UNIVERZITA KARLOVA
FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD
INSTITUT POLITOLOGICKÝCH STUDIÍ
Civil War in Somalia – a Colonial Legacy?
Barbora Rýdlová
MAGISTERSKÁ DIPLOMOVÁ PRÁCE
Praha 2007
Prohlašuji, že jsem práci zpracovala samostatně a uvedla v ní všechny zdroje, s nimž jsem
pracovala a v textu řádně vyznačila jejich použití.
V Praze, 16.01 2009 ………………………
Barbora Rýdlová
Content
Introduction ............................................................................................................................- 1 PART 1 - Pre-state Somalia .................................................................................................- 10 1.1 Somali Identity ...........................................................................................................- 10 SOMALI IDENTITY: Samale and Sab .......................................................................- 10 SOMALI IDENTITY: Primary production and settlement patterns............................- 11 SOMALI IDENTITY: Social structure, clanship as the traditional political institution- 13
-1.2 Traditional Somali Society - Keystones of Political Unity.................................- 16 1.3 Conflict......................................................................................................................- 17 1.4 Means of Coercion .....................................................................................................- 19 1.4.1 Concept of Heer - Clan Tool of Reconciliation .................................................- 19 1.5 On the make-up of traditional Somali society...........................................................- 21 Pre-state Somalia - Conclusion ........................................................................................- 23 PART II - Somalia’s experience with centralism.................................................................- 24 2.1 Colonialism ............................................................................................................- 24 2.1.1 Colonial administration .......................................................................................- 24 2.1.2 Boundaries...........................................................................................................- 28 2.1.3 Somali state attempt ............................................................................................- 29 Colonialism - Conclusion.................................................................................................- 31 2.2 Decolonization and bitter way to independence.........................................................- 32 2.2.1 The idea of the independent state .......................................................................- 35 2.2.2 Institutions ..........................................................................................................- 36 2.2.3 Territory ..............................................................................................................- 37 2.2.4 Means of coercion ...............................................................................................- 38 Independence period - Conclusion ...................................................................................- 39 2.3 Authoritarian regime of Siyad Barre .........................................................................- 40 2.3. 1 Institutional changes...........................................................................................- 40 2.3.2 From Scientific Socialism to Clanism .............................................................- 43 2.3.3 Ogaden war and Siyad Barre Shrinking Position...............................................- 45 2.3.4 Rise of Opposition...............................................................................................- 47 2.3.5 Means of coercion ...............................................................................................- 52 2.3.6 Superpower Strategic Competition and its Implications....................................- 53 2.3.7 Territory ..............................................................................................................- 57 Siyad Barre regime - Conclusion .....................................................................................- 59 Conclusion: The impact of centralism on Somali society................................................- 60 -
PART III Back to the future - Somalia without a state again ..............................................- 61 3.1 Political development after the collapse of the state ..................................................- 61 3.2 Wartime in the South..............................................................................................- 63 3.3 Land issue...............................................................................................................- 64 3.4 UN involvement .....................................................................................................- 66 3.5 State(s) Formation ..................................................................................................- 68 3.6 Puntland’s approach to state formation ..................................................................- 72 3.7 The Riverine State ..................................................................................................- 75 State formation – conclusion............................................................................................- 77 Conclusions ..........................................................................................................................- 78 Abstract ................................................................................................................................- 81 Appendices ...........................................................................................................................- 82 Map 1 – Somalia: Administrative division ......................................................................- 82 Map 2 - Somalia: Ethnic Division in 2002.....................................................................- 83 Map 3 - Ethnic Division in 1977 ......................................................................................- 84 Map 4 – Division of Agricultural and Nomadic Population ............................................- 85 Map 5 - Puntland .............................................................................................................- 86 Map 6 – Somaliland .........................................................................................................- 86 Bibliography.........................................................................................................................- 87 -
Introduction
Almost nobody disputes that Somalia has been one of the most war-torn societies in
the contemporary world. After more than eighteen years, security in most parts of the country
is still being contested. Ceasefire and reestablishment of peace is essential since the turmoil
has a profound impact on the stability of the whole region, and it also influences the
international community at large. Even though policymakers around the world understand the
strategic importance of Somalia, they do not dispose enough means to carry out a feasible
solution to end the crisis as various international actors have already played a most destructive
role in Somalia’s protracted civil war.
Somalia still remains a deeply troubled country and one, which will take years to
rebuild, should peace ever prevail.
The state collapse did not suddenly erupt with the
overthrow of dictatorship regime of Siyad Barre, but was visible in most part of the country
for some time before in the form of social disengagement or retreat of traditional institutions
that had traditionally secured stability in the society. The Somali nation-state formation was
on the wrong way since the very beginning. The total collapse of the state structures is, thus,
not surprising.
However, the question remains what are the reasons of the protracted civil war in
Somalia. The aim of the paper is to assess whether the civil war erupted as a result of intrusive
colonial period or whether the reasons for the bloody conflict reside in the character of the
Somali society (Somalia is by many scholars reported as warlike culture) or rather, whether
the bloody conflict is a product of interlinked causes.
In this paper I argue that Somalia has fallen victim to political unrest and civil war due
to a long standing effort to eliminate traditional Somali culture and traditional loyalties based
on clanship and lineage system. In this part I examine exploitation of Somalia traditional
social structure by various actors.
It is the intention of this paper to demonstrate that the
concept of clanship is valid in modern era, even though people use it in different contexts.
Effective utilization of traditional institutions of self-governance leads to consolidation of
peace and reestablishment of institutions of governance at the level of the state.
With regard to theoretical approach, analytical constructivist method is used as it
allows dealing with complex security environment in Somalia. Social constructivist approach
enables to analyze the issue of security from a variety of perspectives (e.g. social, political,
military), and, at the same time it enables to analyze more referent objects, or in the other
words, does not restrict the analysis just to state. Therefore, the role of other relevant actors
(e.g.clans) can be also taken into account. Accordingly, as various actors influenced political
development in Somalia, realistic approach highlighting the primacy of a state and neglecting
the role of society, is not appropriate.
Since issues of security and sovereignty are viewed from the perspective of critical
security studies, which consider society and not state for a main point of reference, the
substantial part of the study is based on the findings from the selected works of I. M. Lewis, a
British social anthropologist who first described the foundations of Northern Somali society.
Lewis, known as master ethnographer of the Somalis, deals not only with history of the
Somalia, but most importantly, he also describes traditional Somali social and political system
which are the crucial elements in analyzing the root causes of civil war. His analytically
sharp works, “A Pastoral Democracy” (1961) or „The Modern History of Somaliland: From
State to State“(1988) offer a valuable survey of Somali history until early 1980s. His accounts
of Somali nomads are of utmost importance as he focuses on the interplay of the Somali
culture and social construction in the process of state-building and state dissolution. Along
similar lines, Laitin's Politics, Language, and Thought: The Somali Experience (1977)
provides understanding of the social and cultural aspects of Somali history. With regard to
configuration of Somali society, Helander’s Rahanwyen Sociability: A model for other Somalis?
(1996) stands as invaluable contribution to explain the role of clans within the Southern
Somalia society.
With regard to issues of sovereignty and security, Maria Brons’ Society, Security,
Sovereignty and the State in Somalia: From Statelessness to Statelessness?(2001), is a
significant publication as it analyses disintegration of Somalia from a societal perspective and
elicit implications for Somali state-building process. Her main contribution to the problem is
that she offers a comprehensive analysis of the Somali political history from a pre-colonial
period to the present time.
Another important source to draw attention to is Saadia Touval's Somali Nationalism
(1963) that deals with the origins and course of Somali nationalist tendencies and political
struggles. Similarly, Somali irredentism is treated in historical context by John Drysdale's The
Somali Dispute (1964).
With regard to analysis of the era of dictatorship, Laitin and Samatar's Somalia:
Nation in Search of a State (1987) provides a comprehensive review of events that led to the
military takeover of Siyad Barre. Subsequent Siyad Barre's reign of terror, his fall from
power and dissolution of Somali state into separate regions ruled by clan-based political
groups is well treated in Samatar's Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil (1991).
The paper also draws from the works of Copenhagen School of security studies, whose
followers argue that security is a speech act with distinct consequences in the context over
politics. However, the form of constructing security is not defined solely with the focus on the
speech act (even though this plays significant role in Somali society), since it is equally
essential to understand how society and political communities are formed, and how the
community deals with issues of security.
Second, adherents of Copenhagen school identify as crucial reasons of the intrastate
conflict character of relations between state and non-state actors. For this reason, I made use
of the methodological recommendations outlined in Buzan et al.
“Security: A New
Framework for Analysis” (1998). Another reason for using Buzan’s work “Regions and
Powers” (2003) as a
reference is the fact that this book also explores the impacts of
colonialism on contemporary Somalia, e.g. imposed boundaries and its implications on the
issues of sovereignty in particular. This is a crucial contribution, as it helps to verify my
thesis, that is, the extent to which contemporary political mayhem in Somalia can be
explained by the period of colonial dominance.
Since the issue of civil war in Somalia is rather ambiguous one, there are various
approaches to it, which in turn affects selection of literature. And, for problem of civil war in
Somalia is a complex issue embracing various factors, single-cause analysis is inadequate.
Employing various attitudes contribute positively to identify real causes of the civil war,
which is the aim of the paper.
On the other hand, there are approaches that tend to underestimate the relevance of
clanship as an ongoing basic component of social cohesion. On the academic level, there are
assumptions that clanship in a modern context is no longer valid. Scholars using Marxist
methodologies such Samatar: Empty bowl: agrarian political economy in transition and the
crisis of accumulation (1994:), or Geshekter: Anti-Colonialism and Class Formation: The
Eastern Horn of Africa (1984) claim that clan solidarity can only be plausible in traditional
settings where power is decentralized. It is the intention of this paper to demonstrate that the
Somalis have used clanship in different contexts, and as the Somaliland and Puntland cases
show, their success is largely due to employing clan leadership as the foundation of political
authority in Somali society.
There are also approaches that strive to explain the incidence of civil wars in Africa by
pointing out at economic factors, e.g. Colliere and Hoeffler: On Economic Causes of Civil
War (1998), or Sambanis: Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? (2000). The
advocates of such approach claim that diversity within society helps to create a stable arena as
a precognition the economy provides opportunity for productive activity. I will show that the
outbreak of civil war in Somalia has more to do with exploitation of ethnicity and indigenous
forms of governance than heavy dependence on resource-based primary exports.
Still others argue that there are other divisions within Somali society that are of more
importance, namely class divisions and racial tensions between the noble and lower class. The
latter explanation is mainly used by Besteman: Unraveling Somalia : Race, Violence, and the
Legacy of Slavery (1999). In this regard, it is important to note that no Somalis define
themselves in terms of class (neither during era of Scientific Socialism). Clan ties are so
strong that blur the cleavage of class. It could be said, therefore, that clan is the only reliable
welfare system in Somali society. Although Somalis are keenly conscious of the power social
status that wealth confers, this does not translate into a consciousness of class difference.
Rather, the upper class and poor continue to be bound together by the principle of kinship.
Another theory claims that there are two models in the Somali society, a dominant one
presenting Somalia as a homogenous state and less prevailing approach presenting the
southern model of Somali society - where alliances are base on territory rather than descent.
Advocates of the latter one, e.g. Kusow: The Somali Origin: Myth or Reality (1995), Mansur:
The Nature of the Somali Clan System (1995), or Mukhtar: Somalia: A Terrible Beauty Being
Born? (1995) claim that the southern model is equally valid. I do agree that the main
superstition about Somalia is an invented homogeneity, which presents Somalia as a
culturally, religiously and linguistically homogeneous country.
The myth of Somali
homogeneity plays a significant - however not sole- role in understanding the nature of the
conflict. It only helps to explain why the South of Somalia keeps being war-torn.
With regard to literature, since vast majority of information available in this regard is
from foreign literature not available in the Czech Republic, virtually all the materials used in
this paper are based on articles available from online periodicals, such as the African Security
Review, Journal of International Affairs, Journal of Modern African Studies, and Journal of
Black Studies. Even though secondary resources prevail, several UN documents were also
used – e.g. Resolution 794 (1992) adopted by the Security Council, or UN Economic and
Social Council Assistance to refugees in Somalia adopted by the Economic and Social
Council in 1981. With reference to other primary resources, official websites of international
organizations and Somaliand’s and Puntland’s governments are also used.
The paper proceeds as follows. Part I of the paper describes situation in the pre-state
Somalia.
The first part will go briefly through characterization of primary
production/settlement patterns – the nomadic pastoralism of the Northern Somalia and the
settled farming communities of the South.
The part that follows, elicit important
characteristics that derive from the primary production/settlement patterns - identity and
social structure of the society. The aim of this part is to show that in traditional settings,
centralism is completely alien, and in deep contrast to Somali style of governance. On
contrary, the importance of kinship and employing clan leadership as the foundation of
political authority are seen as crucial elements of Somali politics. In fact, these are the
cornerstones of long-lasting Somali stability and security.
Part II of the paper will examine the effects of political centralization in the two
regions – southern and northern Somalia, from the era of colonialism to the Siyad Barre
regime. Focus of debate is centered upon the change of balance of power among clans in
Somalia. The aim is to determine the extent to which era of central government overrode
traditional political frameworks and to explain why state fails to develop as a neutral place for
its inhabitants.
Part III will focus on the widely divergent paths to conflict-resolution followed by
Somalia, which is still marked by inter-clan violence and failing governments, and
Somaliland, which has seen practically no inter-clan violence over the several years, and
ratified a constitution. In compliance with the thesis outlined above, I argue that Somaliland’s
success has been largely due to the decision of its leaders to utilize indigenous forms of selfgovernance. On contrary, southern Somalia’s difficulties, can be partly attributed to the lack
of meaningful attempts to do the same, and partly to the actions taken by the international
community that aggravated the ability of southern Somalis to effectively utilize traditional
institutions of self-governance that would lead to restoration and consolidation of peace at the
level of the state.
PART 1 - Pre-state Somalia
The most common image of Somalia is the one describing it as one of the few
culturally homogeneous countries of the black continent. The Somali people are said to be
united not only by language, culture, and devotion to Islam, but most importantly by a belief
that nearly all Somalis descend from a common male ancestor and are therefore “drawn
together by emotive bonds of kinship and genealogical ties” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 21).
In fact, Somalia has always been divided into southern agropastoral clans and northern
nomadic clans who have distinctively different cultural, linguistic, and social structures. This
chapter discusses the situation of pre-state Somalia with regard to differences between North
and South that will be further referred to in the following two parts.
1.1 Somali Identity
One of the main superstitions about Somali homogeneity is an issue of identity that
derives from three points of divide within Somali society. This part points out at main
differences between the North and the South with regard to three main points of divide:
Somali origin, primary production/settlement patterns, and concept of clanship.
SOMALI IDENTITY: Samale and Sab
Despite the prevailing wisdom that Somalis originated from the main stream of
Cushite peoples, Somalis believe themselves to be descended from an eponymous ancestor
named Hiil who is said to have come from the Arabian tribe of Quraysh, that of the Prophet
Muhammad. Hill is said to have had two sons Samale, and Sab. Thus, the Somali clan system
recognizes two main lineages, the Samale and the Sab. The ancestors of the former inhabit the
north of the country and account for 60 percent of the population (Mansur 1995:108). They
are made up of the following clan families: the Dir, the Daarood, the Isaaq, and the Hawyie.
These four clan families are the main nomadic tribes of Somalia and consider themselves to
be superior or "noble" tribes.
Two other major tribal divisions trace their descent from Sab; these are the Digil and
the Reewin. They live primarily in southern Somalia, between the Juba and Shabelle rivers,
the country's main agricultural zone. These people of this region are socio-culturally and
linguistically different from the nomadic groups. The Northern and central Somali pastoralists
speak Maaxa Somali, whereas the Southern Somali agriculturists speak May Somali - the two
languages being of proximity as Spanish and Portugese (Lewis 1965: 5).
Even though
agropastoralists account only of approximately 24 percent1 of the whole Somali population
they have been of considerable importance in the evolution of warlord conflict in the south.
Saadia Touval in her book “Somali Nationalism” (1963) points at some antipathy
between the Samale and the Sab. The Sab refer to nomads as massakiin, people poor in spirit.
Their greater respect for authority and government, founded in their agricultural economy, is
substantially different to the nomadic clans who have historically shown independence and
unwillingness to submit to authority. Along similar lines, many Somalis are ignorant about
the various clans composing the Digil and Reewin (Midgan, Tumal, Yibir, Chachi, etc.) and
often refer to them derogatory as Etyle (those living with dogs). The descendants of Sab are
considered of low status because these clans tend to be reliant on agriculture and more likely
to assimilate with non-Somali peoples (ibid). The nomadic population claim to be the original
Somali and claim a right to political domination. I will refer back to this point at later stage
when discussing civil war in the interriverine region where the nomadic clans claim
dominance.
SOMALI IDENTITY: Primary production and settlement patterns
Following brief outline of the production and settlement patterns, pastoralism and
agropastoralism, helps us understand two issues: Somali societal system, and attachment to
territoriality.
Climate is the primary factor in much of Somali life. Somalis are divided along clan
lines and sparsely scattered over a harsh, dry land. The Somali region is dominated by
savanna scrubland and arid to semi-arid climatic conditions (Kaplan et al. 1969; Samatar
1989). Due to high degree of variability of rainfall and extremely arid environment, there is a
scarcity of resources. Ecology defines economic pursuit and life style of the people living
there.
In the Northern part of Somalia, where the occurrence of good grazing and adequate
water are scarce, the climatic conditions favor pastoralism adaptive strategy. The pastoral way
of life is structured around seasonal migratory patterns determined by rainfall and pasture.
1
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4176e/y4176e0b.htm, 12.12.2008
Ties to locality are weak, and every lineage does not possess a specific territory and the
territorial dispersion of groups does not mirror their genealogical relationships (Lewis 1961b:
95). Clans control a given territory, essentially defined by the circuit of nomadic migration
but having unspecified boundaries, so that the territories of neighboring clans tends to
overlap. In contrast, in the South one finds mainly farmers who are, thanks sufficiency of
resources, attached to the land they inhabit.
Since access to fertile land and water resources is a key factor in terms of securing
survival, competition and strife over access to them is a constant feature of Somali
pastoralism (ibid). Nomadic clans, who are in search of water and pasture, migrate to the
South where both water and pasture is available all year round.
Nowadays, the traditional
pattern of pastoral migration to South not only continues, but has dramatically intensified.
Drought and refugee-related migration resulted in domination of the Northern-based clans in
the Shabelle region that is territory naturally inhabited by the Southern clans. This northern
domination led gradually to conflict. As will be explained in chapter 3.3 the land issue is one
of the most painful ones and immigrant occupation of land is still one of the major causes of
ongoing conflict in Southern Somalia today (Farah and Lewis 1993; Farah I. 2004).
Second, the availability of resources plays a significant role in organization of society.
The access to resources determines not only economic security but also social and political
relations between particular nomadic groups. In the North, pastureland is not privately owned
but grazing rights are allocated to clan lineages according to customary law and seasonal
conditions. Thus, the social structure of the northern pastoral Somalis is characterized by little
social stratification and no centralized government (chapter 1.1 Somali identity, social
structure, clanship as the traditional political institution). In contrast, the South, namely the
area around the Juba and Shabelle rivers, is by far the most fertile region and the only part of
the whole country in which water is available all year round. Irrigated agriculture and cattlepastoralism are therefore concentrated in these areas. The tradition of agricultural economy
gives southern Somalia some unique cultural patterns. Unlike nomads, agricultural clans tend
to consist of unites of village communities that coalesce around a central lineage by reason of
economic interest. Also, in contrast to the segmented, decentralized social world of the
pastoral regions, chieftaincies and chiefly institutions proliferate among the Digil and Reewin
Sab clans. The confederacy of Geledi calns, the Goobroon lineage has traditionally held a
prominent position in the society (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 29). For more details see chapter
1.1 Somali identity, social structure, clanship as the traditional political institution.
SOMALI IDENTITY: Social structure, clanship as the traditional political institution
Environmental conditions play important role in understanding social structure of the
society. The fragile environment of the North gave rise to a specific form of kinship that can
be found nowhere else but in Northern Somalia. Along similar lines, Somali lineage system
in South is a response to specific territorial conditions. Somali societal system as described
below would not have evolved without specific physical features of Somali environment.
Somalis are not a unitary people, but a grouping of broad clan federations that spread
across the country. Both Both Sabs and Samales are themselves broken down into clan
families, clans, subclans and sub-subclans, all the way down to primary lineage units, and
diya-paying groups2. Somalia, thus, consists of a vast genealogical tree of ever-expanding or
dwindling branches whose member segments “are linked together in a web of crisscrossing
kinship ties” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 32).
In principle, politics are a function of genealogical proximity. “Genealogical distance
- the number of ancestors counted apart – defines the social relation of one man or group with
another. Somali societal structure is based on kinship; each individual’s place in society and
their precise connections with others in society are determined by his lineage, or more
precisely, one’s patriarchal descent determines his political affiliation. Agnation (tol) is the
basic principle of Somali social relations” (Lewis 1961: 126-130).
Agnation in the northern pastoral society is viewed as a binding and absolute tie that
cannot be severed (Lewis 1961: 137). Due to the uneasy availability of water and other
resources the pastoral base is an unstable, fragile system characterized at all levels by shifting
2
Diya-paying group is the focal unit for Somali political and social action; a unit within which one most
often acts as a member, and thus a group around which political relations most frequently revolves. Diya-paying
group is a lineage, or collection of small lineages whose members are bound not only by their close agnatic ties,
but also by an explicit contract (xeer) defining the terms of their collective responsibility. It is through
membership of a dia-paying group that a person's political status is primarily defined, and no Somali has political
status except through belonging to such a group. The name diya-paying group refers to the solidarity of the
group’s members in collective payment of blood-wealth. If a dispute is resolved by payment of compensation
instead of by open conflict, compensation is generally collected on a basis of male strength, each lineage
contributing and receiving according to its male population. The procedure that this is done trough is that known
as "penis-counting" (qooratiris) and involves all men including children.
The process of identification with
diya-paying groups is centuries old and have not disappeared even in modern era at still represented primary
building block of Somali society (Lewis 1961).
allegiance. Power and politics are exercised through temporary coalitions and ephemeral
alliances of lineages (Samatar 1991: 12).
The social structure of the northern pastoral Somalis is characterized by little social
stratification and no centralized government. There is no hierarchical structure; the pastoral
Somalis do not have chiefs as the term is understood elsewhere. The clan head called
variously Suldaan, Boqor, Garaad, Ugaas, etc3 is “merely a primus inter pares since, in the
clan which ranges in population from 10,000 to 10 times that number, policy is decided by the
in the ad hoc councils formed by the elders of a clan” (Lewis
1959: 285). With few
exceptions, a nomadic clan head's functions are honorary and ceremonial. In Lewis word, clan
head is ”a symbol for and focus of the agnatic solidarity of the clan” (ibid).
In contrast, the society of agropastoral clans who dwell in the South has been
distinguished by “marked social hierarchies of chiefs and subjects and of patron and client
clans in which inherited authority plays a dominant role” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 29).
Thus, chiefs of agricultural clans exercise real authority as compared to the clan heads of the
pastoral clans. In the South, the clan elder is usually the village elder and thus the local
authority with regard to the adjudication of land disputes. Clan elders are often among the
most influential landowners, making them personally more involved in conflict that is the
case with their nomadic counterparts (deWaal 1994).
Second, Sab clans have more heterogeneous character compared to the rest of the
Somali clans. This is because of adoption of new members who live aside4 Sab and Samale
clans. In this regard, the clan system as Sab clans interpret it can be described as a system
highly open to immigrants where the role of marital ties is of paramount importance. Also,
3
The title Sultan used to be more popular with the Isaaq clans; the terms Bogor and Ugaas were more commonly
used among the Ogaden clans and in the northwest Somaliland, and Garaad tended to be more popular with most
of the Darod groups as well as with Hawiye. Now all these titles are more or less synonymous (Lewis: 1959).
4
Apart from Samale and Sab descendants, there is another group of people in Somalia. Those people are
believed to have inhabited the country before the arrival of the Somalis. Known as Sab (ignoble) among the
Samale and as Bon (low caste) among the Sab, they pursued certain inferior occupations such as hunting,
blacksmithing, weaving, tanning, shoemaking, and leatherdressing. The people who practise these occupations
form a minor fraction of the total population (approximately 10 %) and, traditionally, were separated from both
the Samale and Sab clans by restrictions on marriage and commensality. These people are mainly found in the
coastal areas and are believed to be from unmixed Arab and Persian descent (Besteman 1999). Next, there is a
small number of slaves attached to both pastoral and sedentary Somali groups, but of greater economic
importance among the latter.
with regard to access to political decision-making and holding political office, the Sab clans
did not differentiate between agnates and adopted members (Helander 1996).
In addition to openness to adoption of strangers, there are other factors that are
substantially different from the concept of clanship in the North. The importance given to the
villages as a form of community partly independent of clans is of vital importance. “The term
reer, which the Samale use in connection with descent, is used by the Sab with a place name,
e.g., reer barawa ("children of Baraawe") (Metz:
1992). In Helander’s word, “from the
inexhaustible variety of models of the Reewin society, one that defines the groups of clans, a
confederation has always been the prominent view” (Helander 1988: 197). In terms of
descent, the organizing principle of clan life in the South is the central lineage, whose position
of social and political primacy stems from its spiritual charisma of ritual attachment to the
land rather that from any genealogical preponderance (as among pastoralists). Thus, the
confederacy of clans can gain the prominent position not due to its numerical strength as it is
among pastoralist, but rather by the importance of firstborn status (Helander 1988; Laitin and
Samatar 1987).
The most significant difference is that agnation is not the overall binding principle.
Rather, the two leading principles that of clanship and village often overlap (Helander 1996: 195).
Thus, village and lineage made up the socio-political context of identity before there was any
idea of a Somali national identity. For the descendants of Sab, security derived form the
village community, which combined common land, common labor and common worship,
together securing survival of the people. In the South, “village life is dominated by principles
of good neighborliness and inter-clan solidarity rather than the assertion of clanship ties”
(Helander 1996: 140).
While among the pastoral Somali, social obligations, status and
prestige and security were all provided by the lineage.
In sum, the Digil and the Reewin clan families are mainly sedentary cultivators in
southern Somalia and they have a mixed clan constitution very different from that of the
Northern Somali pastoralists. They are considered to be "less war-like, less individualistic,
more cooperative and more biddable" than their Somali brethren. Their greater respect for
authority and government, founded in their agricultural economy, is at complete variance with
the nomadic ideal of the independence of the warrior” (Touval 1963: 16).
1.2 Traditional Somali Society - Keystones of Political Unity
As outlined above, Somalis are not a unitary people group but a grouping of broad
clan federations that spread across the country. In terms of political authority, power is
decentralized among and within clan families, clans, subclans and diya-paying groups, the
latter one being the “fundamental political unit in northern pastoral Somali society” (Lewis
1961: 325). However, as Lewis (1961: 2) points out: “Somali genealogy is not a mere family
tree recording the historical descent and connections of a particular individual or group…in
the sphere of politics its importance lies in the fact that it represents the social division of
people into corporate political groups. By reference to his ancestors, a man’s relations with
others are defined, and his position in Somali society as a whole determined. Thus an
understanding of the political relations between groups requires knowledge of their
genealogical relationships”.
The patterns of interaction are contextual; one level of lineage may be more salient
than others in varying situations. Some clans within their clan family might unite for e.g.
political purposes, and some lineages within a clan might associate to pay and receive blood
compensation in cases of homicide. These alignments are based on kinship and such units
might be dissolved and new ones formed (ibid).
The result of unstable Somali clan organization characterized by shifting allegiances at
all levels is a society so integrated that its members regard one another as siblings and
enemies at once. As a consequence political instability is “the society’s normative
characteristic” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 31). In this regard, lineage segmentation inherently
militates against the evolution and endurance of a stable, centralized state5. Never in Somali
history, felt its indigenous people need to create national institutions, and attempts to state
formation were artificial creations that were undermined by the actions taken by clan
affiliations. As Laitin and Samatat observe “even though the modern state would be able to
exercise power through centralized authority most Somalis would continue to give greater
political and emotional loyalty to their lineages” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 30). For more
details see chapter 3.5, 3.6 respectively about Somaliland and Puntland.
5
http://www.photius.com/countries/somalia/society/somalia_society_lineage_segmentation~1599.html,
10.04.2008
1.3 Conflict
The most peculiar characteristic of the Somali system is its relativity and flexibility. A
man belongs to a wide range of segments of different orders. The points of unity and division
at which political solidarity emerges are at level of the clan, primary lineage and diya-paying
groups. “In a system of lineage segmentation, one does not have a permanent enemy or a
permanent friend, only a permanent context. Depending on the context, a man, a group of men
or even a state may be one's friends or foes6”. This fact is cogently summarized in an Arab
Bedouin saying:
My full brother and I against my half-brother, my brother and I against my father, my
father's household against my uncle's household, our two households (my uncle's and mine)
against the rest of the immediate kin, the immediate kin against non-immediate members of
my clan, my clan against other clans, and, finally, my nation and I against the world.
Thus, societal segmentation goes up from the household level with the children of a
man's two wives sometimes turning on one another on the basis of maternal lines. And this is
exactly what makes the Somali case different - the branches of a single tree encompass
virtually all Somali citizens. Tribalism elsewhere in Africa refers to battles between peoples
who do not share a common kinship structure; in Somalia tribalism involves battles among
people who do so share (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 30).
Historically speaking, conflict mainly occurs between clans or between diya-paying
groups within one or two clans. Conflict between pastoral clans mostly occurs over control of
grazing territories, access to water wells, and looting of livestock. In the South, conflict arises
over land tenure, infringement of grazing reserves, and occupation of farmland. In the modern
era, there are political conflicts which are interweaved with clan conflict over resources,
sometimes refer to historically transmitted traditional mistrust, suspicion or stories of betrayal,
or political purposes.
Among pastoral people, outbreak of violence became related to the clan, thus, conflict
resolution and subsequent compensation was common responsibility of the clan not
individual. As such, violence between various segments within or between clans had not only
a protection component, but also a power-regulation component (Brons 2001 ). In the pastoral
society, it were mainly the warriors (waranleh) who became involved in violent conflicts.
They were responsible for control and defense of the territory and resources. The elders of
the clan or village, the clerics (wadadoo and sheiks) had the responsibility of mediating peace
6
http://countrystudies.us/somalia/43.htm, 15.12.2008
and maintaining security and stability when conflict broke out. Conflict resolution always
depended on the goodwill and respect of the warriors towards their clan elders. Violence was
used both as defense tool and as a mean of claiming political strength and power, and thereby
determining political status (Lewis 1961: 240). The specific pastoral attitude towards violence
had two main roots. The first derived form peculiar territory nomads occupy – that is
competition for scarce resources.
Second, it was the feature of collective guilt and
responsibility that make the second difference in relation to other Somalis who lived in the
condition of relative food sufficiency.
With regard to sedentary population, their experience with violence was mainly
through conflict-ridden relationships with surrounding pastoral clans who subjected interriverine villages to repeated raids. The nature of pastoral society coupled with pastoralists’
feeling of superiority over the faming communities, were the main assets of pastoral Somali in
relation to sedentary Somali who, in terms of military organization, were weak and
inexperienced. The general attitude to violence is rather different within the settled clans as
they were unified in their common locality and dependent on cooperation (Helander 1988).
Thus, in the traditional configuration, competition is limited to relatively small groups.
In history, the clan family never acted as one body, that is never went to war altogether Adam
1992). However, during modern era of centralization there was a need for wider
alliancesThese have been formed in two modes.
The first emerged following the
independence and in the first phase of civil war when groups competed over distribution of
power and formed the first political parties. The poles of power in the politics of independent
Somalia tended to form around the Darood clan family and confederacy of the Hawiye which
competed for government posts. During Siyad regime, it was the Darood who held the power
through him. As these clan families/ confederations are, similar to other clan families,
politically acephalous and prone to factionalism, there was fierce competition within these
large clan groupings, between their lineages (for jobs etc.). Second case, when groups
competed at the higher level of descent organization arose in the form of anti-Siyad Barre
movements. Even though there were strives to form non clan-based opposition, it came in
vain. Both these cases will be later discussed in details.
To sum up, Somalia has a unique, warlike culture that characterizes Somalia’s lineage
based social organization. The traditionally pervasive nature of these factors has long bound
Somalis into patterns of oppositional warfare. This political and structural segmentation has
many far-reaching implications. First and foremost, it means that Somali politics is likely to
be dominated by a concern among political actors with who in power is related to whom and
how (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 31). Second, bitter disputes take place only on local level and
are extensive only when clan consciousness is manipulated (Adam 1999: 170 - 171).
Although institutional instability is actually woven into the fabric of Somali society, the
following chapter (chapter II) will clarify how external intervention exacerbates this tradition
by misinterpreting institution of clanship and exploitation of interclan rivalries.
1.4 Means of Coercion
In the stateless period, both customary and sharia law7 were used in conflict
resolution, embracing legal issues deriving from resource-competition over resources (either
water or pasture), family affairs, criminal offences and compensation (dyia) payments. The
difference between sharia and customary law lies in the point that, in the former, the
perpetrator is personally held responsible, whereas, in the latter, there is a collective lineage
responsibility for the committed crime. The perception of collective responsibility often leads
to acts of revenge that are in turn directed against a clan as a whole. This is a major factor in
the dynamics of violence that unfolds in crisis situations.
1.4.1 Concept of Heer - Clan Tool of Reconciliation
Customary law is deeply intertwined with the clan system in the sense that descent
(tol) and contract (heer) complement each other in one security-providing structure within
Somali society (Lewis 1961; Schlee 1995). Unlike tol where solidarity derives from agnatic
statues in the lineage system, heer is a form of an egalitarian contract that “enable agnates
(and sometimes non-agnates) to unite in corporate political groups sometimes irrespective of
their genealogical proximity” (Lewis 1961b: 94).
Heer is the legal foundation for traditional Somali politics, it is an informal contract by
which Somali society accommodates its legal and political disputes, and it has traditionally
patterned person-to-person relationships among the nomads of both parts of Somalia. Lewis
once characterized her as a sort of social contract, which did not lead to the creation of a state
(Lewis 1961: 3).
7
With regard to sharia law, in pre-colonial times permanent legal courts headed by Kadis existed in villages and
towns, whereas in the pastoral area, most legal affairs were handled by wadaado or by sheiks.
The base upon heer functions will reveal why it was possible to establish a
functioning entity in Somaliland since is the foundation of all formal political units among the
northern pastoral Somali. The word heer (xeer) is usually translated as custom, however, it
has more meanings. What gives the definition a common feature is its implication of binding,
fastening and of securing (Lewis 1959: 282). Two men or parties are said to be of the same
heer when their relations are regulated by a common treaty. There are two forms of doing it,
first, a man or a party enter into the heer deliberately, or such contracts can be inherited from
their ancestors.
Heer binds the people of the same treaty together in relation with other
similar groups. It is thus a form of egalitarian social contract that explicitly formulates the
obligations, rights, and duties of those parties that have entered into the contract, thereby
regulating the relations between lineage groups (Lewis 1961: 161).
The majority of heer agreements refer to collective defense and security and to
political cohesion in general.
The most important delicts are those of homicide (dil),
wounding (qoon), and insult (dalliil). Heer also regulates various forms of interaction
including the regulation of access to water sources and grazing land (due to the fundamental
importance of these common-pool resources to the lives of nomadic pastoralists, especially
during the dry seasons) (ibid).
Heer, along with Islam and clan ideology8, regulates the behavior of a man not only
towards his fellow kinsmen but towards members of other clans (Samatar 1991: 10). For
instance, a diya-paying group bound by heer is collectively responsible for those actions
committed by its members that go against the obligations set forth in the contract. For
instance, when a man commits a homicide, the guilt does not remain with him solely as an
individual but is attributed to all of the murderer's kin, who become guilty in the eyes of the
aggrieved party by reason of their blood connection with the perpetrator. Members of the
aggrieved group then seek revenge, not just on the perpetrator, but on any member of his
lineage they might chance upon. The system’s lack of individual culpability is a specific sign
of Somali society (ibid).
The heer functions in the context of ad hoc established deliberative lineage groups
councils – the guurtis, that are called for the occasion in order to resolve conflicts.
Participation in guurti meeting is flexible and composition of membership is adapted to the
specific kind of conflict as well as to the clan or lineage level of the parties involved (Lewis
1961: 240-265). The type of conflict – be it political, economic or interfamily- determines the
8
The institution of Xeer reconciles the demands of Sharia and the principles of pristine common laws.
composition of the council. In pastoral setting, participation at council of elders is based on
democratic principles and participation. Thus those concerned are provided with a legal and
political constitution and established as a legal and political unit.
These lineage group councils - guurtis- have the right to declare war and to make
peace. They also propose punishments for its members and establish principles by which they
as a social-political unit will collectively act externally. They decide the proportion in which
they will receive compensation for external actions and amounts payable in international
disputes. In pre-state Somali society the guurti councils were considered the fundamental
institution of government (Lewis 1961: 198-199).
A council of elders consensually selected by the guurti, guurti in the North and
aqiyaarta in the South (which also participates in the deliberations and functions as a court),
assumes the duties of monitoring and enforcement. They take up residence at the affected
location until the conflict is solved, a compromise found, or a follow-up meeting agreed upon.
Guurti/Aqiyaarta are considered the highest traditional authority. These are the sources of
political stability for the community or lineage as they reconcile conflicts within the village
community or between pastoral lineages.
The fact that heer is not a static institution - these contracts can be renegotiated or
dissolved when the various exigencies of nomadic pastoral life call for such a change (e.g.
fragmentation of groups which have become too large or unwieldy to continue as manageable
units, fission arising out of mutual quarrels, rivalry for political control among leader elders or
differences) - is important as it reflects the changing circumstances of nomadic life and, more
importantly, positively contributes to conflict resolution.
1.5 On the make-up of traditional Somali society
Prior to colonial occupation, there was no single polity or state-like configuration of
society that would have united the nomads with agropastoralists into one political entity.
Somalia, similar to rest of Africa, was a place of “loosely defined political systems: a world of
societies rather than states and far more recognizable to anthropology than to international
relations” (Jackson 1990: 67).
Attempts at state formation were result of the need for political stability as a response
to economic boom with increased trading in coastal towns. Formation of state-like polities
took place since 13th century in the form of sultanates or emirates that were based on Islamic
judicial system.
Whatever sultanate, emirate or chiefdom, what all state-like political entities had in
common is that sedentary Somali have integrated quite easily into the emerging authority
structure since they accord a high value to communal identity. Religion created bonds of
belonging, security and social stability; Somali Sheiks were reported to be of utmost
importance in these city state (Kassim 1995). Not only were Somali coastal and southern
communities integrated into these polities, but they also transformed in their inner structure
and organization.
The nomadic groups, on the other hand, were less involved in politics and trading and
thus have not integrated much into the emerging authority structure. Contrary to Somali
sedentary clans, nomads have had loosed and more sporadic ties with the early states as
caravan traders or warriors. Northern Somali society existed in the form of several nomadic
groups organized along kinship ties: the Isaaq, Dir, Hawiye and Darood clans. As nomads,
these clans occupied specific grazing grounds and water points and control trading routes that
crossed their territories. The economic necessity underlying the pastoral clans, cyclical
migration between water wells and pasturelands gave rise to egalitarian society. The statelike entities in the north were not stable and permanent units, according to Lewis (1961: 207),
“the state’s existence was constantly threatened by its egalitarian Somali population”.
To sum up, the characteristics of state in Weberian sense, permanent institutions,
control over the means of violence and territoriality – were restricted to city states. These
polities were territorially localized and different in terms of society configuration, reflecting
the differences between nomads and agropastoralists. Before the colonial period, the
agricultural communities in the South were predominantly organized as chiefdoms, with a
strong sedentary and religious component, while nomadic population lived scattered across
the territory. However, beginning of colonial era sparked off the rapid dissolution of these city
state formations and brought about significant changes with regard to issues of territoriality
and exercising power.
Pre-state Somalia - Conclusion
The aim of this part was to describe traditional ways of lifehood in Somalia with
regard to three main points of divide present in Somali society: origin, primary
production/settlement patterns, and concept of clanship. Although the overwhelming majority
of Somalis trace their genealogical origin to the mythical founding father Hill, the decisive
factor for identification is his two sons, Samalee and Sab. The Samale consider themselves
superior to settled Somalis, which give them a justification for landgrabing and their
dominance in the South (see chapter 3).
In the course of events, the Samale and the Sab evolved differently as they adapted to
different physical environments. The nomadic Samale lived in the North and devoted them to
pastoralism, while the Sab communities inhabited the area between the Juba and Shabelle
rivers where they devoted themselves to agropastoralism.
These production/settlement patterns play significant role in organization of society. In
the North, where resources are scare and people are forced to nomadic, the water access
determines not only economic security but also social and political relations between
particular nomadic groups. For pastoral clans, an individual’s place in a group - and the
group’s relation to the larger society – is primarily determined by blood ties, however, these
do not play as crucial a role in defining a groups corporate existence in settled communities.
Rather, agricultural clans tend to consist of unites of village communities. Despite these
differences, clan system is considered one of the cornerstones of Somali social organization
and polity. Clanism is a Somali version of ethnicity or tribalism: it represents primordial
cleavages and cultural fragmentation within Somali society.
With regard to conflict, in traditional settings, political authority within the
communities lay with the elders and the traditional heads of clans and lineages, the
Sultans/Boqor,/Garad/ Ugaz etc.).
The institution of clan head was the only traditional
political office in Northern Somali society. Clan heads had no formal court and no
constitutional authority; however, they command a certain prestige, as they function as
arbitrators and peacemakers in their clansmen and are concerned for clan solidarity and
welfare. They represent their clan in external relations with leaders of other clans especially in
negotiations between clans and as a figurehead for clan solidarity. Clan elders dealt with legal
issues and economic resource allocation as well as with political conflict. After the
disintegration of the state, clan elders were of utmost importance, since they helped to
reestablish state authority in Somalia (to be discussed in part 3).
PART II - Somalia’s experience with centralism
This chapter deals with several attempts at state formation that took part in the Somali
history. This chapter is divided into three parts, of which the first provides a characterization
of the nature of the colonial state in both parts of Somalia; the debate on the colonial state
centers upon its administration and dynamics of colonial power, and political events during
colonization with emphasis on territorial aspects - the role of imposed boundaries in
particular. Implications of these impositions on newly-created states will be also discussed.
The part that follows presents an analysis of one early Somali anticolonial attempt at Somali
state formation.
The second part of the chapter deals with the period of independence and the strife to
transplant a Westphalian state system into Somali society. To do this, de facto perspective is
adopted, using the approach of the three main pillars needed to call a social construct a state
(territory, institutions, and idea of a state).
Third, the authoritarian regime of Siyad Barre is reviewed. Focus of the debate is
centered upon institutional changes with regard to change of balance of power among clans in
Somalia and exploitation of traditional Somali way of governance that formed part of the
president’s strategy of divide and rule.
2.1 Colonialism
2.1.1 Colonial administration
A key challenge in analyzing Somali colonial administration, as with other spheres of
colonialism, is their sheer diversity. During the colonial period, the country known today as
Somalia was two separate entities: the British Somaliland Protectorate in the north and Italian
Somaliland in the South9.
To start with, in 1884 and 1886, the British government signed protection treaties with
the Issa, Gadabursi, and Isaaq subclans - Garhajis, Habr Jaalo and Habr Awal. In July 1887
the Protectorate of British Somaliland was officially established (Lewis 1965: 46). Britain had
9
The British Somaliland Protectorate was controlled briefly by the Italians during World War II, and the
‘possession’ of Italian Somalia was briefly handed over to the British after the war.
formulated no plan for its Somali possessions and
Somali territory was treated as a
dispensable asset, alternatively to be traded for higher imperial stakes in Ethiopia, or to serve
“Aden`s butcher shop” (Ahmed 1999: 236).
British rule can be characterized as indirect, allowing the traditional tribal authorities
to govern trough its leaders. Although the British did permit to associate in the form of
cultural societies, or political parties, there was social segregation and Africans were denied
direct participation in the government. The stability of diya-paying groups was weakened by
the appointment of chiefs for each clan by the British colonial authorities in an effort to ease
the running of their administrations (Issa-Salwe 1996: 5). This practice, known as the Akils
system vested, in a single person, the powers of assisting the administration in maintaining
law and order within the clan, enforcing government orders and regulations, and bringing
persons guilty of crimes within the clan to justice, which diminished the bonds of contractual
solidarity within the diya-paying group (Lewis 1961: 201). The Akils were divided in terms of
loyalty, on the one hand to clans, on the other to colonial state. It was the first step into the
direction of divide and rule that until today pursue the Somalis. Furthermore, because these
appointed chiefs were provided with a government stipend competition was created among
clan elders to be appointed to this position (Issa-Salwe 1996: 5). As a consequence, the
traditional authorities suffered from a loss of power and, in many cases, legitimacy.
Next, the newly introduced institutions marginalized the actual power of political
authorities such as sultans and khadis. A central judiciary was introduced that referred to
colonial laws of British and Italian origin and only partly to customary and sharia laws. The
establishment of colonial state law, even though it was not in conflict with traditional legal
system, introduced a perception of the superiority of the modern over traditional law system
(Compagnon: 1998).
There was also a clan privilege: the British acquired title deeds to the northern portion
of the country by entering into various treaties with the elders of the Isaaq, Warsangeli and
other northern Somali clans (Samatar 1991: 15). Later, when the colonial rule was already
established, the British continued to favor some clans. For instance, they over-recruited men
form Daarood clans, something that brought considerable tension within the territory (Laitin
and Samatar 1987: 74). In this regard, colonization has significantly altered the balance of
power among clans in Somalia.
The explanation of nowadays political turmoil, some believe, lies in a combination of
elements of African society with the impact of colonialism. Berman (1998: 341) claims that
the patron-client relationships of precolonial African politics were selectively reinforced by
colonial practice. This may explain why patron-client relationship dominates politics and the
state fails to develop as a neutral place for its inhabitants. Along similar lines, Ekeh (1975:
226) argues that “the civic side of African public life is systematically exploited and degraded
in order to maintain primordial networks within which reside the traits of morality, loyalty,
obligation, and commitment that are denied to the state”.
With regard to the Italian part, by 1888, Italian trading companies had begun to sign
protection treaties with Somali clans along the Indian Ocean coast – the Majertain Sultans of
Obbia and Alula. In 1892, Italian trading companies administered the Benadir coast, while the
British kept the area south of the River Juba, Jubaland, which remained part of the British
East Africa Protectorate until 1924. Since the first protection treaties with Majertain sultans
had been signed in 1889, other Somali had signed treaties with Italian representatives of the
Filonardi Company. After the Benadir company had run into bankruptcy, Italy finally decided
in 1905 on direct administration of their colony, Somalia Italiana (Pankhurst 1950).
Compared to the British, the Italians went much further in their efforts to weaken the
traditional societal configuration. The Italian colonial administration was highly centralized
with all posts of any importance held by Italians. During the era of Italian fascism, land was
appropriated from Somali owners, who were then forced to work the land essentially as
sharecroppers, reducing Somalis to a source of cheap labor. Trade and commerce within
Italian Somaliland were controlled by governmental monopolies; participation was denied to
Somalis in any sector of the economy that was deemed essential to Italian interests.
From 1893 to 1905, when the Italian government took over direct administration of the
southern inter-riverine region, both companies - the Filonardi and the Benadir Company
introduced customs and tariff regulations which were anathema to the people of the region.
Such policy represented an economic threat to particular clans - eg. Biyamals, the Tunis, the
Geledi, the Wa’dans and others (Mukhtar 1996: 547) and contributed to disbalance of power
between particular clans.
Many laws discriminating the principle of xeer were enacted that further abased the
status of Somalis, who also were subject to “severe and arbitrary punishments for trivial
offenses” by the Italian legal system (ibid). The agropastoralists, both of Samale and Sab
origin, were more strongly affected by the European colonization compared to the nomadic
communities.
Colonial authorities appointed government chiefs for each clan or large
lineage, even in cases where there had been no chiefs of any kind. To take an example, the
Geledi subclans were headed by the sultan, whatever his origin, the government-nominated
leader was expected to be the negotiator between the colonial government and the people
(ibid).
Furthermore, the abolition of the slave trade and the outlawing of slavery by 1920
changed not only the lives of the slaves but also the position of the slaveholders whose
economic and political power depended on the slave economy. In Geledi areas and elsewhere,
many slaves left to take up other land as subsistence cultivators. A few remained, and their
descendants maintained a quasi-dependent relationship as clients of their former masters. By
the second decade of the twentieth century, slaveholders were faced for the first time with
having to cultivate their own land. Not only Geledi, but also other Digil and Reewin clans
were affected in their social and political character by the Italian colonial administration. The
impact of colonial rule in the Southern farmlands on land rights intensified after 1923. Italian
agricultural policies were dominated by the kolonya system, which meant expropriation of
land of the highest quality from villagers and forced relocation of villagers (Pankhurst 1950).
In this time, the era of land appropriation had sparked off.
The Italians, whatever their motives and tactics, were able to inculcate a “more
modern attitude towards centralized government” in the southern Somali people, and did more
to modernize the economic system of the South than did the British in Somaliland (Lewis
1965: 112-113; Ahmed 1999: 236). However, only some clans benefited from the new order
of economic prosperity and social mobility. Some groups, like the Haaji Diiriye and Yuusuf
Igaal families, grew exceedingly rich form the boom times (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 52).
Thus, as different factors impacted positively and negatively on Somali society, some clans
profited from colonial states policies and some became marginalized.
To sum up, the
Italian administration inculcated the values of a Western-style
centralized government to the Somali life created by the administration’s economic
modernization policies, while the British placed much less emphasis on both modernization
and the creation of a system of highly centralized national governance. Due to the fact that the
British did not enforce centralism, traditional structures continued to exist on substate level in
a complementary form, which was one of the factors that helped northerners to establish a
functioning state-like entity.
2.1.2 Boundaries
The manner, in which European nations descended on Somali in their scramble for
territory, was bound to leave a heritage of artificially controlled borderlines, which now
demarcate the Somali state. The Berlin conference ushered in a period of elimination of
existing forms of states autonomy and traditional way of self-governance. The colonizing
countries drew up boundary lines that mutilated kinship units into bewildered fragments, and
then colonial administrations attempted to turn their boundaries into blockades, as happened
at various times with various levels of success though the colonial period. The colonial
partition of Africa cut across not only existing physical, cultural, and linguistic units, but also
across ethnic groupings (Potholm 1985: 37).
In Partitioned Africans, A. I. Asiwaju (1985) provides a checklist of partitioned
culture-areas, that is, broad cultural groupings that were bisected by the boundaries of colonial
invasion. To take a few examples, the Mareehaan clan was shattered by the new frontiers into
three parts, one part in the Italian zone, another under the British in the Northern Frontier
Disctrict -NFD, ant still another in Ethiopia’s Ogaadeen. So were the Bah-Gati and
Mahammad Subeer Ogaadeen clans as well a host of smaller clans (Laitin and Samatar 1987:
52).
By imposing frontiers, the colonial countries created new administrative entities and
“superimposed a grid of rather artificial order” (Potholm 1985: 37) that had severe
implications. In establishing their respective frontiers, the colonial powers tented to ignore the
economic necessity underlying the pastoral clans; cyclical migration between water wells and
pasturelands. The Somali concept of territoriality, reflecting the environmental conditions and
socio-political structures of the society was ignored during partition. Accordingly, the concept
of territoriality changed.
Also, the imposition of boundaries had far-reaching implications as Somali clans and
people in general, were only marginally involved of process of its creation. The concept of an
undivided colonial state sovereignty was established, thus undermining the basic sovereignty
of the Somali people that consisted de facto of divided sovereign entities. Some of the
contradictions that arose out of the imposition of colonial rule still haunt the Somali people
(see part 2.2 Decolonization).
Accordingly, the colonial occupation and division of territory made the country more
prone to violence. Continuous external military engagement in the region involved Somali on
opposing sides and increased the conflict potential of Somali society. Gradually, in the course
of 20-year anticolonial struggle, credibility of protection treaties came in vain. Somali
loyalties towards the British and Italian administration were split, adding another dimension
to Somali internal conflict. The Dervish wars10 affected Somali territories under Italian
protection in the Northeast. Majertain clans were divided in their reaction to the movement
led by Mohammed Hassan (Pankhurst 1950). In the subsequent two wars fought by the
colonial powers in the Somali region (the 1935 Italian invasion of Ethiopia and the 1941
World War II battles in the Horn) Somali had fought against each other. To the traditional
inter-clan rivalries, and the anticolonial struggle, had been added another dimension. Also, the
colonial occupation confronted for the first time in Somali history with modern warfare
strategies.
2.1.3 Somali state attempt
The genesis of the idea of a Somali state emerged through anti-colonial opposition. In
reaction to the imposition of British colonial rule in Northern Somalia, an anticolonial
struggle began, led by Sayyed Mohamed Abdulle Hassan. His movement was primarily aimed
at spreading Salihiya religious belief among the Somali. However, consequently it developed
into an anticolonial struggle. His strive culminated in 1905 when he was granted control over
fixed residence between Ras Garad and Ras Gabbe, a territory in Northeastern Somalia by
both British and Italians (Touval 1963: 54). Although de jure the territory remained under the
Italian flag, and Hassan became procurator of the Italian Government, de facto he was granted
full political authority over these territories.
Apart from British and Italian authorities,
traditional authorities also gave consent to a new forming polity.
In terms of institutional framework, all elements for state in Weberian sense were
present: territory, idea of a state and control of means of violence. The constituting
components of the polity were: council of elders, the official army, and the community at
large (Samatar 1982: 119). Formation of armed forces was based on non-clan principle,
however, majority of the warriors were form the Darood clan (Lewis 1961: 227). The
unifying ideology of his followers, the identity beyond clan affiliation had both a religious
and a political component, the religious one being a consent component.
10
Wars fought in order to topple colonial governance.
The political component of identity beyond clan affiliation lay in his autocratic rule,
where power was concentrated in one person. Lewis (1961: 227) notes, “amongst his
followers, who came form many different clans, lineages and diya-paying group, he strove to
replace clan and contractual allegiance by devotion to himself”. Since Sayyed attempt at state
formation was driven by force, the power rested with Sayyed and not with elders.
However, Hassan’s attempt at state formation did not evolve from ideas to political
practice. Three factors prevented state creation. The first one is clan factor. The leader of
Dervish movement, Mohammed Haasan came from a nomadic Somali area. Although he
appealed for religious unity within his movement, he continued to use clan politics –
combining descent and contract with descent and marriage - as a tool for securing and
extending his power base. One of the reasons why Dervish movement did not lead from
Somali anti-colonial struggle to a state formation, is the fact that his policies remained clan
attached and thus fragmented. His revolt was directed not only towards the British, but also to
Somali collaborators (mainly Akils, and trading community in Northern Somali towns, e.g
Berbera, Burao) (Brons 2001: 140). In this process, earlier inter-clan rivalries, such as those
between Isaaq and Ogadeen over land tenure, pasture rights and the control of trading routes
gained another dimension (Markakis 1987). The Somali clans were in addition to traditional
division, divided into pro and anti colonial. Those against were exposed to raiding and looting
attacks (Brons 2001: 140).
A second major factor of state creation failure was due to incongruity of Sufi orders
followed by Mohammed Hassan and Sheikj Uways Mahamud al-Baraawi, a political leader
form the South (Kassim 1995).
Last but not least, there was a different colonial experience among the nomads and
agropastoralists (see above), and different ways of dealing with the colonial powers.
Hasssan’s movement derived from the nomadic culture, whilst Somali resistance movement
was in nature different to that of nomads and revolved around villages (Mukhtar 1996).
Southern Somali were confronted with other forms of oppression, such as slavery. Thus, in
the South, the resistance was directed against Italian and Somali landlords.
In short the, due to diverse experiences and interests of the two parts of Somalia,
Hassan’s attempt at state formation did not evolve from ideas to political practice. Clan
division and religious component worked against the development of united Somali state by
consent, and strife for creation of state by force was not strong enough (Doornbos 1975).
Colonialism - Conclusion
Whatever the differences in exercising powers, both colonial systems were disruptive
and disconcerted indigenous societies. Colonialism influenced the Somali society in terms of
reinforcing and creating clan division. Most importantly, Somali traditional ways of
governance were destroyed as a result of imposed arbitrary boundaries that were drawn along
the economic interest of colonial powers with a total disregard of traditional clan ties. Sultan
in the South, and Akil in the North were the link between the people and the colonial state.
The appointing of Akils/Sultans had severe implications in terms of power balance, since
these were divided in terms of loyalty, on the one hand to clans, on the other to colonial state.
As a result, traditional political systems were seriously affected by these impositions.
In terms of an idea of the state, the colonial heritage established a pattern of rising Somali
political nationalism. This, however, did not necessarily reduce social fragmentation within
Somali society. Instead, new dimension of social fragmentation emerged. Following the
partitioning of the continent, the imposition of the Westphalia state system laid the foundation
for conflicts. Although warfare is immanent to Somali and nomads in particular, the colonial
occupation and division of territory made the country more prone to violence. Despite the
British and Italians granted provisions of security, they did not fulfill their promise. Clans
under their protection faced numerous Ethiopian attacks both prior to and after boundaries
were agreed on. Continuous external military engagement in the region involved Somali on
opposing sides and increased the conflict potential of Somali society. Since people were
dispersed in different states, they were forces to fight against Somali. Also, it confronted for
the first time in Somali history with modern warfare strategies.
Another aspect of social fragmentation that was strengthened through colonial
policies was the rift between the nomadic and sedentary population. Colonial policies in the
South sanctioned discrimination against settled, and particularly Somali Bantu communities.
Next, the colonial powers imposed boundaries cutting across various clan territories, pastoral
grazing grounds and trading zones. The splitting of clan territory implied a division of grazing
lands for Somali pastoralists and increased insecurity in the region. These, then, were the
most profound of the changes that accompanied the transformation of Somali society form a
stateless to state society. It is the structural grid that is one of the most enduring colonial
legacies in Somalia. The Westphalia state system that imposed arbitrary boundaries across the
continent remains to be a fundamental colonial legacy that continues to be an obstacle to
development.
2.2 Decolonization and bitter way to independence
Charged with the demanding tasks of consolidating colonial rule and linking the
colony to the metropolis, the result was that the colonial state was both interventionist and
fragile, authoritarian and weak, and exercised domination without hegemony. Transplanting
European-style states and forms of Westphalian international relations to non-European
peoples was not easy anywhere in the world, but in Africa the transplant has largely failed.
Somalia has been for the most part week both as a state (low levels of sociopolitical cohesion)
and as a power (commanding small economic, political, and military resources). The fact that
colonial state was weak, and exercised domination without hegemony, ensured its eventual
downfall. Thus, independence was by many perceived as a historical moment of recovery in
which the agency of the precolonial past would be restored. The decolonization era in Somalia
was largely defined by the belief that the transplant of a Westphalian state system would
eventually take root.
Rather than consolidating the empirical reality of a modern bureaucratic state, the
trend since decolonization has been towards highly personalized, kleptocratic, neopatrimonial regime with no interest in developing the state as such, or even outright
warlordism (Reno 1998). Jackson and Rosberg (1985) capture what was unique about postindependence era with their distinction between empirical and juridical sovereignty.
Traditionally empirical sovereignty (the Weberian understanding of the state as an
organization having real capacity to govern a territory and people) was the first requirement
of statehood and the basis for recognition by others. In contrast, African states were created
by the international community, and maintained by it. Somalia was no exception. African
states, thus, were commanding juridical sovereignty long before they acquired the capacity for
empirical sovereignty (Buzan and Waever 2004: 221). The result was a unique construction
mixing together post-traditional (clans), modern (state), and postmodern features; while the
former element became the most prominent one since clans retained a strong position as
sources of identity, legitimacy, economy, and obligation (Thomas and Mazrui 1997: 3).
“Juridical sovereignty reinforced the personalized, kleptocratic politics, and the dominance of
loyalty to kin, clan, and patron-client relations over that to civil society of the state”(Clapham
1998b: 147). As Buzan and Waever (2004: 222) cogently mention: “by imposing boundaries
on to Africa’s complicated social structure, juridical sovereignty did little to constrain a
widespread record of violence within political life of the new African states”.
Similar to other colonized countries, Somalia came to independence with three
colonial legacies - colonially inspired political framework, a period of electoral competition,
and a sense of competitiveness over the leadership positions in newly created states (Potholm
1985: 142).
To begin with, colonially inspired political framework gave rise to authoritarian
regime. With regard to control over the use of force, the establishment of colonial police and
military units prepared the ground for the diminishing authority of the elders in clans and
village communities. The merger of these units into a national army on the eve of
independence paved the way for the development of strong instruments of coercive violence
in the hands of future Somali state authorities. It is often claimed that Siyad Barre learned his
policy at the feet of his former colonial rulers (to be discussed in detail in the following part).
Next, the period of decolonization of Somalia was marked by period of electoral
competition. The first national elections were held in 1956 when a Territorial Council was
established comprising representative from traditional society as well as from the newly
created political parties (Kaplan 1969: 45). There was a distinct voting system for pastoralists
who voted in according to clan voting system11, whilst sedentary Somalis secret ballot was
used. The fact that parties, not candidates, were the recipients of votes invited factions and
exacerbated the anarchic tendencies already present in the society. Maintaining balance rather
than solving Somalia’s deep problems became the leitmotif of Somalia’s democracy.
Stagnation was socially, economically, and politically debilitating (Laitin and Samatar 1987:
74).
Moreover, there were some discrepancies in terms of formation of political parties as
political parties in the British protectorate were considered illegal until 1959 (ibid). The
institutionalization of party politics developed here much later that in the in the Italian
administered trust territory.
Moreover, Somali political parties had different attitudes towards independence and
state formation. The Darood dominated Somali Youth League (SYL) had branches all over
Somalia, thus its vision of Somali state included all five territories – that is today’s Djibouti,
Somaliland, Southern Somalia, Ogadeen and Northern Kenyan District. The second most
relevant party to run for the elections was HDMS (Hisbia Dhigale Mirifle Somaaliyeed)
representing Reewin clans. Since Reewin clans were fearful of possible nomads’s dominance
in the newly established state, HDMS called for a 30-year trusteeship under Italian
11
For details see Kaplan 1969: 46-47.
administration. Third, there was The Somaliland National League (SNL) that came into being
in 1935.
Its members came mainly from the Isaaq clan family, and in terms of state
formation, SNL proposed unification of both British and Italian protectorates (Markakis
1987). As parties that contested elections had different views of the form of state, the
consolidation of the state was not an easy task.
In early 1960, new elections were held. These were the first elections in the British
Protectorate with Somali parties involved. The Somali National League won the majority of
the seats (20), 12 went to the United Somali Party12 (USP) and only one to the Somali Youth
League. Soon after independence the northerners became dissatisfied with then situation since
Southern Somalis held major posts in the newly created government and a majority of seats in
the parliament, something which was in deep contrast to traditional configuration of the
society where northerners enjoyed numerical strength and thus more power (Kaplan 1969:
50).
Still, the most severe problems concerned the merger of the two territories as the
leaders of the two regions had confused ideas about what the association between the two
territories entailed, or whether it was desirable; and neither Somaliland nor Somalia was
prepared for union (Mohamed 2002: 1177-1202). When in 1960 British Somaliland joined
Italian Somalia to form the Somali Republic, there were almost irreconcilable differences in
the northern and southern part of the country (especially underdevelopment and socioeconomic stratification in the north).
On the eve of independence, two parliaments existed side by side, one in the British
territory and the other in the Southern Trust Territory. The independent Somali state of 1960,
in contrast, was a unitary republic. It was much less than a union, however. As H. F. T. Smith
put it, the ‘union’ marked the total ‘absorption of Somaliland by Somalia’ (Smith 1996). The
north lagged behind the south in economic and educational development. This may help
explain the gradual domination since independence of jobs and other privileges by southern
bureaucrats – “a domination that fostered considerable tensions and antagonism within civil
service of the young republic and also forms the background to the legitimate grievances of
today’s northerners” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 52).
The new multi-party national assembly constituted the center of political power. Apart
from elections to the national assembly, the only other elections to representative bodies were
at the municipal level. For the eight regions and 47 districts, the minister of the interior
12
Darod based party, opposed to SNM's secessionist policies in Somaliland.
appointed regional governors and district commissioners. Hence, politics became centralized
in Mogadishu. The constitution made no allowance for regional differences. Its drafters
considered neither federalism nor decentralization, although either system would have better
reflected the political realities of Somali society (Brons 2001).
2.2.1 The idea of the independent state
On the eve of independence seeds of instability had been already sown when political
differences between North and South on the characteristics of the union were not taken into
account. First, there were considerable differences arising from traditional societal divide
between pastoralist and agropastoralists, second, there was imbalance concerning public
investment rooted in colonial times, where in the South Italians were widely credited with
encouraging economic development (they established schools, hospitals and infrastructure
etc.).
Since the two parliaments did not agree on the Act of Union, a document officially
establishing the state, the interim government decreed the unification without having settled
outstanding differences. In the words of Laitin and Samatar (1987: 70-71): “Nearly all
preparatory work had been accomplished in the South, in negotiation with Italian officials,
before the British agreed to grant independence to their protectorate”. Thus, Northern
politicians could only make insignificant influence on the constitutional development process
and Northerners felt considerable resentment towards politicians from the South for not
allowing them fully participate in the constitutional process.
Although the constitution was adopted, the overall results of the referendum did not
portray an accurate picture: majority people in the North voted against the adoption.
According to Drysdale (1992: 47) 72 percent of the people in Hargeisa voted against the
constitution, as did 69 percent in Berbera, 66 percent in Burao, and 69 percent in Erigavo. The
constitution thus sowed a seed of conflict-prone problem-solving institutional framework as it
did not reflected regional differences. Northern politicians felt discriminated as they were
denied equal participation in the constitutional process.
The underrepresentation of northern politicians in the upper levels of the central
government during this time meant that few northerners were part of the state apparatus. As a
consequence, Isaaq clan family and HDMS, the party representing Reewin, had called for
creation of federal system that would have taken into account specific characteristics of
Somali society (Mukhtar 1996).
2.2.2 Institutions
The independent Somali state was democratic state, its legal system combined Sharia
and customary law with modern state law. In many respects, local political arrangements
continued to operate, creating diffuse domination over social control. The majority of people
remained detached from the modern state framework (Doornbos 1993). State political
institutions did not penetrate society. Instead, non-state political structures penetrated the
modern state. The reasons for this were threefold: geographical distance form the capital that
concerned the Northern urban population; a marginalized status within the Somali clan system
causing concern for the inter-riverine population; and isolation from modern way of life that
concerned the pastoral nomads of the North (Brons 2001: 165).
The state also failed to offer a public social security system as an alternative to substate mechanism rooted in clan networks. The state was simply perceived as having
complementary role to more natural traditional security arrangements (ibid).
Sovereignty de facto remained divided; de jure, however, it was ascribed to the
government of the internationally recognized Somali state. The central political power
inherited from the colonial rule increased as the Northern former capital became
marginalized, and all politics centered about national capital Mogadishu. One of the
weaknesses of the "democracy" from 1960 - 1969 was that the Italian-style constitution and
the resulting structure of government did not adequately integrate the traditional democratic
governance by clan leaders along clan lines (Compagnon: 1997).
Thus, during the civilian
regime, the southern urban elite, whose commitment to the concept of xeer had already been
diminished due to the abandonment of clan-ties, dominated the Italian-style central
government, soon became a predatory ‘state class’, using their government positions for
personal gain to the detriment of the Somali people. Both Northerners and Southerners felt
legitimately deprived. To take an example, the Rehanwein clan family, which enjoyed an
equal number of seats with the two other major clan families of Hawiye and Darood in the
south prior to unification, was to be comparatively marginalized (Mukhtar 1996: 543-553).
Along similar lines, following unification, the dominant Isaaq political party from the North,
the SNL became Samatar in Mogadishu. In contrast, the SYL gained strength as it merged
with Darood minority in the North (ibid).
The dynamics that evolved out of this centralized, Southern-dominated political
structure is reflected in voting patterns of political parties. Throughout the existence of the
democratic independent state, it was de facto only one party that ruled the country (Samatar
2001: 16). The Somali Youth League (SYL), despite Darood dominated party, managed to
create a picture of common Somali nationality since its program focused on nation building
with moderate Greater Somalia ambitions. SYL was not per se a clannish party, including
members from Hawiye, Dir, Isaaq and Reewin (Nelson 1982: 27).
Members of parliament perceived the central state framework as a source of
enrichment and the centralized political system became another layer in the clannish policy.
With every cabinet to be formed, clan balancing became “a standard operating procedure in
democratic Somalia, as government jobs necessarily meant representation for any clan”
(Laitin and Samatar 1987: 70). The parliamentary system of power distribution negatively
influenced political stability and led finally to the military coup in 1969.
2.2.3 Territory
The independent state acted on the idea of Greater Somalia - embracing British
Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, the Somali inhabited Bale/Ogaden/Haud
regions in Southern Ethiopia, and the Northern Frontier District in Kenya. The majority of
these territories were Darood inhabited and Darood politicians were eager to incorporate those
into the newly created state. They did so under the disguise of unifying the nation into a state
and representing the will of majority. However, even though Darood clans occupy the largest
territory in Somalia, they do not constitute the major clan family in terms of its numerical
strength. Within the boundaries of the independent state, it was the Hawiye and Reewin that
accounted for the majority of population. Moreover, the population of the inter-riverrine area
constitutes between 35-40 percent of the total Somali population (Mukhtar and Kusow 1993:
8). Thus, the Greater Somalia ideology became a source of legitimacy for Darood political
dominance.
Somali unification, although by Darood presented as the binding idea of all clans, was
a controversial idea. HDMS in the South feared possible political dominance of Hawiye –
Darood power bloc and called for transitional period of trusteeship to avoid such scenario.
The second clan-based opposition to the Greater Somalia idea came form the Isaaq in the
North. SNL calls for independence from British occupation and joining the trusteeship
territory in the South were given priority then the idea of pan-Somalism.
2.2.4 Means of coercion
Following Somali independence, foreign policy concentrated on the idea of panSomali unification. In doing so, the government had to be prepared for Ethiopian military
response and had to have means to suppress it. In this regard, building a strong national army
became the utmost need.
To satisfy the need, Somalia turned to the West. United States, Italy and Germany
offered join aid program to train and arm 5,000-6,000 soldiers. In 1963 Somalia rejected the
offer considering it insufficient. The same year, the Somali government accepted military
assistance from the Soviet Union which was doubled compared to Western offer, and
included air force and navy. The Soviets had agreed to grant loans that eventually reached 52
million US dollars and to help build a 14,000-troop army (Brons 2001: 169). Within a few
years, the Somali army had developed into the fifth largest on the continent (ibid).
At the same time, western governments supported Somali police force with equipment
and training, which was in accordance with continuation of colonial policy. The involvement
of Western powers was merely nothing else, but strife to counterbalance the Soviet influence
in Somalia. External aid in the form of military assistance and training, equipped the state
with a potential of violence that could be used either towards external or internal enemy.
Moreover, the Darood power bloc gained significance as the idea of creating Greater
Somalia transformed itself to practical government policy. In Brons words (2001: 171):
“Furnishing an already modestly Darood-dominated Somali state network with means of
violence to be used either internally or externally, opened opportunities for a further
marginalization and suppression of other clans and political groups and parties within
Somalia”. In the other words, the military coup in 1969 was a culmination of the nine years
of independence.
Independence period - Conclusion
The first nine years after independence were characterized by nationalism and
experiments with multi-party democracy. But at the end of the 1960s Somalia was caught in
corruption and clan-politics. Government positions were perceived as a possibility to get a
share of the resources of the state, which were then redistributed among the close kin of the
politicians.
These conflict prone patterns within Somali politics were to have a long-term impact
on future Somali development. Both territorial perceptions and ideology that underlay policy
making and the framework of state institutions served as the foundation of arrangements that
offered security to some while creating insecurity for others. This unequal development began
immediately after independence and increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The reasons
for the political instability of the democratic system lie in clan politics and impact of external
security policies and the role and prestige of the national army, both of which affected the
availability of coercive means of violence on the hands of the government, finally leading to
the military coup in 1969.
2.3 Authoritarian regime of Siyad Barre
The 1960-1969 period of multiparty democracy and independent state started off the
conflict-prone patterns within Somali politics that were to have a long-term impact on
political developments in the country. The territorial perceptions and ideology that underlay
policy making and the framework of state institutions served as the foundation of
arrangements that offered privilege to some groups while others were marginalized as they
were denied participation on state policies.
Against this background many people were relieved when in October 1969 a group of
military officers toppled the civilian government. When Supreme Revolutionary Council
(SRC) took over state leadership Somalis welcomed this, as army wielded favorable position
within Somali society - army units were working on government road-building programs,
operating farms in the South or digging public wells in nomadic areas (Brons 2001: 170).
2.3. 1 Institutional changes
In the early years of his rule, Siyad Barre seemed to be committed to the principle of
advancement. It was him who introduced an official orthography for the Somali language,
embedded a successful literacy campaign, and initiated infrastructure developmental
programs. One of Siyad Barre main goals was to reduce the gaps between the haves and havenots created by the previous democratic regimes. Thus the new regime focused on eliminating
the immanent divisions in Somali society: the cleavages between clans and lineages,
sedentary and nomadic population, strong and weak, pastoral lineages competing for grazing
and water, patrons and clients in the cultivating regions, and urban and rural residents. “Under
the new regime, clan and lineage affiliations were irrelevant to social relations, and the use of
pejorative labels to describe specific groups thought inferior to Somalis were forbidden”
(Metz 1992).
Hence, the initial goals of SRC were to eliminate clan rivalry that had produced
corruption and nepotism. Coming from a clan13 that did not have a commanding presence in
the Somali state, Siyad Barre therefore had an interest in minimizing clans as a basis for
advancement. All political parties were banned (there has been a general feeling in Somali
society that the tribalism of the party system had been destructive) as expressions of clanism
13
President Siyad Siyad Barre is a member of the Mareehaan clan and was born near Shilaabo (In Ethiopia). His
mother was Ogaadeeni, an important clan ally.
and centralism became the backbone of institutional framework. The decisive condition for
political participation was personal loyalty to the president. In the early 1970s, the military
and political leadership represented a relative clan balance. Members of Isaaq, Hawiye, and
Darood clan families participated on political power. As Laitin and Samatar (1987: 76) put it:
“Appointments, for the first time in the republic’s short history, were made not according to
clan affiliation”. The SRC toughest political position was closely connected to the campaign
to break down the solidarity of the lineage groups. Tribalism was condemned as the most
serious impediment to national unity. Siyad Barre defined tribalism as a disease hindering
Somali development. The government punished those who failed to obey a relatively broad
category of proscribed activities classified as tribalism14.
The middle of the decade proved to be determinative for Somali further development
since the military leadership introduced elements that constituted a radical break with the past.
The newly formed government - the SRC - reorganized the country’s political life and legal
institutions in a number of ways. Among the new government's objectives were breaking up
the old regions into smaller units as part of a long-range decentralization program intended to
destroy the influence of the traditional clan assemblies. Revolutionary Councils were
established from the national to regional and local levels. Administrative division was
reorganized form eight provinces to sixteen regions (Mukhtar 1993).
Local orientation
centers were meant to be a cornerstone of the society. Their function, apart from stated one,
was to replace the old lineage structure as they were based on friendship and patriotism, not
kinship (Brons 2001).
With reference to the legal system, Siyad Barre eliminated codes that gave clans land,
water, and grazing rights. In the early 1970s, he abolished the Islamic payment of blood
money for injuries. The dismantling of the diya system – traditionally the most stable political
unit, which guaranties the Somali security of his life and property; dissolving institutions of
political and administrative offices intended to eliminate power vested in lineages and clans;
and the establishment of committees, councils, and cooperatives were all part of a new policy
with the aim to replace the descent group/territorial unit system as the primary means of
organizing Somali traditional life.
Another manifestation of this policy was the banning of weddings, burials, and
religious rites, organized on a lineage or clan basis. Since 1972 SRC decree, wedding
ceremonies were to be held at orientation centers or other public places. Siyad Barre had
14
http://workmall.com/wfb2001/somalia/somalia_history_siad_Siyad Barre_and_scientific_socialism.html,
03.04.2008
sometimes participated in these occasions as a head of the rite and contrasted the benefits of
socialism to the evils he associated with tribalism. Additionally, money for the burial of a
dead member could not be raised from lineage members, and the law forbade religious rites
tied to local traditions (Metz 1992).
Among the revolutionary regime's concerns was also the status of women. Under
Somali customary law, a woman was under the legal protection of a male - her father or
husband, or one of their kinsmen in the event of their deaths. In blood compensation, her life
was usually valued at half that of a man (Lewis 1961). Then traditional Islamic law permitted
daughters to inherit half of what was inherited by sons, and daughters normally did not share
in the inheritance of valued property (camels or land). A handful of Somali girls attended
school and even fewer continued beyond the elementary level. From the onset of 1975,
evoking the message of equality, justice, and social progress contained in the Quran, the
government established committees to deal with women's affairs. A new family law that gave
women the right to inheritance on an equal basis with men was put into practice. Moreover,
the diya payment for injuries to women became challenged following the formal termination
of the traditional system. Thus, soon after the revolution increasing numbers of girls were
bound to compulsory school attendance, more females were studying at university; women
also began participating in government and on social and cultural life in general. There were
women in visible public posts in Somalia in 1990. Until the 1991 collapse of the state, 6 of the
171 elected members of the People's Assembly were women (Rinehart et al 1982: 28).
However, the decision to give equal rights to women (especially equal inheritance rights and
compulsory school attendance for girls), was a move that led to protests by some Islamic
leaders. SRC attempts to improve the status of Somali women were unpopular in a traditional
Muslim society, despite Siyad Barre's argument that such reforms were in compliance with
Islamic principles.
Some Somalis believed the law was proof that the SRC wanted to
undermine the basic structure of Islamic society. In Mogadishu twenty-three religious leaders
protested inside their mosques. They were arrested and charged with acting at the instigation
of a foreign power and with violating state security; ten were executed (Rinehart et al 1982:
18). The position of religious leaders, thus, changed substantially after the adoption of
scientific socialism. From this time one, religious leaders were warned not to meddle in
politics (ibid).
Another significant change concerned resettling the nomadic population. Like most
governments required dealing with this issue, also the revolutionary regime painstakingly
sought to find ways to settle the pastoralists. To increase production and control over the
nomads, the government resettled 140,000 nomadic pastoralists in farming communities and
in coastal towns, where the erstwhile herders were encouraged to engage in agriculture and
fishing. Additionally, the 1974 drought forced many nomads to ask government for help; by
1975 about 105,000 had been resettled, 90,000 as cultivators and 15,000 as fishermen (Metz:
1992). Clans were purposely mixed within the settlements, and the settlers were expected to
deal with local councils, committees, and courts, whose membership was also heterogeneous.
Three years later, nearly 45 percent of the adult males had left the cultivating settlements,
perhaps to resume herding (ibid). Dislocating the nomads and severing their ties with the land
to which for centuries belonged to, the government have undercut clan solidarity. In many
instances, real improvement in the living conditions of resettled nomads was evident, but
despite government efforts to eliminate it, clan consciousness as well as a desire to return to
the nomadic life persisted. Thus, efforts to convert the nomads into farmers went by the
board, and in the early 1990s most herders were still nomadic or seminomadic (ibid).
The Siyad Barre regime, thus, sought to erode social stratifications inherent in
traditional society. All these measures were designed to break down the traditional clan
structure, to weaken the role of traditionally strong religious leaders as well as to strengthen
the personal control of Siyad Barre. “The elite was said to be created on the basis of
shared political ideas within a state, rather than personal ambitions and the utilization of
kin ties. In reality, however, the guiding principle for Siyad Barre was to use any means
that could secure his political survival” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 159).
2.3.2 From Scientific Socialism to Clanism
In 1976, the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party (SRSP) was founded. This marked
the beginning of the transfer form military co civil government. The change in government
from military to civilian was completed in 1979 with the adoption of a new constitution. A
civilian presidential system was established, and widening of the political power base of the
president became evident. In effect, Siyad Barre became the personification of the state. In
1980, the president declared a state of emergency that returned the country to military rule.
Even though the emergency rule officially ended in 1982, a real change from military to
civilian leadership never took place.
Concluded relationship with the Soviet Union had brought about significant changes
as for declaring socialism as its frame of reference (in part as a means of obtaining Soviet aid
which was finally directed at Siyad Barre opposition. The regime's basic ideas constituted a
pragmatic version of Marxism adapted to local social and economic conditions. In order to
overcome the divisions based on clanship, all Somalis were asked to call each other comrade
(jaalle). “This was a clear signal to the people that socialist camaraderie would surpass
kinship in the scientifically socialist way... many Somalis believed truly that they were an
autonomous people who could improve their material condition” (Laitin and Samatar 1987:
80). Since there was almost no bourgeoisie in Somalia, neither was there proletariat, class
strife typical of a socialist state was equated with lineage system. Consequently, the main goal
of a society became “to liberate itself from distinctions imposed by lineage group affiliation”
(ibid).
Institutional innovations included the organization (under Soviet supervision) of the
National Security Service (NSS), directed at counteracting attempts to settle disputes among
the clans by traditional means. For instance, the government sought to change the function of
the clans and lineages by abolishing the traditional headmen, whom the democratic
government had paid a pension (elder) and replacing it with peacekeeper15 (nabod doan)
appointed by Mogadishu to represent government interests. Moreover, the government also
created various committees in place of traditional clan groups. Community identification
rather than lineage affiliation was vigorously advocated at orientation centers established in
every district as the focal point of local political life. In short, the influence of lineage groups
at all levels and elitism based on clan affiliations were targeted for eradication.
Hence, as scientific socialism failed to deliver promised outcomes the rhetoric of
socialism faded and Siyad Barre restored to clanism. The dominant clans in the civilian
period, the Hawiye, the Isaaq, and the Majeerteen16 were not preeminent in Siyad Barre`s
government, therefore, they felt legitimately deprived. A mutual anxiety began to develop. As
leaders of the Majeerteen, Hawiye, and Isaaq began to voice their misgivings about their
status under Siyad Barre rule, the president began to surround himself with more people from
his clan. Consequently, in spite of the revolutionary regime's intention to denounce clanism,
the government found itself in the center of the Daarood kin community that consisted of
Mareehaan (Siad Barre's clan), Ogaden (the clan of Siyad Barre's mother), and Dulbahante
(the clan of Siyad Barre son-in-law Colonel Ahmad Sulaymaan Abdullah, who headed the
15
Peacekeepers were the appointed spokesmen of what were officially regarded as local groups composed of
either cultivators or pastoralists.
16
The Majeerteens were the clan that held the key to power throughout most of the civilian era. They had
developed an ideology that justified their right to rule based on their political finesse and administrative
competence. Siyad made allusions to his enemies among ht Majeerteens in many of his early remarks.
NSS) clan-based coalition (commonly referred to as MOD).
In doing so, Siyad Barre
relegitimated the language of tribe in Somali politics. In 1975 ten of the twenty members of
the SRC were from the Daarood clan-family, of which these three clans were a part; the Digil
and Reewin, the sedentary interriverine clan-families, were totally unrepresented17. The MOD
circle also had wide representation on the Supreme Council and in other party organs18.
Although the SRC monopolized executive and legislative authority, in reality,
however, power remained within a core around Siyad Barre who appointed a number of
executive posts. Despite his titles were of less importance, he managed, via clan manipulation
that the SRC members deferred to him. The regime's creation of a party was a mean to
disguise where real power rested, and “the supposedly increased base for the
assimilation was more symbolic than real” (Lewis 1965: 223)…. “Leavened as it was
by the wider representatives of the SRC and the government, the MOD alliance was a
useful recipe of rule in Somalia” (Lewis 1994: 167).
2.3.3 Ogaden war and Siyad Barre Shrinking Position
In order to bolster shrinking political support Siyad Barre looked to the dispute
over the regions of Ogaden and Haud with Ethiopia. Thanks to the decision to enter the
war, the power base of Siyad Barre was further strengthened. Several leading fighters from
the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) were incorporated into the Somali National
Army in 1978, increasing the coercive powers and political influence of the president
(Saether 2000: 130). The issue of Somali unity joined all Somalis and the irredentist
cause possessed enormous political power. This power made the use of the irredentist
cause into a dangerous political temptation for Siyad Barre as “he sought to galvanize
the regime and the MOD alliance while facing economic recession” (ibid).
The Ogaadeen War has been interpreted, by some, as the single most important
turning-point for the regime. The defeat by Ethiopia in 1977/78 triggered off a huge flight of
Somali Ethiopian refugees into Somalia. The number reached its peak in 1981 when an
estimated 1.5 million refugees fled to Somalia. As a result, the country’s population was
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increased by almost 40 percent (Legum 1980: 26). Somali Ethiopian refugees mostly came
from Darood clan family, and these mainly settled in the North among the Isaaqs and in the
South among the Reewin inhabited areas. More than 750 thousand of them were settled in the
North (Brons 2001: 187). Thus, resentment intensified as Isaaq clan family was reduced to
second-class citizens in their own territory (Omaar 1994: 223). The refugees were better off
that the local population as the government took land from local populations for refugee
camps and agricultural projects for those who left Ethiopia. Economic and social inequities
between refugee population and native inhabitants of these areas were sharpened by
traditional clan animosities between Isaaq and Ogaden Somali (Markakis 1987). The land
traditionally held by Isaaq clans came under the control of Darood clan family. In traditional
settings, land ownership derived from customary rights over the use of land and water
resources. This was in conflict with state laws that declared all land to be state-owned, thereby
establishing the right of the government to determine the allocation of land including the one
given to refugees.
Humanitarian aid played an important role in the survival of the regime. One of the
consequences was camp recruitment for Siyad Barre militia. The refugee sector also provided
material support to those with connections to the National Reconciliation Congress
administration. The majority of these sources went to Darood clan family (Africa Watch
1990: 32). In addition, Ogaden refugees were used as political spies by the government, and
were armed and mobilized for anti-SNM attacks, and later they featured in the persecution of
the Issaq population (Africa Watch 1990).
During the economic and refugee crises, Siyad Barre has resorted again to tribalistic
techniques to hold onto power: “he has been shuffling political appointees back and forth
throughout the bureaucracy and building ever new and changing tribal alliances” (Laitin and
Samatar 1987: 93). This technique divided his enemies and logically intensified general
awareness of clan membership. Siyad Barre kept on encouraging clan warfare in a number of
ways - he organized raids; his troops armed loyal clans and encouraged them to wage war
against opposing clans. The damage caused by negative and destructive manipulation of clan
consciousness has reflected in the inability of civil society to rebound when Siyad Barre was
deprived from power. According to Adam (1999) the manipulation of clan consciousness
explains the delay in state renewal. Adam deems that Siyad Barre`s manipulation of cleavages
“led bad governance to overwhelm historical, structural factors of non-hierarchical Somali
civil society“ (Adam 1999: 171).
2.3.4 Rise of Opposition
In the aftermath of the defeat, various opposition movements appeared. A group of
dissatisfied army officers from Majerteen clan led by Colonel Mahammad Shaykh Usmaan
attempted to overthrow Siyad Barre regime. The coup failed and seventeen alleged insurgents
were executed. All but one of the executed were of the Majeerteen clan. One of the leaders,
lieutenant Colonel Abdillaahi Yuusuf Ahmad, managed to escape, and consecutively, he
formed the first opposition movement called the Somali Salvation Front (SSF; later renamed
the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, SSDF), headquartered in Ethiopia (Rinehart et al
1982). With support form the Ethiopian army, this group carried out guerrilla warfare across
the border. In reaction to SSDF anti-government activities, parts of the Somali population and
particularly those belonging to the Majeerteen clan were punished. The Red Berets (Duub
Cas), systematically smashed the small tanks in the area around Galcaio so as to deny access
to water resources to the Umar Mahamuud Majeerteen sublineages and their herds. In May
and June 1979, more than 2,000 died of thirst in the waterless area northeast of Galcaio,
Garoowe, and Jerriiban. Additionally, the clan lost an estimated 50,000 camels, 10,000 cattle,
and 100,000 sheep and goats (Rinehart et al 1982: 7) Moreover, in Galcaio, members of the
Victory Pioneers, the urban militia notorious for harassing, raped large numbers of
Majeerteen women.
Siyad Barre then turned on the Isaaq in the north, who were discontented because they
felt inadequately represented in his government. Political and economic discrimination against
the Northern region had been a regular occurrence since the early post-independence years
and escalated to clan-related state terrorism against Isaaq clans. Also, in terms of allocation of
development aid and state investment, the North felt extremely neglected. State expenditure
on infrastructure was lower than those in colonial times. Pastoralists became victims of
discriminatory policies, such as water wells poisoning or landmines lying. Civil service
positions for Northerners remained scarce because of the centralization of government and
administration in Mogadishu. In 1982, when government economic policies became clannish,
the attacks were directed against both Isaaq and Hawiye who dominated the two major centers
of private commerce. As state provided security mainly to those clans who were part of the
government, it was mainly the Hawiye and the Isaaq who were victims of Siyad Barre
discrimination policy.
In response to Siyad Barre treatment, in Isaaq emigrants in London had formed the
Somali National Movement (SNM) to topple Siyad Barre's regime, and this became the
second clan-based opposition group to Siyad Barre rule.
In 1982 they moved their
headquarters to Dire Dawa, Ethiopia, from where they conducted guerrilla raids against
Somali government-held territory. Following its formation, government intensified the
repression against this clan. “To create enmity between clans, senior military officers in the
Somali army from Issaq clans were deliberately posted in the Majereen regions where the
government was waging war against local people” (Ahmed 1999: 242).
Siyad Barre's
campaign against the Isaaq was particularly bloody; it included the 1988 destruction Somalia's
major northern city of Hargeysa where bomb attacks were used. This event had further
implications since a large number of victims fled to neighboring countries.
Next, Siyad Barre attacked the third biggest clan - the Hawiye in the central area
around Mogadishu. Hawiye fighting units had been active in the Central region (Mudug), first
as part of the SSDF struggles of 1983-1986 and, after 1988, on their own. The Hawiyedominated United Somali Congress (USC), which received support from the SNM, was
formed in Italy in 1987 and was immediately divided into two rival factions based of different
sub-clans (Ahmed 1999: 242). The diplomatic moves of the Siyad Barre government –
offering amnesty in order to split the opposition – left both the Darood/Harti and the Hawiye
divided into those who continued in the struggle against the brutal dictatorship and those who
agreed on a compromise with the government. This development led to creation of two
opposition movements - Hawiye dominated United Somali Congress (USC) and Manifesto
Group, also predominantly a Hawiye initiative.
To begin with, USC called for an extensively decentralized administration and a multiparty system. Second Hawiye opposition emerged in the form of so called Manifesto group.
A Manifesto No. 1 was a diplomatic document sent to president Siyad Barre, which called for
establishment of national reconciliation conference in the form of traditional guurti meetings
which are based on finding a compromise. In clan terms, the group of signatories consisted of
Hawiye and Darood with just a handful of Isaaq participants. Siyad Barre response to
manifesto was a common one, arrestment of the signatories.
Furthermore, there were non clan-based opposition groups. Siyad Barre faced the
voices of the religious elites since his attempts to demonstrate the links between socialism and
Islam were not coherent. His choice of the Latin script to write the Somali language did not
reverse the devout Muslim’s cautions. Finally, his celebration of International Woman’s Year,
in which he proclaimed a new law giving women equal inheritance rights, brought many
sheiks into fierce opposition to Siyyad`s secularism (Rinehart et. al 1982).
Still another source of opposition came from ideologically loud opposition from some
of his former socialist allies. The Somali Democratic Union (SDU), based in Aden, became
one of the more prominent socialist-oriented anti-Siyad Barre groups. It has tried rather
unsuccessfully to provide ideological coherence and a supraclan facade to the SSDF and SNM
leaders; however, the movements remain distinct from each other (Laitin and Samatar 1987:
94).
Nevertheless, the regime might have lingered indefinitely; the opposition movements
headquartered in Ethiopia have not yet been able to mobilize discontent within the Somali
Democratic Republic. There have been major conflicts and rebellions within the opposition
forces themselves. For United Somali Congress, the Hawiye sub-clans represented by USC
did not include the Habr Gedir/Sa’ad sub-clan which had fought against government forces in
the central region for many years and was very well linked to SNM and other fighting unites.
The reason for not including Habr Gedir/Sa’ad sub-clan into the USC was that its main
military and political leader was Mohamed Farah Aideed. Thus the cleavages were as follows:
guerilla movements operating at the periphery of power; political elite and the exile. There
was an attempt to settle these differences within the Hawiye opposition at a 1990 congress
where SNM Southern Front also took part. There a coordinated offensive of USC and SNM
emerged (Shaw 1999: 4). Along similar lines, in May 1984 internal fighting within a SSDF
guerrilla camp led to the return to Somalia of about two hundred guerrillas who no longer
fought against then regime.
The diverse reactions of the constituent clans towards the
dictator only showed the rift between military and political approaches within both the
Hawiye and the Darood clan families.
Thus, with a weak opposition divided along clan lines, which he skillfully exploited,
Siyad Barre seemed invulnerable.
Moreover, the Somali government has received
confidential support from the United States, Egypt, and South Africa (which paid for the pilot
training of white emigrated Rhodesians in Somalia) to help infiltrate and fight the guerrilla
forces (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 93). Also the 1988 peace agreement between Siyad Barre
and his Ethiopian counterpart put support of any political opposition directed towards the
neighboring country to a halt.
However by the beginning of 1986 Siyad Barre's hold on power seemed unthreatened,
since Siyad Barre unleashed a reign of terror against the Majeerteen, the Hawiye, and the
Isaaq, carried out by the Red Berets, a frightful elite unit recruited from among the president's
Mareehaan clansmen, the president received a severe blow from an unexpected quarter. He
progressively managed to alienate an increasing number of clans, including some, such as the
Ogaden or Mareehaan, that have originally supported him. Those were especially members of
his immediate family, including his brother, Abdirahmaan Jaama Siyad Barre; the president's
son, Colonel Masleh Siyad , and Mama Khadiija, Siyad Barre's senior wife. Interestingly,
Mama Khadiija ran her own intelligence network, had well-placed political contacts, and
oversaw a large group who had prospered under her patronage19. This anti-constitutional
faction was established when Siyad Barre was unable to govern due to an injury caused in an
automobile accident. The absence of his rule unleashed a power struggle not only among
element of the Mareehaan clan, but also among senior army commandants, and related
factions. Once they formed its own opposition movement, the Somali Patriotic Movement SPM, they initiated cooperation with both USC/Aideed and SNM. In territorial terms, the
SPM operated in the Bakol and Bay regions, towards Mogadishu, while USC military actions
concentrated in the Central regions (Shaw 1999: 4). Consequently, by the mid 1980s, the
MOD alliance was no longer effective. The army had become the main power base for
Siyad Barre who could only rely on support from Siyyad`s constituency, a small
component of the whole civilian population.
Nevertheless, the manipulation of kin community adherence continued, but this
time without having a firm roots in the MOD alliance. Siyad Barre used to corrupt
members of other clans to hold onto power. Interestingly, in mid 80s out of twelve leading
officers, only four were for the MOD clans. There were two Issaqs, two Majeerteens, and one
Hawiye (Samatar 1987: 89). Similarly, in an accounting of leading ministers and
businessmen, there was a wide range of clan affiliations. Other appointments by Siyad Barre
also reflect a broader base of inclusion, the third mechanized division in the Hargesia region
was commanded by a Hawiye, and the first division of the same region was also headed by a
member of the Majeerteen clan (ibid). In October 1984 Siyad Barre appointed a popular
leader of the Habar Awal clan, as governor of Hargesia (ibid). Typically, in correspondence
with tradition of shifting alliances, Siyad Barre has made alliances with many Somalis form
small, politically powerless subclans of the Majeerteen, Hawiye, and Isaaq clans, and he has
rewarded them with jobs and contracts. It was this strategy that made the prominent members
of the non-MOD clans even angrier.
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Barres_repressive_measures.html,
Thus, it was a set of serious policy failures by Siyad Barre, which contributed to
alienation of various opposition groups. It was mainly the repressive measures that
alarmed both Siyad Barre supporters and opponents. For instance, the arrest of seventeen
prominent politicians that took place on June 7 1982 evoked a wave of abhorrence because
the arrests included Mahammad Aadan Shaykh, a prominent Mareehaan politician, detained
for the second time; Umar Haaji Masala, chief of staff of the military, also a Mareehaan; and a
former vice president and a former foreign minister. At the time of detention, one official was
a member of the politburo; the others were members of the Central Committee of the SRSP20.
Moreover, there were numerous casualties on the side of main clans. Africa Watch (1990)
reported that 50,000 unarmed civilians were killed during Siyad Barre's various vengeances
against the Majeerteen, Isaaq, and Hawiye. Thousands more died of starvation resulting from
the poisoning of waterwells and the slaughtering of cattle. In addition, hundreds of thousands
sought refuge outside the country following a ferocious engagement in which the full military
armament of the state was unleashed on Isaaq-inhabited parts of the country.
Tens of
thousands were killed, two of the towns destroyed and hundreds of thousands hurried across
the border in search of refuge in Ethiopia (Samatar 2000: 57). Jailing of these prominent
figures coupled with brutal repression of traditionally strong clans created an atmosphere of
fear, and alienated the Isaaq, Majeerteen, and Hawiye clans (Rinehart et al. 1982).
These three prominent opposition groups waged relatively intense warfare against the
national army during Siyad Barre's final three years in office and gained control of extensive
government areas. The SNM controlled northwest of the country. As Samatar (1987: 92) put
it: the 1988 was a monumentous year when “the forces of the Somali National Movement
(SNM) crossed from their bases in Ethiopia and fought their way into some of the major
centers in northern Somalia, including Hargeisa”. Furthermore, the USC captured the center
of the country, and the SPM gained control in the south. Following July 1989 bloody
demonstration in Mogadishu, leaders across the whole clan specter established the Council for
National Reconstruction and Salvation calling for political change. Within a couple of
months, rebellion spread to many areas of the South. Siyad Barre, in a last-ditch effort to
restore his authority, sent more weapons to his kin and supporters while, at the same time,
trying to weaken the opposition through greater exploitation of lineage differences. By the
end of the year, only the capital and a few other urban centers were under the effective rule of
the regime. In May 1990, the Council for National Reconstruction and Salvation published a
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manifesto pressing Siyad Barre to leave his post, demanding the establishment of an interim
government representing various opposition movements, and a schedule for multiparty
elections.
A month of intensive fighting between the last remnants of the fully clanized Somali
army and the forces of the United Somali Congress, who had a large following in the capital,
resulted in Siyad Barre defeat on January 27, 1991. Long before the government collapsed,
however, the armed forces, the police force, the government, and public institutions
(including schools and health facilities) had ceased to operate.
2.3.5 Means of coercion
Faced by a police state that could be identified with a specific clan coalition, people
trusted nobody but their closest relatives and lineage members. During authoritarian regime,
traditional arrangements that had provided security were not taken into account. Moreover,
they were constantly challenged, threatened or forbidden by state authorities. The political
function of elders was placed under increased state control. State authority relied on coercion
rather that on fair competition between the various social forces found within society.
The state under Siyad Barre rule was since its foundation weak and prone to political
instability. Hence, although the state leadership did not lead openly despotic policies, from the
very beginning the military state ruled through means of coercion. The events of late 1970
were particularly bloody. As Samatar (2000: 55) put it: „The year 1979 closed with the
appearance of organized dissidence claiming the loyalties of their respective kin groups. Siyad
Barre and the regime responded by manipulating kin-based identities and, more than even the
colonial administration had done, pitted one segment of society against another, while the
state was turned into a fortress”. The guiding principle for Siyad Barre was to use any
means that could secure his political survival (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 159).The legal
and institutional instruments of state coercion that secured the Siyad Barre government
consisted of a combination of national security/state emergency laws and special units within
the army, police and political apparatus (Brons 2001: 176).
Faced with oppression, a new mechanism emerged at subsate level. Families of
migrant worked received the remittances at free-market exchange rates (Brons 2001: 192).
This system was based solely on the trust to clan network. Thus non-state structure became
more and more important and led to dispersal of state control in trade and finance. The state
retained coercive control but increasingly lost other aspects of de facto sovereignty in the
Northwestern region. In spite of state attempts to suppress traditional arrangements, it did not
succeed. Customary and state laws continued to be used in parallel. However, customary law
stayed apart the official state law.
It was the military, political and financial backing that provided the means of survival
for a state that lacks internal de facto sovereignty. After 1969, there were basically two sets of
external factors, which substantially supported the survival of the Somali state: the politics of
superpower rivalry in the region (see chapter 3.2), and the international humanitarian aid to
Ethiopian-Somali refugees (see above).
2.3.6 Superpower Strategic Competition and its Implications
It was the military, political and financial backing that provided the means of survival
for a state that lacks internal de facto sovereignty. The superpowers` involvement in Somalia
was not one way street. Despite the initial intention of both superpowers - to consolidate their
power in the international arena by supplying their allies with armaments – African countries
adeptly managed to use these arms for their own benefit. Also Siyad Barre managed to turn
externally rooted policy-interests in Somali to the advantage of his own personalized regime.
Once independent, Somalia’s leaders recognized that their hopes for a unified Somalia
might one day bring them into armed conflict. They felt they needed to multiply the size of
their army, and they sought foreign aid to achieve this goal (Marte 1994). This was an easy
task since Somalia’s strategic position has long attracted foreign interests. Somali leaders
went first to the United States, which was reluctant to arm the Somalis in light of the US
alliance with Ethiopia. Thus, the USSR was “pulled into this power vacuum” (Laitin and
Samatar 1987: 76).
ith the 1976 soviet take-over, the USSR with its allies and the Siyad Barre regime
deepened their existing relationship (a treaty of friendship with the USSR was signed in
1974), when the Somali government decided to exchange the location of the country for
increased military equipment and training. By the onset of the Ogaden War of 1977-1978,
Somalia deployed a large number of armed men (near1y 20 000) which was a quantity
uncommon to African relations. Somalia at that time was considered to have had one of the
best-equipped fighting forces in Sub-Saharan Africa at its disposal (Samatar 2000: 46).
However, what emerged as a series of victories for Somalia ended with their total debacle the Soviets, panic-striken by the eagerness of pan-Somalism, shifted their alliance to Ethiopia
pouring in vast amounts of weapons to support Ethiopian forces. As a result of the war,
Siyyad`s ideological apparatus came apart. “He became a born-again capitalist and friend of
the West. He criticized the United States for not coming immediately to his aid to counter the
evil of Soviet empire” (Laitin and Samatar 1987: 90). During the 1980s, about 100 million US
dollars per year was directed to Somalia (ibid). By the decade's end, some military and
economic assistance had been swapped for the use of the very facilities (primarily seaports
and airfields) left behind by the Soviets. Siyyad invited capitalist investments with open arms,
and he did all this without once recanting his scientific socialism (ibid).
Apart from US and Soviet help, the military dictatorship also benefited from Libya,
France, Egypt, Italy and China support. In 1973, Chinese economic aid to Somalia surpassed
that of at the Soviet Union (Patman: 1982). Moreover, there was significant financial
assistance provided from the United Nations and World Bank as Siyad Barre maneuvered
Somalia into the Arab League in 1974 and the regime received Arab petrodollar assistance
(Adam 1999: 176-178). In this regard, military, technical, and financial foreign assistance
played a key role in prolonging Siyad Barre regime. Samatar observes: “There was never in
Somalia's history a sustainable material basis for a viable central state authority. In the past,
the Somali state was funded almost entirely by Cold War-driven foreign aid, leading to a
bloated artificial structure which collapsed soon after that aid was frozen in the late 1980s”
(Samatar 2000: 46- 47). Thus, the logic was simple: as long as resources did not dry up, Siyad
Barre was able to hold on to power. The influx of foreign aid helped “to proceed against the
opposition with impunity” (Adam 1999: 178) and exacerbated the clan clashes that escalated
and reached its peak after the authoritarian regime fell. In this regard, international actors
helped to worsen state-society relationship in Somalia.
An important result of involvement with the superpowers was the deepening of the
dependence of the Somali state on external fiscal transfusions. The decline in aid is not only a
short-term problem, since “it has been precisely those states that received large amounts of
largess during the Cold War that have often faced the most severe problems with state failure.
The artificially high external resource flow received due to the global strategic competition
had the effect of masking the fundamental problems the state faced and delaying the point at
which leaders had to adjust” (Herbst 2000: 255). Since states receiving financial aid in bulk
had been dependent on regular financial inflow, the abrupt stoppage of aid caused by EastWestern approachment led to collapse of those states. In this regard, Herbst mentions:
“Somalia entered its particularly sharp downward trajectory in part because it could no longer
play the U.S. off against the Soviet Union in order to receive more aid” (Herbst 2000: 260).
Somalia at that time became week both as a state and as a power. In the other words, there
was a room for rebel movements to emerge. When the fighting broke out, the state was so
wakened that a military solution to even the feeble challenges posed was not possible.
Use of arms
Even though the era of superpower geo-strategic competition which gave Somali territory its global significance has ended, there are two essential ways in which those
relationships had affected Somali society: the easy procurement of weapons and the emphasis
of force which conditioned resistance to act.
Both financial and military support was needed by the Siyad Barre regime in order to
hold on to power. This support contributed to the “hardening of the militaristic caste and the
corrupt tendencies of the state class” (Samatar 2000: 46). The Somalis were pursuing their
own national priorities, of which the acquisition of military hardware and financial aid were
uppermost. Financial aid was essential in order to supplement limited domestic resources for
state operations and urgent development plans. This mutuality of interests eventually led to
the creation of fragile state since “facilitated by the disintegration of Somalia, and by
Ethiopians backing, the armed opposition groups soon managed to obtain weapons from local
markets” (Adam 1999: 178) or through what became known as “income generation” - civil
servants, who sell, rent or lease official weapons. It is believed that 80 percent of males in
nowadays Somaliland posses a small arm. The number of small guns in the hands of civilians
is estimated to as many as 350,000 guns. The proliferation of AK-47, which was the official
weapon of the army, the police and the paramilitary forces of Somalia, is widespread.
Correspondingly, ammunition for this gun was to be found in abundance. Because of its wide
availability most of the people were familiar with the weapon and how to use it (Gebre–Wold
2002: 20).
In the early 1990s, guns were rampant and used on a daily basis as immediately after
the end of Cold War, when central European countries began to dump their stocks, various
insurgency movements were able to procure the weapons on the international market. At the
same time, the wars in the Horn left large numbers of weapons that could be bought cheaply
(Mepham and McLean 2004). “Of Somalia’s six military sectors at the time, three sectors
constituting eight divisions equal to 50,000 troops were based in Somaliland. This means that
at the height of the war there were hundreds of thousands of small arms in the hands of
government forces in Somaliland alone - including the militias, police and other paramilitary
forces. Most of these arms fell into the hands of the Somaliland people at some stage and are
used in the war” (Gebre–Wold 2002: 19-23).
The nature and level of demand is the direct result of certain dynamics in a specific
context. In the Somalia case is that of precarious geo-ecological conditions. The scarcity of
natural resources predisposes communities to threatened livehoods and existences, and leads
to competition for resources. Nomadic way of life meant that the Somalis were dependent on
owning livestock, which in turn became a source of conflict. As people were fighting over
scarce resources, the use of weapons became part of their daily life.
People tend to resort to small arms when their rights are violated and their basic needs
are not fulfilled, thus arms in Somalia have become tools which enable the owner to acquire
material goods and political gain by force (Thomas and Mazrui 1992). This naturally leads
into a spiral of violence and feeds demand for efficient and reliable small arms.
Accordingly, in the event of trigger effects, such as political violence or economic
recession, traditional arms are replaced by small arms left behind by superpowers - arms that
wreak even more devastation. This means that in many of the communities, there is a very
real potential internal demand for small arms which is exacerbated by intervening external
factors. Foreign involvement, thus, unquestionably raised the level and scope of violence by
arming various clan groups.
Also, there are significant underlying latent factors that contribute to the demand of
small arms. These factors touch on the values and practices of peoples and have important
gender and generational implications. “In most parts of the Horn, including Somalia, the rural
population is detached from decision-making in the capital, thus, many people inhabiting rural
areas, see the acquisition of small arms as a means of widening their options for personal,
communal, clan or larger family defense requirements; protection from armed groups, bandits
and other clans; advancing or securing their interests, as they define them. Most of the ethnic
groups of the region have a warrior age-group which is responsible for defense of the
communities” (Gebre–Wold 2002: 48). A culture of vendetta or a warrior culture is still a
powerful factor in the lowlands of Somalia. The revenge for a murder often must be carried
out before the victim’s burial ceremony (Lewis 1961; Laitin 1987).
Second, the Cold War’s impact lies in the emphasis of force which conditioned any
serious resistance to act accordingly – an unfortunate characteristic of the contemporary civil
war. The fragmented, politicized clan structures and relative military balances in Somalia
made it highly unlikely that someone would conquer and pacify the country. Adam deems that
“even a top-down solution would have to emerge not through decisive armed force but via a
negotiated settlement among the warring strongmen - a form of consocional or power-sharing
authoritarianism” (Adam 1999: 186). Even some of the Somalis are willing to consider it not
as the best but as the optimal alternative to the "war, where every man is enemy to every man
... and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death, where the life of man,
is poor, nasty, brutish and short" (ibid).
Accordingly, only Siyad Barre, supported by the Cold War antagonists, could
temporarily impose a military hegemony over all of Somalia. Correspondingly, the fall of the
authoritarian regime in Somalia was in part the result of the east-western rapprochement. As
Thomas and Mazrui argue Somalia conflict would have been much more severe if the USSoviet rivalry had prevailed: “….the United States and the Soviet Union would have been
more likely to prolong the civil war than end it” (Thomas and Mazrui 1992: 168).
2.3.7 Territory
During last four decades, traditional clan distribution underwent transformation.
Among the most profound factors that have altered the territorial distribution of clan-families
since independence in 1960 are: (1) wave of migration to Mogadishu on the eve of
independence.
During that period, the capital became a multi-clan town where was
impossible to find single district with one clan (Marchal 1996); (2) 1973/75 drought-ridden
migration, when more than 100,000 nomadic drought-victims were resettled in the interriverine areas imposing on the adaptation to the lifestyle of farmers. Even after conditions
improved, many Somalis – mainly women and children remained in richer areas of the South;
(3) refugee flight factor caused by loss in Ogaden was of primary importance. During that
time most of the Somali origin Ethiopian refugees of Darood clan-family were resettled to the
inter-riverine area, and smaller, yet important part was located in the Northwest in the
Hargeisa ans Borama environs.
Both drought- and refugee-related migration dramatically changed the pattern of
pastoral migration to South as it lead to domination of Darood clan-family in the Shabelle
region that is territory naturally inhabited by the Sabs. The local Southern (Reewin/Hawiye)
as well as Northern (Isaaq) population felt unequally treated in comparison to the refugees.
The Darood domination that had government backing led gradually to conflict and land issue
became one of the main factors motivating political opposition in the early 1980s. Immigrant
occupation of land is still one of the major causes of ongoing conflict in Southern Somalia
today (Lewis 1965; Ahmed 1999).
As a response, the land reform legislation introduced a system of registration of title
which was the only way to hold land. This meant that state law overruled customary land
tenure rights, and local authorities such as clan/village elders stayed apart (Besteman 1996).
The rule also provided for the establishment of agricultural cooperatives. In theory, the idea
behind these had been to allow “a lineage to register the entirety of its land and continue its
customary tenure practices within those boundaries (ibid: 40). However, in practice, both the
land-registration requirement and the creation of cooperatives threatened and undermined the
tenure security of local farmers. The rules of registration (one household being allowed to
register only one farm) did not reflect differing patterns of cultivation of different available
soils in the South. Moreover, situations within families became conflict prone as only one
owner could be registered. Next, the social balance within a village became disturbed as those
who had connections registered, while the others had not. Furthermore, much of the best land
was expropriated by the state for huge irrigated state farm projects. This led to increased
eviction of local farmers from the more fertile soils, with a resultant loss in their crisis-coping
mechanisms (Brons 2001: 194-196).
As a result of state land tenure policies the population structure of the inter-riverine
lands changed. Much land came to be occupied by Somali who did not originate in the interriverine areas. Absentee speculators of specific clans profited from arrangements as settlers in
the inter-riverine region. These significantly differed from those migrants who were looking
for safe heavens due to draughts and were adopted by Reewin clans. The modern settlers kept
their own clan affiliation and occupied Reewin lands, rather than integrating into Reewin
village communities. They were mostly Marehan/Ogaden/Dulbahante and sometimes SomaliEthiopian refugees with Darood affiliation who managed to move out of refugee camps into
farms registered to them in the form of cooperatives. In this way, whole refugee villages came
into existence in the Lower Shabelle area (Rinehart et al. 1982).
Siyad Barre regime - Conclusion
From 1969 until the mid-1970s, Siad Barre's authoritarian regime enjoyed a degree of
popular support, largely because it acted with a decisiveness not displayed by the civilian
governments of the 1960s. Unlike democratic state, the authoritarian regime strived to
reconcile the newly established agenda with traditional arrangements. Somali economic,
social and cultural developments were to be noticeably improved. Consequently, the early
years of Siyad Barre rule were, by most Somalis characterized as popular.
For government representation, in the first months of his rule, Siyad Barre made
cabinet appointments by employing officials from many clans. This, however, changed with
attempted coupe d’état in 1971 when the stability of his position was endangered. Fearful of
the loss of his position Siyad Barre , in response identified the rebels as members of three
opposition clans – Majeerteen, Isaaq, Hawiye. Whether or not these clans were supporting
this countercoup, the fact that Siyad Barre executed members of three leading clans only
confirmed the trend that tribalism is present in Somali society. In reaction to anti-government
activities, parts of the Somali population and particularly those belonging to the Majertain
clan were punished. So were the Isaaq in the North. Somali civil servants from Southern and
non-Isaaq clans usually executed the harsh government policies in the North. This policy
augmented hatred between clans and formed part of the president’s strategy of divide and
rule.
In late 1980s, thus, the interclan enmity was worse and potentially more violent that in
any period of Somalia’s history. “The period from 1980 to 1990 was the decade of real decay,
unprecedented repression, civil war, and final dissolution” (Samatar 2000: 56). With regard to
means of coercion, the presence of East-West rivalry in Somalia resulted in clan tensions, vast
militarization, and economic stagnation. Cold War derailed the process of political
development, economical growth, nation-building and democratization. After the end of Cold
War then attractive Somalia became an overlooked entity. An abrupt stoppage of all aid to
Somalia prevented the formation of the institutions. Moreover, the easy availability of arms
exacerbated the nature of civil strife in Somali society.
Conclusion: The impact of centralism on Somali society
Somali state policies impact was rather threatening. The traditional economic, social,
legal and political arrangements were forced to adapt to new circumstances. Relations among
and within groups underwent significant changes during the colonial era, and both during and
after independence. Armed conflicts between descent groups/ territorial units were reduced to
a minimum during the 1960 and 1970. However, in the 1980s and early 1990s, as Siyad
Barre spurred and encouraged clan antagonism, and Somalia witnessed an unprecedented
break out of both inter- and intra-clan struggles.
The president sparked off sub-state mechanisms when he used political networks
embedded in the clan system in order to suppress opposition. Siyad Barre increasingly relied
on divide and rule tactics, sparked off clan conflict, arming particular groups to fight against
opposing clans, buying loyalty through the allocation of development funds, and thereby
dividing the opposition. The clan system, in particular, provided a strong network granting
security to the Somali citizens, and override the state’s institutional structure. State
institutions did not, unlike other social arrangements rooted in non-state configuration, enjoy
de facto sovereignty. State sovereignty remained intact only de jure, thanks to external powers
backing. De facto sovereignty became increasingly divided.
The milestone in Somali development was the Ogaadeen War debacle, which marked
the beginning of the end of Siyad Barre rule as he could neither disguise the precarious
base of the regime in the face of rising opposition nor was the socialist doctrine
plausible. Since then the regime functioned on a shaky base in which the enemy today
was the friend tomorrow and vice versa. All regions and groups were involved into the
conflict and the civil war spread throughout Somalia. The result was violent
contestations for power, the emergence of guerrilla groups and finally state collapse
which can be interpreted as the derailment of the efforts to build a national elite class via
clan manipulation. The move from state to stateless society was caused military factions to
agree on the future developments.
PART III Back to the future - Somalia without a state again
After thirty year experiment of central state rule, Somalia became stateless again.
Once united opposition movements failed to find a compromise on state formation and instead
continued fighting over territory, power and resources. At the end of 2008, there is still no
internationally recognized state on the territory of Somalia.
As outlined, this part examines Somali territory after the collapse of the authoritarian
regime of Siyad Barre. The first chapter concentrates on the situation in the Southern region
which continues to be the most war-torn part of Somalia. The focus is on the attempts that
have been used to deal with long-lasting violence. In this context, I will go briefly though two
examples of international interventions - UNITAF and UNOSOM missions to show how
third-party engagement influence situation on a sub-state level. Second, with regard to
political instability in the South, the issue of land tenure is discussed as this problem is often
presented as war behind the war.
The chapters that follow discuss processes of three attempts at political state formation
(1) Somaliland; (2) Puntland, and (3) Riverine State. Terms of reference are the three pillars
that define Weberian state: the territory, the idea of a state, and the institutions. The limited
space and amount of sources does not allow me to go through all polities that had emerged in
Somalia. Also, due to the lack of available literature, each polity is given different amount of
attention.
3.1 Political development after the collapse of the state
The internal fission of opposition movements apparent from late 1980s was brought to
a halt when, in autumn 1990, the various opposition movements had agreed on joint military
operations in order to launch coordinated final struggle against the brutal dictatorship. The
common position was formed in February 1991 when USC announced the formation of a
provisional government, with Ali Mahdi Mahammad of the Hawiye clan-family as president
and Umar Arteh Ghalib, of the Isaaq clan-family, as prime minister (Metz 1992).
The newly created interim government (despite it included all Somali clans) did not
reflect the actual power balance in the country therefore the Mahdi (USC/Manifesto)
government was never accepted as legitimate within Somalia (ibid). Those who fought
against Siyad Barre, had the greatest loss in personnel were denied participation on the
government, the military leaders form both SNM and SPM felt cheated of their successes.
SNM moreover felt again politically marginalized, as many times since independence. Thus,
former army commander General Mahammad Faarah Aidid opposed Mahammad's presidency
and eventually split away to form his own USC faction (Laitin 1987).
In the subsequent clashes, the SSDF and the SPM aligned themselves against the USC.
In the course of the fighting, control of various towns such as Chisimayu and Baidoa changed
hands several times. Intra-clan fighting resumed in Mogadishu, between Habar Cedir
and Abgal forces from 17 November 1991 and continued through March 1992. A
number of cease-fires were announced between early April 1991 and the latter part of 1992,
but none remained in effect long (Brons 2001: 218).
Meanwhile fighting in the Central and Southern part intensified: “shifting alliances
marked a deepening rift between the USC wings led by Ali Mahdi Mohamed and Mohamed
Farah Aideed, respectively” (ibid). The capital became divided between the two Hawiye
political factions. The Juba and Shabelle area was torn by battles of various political factions
some of which came to being relatively short time ago, during the political mayhem in 1990.
To mention some of them: Marehan remnants of ex-president supporters, Somali National
Front (SNM); the Reewin Somali Democratic Movement (SDM), or SPM/Ogaden forces
(ibid).
Other centers of fighting were the inter-riverine area where the Reewin Resistance
Army (RRA) fought against USC/Aideed forces; the Gedo region near Ethiopian borders,
where SNF/Marehan militia fought against Al-Itihad al_Islymiya; the southern port of
Kismayo where Majertain and Ogaden militias competed for control; and finally Merca, a
port near Mogadishu, where internal fission among Aideed forces broke out (Brons 2001:
219-220). Despite widespread fighting, on sub-state level, formations of security and trust
emerged. Lineage elders and women became involved in local peace process. Interestingly,
women played an important role in reconciliation process as they managed to persuade
inhabitants in Juba valley to disarmament (except for guards who were regularly checked).
Moreover, militias were given a plot of land in order to prevent them from looting (Horn of
Africa Bulletin, Vol. 9. No. 6. p. 20-21).
Meanwhile, in the North the SNM refused to participate in the unity talks proposed by
the USC. The proclamation of the government by Ali Mahdi (UCS/Manifesto) only confirmed
long-lasting fear of Isaaq clan family of renewed Southern domination. In fact, that was one
of the crucial factors that led to proclamation of Somaliland in May 1991 by SNM. The
Republic’s government was proclaimed as intertim government, pending 1993 elections, and
decreeing the sharia as its legal base21.
Correspondingly, in the other parts of Somalia other polities begun to take roots. In
May 1995, the Digil Mirifle Governing Authority emerged in the South as a result of an end
of internal Reewin fightings. A few months later, however, this state structure was destroyed
when Mohamen Aideed occupied most of the region.
It remains to be seen if the
interriverine state will finally take root.
In July 1998, Puntland regional state, comprising the Darood/Harti lands in the North
was proclaimed.
3.2 Wartime in the South
After the failure to establish a unitary state, various strives to form regional polities
emerged. Protracted fighting marked the Southern and Central regions. After Siyad Barre
flight, much violence motivated by the revenge of those who suffered under his rule could be
seen. Atrocities were committed by the liberating USC force, victims being selected
according their clan affiliation - Hawiye/USC liberators against Darood (MOD) supporters.
However, over a time, violence escalated and was directed towards all non-Hawiye who were
considered as collaborators (Compagnon: 1997).
Heavy fighting over power between Ali
Mahdi and Mohamed Aideed continued, the conflict finally led to division of Mogadishu to
two zones of influence, the South controlled by Aideed, the North by Mahdi.
The fight for power and territorial control also continued in the inter-riverine region.
In March 1991, supporters of Siyad Barre (mainly Marehan) regrouped in Somali National
Front - SNF and decided to launch a military offensive with the aim of recapturing the capital
and gaining control over the farming areas then occupied by USC and SPM forces (Salad
Elmi: 1992). SPM and USC had the support of SDM, the Reewin clans, and the SSNM,
mostly of Dir clan family. The military alliance of UCS, ad SDM faction, SPM faction and
SSNM became the Somali National Aliance (SNA). Over a time, SNF forces were defeated
by Aideed and Siyad Barre loyalists never came to power again.
Besides militia fighters, there were also gangs of male youngsters, especially in
Mogadishu; they had no affiliation to political factions and secured their survival by looting
and robbing. Known as moryaan (Marchal 1997), were a gang of urbanized youngsters who
21
http://workmall.com/wfb2001/somalia/somalia_history_historical_setting.html, 03.04.2008
committed attacks against the wealthy people in Mogadishu. A peculiar feature of the
character of moryaan conflict was combination of modern and traditional Somali ways of
conducting crime (e.g. post-feud compensation). However, traditional way of waging conflict
did not include the elders element to secure violence control, and these thus became
uncontrollable by authorities within the clan system. This, in turn led to complete political
turmoil in the areas controlled by neither of one faction but by the moryaans (Afrah 1993).
Other groups of moryaans derived from young fighters with nomadic backgrounds
who reached the city later in 1991. This group was more connected to the traditional clan
system, and as such was devoted to one or other of the sub-clans in the Aideed-Mahdi
conflict. Common to all those groups of young men was their lack of respect for traditional
authority. Brons claims that the disrespect to traditional society arrangements is caused by
three mutually-enforcing factors: (1) the scarcity of resources; (2) an easy availability of arms
gained during Cold War rivalries; and (3) mistrust between clans that had been triggered
during Siyad Barre dictatorship (Brons 2001: 228).
Accordingly, what made situation in the South extremely insecure was the
disintegration of traditional structures within which violence was traditionally controlled.
Even though the cornerstones of traditional arrangements were not erased, the elders did not
exercise enough power to provide people with security, because of (1) the continuous fighting
that was marked by constant shifting coalitions of factions that were out of the control of their
leaders; (2) the clan elders did not command enough respect - the actual power holders did
not feel the need to accept any stimulus from elders in ending the fighting and initiating the
reconciliation process as their power derived from threat.
3.3 Land issue
The inter-riverine area is not only the most fertile region in the country, but also an
area that is becoming increasingly important for pastoral production, as herding capacity of
the pastoral lands diminished due to desertification in the North (Kusow: 1994). The scarcity
of resources plays a leading role in the conflict as it is the main source of conflict in the Jubba
valley.
When the civil war reached the inter-riverine area in 1990, Aideed liberation forces
were trying to occupy the farmlands, which were under the control of the state of absentee
landowners with good connections to government circles. As noted earlier, resettlement to
South was not a new phenomenon, but never in Somali history reached such a mass extent.
Before 1991, it was mainly Marehan who profited by occupying Reewin lands, either by force
or on the basis of 1975 land laws designed by their governments. After the collapse of Siyad
Barre regime, it was mainly Hawiye who occupied the Reewin lands (Brons 2001; Lewis
1993; Ahmed 1999, Farah 2004).
There is a widespread consensus among scholars that the war in the inter-riverine
region was the conflict of power between the Darood and the Hawiye for control of this fertile
land which did not belong to either of them (Kusow 1994; Mukhtar 1993; Helander: 1996).
Inter-riverine farmland fell victim to the fighting in early 1990. Destroyed stores of farming
communities resulted in internal displacement from the inter-riverine lands. The SDM, a
Reewin organization sided with USC forces, in the hope of an end of landgrabbing.
Nonetheless, the Reewin civilians suffered and had no clan safe haven to go to. In their hope
for liberation, the Reewin were dramatically let down by the Hawiye. The man-made
starvation of the Reewin population was in fact an attempt to manipulate the population
figures in Southern Somalia to the disadvantage of those who originally have dwelled in this
area (Africa Rights 1994). Since Reewin are by number (although not by territory) one of the
largest Somali clan families and not Sab minority as is often claimed (Brons: 2001; Mukhtar
1993; Kusow 1993), they were considered a threat to Hawiye political dominance – “a
dominance that, from the Hawiye perspective, was well deserved after three decades of
Darood dominated central state leadership” (Brons 2001: 226).
Thus, issue of land tenure is important to understanding the dynamics of conflict in
Somalia as it plays a major role in duration of the conflict. Second, the land plays a vital role
in determining political strength at national level. In the Farah words: “ The fact that the issue
of Deegaan - land and its resource base, which is a very core and highly valued commoditywas to sensitive for conference participants to address /Reconciliation Conference on Land
Tenure and Conflict in Africa: Prevention, Mitigation and Reconstruction/; shows that it does
remain a significant barrier to reconciliation process in the country” (Farah 2004: 73)
3.4 UN involvement
Unlike in the North where relative political stability was established, in the South the
problem was that those who traditionally settled the disputes did not dispose enough power to
control the fighters and, also, that the actual power holders were got rid of their legitimacy.
Thus, an international intervention seemed to be the path to lead Somalia to the right
direction. The UN, however, did not deliver promised outcomes.
Somalis expected UNITAF to solve the root causes of insecurity that is to disarm the
fighters and young gangs. It was also expected that the reconciliation dialogue would involve
traditional authorities that is the elders from both village and pastoral communities (Gassem:
1994). However, enacted resolution 794 defined the Somali crisis as a purely humanitarian
problem. The Security Council “Determined to establish as soon as possible the necessary
conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance wherever needed in Somalia, in
conformity with resolutions 751 (1992) and 767 (1992)”22.
Thus, initially, there was an absence of discussion on disarmament or reconciliation
program or military control. The underlying problems of violence, the presence of armed
militias were completely neglected. Moreover, a UNITAF mission was marked by
inconsistency on disarmament. Heavy weapons remained practically untouched, and small
ones were collected, leaving civilians without means of protection (Compagnon: 1997). The
street patrols that had become so important for the safety of ordinary people were
decontrolled by airstrikes on supposed hideouts of Aideed. The UN missions have established
themselves as providers of security, and as such they represented a kind of completion to the
state as well as to sub-state structures (Brons 2001: 243). But as was proven, “multilateral
institutions can neither replace the functions of the state nor reconstruct the state institutions
they have directly or indirectly participated in destroying” (Mohamed Salih 1999: 137).
Second attempt at reconciliation process in Somalia came in March 1993, under the
auspice of UNOSOM mission, when a conference with the aim to set a framework for
creation of central government in Somalia was held. “The mission developed into a broad
attempt to help stop the conflict and reconstitute the basic institutions of a viable State”23.
UN vision was to create a central state within the 1960 borders as demarcated after fall
of colonialism. And again, the state was supposed to be established primarily on de jure rather
than de facto sovereignty. UN effort for reconciliation did not involve traditional authorities,
22
23
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNSC,,SOM,456d621e2,3b00f21137,0.html, 12.12.2008
http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm, 12.12.2008
but rather gave recognition and mandate to military factions.
In Hofmann words “By
excluding clan elders from the reconciliation process, the UN essentially denied any role for
the very actors who may have been able to appeal to peer as a means to bring peace to
southern Somalia“ (Hofmann 2002:22). As a consequence, established District Councils did
not wield much respect as they were not created by the local community and their power
remained limited. In cases where some formation of political authority took place, the process
was hampered by the militias who were the actual power holders (de Waal 1994). Issues of
utmost importance – resettlement of Somali refugees and land rights adjustment – were not
solved. Interestingly, UN organized conference allowed military factions to settle these
matters among them, not including Reewin clans to whom the land originally belonged
(Brons 2001: 237). Accordingly, genuine state restoration was not possible given the lack of
mutual trust – a crucial precondition for reconciliation.
Despite effort made, the UN humanitarian intervention did not take into account the
root causes of the Somali crisis, and the political dimension of the conflict remained
neglected.
Traditional authorities who could claim a mandate from the people and were
therefore more suitable for actual reconciliation were not given room. This attitude played
into the hands of the faction leaders. Both UNITAF and UNOSOM were not capable of
putting violence to a halt, but moreover, by their above-described actions they contributed to
exacerbation of the conflict which finally led to a wave of violence directed against UN
troops, adding the conflict another layer.
The main problem UN faced in their attempt to restore peace was the absence of state
authority. Since the UN effort failed, the question remains how to involve the two authorities
(the actual holders of power and clan elders) into peace process.
3.5 State(s) Formation
Opposed to the continuous warfare in the South there were attempts at state formation
elsewhere in the country. These developments were formed on the bottom-up approach and
included discussion of faction leaders and clan elders. Three polities that are to be examined
include Somaliland that has proven to be a stable political authority; it is also only polity that
claims de jure status. The other two states, Puntland and the Riverine State, do not attempt to
be independent states; rather, they strive to be regional autonomous states that will one day
become part of Somalia.
3.5.1 Somaliland – formation of sovereignty
The ground for political stability in the North was laid in the refugee camps. There, a
basic administrative structure where the elders were of utmost importance was established.
An important feature of political life in Hartisheik camp in the North was the fact that it
housed the urban as well as the clan and political backbone of Northern Somalia – that is
people with high human and financial capital and people from Isaaq. There the inner structure
of SNM was formed according to subclan affiliation (Brons 2001: 207). The initial
developments concerning the form of the state were in favor of a united state. What made the
Northerners change its minds were renewed Southern tendencies, particularly USC/Hawiye
towards dominance24 (Drysdale: 1992).
Accordingly, SNM decided to form a polity on its own. The reconciliation process
embraced the faction leaders and supporters of former regime together with clan elders. There
were numerous conferences held in order to establish peace that would finally lead to state
formation. Peace conferences in Berbera, Hargeisa and Burao which gathered Isaaq clans
together with Darood/Harti (Warsangeli and Dulbahante) and Dir (Gadabuursi and Issa)
paved the way to the independence (Brons 2001: 245-246).
The underlying cause of such success was the fact that the reconciliation process relied
heavily on employing traditional institutions of governance – the guurti assemblies. The
guurti (see chapter 1.4.1 Concept of Heer - Clan Tool of Reconciliation) enjoyed recognition
and respect in the traditional Somali society, especially in the nomadic North. The
24
The overthow of Siyad Barre regime was claimed by USC, which was not able to fight agens the dictatorship
regime without SNM support. Moreover, there were claims to take 1960 constitution as a basis for state formativ
– a constitution that was rejected by the North due to its neglect of the Norhtern part of the country.
maintenance of stable area and settling disputes was the main responsibility of clan elders
who gathered in the form of guurti conferences. The traditional institutions did not disappear
during state period, but their role was restricted during the colonial years (the elders, known
as akils under colonial rule, were responsible for peace making and the marginalization of the
role of the Sultans (Lewis: 1988). During Siyad Barre regime, akils were used to serve
dictator government’s manipulative ideas and were provided with arms and to incite conflict
between the lineages that they represent. What was the most important feature of statebuilding process in Somalia is that clan antagonism unleashed by Siyad Barre regime was
overcome for the principle of independence. This was thus the continuation of process that
had been functional for years prior to foreign involvement and state formation.
In short, the reconciliation conferences were a mere continuation of the process of
integrating elders into political decision-making. A new feature was the integration of all
northern Somali clans in the process of state-formation. As a result, the inhabitants of the
North vested their trust and sovereignty in the political authorities. Despite having de facto
sovereignty, Somaliland still does not have international recognition, and thus lack de jure
sovereign status, a precondition to be called a state.
3.5.2 Somaliland –control of violence and subsequent formation of institutions
The early years of independence were characterized by the rule based on the
organizational structure of SNM. However, the transformation of the SNM from a movement
to a government still had to be achieved. The involvement of clan elders was the main
attribute of nation building process.
Various guurtis settled local disputes as well as conflict on the political level. Among
the most common were conflict over access to resources, (pasture and water rights) within
the Isaaq clan-family and between the Dulbahante and Warsangeli (Hofmann 2002: 24).
Nevertheless, these were quickly solved by using the principle of xeer, a traditional clan tool
of conflict resolution.
With regard to conflicts on the political level, these included battles between
tradionally rival Isaaq clans, the Habar Yonis and Habar Jeclo, both SNM members, who
fought over control of Burao; another battle concerned the control of Berbera port between
the Habar Yonis and ‘Iisa Muusa (ibid). A peace conference, headed by the Gadabuursi
elders who were neutral in the rift, was summoned to solve this issue. Thus, similar to other
disputes, also this conflict was solved employing traditional means. (Lewis 1993). The
Sheikh conference than turned to issues of military security in the region. As a result, the
National Guurti was established which then took over the role of the state formation process.
The National Guurti created a legal framework which was binding for all local guurtis
in Somaliland. A decentralized structure was endorsed, thus the clan communities wielded
responsibility for establishing local committees which were subordinated to the National
Guurti. Each community should ensure its militia away from major towns ad these must not
trespass the boundary of a different group unless a special permission a respective group is
issued. (Lewis 1993: 84-87). In this regard, Shiekh conference laid down the formations of the
future Somaliland state.
Arrangements initiated at Sheikh Conference were broadened on the following
conference in Borama. There the guurtis from all over the country gathered and defined the
political and institutional structures of the state. A provisional constitution, a National Charter
was enacted. On the basis of this document a legislature was created in the form of two
chamber system (Hofmann 2002: 24), with overriding security provided by National Guurti.
National Guurti wielded enormous power during the years of government crisis – it could
summon a conference where all clans would be represented to decide on the political
proceedings. This happened four years after independence when the conflict between
government and the expresidents Garhajis/Eidgella clans broke out. In July 1996 National
Guurti called a national conference where the guidelines for qualification for presidential
elections were agreed (Brons 2001: 251 – 252; Hofmann 2002:25). This was a prove that the
institutional framework of governance is functioning also in the time of crisis.
In sum, the Somaliland stability is largely due to integration of traditional
arrangements to the state framework. The role of National Guurti as a security provider
enabled the creation of institutions responsible for the control of violence, such as police and
army. Thus, in 2008 relative security in terms of political stability and military were
established in Somaliland.
3.5.3 Somaliland- territoriality
The territorial demarcation of Somaliland is based on the boundaries of the British
Somaliland. The main legal argument for claiming independence is the fact that there was a
polity prior to unification that was territorially defined by colonial borders and recognized in
international law. The decisive factor for claiming independence was the fact that Somaliland
became independent on 26th June 1960 that is five days before it joined the South (Brons
2001).
Despite demarcation of the territory within former British boundaries there were two
contentious issues to be solved. First one concerned the wider Togder region which was due
to government rift with ex-president clans out of government control for some time. This
issue was solved as the Garhajis clan’s problems were determined more by personal hatred
than by territorial claims (Brons 2001: 253). Second, there were territorial disputes over the
Sanaag and Sool regions inhabited by Harti clans, the Warsangeli and Dulbahante. In the
early reconciliation conferences, the Harti clans were committed to the principle of
independent state creation. In 1997, however, the Northern Somali Alliance (NSA) was
formed, of the Dulbahante/Warsangeli and the Issa which opposed the idea of Somaliland’s
independence. This issue was unleashed on a bigger scale between Somaliland and Puntland,
a development to which we will return later in this chapter.
In summary, the internationally recognized colonial borders defined the territory of
Somaliland state. Although there are members of clan who opposed the idea of independence,
the majority of clans supported the elected leadership that secured political stability and
general conditions for recovery. Various guurtis settled local disputes that arose over land
tenure and grazing rights and undertook the leading role within their respective communities.
3.6 Puntland’s approach to state formation
Although pre-colonial Somalian society did not have a national government and clearcut borders, there were structures exercising power over people in what is now Puntland.
These existed in the forms of various state-like polities, e.g. Majertain Sultanate whose
territory included the current regions of Bari and Nugal, the Sultanate of Mudug/Hobyo and
the Sultanate of eastern Sanaag (for more about citi states see chapter 1.5. On the make-up of
Somali society). These structures safeguarded security, social welfare and political stability
until these were disrupted by colonial powers; the Italians in the former two Sultanates and
the British in the latter one (see chapter 2.1 Colonialism)25.
In 1991, after the collapse of the state, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front - SSDF
was the only political as well as military structure that existed in the territory of Puntland.
The SSDF was in favor of a federal system for Somali and called for all-inclusive
participatory community conference to decide on governance matters. The decision to create a
regional state was undertaken at conference in Garove in 1998 in reaction to failure to
establish a national united state.
Before the proclamation of Puntland, the role and function of the elders in a future
state was a controversial issue as part of SSDF politicians were against employing traditional
institutions into a modern state (WSP: 1998). In 1998, at a Bossasso conference, SSDF
leaders, clan elders and traditional leaders from the three Northeastern regions, agreed on the
cornerstones of Puntland. A presidential system was chosen for regional state structure.
Although the council of elders is said to be in close consultation with the government, it did
not become a state institution (Brons 2001: 271-273).
The problem with traditional institutions is that, clan and lineage elders alone are
incapable of providing a political and military security. The traditional methods of conflict
resolution are not adapted to cope with the complex needs of contemporary Somali society.
The guurti meetings are based on ad-hoc basis and are not designed to function as conflict
prevention mechanism. In the other words, they do not have capacity to crush militias or
gangs of youngsters as faction leaders do not see elders as superior authority. On the other
hand, traditional rule proved indispensable in preventing a slide into total anarchy (Brons
2001: 274).
25
http://www.puntlandgovt.com/profile.php, 15.01.2009
It is a matter of time if the role of clan elders in the predominantly pastoral area will
be further broaden or marginalized. The future will show whether Puntland state authority
will succeed in securing overall control of the use of force in the territory. A demobilization
of militias and the establishment of a regional state police are the first requirements.
Another issue to be solved immediately is the form of institutional structures, as in the
Northeast society there is a strong urban-pastoral divide. As Brons mentions. “this may be
particularly important if the local and regional guurti are not integrated as an additional
authority into the institutional framework of the regional state. So- called modern state
structures might end up being superimposed on the clan structures of governance, as
happened in earlier post-colonial state experiments” (Brons 2001: 273-274). The dilemma to
solve is find ways in which to form the traditional and modern institutions into one
functioning body.
3.6.1 The idea of a state in terms of territoriality
The failure to mould modern and traditional institutions emerges again when
examining the territorial issue. According to Brons (2001) there are contradictory versions of
the territorial delimitation of Puntland. Commonly, Puntland is usually portrayed as state
extending on the area between Bari and Nugal regions that is Majertain clan territory.
However, another interpretation includes the provinces of Bari, Nugal, Mudug, and part of
Galgudud (Mohamed Salih: 1999).
Since definition of Puntland territory varies, the only coherent idea that seems likely to
bind the people in Puntland to a Northeastern identity is the Harti sub-clan affiliation that is
common to all of them. The binding idea of persecution, common to both Somalilanders and
people of the Digil-Mirifle Governing Authority, is not powerful enough to bind all the people
of Puntland as there were some Majertains as well as Dulbahante lineages from Harti subclans who were integral part of the dictatorship.
An identification based on the Harti identity, thus, seems to be only binding principle.
Moreover, there is another dimension of identification with Darood/Harti. Apart from Harti
lineages in the North, there are also Harti/Majertain living the Middle and Lower Juba region.
Accordingly, the union based on identification with Harti as a major Daroood sub-clan would
dramatically extend the Northeastern regional limits. In fact, there is a political alliance
between Puntland and Jubaland regional administration (Brons 2001). In the war in South,
Puntland supports Majetain/Ogadeen side in the conflict. And, since the South is merely a
fight over power between the Darood and Hawiye, and in Hawiye blueprint for Somalia,
neither Somaliland, nor Puntland exist as either independent or regional entities, the Puntland
authorities support Darood clans in order to prevent Hawiye attack on Puntland (Brons 2001:
278-279).
Second problem with regard to territorial issues was the intention of the Puntland
authority to include the areas inhabited by Dulbahante and Warsangeli in the Northeastern
region despite the fact these were found in Sanaag and Sool territories, already part of
Somaliland. While Somaliland leaders were convinced as for territorial issues, the clans elders
from the Dulbahante clans in Sool and Sanaag remained divided. Some signed a declaration
stating that the two disputable regions should be integrated into Puntland. Vast majority,
however, agreed to remain part of Somaliland. Occasional warfare over the control of the two
territories emerges. It remains to be seen how the matter of territoriality will be resolved in
the future.
3.7 The Riverine State
The area of the Riverine State (The Digil-Mirifle/Reewin) Governing Authority is the
most war-torn region in Somalia. The fact that the riverine region is the feedbasket of the
whole country is the most underlying cause of the conflict and it is likely that the indigenous
clans will have to continue facing the threat of exploitation and domination by other clans in
the future.
The rift between Samale and Sab continues to exist, and reflects the depth of the
contemporary crisis of Somali identity. The state leadership from 1960 to 1991 and the
militarily powerful faction leadership after 1991, both belonged to the exploiting, dominating,
oppressing groups within Somali society with regard to their relation to the Reewin clans.
“The settled clans have been the main losers in the political situation of statelessness in the
Southern Somali region. Their insecurity derives from patterns of domination rooted within
the socio-economic make-up of Somali society. This domination was state-induced under the
dictatorial Siyad Barre regime, particularly in the context of the implementation of the 1975
land laws” (Rinehart et al. 1982: 46).
Flight, displacement and continuous warfare made it difficult for sub-state structures
to remain operational. Guerrilla forces conquered villages and farms in the countryside. The
southern militia (SDM) was militarily weak and therefore unable to protect its own people.
Despite effort made in the form of the Reewin Resitance Army (RRA), Digil Mirifle militia
were military comparatively weaker than other militant bodies of other clans and failed to
provide people of the South with security.
The threat of Hawiye domination and further fighting gave rise to the idea of state
formation. More precisely, the idea for creation of the Riverine State lies in the Reewin
identity, had been formed in the course of starvation and political deceit during early 1990s.
The Reewin have never been as united as they are now (Helander 1995). The political revival
of Reewin awareness created a strong ideology that has the potential to nurture their struggle
in the future (Brons 2001: 263). As a result, clan elders managed to resolve a number of
intro-clan conflicts.
At a Bonka Conference in March 1993 to which all Reewin clans were invited should
serve as an arena for state creation. Similar to Puntland, the Riverine state intended to be a
provisional solution; a regional state to be incorporated to federal Somalia after the peace is
established all over the country. However, not all clans could participate as their territories
had been occupied by either Hawiye or Darood clans (Mukhtar and Kusow 1993). As a
consequence, the District and Regional Councils that operated in the occupied territories
lacked the legitimacy of the Digil and Mirifle Governing Authority. The painful issue of land
tenure was unleashed as policies conducted by councils whose authority derived from power
of faction leaders who redistributed lands of displaced people to the hands of militia.
The reconciliation process initiated by Bonka conference culminated in 1995 by the
Pan Digil and Mirifle Congress which main outcomes were the establishment of state
institutions (parliamentary democracy was introduced in the form of a two-chamber system, a
House of Elders and a House of Representatives); and demarcation of the state territory
defined to include Gedo, Lower Juba, Midlle Juba, Bakol, Bay and Lower Shabelle regions
(Brons 2001: 262).
The problems with territoriality were of utmost importance. Due to reforms enacted by
Siyad Barre regime the indigenous Reewin population was marginalized. The Gedo region,
for instance, became a Marehan/Darood dominated region, and the Bay and Bakol were
controlled by the Hawiye (ibid). By creation of the Riverine state in its proposed boundaries,
Siyad Barre prominent clans - the Darood and Hawiye would become minorities in this part
since the Reewin plan for Riverine state would return Hawiye back to their indigenous
territories. It is logical, that the Hawiye, the most powerful clan family in terms of military
strength, would not agree on such a scenario and rather called for creation of unified state
where they would be given much bigger portion of power sharing. Unlike Hawiye, Darood
clans has for centuries lived within Reewin territories, thus the Digil Mirifle blueprint for
federal Somalia did not count on creating own political entity for the Darood.
In terms of the three pillars of the state, the 1995 conference laid the ground for the
future state formation process. It was the political developments which did not allow the
developing state to take firm root. The main obstacles are the continuing occupation of the
interriverine lands by non-Reewin military factions, the Darood and Hawiye. The process of
state formation was interrupted by USC/SNA when they attacked the Baidoda, the capital of
the future Riverine state. Second factor preventing the state formation is the long-term
disruption of social and political networks caused by displacement of farming communities26
(Brons 2001: 263-265).
26
In 1996, there were 54,680 internally displaced people in Mogadishu; the majority of them were farmers form
the inter-riverine areas (Horn of Africa Bulletin 8/1, 1996).
State formation – conclusion
In all three cases, the will to form a state emanated from the frustration of the events of
the past decades. Generally speaking, the Isaaq, the Reewin, and the Majertain all felt
threatened by political and military actions undertaken by Hawiye in order to gain political
domination. All three groups also experienced terror under Siyad Barre rule, and faced
various oppressions during colonial era. All discriminatory measures of these governments
were designed to break down clan structure, the traditional element of society cohesion.
In contrast to other regions, which underwent the same colonial and authoritarian
experience, the internal fission within political movements and military factions was put aside
in order to create a stable arena for living. There was a dialogue between traditional Somali
institutions and militia leaders in order to overcome the problems and stop fighting. Clan
elders played a major role in all these state formation efforts.
The analysis of the three polities showed that the best scenario to follow is one based
on employing regional clan-based units as for institutional stability (clan elders are the
medium for political stability and conflict resolution) and identity (people of Somalia identify
themselves first and foremost in clan terms; this is apparent in the case of Harti who hesitate
to identify themselves with the Somaliland, and give recognition to clan ties- that is over
borders to Puntland).
Accordingly, state territory remains the disputable issue. Throughout history, grazing
right and land tenure had been the principle reasons of conflict in Somalia. What we are
witnessing now is rather ambiguous scenario. The state-formation process in on the one hand
characterized by clan identity, while on the other it refers back to colonial times. A
compromise is needed to solve territorial issues.
Second, there is another issue to be solved promptly. Although de facto states, these
polities are not internationally recognized and thus lack de jure sovereignty. Although nonstate institutions proved to secure the living in terms of ensuring political, economic and
social needs within the proclaimed territory, it is the state that secures the international
representation of people in the world community.
Conclusions
One major question that guided my intention to write this thesis was to analyze
whether the state failure can be attributed to the intrusive colonial period. To do so, I analyzed
various structures imposed on Somali people – the traditional stateless period, the colonial
and independent periods of Somali statehood and the period after state collapse. The
presented analysis of Somali society revealed that the state collapse can be attributed to the
exploitation of traditional ways of governance during the experience of centralization and
subsequent international intervention.
Before colonialism, Somali people lived in political communities that were centered
upon village, or descent and contract respectively. In pre-colonial times, Somalia was de jure
stateless and consisted of territorially divided political entities. Such social setting reflected
the harsh environmental conditions Somalis live in. This framework was undermined when
the concept of undivided colonial state sovereignty was established.
The onset of colonization initiated a shift form pre-state (in the South) and stateless (in
the North) society, to a state one. Colonial powers introduced features that were alien to and
in opposition to Somali traditional society configuration. Colonial state institutions, laws and
policies transformed and marginalized those known before. The colonial state structures that
were established in the various parts of the Somali region laid the foundation for the political
instability and insecurity of the future independent state.
The second attempt to accommodate the various clans groups under one political
entity emerges during the independence. With regard to sovereignty, in 1960 the Somali state
inherited de jure sovereignty; however, the Somali state has never been the reference point for
security provision. The state was never socially or politically recognized by the Somali
society as the one and only sovereign authority. Sovereignty remained de facto split between
different authorities as the differences between North and South on the characteristics of the
union were not taken into account. Second, territorial perceptions and ideology that underlay
policy making served as the foundation of arrangements that offered security to some while
creating insecurity for others. All power was centered in the capital and government positions
represented a possibility to get a share of the resources of the state, which were then
redistributed among the close kin of the politicians. These conflict prone patterns within
Somali politics could be seen throughout the whole independent period 1960-1969 and were
to have a long-term impact on future Somali development and led to coup d´etat in 1969.
During early Siyad Barre years in office, it seemed that the decentralization will take
place. The decentralization reforms enacted proved to be the means for controlling citizens
rather than giving them power. Whatever the early years of Siyad Barre rule were perceived
as positive - the coming years under Siyad Barre encouraged clan antagonism, and Somalia
witnessed an unprecedented break out of both inter- and intra-clan strives. Gradually, all
regions and groups were involved into the conflict and the civil war spread throughout
Somalia. The result was violent contestations for power, the emergence of guerrilla
groups and finally state collapse.
Several attempts at state formation, the colonial state, independent central state, and
authoritarian regime of Siyad Barre, sparked the era of instability, insecurity and violence
which in its final effect led to state dissolution. Put simply, the reasons of the bloody conflict
reside in attempts at state formation that did not take traditional configuration of the society
into account.
Second, external political dynamics such as the superpower conflict had their impact
on political developments in Somalia as the weak state was given means to secure its
existence. Along similar lines, the UN aid to relief refugee crisis also strengthened the state
by strengthening the position of faction leaders. It is common wisdom that aid can influence
the balance of power. This was even more the case in stateless settings where the power
balance is unsettled.
When the modern state collapsed and the attempts to form a central state failed as
warring factions did not agree on the form of state, it were traditional local political structures
(clan elders) that took a leading role in the reconciliation process. While their role within
society remained significant throughout Somali political history it has become particularly
crucial during the last nine years of statelessness. As long as there was a Somali state, the
impact of traditional authority was marginalized and took place in a sphere parallel to the
formal state sphere and sometimes in opposition to it. After the state collapse the efforts
arising from the sub-state level of security provision were by no means anti-state, but intended
to help reestablish state authority in Somalia. Thus, after the decades of marginalization of the
traditional leaders these proved to be the foundation of Somali political society. In all three
cases at state formation - Somaliland, Puntland and the Riverrine state, the process of statebuilding was started off by clan elders. The principal condition for such a success was the will
of actual power holders to accept such authority. A way to go for Somalia is either
decentralization or regionalism. Put simply, without a centralized state, Somalia will grow
strong enough to be a player in the world arena.
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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to analyze whether the state failure can be attributed to the
intrusive colonial period. To do so, I analyze various structures imposed on Somali people –
the traditional stateless period, the colonial and independent periods of Somali statehood and
the period after state collapse. The analysis reveals that the state collapse can be attributed to
the exploitation of traditional ways of governance during the experience of centralization and
subsequent international intervention.
Appendices
Map 1 – Somalia: Administrative division
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_pol92.jpg, 12. 01. 2009
Map 2 - Somalia: Ethnic Division in 2002
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_ethnic_grps_2002.jpg, 12.01. 2009
Map 3 - Ethnic Division in 1977
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_ethnic77.jpg, 12.01. 2009
Map 4 – Division of Agricultural and Nomadic Population
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/africa/somalia_nat_res_2002.jpg, 12. 01. 2009
Map 5 - Puntland
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Puntland,
Map 6 – Somaliland
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/2005/210/09.shtml
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UNIVERZITA KARLOVA FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD
FAKULTA SOCIÁLNÍCH VĚD
INSTITUT POLITOLOGICKÝCH STUDIÍ
PROJEKT DIPLOMOVÉ PRÁCE
Civil War in Somalia – A Consequence of Colonialism?
Barbora Rýdlová
Konzultant: PhDr. Kateřina Staňková
Since the end of the Cold War, civil war has become the predominant form of violence
globally. Africa remains the most conflict ridden region of the world and the only region in
which the number of armed conflicts is on the increase. African countries have fallen victim
to political unrest and civil wars for various reasons throughout their development. Some of
these reasons include the fight for resources, colonization or other form of foreign influence,
autocratic regimes, corruption, or the high level of militarization. The above-mentioned
causes of civil war are doubtless true, but the question to ask is whether those are the factors
capable of explaining the gist of outset of intrastate conflict in Somalia.
Civil war in Somalia is a conflict sui generis, because it started despite ethnical and
religiously homogenous society, therefore it deserves special attention. Somalian civil war
lasts more than 15 years, and is one of the most perpetuated civil wars on the continent. The
vacuum of state authority in Somalia left the country in a state of low level conflict and
economic weakness. Ending this conflict is now viewed as the essential step in bringing
political stability and economic progress to the region. Unfortunately, there has been little
progress in reconciliation process. The country remains without a central government and
current peace negotiations are unlikely to end with ceasefire. On the other hand, there has
been remarkable progress towards peace and political stabilization in the north of the country.
Somaliland and Puntland are the only two functioning entities in the state. The task is to
identify the factors that lead to stabilization and democratization in one part of the country
and resulted in political and communal turmoil in the rest of the state.
When exploring the causes of contemporary dismal situation in Somalia, one should
not avoid looking back at historical background of the country. The aim of the paper is to
determine the extent to which the causes of civil war in Somalia can be attributed to historical
events and the extent to which are the causes a matter of the gist of African state system.
This paper discusses the key elements - local, regional and international – that
contributed to shape this conflict. As with many conflicts, outside forces were drawn into this
war, and major powers outside the continent intervened on one side or the other for a variety
of reasons: political ideology, ethnic alignments etc.
First part of highlights the historical legacy of the contemporary political and security
background in the country and analyses third party engagement in the conflict. Focus is on
colonial era as European colonialism had left a legacy of ongoing conflict in today’s Africa.
The problems of African states are strongly rooted to the colonial era – African states have
juridical, but no empirical sovereignty. Later, as each colonial entity declared their
independence, the problems of internal conflict, illegal trade etc. arose because those new
African states were challenged to meet the competing interests of their diverse populations.
Second, role that have global forces, from the Cold War to the spread of arms, played in
bringing war to Africa is also discussed.
Second part focuses on analysis on intrastate level and examines factors that
profoundly influence the conflict. This chapter also deals with power distribution in terms of
creating discrepancy between national identity and family, ethnical and local ties. In short, the
state is not recognized by its citizens and this lack of loyalty, in turn, contributes to emerging
breakaway movements which in many cases are supported by neighboring countries with
ethnic ties to those groups.
Final chapter examines the political situation in the two autonomous entities in
northern Somalia – Somaliland and Puntland. This part strives to identify elements that lead
to establishment of a peaceful and relatively stable environment in these “statelets”. Particular
attention is paid to local political and election system. This is a core chapter as it investigates
and identifies factors which lead to setting up a peaceful and relatively stable environment in
Puntland and Somaliland. Those elements are consequently put into context with the situation
in Somalia.
CONTENTS
1. Introduction
1.1 Defining the topic
1.2 Terminology
1.3 Aims of the paper
1.4 Theoretical approaches
1.5 Critical analysis of literature
2. Historical roots of contemporary conflict
2.1 Colonial Legacy
2.1.1
Colonial borders
2.1.2
Distribution of power
2.2 Cold War Legacy
2.2.1
Proxy wars and East-West rivarly
2.2.2
Arm supply
3. Character of African State System
3.1 Internal vs. external sovereignity
3.2 Funcion of family and local ties
3.3 Role of none-state actors
3.3.1
Clans
3.3.2
Insurgency movements
3.3.3
Warlordism
3.3.4
NGOs
4. Situation in Somaliland and Puntland– case studies
4.1 Traditional clan-based system vs. political party system
4.2 Election system - consensus building
4.3 Politics of non-intervention
5. Conclusion
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