗
0.024∗∗∗
0.031∗∗∗
(0.003)
(0.005)
(0.002)
(0.004)
Parliament^2
−0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Cohort
−0.003
−0.008†
−0.002
−0.001
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.004)
Cohort^2
0.000
0.000†
−0.006∗
−0.012∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.002)
(0.003)
Log(scale)
−2.029∗∗∗ −1.780∗∗∗
0.000∗∗
0.000∗∗∗
(0.000)
(0.056)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Total N
4695
4695
3820
3565
Censored N
1866
2977
1296
1973
log L
1072.223 −714.007
1501.167
−44.410
p(Wald)
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
†
significant at p < .10; ∗ p < .05; ∗∗ p < .01; ∗∗∗ p < .001
Table 5: Party level unity for the Liberal and Conservative parties. Tobit models 1.1 and
2.1 excluding abstentions (Yay + Nay votes). Model 1.2 and 2.2 include abstentions (Yay +
Nay + Abstentions). Heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.
37