Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book, The Influence of Sea
Power on History, 1660 - 1783 contributed
significantly to the rise of an imperialist ideology
in the late nineteenth century.
The Civil War era had speeded the development of
a number of new technologies that called for a
revolution in naval strategy. These included the
use of steam power on seagoing ships, the new
production of cheap and highly durable steel, and
chemical breakthroughs in the use of explosives.
The old wooden, sail-driven fleet was clearly
obsolete. But what was to take its place? The
navy appointed hundreds of commissions to
investigate these new developments and build a
strange array of ships. Some were made of both wood and steel. Others had both
steam and sails. All featured distinctive armaments. The navy had little idea of
what to do with these ships. Those that combined steam and sail power were
required by naval regulations to travel under sail a certain number of hours each
day. The navy, in short, suffered from an embarrassment of technical riches that it
had yet to figure out how to use.
Then Mahan wrote his book. The Influence of Sea Power provided a clear and
convincing rationale for how a navy should be used. Once, it became clear what
the navy needed to be ready to do, all of the technical problems became relatively
easy to resolve and a modern navy became possible.
Bruner, David, Virginia Bernhard and Stanley I. Kutler. Firsthand America: A
History of the United States. 8th Edition. St. James: Brandywine Press.
2005.
Mahan argued that modern navies needed repair and coaling stations. Those
facilities would not be dependable if controlled by other nations. This reasoning
inferred a rationale for American acquisition of port facilities throughout the
world.
Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Interest of America in Sea Power (1897)
Alfred Thayer Mahan was a U.S. naval officer and a founder of the U.S. Naval War College.
While teaching there, Mahan wrote extensively on the role of powerful navies in world history,
and he called special attention to England’s incredible success as a sea power. Mahan argued
tirelessly that only a modern, technologically superior navy could assure the United States of a
powerful place—militarily, economically, and politically—in a changing world. The selection
below was published just one year before the Spanish-American War, as the United States was
pursuing imperialist policies that would expand its political and economic influence throughout
the world.
. . . The interesting and significant feature of this changing attitude is the turning of the eyes
outward, instead of inward only, to seek the welfare of the country. To affirm the importance of
distant markets, and the relation to them of our own immense powers of production, implies
logically the recognition of the link that joins the products and the markets,--that is, the carrying
trade; the three together constituting that chain of maritime power to which Great Britain owes
her wealth and greatness. Further, is it too much to say that, as two of these links, the shipping
and the markets, are exterior to our own borders, the acknowledgment of them carries with it a
view of the relations of the United States to the world radically distinct from the simple idea of
self-sufficingness? We shall not follow far this line of thought before there will dawn the
realization of America's unique position, facing the older worlds of the East and West, her shores
washed by the oceans which touch the one or the other, but which are common to her alone. . . .
Despite a certain great original superiority conferred by our geographical nearness and immense
resources,--due, in other words, to our natural advantages, and not to our intelligent preparations,-the United States is woefully unready, not only in fact but in purpose to assert in the Caribbean
and Central America a weight of influence proportioned to the extent of her interests. We have
not the navy, and, what is worse, we are not willing to have the navy, that will weigh seriously in
any disputes with those nations whose interests will conflict there with our own. We have not,
and we are not anxious to provide, the defence of the seaboard which will leave the navy free for
its work at sea. We have not, but many other powers have, positions, either within or on the
borders of the Caribbean. . . .
Yet, were our sea frontier as strong as it now is weak, passive self-defence, whether in trade or
war, would be but a poor policy, so long as the world continues to be one of struggle and
vicissitude. All around us now is strife; "the struggle of life," "the race of life," are phrases so
familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. Everywhere nation
is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others. What is our protective system but an
organized warfare? . . .
Document Analysis
In the first paragraph, what does Mahan identify as the nation’s advantages in shipping and
markets?
How does Mahan link trade and warfare in his call for an expanded navy?
How does Mahan describe the relationship between the United States and the Caribbean, both
as it was in 1897 and as he hoped it would be?
The Teller Amendment
The Teller Amendment - authorized April 20, 1898
Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the
Island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of
the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating, as they
have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with two hundred and sixty-six of
its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer
be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to
Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of
Congress was invited: Therefore,
Resolved, First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, of right ought to be, free and
independent.
Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the
United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its
authority and government in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces
from Cuba and Cuban waters.
Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and
empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into
the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as
may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.
Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise
sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said Island except for the pacification thereof,
and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and
control of the Island to its people.