Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
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International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254 – 266
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijproman
What is a good project manager? An Aristotelian perspective
Christophe Bredillet a,⁎, Stephane Tywoniak b , Ravikiran Dwivedula c
a
QUT Project Management Academy, Brisbane, Australia
QUT Graduate School of Business, Brisbane, Australia
Emirates College for Management & Information Technology (ECMIT), Dubai, United Arab Emirates
b
c
Received 29 September 2013; received in revised form 21 March 2014; accepted 1 April 2014
Available online 24 April 2014
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to take a critical look at the question “what is a competent project manager?” and bring some fresh added-value
insights. This leads us to analyze the definitions, and assessment approaches of project manager competence. Three major standards as prescribed
by PMI, IPMA, and GAPPS are considered for review from an attribute-based and performance-based approach and from a deontological and
consequentialist ethics perspectives. Two fundamental tensions are identified: an ethical tension between the standards and the related competence
assessment frameworks and a tension between attribute and performance-based approaches. Aristotelian ethical and practical philosophy is brought
in to reconcile these differences. Considering ethics of character that rises beyond the normative deontological and consequentialist perspectives is
suggested. Taking the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis between theory and practice into consideration is advocated to resolve the tension
between performance and attribute-based approaches to competence assessment.
© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Project manager; Competence; Standards; Ethics; Aristotle; Praxis; Phronesis
1. Setting the scene: competent PM, and
competence assessment
1.1. An increasing need for competent PM
For sixty years, organizations have increasingly been using
projects and programs to achieve their strategic objectives.
Nowadays about 25% of global economic activity takes place
as projects (World Bank, 2012)1. To support the resulting need
for the development of competent project managers (PMs),
over time professional bodies such as the International Project
Management Association (IPMA) and the Project Management
⁎ Corresponding author at: Queensland University of Technology, Level 7-S
Block-Room S703, Gardens Point, 2 George Street, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane,
QLD 4001, Australia. Tel.: +61 7 3138 2416.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (C. Bredillet),
[email protected] (S. Tywoniak), [email protected] (R. Dwivedula).
1
From World Bank Indicators web site url http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/NE.GDI.TOTL.ZS, accessed on 31 March 2012.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijproman.2014.04.001
0263-7863/00/© 2014 Elsevier Ltd. APM and IPMA. All rights reserved.
Institute (PMI), respectively created in 1965 and 1969, have
established standards and related professional certification
systems (IPMA framework since 1987, and PMP®, since
1984). This is evidenced in the exponential growth in the
number of certified project managers (PMs — IPMA
Certification Yearbook, 2012; PMI Today, September 2013).
Standards and credentials supported by professional bodies
are developed based on identified ‘best practice’ within the
profession. However, delineating what is a good project
manager and the level of performance at which s/he is expected
to perform is still a burning issue (e.g. Cicmil, 2006; Hodgson,
2002; Lalonde et al., 2012). For the purposes of this paper we
refer to performance in relation to the PM's actions, not to the
overall performance of a project even though the two may be
related. We assume that assessing the competencies of PMs
enables to infer their level of performance in his/her present and
future role (Crawford, 2005, p. 9). This leads us to suggest two
questions for further investigation: “what is a competent project
manager?” and “how do we assess the competence of project
managers?”
C. Bredillet et al. / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254–266
1.2. Defining competence
We use Crawford's definition of PM competence, broken
down into two dimensions: attribute-based and competencebased.
The attribute-based dimension of competence comprises
Input and Personal competencies:
1. Input competencies are defined as “the knowledge and
understanding, skills and abilities that a person brings to a
job” (Crawford, 2005, pp. 8–9). Knowledge is captured in
bodies of knowledge (information pertinent to specific content
areas) and skills as abilities to perform certain physical or
mental tasks through qualification and experience;
2. Personal competencies are defined as “the core personality
characteristics underlying a person's capability to do a job”
(Crawford, 2005, pp. 8–9). Personality traits, attitudes and
behaviors represent these core personality characteristics;
The performance-based dimension of competence relies on
Output competencies:
3. Output competencies are defined as “the ability to perform
the activities within an occupational area to the levels
of performance expected in employment” (Crawford, 2005,
pp. 8–9). Demonstrable performance and use of project
management practices in the workplace characterize this
ability.
Based on these definitions, a competent project manager is
the one who: possesses some attributes to fulfill her/his role;
and will demonstrate a certain level of performance. The
attributes and performance standards are defined and published
by professional bodies such as the Project Management
Institute (PMBOK® Guide, PMI, 2013a), the International
Project Management Association (IPMA Competence Baseline
(ICB), IPMA, 2006), and the Global Alliance for Project
Management Standards (GAPPS Project and Program Manager
Standards; GAPPS, 2007). PMI's PMBOK® and IPMA's ICB
have been mainly developed along the attribute-based dimension, whilst GAPPS' standards have been mainly developed
along the performance-based dimension2.
For attribute-based standards (such as PMI), the certification
examination is designed to reflect tasks and activities a PM is
expected to perform on the job (based on PMBOK®).
Furthermore, the certification requires a defined length of
professional experience, depending on the academic credentials
of the applicant. The IPMA certification process is structured in
four levels, with different educational and experience prerequisites. The certification process involves a written examination, and depending on the certification level, a report
(documenting demonstrable performance), a workshop, and
an interview. Therefore, whilst the PMI and IPMA standards do
2
We have selected these three sets as they have been published by longestablished bodies and account for a large number of credentialed project
managers.
255
not include specifically performance-based criteria (GAPPS,
2007, p. 2), their certification processes attempt to capture
elements of performance. In other words, the transition from
standard to certification implies a shift from “what is a
competent PM?” to “what does a competent PM do?” The
performance-based approach is exemplified by the GAPPS
frameworks (2007, 2011). Based on the role descriptions (what
does a competent PM), and considering possible differentiations with regard to breadth of responsibility and management
complexity, the GAPPS frameworks are defining 1) units of
competency, i.e. specific areas of professional performance in
the workplace, 2) elements of competency, i.e. key components
of work performance within a unit, and 3) performance criteria,
i.e. type and level of performance required to demonstrate
competence in each element based on observable results and
actions (GAPPS, 2007, p. 2; 2011, p. 2).
1.3. Competence and ethics
A competent PM is expected to perform at or above a certain
level of performance. One anticipates s/he will do the “right”
things “right”, and “get things done” – “At its most fundamental,
project management is about people getting things done”
(Dr Martin Barnes, APM President 2003–2012, APM web site,
http://www.apm.org.uk/WhatIsPM, accessed 6 March 2014) –
and deliver “good” outcomes. Expectations about what a PM
ought to do in his/her duty (“right” with the idea of compliance)
are supported by the general concept of deontology, while the
focus is on getting the “good” outcome, by the concept of
consequentialism (doing “right” meaning here getting things
done, i.e. the “good” outcome). Therefore, defining what is a
competent PM and how to assess his/her competence lead to
ethical questions such as what are “right” actions and “good”
outcomes. These questions are fundamental, as each normative
ethic (deontological and consequentialist) carries its own
limitations (Duska, 1993, p. 228). On the one hand, the question
of arbitrage and conflict of duty (which is the “right” duty,
towards which stakeholder?), on the other hand, the relation
between means and ends (“the ends justify the means”). As we
demonstrate below, we argue that moving from these normative
ethics to an Aristotelian ethic of character provides a more
holistic ground to answering in a practical way our two initial
questions. Thus, the paradigmatic and ethical underpinnings of
standards and assessments need to be studied. It is important to
address these questions as they have implications for communities of practitioners and scholars who collectively reflect to
develop meaningful practices and routines. This in turn is
important to achieve the “end purpose” i.e. both doing “right”
things “right” and delivering “good” outcomes to benefit
stakeholders (GAPPS, 2007, p. 4; GAPPS, 2011, p. 5; IPMA,
2006, p. 2–3; PMI, 2006, p. 1).
In summary, addressing the question “what is a competent
PM” leads us to discuss 1) the ethical foundations of what being
competent means, 2) the consequences for the assessment of
competence, and 3) the underlying perspectives supporting
standards. We critically discuss these three aspects for GAPPS,
IPMA and PMI in the next section of this article. Then, from
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C. Bredillet et al. / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254–266
Table 1
Mapping competence assessment processes.
Competence
Ethical approach
Deontological (duty, “right” action defined
independently of the “good” outcome)
Consequentialism (the “right” action produces
“good” or “best possible” outcome)
Knowledge
PMI (PMP®, PgMP®)
Skills (qualifications &
experience)
Core Personality characteristics
PMI (PMP®, PgMP®)
IPMA ICB Experience
assessment
IPMA ICB Experience
assessment
IPMA ICB Experience
assessment
Demonstrable performance
PMI (PgMP®)
GAPPS assessment
the conclusions we draw and tensions we unveil between the
standards, the related assessment perspectives and their ethical
basis, we suggest, in Section 3, an Aristotelian lens, as a
promising avenue for a more encompassing, holistic and
competent practice.
Consequentialism “also sometimes termed teleology, is
directed towards securing the right outcome” (Harrison, 2004,
p. 2). An action is “right” if and only if it produces the “good”
or “best possible” outcome. The end justifies the means.
GAPPS subscribes to this vision, and the GAPPS standard is
rooted on what a competent PM does (GAPPS, 2007, p. 2;
2011, p. 2). Although the focus is not on knowledge and skills,
the underpinning knowledge and supporting skills needed to
produce the results are measured by performance criteria
(GAPPS, 2007; p.40) embedded in each unit, thus reinforcing
the “outcome” perspective.
The IPMA assessment process refers to both normative
ethical perspectives. Its knowledge assessment (standards and
guidelines to define the work of project management personnel)
is grounded in the deontological perspective. Competence is
assessed using the STAR (Situation, Tasks, Actions, and
Results) framework (IPMA, 2006, p.12), which refers to the
consequentialist perspective. Similarly, the PMI Program
Management Professional (PgMP®) certification assesses the
applicant's history of demonstrated task performance, and thus
is grounded in the deontological perspective.
The above discussion is summarized in Table 1.
Attribute-based approach
Performance based
approach
2. Current standards and assessment perspectives:
unveiling inherent tensions
2.1. Ethics and assessment
Defining what a competent PM is, or what s(he) does, and its
assessment is foremost an ethical matter in conjunction to
professionalism. This is acknowledged by various codes of
ethics and professional conducts (c.f. IPMA, 2006, p.2; PMI,
2006, p.1; GAPPS, 2007, p.2).
The assessment perspective is directly subject to underlying
ethical questions such as should the focus be on the “right”
action, the duty, to be performed? Or, on the “good” or “best
possible” outcome to be produced? Harrison (2004) aptly notes
that two main approaches of normative ethics are usually
considered: deontology (“right action”, duty) and consequentialism (“good” or “best possible” outcome).
Deontological ethics (from the Greek deon, “obligation,
duty”), while linked to antique codes of conducts such as the
Ten Commandments, takes its modern roots in the Kantian
moral theory and the two principles of “universalisability” (sic)
and “reversibility” (sic). Universalisability means: “if everyone
can act on it” (Schick & Vaughn, 1999; p.334); and
reversibility means: “if the person acting on it would be willing
to have everyone act on it” (Schick & Vaughn, 1999, p. 344).
According to this ethical stance, a “right” action is independent
from its “good” outcome, ends can never justify means, and this
fits well with attribute-based competence assessment perspective. This view is reflected in the PMI Code of Ethics and
Professional Conduct where everyone is deemed to act the way
“PMI practitioners” act (“universability”), and be willing to act
the way “PMI practitioners” act towards themselves (“reversibility”). Thus, the focus of assessment is the “role” of
individuals, their knowledge, tasks, and skills required, and
what they do on their jobs (PMI, 2011, 2013a,b).
IPMA ICB Knowledge
assessment
IPMA ICB Knowledge
assessment
IPMA ICB Knowledge
assessment
2.2. Standards and underlying assumptions
2.2.1. Classical perspective
The classical view of standardization is exemplified by the
International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Both PMI
and IPMA are aligned with ISO, respectively through the
development of PMBOK® Guide-Fifth Edition, ANSI/PMI
99-001-2013, ISO 21500, and ISO/TC2583;for PMI; and ISO/
TC 258 Project, Program, and Portfolio Management, and ISO/
TC 176/SC 2 Quality Systems standards for IPMA4.
The classical view is supported by assumptions of consensus,
transparent & available information, and certainty & stability.
3
http://www.pmi.org/PMBOK-Guide-and-Standards.aspx, accessed 10 September 2013.
4
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about/organizations_in_liaison/organizations_in_
liaison_details.htm?id=9297&LiaisonList=True, accessed 10 September 2013.
C. Bredillet et al. / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254–266
2.2.1.1. Consensus. First, standards are established by
consensus5 and focus on commonly agreed ‘best practice’
with a focus on stable entities and structures, where individuals
operate on the basis of an exchange relationship with the
environment. Under this view, mutual coordination between
two parties, such as assessment of competence, occurs via a
normative orientation, i.e. common norms and values that exist
prior to the interaction. (Hernes and Bakken, 2003, p. 1516).
This view can be associated with an equilibrium-based theory
(Hernes and Bakken, 2003; p.1516) that enables predictability
(Stacey, 2010; p. 20). Multiple perspectives such as the
resource-based view6, the market-based view7, and an overarching stakeholder-based view8 are integrated using the
socio-political lens, enabling the universal applicability of the
standard's best practice.
2.2.1.2. Transparent and available information. Second,
standards aim at enabling actions based on full, relevant, and
transparent information. In this view the focus is on the process
used to make decisions and take action. The focus here is on
subjects, who, using transparent information, make rational
choices, set goals, and make normative decisions with respect
to assessing future risks. Consistent with equilibrium assumptions, this view enables the PM as rational actor to optimize
outcomes.
2.2.1.3. Certainty and stability. Third, an assumption about
certainty and order is embedded in standards. The definition of
standardization and standard (“… aimed at the achievement of
the optimum degree of order…” Hatto, 2010, p. 5, p. 9) is
related to the assumption of market equilibrium. As Brunsson
et al. (2000; p.16) state, standards “are said to make the
complex world simpler”. This is acknowledged by IPMA
“Standards are essential in an increasing complex world. They
should enable collaboration within and across organisations in
order to improve effectiveness and efficiency in project related
activities”9.
Overall, these assumptions mean being able to “rightly” act
in order to produce the “best possible” outcome. They are
fundamentally rooted in a consequentialist perspective and the
attribute-based competence approach logic fits well here,
enabling to link attributes to performance in a predictable way.
2.2.1.4. Critique of the classical perspective. The classical
perspective of standardization brings value in particular contexts,
where stakeholders share unitary views and situations are simple,
and therefore the transfer of best practices among stakeholders,
complexity reduction, and rational decision-making is possible
(Jackson, 2003).
5
PMI, “how standards are developed?” http://www.pmi.org/PMBOK-Guideand-Standards/Standards-Overview.aspx accessed 10 September, 2013).
6
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards.htm.
7
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development.htm, accessed 10 September 2013.
8
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards_development.htm, accessed 10 September, 2013.
9
http://ipma.ch/resources/standards/, accessed 10 September 2013.
257
However, in complex pluralistic or conflicting settings, these
standards, aiming at universality, face limitations. Challenging
the classical perspective, Hodgson (2002) and Cicmil and
Hodgson (2006, p.11) discuss how standards, best practices and
other bodies of knowledge governed by a tradition of natural
science cast project managers in mechanistic roles of “implementers”, disabling a potential wider role in complex project
situations. Further, such adherence to universal techniques
leads to the loss of reflexive and embodied rationality
(Townley, 2002) as ‘best practice’ directs PMs towards one
unique course of action, eliminating the need to reflect. Lastly
Cicmil and Hodgson (2006, p.12) emphasize the fact that
classification (e.g. the “PMP” class — Hacking, 2002, p. 7) and
language (e.g. agreed terminology and meaning — Hacking,
2002, p. 9) contribute to reinforce the general idea that
“managers face an objective reality which they can control by
applying suitable methods for a rational assessment of the
problematic situation in order to come up with the correct
solution”. Critics of the classical perspective suggest that we
need to turn back to perspectives attuned to the empirical
dynamics of facts such as a “practice” perspective (Cicmil and
Hodgson, 2006; Cicmil et al., 2009; Hodgson, 2002), a
practice-turn (Blomquist et al., 2010; Hällgren and Lindahl,
2012), a phronetic approach (Flyvbjerg et al., 2012), or new
institutional theories and convention theory (Bredillet, 2003,
2010). Arguably, the value of these perspectives is that they
enable to consider what a competent PM does in contexts
involving plurality or conflicting views amongst stakeholder
and complex and uncertain situations.
2.2.2. Practice perspective
Focusing on the question “what does a competent PM do?”
leads naturally to turn to practices. GAPPS (2007) exemplifies
this approach focusing on “what is done by individuals in the
workplace” (GAPPS, 2007, p. 2) and to the evaluation of “past
and present experience based on evidence” (IPMA, 2006, p. 3).
The practice view is supported by the three following
assumptions which structurally mirror the assumptions of the
classical perspective: uncertainty, interpretation of information
and interdependency and cooperation.
2.2.2.1. Uncertainty. Under conditions of fundamental uncertainty, as the future is unknown (Dequech, 2011; Knight,
1921) self-interested agents cannot be guided by calculative
rationality only: the optimal course of action cannot be
determined ex-ante, as they lack stable information and means
of evaluation (Jarvis, 2010; Knight, 1921; LeRoy and Singell,
1987). The notion of known unknowns (Davidson, 1995; Dow,
1995) is thus summarized by Keynes: “…there is no scientific
basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever.
We simply do not know” (Keynes, 1937, pp. 113–114). Such
notions of uncertainty lead to assume incomplete or bounded
rationality (Simon, 1957) where competent decision makers are
able to satisfy minimum performance thresholds but cannot
optimize.
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2.2.2.2. Interpretation of information. The inherent uncertainty, about information and lack of knowledge about future
events or states, challenges the assumption of information
transparency. In this, when agents need to interpret the
information in order to make sense of it, agents' actions
cannot be only the product of rational calculation, where the
information is fully accessible and transparent (Gomez, 2006,
p. 220). This aspect is acknowledged by GAPPS where
“competence is inferred based on demonstrated ability to
satisfy performance criteria” (GAPPS, 2007, p. 2) and where
the “GAPPS framework is intended to help an assessor infer
whether an experienced, practising project manager is likely to
be able to perform competently on future projects” (GAPPS,
2007, p. 9), thus proving an interpretation framework.
2.2.2.3. Interdependency and cooperation. Considering the
conditions of fundamental uncertainty, and the resulting
necessary information interpretation, leads to raise the questions of consensus and the challenge to cooperation. Contrasting the classical perspective, the assumption of pre-existing
norms binding the decisions and actions of the agents cannot
be held relevant in a context of perpetual movement and
transformation. Hence, “consensus is but one possibility for
interaction” (Hernes and Bakken, 2003, p. 1518). Indeed,
pluralistic and conflicting perspectives, as acknowledged by
Jackson (2003, p. 19) are also possible modes of interaction in
complex contexts. Thus, “contingency lies in the interaction
rather than at the abstracted level of norms and, as such, it sets
the stage for the emergence of the social system. Social order
should not be explained transcendentally, but as a circular
movement that has neither beginning nor end (Luhmann &
Schorr 1990).” (Hernes and Bakken, 2003, p. 1518).
These three key features have major implications for the way
we should consider the development, roles, and relevance of
standards for practice. For example, uncertainty, interpretation
of information, and interdependency lead to rethink how the
process of assessing PM competences is conducted through
interviews as in GAPPS (2007, p. 9, 42) or IPMA (2006, p. 8).
Contextualized in the inherent complexity of organizational
phenomena and uncertainty about the future, in the absence of a
structure for calculating the likely outcomes of the actions,
actors must still make choices using some mechanism or
heuristic (Gomez and Jones, 2000, p. 696). Our point is that a
standard as a “…social mechanism that associates a rational
void, i.e., a set of non-justified norms, with a screen of symbols,
i.e., an interrelation between objects, discourses, and behaviors”, closes the gap between “free will and social context
interact to produce both structure and action” (Gomez and
Jones, 2000, p. 706). Standards and PMs form a governing
system, a system of rules and measures that order social actors.
The on-going dynamic adjustment between PMs and the
rules enables regulation beyond any explicit “management”
policy, and the “conviction” about the “normal” rules (what a
competent PM does, his duty) constitutes the accepted common
view (Gomez, 2006, p. 224).
Overall, these assumptions mean that the focus should be on
the “right” action rather than on an unforeseeable outcome.
They are fundamentally rooted on a deontological perspective
and the performance-based competence approach logic fits well
here, enabling to link what competent practitioners usually do
in the role and what is the acceptable level of performance to be
considered as competent (GAPPS, 2007, p. 2 2011, p. 2).
2.2.2.4. Critique of the practice perspective. When the level
of environmental uncertainty increases, complex situations
involve not only by consensus but also through pluralistic or
conflictual relations. In such contexts a shift from the classical
perspective to the practice perspective is beneficial as this
broadens our understanding of managers' competence: there we
do not see them as good professionals (meeting a list of
universal attributes) but we consider their demonstrated
performance in what they do in a given context (GAPPS,
2007, p. 2). This is assumed to be a “good indicator that future
projects will be managed successfully” (IPMA, 2006, p. 3). In
this context of uncertainty and complexity, the “known”
(practice AND standards) is within the knower and emerges
from recursive relations and interactions between purposeful
actions using verstehen10, practice and standards. Kraaijenbrink
notes: “Management though is rarely like that [certainty
with managers as theory-applying rational decision-makers]
and managers only really matter when there is uncertainty”
(Kraaijenbrink, 2010, p. 2). And Perminova et al. (2008) rightly
state: “the way uncertainty is perceived by project managers
depends on personal skills, intuition and judgment.” …
“Managers' attitudes and understanding of uncertainty do not
create or eliminate it” (Perminova et al., 2008, p. 77). In project
situations, Lalonde et al. (2012) recognize that “the relationships
established between the actors' cognitive schemas and perceptions of the situation, is an uncertain state of affairs. The actors do
not deal with clear-cut situations” (Lalonde et al., 2012, p. 425).
The demonstrable performance based approach of competence fully recognizes this need in two main ways. First through
the notion of “threshold” performance (GAPPS, 2007, p. 3) or
competence level (IPMA, 2006, p.11), which provides room for
creativity, stemming from a balance between “the real and the
preferable” (Lalonde et al., 2012, p. 428). Second, standards are
about “what is done”, and what one “ought to do” to be
recognized as competent by competent peers, not “how the work
is done” (GAPPS, 2007, p. 2), in other words “not a cookbook”
(IPMA, 2006, p. 10). Thus, judging contextual uncertainty is a
reflexive intuitive process leading the competent PM to perform
the “right” action, following a deontological perspective. The
overall purpose may provide a Kantian categorical imperative to
act or some threshold deontological norms (Moore, 1997) but
actions are not merely dictated by an unpredictable future.
Several difficulties still persist. On the ethics side, the practice
perspective emphasizes a deontological approach and therefore
the relation from practice to outcome may be not fully integrated
or made explicit. Further, the problem of competing duties
remains unresolved: “conflicts between competing duties, such as
duty to society versus duty to client” (Harrison, 2004, p. 1). The
10
According to Schütz, human action is accomplished by the use of verstehen
“the intuitive quickness of enlightened understanding” (Schütz, 1964, p. 4).
C. Bredillet et al. / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254–266
turn to practice reveals two sets of unresolved tensions (Brown,
2012): between rigor and relevance in knowledge creation and
use (theory v. standards) and between researchers and practitioners (knowers and doers).
The “practice turn” focuses on “knowledge and inquiry ‘for’
and ‘about’ and even ‘in’ practice” (Kondrat, 1992, p. 238) and
aims to balance scientific rigor and relevance (Carter et al.,
2008; Vaara and Whittington, 2012). However, the “phronetic
turn” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, 2004; Flyvbjerg et al., 2012, 2004)
advocates for researchers to have an impact on society —
focusing on relevance, and that “our knowing is ‘in’ our action”
(Schön, 1983, p. 49). Maturana and Varela (1998, p. 27–29)
similarly define knowing as “effective action”, and write that
“all doing is knowing, and all knowing is doing.” By contrast,
from the practitioners' perspective, standards are assumed to
contain what “knowledge” is used in “right project management theory and practice” or “acceptable” (IPMA, 2006, p. 3)
and for “acceptable performance” (GAPPS, 2007, p. 2).
Knowledge from research and knowledge for practice may
meet but remain distinct, and sometimes distant.
Therefore we need to question the “divisions of labour
between the researchers and the researched” (p. Eikeland and
Nicolini, 2011, p. 167), the roles, behaviors and expectations of
the communities of practitioners (PMs), as framed by the
classical classes' dichotomy between scholars and practitioners
(Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006, p. 806), involved in
knowledge creation and transfer. Some authors have pleaded
for some kind of junction or integration between the “scholars”
and the “practitioners” (e.g. reclaiming the practical (Kondrat,
1992, p. 241); social science practitioner (Warry, 1992, p. 160);
engaged scholars (Van de Ven and Johnson, 2006, p. 803);
practitioners in the context of project-as-practice (Blomquist
et al., 2010, p. 13); practitioner–researcher (Jarvis, 1999),
researcher–practitioner (Lalonde et al., 2012, note 8, p. 42911),
or being “native” (Eikeland, 2006, p. 45; 2012, p. 11)).
The practice turn invites to rethink the relationships between
practices and standards. But in doing so, it reveals the need to
rethink how practitioners and researchers interact towards a
more joined-up relationship where practice and theory are
mutually constructed. In the following section, we discuss how
these unresolved tensions play out in the standards and
associated assessment schemes.
2.3. Fundamental tensions between the current standards and
assessment perspectives
In the above discussion, we have shown that the PMI
and IPMA assessment approaches are mainly rooted in a
11
Following the Aristotelian tradition, Lalonde et al. (2012) refer to the project
actor as becoming a phronimos: “The interest in theorizing inquiry practices is
that it frees professional action from poiesis and solely instrumental considerations and infuses it with praxis. That is, the project actor has the potential to
become a ‘phronimos’, or an individual endowed with practical wisdom, with the
capacity to think through increasingly complex project situations where values
must be considered in light of critical issues for organizations, communities and
the general public.” (Lalonde et al., 2012, p. 430).
259
deontological approach and are mainly attribute-based. However for the higher levels of project management, the PMI
assessment moves to a performance based approach still
anchored in a deontological approach, while the IPMA assessment, remains attribute based, but moves to a consequentialist approach. The GAPPS assessment approach is performancebased and rooted in consequentialism (see Table 1 for a full
summary). Therefore the PMI standards are based on a consequential perspective, dissonant with the deontological approach
to assessment. For IPMA the dissonance emerges the other way
around, as a deontological standard is associated with consequentialist assessment. Similarly, the GAPPS standards, which
focus on units of competency applicable to PMs roles, are rooted
in a deontological approach, inconsistent with a consequentialist
assessment. Our investigation of standards and assessment
reveals fundamental ethical tensions between standards including
the way they are developed by the community of practitioners
with the support of scholars, and the assessment processes.
We identify two fundamental tensions emerging from this:
- An ethical tension between means (“right action”) and ends
(“good” or “best possible” outcome) at two levels. First,
for each body, a tension between the ethical approaches
supporting their standards and assessment processes, i.e.
duty vs. outcome, despite their usefulness, and while “both
deontological approaches and consequentialist approaches
are regularly construed as opposite sides of the same coin;
duty versus outcomes” (Harrison, 2004, p. 2); Second, a
tension within each standard and assessment process: the
competing duties dilemma with regard to the “right” action
for those rooted in the deontological approach (conflicts
between competing duties, such as duty to society versus
duty to client) (Harrison, 2004, p. 1) and the conflict
“means” vs. “end” for those rooted in the consequentialist
approach;
- A theory vs. practice, rigor vs. relevance, tensions between
values (what one “ought to” be, or “ought to do”) in the
attribute-based approach, and between facts (what one “is”,
or “does”) in the performance-based approach.
Building on Tables 1, 2 summarizes our arguments.
Recognizing the diversity of approaches and the tensions
within and between them lead to acknowledge the fracture lines
that emerge between the definitions of what a competent PM is
or does, and how we assess competence and what standards
encompass and the ground on which they are developed. This
fragmented picture is not satisfactory and not helpful in practice
as it harbors contradictory positions. Whatever the choice of
approach, there are gaps in the definition and expectations of
what a competent PM is or does. A combination of approaches
resting on different lenses does not lead to a consistent view,
and the internal contradictions arising may prove such a
combination impracticable.
In order to overcome the above-described tensions, we
suggest that turning to Aristotelian ethical and practical
philosophy may provide a solution. Aristotle's doctrine of the
mean, where virtues reside between excess and deficiencies
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Table 2
Mapping standards and competence assessment approaches: modern and postmodern perspectives.
Competence
Ethical approach
Deontological (duty, “right” action
defined independently of the “good”
outcome)
Consequentialism (the “right” action
produces “good” or “best possible”
outcome)
Ethical tensions/duties vs. outcome, means vs. ends
Ethical tension/competing duties
Attribute-based approach
(theory, rigor, what one
ought to be or do, values)
Tension between theory Knowledge
vs. practice, rigor vs.
relevance, vales vs. facts
Skills (qualifications
& experience)
Core Personality
characteristics
Performance based approach
(practice, relevance, what
one is or does, facts)
Demonstrable
performance
(Kraut, 2012) appears to be appropriate to connect means and
ends, facts and values. The Aristotelian philosophy provides a
relational and holistic way of thinking — where knower and
known, ethical and intellectual virtues, means and ends, facts
and values, ethics and politics are integrated. We argue that
such an approach can help us to understand and act about what
a competent PM “is” or “does”.
3. The “good” PM
In the social sciences many authors seeking to overcome
modern and postmodern limitations build on “pre-modern”
philosophies such as Aristotle's (e.g. Blomquist et al., 2010;
Flyvbjerg, 2001; Lalonde et al., 2012; MacIntyre, 1985;
Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997). Toulmin (in Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 655), advises a possible path, summarizing the arguments for this approach:
“It can cling to the discredited research program of the
purely theoretical (i.e. “modern”) philosophy, which will
end up by driving it out of business: it can look for new and
less exclusively theoretical ways of working, and develop the
methods needed for a more practical (“post-modern”)
agenda; or it can return to its pre-17th century traditions,
and try to recover the lost (“pre-modern”) topics that were
side-tracked by Descartes, but can be usefully taken up for
the future” (Toulmin, 1990, p. 11).
Eikeland (2007, 2008, 2012) and Eikeland and Nicolini
(2011) aptly discuss the Aristotelian “gnoseology”12. Eikeland
suggests that it “allows for reconsidering and reintegrating ways
of knowing: traditional, practical, tacit, emotional, experiential,
intuitive, etc., marginalised and considered insufficient by
modernist thinking” (Eikeland, 2012, p. 20–21). He emphasizes
12
For Eikeland (2007, p. 347) gnoseology, by contrast to epistemology,
involves broader notion of knowledge. Epistêmê is just one form of gnôsis.
PMI
IPMA ICB
(PMP®, PgMP®) Knowledge
assessment
PMI
IPMA ICB
(PMP®, PgMP®) Knowledge
assessment
IPMA ICB
Knowledge
assessment
PMI (PgMP®)
GAPPS
standards
PMI
IPMA ICB IPMA ICB
standards Experience
assessment
PMI
IPMA ICB IPMA ICB
standards Experience
assessment
IPMA ICB IPMA ICB
Experience
assessment
GAPPS
assessment
that the modern and post-modern appropriation of Aristotle's
philosophy are “insufficient for understanding both knowledge
and ethics” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 348). In particular, these
incomplete appropriations lack the understanding of nuances
between concepts (virtues, ways of knowing and knowledge
forms) and they attempt to categorize concepts as independent
therefore missing a fundamental point of Aristotelian thinking
about theory and practical experience (Eikeland, 2008, p. 46–47).
Drawing mostly on Eikeland (2007, 2008, 2012) and Kraut
(2012) we summarize below some key aspects of Aristotle
gnoseology. A summary of the detailed discussion offered below
is provided in Table 3. An overview of the intellectual virtues,
various ways of knowing and related knowledge forms is offered
(Eikeland, 2007, p. 348; Eikeland, 2008, p. 526; Eikeland, 2012,
p. 20). The various approaches (GAPPS, IPMA and PMI)
discussed in this paper are mapped against the Aristotelian
intellectual virtues. And we illustrate briefly of how Aristotelian
concepts are embodied in project managers' practices.
3.1. The inseparability between ethical and intellectual virtues
In this discussion, we refer to the main Aristotelian treaty on
ethics i.e. the Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 1926)13.
3.1.1. Ethics and ethical virtues
For Aristotle, ethics (and ethical virtues such as courage,
temperance, friendship, justice, fairness, … and prudence
(phronêsis)) is intimately linked to the ultimate “end” of humankind, that is improving our lives and achieving happiness and
well-being (eudaimonia) both for individuals and for the society.
Ethics is the condition for making righteous actions possible,
which in turn enable the development of right habits, and, in turn,
enable the development of good character (aretê14) required to
13
We do not consider two other treatises, the Eudemian Ethics and the Magna
Moralia as the coverage is quite similar considering the purpose of this article.
14
Disposition (hexis) involving conscious choice.
C. Bredillet et al. / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254–266
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Table 3
Mapping standards and competence assessment approaches: Aristotelian perspective (after Eikeland, 2007, p. 348; Eikeland, 2008, p. 526; Eikeland, 2012, p. 20).
Basis
Way of knowing
Aísthêsis
(perception)
Theôrêsis = epistêmê2 Using general models
Spectator speculation to investigate social or
environmental impact
of a project
Páthos
Management of stress
Being affected
generated by external
passively from
(non controllable)
the outside
constraints, change
and uncertainty in the
project context
Khrêsis
Using a PM software
Using instruments
(doing things right,
getting things done)
Empeiría
(practically
acquired
experience)
Poíêsis
Making,
manipulating
materials
Praxis2
Doing: virtuous
performance,
practical reasoning
praxis1
Enérgeia
(perfecting
Practice, competence
actualization) development and
insight (theôría)
theôría = epistêmê1
Insight
Example of project
managers' practice
Estimating, scheduling
calculations, technical
risk management
(application of general
techniques to a specific
project) (doing things
rights, getting things
done)
Non technical risk
management, team
management, conflict
management, stakeholder
management… (contextual
use of theories, and
techniques involving
adaptation and questioning
assumptions) (doing the
right things, getting things
done)
Lessons learned across
projects experience,
reflective practice
vis-à-vis the context
(How do we decide
what is right?)
Conscious development
of reflexive expertise and
patterns of practice
(involve examining into
how practitioners are
thinking about what they
are doing, not just a
reflection on what they
are doing), critically
translate and adapt lessons
learned to specific situations
and context (How do we
decide what is right?)
Associated rationality/ The known (what the
Standards and competence
knowledge forms
knowledge concerns)
assessments approaches
in relation to the knower
Deduction,
demonstration,
didactics
??
The known as external
to knower: outer object
qua phenomenon =
appearance
Within the knower
PMI
standards
IPMA
standards
IPMA
assessment
(PMI
standards)
Tékhnê
(calculation)
External to knower:
external object qua
something used as
instrument
External to knower:
external object qua
something manipulated,
changes, created
IPMA
PMI
standards
assessment
PMI
assessment
GAPPS
assessment
Phrónêsis
(deliberation)
Within the
knower; choice
and performance
(PMI
(IPMA
assessment assessment
PgMP®)
higher levels
A & B)
GAPPS
assessment
GAPPS
standards
of actions in a
concrete situations
Dialectics/dialog.
The way from
novice to expert,
from tacit to
articulate
Within the knower:
internal object/objective
as praxis form/concept
form
The (mostly) ignored part of current
models
Dialog,
deduction,
deliberation
achieve happiness. Ethics is thus practical knowledge rooted on
experience and “good action” oriented rather than just theoretical
knowledge. Practical wisdom (phronêsis) is both an ethical virtue
and an intellectual virtue (Eikeland, 2008, p. 53): it must be
acquired through practice, rather than learned as a set of given
general principles to be applied to particular occasions. In his
description of different types of virtuous persons Aristotle
mentions that good leaders exhibit phronêsis (Aristotle, 1926,
1144b). Two aspects should be emphasized: every ethical virtue
is a balanced condition between excess and deficiency (Aristotle,
1926, 1106a26-b28); and ethical theory does not offer a decision
procedure as ethics cannot be reduced to a system of rules
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although some rules are uninfringeable. Ethical theory illuminates the nature of virtue but what a virtuous agent must do in
particular occasion depends on the circumstances.
3.1.2. Intellectual virtues
However, Aristotle makes clear that in order to fully acquire
practical wisdom or prudence as phronêsis, one must become
both ethically virtuous and practically wise through the
development of proper habits (ethical virtues, not part of the
reasoning soul but following reason) and of the aptitude to
reason (intellectual virtues). This development is not sequential,
and Aristotle states that ethical virtue is fully developed only
when integrated with phronêsis (Aristotle, 1926, 1144b14-17).
“For Aristotle, praxis knowledge represents a relationship
between colleagues sharing common standards for how
to go about their professional activities” (Eikeland, 2007,
p. 351; Eikeland, 2012, p. 26). Phronêsis is a knowledge
form related to Praxis2. Phrónêsis is “the way down from
“theory” to “practice” … the practical enactment is often
immediate and spontaneous … but in other fields where the
practice is not equally standardised and “automated” … the
“application” of general competence or of the knowledge of
principles … needs deliberation or phrónêsis… The point is
that the way from theory to practice within this kind of
knowledge is not deductive…” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352;
Eikeland, 2012, p. 31). Conversely, Praxis1, through dialog
and dialectics, is “the way of learning or research, moving
“up” from how things appear to us phenomenologically to
an articulated insight in basic principles … searching
patterns, similarities and differences in our accumulated
practical experience…” (Eikeland, 2007, p. 352; Eikeland,
2012, p. 27).
3.1.3. The mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis
For Aristotle, praxis, phrónêsis and ethics are inseparable.
Phrónêsis (prudence, practical wisdom) involves “knowing the
right values and being able to put them into practice in
concrete situations” (Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997, p. 666).
As phrónêsis is both intellectual excellence and excellence of
character, “it is impossible to be practically wise without being
good” (Aristotle, 1926, 1144a, 18). Praxis is action in relation
to phrónêsis and ethics. It is action that embodies a commitment to eudaimonia and the search for truth, and respect for
others. Praxis requires that a person “makes a wise and prudent
practical judgement about how to act in this situation” (Carr
and Kemmis, 1986, p. 190 quoted in Smith, 1999, 2011).
Warry (1992, p. 156) offers an authoritative summary of the
articulation between knowledge and practical experience and
the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis: “Praxis, as a
particular form of activity, can serve as a focal point through
which the discursive testing of theory is grounded through
decision-making and experience…”. As Eikeland (2008, p. 87)
puts it, “Only in praxis, not in the study of external nature, the
student and the studied, the knower and the known, coincide.”
Project management authors such as Cicmil & Hodgson
(quoting Balck, 1994, p. 2 in Cicmil and Hodgson, 2006,
p. 13), Blomquist et al. (2010, p. 9) and Lalonde et al. (2012,
p. 428) have acknowledged a similar view. As a matter of
consequence, Eikeland explains that “knowledge and competence is increasingly developed from within practical contexts…making organisational learning in work places and all
cooperative endeavours – i.e. collective efforts, experiential
learning and improvement – increasingly important in general”
(Eikeland, 2008, pp. 21–22). This relation between knowledge
and practice is also acknowledged by Weisinger and Salipante
(2000, p. 387): “The knowing is bound with the practicing of
seemingly mundane actions … knowing as situated learning
and practicing”. We fully grasp here the recursive logic
between “theorizing practice and practicing theory” and the
fact that “theorizing practice is itself a practice” (Feldman and
Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1250).
Having briefly explained how in the Aristotelian view, ethical
and intellectual virtues, knowledge and practical experience,
praxis and phrónêsis are holistically integrated, we now turn to
what this implies for defining a “good” PM.
3.2. The “good” PM: “reconnecting means and ends, facts and
values” (Tsoukas and Cummings, 1997, p. 668)
For Aristotle, human agents and natural things are defined for
the sake of some functions or “ends” (purposes, subordinated to
the ultimate end: eudaimonia). Teleologically, classifying
someone as a PM is to think about the purposes, the ends, s(he)
pursues with regard to the functions or roles s(he) fulfills or
the way s(he) is expected to behave, “not conceiving [him/her]
as ahistorical selves or abstract individuals” (Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 670). Thus calling a PM “good” is to make a
factual statement about what an acknowledged “good” PM
does (“means”), and not referring to a list of attributes he/she
should meet. A concept such as “good” is not an abstract entity
or category in a classification system, but is embedded in
the activity, particular context and situation (Feyerabend, 1987,
p. 113). Calling a particular action “good” means what a “good”
PM would (is expected) do in the situation and is therefore
making a factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, p. 59; Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 670) and closing “the pronetic gap” (Taylor,
1993, p. 57) through the mediating role of praxis and phrónêsis
to move beyond “a dualistic way of thinking” (Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 668). Hence, from a factual statement such
as “s(he) (e.g. PM) meets recurrently and successfully the project
objectives” we can infer the evaluative judgment “s(he) is a
good PM”.
3.3. Standards, ethics and politics
For Aristotle, “praxis is not only individual, however.
Collective praxis is possible when we follow common
standards, and adjust to each other communicatively, i.e.
through establishing mutual and common understandings of
how things should be done in “concord” (homónoia in
EN1167a22-b16 […])” (Eikeland, 2008, p. 87). Developing
“good practice” is done by entering the tradition of a community
C. Bredillet et al. / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254–266
of practitioners (MacIntyre, 1985; Schön, 1987) sharing common
goals (“ends”) will, wish, or want and opinion (Eikeland, 2008,
p. 87, 121) and way of achieving them: “means” with the
underlying idea of doing (praxis) and doing well (eupraxia).
Being part of the community (polis) doesn't involve blind
acceptance of standards, conventions, norms (nomos — laws)
but at the same time the acceptance of historically developed
laws and collective dialogs, debates, deliberations about them
leading to possibly changing them (Solomon, 1992; Tsoukas and
Cummings, 1997, p. 670). Commenting on the ancient Greek
conception of politics, Castoriadis (1991) explains:
“If the human world were fully ordered, either externally or
through its own “spontaneous operation”, if human laws
were given by God or by nature or by the “nature of society”
or by the “laws of history”, then there would be no room for
political thinking and no sense in asking what the proper law
is or what justice is. […] If a full and certain knowledge
(epistêmê) of the human domain were possible, politics would
immediately come to an end […]” (Castoriadis (1991, p. 104)).
Tsoukas and Cummings (1997, p. 671) rightly enhances: “…in
the social domain in general, and in organizations in particular,
uncertainty, ambiguity and politics must go together”.
But how are these common standards conceived, developed
and used in an Aristotelian perspective? The way of conceptualizing “universals” or “general theory” has to be made
clear. According to Eikeland (2008, pp. 25), three kind of
traditions can be considered: 1) Covering laws (deductive
nomological or hypothetico-deductive model), 2) Statistical
generalizations and, 3) Standards. Here standards are defined as
“fixed points or “ideals” for practitioners within certain areas,
saying something about what it means to perform a certain kind
of activity competently or, according to a, saying something
about what it means to perform a certain kind of activity
competently or, according to certain quality.” (p. 26). Standards
are not understood as mere average norms, arbitrary or imposed
by external bodies (e.g. Brunsson et al., 2000). Nor are
such standards qualitatively or quantitatively influenced by
counter facts. Standards are made by the success of virtuoso
performers, and they “change when someone finds a better way
of doing, making or using something”. The key characteristics
of such standards are that “not everybody should or could
realize them equally or fully […] their non-arbitrary character,
their immanence as patterns to practice, and “ways-of-doingthings”, and their practical inevitability in human life as
either implicit or explicit, vague or more exact standards of
measurement, as standards of validity of excellence” (p. 26).
Contrary to arbitrary standards, which can be conventional,
unnecessary, or enforced, non-arbitrary standards are necessary
as they express an existential necessity that is what it means to
be or to do something. Such standards are to be observed
practically from within the practice and they are impossible
to be observed just from outside, by perception. The position
of the “observer” is thus quite different between these
three traditions. In the case of “standards”, the observer is
the practitioner, the native, dealing with things and theorizing
263
his/her own practice, and there is no separation between
practice and theory (Eikeland, 2008, p. 27).
Therefore the Aristotelian ethic enables to dissolve the
tensions between rigor and relevance, practice and knowledge,
practitioners and researchers we identified in the practice turn.
4. Critical insights and concluding comments
4.1. Tensions and limitations brought about by normative
ethics
The question of competence (standards of practice and
assessment) leads to fundamental ethical questions: what is a
“right” action, what is a “good” outcome? And, as consequence, how is the ethical perspective embodied in assessment
approaches and standards and in the assumptions underpinning
them?
Our discussion unveiled two categories of fundamental
tensions within and between assessment approaches and
standards. First, ethical tensions between means and ends, that
is between deontological and consequentialist approaches, i.e.
between duty and outcome. For each body under study we have
a shift of ethical perspective between standards and assessment
approach: PMI and IPMA standards are “consequentialists”
while their assessment approaches, emphasizing inputs and
personal competencies (with some nuances, explained in the
main body of the article, for IPMA and PMI higher level
assessments), are “deontological”, and conversely for GAPPS,
the standards concentrating on duty, while the assessment
approach, focusing on output competencies, considers outcome.
As part of the ethical tensions, we have to mention the conflict
“competing duties” (e.g. duty to society versus duty to client)
inherent to the deontological approach. Second, a tension
between facts and values, that is between performance-based
approaches (GAPPS) rooted in practice, in what one “is” or
“does” and emphasizing relevance, and attribute-based approaches (IPMA, PMI) grounded on in theory and “universal”
best practices, in what one “ought to” be, or “ought to do” and
highlighting rigor.
In order to overcome these tensions and the related
fragmentations of standards and competence assessment
approaches we suggest the Aristotelian ethical and practical
philosophy offers a more holistic perspective. Hence, we turn
our attention to an ethics of character providing a balance
between the excess and deficiencies outlined above, of both the
normative deontological and consequentialist approaches.
4.2. Towards a holistic perspective on standards and
competence assessment
The Aristotelian perspective, acknowledging two fundamental relations through the mediating role of praxis and
phrónêsis, between ethical and intellectual virtues, and between
theory and practice (the various ways of knowing and
knowledge forms) enables us to reconnect duty (means) and
outcome (ends) and facts and values. We can now briefly
emphasize how it offers a holistic answer to tensions highlighted
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C. Bredillet et al. / International Journal of Project Management 33 (2015) 254–266
above within and between the main current standards and
competence assessment approaches and highlight three types of
insights: the Aristotelian ethics helps to overcome the duty
(means) vs. outcome (ends) and competing duties dilemma; the
way a competent PM is assessed enables to reconnect facts and
values; the way to define standards enables to overcome the rigor
and relevance debate.
First, the Aristotelian ethical perspective, an ethic of character
or virtue by contrast to ethics of conducts, goes beyond the
classical dichotomy “duty” (and competing duties) vs. “outcome”, deontology vs. consequentialism (Athanassoulis, 2010).
The mediating roles of praxis and phrónêsis, both ethical and
intellectual virtues, make duty and/or duties (“means”) inseparable from outcome (“ends”, commitment to eudaimonia).
Aristotelian ethics transcend the normative dimensions of
deontology (“right” action) and consequentialism (“good” or
“best possible” outcome) acknowledging that being “good”, i.e.
doing “right” action, involves an inseparable relation between
ethical and intellectual virtues: “we cannot be prudent without
being good and we cannot be fully good without being prudent,
taking the particulars of the situation into account” (Eikeland,
2008, p. 64).
Second, the Aristotelian perspective enables to reconnect
facts and values (performance-based and attribute-based
assessment approaches) transforming evaluative judgement
into factual statement (MacIntyre, 1985, pp. 59) about what a
recognized “good” (i.e. competent) PM “does”, acknowledging
that a “good” action (“right” action) is what a “good” PM is
expected (“ought to”) to do in a specific situation with regard to
the role s(he) fulfills in relation to the purposes and ends s(he)
pursues, and ultimately how this relates to eudaimonia. Thus,
competence and performance “criteria” are assessed, combining
factual and evaluative judgment, in a holistic way by peers from
the community of practitioners, including the “intellectual” and
“ethical” dimensions of the way the PM role is fulfilled and the
PM behaves, i.e. what the PM does in situation. This contrasts
and goes beyond the competence attribute-based assessment
referring to a list of features the PM ought to meet, and
the performance-based assessment leading to provide factual
evidence meeting some performance criteria.
Third, standards are defined in a dynamic way. They are
rooted on historically developed “good practice” made by
“good” or virtuoso practitioners, recognized as such by the
community of practitioners sharing common values, and
include also changes subject to collective dialogs and
deliberations considering better ways of doing things. “Good”
practice, performed by “good” practitioners, is developed and
supported by ways of knowing (theory and practice — see
Table 3) and knowledge forms based on perfecting actualization (energeia) as well on practical acquired experience
(empeiría) and on perception and abstract, distant and external
observation (aísthêsis). This holistic perspective can be
contrasted with the attribute-based approach focusing on the
abstract side and the “universal known external to the knower”
(i.e. aísthêsis and empeiría for the techniques), and the
performance-based approach emphasizing “the known within
the knower” (i.e. empeiría).
4.3. Conclusion: and the answers are
We can now answer our two questions in a more comprehensive way:
• What is a competent PM? A “good” PM is a “wise” PM and
conversely acts “rightly” or does “good” action in context.
That is what a “good” PM is expected to “do” with regard to
purpose s(he) pursues and role s(he) fulfils in this very
situation.
• How do we assess competence? By the community of
practitioners acknowledging that a PM behaves according to
what a “good” PM is expected to “do” with regard to
purpose s(he) pursues and role s(he) fulfils in this very
situation.
Lastly, the Aristotelian perspective allows us to outline a
general theory of standards, focusing on the role of the
community of practitioners (polis) native of the project situations,
and made of patterns of practices and ways-of-doing-things by
virtuoso practitioners. Standards are thus not centered on
“theory” and perception, but on praxis mediating theory
(aísthêsis, energeia) and practical experience (empeiría). Consequently, developing “good” practice and doing “well” (eupraxia),
and thus competence, is done by joining a community of
practitioners, sharing common purposes ultimately oriented
towards eudaimonia. Through the development of standards of
“good” (i.e. competent) practice, “ethics is politics inasmuch as
the achievement of human happiness” (Strang, 1998, p. 1).
Ultimately, we do hope reading this paper will provide an
opportunity for enérgeia and further dialogs and deliberations.
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