ECONOMIC RESEARCH CORPORATION REPORT ON THE CHIGNECTO CANAL ,
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THE CHIGNECTO
CANAL
PREPARED FOR:
THE CHIGNECTO CANAL COMMITTEE
SUBMITTED BY:
Donald E. ARMSTRONG, B.A., B.Comm., Ph.D.
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D. Harvey HAY, M.A., Ph.D.
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ECONOMIC RESEARCH CORPORATION LIMITED
1255 University Street, Montreal, P .Q.
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PROJECT
APRIL
1960
No. 196 CC
This report contains the results of a preliminary investiga­
tion into the economic effects of a ship canal across the
Chignecto Isthmus. In this report it has been assumed, in
accordance with the findings of the Surveyer Commission,
that the canal is feasible from a technical point of view and
usable from a climatic point of view.
THE CHIGNECTO CANAL
QUEBEC
SHERBROOKE ( /
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CANADA
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PORTSMOUTH
.Springhill
SCALE OF MILES
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1. SUMMARY
The Chignecto Canal would provide a passage for ships between the
Fundy Bay and Northumberland Strait areas, at a cost estimated by
Foundation of Canada Engineering Corporation Limited at approxi­
mately $90 millions.
2. The Canal would be the direct cause for the investment of over $105
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. millions in new industries in the Fundy area, as announced to the
Chignecto Canal Committee in response to its questionnaire. Of this
total, over $100 millions is the undertaking of the K. C. Irving inter­
ests, conditional upon the construction of the Canal.
The stimulus this new investment would give to regional industry makes
the Chignecto Canal a primary major development project of the
Atlantic region.
New plants constructed as a result of the existence of the Chignecto
Canal would result in a permanent increase in annual production of the
Atlantic Provinces estimated at $280 millions.
The construction phase of the Canal could result in a temporary in­
crease of $300 millions in Canadian incomes, of which $160 millions
might be spent in the Atlantic Provinces.
The net cost to Canada of this step to relieve the depressed conditions
of the Atlantic Provinces could be more than counterbalanced by
increased revenues from the region.
The Canal would be a natural extension of the St. Lawrence Seaway,
linking it with a sheltered route for Atlantic coa~tal shipping. For
the new waterway a laker-type boat could be used which would be
cheaper to build and to operate than the ships normally used in ocean
travel.
It appears probable that the very large tidal power potential of the
eastern portion of the Bay of Fundy will be economically· developed
in the future. This can be achieved without conflict with the construc­
tion and operation of the Canal.
The Surveyer Royal Commission reported favourably on the project in
the 1930'S on climatic and engineering grounds, but, influenced by the
depression, it recommended that construction of the Canal should stand
in abeyance until more favourable conditions prevailed. Both the con­
struction of the St. Lawrence Seaway and the pr<1?ent economic
advantages of the Canal combine to make the project highly desirable
now to aid the depressed economies of the Atlantic Provinces.
THE CHIGNECTO CANAL-The dotted line indicates potential
shipping routes through the Chignecto Canal linking the
St. Lawrence and Northumberland Strait areas with the
Bay of Fundy and the U.S. Atlantic coast. Inset, three
possible variants of the Canal are shown.
I. From Cumberland Basin to Baie Verte, along the Missaguash River. z. A waterway along the course of the Memram­ cook River, and a canal to Shediac Bay. 3. A waterway along the course of the Petitl;Qdiac
River, and a canal to Shediac Bay.
The dams for tidal power projects which may be de­
veloped in future are indicated in red (see page 18)
II
A BRIEF HISTORY
The first suggestion for a canal through the Chignecto Isthmus was
made in 1686 by Jacques de Meulles, Intendant of New France. The subject
has continued to be discussed since then. Twelve major engineering
reports have been submitted on the project and three separate Royal Com­
missions have examined and reported on it. The engineering feasibility of
the canal has never been disputed. The principal economic argument
against its construction appears to have been that at the particular times
this was under consideration, Canada was in an economic depression and
a large capital expenditure was considered not to be appropriate. It must
be remembered that for most of this period the idea that governments
might, in part, fight recessions by means of public works was unknown.
In 1871 a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Sir Hugh
Allan placed the canal among a group which it recommended "for the
general interest of the Dominion should be undertaken and proceeded
with as fast as the means at the disposal of the Government will warrant".
At that time the country was in the midst of negotiations with the United
States for restoration of the Reciprocity Agreement and the United States
commissioners exerted pressure for enlargement of the WeIland Canal.
With attention thus focussed on the canals of Central Canada, the
Chignecto Canal (or Baie Verte Canal as it was then called) became the
only canal strongly endorsed by the Allan Commission which was not built.
In 1880 Mr. H. G. C. Ketchum suggested that a marine railway be
constructed to bridge the isthmus. A company was formed to build the
railroad and a Federal subsidy was voted provided the railway was com­
pleted by July 1, 1890. Ketchum experienced difficulty raising the necessary
capital and the time for completion of the railroad was extended to 1893.
When the railway was three-quarters completed, Ketchum again ran into
difficulties attempting to raise the money. By June 1894 he had sufficient
capital to complete the railway, but a bill allowing a further extension
of time was defeated in 1896 by a vote of 55 to 54. The railway was never
completed.
The last investigation of the subject, by a Commission under the
chairmanship of Dr. Arthur Surveyer in the 1930'S, approved the engineer­
ing and climatic aspects of the Canal. This Commission was stPOngly in­
fluenced by the prevailing economic depression and recommended that the
project be allowed to stand in abeyance until it could be further examined
in the light of future development of Canada's economic situation.
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This Commission found that the Chignecto Canal was technically
feasible as either a half-tide or full-tide project but that the advantages of
a full-tide canal over a half-tide canal outweighed the disadvantage of
relatively small additional cost. It also found that, "The fog study incor­
porated in our report and the statement of fog percentages, based on twenty
years of observation, indicate that Bay of Fundy waters are subject to
rather less fog than is found on the Atlantic shore of Nova Scotia." The
probable savings in transportation costs found by the Commission were
roughly comparable to those estimated in this report. At that time these
savings formed the only arguments for the Chignecto Canal. Today trans­
portation savings are a subsidiary argument. The phenomenal develop­
ment of the Canadian economy which has greatly changed the "prevailing
financial conditions" noted by the Surveyer Commission, has been shared
only partially by the Atlantic Provinces. Today the chief argument for the
Chignecto Canal is that it will be of primary importance in aiding the
depressed economies of the Atlantic Provinces.
III
ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON THE ATLANTICREGI0N
The areas which would benefit most immediately Jrom industrial
development as a result of the Chignecto Canal are probably the Bay of
Fundy and Northumberland Strait areas of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
and Prince Edward Island, the north shores of Nova Scotia and New Bnins­
wick and the western coast of Newfoundland. However, a longer view of
growth resulting from the Canal should also consider developments which
are now taking place or will take place, not only in the Maritime Provinces,
but also on the St. Lawrence north shore, in Labrador, and in south bound
traffic along the St. Lawrence River.
In Newfoundland, there are several promising mineral areas, par­
ticularly in the western part. Surveying is carried on actively althou.gh it is
slow because of the few outcrop pings. Several areas have been proved to
be rich in minerals. The Central Mineral Belt extends southward from the
regions around Notre Dame Bay and contains base metals. Another promis­
ing area is the Ultrabasic Complex or the West Newfoundland Igneous
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fl Belt, which runs south from Bonne Bay along the west coast. In the
northern sections of this area are stratified igneous rocks which resemble
a number of important mining areas in the world, including Sudbury,
Montana, South Africa, and Sierra Leone. From such formations in other
regions have come rich reserves of nickel, platinum, chromite, and asbestos.
Small amounts of chromite and nickel as well as asbestos have been found
in this section of Newfoundland, and there is a similar formation in the
Hare Bay region of the northern peninsula.
There are also important deposits of limestone on the west coast
of Newfoundland, particularly at Humbermouth near Corner Brook, and
of gypsum in the Bay St. George area.
The Bathurst region of New Brunswick is the site of large deposits l
of copper, lead, zinc and silver. Exploration of these regions has continued
for some years, and it was reported in 1959 that this exploratory activity was
greatly increased. Unfortunately there has not been commercial exploitation
of these resources because the price of base metals has been too low to allow
profitable operation. At least three mining operations, those of Brunswick
Mining and Smelting Company Limited, Heath Steele Mines Limited, and
Nigadoo Mines Limited have been in production. They now sit dormant
awaiting a higher price for metals. It has been reported however that new
financial arrangements will lead to the re-opening of the Brunswick
operation in the near future, with plans to ship the ore to Europe for five
years.
One of the natural routes for the concentrates or metal products of
these mines is from the mine to the Atlantic coast of the United States.
Milling woulq take place at the mines. The concentrate resulting from the
milling operation would then be sent through to the~smelter. Provisional
plans have already been made by mining companies, strongly encouraged by
the Government of New Brunswick, to establish a smelter in New Bruns­
wick at a time when the mining operations have been developed to a stage
which will warrant it. The influence of the Canal would encourage an
earlier development of these plans. For example, Strategic Metals are now
attempting to arrange financing for an establishment at Saint John which
would ship 75,000 tons or more to the Great Lakes area.
In Nova Scotia, in addition to coal, gypsum, salt, anhydrite, and
barite, there are plentiful supplies of granite, sandstone, silica, limestone,
dolomite, and quartzite, which represent a potential source for additional
production should the demand arise. Exploratory work is being carried out
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Estimated reserves to 1,000 feet are 150 million tons.
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1\ Uj for the base metals, principally copper, lead, and zinc. The pegmautlC
phases of the Devonian granite, whose constituents are orthoclose (potash),
feldspar, quartz and biotote mica, offer the source for feldspar and the
iron-free quartz used in glass manufacturing. The deposits of oil shale in
Pictou county may be a potential source of liquid fuels, and there may be
petroleum and natural gas in the areas adjacent to the Northumberland
Straits, as these fuels have been found in rocks of the same age in southerl1
New Brunswick. There are also extensive reserves of low grade manganese
ores. Roughly speaking, the total value of mineral production of Canada has
increased by about ten times every twenty-five years. This increase has come
about because of new finds of ore, because of rising prices, and because
known bodies of ore have become economic. Any saving in transportation
cost will aid in making the deposits now known, economic so that they tan
contribute to future growth.
The pulp and paper industry of New Brunswick and of Newfound­
land would also benefit from a reduction of transportation costs. New­
foundland, in particular, with over 8,000,000 acres of productive forest
land on the island, and another 50,000,000 in Labrador, is well able to
expand not only its pulp and paper industry, but also its sawmilling. The
Atlantic States are a natural market for these two areas, and newsprint is
a commodity suited to water transportation. For example, although the
Richelieu Canal is shallow and therefore inefficient, it is regularly used to
tl'ansport newsprint from the St. Lawrence River to New York. The
Chignecto Canal would open a similar although much more capacious
route from northern New Brunswick and Nova Scotia and from western
Newfoundland.
The report of the Commissioner of Mines in New Brunswick dated
March 24, 1960, contained the following statement with reference to the
Chignecto Canal:
"Since transportation is one of our major problems in. the develop­
ment of our natural resources, in order to promote or give incentive to the
development of the mining and forest industry, especially in the north­
eastern section of New Brunswick, I would strongly urge the development
of the ChignectoCanal as, by this development, the shortest possible route
will be opened for shipment to the largest market in the world, namely, the
United States."
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It is to be expected that economic activity generally will benefit
from the new Canal, particularly as growth in one industry or area will
generate growth in ancillary industries or areas. A natural route for coast­
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wise shipping will be opened from Yarmouth to Montreal on the one hand
and to Newfoundland and Labrador on the other.
Refined petroleum products from Saint John could be efficiently de­
livered along the northern coast of New Brunswick and to the ports of the
lower St. Lawrence, and, in turn, products now shipped from Montreal could
be distributed along the Bay of Fundy area. Barite might be transported
from Walton, Nova Scotia through the St. Lawrence for the oil fields of
Central and Western Canada. The existence of the Canal would lead to a
regular service from the Bay of Fundy to the north. With such a service
in operation the Bay of Fundy would lose its present unfortunate position
on a dead-end water road and would become a port of call on a water high­
way. Furthermore, developments which may be expected to take place in
ports and areas of the region, will lead to increasing needs which may be
met from other Maritime areas. Growth in Saint John, for example, will
lead to a greater demand for coal, which might be met from New Brunswick
and Nova Scotia mines.
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This will benefit some sections of the Maritimes, such as the Bay of
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Fundy ports, in particular, as in addition to the advantages of further
economic activity, there will also be the advantages of transportation
savings and consequently lowered costs generally. Finally, the evidence
of existing industries indicates that labour-oriented industries will find
location in the Maritimes attractive, for transportation disadvantages will
be lessened and the advantages of the labour market will ret?ain. If in
ad,dition, the size of the Maritime market will support their operations,
market-oriented industries may find the Maritimes a better than average
Canadian location.
The most concrete evidence of the immediate industrial development
which would commence·· with the undertaking to proceed with the con­
struction of the Chignecto Canal are the statements of intention formally
presented to the Chignecto Canal Committee that investments of over
$105,000,000 will be made in the Bay of Fundy area if, and only if, the
Canal is built. Without a detailed knowledge of these plans it is only
possible to make approximations of the effects of this prospective invest­
ment. The calculations which follow are, therefore, designed to produce
reasonable statements but not forecasts.
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As a first method of approximation we can assume that the investors
will expect a return of six per cent per annum after taxes. Although it is
not expected to be the case, we will treat this investment as if it were all
made in a single plant. This means that the profit involved would be taxed
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at almost 47 per cent. The profit before taxes would therefore be expected
to be $6 x 100/53 = $11.3 millions; Various manufacturing operations
yield profit per sales dollar of from ten to twenty per cent. Sales of these
plants might be planned therefore in the range from $45 to $226 millions.
Taking the average of these two estimates, we would expect a sales volume
from the new plant of approximately $135 millions.
This estimate can be compared with the published statistics for
New Brunswick manufacturing industries for 1943 (the last year for which
estimates of capital investment are given). In that year a capital invest­
ment estimated at $III,287,910 resulted in factory shipments valued at
$140,934,879.1 On this basis an investment of $100 millions would result
in factory shipments valued at $133 millions approximately.
A second method of approximating is to estimate the employment
which will result from the new investment and the value of production
which will result from this employment. The information contained in
the questionnaires returned to the Chignecto Committee indicates that one
employee will be hired for each $10,000 of investment, roughly. On this
basis 10,000 employees would be hired. In 1957 the gross value of products
per employee in New Brunswick manufacturing was approximately
$15,000. 1 We would therefore estimate a total value of production of $155
millions.
It may be expected then, that an annual production of from 50 to
over 200 million dollars would result from investment resulting from the
construction of the Canal. The best estimate would appear to be in the
neighborhood of $140 millions.
There will also be secondary effects of this investment. A study of
the secondary effects of the oil industry in Alberta which is presently
being completed indicates that the secondary effects of investment in that
industry are about equal to the primary effects. If the same relationship
holds for the new income from added manufacturing in New Brunswick,
the annual production discussed above will be doubled. Since this assumes
that only one-half of each dollar spent in New Brunswick for wages and
materials is re-spent in the Atlantic provinces, it appears to be an entirely
reasonable estimate. Perhaps more important, the secondary employment
effects would add a second 10,000 persons to Atlantic payrolls for a total
of 20,000 persons.
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We therefore conclude that this investment can reasonably be
expected to result in an increase in the value of production of some $280
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DBS: The Manufacturing Industries of Canada, Section B, 1957 p. 40.
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millions in the Atlantic Provinces. The range of this estimated increase
would be from $100 to $400 millions. If one compares this increase with
the manufacturtng activity of New Brunswick alone, it will be seen that the
increase in value of factory shipments will be almost equal to the I957
total value of factory shipments in manufacturing. The importance of
such a development to the economy of the Atlantic Provinces is obvious.
The most immediate effects of the Canal will, of course, come from
the construction expenditures. The first effect therefore will be an increase
in the Maritime income of approximately $90 millions. However, it is
well known that an expenditure of this type has secondary effects which
are more important than the primary one. As the original sum is spent
and re-spent by the successive recipients, the income from it is multiplied.
In Canada the multiplier has been estimated as 3.3 from expenditures on
construction. 1 Therefore the expenditure of $90 millions would, in effect,
be an increase in income of approximately $300 millions.
Not all of this, of course, would be spent in the Maritimes. Still,
most of the materials would be purchased in the Maritimes and the labour
would be local from the area. In I957 the Dominion Bureau of Statistics
figures indicate that these items formed 80 per cent of the value of con­
struction work performed. This amount then would be almost entirely
re-spent in the Maritimes. It seems reasonably conservative to estimate that
at least I60,000,000 dollars income would be generated in the Atlantic'
Provinces.
If this Canal were to be considered solely, or even chiefly, in terms of
the transportation savings, based on present traffic, which are outlined in
the following section, it would not be justified. The justification of the
Canal rests upon the contribution to the revivification of the Atlantic
Provinces actively derived from the new industrial investment of more than
$IOO millions which will follow the construction of the Canal. There tan
be no doubt that the increase of from $100 to $400 millions in the value of
production will be of major significance in terms of the economic develop­
ment of the Atlantic Provinces. The temporary increase in income of some
$300 millions generated by the construction expenditures will be continued
by the new industries established.
Since the chief effect of the canal would be to encourage new in­
dustry it is clear that it would encourage new trade rather thap divert
trade from other shipping routes.
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Harvie, Thomas: Relationship of the Aircraft Industry to the Canadian Economy. Unpub­
lished M.A. Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1958.
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IV
THE IMPACT OF THE CANAL ON EXISTING SHIPPING
The impact which the Chignecto Canal will eventually have on
shipping patterns is discussed in the second part of this section. It is im­
portant to note first what savings may be effected in shipping costs with
the present patterns of trade. Three principal routes will be affected;
first, between the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence ports and those of the Bay
of Fundy and the eastern seaboard of the United States; second, between
ports on the Bay of Fundy and ports to the north, especially other ports
in the Atlantic Provinces; and third, particularly at those times of year
when northern tracks are being used, between ports on the Bay of Fundy
and northern European ports.
To a ship-owner a canal is useful only if it permits entry. into an
area otherwise inaccessible, or if it permits the use of ships more economical
than would be possible without it, or if it shortens the time of a voyage.
The saving in distance brought about by the canal must be considered in
relation to the slower speed in restricted waterways, delay in locks and so
forth. For an initial approach, however, an estimate of the total traffic
which would use the canal may be obtained by noting the total trade which
was being carried on, between points w~ich would use the canal, in a given
year. The estimates which follow are based on ~he 19,57 traffic pattern.
Potential Chignecto Canal Traffic
(Short Tons)
Traffic
Bay of fundy
to Northern
Ports
St. Lawrence
to South
Atlantic
Total
Inbound
Outbound
2,800,000
4 00,000
3,200,000
1,800,000
. 150 ,000
I,95 0 ,000
Total
4,600,000
55 0 ,000
5,15 0 ,000
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The estimate for St. Lawrence to South Atlantic ports is based on
information supplied by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, on the likely
use of the Canal by ships plying this route. Certain downward adjustments
were made to reduce the total by the amounts which were destined for ports
considered to lie too far to the east to use the Canal.
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The potential of 5,150,000 for the Chignecto is almost half that
which, in the same year, 1957, on which these estimates were based, the St.
Lawrence Canals carried (12,200,000 tons).
Since even at a depth of 35 feet, the ore trade would tend to seek
deeper routes, approximately 7,000,000 tons of iron ore from the St. Law­
rence to United States ports were excluded from these calculations. Some
part of the shipping involved would likely use the Canal, at least on the
return voyage.
The Bay of Fundy - Northern Ports traffic was estimated on a
proportional basis. First the proportion which total trade of the Bay of
Fundy ports to other eastern Canadian ports bears to the total trade of all
New Brunswick and Nova Scotia ports to other eastern Canadian ports
was found. This proportion of loadings and unloadings was then applied
separately to the trade of New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia to other prov­
inces individually. To estimate the trade of Bay of Fundy ports with other
ports of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, one-half of the proportionate
share was taken. This amount was used since in each case about one-half
the coast line would not use the canal.
Attempts to estimate the precise savings in shipping costs are very
difficult. The best route between two points is not necessarily the most
direct. Local conditions along the route may make deviations necessary.
Shipments from various ports to each destination must be estimated since
only aggregated traffic statistics are published. Nevertheless, it is possible
to make computations which indicate the order of magnitude of the savings
which would be accomplished. After allowance for delays in the canals
because of lockage and slow speed in the restricted channel, an examination
of the 1957 shipping figures indicates savings of approximately $500,000.
The basis of the calculations is set out in Appendix B.
A more important aspect of the impact on shipping cannot be
illustrated by examination of the trade pattern of past years. That is the
amount of shipping activity which would be generated by the existence of
the Canal. The distance between Atlantic Provinces ports by water would
be cut, in some cases, by as much as 415 nautical miles. The existence of this
short route would in itself create an impetus to increased coastwise ship­
ping. The fact that two of these provinces are isolated by water of course
lends emphasis to the use which must be made of ships.
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Again, it is impossible to give numerical estimates of the coastwise
shipping which would be generated. There are, however, three reasons for
believing that an increase will take place.
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Shipping trade already exists between ports north of, and south of,
the Chignecto Isthmus. Empirically, it has been found that trade
between closer points is greater than between more widely separated
points. Further, this difference seems to be more closely related to
the square of the difference than to the difference itself. Thus
halving the effective transportation route between the two points
will tend to quadruple the trade between them.
The Canal would make the Bay of Fundy a natural extension of
the route from the Great Lakes to the ports of the Eastern United
States and the Panama Canal.
The fact of more frequent sailings between these ports would, itself,
create more offerings of traffic as shippers became aware of the
possibility of faster service.
While it is not possible to make numerical calculations of the amount
which might be saved in this trade, there can be no doubt that the stimula­
tion which the Canal will give to shipping in the area will expand the
savings in transportation costs considerably.
In addition to the traffic generated immediately, there will in future
years be a natural growth of trade. The use of the St. Lawrence Canal, to
give an example, has been very closely related to general economic activity
in Canada. 1 The tremendous rate of growth in Canada's economy has been
sufficient to cause a doubling in real Gross National Product every fifteen
years. Even if we assumt:! a more modest rate of increase in the future it is
clear that the use of the Canal will grow quickly once it is established. Even
so, the savings in transportation costs estimated in this section would not,
in themselves, be justification for constructing the Canal. However, it is
obvious that since the new industry discussed in the previous section is
predicated upon the existence of the Canal, this new industry will be an
important user of the Canal, and will greatly expand its use. .
A new water route will be established which will permit the use of
a different type of craft to those used in ocean travel. It could be a laker­
type boat which could operate under a restricted international licence and
with personnel certified for home trade, and would be much less expensive
to build and to operate than a normal ship. New services could thus operate
successfully in a Maritime area which is not now adequately served by sea
transportation.
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The result will be to revitalize the area economically.
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Tonnage carried through the Sf. Lawrence Canal and Gross National Expenditure in
constant 1949 dollars are very highly correlated for the eleven years 1947-1957. (r = .948).
IS 'v
TIMING OF THE CHIGNECTO CANAL PROJECT
It is obvious that the more quickly the Chignecto Canal is built, the
quicker benefits will flow from it. If an immediate start is made, final
engineering examination· and specification will not be completed until
1961. The cost of the engineering study necessary before the final cost of
construction can be confirmed has been put at $350,000 by Foundation of
Canada Engineering Corporation Limited. It might be argued that a time
when the Government of Canada and our financial institutions are pre­
occupied with fighting inflation is not a time to consider large expendi­
tures. However,
., the Atlantic Provinces, as is well known, suffer from what
might fairly be described as a permanent recession. This project would be a
most valuable addition to the gov:ernmental armoury of weapons to
combat regional depression. It has the following important advantages.
It is sufficiently large that it will have a decided impact on
. the economy of the Maritime Provinces.
It will create advantages of lasting benefit to the eastern part
of Canada.
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Should this project be undertaken as part of a programme to combat
regional depression, the cost to Canada will be less than the expenditures
on it.. These expenditures will be. offSet in .part by expenditures which
w0u!d otherwise be made for unemployment insurance am! might make it
possible to reduce certain other subsidies. In fact, since the effect is
multiplied, this saving will be more than the direct replacement of wages for
unemployment insurance. In addition some part of the cost will be re­
covered as corporate and personal income taxes which would not otherwise
be due. The calculations of Section III would indicate that corporate
income taxes from new industry resulting from the Canal would be in the
order of $10 rriilHons. The actual ~et cost to the Government of Canada
of the Canal could therefore be negative.
16 APPENDIX A GENERAL DESCRIPTION AND LOCATIONl Engineers have considered four routes for the Canal. A route along
the Missaguash River is thought to be the most advantageous as it would
pass through marshland along four-fifths of its length and would present
the smallest excavation problem. It is about 16 miles long. This route is
illustrated in the inset map, numbered 1.
There is a shorter possible route from Moncton to Shediac Bay
which would be between 12 and IS miles long. As it runs over high ground,
however, the amount of excavation needed would be at least three times
the amount required for the Missaguash route, (I).
The Canal will form a natural extension of the St. Lawrence Ship
Channel. It should therefore be of at least the 27-foot depth of the St.
Lawrence Seaway. Preliminary engineering reports indicate that a 35-foot
depth which prevails up to Montreal will be practicable. This is the more
important as the average size of ocean-going ships is increasing. In 1958
about half the available ocean-going tonnage required a depth of over 30
feet when fully loaded.
If the ore and tanker trades are important even greater depth is re­
quired. A depth of 40 feet can be considered minimum for large ore­
carriers. Charts I to IV illustrate this diffetence and the tendency for the
average size of ships to grow. One source of confusion is the abundance
of "Liberty" ships which are still in existence. While. these ~hips exist they
are already becoming of uneconomical size (and, of course, age). On No­
vember 1st, 1958, over 400 "Liberty" ships were inactive.
A depth of 35 feet will allow tankers up to 25,000 tons dwt., and
other ships up to 20,000 tons dwt., with a maximum 32 foot draft, to use the
canal when fully loaded.
The difference in tide levels between Cumberland Basin and Baie
Verte makes at least one lock necessary. The maximum tide range in Baie
Verte is about 10 feet, compared to 50 feet in Cumberland Basin while
extreme tides at Cumberland Basin are about 20 feet lower or higher than at
Baie Verte.
The cost of a 35-foot deep canal with a width of 300 feet including
the cost of one lock, approach facilities to the canal, one railroad crossing
and two highway crossings but exclusive of land expropriation'! costs, was
estimated at approximately $90 millions by Foundation of Canada En­
1
Engineering information included in this section has been summarized from "A Preliminary
Engineering Report on the Chignecto Canal" prepared by Foundation of Canada Engineering
Corporation Limited (April, 1959)
17
gineering Corporation Limited. The plan, together with the proposal to
employ one lock, is the result of close cooperation between the Corporation
and LaSalle Hydraulic Laboratory. It has been independently examined
and approved by Professor P. Danel, President of Sogeah in France, who
is a leading world authority on hydraulics; and we believe the system pro­
posed in the report to be worthy of the most careful study before it is
abandoned in favour of a two-lock system.
With one lock, at the Cumberland Basin entrance, the canal's water
level will fluctuate from about 0 - 8 feet, with the Baie Verte tides. With
two locks, one at either end, the canal's water level can be kept constant at
about I4 - 16 feet above low tide at Baie Verte. One lock will naturally
reduce the time of a ship's passage through the canal, will decrease main­
tenance costs, and will enable ships with 36 foot drafts to pass through at
high tide, since the time of the passage, which is zt-3 hours, would be shorter
than the time during which the water level in the canal will be higher than
the 35 foot minimum. One lock will also avoid the drainage problem which
will be raised when the canal with its constant water level will cut across the
Missaguash River. These advantages of the one lock system outweigh the
extra excavation which will be required to maintain the 35 foot depth at low
tide.
The lock chamber would be 800 feet long and 100 feet wide, which
is the minimum size required to handle large tankers, freighters or carriers,
and tugs towing barges. The time for the passage of a ship through the lock
would not exceed 30 minutes.
The lock will consist of a main chamber, gates and filling system,
and approaches with mooring facilities on both sides. A railway bridge will
be located at the south end. The chamber walls will be of concrete crib
construction with the cribs 60 feet wide and 95 feet high, filled with gravel
or rock and provided with mooring facilities.
The bottom of the chamber will be lined with a concrete slab con­
taining weep holes to release hydrostatic pressure under the lock.
Estimates of the cost of the canal have been made on the basis
of assumed ground elevations and assumed soil types. Firmer estimates
would require soil borings and finer mapping than has yet been done.
It appears probable that the very large tidal power potential of the
eastern portion of the Bay of Fundy will be economically devel~ped in the
future. This can be achieved without conflict with the construction and
operation of the Canal. If tidal power plants are built later in the Cumber­
land and Shepody Basins, navigation would benefit from increased water
depth in the Cumberland Basin.
18
ENGINEERING ESTIMATES The following excavation quantities are based upon assumed ground elevations: Canal
75,500,000 cu. yd. Dredging excavation
$30,200,000
6,500,000 cu. yd. Rock excavation
13,000,000
2,000,000 cu. yd. Rock protection
8,000,000
$51,200,000
Canal Approaches
13,050,000 cu. yd. Dredging-Cumberland Basin
4,567,500 12,210,000 cu. yd. Dredging-Baie Verte
4,273,500 8,841,000
Navigation Lock
825,000 cu. yd. Earthwork including excavation,
backfill and pumping
1,452,000
155,300 cu. yd. Concrete in lock chamber
3,880,000
37,600 cu. yd. Concrete in 39 dolphins and
bridging
2 sets of sector gates (94' x 100' opening)
including equipment
28,000 sq. ft. Sheet piling
1,504,000
4,300,000
84,000
11,220,000
Road Crossings
2 high level highway crossings
2,600,000 1 railway bridge (at lock)
1,100,000 3,700,000
Contingency 20%
$74,961,000
14,992,200
$89,953,200
APPENDIX B-1
Estimated Daily Running Expenses Under "Free Flag"-Ore Carriers & General Cargo Ships
Carrying
Capacity
(tOns)
Total
Personnel
Officers I
Crew
Victualing
$
Payroll
$
I
Stores
Repairs
$
$
Surveying
$
Manage. ment Mise.
$
$
Total Daily Running Expenses $
(1956 Figures)
ORE CARRIERS
20,000
8
30
250.00
50.00
80.00
80.00
35.00
65.00
50.00
610.00
30,000
8
30
250.00
50.00
80.00
80.00
35.00
65.00
50.00
610.00
40,000
8
32
270.00
55.00
90.00
100.00
45.00
65.00
50.00
675.00
50,000
8
32
270.00
55.00
90.00
120.00
45.00
65.00
50.00
695.00
60,000
8
35
300.00
60.00
100.00
120.00
55.00
65.00
50.00
750.00
N
o
(1958 Figures)
GENERAL CARGO
35
-
-
-
10,500
35
-
-
13,500
35
-
-
-
7,500
-e
--
(1)
Includes certain insurance items.
-_
......... ­
-
-
-
-
-
650.00
-
-
-
650.00(1)
-
-
-
800.00(1)
APPENDIX B·2
Speed and fuel costs-per day
Ore Carriers and General Cargo Ships Under "Free Flag"
Carrying
Capacity
(tons)
Miles Per:
Hour
I
Fuel Tons
Per Day
Day
ORE
CARRIERS
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
. Price of Fuel
per ton
(Average)
Cost of
Fuel per
day
$
$
(1)
(2 )
(3)
5
15
120
360
30
30
10
25.00
25.00
25.00
750.00
750.00
250.00
(1 )
(2 )
(3 )
5
15
120
360
35
35
12
25.00
25.00
25.00
875.00
875.00
300.00
(1)
(2 )
(3)
5
15
120
360
40
40
15
25.00
25.00
25.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
375.00
(1)
(2 )
(3 )
-
-
-
-
-
-
15
120
360
45
45
18
25.00
25.00
25.00
1,125.00
1,125.00
450.00
5
15
120
360
-
50
50
20
25.00
25.00
25.00
1,250.00
1,250.00
500.00
(1)
(2 )
(3)
5
15
120
360
15
15
25.00
25.00
375.00
375.00
(1 )
(2 )
(3 )
5
15
7
25.00
25.00
25.00
450.00
450.00
175.00
20
20
10
25.00
25.00
25.00
~OO.OO
(1 )
(2 )
(3 )
5
-
-
-
GENERAL
CARGO
7,500
10,000
13,500
(1)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(2 )
(3 )
-
-
5
15
-
-
-
120
360
18
18
-
120
360
-
Canal
Sea
Port
21
-
-
00.00
250.00
APPENDIX B·3 Estimated Daily Capital Charges-"Free Flag"-Ore Carriers and General Cargo Ships
-
CoSt of
Construction
Per Ton of
Deadweight
.$
Carrying
Capacity
(tons)
Total Cost of Construction .$
Daily
Interest
Annual Payments
Interest at 5% per
Payments Year on
at 5% on Outstanding Outstanding
Capital
Capital .$
.$ (1) Annual
Cost of
Depreciation
at 5%
per Year
.$
Daily
Cost of
Depreciation
at 5%
per Year
.$
Annual
Cost of
Insurance
at 2% of
Total
Value of
Ship
[$ (2)
Daily
Cost of
Insurance
at 2% of
Total
Value of
Ship
[$
Total
Daily
Capital
Charges
:$
(1956 figures)
ORE CARRIERS hi
tJ
20,000
175.00
3,500,000
105,850
290.00
175,000.00
479.00
70,000
192.00
961.00
30,000
175.00
5,250,000
158,775
435.00
262,500.00
719.00
105,000
288.00
1,442.00
40,000
175.00
7,000,000
211,700
580.00
350,000.00
959.00
140,000
384.00
1,923.00
50,000
175.00
8,750,000
264,625
725.00
437,500.00
1,200.00
175,000
479.00
2,404.00
60,000
175.00
10,500,000
317,550
870.00
525,000.00
1,438.00
210,000
575.00
2,883.00
(1958 figures)
GENERAL CARGO SHIPS 7,500
71,250.00
195.00
28,500
80.00
392.00
59,850
164.00
99,750.00
273.00
39,900
109.00
546.00
76,950
210.00
128,250.00
351.00
51,300
140.00
701.00
1,425,000
42,650
10,500
190.00
1,995,000
13,500
190.00
2,565,000
(1)
(2)
"
117.00
190.00
-I
Present race is closer to 6%.
Average insurance is 2-21;2%, buc can vary widely with experience.
APPENDIX B ~4
Estimated Daily Transportation Costs
-By Type of Carrier and Carrying Capacity- .
Daily·
Capital
Charges
:$
Carrying
Capacity
(tons)
Daily
Running
Expenses
$
20,000
610.00
750.00
961.00
2,321.00
30,000
610.00
875.00
1,442.00.
2,927.00
40,000
675.00
1,000.00
1,923.00
3,598.00
50,000
695.00
1,125.00
2,404.00
4,224.00
60,000
750.00
1,250.00
3,883.00
5,883.00
7,500
650.00
375.00
392.00
1,417.00
10,500
650.00
450.00
546.00
1,646.0<?
13,500
800.00
500.00
701.00
2,O(} 1.00
Daily
Fuel
Consumption
$
Total
Daily
Expenses
$.
-
ORE
CARRIERS
GENERAL
CARGO
SHIPS
'r
APPENDIX B-S
Estimated Savings of Shipping Costs
Costs
Saved
$
Days
Saved
Trips
per Year
Prince Edward Island
-United States (New York)
-Panama
-West Indies
-South America
-Central America
0.41
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
1.18
0.22
0.70
0.85
0.04
809
70
222
270
13
Nova Scotia (Bay of Fundy)
-Prince Edward Island
-Newfoundland
-New Brunswick
-Nova Scotia
-Province of Quebec
0.99
0.69
1.10
0.66
0.80
0.26
5.85
0.41
0.75
4.60
430
6,746
754
827
6,150
New Brunswick (Bay of Fundy)
-Prince Edward Island
-Newfoundland
-New Brunswick
-Nova Scotia
-Province of Quebec
0.93
0.51
1.05
0.93
1.06
0.87
0.77
7.05
15.39
32.81
1,352
656
1,237
2,391
58,122
New Brunswick (North)
-United States
0.55
18.26
16,784
Province of Quebec
-United States
-Panama
-West Indies
-South America
-Central America
0.41
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.19
205.73
36.10
77.18
90.11
7.22
140,965
11,463
24,507
28,612
2,293
Newfoundland
-United States
0.09
29.79
4,807
Route
Allowance for Additional Sav­
ings by Protected Shipping
TOTAL
200,000
't
509,480
In making the above estimates a speed of 6 m.p.h. was assumed in the Canal and a one­
half hour delay in the lock. The calculations were based on information received from ship
operators about the costs of operating a ship under "free flag", Although some operators
believe that individual items in the estimates are open to question, there is general agreement
that the totals are realistic. Costs vary gready depending upon the country of registry, In the
main text the total above was inflated to make what is believed to be a conservative allowance
for the additional savings which will be realized by ships of "protected flag", No shipments of
iron ore have been included in these estimates.
CHART I
DISTRIBUTION
DRAUGHT OF FREIGHTERS
Mid - 1958
No. of Ships
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
.(
o
14 and
under
15 -
19
20 -
24
Draught in Feet
25 -
29
30 -
34
35 and
over
CHART II DISTRIBUTION DRAUGHT OF FREIGHTERS ON ORDER Mid - 1958 No. of Ships
840
720
600
480
360
240
120
'/
O~--------~"WL---
14 and
under
15 -
19
20 -
24
25-2930-34
Draught in Feet
35 and
over
CHART III
DISTRIBUTION DRAUGHT OF BULK CARRIERS Mid· 1958
No. of Ships
300
250
200
150
100
50
o
14 and
under
15 -
19
20 -
24
Draught in Feet
27
25 -
29
30- 34
'I
35 and
over
CHART IV DISTRIBUTION DRAUGHT OF BULK CARRIERS ON ORDER Mid - 1958 No. of Ships
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
14 and
25 -
under
29
over
Draught in Feet
28