Intelligence and National Security
ISSN: 0268-4527 (Print) 1743-9019 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fint20
Perception, intelligence errors, and the Cuban
missile crisis
Beth A. Fischer
To cite this article: Beth A. Fischer (1998) Perception, intelligence errors, and the Cuban missile
crisis, Intelligence and National Security, 13:3, 150-172, DOI: 10.1080/02684529808432497
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02684529808432497
Published online: 02 Jan 2008.
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Date: 10 August 2016, At: 03:32
Perception, Intelligence Errors, and the
Cuban Missile Crisis
BETH A. FISCHER
As the editors note in their introduction, the Cuban missile crisis is one of
the most studied events in the history of international politics. A prominent
goal in the analysis of the crisis, whether by scholars or officials, has been
to identify the mistakes crucial players made prior to and during the crisis,
with an eye toward drawing 'lessons' that will help us avoid similar
incidents in the future, or to help us manage them better should we prove
unable to avoid them. Some of the more notable mistakes can be traced to
faulty or inadequate intelligence, or to the misuse of intelligence by political
leaders. It is natural enough to seek to 'fix' the 'mistakes' made in 1962 for example, by changing the organizational structure of the intelligence
community, or the processes of intelligence assessment and exploitation. In
this essay, I argue that some of the mistakes made during the missile crisis
may not have been avoidable, and are of a kind not easily corrected, because
they were the direct result of perfectly normal psychological processes.
Scholars have long been interested in the role of perception in
international relations. Diplomatic historians, political scientists, and
psychologists have all studied the way in which images and beliefs affect
the conduct of international affairs. This body of literature demonstrates that
the way in which leaders perceive themselves, their environment, and their
adversaries has an important effect on the course of events.1 Relatively few
scholars have applied psychological insights to the study of intelligence
assessment specifically, however, though many have done so incidentally.
The Cuban missile crisis is an appropriate vehicle for such a study because
of the richness of the record upon which to draw.
The ideal of an analyst who is open to any and all information, able
accurately to gauge its quality, and capable of perceiving its true import is
an ideal without an empirical referent. At every stage of the decision
making process, biases are apt to introduce error. These biases are perfectly
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
151
normal, and have two causes: our needs and motives; and the cognitive
shortcuts we employ to help us cope with the sheer volume of information
with which we are bombarded every day - much of which is contradictory
or ambiguous. Motivated and cognitive errors may be inconsequential when
decision makers are dealing with mundane matters, but they can have far
reaching consequences in international crises. Unfortunately, to the extent
that mistakes made during the Cuban missile crisis have roots in human
nature, they are unlikely to be 'fixed' by tinkering with the organizational
structure or processes of intelligence.
I begin by surveying psychological models of decision making and their
implications for intelligence assessment. I then apply them to Soviet,
American, and Cuban judgments about three critical issues in the missile
crisis (the likelihood of a US invasion of Cuba; Soviet motives for
deploying nuclear missiles to Cuba; and the likely US response to the Soviet
deployment),2 explaining how psychological models of decision making can
account for important differences in judgment, and for egregious errors.
Finally, I conclude with some general observations about perception and
intelligence errors during the Cuban missile crisis.3
PSYCHOLOGY AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
Motivational models of decision making take as their starting point peoples'
needs and emotions. These models contend that individuals have a strong
need to maintain images of themselves and their environment that are
conducive to their emotional well-being. For example, we seek social
approval, achievement, and self-esteem. At the same time, we seek to avoid
feelings of anxiety, fear, shame and guilt.4 Motivational models explain how
this need to maintain our sense of well-being can interfere with our ability
to process information accurately.
Humans are emotional beings beset with doubts, who often seek
incompatible goals.5 Nevertheless, we naturally seek to avoid uncertainty
and painful trade-offs. We especially try to avoid these types of situations if
the decisions we make will be irrevocable. Of course, it is nearly impossible
to avoid such situations. Consequently, we employ a variety of coping
mechanisms in an effort to maintain our peace of mind and reduce our
anxiety. For the most part, we do so subconsciously. One such coping
strategy is 'defensive avoidance': we attempt to avoid anxiety-arousing
warnings about the impending negative consequences of our preferred
actions. For example, we may pay selective attention to information,
preferring that which suggests certainty or minimizes trade-offs. Once we
have made a decision, we sometimes defend our commitment to it by means
of a second strategy called 'bolstering', where we actively seek to downplay
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
the trade-offs associated with our choice. We exaggerate the positive
consequences of our decision, minimize the negative ones, and go to some
trouble to seek out comforting information with which to discredit
disturbing information. Additionally, we may engage in 'wishful thinking',
in which we persuade ourselves that our chosen course will succeed despite
many indications to the contrary.6
Whereas motivational models of decision making focus on our
emotional and psychological needs, cognitive models focus on the decision
rules, shortcuts and simplifications that we employ when processing
information. Psychological theory posits that human beings process
information in two ways: either in a theory-driven manner, or in a datadriven manner. Theory-driven information processing is a method of
interpreting data on the basis of one's prior beliefs or prior knowledge. One
begins with an assumption and interprets new information through the
prism of that assumption. It is a top-down, concept-driven activity. Datadriven information processing, on the other hand, is bottom-up. One attends
first to the data and then develops theories or conclusions on the basis of this
raw information. Theory-driven information processing is a deductive
manner of reasoning while data-driven processing is inductive.7
Cognitive psychologists contend that we engage in theory-driven
thinking far more frequently than we engage in data-driven thinking. This is
primarily because we prefer to conserve mental energy, and theory-driven
processing requires less mental effort. Data-driven processing typically
requires us to attend to a vast amount of information and to weigh it all
before we draw conclusions. Such a process is mentally taxing, as well as
time-consuming. Theory-driven processing is less onerous.
Under routine conditions, theory-driven thinking is efficient. Most of the
decisions in our daily lives concern mundane issues, and it makes sense to
expend as little mental energy as possible when attending to them. Theory
driven thinking is usually 'good enough'. However, our tendency to engage
in theory-driven thinking, and to use mental shortcuts, can lead to errors.
For example, we tend to pay attention only to information that conforms to
our previously-held beliefs and to overlook information that challenges our
expectations. If we do attend to discrepant information, we have a tendency
to dismiss it, either by finding fault with the information itself or by
questioning the credibility of its source. Ironically, encountering and
dismissing such information frequently leads to even stronger beliefs that
our preconceptions are correct.
Not only do we have a tendency to pay greater attention to information
that confirms our beliefs, we tend to actively seek out such information.
Psychologists refer to this as the 'hypothesis-confirming bias': we tend to
search for evidence that suggests our assumptions are correct, rather than to
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
153
search for data that would cause us to revise our assumptions.
Theory-driven thinking also affects the way in which we understand
ambiguous information: we tend to interpret it in such a way that it supports
our prior beliefs and assumptions. Psychologists refer to this phenomenon
as 'priming'.8 In a classic study demonstrating priming effects, subjects
were divided into two groups and shown a series of slides. The first group's
slides included positive subliminal words such as 'brave' and
'adventurous'. The second group's slides included negative subliminal
words such as 'reckless' and 'dangerous'. Both groups were then shown
pictures of people shooting rapids in a canoe, and asked to assess the
scenario. The subjects that had been exposed to negative subliminal phrases
were far more likely to assess the scenario in a negative manner, and to
conclude that the canoeists were acting irresponsibly. Subjects who had
been exposed to positive subliminal phrases, however, were more likely to
assess the scenario positively. In their view, the people in the canoe were
having fun.9
Information processing biases have two crucial consequences. First,
theory-driven processing undermines our ability to generate alternative
interpretations of the data. When we reason in a theory-driven manner, we
attend first to our preconceptions, and then to the data. This inclines us to
interpret information in such a way as to make it conform to what we
already expect. Typically, we inadequately consider the possibility that the
same information can support a variety of conclusions. Second, because we
seek out information that supports our beliefs and ignore information that
challenges them, our beliefs resist change.
The tendency to engage in theory-driven thinking means that two people
can observe exactly the same behavior, yet interpret it in completely different
ways. Since we tend to interpret ambiguous information in such a way as to
make it conform to our pre-existing images and expectations, people with
different beliefs might attach different meanings to the same information.
Motivational and cognitive models of decision making thus derive from
different premises. Motivational models take as their starting point the
human desire to avoid the anxiety that accompanies uncertainty and painful
trade-offs. The starting point for cognitive models is the rules for processing
information that we employ in order to make sense of a complex
environment. Motivational models contend that we see what we want to see,
whereas cognitive models contend that we see what we expect to see.10
Despite these different starting points, however, both models seek to explain
the same outcomes - errors in judgment and inference - and, in many
instances, lead to similar expectations. Both seek to explain insensitivity to
information that challenges existing beliefs and preferences, and failure to
acknowledge important trade-offs among policy options."
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
CRITICAL PERCEPTIONS IN THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Identifying the psychological processes behind real-world decisions is
difficult enough when decision-makers are readily accessible and the events
in question are fresh in their minds. It is a much more daunting task to
explain the way in which government officials made decisions 35 years ago.
A great deal of information is needed in order to determine whether decision
makers' perceptions were rooted in cognitive or motivational biases, and we
may never be able to draw such conclusions with certainty. Nevertheless, it
is useful to consider plausible psychological explanations for the way
analysts and leaders interpreted data during the Cuban missile crisis. Such
an exercise helps us to understand why intelligence assessment and the
effective exploitation of intelligence by national leaders are such difficult,
error-prone tasks. Intelligence errors may be rooted not only in institutional
and procedural flaws, which in principle can be fixed, but also in perfectly
normal human traits, which cannot.
The essays in this volume indicate that officials involved in the Cuban
missile crisis held strikingly different views on three critical issues: the
likelihood of a US invasion of Cuba; the motive for the Soviet deployment
of nuclear missiles in Cuba; and the likely US response to the deployment.
In this section I consider the ways in which analysts and national leaders
perceived these issues, and I offer plausible psychological explanations for
their divergent assessments.
The Likelihood of a US Invasion of Cuba
In April 1961 the Kennedy administration backed an invasion of Cuba that
failed miserably. Although US troops did not take part in the Bay of Pigs
landing, the affair was an embarrassment for Kennedy, and both the media
and Congress pressured the President to try again. While the US military did
draw up contingency plans for an invasion, White House officials were
opposed to implementing it for a variety of moral and political reasons. The
Kennedy administration did not intend to invade Cuba in 1962 (although it
had not entirely ruled out such an option should certain circumstances arise,
such as a Soviet deployment of nuclear weapons to Cuba). Instead, the
White House launched Operation 'Mongoose', a program of sabotage
designed to harass the Cuban government.12
After the Bay of Pigs, both the Cuban and the Soviet intelligence
communities sought to assess the likelihood of a second, more serious
invasion of Cuba.
Soviet Perspectives: As Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali have
noted, Soviet intelligence agencies lacked detailed information about
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
155
decision making within the Kennedy administration. Most information
came through third parties in Europe and Latin America, rather than from
sources close to the American President. The Soviets relied heavily upon
reports from journalists, officials in France and Belgium, and members of
the Washington diplomatic community. These reports were based to a large
extent upon open source material and gossip. The Soviets also relied upon
Sigint to some extent (analyzing the volume of US communications traffic
to look for signs of imminent military action), but Sigint provided no firm
evidence of Kennedy's intentions toward Cuba.13
It is difficult to determine the Soviet intelligence community's
assessment of the likelihood of a US invasion of Cuba. According to
Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, the KGB's official reports during
the spring of 1962 were unable to draw firm conclusions regarding the
likelihood of an attack. Such waffling was not unusual for the Soviet
intelligence community, as its reports were notoriously short on analysis. It
was politically expedient to provide Soviet leaders with raw data and let
them draw their own conclusions, rather than to provide an assessment that
might contradict these leaders' views.14 However, Soviet intelligence did
suggest that an invasion was not imminent. Soviet intelligence officials in
Washington believed that Kennedy was reluctant to attempt another
invasion because such an attack might undermine some of his other foreign
policy initiatives, and because an invasion might lead to retaliatory attacks
from the Soviets and the Chinese. Kennedy would not attack unless
provoked, these officials reasoned. Cuban testimony, however suggests that
Soviet intelligence provided radically different assessments of US
intentions to Havana. According to Cuban intelligence officials, beginning
in late 1961 Soviet intelligence repeatedly reported to Castro that the
Kennedy administration was planning a full-scale invasion of Cuba. These
unrelenting warnings were accompanied by reports that Washington was
also actively seeking to assassinate the Cuban leader.15
Because the Soviet intelligence community offered different opinions to
different audiences, it is difficult to determine the source of its assessments
and to evaluate them. However, the fact that the conclusions of the Soviet
intelligence community varied from audience to audience suggests that
political pressures heavily influenced its findings. For example, it is unclear
whether the KGB told Soviet leaders it could not reach a conclusion about
the likelihood of a US attack because it could not draw a conclusion perhaps because of a lack of good information - or because it would not
draw a conclusion, for fear such a conclusion might be unacceptable to
Soviet leaders. Conceivably, the discrepancy between KGB reports to
Soviet leaders and KGB reports to Cuban leaders reflects Khrushchev's
attempt to use Soviet intelligence for political purposes. As Domingo
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Amuchastegui has noted, Cuban intelligence suspected that Soviet
intelligence assessments were purposely skewed so as to induce Castro to
accept a deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba.
By most accounts, the Soviet leadership had firm views about the
likelihood of a US invasion. Khrushchev was convinced that President
Kennedy would attempt a second attack on Cuba at some point, unless
adequate provision were made for deterrence. The Soviet leader believed
the Americans would not tolerate the continued existence of a communist
state 90 miles off the US coast unless forced to do so. Khrushchev therefore
interpreted the Bay of Pigs and the harassment of Cuba that followed as
precursors to an all-out confrontation.16
Although the available evidence does not allow for a conclusive
judgment, it is possible that theory-driven thinking led Khrushchev to
become convinced that the United States would invade Cuba. Khrushchev
may have begun with the assumption that a confrontation was inevitable,
and interpreted the Bay of Pigs and Operation 'Mongoose' as evidence for
his belief. While such a conclusion was plausible, there was no logical
connection between Washington's subsequent harassment of Havana and
the likelihood of a second invasion. There were many ways to interpret
Operation 'Mongoose'. In fact, as Cuban intelligence duly noted, the
activities associated with 'Mongoose' at least as plausibly suggested that
the Kennedy administration did not intend to invade. Cuban intelligence
concluded that these activities demonstrated that, for the time being at least,
Washington had given up plans for an invasion and had instead resigned
itself to simple harassment. Khrushchev could have reached the same
conclusion if he had reasoned differently. Data-driven thinking could have
led to the (correct) conclusion that the Kennedy administration was not
planning an attack in 1962.
Cuban Perspectives: After the failed American attempt to invade Cuba in
April 1961 the Cuban government devoted the bulk of its intelligence
resources to determining the likelihood of another invasion. Intelligence
priorities revolved around detecting US plans to invade the island, as well
as plans to assassinate Fidel Castro.17
Fidel Castro assumed the United States would never accept the Cuban
Revolution. After the Bay of Pigs affair, the Cuban leader was convinced
that a confrontation with the Americans was inevitable. He maintained that
Washington sought to exact revenge for the failed invasion, and to crush the
Revolution. For Castro, the main question was not whether an American
invasion would occur, but when.
Cuban intelligence shared Castro's belief that a confrontation with the
United States was inevitable. Intelligence officials reasoned that
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
157
Washington viewed international relations in zero-sum terms and therefore
perceived the establishment of a communist government in Havana as a
defeat of major proportions. As long as the Cuban Revolution survived, it
would rub salt in American wounds. At some point, intelligence officials
believed, the United States would seek to overthrow Castro.18 However,
between the spring of 1961 and the spring of 1962, Cuban intelligence
maintained that an attack was not imminent. Washington was most certainly
engaged in a variety of activities meant to harass the Castro government, but
Cuban intelligence concluded that these activities were not necessarily a
precursor to invasion. As Domingo Amuchastegui has noted, Cuban
intelligence actually believed that a US invasion was becoming increasingly
unlikely, as Washington was unable to rally the support of the Organization
of American States, something that was crucial in order to make such an
invasion politically acceptable both to the international community and to
the American public. Cuban leaders did not agree with the Cuban
intelligence community's conclusions. Castro dismissed the intelligence
community's judgment that a US attack was not imminent, and pressured it
to search for evidence of an impending conflict. Castro instead embraced
the Soviet reports that such an invasion was looming.
Thus, within Havana there were important differences of opinion
regarding the likelihood of a US invasion. Both the political leaders and the
intelligence community believed a confrontation was inevitable, yet they
differed in their estimation of its imminence. The available evidence
suggests that these discrepancies might have been rooted, at least in part, in
different methods of processing information. It is plausible that Castro, like
Khrushchev, engaged in theory-driven thinking. He began with the
assumption that an invasion was inevitable, and then sought out information
to confirm this expectation. Castro embraced Soviet intelligence reports that
confirmed his beliefs, and rejected information from Cuban intelligence that
challenged his expectations. Because he paid attention only to information
that confirmed his expectation that an invasion was imminent, the Cuban
leader avoided having to revise his expectations.
On the other hand, Cuban intelligence partly resisted the tendency to
engage in theory-driven information processing. Despite its own
assumption that confrontation was inevitable, despite political pressure to
seek out information confirming an invasion, and despite reports from the
KGB that an attack was imminent, Cuban intelligence concluded that an
invasion was not likely in 1962. In this respect, Cuban intelligence attended
first to the raw information, and then developed conclusions on the basis of
the data. To the extent that Cuban intelligence engaged in theory-driven
information processing, it relied upon an assumption that Castro apparently
did not share: namely, that the United States would only invade Cuba in the
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
context of a favorable international political climate. Thus different basic
assumptions can lead to radically different interpretations of the same
information.
Soviet Motives for Deploying Nuclear Missiles in Cuba
The dominant view among contemporary scholars is that Khrushchev had
two primary motivations, and one supporting motivation, for deploying
nuclear missiles to Cuba: (a) to deter a US invasion; (b) to restore strategic
parity between the United States and the Soviet Union; and (c) to respond
in kind to the deployment of American nuclear missiles on the Soviet
periphery in Turkey, for symbolic or emotional reasons." Although it is still
unclear which of these motives carried the most weight, it is now generally
agreed that Khrushchev's motives were largely defensive. He sought to
redress a strategic imbalance which strongly favored the United States, and
to protect an important ally. As the first state in the Western Hemisphere to
embrace communism, Cuba had important symbolic significance for the
Kremlin. In the zero-sum world of the early 1960s, it would have been
tragic for Moscow if Washington were able to depose Castro and replace
him with someone more palatable to the United States.
This contemporary scholarship, however, is based on now-declassified
documents and extensive interviews with former government officials. It
benefits from an exchange of information that was not available to
intelligence analysts and political leaders at the time of the crisis. How,
then, did officials in Washington and Havana perceive the Soviet decision
to deploy nuclear missiles at the time?
US Perspectives: Several puzzling questions arise when one considers US
estimates of Soviet motives during the early 1960s:
1. Why did the US intelligence community not give greater weight to the
possibility that Soviets would deploy strategic missiles to Cuba? The
Soviets were engaged in a major buildup of conventional arms on the
island during the summer of 1962, and some have charged that the CIA
should have foreseen that strategic missiles would be included in this
deployment. A Special National Intelligence Estimate issued on 19
September 1962 considered the possibility that the Kremlin would
deploy medium-and intermediate-range missiles to Cuba, and noted that
such a deployment 'would confer considerable military advantage' on
the Soviet Union. However, this scenario was dismissed as unlikely
because such risk-taking would not be congruent with past Soviet
behavior.20 As Raymond Garthoff has noted, there was not enough
evidence to conclude that the Soviets were planning a nuclear
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
159
deployment in Cuba. However, there was not enough evidence to
conclude that the Soviets had ruled out such an option, either. Moreover,
although not a typical Soviet trait, risk-taking was congruent with
Khrushchev's past political behavior. In retrospect, the intelligence
community clearly should have given greater weight to the possibility of
a strategic deployment in Cuba.
2. Why did the CIA fail to detect the missiles earlier? The United States
had been monitoring the buildup of Soviet weapons in Cuba closely. It
is therefore unclear how could it have missed the transshipment of
missiles and supporting equipment, and the construction of weapons
sites which so scarred the Cuban landscape, especially since the Soviets
failed to mask construction work at the sites until after American photo
reconnaissance had discovered them.21 Such an oversight is especially
puzzling when one considers evidence from Cuban intelligence that
information regarding the missile sites was streaming into the United
States.22
3. How could the CIA have so underestimated the number of Soviet
military personnel in Cuba? Although nearly 42,000 members of the
Soviet military were deployed to Cuba in the fall of 1962, US
intelligence estimated that, at a maximum, there were 16,000 such
personnel on the island.23 Although these personnel wore civilian
clothing, they all sported crew-cuts and traveled in military formations,
and many were fair-complexioned. Their presence was conspicuous
even to the average Cuban.
4. When considering Soviet motives for the deployment, why did
American officials fail to give adequate weight to Khrushchev's
defensive motivations? At the outset of the crisis intelligence reports
noted the possibility that the Soviets might have deployed nuclear
missiles to Cuba for defensive reasons. CIA memoranda on 16 and 17
October both discussed the possibility that the Kremlin decided to install
the missiles so as to deter the United States from intervening in Cuba.
Special National Estimates prepared on 19 and 20 October failed to
consider the deterrence motivations for the deployment, but they did
suggest that the Soviets might have deployed nuclear missiles in an
attempt to offset their strategic inferiority vis-a-vis the United States.
However, these defensive considerations were largely ignored in
subsequent assessments. In his briefings to President Kennedy and the
ExComm, CIA Director John McCone emphasized offensive
motivations for the deployment, focusing in particular on Khrushchev's
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
likely desire to enhance Soviet strike capability against the United
States. McCone failed to note that the military balance strongly favored
the United States. Likewise, formal CIA assessments prepared for the
ExComm failed to mention that the Soviets might have deployed
missiles so as to defend Cuba against an American attack. They also
failed to note the symbolic significance of the island country to the
Kremlin. The President and his advisers also assumed that the
deployment was offensive in nature, believing the action was meant to
test American credibility and fortitude.
From a psychological perspective, these issues may be interrelated. It is
plausible that these intelligence oversights were all rooted in the
intelligence community's image of the Soviet Union and attendant
information processing errors. Available evidence suggests that American
officials began with the assumption that the Soviet Union was an aggressor
seeking to expand its influence throughout the globe. Such an assumption
would have led US officials to be more attentive to information that
confirmed their expectations and relatively insensitive to information that
challenged them.
The American image of the Soviet Union as an expansionist and
opportunistic aggressor may have blinded US officials to the feelings of
vulnerability that the strategic nuclear imbalance generated in Moscow.
Early CIA analyses mentioned the possibility that Khrushchev might have
decided to deploy the missiles for partly defensive reasons; but it is
noteworthy that this line of thought was neither fully explored nor
consistently pursued in American assessments. It may have dropped out
because defensive motives did not fit with American preconceptions of an
expansionist Soviet Union.24 Moreover, such assessments did not fit with
Americans' preconceptions about the United States. If US officials had
acknowledged that the Kremlin had deployed nuclear missiles for defensive
reasons they would have been conceding that the United States could be
perceived as an aggressor. Such an idea would have been highly discrepant
with Americans' self-image as freedom-loving defenders of democracy: the
United States was not, and could not be, a 'threat' to the Soviet Union,
because its motivations were defensive and benign.25
Moreover, the dominant American image of the Soviet Union was not
merely that of an opportunistic expansionist aggressor; it was of a riskaverse opportunistic expansionist aggressor. While the Soviets constantly
sought to expand their influence, American officials believed, they avoided
taking great risks in pursuit of that goal.26 US intelligence officials noted the
advantages a nuclear deployment might confer upon the Soviet Union, but
concluded that Moscow would not take what at the end of the day would
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
161
surely be a very poor gamble. Interestingly, US analysts failed to consider
Khrushchev's attitude toward risk in these analyses. Khrushchev had
demonstrated a tendency to engage in risk-taking behavior, most notably in
his decision to expose Stalin's crimes, in his bluster over Berlin, and in his
reckless policy of nuclear bluff.27 The failure to integrate Khrushchev's past
behavior into American estimates is puzzling.
The American failure to anticipate the Soviet deployment, therefore,
may well have stemmed at least in part from a misjudgment about Soviet
risk-taking. How can such a misjudgment be explained? Behavioral
decision theory offers one possibility. The American estimate presumed an
expansionist motivation. But Khrushchev did not deploy the missiles to
Cuba to gain advantage over the United States. He did so largely for
defensive reasons: to redress the Soviet position of strategic inferiority, and
to deter an invasion of the only Soviet ally in the Western Hemisphere. He
sought to recoup one loss (the explosion of the 'missile gap' myth)28 and to
forestall another (the loss of Cuba). Psychological research on decision
making under conditions of risk suggests that this is an important
distinction. People tend to be risk-acceptant in the domain of loss, and riskaverse in the domain of gains.29 That is, people will take greater risks when
trying to redress or avoid a perceived loss than they will when they are
trying to realize a gain. Of course, US officials could not have been
expected to be aware of developments in the field of behavioral decision
theory that had not yet taken place. Nevertheless, it is intuitive to expect
desperate action from desperate people, and had the Kennedy
administration understood that Khrushchev was attempting to shore up a
position of vulnerability, they might then have evaluated the possibility of a
missile deployment differently.
Since US analysts assumed that a Soviet deployment would not occur,
they may well have been relatively insensitive to the vast amount of human
intelligence - such as refugee reports and sightings by operatives in Cuba that suggested such a deployment was underway. The CIA may have failed
to detect the missiles earlier in part because they did not expect the missiles
to be there at all. The hypothesis-confirming bias predicts CIA analysts
would seek information that supported their expectations, rather than
information that would disconfirm them. US officials not only discounted
discrepant human intelligence; they also dismissed many of their sources as
not credible.30
Motivational errors might also have contributed to the failure to detect
the deployment earlier, although this explanation is less satisfactory. After
the Bay of Pigs incident the CIA suffered a loss of status and influence
within the Kennedy administration. The President and his advisers had
blamed the debacle in large part on ineptitude within the US intelligence
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
community. It is possible that the CIA sought to avoid further blame for
inaccuracies and therefore required unequivocal proof of a missile
installation before notifying the administration. If the CIA was motivated to
be as accurate as possible, it might have exercised undue caution in its
estimates. The problem with such an explanation, however, is that if the
CIA had been motivated to be as accurate as possible in order to avoid a
further erosion of its bureaucratic position, it could equally plausibly have
redoubled its monitoring efforts, leading it to discover the missiles earlier
than it otherwise might have done. Extreme caution could have led to
extreme vigilance. Since a motivational explanation leads to no precise
prediction about the CIA's performance in this case, it is less satisfactory
than cognitive explanations.
It is plausible, then, that theory-driven thinking contributed to the
American intelligence community's inability to detect the missiles at an
earlier point in time. If American intelligence had concluded before the
onset of the crisis that a Soviet deployment of nuclear missiles was not as
unlikely as they thought, then analysts would have been more receptive to
evidence that suggested such a deployment was, in fact, taking place.
The same reasoning might help to explain why US intelligence so
underestimated the number of Soviet military personnel in Cuba. Although
the extent of the Soviet presence was obvious to many Cubans, it may not
have been obvious to those less familiar with the daily rhythms of the
island, especially to those neither expecting nor looking for a massive
deployment of a complete combat-capable Soviet force.31
In short, US analysts began with the image of Moscow as an expansionist
aggressor, and this image may well have blinded them to Moscow's feelings
of vulnerability caused by its position of inferiority. Accordingly, US analysts
underestimated the probability that Khrushchev would risk deploying
strategic missiles to Cuba. The belief that Khrushchev would not make such
a deployment may then have caused US analysts to be insensitive to
information that such a deployment was, in fact, taking place.32
Cuban Perspectives: When Nikita Khrushchev first broached the idea of a
nuclear deployment in Cuba with Castro, the Soviet leader maintained that
the purpose of the deployment was to deter an American attack on the
island. Castro recognized that Khrushchev's aims were not limited to the
defense of Cuba: the deployment would also shift the global balance of
power in the Soviet Union's favor. However, the Cuban leader considered
Moscow's geostrategic concerns irrelevant. He feared that an American
invasion was imminent, and was convinced that the Cuban military alone
could not deter Washington. Castro needed an effective deterrent, and
accepted the missiles readily.33
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
163
Although Castro's primary aim was to deter an American invasion, the
deployment of Soviet strategic missiles to Cuba actually increased the
likelihood of such a confrontation. Castro either failed to recognize this
trade-off, or chose to ignore it. Motivated biases may have contributed to
this decision making error. Castro was driven by the need to protect both
Cuba and himself. Fearful of an impending attack, convinced the Cuban
military could not protect the island, and facing Soviet pressure to deploy
strategic missiles, Castro may have engaged in defensive avoidance.
Evidence suggests that Castro avoided information that would produce
anxiety about the trade-offs involved in his decision to accept the
deployment. For example, information from Cuban intelligence suggests
that Castro was not open to the suggestion that a deployment could raise the
probability of a US attack. In mid-September 1962 Cuban intelligence
prepared a report on the dangers of being seen as a Soviet proxy and the
possibility that such perceptions could drag Havana into a superpower war.
However, these estimates were not forwarded to Castro because of an
institutional reluctance to contradict the leader's views.34 Castro might also
have engaged in wishful thinking, thus persuading himself that the nuclear
deployment was the best option for the defense of Cuba.35
Intelligence analysts in Havana doubted that Cuban security was the
Soviets' primary motive for deploying strategic missiles to Cuba. Long
before learning of the missile installation, Cuban intelligence had grown
suspicious of recurring Soviet reports that a US invasion was imminent.
Upon learning of the deployment, Cuban intelligence concluded that the
Soviets had deliberately skewed their intelligence reports so as to make
Castro more amenable to it. The Soviets needed to convince Castro that an
American invasion was imminent so that they could deploy their nuclear
missiles 90 miles off the US coast.36
It is interesting that Cuban intelligence and American intelligence
concurred that Khrushchev deployed the missiles to Cuba primarily for
offensive reasons. These assessments were not accurate. A variety of
defensive considerations drove Khrushchev to deploy missiles in Cuba. The
Cubans acknowledged these defensive considerations to a greater extent
than did the Americans, but ultimately considered them secondary.
It is also interesting to note that while Cuban and American intelligence
reached the same (inaccurate) conclusion about Soviet motives, they appear
to have done so via different methods of information processing. American
analysis appears to have been heavily theory driven. Beginning with the
assumption that the Soviet Union was a cautious, opportunistic aggressor
unlikely to risk a nuclear deployment to Cuba, American analysts concluded
that the purpose of the deployment was to give the Soviets a strategic
advantage over the United States once the deployment became evident.
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Cuban intelligence, on the other hand, inferred Soviet motives from the
available data - specifically, the discrepancy between the dire Soviet
assessments of the American threat and Cuban assessments that such a
threat was receding. This finding suggests that there is no necessary
relationship between one method of information processing and the
accuracy of inferences. Data-driven and theory-driven information
processing can both lead to inaccurate assessments.
The Likely US Response to the Soviet Deployment
The American response to the Soviet installation of ballistic missiles in
Cuba was crucial because of the possibility that Washington would escalate
the conflict. The ExComm considered a variety of options, including air
strikes and an invasion. These options could conceivably have led to all-out
war. In order to be able to respond effectively to Washington's reaction to
the deployment, Cuba and the Soviet Union needed to try to predict it.
Soviet Perspectives: Nikita Khrushchev maintained that the Kennedy
administration would accept the deployment of Soviet nuclear missiles to
Cuba. Why he believed this is not entirely clear. Some scholars have argued
that Khrushchev questioned Kennedy's resolve, and believed the American
leader would not force a confrontation over the missiles.37 More recent
studies have argued convincingly that the Soviet leader engaged in wishful
thinking. Khrushchev faced a variety of political pressures: the agricultural
reforms he had championed were not working, leading to growing
economic problems; there was growing dissent within the Presidium about
a policy of accommodation with the West; with the 'missile gap' exposed as
a myth, the Soviet Union stood vulnerable to American nuclear might; and
Cuba stood vulnerable to American attack. A successful nuclear
deployment would alleviate many of these difficulties. Evidence suggests,
however, that Khrushchev failed to recognize important trade-offs. Needing
the deployment to succeed, he persuaded himself that it would succeed,
ignoring evidence that his plan would fail, and underestimating the risks
involved.38
Oddly enough, given the seriousness of the situation, the KGB was not
specifically instructed to estimate the likely US response to the deployment.
The reason for this is unclear, although several explanations are possible.
The least plausible is that it was simply an oversight. This information was
so crucial that it strains credulity to believe that Khrushchev simply forgot
to ask for it. More plausibly, the Kremlin may have believed that Soviet
intelligence would have been unable to predict the US response accurately.
The KGB and the GRU had few sources close to the President, and relied
primarily upon hearsay and open sources for information about top-level
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
165
decision making.39 In any case, both agencies were more proficient at data
collection than data analysis.
The failure to task Soviet intelligence with determining the probable US
response to the deployment might also have reflected the secondary status
of the intelligence agencies in the policy making process. IChrushchev
largely distrusted the KGB and the GRU, and frequently acted as his own
intelligence analyst. Perhaps the Soviet leader simply did not value the
opinion of the intelligence agencies on this matter. Another possibility is
that Khrushchev feared that if he tasked Soviet intelligence with assessing
the likely US response, the instructions would leak and he would lose the
element of surprise. Finally, it is also possible that Khrushchev did not want
to know what the US response would be. He may have been so wedded to
the idea of deployment that he did not wish to hear that it might provoke a
deadly military confrontation with the United States. Of these various
possible explanations, only the last turns critically upon psychological
processes (in this case, a motivated error). The other explanations are
organizational or bureaucratic.
Cuban Perspectives: Cuban intelligence was sensitive to the fact that
Washington perceived Cuba to be a Soviet proxy. Intelligence analysts in
Havana reported that it would be dangerous for Cuba to ally itself too
closely with Moscow because the island could then become a pawn in the
growing hostilities between the superpowers. Thus, when it appeared that
the Americans were close to discovering the nuclear missiles in Cuba,
Cuban analysts assumed that Washington would refuse to accept the
deployment. The Americans would perceive the deployment not only as a
threat to US security, but -just as importantly - as a challenge to American
dominance in the Western Hemisphere. In the zero-sum world of the Cold
War, Washington would not and could not allow the Soviets to deploy
nuclear missiles in Cuba.
While Cuban intelligence was correct in its prediction that the
Americans would not accept the deployment, it erred when it assumed that
Washington would respond with a military attack. It is not entirely clear
why Cuban intelligence would make such an assumption, especially since
an invasion could have unleashed a confrontation of catastrophic
proportions. Lack of information may have contributed to the failure of
Cuban intelligence to consider the range of policy responses open to the
Kennedy administration; Cuba evidently had no sources close to the
President. In an effort to determine American intentions, Cuban analysts
monitored US military bases at Guantanamo Bay and in the southeastern
United States, as well as US military activities in the Caribbean. It is
conceivable that Cuban intelligence assumed that Washington would
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
respond militarily because they relied so heavily upon military indicators.
Such an interpretive process would be consistent with priming effects.
Like Khrushchev, Castro may have been driven by his need to believe
that Kennedy would accept the missile deployment. From Castro's
perspective, the deployment was necessary to deter a US invasion of Cuba.
Castro would not have permitted the deployment if he had believed it would
provoke a US attack. The fact that Castro accepted the deployment suggests
that he persuaded himself that the Americans would ultimately accept it.
Evidence also suggests that the Cuban leader took comfort in Khrushchev's
confidence that Washington would accept the missiles. The Kremlin had far
more experience in such matters, and had greater intelligence-gathering
capabilities. Castro may have persuaded himself that Khrushchev knew
best.40
Thus, there was disagreement regarding the likely American response to
the missile deployment. Khrushchev (and, it seems, Castro) believed that
Washington would accept the missiles, while Cuban intelligence demurred.
These divergent assessments may have stemmed from the way in which the
two groups approached the assessment process. Khrushchev believed the
Americans would accept the missiles because he wanted and needed to
believe that this would be the case. He needed the deployment to succeed,
because he needed it to solve a variety of acute political problems. He
ignored or downplayed evidence that his gambit would fail.41 The fact that
he failed to instruct Soviet intelligence agencies to look into the matter is
consistent with his not wanting to hear that his plan might not work. Cuban
intelligence, on the other hand, began by considering Washington's
perception of Soviet-Cuban relations, and larger geostrategic issues. They
based their predictions of US behavior on the fact that Washington would
oppose any expansion of Soviet power into the Western hemisphere.
CONCLUSIONS
Many of the scholars and government agencies that have investigated the
Cuban missile crisis have sought to uncover the mistakes that were made in
October 1962. The aim is to discover 'what went wrong' and to 'fix'
organizational and procedural flaws so that such a crisis will not recur. This
chapter has examined these intelligence errors from a psychological
perspective. In this view, many of these mistakes may well have been rooted
in perfectly normal decision-making processes. Officials' needs and
motives may have led to decision-making errors. Likewise, the cognitive
shortcuts that are so useful in allowing us to cope with the vast amounts of
information that we encounter each day may have led to intelligence
oversights. In sum, many of the mistakes made during the missile crisis may
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
167
not have been amenable to easy correction because they were rooted in
human nature.
How do we know that psychology played an important role in the
genesis and management of the Cuban missile crisis? As a 'soft science',
the study of international relations is not as amenable to scientific
experimentation as some other fields of inquiry, such as physics or
chemistry. It is difficult to identify and control for important variables in
international affairs, so as to assess the relative importance of
psychological, bureaucratic, domestic political, societal, or systemic factors
in determining how events unfold. Collectively, however, the essays in this
volume by Garthoff, Fursenko and Naftali, and Amuchastegui enable us to
conduct an unusually well-controlled thought experiment. Here we have
information about how intelligence analysts and national leaders
simultaneously assessed precisely the same events. If each government had
interpreted these events in the same manner - that is, if each government
had agreed on the meaning, purpose, and significance of each event - then
one could conclude that perceptions did not matter during the Cuban missile
crisis. If each government had agreed, for example, on the likelihood of a
US invasion of Cuba, or the motives for the Soviet nuclear deployment in
Cuba, or the Kennedy administration's probable response to the
deployment, then information-processing could not have been a significant
variable. But as these essays demonstrate, this was not the case. Frequently
there were divergent perceptions not only between capitals, but within them
as well - and these divergent perceptions frequently had profound
consequences for the actors.
Perceptions mattered; and misperceptions are unavoidable. No amount
of organizational or procedural tinkering will eliminate errors associated
with normal human psychology. Yet it would certainly be enlightening, and
may even be useful, to ask whether there are patterns in the errors. While it
is impossible to generalize on the basis of one case, it is worth attempting
to determine in further studies whether two patterns evident in the Cuban
missile crisis apply to intelligence assessment more broadly: (a) the greater
propensity of political leaders than professional intelligence analysts to
commit motivated errors; and (b) the greater likelihood of error in a
politicized intelligence process.
It is clear that in the Cuban missile crisis, political leaders were more
likely than professional intelligence analysts to commit motivated errors.
While there is evidence that Khrushchev and Castro engaged in defensive
avoidance and wishful thinking, there is little evidence of these tendencies
within the three countries' professional intelligence communities. Political
leaders' misperceptions stemmed from both motivational biases and
cognitive errors, whereas intelligence analysts' misperceptions were rooted
168
INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
primarily in cognitive errors. This makes sense when one considers that
political leaders confront a variety of needs and aims. They may face
domestic political pressures, pressures from allies as well as adversaries,
and, oftentimes, a need to maintain their own political positions. These
needs are frequently contradictory, and generate anxiety. Anxiety and
uncertainty, in turn, lead to motivated errors in decision making.
Professional intelligence analysts, in contrast, have more limited, better
defined, and less anxiety-producing needs and goals. Their responsibility is
narrower in scope: to gather and interpret raw information. This can be a
daunting task, but professional intelligence analysts are not confronted by
the range of conflicting goals and needs that a political leader must face.
Moreover, political leaders must make irrevocable decisions in the face
of uncertainty, and these decisions are usually made public. In making these
decisions they often confront painful trade-offs, and must chose among
them. Intelligence officials, on the other hand, do not confront such tradeoffs, and do not have to make binding public decisions. Their responsibility
is to pass on their assessments to those who make policy decisions. Thus,
intelligence analysts should be less likely to experience the anxiety that
accompanies making painful trade-offs under conditions of uncertainty. Of
course, if intelligence analysts are operating in a politicized environment, in
which certain interpretations of the data are politically unacceptable, then
they might also be inclined to commit motivated errors. The trade-off
between intellectual honesty and keeping one's job can certainly induce
anxiety. But there is little evidence of this dynamic in the case of the Cuban
missile crisis.
A final reason why political leaders might be more inclined to commit
motivated errors is that leaders are primarily responsible for policy
outcomes. The public will hold the political leaders primarily accountable
for policy failures. If political leaders act on the basis of faulty intelligence,
then intelligence officers might suffer some of the consequences of failed
policy. But even then, intelligence officers - even in a relatively open
society such as the United States - are typically spared some degree of
public scrutiny and accountability. Although there were several bodies that
investigated the performance of US intelligence after the missile crisis, such
scrutiny is rare and far more diffuse than the sort of scrutiny a political
leader must face.
This study also underscores the critical role that political leaders play in
intelligence analysis. Political leaders can influence the process of
intelligence analysis, either by establishing intelligence priorities, or by
including or excluding intelligence officials from foreign policy making.
Political leaders can also influence the content of intelligence analyses, by
pressuring intelligence agencies to treat their assumptions as fact, as Castro
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
169
did, or by intimidating intelligence officers so that they refrain from offering
independent analyses, as Khrushchev did. The lesson here is that even if an
intelligence agency performs well, its assessments may be ignored if
political leaders are not receptive to discrepant information.
Finally, this study has found that misperceptions can have a variety of
sources. In some instances assessments were strongly shaped by methods of
processing information. For example, Castro may have believed that a US
invasion was imminent because he engaged in theory-driven thinking, and
he failed to consider evidence that such an attack was not forthcoming. On
the other hand, Cuban intelligence concluded that Washington would not
attack, based on its reading of a variety of data (including data from Soviet
and East European sources). Castro and Cuban intelligence reached
different conclusions because of the different ways in which they processed
information. Other errors reflect, or were made possible by, limitations on
information. The CIA had no inside view on Kremlin decision making of
the kind that would have made it easier for American analysts to modify
strongly-held beliefs about Soviet motives and dispositions. Likewise,
Soviet officials had little hard information on the basis of which to pin a
reliable estimate of the likelihood of a US invasion of Cuba, or of
Kennedy's probable response to the discovery of the deployment.
Political pressures also undermined accuracy. Fearful of being punished
for advancing views that were at odds with the Kremlin's, Soviet intelligence
engaged in self-censorship. Rather than engaging in analysis, intelligence
officials presented Khrushchev with raw data, and allowed him to draw his
own conclusions. Such practices allowed Khrushchev to remain wedded to
his previously-developed views. Similarly, Castro sought to impose his views
on the Cuban intelligence community. In those instances when Cuban
intelligence chose to challenge Castro, the Cuban leader dismissed his
officials' assessments. In short, operational and technical limitations,
organizational and bureaucratic dynamics, and political pressures can all
combine to increase the likelihood of cognitive or motivated errors.
The accuracy and usefulness of intelligence can be improved, therefore,
through organizational and procedural changes that reduce political
pressures on analysts, and that address pathological organizational or
bureaucratic dynamics. But the accuracy and usefulness of intelligence can
only be improved so far. Cognitive and motivational psychology helps us
see that there is a performance limit to intelligence assessment.
Misperceptions that result from perfectly normal cognitive processes and
psychological needs are, for analysts and policy makers alike, a professional
hazard. In their conclusion to the volume, the editors reflect upon various
ways of coping with them; I hope to have shown, however, that they can
never be eliminated.
170
INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
NOTES
1. On perception and international relations see, among others, Ole R. Holsti, 'Cognitive
Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and Russia', in David Finlay, Ole Holsti and
Richard Fagen (eds) Enemies in Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally 1967) pp.25-96; Robert
C. North, 'Perception and Action in the 1914 Crisis', in John C. Farrell and Asa P. Smith
(eds) Image and Reality in World Politics (NY: Columbia UP 1968) pp. 103-22; and Robert
Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton UP 1976).
2. While these are not the only judgments psychological models of decision making can
illumine, they are, arguably, three of the most important.
3. Broadly speaking, there are two critical steps in intelligence analysis. The first step is the
collection and analysis of raw data obtained by technical means, human sources, and open
and covert sources; the second is the sifting and interpretation of data to determine its
meaning and significance. At each step there is the potential for error. Incorrect assessments
can stem from one or more of seven factors: (1) lack of information; (2) too much
information (such that an intelligence agency or the political leadership is unable to process
the available information); (3) erroneous information; (4) contradictory information; (5)
misinterpretation of correct information; (6) fragmentation of information (a situation in
which information is divided among bureaucracies in such a way that it undermines the
ability to piece it all together); and (7) politicization which precludes certain interpretations
of the information. While in this essay I discuss most of these sources of error, I focus on the
psychological processes that can lead intelligence analysts and political leaders to
misinterpret correct data. However, cognitive and motivated biases can influence the amount
and quality of information intelligence agencies collect, as well as the particular sources
upon which they rely.
4. Irving L. Janis and Leon Mann, Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict,
Choice, and Commitment (NY: Free Press 1977); Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and
War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins UP 1981); and
Janice Gross Stein and David A. Welch, 'Rational and Psychological Approaches to the
Study of International Conflict: Comparative Strengths and Weaknesses', in Alex Mintz and
Nehemia Geva (eds) Decision-Making on War and Peace: The Cognitive-Rational Debate
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner 1997) pp.51-77.
5. Lebow, Between Peace and War (note 4) p. 107.
6. Janis and Mann, Decision Making (note 4) pp.74-95; and Lebow, Between Peace and War
(note 4) pp. 110-15.
7. Shelley T. Fiske and Susan E. Taylor, Social Cognition, 2nd ed. (NY: McGraw-Hill 1991).
8. Ibid. pp.257-65.
9. E. Tory Higgins, William S. Rholes, and Carl R. Jones, 'Category Accessibility and
Impression Formation', Journal of Experimental Social Psychology \"il2 (March 1977)
pp.141-54.
10. Lebow, Between Peace and War (note 4) p. 111.
11. Ibid. p.112.
12. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (Princeton UP 1994),
pp.20-7.
13. See Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, in this volume.
14. Ibid.
15. Domingo Amuchastegui, in this volume.
16. Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (note 12), p.29; Nikita S. Khrushchev,
Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, trans, and ed. Jerrold L. Schecter, with
Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown 1990) p. 170.
17. See Amuchastegui, in this volume.
18. Domingo Amuchastegui, personal communication. See also p.114, note 26, above.
19. Cf. James G. Blight and David A. Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine
the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (NY: Noonday 1990); Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections
on the Cuban Missile Crisis, rev. ed. (Washington DC: Brookings 1989); and Lebow and
Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (note 12). Lebow and Stein contend that domestic political
PERCEPTION AND INTELLIGENCE ERRORS
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
171
considerations also played a role.
See Raymond Garthoff, in this volume.
Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (note 12) p.85.
See Amuchastegui, in this volume.
See Garthoff, in this volume.
Another way to account for this failure is to invoke another common cognitive phenomenon:
the fundamental attribution error. This term describes the natural tendency to explain the
actions we dislike of people we dislike in terms of their personalities and dispositions (e.g.,
'they are evil', 'they are inherently aggressive', 'they are selfish'), and to explain the actions
we dislike of people we like - or our own actions - in terms of situational constraints
('they/we had no choice'; 'they/we were forced into it'). Lee Ross, 'The Intuitive
Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process', in L. Berkowitz
(ed.) Advances in Experimental and Social Psychology, Vol.10 (NY: Academic Press 1977)
pp. 174-7; and Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition (note 7) pp.67-75. American officials may
have misjudged Soviet motivations because of their tendency to interpret Soviet behavior in
terms of dispositional factors rather than situational constraints.
It is natural to assume that others are free to choose how to act, and that their behavior
therefore reflects basic personality characteristics. We discount or ignore the role that
political pressures, social norms, financial limitations, and other constraints may play in
determining their actions. For example, when the Soviet Union shot down a Korean airliner
in Sept. 1983, the Reagan administration concluded that the incident reflected the Soviets'
'barbarism' and disregard for human life. US officials attributed the disaster to their
understanding of the Soviets' disposition. They downplayed or ignored information that the
Soviets had been unable to make contact with and correctly identify an aircraft that had
invaded their airspace over a militarily sensitive region, and that the shoot-down reflected
more poorly on Soviet organizational and technical capacities than on Soviet behavioral
proclivities. See Ronald Reagan, 'US Measures in Response to the Soviets' Korean Airline
Massacre', 5 Sept. 1983, in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1983
(Washington DC: GPO, 1983), pp.545-6; Seymour Hersh, The Target Is Destroyed (NY:
Random House 1986); and Richard Witkin, 'Downing of KAL 007 Laid to Russian Error',
New York Times, 16 June 1993.
People tend to have a positive self-image, and to process and recall positive information
about themselves most easily. There is a tendency to resist acknowledging or recalling
negative information about oneself, and to ignore or discount information that challenges
one's positive self-image. See Fiske and Taylor, Social Cognition (note 7), pp. 180-242. On
the difficulty in perceiving that others may consider one a threat, see Jervis, Perception and
Misperception (note 1) pp.354-5.
See Garthoff, in this volume.
See, e.g., Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy (U.
of Chicago Press 1966); Blight and Welch, On the Brink (note 19), pp.233-5, 252, 270;
Edward Crankshaw, Khrushchev: A Career (NY: Viking 1966) pp. 280-3.
On 21 Oct. 1961, US Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric gave a speech in Hot
Springs, VA, publicly revealing that the United States knew that the Soviet Union had far less
strategic nuclear capability than the Kremlin had claimed, and far less also than the United
States.
Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, 'Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions under
Risk', Econometrica 47/2 (March 1979) pp.263-91; and Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, 'Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions', Journal of Business 59/4 (1986)
pp.S251-S277.
See Domingo Amuchastegui, in this volume.
Raymond Garthoff's report that CIA operatives correctly gauged the size of the deployment,
only to have their estimate dismissed by analysts, lends credence to this view.
The tendency to engage in theory-driven thinking may have been bolstered by the fact that
the United States had little information on decision making within the Kremlin. Intelligence
information came primarily from technical sources rather than from human sources.
Consequently, US analysts knew far more about Soviet capabilities than Soviet intentions. It
172
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
INTELLIGENCE AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
was well nigh impossible for the CIA to engage in data-driven information processing with
respect to Khrushchev's motives.
Ibid.; James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, The
Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse (NY: Pantheon 1993); and Lebow and Stein, We All
Lost the Cold War (note 12) p. 75.
Amuchastegui, in this volume.
Some testimony suggests that Castro must have been aware of the danger that a nuclear
deployment might precipitate an American attack, and that Khrushchev, much more than
Castro, avoided confronting this possibility. See note 41, below.
Amuchastegui, in this volume.
For example, see Elie Abel, The Missile Crisis (Philadelphia: Lippincott 1966); Arnold L.
Horelick, 'The Cuban Missile Crisis: An Analysis of Soviet Calculations and Behavior',
World Politics 16/3 (April 1964) pp.363-89.
For more detail on Khrushchev's motivations see Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War
(note 12) pp.67-93.
Such doubts about Soviet intelligence capabilities would not have been entirely unfounded.
For example, Soviet signals intelligence suggested that the United States was preparing for
some sort of initiative during the third week in October, but intelligence agencies were
unable determine the nature of the response. The GRU suggested that Washington might be
planning some sort of military action, yet political reports from the United States suggested
that Kennedy would accept the missile deployment. Moreover, intelligence officers were
unable to warn the Presidium in advance that Kennedy planned to impose a blockade. See
Fursenko and Naftali, in this volume.
Lebow and Stein, We All Lost the Cold War (note 12) p.75. On the other hand, after the
deployment had begun, Castro stepped up his warnings about a possible US invasion. On 26
Oct. the Cuban leader informed intelligence officials that a confrontation with the Americans
was imminent. Cuban intelligence had no independent information to verify this warning, but
was obliged to treat it as a fact. See Amuchastegui, in this volume.
In late summer 1962, as the US Congress and the American media became increasingly
alarmist about Soviet military shipments to Cuba, a Cuban delegation led by Ernesto 'Che'
Guevara and Emilio Aragones traveled to Moscow and proposed to Khrushchev that the two
countries make the deployment public, stressing its legality, so as to forestall a hostile
American response. Khrushchev blithely dismissed their concerns: According to Aragones,
'[H]e said to Che and me, with [Minister of Defense Rodion] Malinovsky in the room, "You
don't have to worry; there will be no big reaction from the US. And if there is a problem, we
will send the Baltic Fleet" ... He was totally serious. When he said it, Che and I looked at
each other with raised eyebrows.' Quoted in Blight and Welch, On the Brink (note 19) p.334.