CODEBOOK
GOVERNMENTS IN EUROPEAN SEMI-PRESIDENTIAL REGIMES
Project principal:
Petra Schleiter
St Hilda’s College
and Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford.
Research officer:
Emma Sell
Department of Politics and International Relations
University of Oxford.
This data collection project was funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC, Grant Reference No. RES-000-22-0365)
If you wish to use this dataset please cite:
Schleiter, Petra (2004), Dataset: Governments in European SemiPresidential Regimes, available from
http://www.sthildas.ox.ac.uk/drupal-7.12/?q=node/185
Oxford, 2004
Introduction:
This codebook describes the contents of the Governments in European SemiPresidential Regimes dataset. The dataset comprises information on the
governments formed in fifteen East and West European countries, which have or
had semi-presidential regimes for some time between 1945 and Dec 2003. Since
the dataset is designed to enable the study of governments in democratic semipresidential regimes, a threshold for inclusion in the dataset is applied. Countries
are included during time periods in which they reach the mid-scale value of .5 or
better on either the Freedom House or the Polity scales (both normalised to a 0-1
range, where 0 denotes complete lack of democracy and 1 fully fledged
democratic procedures). The countries included in the dataset are Austria,
Finland, France, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, Moldova,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia and Ukraine. For the West European
countries information is collected from the time the first government is formed
post World War II, or from the time the first government is formed after the
adoption of a semi-presidential regime through constitutional change (as in the
case of France and Portugal). For the East European countries information is
collected from the formation of the first government after the adoption of a
democratic semi-presidential regime through constitutional change. The dataset
includes information on governments up to Dec 2003, or up to the point at which
constitutional changes end the semi-presidential regime.
The data consists of a Stata file "Schleiter_Semi-Presidential Cabinets.dta". The
data records government attributes, as well as parliamentary attributes,
presidential
attributes,
and
constitutional
attributes
that
describe
the
environments within which governments work. Cases in these files are defined as
individual governments.
The collection of this dataset was funded by the Economic and Social Research
Council (ESRC, Grant Reference No. RES-000-22-0365). Project principal: Dr
1
Petra Schleiter, St Hilda’s College and Department of Politics and International
Relations, University of Oxford. Research officer: Emma Sell, Department of
Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford.
2
Variables, coding rules and sources
1 Government Attributes
caseno
Government id
country
Country name
countryn
Country id
pm
Name of PM
Sources: Müller and Strøm 2000Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to
1999), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de
Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)
actingPM
Name of acting PM
Sources: Müller and Strøm 2000Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to
1999), Indridasson (2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de
Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)
govpart
Parties/ alliances in government
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson
2000Indridasson (2000) (Iceland),"Keesing's Contemporary
Archives" 1991 - 2003 Ionescu 1997Ionescu (Moldova),
"Constitutional Watch - a Country-by-Country Update on
Constitutional Politics in Eastern Europe and the Ex-Ussr"
2001EECR (Moldova), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate Ortiz
de Zárate (EEU & FSU, WEU from 1999)
govtnumb
Number of government
Note: Continuous numbering of all democratic governments since
the end of WWII, or since the adoption of a semi-presidential
constitution.
formdate
Government formation date
Note: date on which government approved by parliament/ acting
cabinet appointed by president .
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson
(2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU,
WEU from 1999)
termdate
Government termination date
Note: date of formal resignation or date of the election which
constitutionally terminates government, whichever is earlier.
3
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson
(2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU,
WEU from 1999)
elprox
Proximity of cabinet formation to election
Coding : Within 6 months after parliamentary election = 1, More
than six months after presidential or parliamentary elections = 2,
Within 6 months after presidential elections = 3
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU up to 1999), Indridasson
(2000) (Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU,
WEU from 1999)
regime
Character of regime
Coding: President-parliamentary = 1, premier-presidential = 0
Source: definition of regime classification criteria Shugart and
Carey (1992: 23-24), "Constitutions" Constitutions
technic
Character of government
Coding: Technical = 1, Non-technical = 0
Note: Technical governments are defined as governments in which
over 50% of the ministers have no party affiliation.
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data).
govtype
Government type
Coding: Technical = 0, Unified = 1, Cohabitation = 2
Note: Technical governments are defined as governments in which
over 50% of the ministers have no party affiliation.
Unified government is defined as a situation in which the president
is a member of /affiliated with a party in government
Cohabitation is defined as a situation in which the president is not a
member of /affiliated with any party in government
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data).
termin
Preceding government ended by discretionary parliamentary
termination
Coding: Discretionary parliamentary termination = 1, Otherwise = 0.
Note: Discretionary parliamentary terminations are defined as
terminations caused by early parliamentary elections, voluntary
enlargement of coalition, government defeat by opposition in
parliament, termination of acting government by formation of a new
government, conflict between coalition parties, intra-party conflict in
coalition party or parties.
4
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data).
Cause of termination code/s
Note: Text column coding one or several causes of termination.
Coding:
Technical terminations coding:
1 = Regular presidential or parliamentary elections which require
government termination
2 = Other constitutional reason
3 = Death/ Illness of PM
3.5 = Government not terminated by Dec 31 2003
3.51 = Termination of caretaker government by elections that were
arranged before the caretaker government took office.
Discretionary termination coding:
4 = Early parliamentary elections
5 = Voluntary enlargement of coalition
6 = Cabinet defeated by opposition in parliament
6.5 = Acting government terminated by formation of new
government
7 = Conflict between coalition parties
7.5 = Cabinet dismissed by president
8 = Intra-party conflict in coalition party or parties
8.5 = Assembly dissolution by president
Critical event termination coding:
9 = Discretionary resignation after parliamentary/presidential or
other election which does not constitutionally require cabinet
termination
10 = Popular opinion shocks
11 = International or national security event
12 = Economic event
13 = Personal event
14 = President/PM conflict
15 = Insurrection/ Riots
history
Character of previous government
Coding: Technical = 1, Otherwise = 0
Note: history = technic lagged by 1.
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and
FSU data).
majstat
Majority status of government
Coding: Technical = 0, Minority = 1, Majority = 2
5
Note: technical = technic, Minority and Majority defined by
percentage of assembly seats controlled by governing
party/coalition, based on the previous election results. Minority (050%), Majority (50.1-100%)
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck 19972004Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), "Political Transformation and the
Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe" Political
Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist
Europe (2001)(EEU)
duration
Duration of government in days
Note: Number of days from government taking office (formdate) to
government termination (termdate).
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data).
maxdays
Maximum potential duration of government in days
Note: The potential duration of government in days from time of
taking office (formdate) to next constitutionally scheduled election
date, defined by constitutional inter-election period (CIEP).
Coding: nextelecta/p - formdate
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data), International Constitutional Law.
daysdiff
Difference between actual government duration in days and
potential maximum duration of government in days.
Note: Difference in days between actual government duration
(duration)and potential duration according to CIEP (maxdays).
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data), Constitutions.
defgovt
Definition of new government
Note: Reason for identifying new cabinet according to Müller &
Strøm (2000) criteria.
Coding:
1 = A change in the party composition of the government/ or in nonpartisan governments a change of 50% or more of cabinet
members with voting rights
2 = A change of the head of government
3 = Government formation following an election.
These reasons for counting a new government are not mutually
exclusive and several of them may apply at the same time. The
6
different combinations of reasons for counting a new government
are coded as follows:
Aggregation rule: 1 = 1, 2 = 2, 3 = 3, 4 = 1+2, 5 = 1+3, 6 = 2+3, 7 =
1+2+3
Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.
Technical
Technical cause of government termination
Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).
Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred for technical
reason (cause of termination code/s 1 – 3.51), otherwise = 0
Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.
discretionary
Discretionary cause of government termination
Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).
Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred for
discretionary reason (cause of termination code/s 4-8.5), otherwise
=0
Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.
event
Government termination triggered by critical events:
Note: Codes based on termination codes in Müller & Strøm (2000).
Coding: Dummy variable = 1 if termination occurred following a
critical event (cause of termination code/s 9-15), otherwise = 0
Source: Müller & Strøm (2000), Keesings Archives.
cause
Cause of termination
Note: Text column describing reason for cabinet termination
Source: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data)
gvtseats
Government strength in parliamentary seats
Note: Number of seats held by governing party/parties based on
results of last parliamentary election.
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU and
Croatia) Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in PostCommunist Europe (2001) (EEU), "France - Assemblée Nationale"
French Assembly, "Portugal - Assembleia Da República"
Portuguese Parliament
singlmaj
Single party majority in government
Coding: Single party majority = 1, otherwise = 0
Notes: Single party majority coded if a single party forms the
government and controls at least 50.1% of the assembly seats.
7
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU)
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in PostCommunist Europe (2001) (EEU)
prctseat
Government strength in parliament as a percentage of total
seats
Coding: govtseats/totseats x 100.
Note: measured by results of last parliamentary election
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU),
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in PostCommunist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese
Parliament
assuppre
Assembly support for government pre-parliamentary election
Note: Amount of support in the assembly for the government by
percentage of seat shares before an election, based on the
previous election results.
Coding: Minority = 0 (0-50%), Majority = 1 (50.1-66.65%), Supermajority (66.66-100%) = 2
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU),
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in PostCommunist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese
Parliament
assuppos
Assembly support for government post-election
Note: Amount of support in the assembly for the government by
percentage of seat shares after an election. For regimes in which
the constitution does not require the resignation of the government
following parliamentary elections, this variable may differ from
assuppre.
Coding: Minority = 0 (0-50%), Majority = 1 (50.1-66.65%), Supermajority (66.66-100%) = 2
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU),
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in PostCommunist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese
Parliament
2 Parliamentary attributes
totseats
Total parliamentary seats
Note: Number of parliamentary seats filled at the time of the last
parliamentary election
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU),
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in PostCommunist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese
Parliament
8
prctmaj
Percentage of majority based governments during
constitutional era
Note: A constitutional era is delimited by constitutional changes
(coded in datechange) that alter the relationship between president
and parliament, thus creating a new regime
Source: parliamentary election data - Nordsieck (2004) (WEU),
Political Transformation and the Electoral Process in PostCommunist Europe (2001) (EEU), French Assembly, Portuguese
Parliament
parldate
Date of parliamentary election
Note: Date on which parliamentary election took place – if several
rounds, latest date used.
Source: parliamentary election data – Caramani 1999 Caramani
(1999), Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the
Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU),
Election Results Archive, Carr Psephos, Croatia: 2003
Electionworld http://www.electionworld.org/croatia.htm, 2000 and
1992 Election Results Archive http://binghamton.edu/era/elections/
Birch 2003
enp
Effective number of parliamentary parties
Coding: Laakso-Taagepera Index
Note: Data for WEU post-2000 unavailable; 2000 data used.
Sources: WEU: Müller and Strøm (2000 ed.), Iceland: Indridasson
(2000), EEU: Birch (2003: 109-110).
enp2
Effective number of parliamentary parties
Coding: Laakso-Taagepera Index, based on authors' own
calculations using parliamentary election outcomes (see sources
for parldate, prctmaj)
volat
Electoral volatility
Note: Birch –
Volatility = the amount of change observed within the set of
parties that contest two consecutive elections (data available to
2002). To obtain the ‘true’ volatility score it is necessary to divide by
the sum of the fractional shares of the total vote at each election of
the parties which are included in the calculations.
Calculation of indices in Birch (2003) are based on the most
comparable figures, thus figures are based on SMD and PR for
some cases – comments in cells highlight these cases.
9
Warwick – Half sum of proportional changes in parliamentary
strengths of parties from one election to the next (data available to
1987, data unavailable for France).
Sources: Birch 2003Birch (2003) (EEU), Warwick (1995) (WEU)
volatbp
Pedersen volatility score
Note: The Pedersen volatility score - the amount of change
observed within the set of parties that contest two consecutive
elections (data available to 2002) using 2 as a denominator.
This measure is more directly comparable with Warwick’s
data.
Sources: Birch 2003Birch (2003) (EEU), Lane & Ersson (1999)
(WEU).Lane and Ersson 1999
3 Presidential Attributes
presdate
Date of presidential election
Note: Date on which presidential election took place – if more than
one date or run-off then latest date/ run off date used
Source: Psephos, Rulers, "Election Results Archive" Election
Results Archive (WEU, Croatia, Slovenia), "Lijphart Elections
Archive" Lijphart Elections Archive (Finland), "Statistics Finland"
Statistics Finland, "Bundespräsidentenwahl - Historischer
Rückblick" Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria), Political
Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist
Europe (2001) (EEU)
presinaug
Date of presidential inauguration
Note: Date on which president begins tenure
Source: Ortiz de Zárate (2000),"National Politics Web Guide"
National Politics Web Guide (France, Ireland), "Rulers" Rulers
(France), "Presidency of the Portuguese Republic" Presidency of
the Portuguese Republic(Portugal)
electpres
Nature of presidential election
Note: Popular election = 0, Election by parliament = 1
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (WEU post-1999, EEU and FSU
data).
president
Name of president
Note: Name of president and party affiliation/association
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives (subsequent WEU and EEU and FSU
data).
10
prespart
Party membership of president
Coding: Party affiliation = 1, otherwise = 0. Sources: see president.
unified
Unified or divided government
Coding: Unified = 1, Divided = 0
Note: Based on party affiliation of president and coalition/party
make-up of government at time of cabinet formation. Unified
government is coded when the president is a member of/associated
with a party in government.
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
presctrl
Degree of presidential control over government
Coding: Technical = 0, Single party majority = 1, single party
minority = 2, coalition majority = 3, coalition minority = 4,
cohabitation = 5. Coding rules for technical, majority and minority
as for majstat.
Note: Based on party affiliation of president and coalition/party
make-up of government at time of cabinet formation
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
presupre
Presidential support for government pre-presidential election
Note: Amount of presidential support for the government based on
party affiliation at last election.
Coding: Does not support government = 0, Supports government =
1, Supports government and government has a super-majority in
parliament = 2
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
presupos
Presidential support for government post-presidential election
Note: Amount of presidential support for the government based on
party affiliation.
Coding: Does not support government = 0, Supports government =
1, Supports government and government has a super-majority in
parliament = 2
Sources: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives, Ortiz de Zárate (EEU & FSU)
presdis
Presidential involvement in cabinet dismissal
Coding: President not involved = 0, Assembly dissolution by
president = 1, Cabinet dismissal by president = 2, Cabinet
resignation requested by president = 3
11
Source: Müller & Strøm (2000) (WEU), Indridasson (2000)
(Iceland), Keesings Archives.
4 Constitutional Attributes
Sources for all constitutional variables:
Croatia "The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia" The Constitution of
the Republic of Croatia
Moldova –
"Constitution of the Republic of Moldova" Constitution of the
Republic of Moldova
"The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova" Constitution Finder
Ukraine "President of Ukraine" President of Ukraine
Iceland –
Icelandic Constitution
Portugal "Constitution Finder" , "Constitución De La República Portuguesa"
Constitution Finder
Finland –
Constitution Act of Finland Parliament Act 1984Constitution Act of
Finland Parliament Act
Iceland –
Constitutional rules are coded in context of standing orders of
parliament, which give authoritative interpretation of unclear
constitutional passages - Kristjansson 2003Kristjansson in Strøm et
al (2003)
All other countries – "International Constitutional Law" International
Constitutional Law
constdate
Date of Constitutional change
legpow
Legislative power of president
Note: Legislative powers of president according to the Constitution
using Schleiter coding
Aggregation rule – Positive legislative powers (Decree, legislative
initiative, referenda) multiplied by policy responsibility. Then add
sum of negative powers (package veto and judicial review).
Coding:
Decrees (Legislative)
4 Reserved powers, no recission
3 Reserved powers in limited policy areas/ until legislation is
adopted
12
2 President has temporary decree authority with few restrictions
1 Authority to enact decrees limited to states or emergency/martial
law, or by countersignature of government/minister
0 No decree powers, or only as delegated by assembly
Legislative Initiative
4 Unrestricted right of legislative initiative
1 President can exercise legislative initiative only with
governmental/ministerial countersignature
0 No power of legislative initiative
Proposal of Referenda
4 Unrestricted
1.5 President can call a referendum only at proposal or with the
approval of govt
1 President can call a referendum only at the proposal or with the
approval of parliament
0 No power to initiate a referendum
Package Veto/Override
4 No override
3 Override by extraordinary majority
2 Override by absolute majority of whole membership
1 Override by simple majority of quorum (default code when no
specific provisions on override)
0 No veto
Judicial Review (prior to promulgation)
4 President alone refers
2 President, cabinet or majority of assembly refer
1 President, cabinet or minority of assembly refer
0 President may not refer or no prior judicial review
Policy Responsibility
4 Foreign & Domestic (e.g. president presides in Council of
Ministers and/or has explicit domestic policy responsibilities)
2 Foreign, Security, Emergency
1.5 Security/ Emergency only
1 Presidential responsibility can be exercised only upon govt
inititative/ with govt countersignature
0 None
polresp
Policy responsibility of president
Note: Policy responsibility of the president according to the
Constitution using Schleiter coding. See legpow
13
cabpow
Presidential cabinet related powers
Note: Cabinet related powers of president according to the
constitution using Schleiter coding
Aggregation rule: Cabinet termination (average of technical cabinet
termination, cabinet dismissal and censure) plus cabinet formation
plus assembly dissolution powers
Coding:
Cabinet Termination (average technical cabinet termination, cabinet
dismissal and censure)
Technical Cabinet Termination
4 After presidential elections
2 After presidential and parliamentary elections
0 After parliamentary elections
Cabinet Dismissal by president
4 President dismisses cabinet at will
1.5 President may initiate dismissal of ministers, but needs
approval of the PM
1 President may initiate dismissal of cabinet, but requires approval
of the assembly/ advisory body
0 Cabinet/ministers may only be dismissed by assembly/ at
initiative of PM
Censure - No Confidence Vote
4 No censure
3 Censure of cabinet by assembly gives president
discretionary/mandatory power to dissolve the assembly
2 Censure requires government resignation, which may be rejected
by president (possibly on advice of PM)
1 Constructive vote of no confidence
0 Unrestricted censure (through single or repeated no confidence
votes)
Cabinet Formation
4 President appoints PM and/or cabinet without need for assembly
approval
3 President appoints PM and/or cabinet after consultation or with
consent of assembly (e.g. no formal investiture vote required), and
president has first move in all rounds of appointment process
2 President nominates PM, who needs confirmation/investiture by
the assembly; PM proposes/appoints other cabinet ministers
(president has first move in all rounds of appointment process)
14
1 President nominates PM, who needs confirmation/investiture by
the assembly; PM proposes/appoints other cabinet ministers
(president only has first move in first round of appointment process)
0 Parliament proposes PM, president appoints
Assembly Dissolution
4 Unrestricted
3 Restricted by frequency or point within term
2 Requires/ may prompt early presidential elections
1.5 In response to no confidence vote/ failure to adopt budget/
legislative deadlock
1 In response to failed government formation, or only at proposal of
government/PM
0 No provision, or dissolution only when assembly fails to convene
formpow
Cabinet formation powers of president
Note: Cabinet formation powers of president according to the
constitution using Schleiter coding. See cabpow
dismiss
Cabinet dismissal powers of president
Note: Cabinet dismissal powers of president according to the
constitution using Schleiter coding. See cabpow
dissolut
Assembly dissolution power of president
Note: Assembly dissolution powers of president according to the
constitution using Schleiter coding. See cabpow
totpow
Total presidential powers
Note: Total presidential powers according to constitution using
Schleiter coding
Aggregation rule: legpow plus cabpow
scleg
Shugart and Carey presidential legislative powers
Note: Legislative presidential powers according to Constitution
using Shugart and Carey (1992) coding
Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally
given by Shugart and Carey (1992).
Aggregation rule: Additive
Coding:
Package Veto/Override
4 Veto with no override
3 Veto with override requiring greater than 2/3 (of quorum)
2 Veto with override requiring 2/3
15
1 Veto with override requiring absolute majority of assembly or
extraordinary majority less than 2/3
0 No veto; or veto requires only simple majority to override
Partial Veto/ Override
4 No override
3 Override by extraordinary majority
2 Override by absolute majority of whole membership
1 Override by simple majority of quorum
0 No partial veto
Decree
4 Reserved powers, no recission
2 President has temporary decree authority with few restrictions
1 Authority to enact decrees limited (interpreted to include
legislative decree powers during states of emergency and decrees
that require parliamentary approval)
0 No decree powers; or only as delegated by assembly
Exclusive introduction of legislation (reserved policy areas)
4 No amendments by assembly
2 Restricted amendment by assembly
1 Unrestricted amendment by assembly
0 No exclusive powers
Budgetary Powers
4 President prepares budget; no amendment permitted
3 Assembly may reduce but not increase amount of budgetary
items
2 President sets upper limit on total spending within which
assembly may amend
1 Assembly may increase expenditures only if it designates new
revenues
0 Unrestricted authority of assembly to prepare or amend budget
Proposal of referenda
4 Unrestricted
2 Restricted
0 No presidential authority to propose referenda
sccab
Shugart and Carey presidential cabinet powers
Note: Presidential cabinet powers according to constitution using
Shugart and Carey 1992coding (changes to coding in italics)
Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally
given by Shugart and Carey (1992).
Aggregation rule: Additive
16
Coding:
Cabinet formation
4 President names cabinet without need for confirmation or
investiture
3 President names cabinet ministers subject to confirmation or
investiture by assembly
1 President names premier, subject to investiture who then names
other ministers
0 President cannot name ministers except on recommendation of
assembly
Cabinet dismissal
4 President dismisses cabinet or ministers at will
2 Restricted powers of dismissal
1 President may dismiss only upon acceptance by assembly of
alternative minister or cabinet
0 Cabinet or ministers may be censured and removed by assembly
(includes removal by president on approval of assembly).
Censure
4 Assembly may not censure and remove cabinet or ministers
2 Assembly may censure but president may respond by dissolving
assembly
1 “Constructive” vote of no confidence (assembly majority must
present alternative cabinet)
0 Unrestricted censure
Dissolution of Assembly
4 Unrestricted
3 Restricted by frequency of point within term
2 Requires new presidential election
1 Restricted: only as response to censures (or as a result of
legislative factors, or as a response to failure to form government)
sctotal
Shugart and Carey total presidential powers
Note: Total presidential powers according to constitution using
Shugart and Carey (1992) coding
Codes for Bulgaria and Romania diverge from codes originally
given by Shugart and Carey (1992).
Aggregation rule: Additive cabinet powers and legislative powers
nexteleca
Next assembly election date according to constitution
Note: Date of next constitutionally scheduled election, which
triggers government change. Where the constitution is silent
regarding the termination of governments following either type of
17
election, the coding reflects political practice rather than
constitutional norms
Coding rule: parldate + ciepa
Source: parliamentary election data – Caramani 1999Caramani
(1999), Nordsieck (2004) (WEU), Political Transformation and the
Electoral Process in Post-Communist Europe (2001) (EEU),
Election Results Archive, Carr Psephos, ConstitutionsBirch 2003
nextelecp
Next presidential election date according to constitution
Note: Date of next constitutionally scheduled election, which
triggers government change. Where the constitution is silent
regarding the termination of governments following either type of
election, the coding reflects political practice rather than
constitutional norms
Coding rule: presdate + ciepp
Source: Psephos, Rulers, "Election Results Archive" Election
Results Archive (WEU, Croatia, Slovenia), "Lijphart Elections
Archive" Lijphart Elections Archive (Finland), "Statistics Finland"
Statistics Finland, "Bundespräsidentenwahl - Historischer
Rückblick" Bundesministerium für Inneres (Austria), Political
Transformation and the Electoral Process in Post-Communist
Europe (2001) (EEU), Constitutions
ciepa
Constitutional inter-election (parliamentary) period
Note: Number of days, according to the Constitution, to next
parliamentary election that would trigger government change
Source: Constitutions
ciepp
Constitutional inter-election period of president
Note: Number of days, according to the Constitution, to next
presidential election that would trigger government change
Source: Constitutions
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