The Institute for Domestic and International Affairs, Inc.
Special Political and Decolonization
Reunification of the Korean Peninsula
Director: Ian Liberty
© 2008 Institute for Domestic & International Affairs, Inc. (IDIA)
This document is solely for use in preparation for Rutgers Model
United Nations 2008. Use for other purposes is not permitted
without the express written consent of IDIA. For more
information, please write us at [email protected]
Policy Dilemma ______________________________________________________________ 1
Chronology __________________________________________________________________ 4
1 December 1943: Sin’ganhoe Formed ________________________________________________ 4
August 1945 – August 1948: 38th Parallel Drawn________________________________________ 5
25 June 1950: The Korean War______________________________________________________ 5
1968: North Korea Attempts Attack on South Korean President __________________________ 6
March-July 1972: U.S. Recognizes DPRK _____________________________________________ 6
1974: North Korea Increases Nuclear Capacity_________________________________________ 7
1992-1994: North Korea Comes to Conflict with IAEA __________________________________ 7
21 October 1994-2002: Framework Agreement Signed __________________________________ 7
13-15 June 2000: Summit in Pyongyang _______________________________________________ 8
9 January 2002: U.S. Labels North Korea a Part of “Axis of Evil” _________________________ 8
2002-2003: U.S. Relations with Korean Peninsula Sour __________________________________ 9
January - June 2004: U.S. Attempts to Negotiate _______________________________________ 9
10 February 2005: North Korea Announces Nuclear Capacity ___________________________ 10
2-4 October 2007: New Attempts at Peace ____________________________________________ 10
Actors and Interests __________________________________________________________ 12
Russia __________________________________________________________________________ 12
China __________________________________________________________________________ 13
Japan __________________________________________________________________________ 14
United States ____________________________________________________________________ 16
South Korea _____________________________________________________________________ 18
North Korea_____________________________________________________________________ 19
Possible Causes _____________________________________________________________ 20
Similar but Disparate Cultural Identities with Differing Political Ideologies ________________ 20
Korean War Has Not Technically Ended _____________________________________________ 22
Fear of Economic Collapse_________________________________________________________ 23
Projections _________________________________________________________________ 24
Conclusion _________________________________________________________________ 25
Discussion Questions _________________________________________________________ 26
Bibliography ________________________________________________________________ 27
Further Reading _________________________________________________________________ 27
Works Cited_____________________________________________________________________ 28
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Policy Dilemma
The Korean Conflict officially ended with the signing of an armistice on 27 July,
1953;1 however, more than fifty years later, the peace process is far from complete. The
demilitarized zone (DMZ) established after the end of the military action still contains
more than 1.8 million military personnel, twenty-nine thousand of which are United
States (US) troops.
2
The struggle to reunify the peninsula is, in addition to being one of
the causes of the Korean Conflict, an item still at the top of both North and South Korea’s
agendas. The fundamental differences within each state’s political systems pose the
biggest problems in reunification, however, and related issues such as nuclear
proliferation and possible economic collapse make the problem even more complex. The
current unrest between states traces back to North Korea’s raid on the South Korean
presidential Blue House in 1968.3 While to the rest of the world, and especially to the
South Koreans, this action was a continuation of violence in the area, for the North
Koreans, it was simply another attempt at reuniting the Korean Peninsula. Both states
have in the past justified steps taken in order to reunify the peninsula by citing the
importance of one united state, even a state established in force. This mindset can be
dangerous for the stability of both Koreans and the rest of the world, however; had the
U.S. not stepped in to prevent the South Korean government from retaliating to the 1968
attack, there could have been a second Korean Conflict. Columbia University professor
Samuel S. Kim points out that “over the course of their mutually antagonistic existence,
both South Korea [Republic of Korea (ROK)] and North Korea [Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK)] have sought to claim legitimacy over the entire Korean
peninsula and have necessarily had to deny the legitimacy of the other state and its
1
Chris Wright. Korea: Its History and Culture. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1996. p 87
Associated Press, “U.S Military: N. Korean Troops Along DMZ Get Bolder,” Fox News, 11 October 2006,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,219670,00.html (accessed 26 February 2008)
3
Samuel Kim. Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. p 142
2
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strikingly similar claim.”4
The eventual unification of Korea is a stated goal of both governments. Roadblocks to this process are major, however: clashing political ideologies, a history of
distinct foreign supporters for both Koreas, a progression over time of cultural
differences, and economies that are individual to each Korea and are entirely reliant on
factors unique to the history of each region.5 These obstacles have led to stops and starts
in dialogue over the course of almost forty years, and an alarming predilection by both
states to turn to threats of military (and nuclear) force as a solution to their problem. As a
result of the inherent disagreements between both Koreas, it has become necessary to
involve the global community in the effort to unify the peninsula. Many states agree that
the only way to truly foster the reunification of the peninsula is to take into account the
complexity of the problem and address not only the threat of nuclear war, but also the
possibilities and implications of bringing together disparate cultures, politics, and
economies.6
There has been an increase in attempts recently by states to help North Korea and
South Korea peacefully come to a solution. Throughout the history of this conflict, both
Koreas have joined the U.S., Japan, Russia, and China in coming together for six-party
talks in an effort to develop a resolution diplomatically. All of these states have a strong
interest in resolving the conflict either due to their geographic proximity to the region or
because of their political and economic involvement with the Koreas as the conflict has
progressed. Six-party talks have focused on a various solutions that could override North
Korea’s unwillingness to dismantle their nuclear program and the subsequent refusal of
4
Ibid, 9
Feffer, John. “Korea’s Slo w- Motion Reunification,” 9 June 2002.
http://w w w.boston.com/ne ws/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/06/09/koreas_slo
w_ motion_reunification/ (accessed 26 February 2008)
5
6
Ibid.
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the U.S. to fulfill promises of aid and lifting sanctions. 7 The basic areas of interest in sixparty talks (which have gone through periods of inaction and reconvening) are: security
guarantees, construction of and peaceful uses of nuclear energy, improvement of
diplomatic relations, lifting of trade restrictions, and verifiable/irreversible disarmament.8
The consequences of leaving this problem unresolved would be dangerous. With
North Korea now in possession of missile mountable nuclear warheads, any escalation
from either side could lead to another Korean conflict, an added dimension of which is
possible nuclear disaster. Other than military or nuclear threats, sustainability and
development in the region also stands to falter should a solution not be reached. The
people are suffering on a much more individual level as a result of the conflict. South
Koreans are unable and disallowed by both their own government and the North Koreans
to cross over into North Korea to visit family or friends who may reside on the other side
of the parallel; this situation plays out in North Korea as well. The basic quality of life
has declined for all involved, though even more so for the North Koreans than the
commercially-developed, economically-sound South Koreans. Gen. John Tilelli, Jr., of
the U.S. Army’s Republic of Korea/U.S. Combined Force Command pointed out, “[North
Korean leader] Kim Jong Il’s primary responsibility is preservation of the regime. He
doesn’t care about economic development or if people are starving.” Droughts and severe
famine have plagued North Korea since the late 1990s, leaving an estimated two to three
million dead from hunger or famine-related disease.”9 Agricultural and economic decline
is just a sampling of the things that could further go wrong should the conflict between
“Update on Six-Party Talks,” U.S. Department of State, May 2008,
http://w w w.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2008/may/104558.htm (accessed 26 February 2008)
7
“Six Party Talks Await Complete, Correct Data from North Korea,” US Department of State,
M arch 2008, http://w w w.america.gov/st/usgenglish/2008/March/20080320130437tdpper0.4043848.html (accessed 06 October 2008)
8
9
Lory Hough. Forum Panelists Tackle View of North Korea as 'Axis of Evil' Nation. 2 April 2 2002.
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/news/2002/NKorea_Forum_030302.htm (accessed 26 February 2008).
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the Koreas continue unresolved. More people will be denied their basic human rights, and
Korea will exist as two disparate regions constantly fighting for dominance.
The only possible way to avoid the eventual negative consequences is through
peaceful dialogue and agreement. Another ineffective armistice simply will not work if
the world is to see a reunited Korea. It is imperative that six-party talks, along with other
diplomatic efforts, continue on with the goal of conciliatory action. The easiest way to
maintain peaceful relations between states is through communication rather than more
threats. There are also economic and cultural disparities that must be examined,
addressed, and planned for, in the event of reunification.10 By continuing diplomatic
efforts and rebuilding each state’s economy, the Koreas could move much closer to the
ultimate goal of becoming the unified nation of pre-Second World War times, but the
global community needs to properly examine each factor involved in order for a
comprehensive resolution to be created.
Chronology
1 December 1943: Sin’ganhoe Formed
On 1 December 1943 the Allied powers of the Second World War met in Cairo,
Egypt and issued a declaration that, among other things, called for the independence of
Korea from Japan. After their success in the Russo-Japanese and the Sino-Japanese Wars,
there was no longer any competition over the Korean Peninsula. Despite certain
infrastructural and technological advancements made in Korea under Japanese rule,
throughout the entire period of occupation, Koreans faced severe economic hardship and
were worse off than before the Japanese had entered, spurring the coalition of various
communist and nationalist groups in Korea to form the Sin’ganhoe (The New Stem
Association). While opposition to the coalition forced its eventual dissolution, the antiJapanese sentiment formed by this group is one of the major contributing factors to the
10
Major R. W. Larsen. "The Reunification of Korea." Global Security. 1992.
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move towards independence.11
August 1945 – August 1948: 38th Parallel Drawn
In August 1945, the 38th Parallel was established as the border beyond which the
Russian army would not cross. This Parallel divided the northern and southern halves of
the Korean Peninsula into what is now known as North and South Korea. After the end
of the Second World War, the U.S. took the responsibility of resettling the Koreans in the
newly divided peninsula and developing a government for the region. Over the next few
years, leaders from the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Great Britain held meetings to discuss
the future of Korea and the establishment of a government. While meetings were held in
January 1946 and May 1947, little was agreed upon. Finally, on 15 August 1948, the area
south of the 38th Parallel went ahead with elections and formed the Republic of Korea.
Soon after, the northern region declared their communist government created the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.12
25 June 1950: The Korean War
On 25 June 1950, after increasingly attacking the neutral demilitarized zone, the
North Korean army crossed over the 38th Parallel into South Korea with the intent to
reunite the peninsula by force. Despite the larger population living south of the parallel,
the North Korean army was much stronger and benefited from arms supplied by the
Soviet Union. This military action marked the beginning of the Korea War. Soon after
crossing the border North Korean troops conquered Seoul, the capitol of South Korea.13 In
September of that year, United Nations troops, made up mostly of U.S. soldiers, retook
Seoul and marched all the way to the Chinese border. Allied with their communist
neighbor, the Chinese government sent large numbers of troops and forced the UN force
to retreat. On 4 January 1951, the Communists retook control of Seoul from the south.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/LRW.htm (accessed February 26, 2008).
11
Chris Wright. Korea: Its History and Culture. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1996. Page 80-86
12
Ibid, 86-87
13
Chris Wright. Korea: Its History and Culture. Seoul: Korean Overseas Information Service, 1996. Page 87
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Two months later, on 12 March 1951, UN troops regained control of Seoul once again.
After this point, the war consisted of very little actual movement. After two years of
fighting along the 38th Parallel an armistice was signed and a demilitarized zone
declared.14
1968: North Korea Attempts Attack on South Korean President
In 1968, the North Korean army attempted, and failed, to raid the South Korean
presidential Blue House. Considering its desire to reunite the peninsula by force, the
South saw this as the perfect opportunity to retaliate. Given its current war in Vietnam,
however, the U.S. wanted to avoid another conflict in the region at all costs. President
Lyndon Johnson even initiated the Vance mission, in which he sent Cyrus Vance to tell
South Korean President Park Chung Hee that no military action against the North would
be tolerated. This action shifted the U.S. role in the Korean peninsula from merely
containment of the North to also restraining the South. The U.S. established a policy that
stated that any unilateral military action initiated by South Korea would result in an end
to military and economic aid, and even the use of military force to establish martial law.15
March-July 1972: U.S. Recognizes DPRK
Despite some twenty years that had passed, hostility between the North and South
was still very prevalent. In 1972, however, the two states issued the North-South joint
communiqué in an attempt to warm relations throughout the peninsula. The continued
presence of the U.S. along the 38th Parallel and in South Korea raised suspicions of a
possible alliance between a U.S.-backed South and the North. In March 1972, there were
hints that the U.S. might lift the travel restrictions between the north and south. Seoul
strongly protested this action, fearful of a re-escalation of the conflict. In July 1972, the
U.S. Department of State officially recognized the North as the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK), making the South nervous, as it considered the action as the
14
15
Ibid, 86-87
Samuel Kim. Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Page 142
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first steps towards recognition of the regime.16
1974: North Korea Increases Nuclear Capacity
The North Korean nuclear program actually started in the 1962; however, it did
not gain much attention or momentum until 1974 when the north successfully upgraded a
Soviet reactor by increasing its capacity and the enrichment of Uranium to 80 per cent,
making the U.S. and the United Nations very nervous because in the previous years of its
nuclear program, North Korea had only enriched its fuel to 10 per cent. This massive
jump in enrichment displayed the real possibility of a North Korean nuclear weapons
program17.
1992-1994: North Korea Comes to Conflict with IAEA
The period 1992-1994 marked a series of conflicts between the North Korean
government and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding the
development of nuclear weapons. In accordance with IAEA policy, North Korea was
required to issue a declaration stating its purposes in nuclear research, and to disclose all
information about previous accomplishments and nuclear materials. At face value, North
Korea cooperated with this policy; however, when the IAEA decided to inspect the
nuclear facilities, the agency found many inconsistencies with the information reported
by North Korea, suggesting to the IAEA and the U.S. that more nuclear research facilities
existed than the agency had originally been led to believe. Soon after, U.S. satellite
images confirmed this fear, and the North Korean government announced its withdrawal
from the Nuclear Non-proliferation treaty (NPT).18
21 October 1994-2002: Framework Agreement Signed
After about three years of conflict between the IAEA, the U.S., and North Korea,
16
Kim 140-141
Weapons of Mass Destruction. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke2004.htm (accessed February
26, 2008).
18
Weapons of Mass Destruction. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke2004.htm (accessed February
26, 2008).
17
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the two countries signed a Framework Agreement on 21 October 1994, stating that North
Korea would dismantle its existing nuclear program, including its high-powered reactors.
In exchange for this, North Korea would be provided with two lower powered light-water
nuclear reactors which are safer and produce much less plutonium. The IAEA continued
to perform checks on North Korean nuclear facilities until 2002, when North Korea no
longer allowed IAEA inspectors to inspect its facilities. In December 2002, North Korea
received a shipment of twenty tons of a chemical called tributyl phosphate from a
Chinese company, which can be used to extract material for nuclear bombs from
stockpiles of nuclear waste and reactor fuel. Later that month, North Korea announced
that it was lifting the freeze on the facilities discussed in the Framework Agreement with
the U.S. In addition, the country removed all IAEA cameras from its facilities19.
13-15 June 2000: Summit in Pyongyang
From 13-15 June 2000, the DPRK hosted a summit in Pyongyang to discuss a
resolution to the conflict between the North and South, the first such attempt since the
division of the country. This diplomatic effort resulted in a North-South Joint Declaration
with the following initiatives: an agreement to address the question of reunification
independent of the rest of the world; an acknowledgement of each other’s plans to
achieve reunification, including a loose federation or a commonwealth system; a decision
to address the humanitarian issues facing the region as early as possible; and finally, an
agreement to work towards economic prosperity in the region. The two leaders also
agreed to hold meetings and work together to achieve these goals.20
9 January 2002: U.S. Labels North Korea a Part of “Axis of Evil”
On 9 January 2002, at his State of the Union address, U.S. President George W.
Bush declared North Korea, in addition to Iraq and Iran, as part of an “Axis of Evil.”
19
Ibid.
"North-South Joint Declaration." The Pyongyang Times. June 13-15, 2000.
http://www.kcckp.net/en/one/nation.php?1+joint (accessed April 30, 2008).
20
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While the bold statement certainly declared that the U.S. was not going to tolerate a
North Korean nuclear weapons program, it also essentially scorched any hope of
diplomatic resolution to the conflict in the Korean Peninsula during his presidency. On 2
April 2002, a group of panelists got together to discuss the future of the peninsula and the
affect that President Bush’s speech had on relations between the North and South Korea.
In this meeting the panelists pointed out that North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il was only
considered with one thing – preservation of his regime, meaning that the U.S. statements
were particularly harmful to relations between the U.S. and North Korea.21
2002-2003: U.S. Relations with Korean Peninsula Sour
By publicly denouncing the North Korean government and nearly eliminating any
chance at dialogue with the state, the U.S. had become a veritable impediment to the
Korean peace process by 2002. Polls in December 2002 showed that South Koreans had
more negative feelings towards the U.S. than they did against North Korea, and that the
majority of South Koreans believed that the revitalization of the North Korean nuclear
program was a result of the Bush Administration’s hard-line policy towards the country.
On New Year’s Eve 2003, twenty-three thousand South Koreans protested the U.S.
policies in the Korean peninsula. This rally, however, did not represent all of the people
of South Korea. Some of the largest pro-America rallies ever were held in South Korea
just days later. Much of the controversy in the Korean peninsula regarding the U.S.
actually comes from within South Korea.22
January - June 2004: U.S. Attempts to Negotiate
Throughout most of 2004, the U.S. attempted to make some kind of agreement
with the North Korean government to satisfy both its own desires and North Korean
demands. During talks between the countries, the U.S. offered to lift sanctions against
21
Lory Hough. Forum Panelists Tackle View of North Korea as 'Axis of Evil' Nation. April 2, 2002.
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/news/2002/NKorea_Forum_030302.htm (accessed February 26, 2008).
22
Samuel Kim. Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004. Page 148
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North Korea, while China, South Korea, and Russia offered to ship the country large
amounts of oil, in exchange for the dismantling of its nuclear program.23
10 February 2005: North Korea Announces Nuclear Capacity
On 10 February 2005 the North Korea government announced to the international
community that it did, in fact, have nuclear weapons. In addition, North Korea suspended
its six-party talks with the U.S., South Korea, Russia, China, and Japan. North Korea
argued that it needed nuclear weapons to defend itself from the U.S. Additionally, North
Korea claimed that it had the ability to mount its warheads on missiles as well, meaning
that they had a means of delivering a nuclear payload, likely beyond the Korean
peninsula.24
2-4 October 2007: New Attempts at Peace
Seven years after the first Pyongyang summit, the goals of the Joint Declaration
had still not been achieved. From 2-4 October 2007, officials from North Korea hosted a
second summit in Pyongyang with the same goals in mind, reaffirming the spirit of the
initial Summit. Following the second phase of the sixth round in the six-party talks, the
summit issued an eight point Declaration for the Advancement of South-North Korean
Relations, Peace, and Prosperity. This declaration upheld the agreements of the first
agreement, and included an effort to transform inter-Korean relations into ties of mutual
respect. They also agreed to work together to end military hostilities, and achieve a
permanent peace. They both agreed to continue working towards economic prosperity in
the region, and to improve the region in the areas of science, technology, history, and
education. Finally, they agreed to work towards their humanitarian goals and promote
the welfare of the Korean people. This meeting was a sign of modernity, where the states
negated the presence of the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan and instead took it upon
23
Weapons of Mass Destruction. http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nuke2004.htm (accessed February
26, 2008).
24
Ibid.
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themselves to improve inter-Korean relations.
2008: Shift from Sunshine Policy to Hard-Line Stance
During his time in office, South Korean President Kim Dae Jung initiated the
Sunshine Policy as a means to facilitate relations with North Korea “to prevent the North
from becoming a militarized state that was closed precisely because of its
impoverishment, and induce it to change its stance into a more open nation with a priority
given to economic development.”25 This progress would be achieved through
compromises like the Berlin Declaration, which was proposed by South Korea in 2000, a
declaration that sought to help build infrastructure in North Korea, including highways,
power plants and other facilities. The proposal also encouraged the North to accept talks
with the South.
The three main points of the policy (no toleration of armed provocation from the
North, no attempts to absorb the North in any way, and an active seeking of cooperation
between the South and the North) garnered Jung a Nobel Peace Prize nomination, and
many praised its expansion of ideals into the realm of separating politics and economics
(essentially letting the private sector invest in North Korea) and a required reciprocity
from the North. Yet criticism of the policy stemmed from North Korea’s unwillingness
to compromise on such things as a reunion center for separated families in exchange for
fertilizer assistance; following this rigidity from the North, the South changed its policy
to “flexible reciprocity,” essentially promising aid with a hope for eventual return. Critics
also said that the policy was just a way for the South to continue funding the North’s
resistance and Kim Jong Il’s regime, rather than a way to further diplomatic relations.26
25
Sakamoto Yoshikazu. Envisioning a Peace in Korea: Can Japan Do It? March 1, 2001.
http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/envisioning01.html (accessed 26 February 2008). Page 2
26
“The Cost of Sunshine,” Time Online, 03 February 2003,
http://w w w.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501030210-418629,00.html (accessed
26 February 2008)
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In March 2008, Lee Myung-bak took the presidency of South Korea and made his
feelings known regarding inter-Korean relations. His party, the Grand National Party,
takes a hard-line stance to North Korea, and once Myung-bak took office, he replaced the
Sunshine policy with a harder look at North Korea. He promised to continue economic
assistance, but only in accordance with a North Korea abandonment of the suspected
nuclear weapons development.27 North Korea took this negatively and responded by
calling Myung-bak a traitor, deploying forces provocatively close to the DMZ. Myungbak has never explicitly refused to honor past agreements, but has withheld aid and taken
a more confrontational tone with North Korea (some say in order to improve South Korea
and U.S. relations) by claiming unless North Korea fulfills their ends of the agreements
made, then South Koreans have no impetus to do the same.28 Critics of Myung-bak fear
that inter-Korean relations are at the standstill because of his actions, but supporters claim
that with Myung-bak’s stance and without his economic assistance, North Korea’s regime
may naturally crumble. As of now, relations between the states are somewhat more
tentative than they have been in the past, and many feel this is owing to Myung-bak’s
policies.
Actors and Interests
Russia
Like the other major players in the Korea peace effort, Russia feels that any
conflicts or tensions remaining in the region “should be resolved by peaceful, political
means.”29 This sentiment is not surprising considering its proximity to the Korean
“Rocket Man Versus Bulldozer,” The Economist Online, 3 April 2008,
http://w w w.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10961848 (accessed 06
October 2008)
27
28
29
Ibid.
Alexander Zhebin. Russia’s Efforts for Reconciliation and Peace in Korea. August 2004. http://www1.koreanp.co.jp/pk/208th_issue/2004081407.htm (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 1
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Peninsula. The risk of an escalation of violence shifting into Russian territory, not to
mention the possibility of refugees, is not terribly far-fetched:
Moscow’s position concerning the inter-Korean rapprochement and its possible results is
determined by the national interests of Russia which, certainly, will benefit from the
liquidation of the hot-spot right next to its Far Eastern region and from the founding of a
unified Korea, capable of maintaining relations of friendship, good neighborhood and
cooperation with Russia.30
Russian President Vladimir Putin said, “It is in Russia’s interests that the Korean
Peninsula becomes a peninsula of peace, stability, and prosperity,”
31
and despite its
desire to accomplish the Korean’s goals of reunification, the state’s top priority is still the
maintenance of stability in the region. Moscow has made it clear that the Koreans and
their governments – without interference – should decide the principles upon which peace
and cooperation develop on the Peninsula. Moscow also noted the importance of
peaceful, diplomatic methods similar to the Joint Declaration of North and South Korea
of 15 June 2000, the pivotal agreement between the North and South that discusses some
of the terms of an eventual reunification. Through diplomatic measures such as these,
Russia “welcomes the establishment of a peaceful united Korean State.”32 Russia
ultimately feels that without ensuring the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
Korean Peninsula, accomplishing the goal of reunification will be impossible to do so in
a peaceful manner. In fact, Russia not only fully supports the denuclearization of Korea,
but “is ready to contribute to [the] processes” to achieve this.
China
China’s concern over peace in the Korean peninsula, and more specifically nuclear
proliferation in the North, deals with the long-term consequences that would result in a
failure to achieve peace. For example, nuclear proliferation in North Korea could lead “to
30
31
32
Ibid, 2.
Ibid, 4.
Ibid, 2.
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Taiwan’s entry into the nuclear weapons field.”33 While North Korea’s possession of
nuclear weapons in itself does not pose an immediate threat to China, the results of
proliferation could. Another possible motivation for China’s interest in the reunification
of Korea is that the country “seemingly fears the advancement of the U.S. troops to the
almost 1,400 km-long Korean-Chinese borders in the context of an unresolved Taiwan
problem.”34 Out of all of the states with which North Korea has contact, the country has
the strongest relationship with China. Their similar views on government allow them to
agree on many issues and also help China to understand North Korea’s point of view of
the U.S.
China also provides a significant amount of aid to North Korea, in turn, giving
them a certain amount of influence over the state. When North Korean Premier Kim
Jong-Il said that North Korea did not plan on attending anymore six-party talks, China
sent a large envoy to Ryongyang and, consequently, changed Kim Jon-Il’s mind. It was
in China’s best interest, as well as beneficial towards achieving peace in the peninsula,
that these diplomatic efforts continued.35 The preservation of peace and stability in the
region through the six-party talks is especially important to China because the country
wants to prevent the U.S. from taking unilateral action to resolve the conflict. Chinese
state media quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing as telling U.S. Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly that China was ready to “work with all relevant parties to
find a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.”36
Japan
Japan’s role in the modern Korean peace process is limited due to its past history
33
Charles Pritchard. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb. Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 2007. Page 90.
34
Alexander Zhebin. Russia’s Efforts for Reconciliation and Peace in Korea. August 2004. http://www1.koreanp.co.jp/pk/208th_issue/2004081407.htm (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 2
35
Charles Pritchard. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb. Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 2007. Page 91-92.
36
Charu Signh. "Interviening for Peace." Frontline. February 2003.
http://www.flonnet.com/fl2003/stories/20030214001605600.htm (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 2.
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and unresolved conflicts. Professor Sakamoto Yoshikazu of The University of Tokyo
wrote:
to this day, Japan has tried to avoid reparations or compensation by ignoring the demand
which is common to both Koreas. As a result, as long as Japan fails to fulfill its historical
responsibility, it is likely to fall behind other countries in normalizing relations with the
DPRK, reflecting Japan’s lack of moral determination and political vision to promote
détente and reconciliation on the Korean peninsula.37
While the Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula has caused significant tension
between the two parties, it has not been the sole contributor. The Japanese want some sort
of resolution to the conflict regarding the North Korean government’s abduction of
Japanese citizens during the 1980s. Unless the Japanese public sees what it considers
significant progress on the abductions, the only course of action that Japan is able or
inclined to take is to threaten support for the hard-line tendencies of the more
conservative elements in its government and in Washington.38 The tensions between
North Korea and Japan have resulted in very few diplomatic efforts. North Korea refuses
to have bilateral talks with Japan regarding peace in the peninsula over fear the
conversation will quickly turn to the abduction issue.39
Despite the friction between the two states, Japan provides North Korea with a
significant amount of food aid. Yet this did not stop the North Korean government from
performing a missile test through Japanese airspace. Shinzo Abe, Japan's chief Cabinet
secretary said “Japan would respond to the tests with a strong protest.”40 Japan had stated
previously that it would not hesitate to withhold aid or limit trade with Pyongyang if
North Korea conducted a test. Tensions between Japan and North Korea not only pose a
risk for the escalation of a conflict between them, but also restrict the success of
37
Sakamoto Yoshikazu. Envisioning a Peace in Korea: Can Japan Do It? March 1, 2001.
http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/envisioning01.html (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 8.
38
Charles Pritchard. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb. Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 2007. Page 89.
39
Ibid, 88.
40
David Ensor. " U.S. officials: North Korea tests long-range missile." CNN. July 5, 2006.
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/04/korea.missile/index.html (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 2.
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achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula. Once the Japanese-Korean tensions can be
resolved, diplomatic negotiations regarding the Peninsula will be more successful.
United States
The U.S. has had a role in the Korean peace process since its involvement in the
Korean War. Now, over fifty years later, the U.S. is working towards bilateral and
multilateral agreements to end conflict in the region. The State Department has made it
clear that its intent is to continue peace talks with the Koreas, Russia, Japan and China.
Reunification, however, is not the first priority of the U.S. The U.S. Department of State
said that “[they are] not going to be reaching any peace agreement on the peninsula ahead
of denuclearization.”41 While the U.S. agrees that it is important to ease tensions between
the North and South, its first priority is to eliminate North Korea as a nuclear power and
ensure that it does not make future attempts at nuclear proliferation. Maj. R. W. Larsen,
U.S. Marine Corps, points out, “the official American East Asia policy is that regional
stability is the primary security objective and a requirement for the satisfaction of
national interests.”42 The U.S. feels that the existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea
obstructs this objective, and was further motivated to eliminate the nuclear weapons
program in North Korea after the state’s missile test in 2006. Despite the failure of the
missiles, analysts at the time made it clear that North Koreans were within a few years of
being capable of hitting the western U.S.43 The U.S. urged [North Korea] to stick with the
moratorium on long-range missile tests it declared in 1999, after it fired a Taepodong-1
missile over Japan in 1998,44 but should North Korea continued to move forward with its
nuclear ambitions, the U.S. made clear that all the agreements achieved through six party
41
Stephen Kaufman. Macanese Authorities Unblock $25 Million in North Korean Funds. April 11, 2007.
http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-english/2007/April/20070410165908esnamfuak0.1288263.html (accessed
February 26, 2008). Page 1.
42
Major R. W. Larsen. "The Reunification of Korea." Global Security. 1992.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/LRW.htm (accessed February 26, 2008).
43
David Ensor. " U.S. officials: North Korea tests long-range missile." CNN. July 5, 2006.
http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/04/korea.missile/index.html (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 2.
44
ibid
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talks over the years would be negated. The U.S. has also been working with South
Korea’s Lee Myung-bak to improve relations with both Koreas, but its focus still remains
on North Korea.
First and foremost, the U.S. wants North Korea to honor its promises; however,
critics have pointed out that the U.S. is just as remiss in following through on its
agreements. Ultimately, the U.S. seeks to negate the threat of nuclear power in North
Korea’s hands, and in doing so, put forth economic sanctions that crippled the North
Koreans and made them reticent to negotiate. In order to avoid any violent confrontation
with North Korea, however, and following the gradual disarmament process undertaken
by the North Koreans, U.S. officials acknowledged that bilateral agreements were
necessary.45 In exchange for fuel aid, North Korea shut down a nuclear facility, and the
U.S. began the process of normalizing diplomatic relations with the state. Through a
system of concessions on each side (though some critics say there have been too many
concessions made for too little) the U.S. has gradually lifted restrictions and North Korea
has ceased threatening nuclear power on the U.S.46 Currently, North Korea has been
removed from the U.S. list of state-sponsored terrorists, though this agreement is tenuous
at best. Detractors of this removal state North Korea’s reticence to comply quickly and
agreeably. The U.S. has received what it wants in North Korea’s destruction of plutonium
and nuclear plants in its borders, but the U.S. itself has yet to certifiably extend any
agreed upon benefits to North Korea.47
45
Mary Crane. "NORTH KOREA: The North Korean Disarmament Talks." Council on Foriegn Relations. July 27,
2005. 2008 (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 1.
46
“Rice Hails N. Korea Nuclear Deal,” BBC Ne ws, 2007, http://ne ws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/6358797.stm (accessed 06 October 2008)
“North Korea is Off Terror List After Deal with U.S.” NY Times,
http://w w w.nytimes.com/2008/10/12/world/asia/12terror.html?_r=1&bl&ex=1223956800&en
=9129ef63b50f6f1c&ei=5087%0A&oref=slogin (accessed 11 October 2008)
47
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South Korea
Reunification is, and always has been, the ultimate goal of South Korea in its quest
for peace in the region. Unfortunately, reunification requires many other elements before
it can be achieved, notably maintaining balance and stability in the region.48 First,
economic issues are of particular concern. It is obviously in South Korea’s interest to
support its own economic growth. It is the world’s tenth-largest economy, has many
successful companies, and is making remarkable advancements in technology.49 This
progress could be jeopardized, however, if reunification occurs before North Korea
rebuilds its own economy. Consequently, the South also has an interest in helping to
rebuild the North’s economy, which is evidenced by the Sunshine policy and efforts to
reconcile the private sector of South Korea with interests in North Korea.
South Korea believes the North’s focus should not be nuclear power. Like many
other nations, the risk of a nuclear weapons program in North Korea does not sit well
with South Koreans. Preserving the nonproliferation regime in general and walking back
the North Korean nuclear weapons program in particular are also relatively high on
Seoul’s list of priorities.50 South Korea’s ultimate aim therefore is to resolve any of the
disputes within the peninsula solely through diplomatic means, without starting new
armed conflict with the North.51
Former President Kim Dae Jung made it clear that he is motivated to maintain
peace in the peninsula “by his conviction that the Korean people should never again
engage in fratricide.” 52 With the new president Lee Myung-bak, however, South Korea’s
recent history of seeming leniency on North Korea is at the crossroads. Critics have cited
48
Charles Pritchard. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb. Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 2007. Page 94-95.
49
Charles Pritchard. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the Bomb. Washington D.C.:
The Brookings Institution, 2007. Page 94
50
Ibid.
51
Ibid, 70
52
Sakamoto Yoshikazu. Envisioning a Peace in Korea: Can Japan Do It? March 1, 2001.
http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/envisioning01.html (accessed February 26, 2008). Page 3
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the fact that South Korea allows North Korea concessions in many areas outside of
nuclear development: though South Korea suspended aid and put their military on high
alert status following the 2006 nuclear missile tests of North Korea, the South also has
followed the Sunshine policy of giving aid despite no concessions from the North, as well
as abstaining from votes regarding UN resolutions addressing North Korea’s dismal
human rights record.53 South Korea has cited reasons such as “a focus on inter-Korean
relations,” a focus which some believe can be both helpful for eventual reunification and
detrimental.
North Korea
Being viewed as the aggressor in any situation can lead to inflammatory action. In
North Korea’s case, this inclination results in drastic measures like missile tests in order
to get the attention of the U.S. and the rest of the parties involved in the Korean peace
effort. Jim Walsh, a national security analyst at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, said the intent of the North Korean missile test appeared to be aimed at
drawing attention back to North Korean demands in the six-party talks, which over time
have progressed in such a manner that North Korea’s desires are being heard and the U.S.
is attempting to make concessions in the areas which it feels most beneficial.
North Korea has claimed that continued development of nuclear weapons is
because it feels threatened by the U.S. sanctions and by other states seeking to end the
regime. The tension and threat of nuclear proliferation is, therefore, less for the physical
protection of North Korea than it is the protection of the regime. North Korea’s leaders
have a serious, and not completely unjustified by past action, fear that the U.S. desires to
dismantle the regime in favor of an eventual dissipation into a South Korea-led state. The
North Koreans will only abandon their efforts if there are guaranteed security and
Korea Times, July 2004,
http://w w w.koreaherald.co.kr/SITE/data/html_dir/2005/11/18/200511180046.asp (accessed
06 February 2008)
53
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economic benefits. To achieve this, North Korea wants to continue building bilateral
discussions with the U.S. and multilateral talks with other sates while continuing to limit
outside presence and influence in the region.54
It is important to the North Korean government that the U.S. and all states respect
its sovereignty. Diplomatic efforts have extended to promising aid and economic
assistance, but with humanitarian abuses occurring in North Korea and North Korea still
withholding information on its nuclear program, outside influences can become either too
involved or not nearly enough. It has become fairly apparent after receiving
approximately four hundred thousand metric tons of food aid in 2005 that just aid is not
enough to appease the North Korean government.55
Possible Causes
Similar but Disparate Cultural Identities with Differing Political
Ideologies
The political systems and ideologies in North and South Korea have a great deal to
do with the continuing tensions between them. Not unlike the tensions between the U.S.
and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, this conflict is one between a communist and
a democratic state. The cultural makeup of the Korean peninsula, however, sets this
conflict apart from most others. In Korea, “diametrically opposed institutions exist
despite a unique degree of cultural and ethnic homogeneity: the two Koreas are ‘two
bowls molded of the same clay.’”56 The result of four thousand years of shared history is
a pull towards reunification. This desire for reunification based upon the shared identity
was the reason that South Korea refused to sign the armistice to end the Korean War. But
since [their] division, political ideology exclusive to both North and South has been
54
Pritchard 97
Mary Crane. "NORTH KOREA: The North Korean Disarmament Talks." Council on Foriegn Relations. July 27,
2005. 2008 (accessed February 26, 2008). page 2.
56
Associated Press. "U.S. Military: N. Korean Troops Along DMZ Get Bolder." Fox News. October 11, 2006.
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,219670,00.html (accessed April 30, 2008).
55
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woven into the fabric of ethnic identity, and it is these competing political ideologies
from which the past half-century of quasi-peace stems, even going so far as to effect the
evolution of cultural identity in North and South Korea today.57
One of the most interesting yet troubling aspects of the conflict between both
states is the fact that citizens of both regions have similar ancestral roots but completely
different lifestyles, yielding a modern culture clash that is the basis for many individuals
of both Koreas worrying over the possible outcome of reunification. North Koreans, due
to government policy, live a much more sheltered and culturally distinct life. Foreign
publications and media are not in wide circulation, and freedom of speech is limited.
Travel overseas is limited as well, and information entering North Korea regarding the
world is filtered through a government-approved system. As such, North Koreans live a
life of suspicion and isolation, with little to no interaction (though this is improving) with
South Korean counterparts unless in specifically inter-Korean designated locations.58
South Koreans, however, live a commercially-driven life, using cell phones and new
technology, consuming global food and watching global media. South Korean soap
operas have become so popular world-wide that even in North Korea, cassette tapes of
recorded episodes have been peddled.59 Buddhist and Christian sentiment is also large in
South Korea, while in North Korea, Communist leaders are martyrs and treated like gods.
North Koreans live a completely disparate life from one another, and on more than one
occasion, North Korean defectors have expressed the fear that should the peninsula
reunify, the culture clash might be too large to overcome. This is one of the sentiments
that is preventing a true dialogue between citizens from taking place.
57
David Scofield. "Seoul Rows Against US Tide." Asian Times. November 24, 2004.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/FK24Dg03.html (accessed April 30, 2008).
58
“North Korea: Losing the Culture War?” March 2005,
http://justoneminute.typepad.com/main/2005/03/north_korea_los.html (accessed 06
October 2008)
59
Ibid.
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Ultimately, both the North and South want to eliminate the other state’s system of
government and take control of the entire peninsula. South Korean policies towards
economic growth and development display an anti-communist ideology, which is
irreconcilable with the North Korean anti-Westernized democracy ideology. Differing
political ideologies not only make it very difficult for either state to compromise on a
unified system of government, but also yield an environment that encourages citizens to
fear the possibility of reunification and integration because of different cultural
understandings.
Korean War Has Not Technically Ended
Despite the armistice agreement signed more than fifty years ago that ended the
Korean War, the war is not technically over. Jungsoo Jang points out that while North
Korea, the U.S. and China all signed the armistice, South Korea did not. “Then-South
Korea President Syngman Rhee refused to sign the document, arguing that an armistice
would remove the chance to reunify Korea.”60 There are approximately 22,500 troops still
in South Korea despite the end of the war.61 In a BBC news article, Keith Howard shows
that, even though the presence of U.S. troops is preventing the North Koreans from trying
to take over the South again, it also raises tensions between the North and South moving
the peninsula further from peace, and U.S. Navy ships patrol the waters along the 38th
Parallel as a precaution. Howard describes an incident in which North Korea’s navy fired
shots after northern fishing boats were pushed back by the U.S. naval forces. Howard
says, “[t]ensions rose when the northern navy arrived, and shots were fired. Within a
matter of minutes two northern vessels were destroyed and at least thirty northern troops
were killed.”62 Conflicts like these pose a serious risk for stability in the region and could
60
Jungsoo Jang, “How can peace be achieved on the Korean Peninsula”, The Hankyoreh,
http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_editorial/208361.html (accessed February 19, 2008).
61
Global Security, “US Forces Order of Battle”, Global Security, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/koreaorbat.htm (accessed February 19, 2008).
62
Keith Howard, “Analysis: Korea’s Unresolved Conflict”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/2074452.stm (accessed February 19, 2008).
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possibly lead to a full re-escalation of military action between the North and South. The
consequences of this would be even worse than during the Korean War, considering that
North Korea is now one of the world’s most militarized countries. The South’s military,
however, is equipped with the latest weapons systems and fully capable of taking on the
North in an armed confrontation. “A small incident, accidental or not, could trigger a
chain of events that would unleash the destructive power each holds over the other,
resulting in mutual assured destruction.”63
Fear of Economic Collapse
Unlike the South’s booming economy and healthy trade relationships, “the North
Korean economy has never been considered healthy, and [with] the loss of its trade and
aid, the situation is becoming progressively worse.”64 The Korean conflict is preventing
the North Koreans from building their economy, but many people think the cause of the
conflict is actual fear that a reunification of the peninsula would lead to further economic
ruin, this time in South Korea. The economic sanctions on North Korea due to the
conflict have caused severe famine in the state that previously had more agricultural
growth than the southern part of the peninsula. Peace in the region is the only thing that
can end this famine and prevent the death of millions of starving people.65 Some feel there
can be no hope for an integration of states however, because the South does not wish to
jeopardize their own strengthening economy. Though in September the state had to fight
off accusations of a slumping economy amidst dropping currency value (down almost 17
per cent this year) as well as a drop-off in stocks, bonds, and currency, the government
made clear that their financial institutions are sound.66 Attempting to integrate North
63
Jae-Jung Suh, The Imbalance of Power, the Balance of Asymmetric Terror”, The future of inter-Korean Relations
(New York: Routledge 2006), 64-65.
64
Major R. W. Larsen, “The Reunification of Korea,” Global Security,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/LRW.htm (accessed 26 February 2008).
65
Christine Ahn, “Peace: the Real Solution to Famine in North Korea,” Global Policy Forum,
http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/sanction/nkorea/2003/0723peace.htm (accessed 26 February 2008).
66
Kim, Seeyoon. “Kim Says Fears of South Korean Crisis are Groundless.” Bloomberg,
http://w w w.bloomberg.com/apps/ne ws?pid=20601087&sid=aLeQd.LFNBvE&refer=home
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Korea’s economic policies (establishing economic self-sufficiency and therefore cutting
off involvement from many international and even domestic competitors) with South
Korea’s could be disastrous in an already tumultuous period of global economic
uncertainty.
Projections
The Korean peninsula is a highly unstable region with a very complex conflict.
There are many different contributors to the tensions between the North and the South,
and consequently, many different issues that must be addressed. Despite the various
nuances and complexities that are associated with this problem, there is one thing that is
certain: if some sort of solution is not found, then all of the peace efforts that have been
taken since the end of the Korean War could be reversed. A Congressional Research
Service (CRS) report written in 2006 points out that “[continued] nuclear tests will
stimulate an arms race in the region. South Korea … could follow suit and develop its
own nuclear weapons program.”67 If the nuclear issue in North Korea, which is a major
contributing factor to the conflict in the peninsula, is not properly and openly addressed,
then it could lead to the escalation of the Korean conflict and further proliferation in the
region. More importantly, if South Korea and North Korea do not come to an agreement
with concerns such as economics, politics, and social issues, the quality of life for all
Korea’s citizens will go down considerably. It is the international community’s duty to
examine the Koreas and help stem further conflict in order to keep the peace worldwide.
(accessed 06 October 2008)
67
Emma Chanlett-Avery and Sharon Squassoni, “North Korea’s Nuclear Test: Motivations, Implications, and US
Options” CRS Report for Congress (2006): 9.
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Conclusion
The conflict between North Korea and South Korea started with division of the
peninsula after Second World War and continued to escalate through the age of nuclear
proliferation to the present day. Despite the war’s end more than fifty years ago, no peace
agreement between the North and South has been achieved. Six party talks between
North Korea, South Korea, the U.S., China, Russia, and Japan have been held in an
attempt to work out some sort of agreement between the two countries; however
successful these talks have been, though, the agreements reached have not addressed all
of the underlying issues of reunification. Along with the growing threat of North Korea
as a nuclear power, the inability to sift through the complexities has led to the increase of
tensions in the region and throughout the world. If peace is not achieved in the region,
then everyone—the international community, the peninsula, and the Korean people—
stand to suffer.
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Discussion Questions
• What are the connotations of U.S. involvement with both South Korea and North
Korea? Which state stands to gain more from U.S. backing?
• How does reunification affect states that are not geographically near the
peninsula? Are there trade ramifications? Why should states that are not directly
affected by reunification take part in peace efforts?
• What measures must be made in North Korea before reunification can occur?
What measures must be made in South Korea? Regarding what elements is it most
important for each state to concede?
• Will improved relations with the U.S. affect North Korea and South Korea’s
relationship with one another detrimentally or beneficially?
• What elements of this conflict are similar to others in the world today? If it is
unique, have any of the diplomatic efforts mirrored steps taken in the past during
other conflicts?
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Bibliography
Further Reading
Pritchard, Charles L. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the
Bomb. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2007.
This is a great source of information about the six-party talks and actors involved
in the Korean conflict. The author displays what diplomatic efforts have already
been taken and what effect they have had on the situation. Pritchard also gives his
projections for the future of the conflict.
Kim, Samuel S. Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2004.
In this book, the author shows the relationship between North and South Korea,
as well as each nation’s relationship with the U.S.. He also describes many of the
challenges involved in reunification. This is a great book to use while researching
your states positions and how they relate to this conflict.
Feffer, John. The Future of US-Korean Relations. New York: Routledge, 2006.
This is a great source in which the author describes the relationship between
each nation and the U.S., and how this has influenced the tensions between North
and South Korea.
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Works Cited
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Forum. June 23, 2003.
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Associated Press. "U.S. Military: N. Korean Troops Along DMZ Get Bolder." Fox News.
October 11, 2006. http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,219670,00.html
(accessed April 30, 2008).
Center, Naval Historical. The United Nations' Offensive, 15 September - 25 November
1950. http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/kowar/50-unof/50-unof.htm
(accessed February 26, 2008).
Chanlett-Avery, Emma, and Sharon Squassoni. "North Korea’s Nuclear Test:
Motivations, Implications, and US Options." CRS Report for Congress. October
24, 2006. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33709.pdf (accessed February 26,
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Chung-in, Moon. Arms Control and Peace in the Korean Peninsula. June 26, 1997.
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Clark, Jr., William "What Does North Korea Ultimately Want?" The Herald Tribune.
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Feffer, John. The Future of US-Korean Relations. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Rutgers Model United Nations
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Feulner, Edwin J. Jr. "Responding to the Looming North Korean Nuclear Threat." The
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Hart-Landsberg, Martin, and John Feffer. "Sanctions and War on the Korean Peninsula."
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Hauben, Ronda. "The Future of the Korea Peninsula." OHMY News. October 24, 2006.
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Hough, Lory. Forum Panelists Tackle View of North Korea as 'Axis of Evil' Nation. April
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http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/news/2002/NKorea_Forum_030302.htm
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Howard, Keith. "Analysis: Korea's unresolved conflict." BBC News. June 29, 2002.
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Rutgers Model United Nations
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Jang, Jungsoo. "How can a peace be achieved on the Korean Peninsula?" The Hankyoreh.
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Kaufman, Stephen. Macanese Authorities Unblock $25 Million in North Korean Funds.
April 11, 2007. http://www.america.gov/st/washfileenglish/2007/April/20070410165908esnamfuak0.1288263.html (accessed
February 26, 2008).
Kim, Samuel S. Inter-Korean Relations: Problems and Prospects. New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2004.
Larsen, Major R. W. "The Reunification of Korea." Global Security. 1992.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1992/LRW.htm (accessed
February 26, 2008).
Niksch, Larry A. "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program." Congressional Research
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Pritchard, Charles L. Failed Diplomacy: The Tragic Story of How North Korea Got the
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