Religion and Politics in Ukraine
Religion and Politics in Ukraine:
The Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches
as Elements of Ukraine’s Political System
By
Michał Wawrzonek
Religion and Politics in Ukraine:
The Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches as Elements of Ukraine’s Political System,
by Michał Wawrzonek
This book first published 2014
Cambridge Scholars Publishing
12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Copyright © 2014 by Michał Wawrzonek
All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or
otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.
ISBN (10): 1-4438-6619-9, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-6619-4
In Commemoration of the Heavenly Hundred
“Allow not the strong to oppress the people.”
(Grand Prince Volodymyr Monomakh’s Instruction to His Children)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword .................................................................................................... ix
Introduction ................................................................................................. 1
Part I: Factors Determining the Place of Religion in Contemporary
Ukrainian Social and Political Life
Chapter One ................................................................................................. 8
Religion as One of the Subsystems of Modern Society in Ukraine
Chapter Two .............................................................................................. 27
The Political System in Ukraine
Chapter Three ............................................................................................ 57
Factors Determining Inarticulate Knowledge
Conclusions: Part I .................................................................................. 108
Part II: The Orthodox and Ukrainian Greek Catholic Churches
in Contemporary Ukrainian Social and Political Reality
Chapter Four ............................................................................................ 114
Relations between the Orthodox Church and State Authorities:
Experiences from the Soviet Period
Chapter Five ............................................................................................ 133
Religious Revival in Ukraine and the Process of its Institutionalization
(1989-1992)
Chapter Six .............................................................................................. 165
Eastern Christian Communities in Ukraine under Post-Communist
Realities
Conclusions: Part II ................................................................................. 197
viii
Table of Contents
Summary ................................................................................................. 206
Bibliography in Latin Alphabet ............................................................... 210
Bibliography in Cyrillic Alphabet ........................................................... 218
Index ........................................................................................................ 230
FOREWORD
The work on the substantive contents of the book was completed in
mid-2013. That is why the breaking events of the transformation which
resulted in Victor Yanukovych’s removal from power from 2013 to 2014
were not analyzed. However, it seems that the book’s constructed model
of Ukraine’s political system can help us to positively understand the
essence of these events. The Churches, both Orthodox and Catholic, also
took an active part in this. Once again, we have become convinced that
Ukraine’s political and religious spheres are quite strongly related to each
other. This book also ought to help us identify these bonds as well as our
attempts to clarify their origins. Naturally, it would be difficult to claim
that we have exhausted this topic.
I would like to thank all the people and institutions who, in their
various ways, contributed to the creation of this publication. The National
Science Centre funded the research and publication of this book (decision
number: DEC-2011/01/B/HS5/00911). Prof. Włodzimierz Mokry, my
director, did everything he could to ensure that I had efficient working
conditions, and his substantive suggestions proved to be extremely
valuable. I also thank Prof. Włodzimierz Marciniak for his helpful
comments. It should also be noted that Artur Wołek inspired me to study
the focal point between religion and politics in the post-Soviet region. I
thank Justyna Jawor for her help in handling the administrative side of the
project, Maciej Olchawa for his support during the preparation of the grant
application to the National Science Centre, Iryna Sklokina, Gelinada
Hrinczenko, Roman Sen’kus, Oksana Rybak and the Basillian Fathers of
St. Basil the Great in Kiev for their help in organizing trips to Lviv, Kiev,
Kharkiv and Rome.
Special thanks to my dear Kasia, Marta, Piotrek and Joasia, and to my
Parents, since it is also thanks to you and for you that I wrote this book!
INTRODUCTION
In previous studies, the problems of the functioning of religion in
Ukraine and, more broadly - in the former Soviet Union - were considered
from different research perspectives: sociological, historical, cultural studies,
law and theology.1 Yet we lack a comprehensive and interdisciplinary
analysis of the meaning and the roles which religion in general and
Christianity in particular play in the social and political life of post-Soviet
Ukraine. Research efforts that have been undertaken in this area –
although very valuable – have not yielded conclusive answers to many
1
The most important works on the topics of interest to us include: Державноцерковні відносини: світовий досвід і Україна (історико-політичний аналіз),
І. І. Тимошенко (ed.), Київ: Видавництво Європейського Університету, 2002;
Християнство доби постмодерну, Анатолій Колодний (ed.), Київ: ІФ НАНУ,
2005; Володимир Пащенко, Православ΄я в новітній історії України, Полтава
2001; Катерина Паньо, Мотиви та наслідки втручання влади у
міжконфесійне протистояння в Україні : (українські церкви та релігійна
свобода на межі століть), Київ, 2004; Степан Боруцький, Держава, церква,
людина: державно-церковні та міжконфесійні відносини у дзеркалі
сучасноті, 1992-2002 рр, Львів: Афіша, 2002; Віктор Єленський, Релігія після
комунізму: релігійно-соціальні зміни в процесі трансформації центрально- і
східноєвропейських суспільств : фокус на Україні, Київ: НПУ ім. М. П.
Драгоманова, 2002; Стосунки між Церквою і державою : протистояння,
‘стіна розмежування’ чи співпраця? : Матеріали студентської науковопрактичної конференції, М. Маринович (ed.), Львів: ЛБА (Інститут релігії та
суспільства), 1998; Віра після атеізму: релігійне життя в Україні в період
демократичних перетворень і державної незалежности, Міклош Томка,
Олег Турій (ed.), Львів: Вид-во УКУ 2004; Андрій Пашук, Українська церква
і назалежність України, Львів: Видавничий центр ЛНУ імені Івана Франка,
2003; Myroslav Marynovych, An Ecumenist Analyzes the History and Prospects of
Religion in Ukraine, Lviv: Ukrainian Catholic University Press 2004; Serhii
Plokhy, Frank Sysyn, Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine, EdmontonToronto: CIUS Press, 2003; Church – State Relations in Central and Eastern
Europe, Irena Borowik (ed.), Kraków: Nomos, 1999; Irena Borowik,
Odbudowywanie pamięci. Przemiany religijne w Środkowo-Wschodniej Europie
po upadku komunizmu, Kraków: Nomos, 2000; Religie i Kościoły w społeczeństwie
postkomunistycznym, Irena Borowik, Andrzej Szyjewski (ed.), Kraków: Nomos,
1993.
2
Introduction
questions. Sometimes these answers, or the very approach to the topic
were subject to a significant degree of the researcher’s subjectivity. In
addition, we need to be aware that following Western concepts and
methodological assumptions about the function that religion plays in
society can limit the effectiveness of studies. We must note that the
research tools used, meaning the phenomena that were the subject of
analysis, and the ways to conceptualize them were adapted to Western
conditions under which the model of the relationship between religion
(church) and society (state) was shaped and evolved.2 Attempts to directly
and mechanically apply these to Eastern Christian, post-Soviet reality in
many cases cannot produce satisfactory results, and sometimes can even
ensure that very dubious conclusions are reached. This in turn seriously
affects the ability to assess the place and function of the Orthodox and the
Greek Catholic Churches in the political system of Ukraine.
An important factor that determines the possibility of the influence of
religion and related institutions on social life is developed in this case in
the model of church-state relations. In Ukraine, this model is constantly
evolving. This is a result of the fact that the main actors are subject to
rapid changes.
In the case of Ukrainian society, we should first note that in the last 20
years, a number of essential elements that constitute or affected her
operation have been subject to far-reaching changes. This concerns such
issues as the ways of legitimizing authority, the regimes in power, the
development of the modern elite, the structuring of society, changes in
Ukraine’s national identity and political culture and changes in the
external environment. All these have a direct or indirect impact on the way
the Ukrainian political system works and the conditions under which
religion and religious organizations function in the social and public
spheres.
The “other side” has also undergone equally significant changes –
meaning the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches. With regard to the
Orthodox Church, we should first note that the process of
institutionalization still has not been completed. It runs a very lively,
sometimes even dramatic, course. Issues concerning the final shape of the
Orthodox Church’s structures, internal organization and orientation of
culture and civilization in Ukraine still remain open. The same is true of
the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. It is experiencing a time of dynamic
recovery after the “catacomb” period. She is fighting to get out of the
2
See for example: Patrick Michel, Polityka i religia. Wielka przemiana, Kraków:
Nomos, 2000; Peter Ludwig Berger, The Sacred Canopy. Elements of a
Sociological Theory of Religion, New York: The Anchor Books, 1969;
Religion and Politics in Ukraine
3
“Galician ghetto,” to break away from the status of a regional church and
fulfill the aspiration to become an All-Ukrainian community. It is also
worth noting that this Church has her own specific history, and carries a
burden of experience in relations with state authorities.
In relation to the undertaken subject, we should also raise the question
of the status of religion as such in the modern world. One has to wonder
what in this respect is contained in the specificity of the former Soviet
Union’s sphere. What role can religion meet today in this region? How,
and to what extent are the relationships between the religious and social
spheres, between the church and state in Ukraine determined by the period
of Soviet atheism? What are the consequences of its involvement in the
recent Soviet past and current post-communist present?
The Ukrainian state in her institutional form is a very young structure.
Therefore, due to this, the unique Ukrainian experiences in the field of
church-state relations are very insignificant. However, the sense of
individuality and self-identity in Ukraine has centuries-old roots. It can be
theorized that one of the characteristics of the political culture, which for
centuries has distinguished Ukrainian lands not only from other Eastern
Slavic areas but also the entire European continent, was the spirit of
religious tolerance that formed within the multi-ethnic and multi-faith
cultural borderland. In the past, it was in the Ukrainian lands that the Kiev
Orthodox Church had to develop in her own way a new model of relations
with the state. In Eastern Christianity, the Byzantine formula of
“symphony” was created and enforced, so it was closer to a symbiosis.3 In
modern times, the Moscow Orthodox Church has been fully subordinated
to the state, and has truly become a part of it.4 However, the specificity of
the Kiev Orthodox Church is based on the fact that it had to function
independently at least in relation to the secular power, and often in
opposition to it.5
3
More on this topic: F. Dvornik, Byzantium, Muscovite Autocracy and the Church,
in: Re-discovering Eastern Christendom, edited by A. Armstrong, E. Fry, London:
Darton, Longman & Todd, 1963, F. Rouleaux, Rome et Byzance aujourd’hui [in:]
« Géopolitique », No. 35, 1991; Marie-Hélène Congourdeau, L’empereur et le
patriarche dans l’empire byzantine, in: « Istina », No. 1, 2005; Peter Arnott, The
Byzantines and Their Word, London: Macmillan, 1973.
4
А. Н. Кашеваров, Православная Российская Церков и Совєтскоє
государство (1917-1922), Москва: Изд-во Крутицкого подворья, 2005, pp. 6685; Hyacinthe Destivelle, Le Concile de Moscou (1917-1918). La création des
institutions conciliares de l’Eglise orthodoxe russe, Paris: Cerf, 2006.
5
More on this topic, i.e.: A. Naumow, Domus divisa. Studia nad literaturą ruską I
Rzeczypospolitej, Kraków: Collegium Columbinum, 2002, pp. 63-77, F. Sysyn,
The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and
4
Introduction
One of the causes of the current divisions in the Ukrainian Orthodox
Church is an attempt to revitalize and restore the specific Kiev Orthodox
traditions. Potentially, this can be a source of genuine autonomy in the
religious sphere of social and political life, including the independence and
empowerment of the Orthodox Church in relation to the state. The lack of
this autonomy is constantly being felt, and no doubt this is one of the
consequences of the Soviet period. In addition, encoded within the
inheritance of the traditions of the Orthodox Church of Kiev is the attitude
of openness towards the Western European cultural circle and the ability
to synthesize these elements with the native Ukrainian, Eastern Christian
foundations. Thanks to this heritage, the inheritance could be an important
catalyst for the process of social pluralism, and the democratization
(poliarchization) of the local political system in Ukraine.
According to Peter Berger we should single out “three moments, or
steps” in social world-construction. These are “externalization, objectivation,
and internalization”6. Externalization is “the ongoing outpouring of human
beings into the world, both in the physical and the mental activity of men”;
objectivation is “the attainment by the products of this activity (again both
physical and mental) of a reality that confronts its original producers as a
facticity external to and other than themselves”; and internalization is “the
reappropriation by men of this same reality, transforming it once again
from structures of the objective world into structures of the subjective
consciousness”. According to Berger, to maintain “an empirically
adequate view of society” all these elements must be “understood
together”7.
Social order is based on “institutions, roles, and identities”. They are
“objectively real phenomena” and at the same they are “nothing but
human productions”8. In this context we have to underline the crucial
significance of legitimization. Legitimacy is “socially objectified knowledge,
which serves to clarify and justify the social order.”9 As Berger pointed
out, “all institutions possess the character of objectivity and their
legitimations, whatever content these may have must continuously
undergird this objectivity. The religious legitimization however, ground
Seventeenth Centuries, in: Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine, edited by S.
Plokhy and F. Sysyn, Edmonton-Toronto: CIUS Press, 2003, pp. 1-23.
6
P.L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy…, p. 4.
7
P.L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy…, p. 4.
8
P.L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy…, p. 13.
9
P.L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy…, p. 29.
Religion and Politics in Ukraine
5
the socially defined reality of the institutions in the ultimate reality of the
universe, in reality as such”10.
As we can easily notice, in Ukraine we are dealing with relatively new
state and social institutions. The social and political reality in Ukraine as
well as throughout the entire post-Soviet space is quite fluid. Among other
things, this is because they are still in the processes of the
institutionalization and legitimization of the new order after the collapse of
the Soviet Union. As it turns out, the Orthodox and Greek-Catholic
Churches in Ukraine are, or have the potential to be, active participants.
10
P.L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy…, p. 36.
PART I:
FACTORS DETERMINING THE PLACE
OF RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY
UKRAINIAN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL LIFE
CHAPTER ONE
RELIGION AS ONE OF THE SUBSYSTEMS
OF MODERN SOCIETY IN UKRAINE
While investigating the perspectives of the influence of religion on
social and political life in contemporary Ukraine, some initial assumptions
concerning the notion of society need to be made. Society will be treated first of all - as “a system of social communication in a very broad sense of
the word”.1 The limits of society are where communication ceases, i.e.
where the opportunities for communication become rare and restricted.2 In
addition, the suggestion of perceiving society as a set of interconnected
subsystems seems very inspiring.
According to our understanding, the religious sphere comprises one
such subsystem. When speaking of the religious sphere, we understand
that it is a sphere of social communication whose center is a religious
community. The Orthodox Church and the Greek Catholic Church play a
key role in the case of Ukraine. On the one hand, these are institutions
functioning in the religious sphere. On the other hand, we must stress that
they strive to be treated, as José Casanova describes, as a symbolical,
sacramental representation of supernatural realities in an empirical world3.
Such tension between the natural and the supernatural realities in
conjunction with the symbolic sphere on the essential meaning of the
definition of the cultural and civilizational identity of Ukraine comprises
the specifics of the religious sphere as a social subsystem and the character
of its ties with other subsystems – including the political.
According to a quite well-established viewpoint, it is possible to use
two basic paradigms which can determine the place of a given subsystem
in the hierarchy. The first, traditional one makes this place dependent on
the social position, the stratum to which a particular activity has been
1
Peter F. Beyer, Religion and Globalization, London: Sage Publications, 1994, p.
33.
2
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 33.
3
José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World, Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 14.
Religion as One of the Subsystems of Modern Society in Ukraine
9
attributed. This paradigm gave rise to the model of a stratified society,
whose most characteristic feature is a clear domination of “the upper,
ruling strata”.4 These strata not only control the most important
subsystems, but they also define the actual limits of society using their
communication skills.5 According to Peter Beyer, such a model is
characteristic of pre-modern societies.
The second paradigm which determines the place of a given subsystem
in society assumes that the structural axis no longer belongs to centrally
positioned status groups. In the new system, the whole becomes subject to
other, functionally rationalized objectives which determine the methods of
action of various institutional spheres.6 In this case, the division into social
strata is replaced with a range of subsystems which can be distinguished
by means of the functional paradigm. These subsystems are: legal,
political, economic, scientific, religious etc. The distinguishing criterion
for them is a specific method of communication which they use and which
has a systemic character.7 In other words, their distinctness is based on the
method of communication which functions according to the grammar
specifics and characteristics of a given subsystem. Additionally, in this
paradigm, each subsystem, on the one hand, possesses real autonomy, and
on the other, is dependent on the fact that other systems are at work. That
is to say, these subsystems are autonomous, but conditioned.8 From our
point of view, it is especially significant that the key functional subsystems
include politics and religion.
For Beyer, society constructed in such a way is called modern.
Therefore, his proposed paradigm of thinking about society also implies a
way of understanding modernity. According to this view, the hierarchical
model of society is anachronistic and belongs to pre-modernity. It is
supposed to gradually disappear and be replaced by the functional model
which is a natural consequence of the process of modernization.
It must be noted, however, that if we are going to analyze social
realities in Ukraine by closely following the ideas put forward by Peter
Beyer, we will reach the conclusion that it is both pre-modern and modern
at the same time. Undoubtedly, it is traditionally stratified, if only on
account of the clan-oligarchic connections. Increasingly, regions began to
4
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 35.
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 35.
6
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 35.
7
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 67.
8
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 79.
5
10
Chapter One
resemble feudal fiefdoms where the local lords were left to run society and
the economy as long as they remained loyal to the center (i.e., Kiev9).
Oligarchic clans operate at the meeting point of a few subsystems –
most of all, politics, law and economy. Most importantly, they
considerably limit the inner autonomy of the above subsystems. It also
turns out that the religious sphere is vulnerable to their influence. The
analysis of conflicts and divisions within the Ukrainian Orthodox Church
allows one to realize how fragile the autonomy of the religious sphere is in
relation to other subsystems. It especially concerns politics and business.
This issue is discussed in detail in later parts of this book.
At the same time, Ukrainian society begins to take on features which –
following Beyer’s train of thought – could be considered symptoms of
modernity. That is, there begin to crystallize the bases for structurization
according to the functional paradigm, such as civic society or the free
circulation of information. Of course, this process is quite slow and
fraught with great difficulties. In this context, the case of religion looks
especially interesting. It seems that, despite the above reservations,
religion in Ukraine is the subsystem which – in comparison to others – is
based on the rules which, according to Beyer, could be called modern. Its
autonomy with regard to other subsystems – at least potentially – is quite
clearly defined, and its inner construction is based on the principle of
pluralism. This is especially evident in the example of Eastern Christianity
and the Orthodox Church, which are at present its representatives in
Ukraine.
For our purposes, it is enough to state that in the social structure of
Ukraine, there are symptoms of what Beyer calls anachronism as well as
modernity. In other words, the Ukrainian social reality is stratified because
of various status groups, while at the same time, instrumental functional
subsystems crystallize. Presently, however, it is hard to conclude whether
the autonomy of the latter will turn out to be powerful enough to neutralize
the unusually strong position of the status groups (this especially concerns
oligarchic structures). Even if this is going to happen, it is difficult to say
when it will take place. Nonetheless, many signals suggest that the
Ukrainian social reality will retain its dual nature for the foreseeable
future. This is just one of the reasons why Beyer’s concept of modernity
should be considered not entirely adequate in relation to contemporary
social changes in Ukraine.
9
Hans van Zon, Political culture and Neo-Patrimonialism under Leonid Kuchma
in: “Problems of Post-Communism”, Vol. 52, No. 5, September/October 2005, p.
15.
Religion as One of the Subsystems of Modern Society in Ukraine
11
The imperfections of the concept are especially noticeable with regard
to religion and the way it functions in Ukrainian society. If we assume that
social changes in Ukraine are the effect of modernization, which results
from certain global regularities, it should be expected that the social,
public role of religion will become marginalized. This is because, from the
perspective proposed by Peter Beyer, religion “is a mode of relating to the
world that thrives in traditional, especially segmented societies, and not in
modern, instrumentally-dominated society”10. In accord with this view, if
this way of relating to the world does not change, the bonds that enable
religion to communicate with other social subsystems will be weakened
and broken. As a result, religion would cease to exert influence on these
subsystems, including politics.
However, an analysis of the situation in Ukraine leads to the
conclusion that the bonds between religion and politics and, on a broader
scale, between religion and the public sphere in Ukraine are far from
becoming extinct. What is more, they have even strengthened and
intensified in certain areas. Interestingly, this also concerns such issues as
support for the process of democratization and building civic society or the
defense of pluralism in social and political life. This was observable, for
instance, in the events of the so-called “Orange Revolution” of 2004;
another issue which will be discussed in more detail later on in this book.
According to Beyer’s concept, moral norms and rules form the link
between the religious subsystem and social problems.11 For this mediation
to be effective, there must be social structures which consider morality a
privileged form of social regulation.12 He states that these structures are
characteristic of pre-modern societies – that is, stratified and hierarchical –
built on the basis of community formations or based on group solidarity.13
However, in the period of modernity, the image of the devil becomes
increasingly blurred, and religion – with its traditional understanding of
morality in terms of good and evil – has become anachronistic. Beyer
explains that the structural changes and globalization of modern societies
make it harder today “to personify evil” and identify it with its obvious
social counterpart.14 And that is why, according to the Canadian
researcher, businessmen in pursuit of profit have no regard for moral
norms, politicians do everything to achieve power and scientists trivialize
moral dilemmas which could hamper new discoveries.
10
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 67.
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 81.
12
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 81.
13
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 81.
14
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 86.
11
12
Chapter One
At this point, it is worth focusing on two things. First, Beyer’s
examples are not so much proof for the lack of any norms whatsoever, but
for the omnipotence of one fundamental norm: “the end justifies the
means.” Second, these phenomena are nothing new. At least in the field of
politics, they had been thoroughly discussed long before the beginning of
the epoch which Beyer calls modernity. Additionally, the question remains
as to whether such subsystems as economy or politics are able to function
in a situation with an absolute lack of any common moral norms, at least
within the limits of a given subsystem. For it is possible to imagine a
situation in which such a normative vacuum becomes dysfunctional, and
there begins to be an increased demand for the subsystem which will not
only supply these norms but also help in their internalization. And then
religion may again turn out to be necessary and useful. This is especially
because, as Patrick Michel notes, so far “politics has turned out to be
incapable of supplying the language which would be able to debate the
issue of sense so clearly and explicitly that it would have an influence on
reality.”15 We should note in passing that the French researcher is also
skeptical about the possibility that religion can exert an effective influence
on politics in the contemporary world. However, it seems that until now –
at least in the case of Ukraine – politics and “the issue of sense” are quite
strongly bound with each other. This, in effect, ensures that the problem of
mutual relations between religion and politics maintains its relevance.
Undoubtedly, from the very beginning of Ukraine’s independence, the
spheres of politics and broadly defined public life have functioned
according to rules which have little in common with what Peter Beyer
calls traditional morality. But they have equally little in common with the
regulations which are in force in societies generally considered modern. It
is quite usual to connect a perceptible tendency to abandon the truths of
Faith with the consequences of the process of individualization. Patrick
Michel even concludes that “never before was identity so individualized as
today.”16 In his view, which seems to correspond quite neatly with Beyer’s
views, modernity, which manifests itself in democracy, “means the end of
the epoch of purposefulness.”17 After this, the epoch of relativity based on
authentic pluralism began. Indeed, in Ukraine, the traditional system of
values and moral norms has fallen into severe decay. It should be noted,
however, that in this case it was not the result of functional problems of
religion in modern society and especially not the result of the ongoing
15
Patrick Michel, Religia i polityka. Wielka przemiana, Kraków: Nomos, 2000, p.
18.
16
P. Michel, Religia i polityka…, p. 96.
17
P. Michel, Religia i polityka…, p. 100.
Religion as One of the Subsystems of Modern Society in Ukraine
13
pluralization of Ukrainian society. Quite the opposite: it is a legacy of the
Soviet epoch. Its essence was the total omnipotence of the state, which not
so much stimulated certain transformations inside society but replaced it,
“sucked in” its structure, assimilating it fully.18 Autonomy in relation to
the state – both on the individual and group level – was practically
extinguished. Any of its manifestations in the strongly centralized Soviet
system were treated as subversive, anti-systemic tendencies. The Soviet
model of society was based on the greatest possible unification and
connection of all the spheres of social reality, which in Europe became the
basis for autonomous functional subsystems. “The Soviet man” formed in
such conditions displayed a total outer containment. In his model form, he
was to represent a kind of completely unreflective “ideal executor” who
needed “outside impulses even to fulfill the simplest life functions.”19
Eric Voegelin states that political society can function as “an acting
unit in history” on the condition that it possesses a system of “beliefs” that
unify it.20 Losing those leads to the disintegration of the social community.
The circumstance which accelerates and deepens destructive processes is
the loss of links with tradition and paralysis, which are the result of the
extermination or persecution of intellectual and political elites.21
It ought to be emphasized that in the case of Ukrainian identity the
sense of one’s own distinctness, this system of unifying faiths, evolved
from traditional and organic relations with the European civilization. This
also concerns the way in which social reality functioned and the position
that religion and the Orthodox Church had within it. From the tradition of
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth emerged the rule of this sphere’s
autonomy as – to use Beyer’s terminology – a separate subsystem. This
tradition, however, was already effaced in the pre-Revolutionary period.
But what proves that it has survived against all odds are attempts to restore
the original Kyiv-Mohylan tradition and the related struggle to establish a
separate Autocephalous Orthodox structure in Ukraine in the 1920’s.
These attempts were discontinued by the Soviet authorities. The expansion
of Bolshevism on Ukrainian lands was the most brutal and ruthless assault
to destroy the bonds which constituted Ukrainian community. As a result,
its existence as “a separate whole in history” was called in question.
18
The Political Analysis of Postcommunism, ed. V. Polokhalo, Kyiv: Political
Thought, 1995, [online] http://www.litopys.org.ua/polpost/ppe.htm.
19
Сергій Грабовський, „Совєтська людина” як культурно-антропологічний
тип, http://www.universum.lviv.ua/archive/book/2001/grab_2.html.
20
Eric Voegelin, The New Science of Politics. An Introduction, Chicago-London:
The University of Chicago Press, 1987, p. 31.
21
E. Voegelin, The New Science…, p. 31.
14
Chapter One
The dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of the independent
state of Ukraine stopped these destructive processes, but the consequences
could not automatically be reversed. Contact with tradition, which could
have cemented Ukrainian society, was to a large extent broken. That is
why the process of its inner reintegration was paralyzed at the very
beginning. The divisions inside the Ukrainian Orthodox Church illustrate
this issue very clearly. The significance of these divisions is not a result of
some essential discrepancies in terms of dogmatics; the truths of Faith.
The disputes and divisions are a consequence of controversies which
emerge at the meeting point of religion and other social subsystems,
especially politics. They refer to such issues as: the relationship to
Ukrainian independence, the place of religion and the Orthodox Church in
the Ukrainian political system, the form of Ukrainian identity and
geopolitical and civilizational orientations. It could be said that the
discussion which would enable Ukrainians to negotiate their own ways of
solving these dilemmas has only just begun. In addition, this is extremely
difficult and its results are not easy to predict because of the damage done
to the Ukrainian national psyche during the Soviet period.
The process which results in people forming themselves into a working
society is what Voegelin calls “the articulation of a society”.22 The
Orthodox Church and, more broadly, Eastern Christianity is one of those
“faiths” which potentially could unite Ukrainian society, and it is also one
of those factors that could positively stimulate the course of this society’s
articulation. As though through a lens, the divisions inside the Orthodox
Church accumulate the crucial problems which complicate the development
of this process. Their analysis should provide considerable aid in describing
the transformation of the contemporary social reality in Ukraine, including
its political elements.
Peter Beyer notices that in traditional, hierarchical societies which
consist of various communities, religion was an important factor in
determining the affiliation of an individual to a particular community. In
this structure, “the dominant status groups, in an effort to bolster and
express their control over a greater social diversity, usually attempted to
style their religion as definitive for the society as a whole, often in the
form of an overarching cosmology that made the norms and values of the
upper strata (...) the presumptive standard for all behaviour”23. In its
assumptions, Beyer’s diagnosis refers to societies which he called premodern. However, it is worth noticing that the above description perfectly
22
23
E. Voegelin, The New Science…, p. 37.
P. Beyer, Religion and…, p. 83.
Religion as One of the Subsystems of Modern Society in Ukraine
15
fits the Soviet model of society as well. Of course, we are talking about the
model realized in practice and not the one written down in the form of
empty declarations. Its key element was the class which possessed the
features of the dominating status group – i.e., the party’s nomenklatura.
The status of elitist religion was given to Marxism-Leninism.
Obviously, we are aware that such a definition may seem controversial.
Already in 1953, Hannah Arendt critically analyzed attempts to use the
term “political religion” in relation to communism. She believes that,
especially at the beginning, it was a kind of “rhetorical figure” employed
by some liberal supporters of communism who simply did not understand
what the Russian great new experiment was all about as well as by
disappointed communists disgusted at Stalin’s deification of Lenin’s
mortal remains and his dogmatization of Bolshevism.24
However, in the course of time, attempts to interpret the phenomenon
of communism in religious terms were made also on scientific grounds.
Arendt distinguishes here two trends: the “sociological” and “historical.”
The supporters of the former drew attention to the fact that in the
totalitarian system, communism had (or was supposed to have) the same
function as “common” religions in a free society. The author of The
Origins of Totalitarianism accuses the representatives of the sociologizing
movement of discussing such phenomena as ideology and dealing with
religion only by analyzing its functions in society. In her view, this leads
to far-fetched simplifications which ignored the most important element,
i.e., the essence of these phenomena.25
The above-mentioned historical trend was free from this error. This
approach treated communism as the most radical version of the immanentist
heresy.26 The supporters of this approach attempted to demonstrate the
religious nature of the ideology. Eric Voegelin was probably the most
distinguished representative of this approach. After an in-depth analysis of
Marxist ideology, he reached the conclusion that Marx realized that “he is
a god creating the world”,27 and his ideas in their original form were
imbued with pathos and eschatological heroism inspired by the vision of
paradise on earth.28
24
Hannah Arendt, Religion and Politics in: H. Arendt, Essays in understanding
1930-1954, Jerome Kohn (ed.), New York: Schocken Books, 1994, p. 372.
25
H. Arendt, Religion and Politics…, p. 374.
26
H. Arendt, Religion and Politics…, p. 372.
27
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution, Durham: Duke University
Press, 1982, p. 298.
28
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 242.
16
Chapter One
As befitted the religious system, Marxism acquired its meaning also
through creating a vision of salvation. But because, as Voegelin claims,
Marx’s soul “was demonically closed against transcendental reality”, he
looked for the sources of salvation in immanence.29 The mystery of human
existence was to be solved with the help of practical knowledge. This
knowledge was responsible for the technological inventions of humanity,
starting with the art of striking fire and finishing with the invention of the
steam engine. From the Marxist perspective, these inventions constituted
successive stages in discovering the mystery of human existence. Voegelin
explicitly claims that in Marxism “Christ the Redeemer is replaced by the
steam engine as the promise of the realm to come”.30
Hannah Arendt is strongly against identifying communism with
religion. She claims that communism pretends to be scientific, not religious,
because it uses scientific arguments and responds to scientific questions
rather than religious ones.31 However, over twenty years later, Voegelin
drew attention to the thoroughly religious methods used to search for the
answers to these questions. He notes that while building his vision of the
world, the author of Capital used speculative methods which were
employed by mystics to translate the experience of God into an earthly
language, and he calls Marxist ideology “probably the best world fetish
ever constructed by a man who wanted to be God”.32 He compares the idea
of communism to the concept of “the universal church of the proletariat”
and points to the fact that communists were distinguished from other
workers’ parties by the universal character of their actions.33
According to Voegelin, communism as an idea is imbued with
eschatological and Gnostic elements. They resulted from the tension
between the death of the spirit which Marx experienced and the hope for
its renewal in the new post-revolutionary world,34 whereas communism in
practice – as it turned out to be the case during the revolution in Russia –
was stripped of its eschatological values. This was because the vision of
freedom contained in the original idea meant little or nothing for the
members of the Marxist movement. In Voegelin’s view, the great
eschatological project of freedom and “the change of hearts” achieved by
means of revolution actually came down to slogans for “the shorter
29
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 298.
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 267.
31
H. Arendt, Religion and Politics…, p. 384.
32
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 299.
33
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 294.
34
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 246.
30
Religion as One of the Subsystems of Modern Society in Ukraine
17
workday and a higher standard of living”.35 When even such a drastically
reduced version of the communist Eden did not appear, substitutes for the
disintegrating vision of the revolutionary paradise were: the idea of the
Soviet “fatherland”, return to Russian traditions and Soviet patriotism.36
Does this, however, mean that Soviet communism completely lost its
religious character? This is not explicit. Very soon after the victory of the
Bolshevik revolution, Polish researcher Bogumił Jasinowski37 pointed to a
number of elements which were conducive to the “sacralization” of
Marxism-Leninism in the Soviet environment. This concerned, among
others, maximalism in approaching reality and setting objectives. In
addition, Jasinowski highlighted the role of a peculiar type of “Soviet
millenarism” which became “the equivalent of the rejected religion.”38
As usually happens with religious systems, Marxism, adapted by Lenin
to Russian conditions, provided “a powerful faith in the logic of history.”39
A similar view on the religious nature of Marxism-Leninism is expressed
by other experts of the Soviet reality – Nikolai Berdyaev and Alain
Besancon.40 Among Polish studies devoted to reflections on the religious
nature of communism, Rafał Imos’s book Wiara człowieka radzieckiego
[The Faith of the Soviet Man]41 is worth mentioning. Following Leszek
Kołakowski, Imos repeats the thesis that man in a natural way tries to
intellectually face the feeling of the “accidentality and indifference of the
world,” and thus searches for the meaning of his own existence.42 In his
search, a tool and, partially also search results, are secular and religious
myths. The latter consist of “unverifiable, unarguable universal facts
whose value lies in the cosmic dimension which a priori negates any kind
of accidentality.”43 According to Imos, secular mythologization “fulfils the
criteria for an incubator (…) of religious mythologization, that is, it
manifests the tendency to holism and radicalization in the face of the
minimal amount of favorable circumstances.”44 As can be inferred, Imos
35
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 247.
E. Voegelin, From Enlightenment…, p. 253.
37
For more information on this researcher see: Bogumił Jasinowski, Wschodnie
chrześcijaństwo a Rosja, Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej, 2002, pp. IX –
XXIV.
38
B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie…, p. XLVI.
39
B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie…, p. XLVI.
40
B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie…, p. XLI.
41
Rafał Imos, Wiara człowieka radzieckiego, Krakow: Nomos, 2007.
42
R. Imos, Wiara człowieka…, p. 67.
43
R. Imos, Wiara człowieka…, p. 68.
44
R. Imos, Wiara człowieka…, p. 69.
36
18
Chapter One
suggests that it is an objective process, independent from the intentions of
the supporters of “secular mythology.” The mythology created in the
secular space not only distances itself from the religious sphere, but can
also be anti-religious, and in favorable circumstances becomes a religion
itself – in functional, structural and ontological terms. Imos puts forward
the thesis that this process could be observed in the example of the
evolution of Marxism in Russia. “Marx’s thought, which developed in the
atmosphere of secular mythologization, evolved through Leninist
enhancement in the direction of a religious myth only to reach its peak in
the Stalinist period.”45
The above thesis corresponds to ideas already formulated seventy years
earlier by Bogumił Jasinowski. He claims that Marxism had conditions
conducive to its development thanks to the Orthodox Russian culture.
Jasinowski believes that, in essence, Bolshevism was not the contradiction
of this culture, but its consequence, a development, it resulted from its
very nature. He accuses the Orthodox Church of anti-intellectualism. He
underlines the enormous significance of monastic congregations in
Western European civilization. They performed the role of “centers which
propagated culture outside.”46 They maintained contact with the world and
thanks to this were able to have an influence on it. The tradition of Eastern
Christianity, however, formed a different kind of monk – an anchorite who
negated the worldly reality, escaped from it and as a result was asocial.47
According to Jasinowski, the Byzantine tradition cultivated by the
Orthodox Church paralyzed the development of the common legal
awareness – instead of the idea of the state of law and the guarantee of the
freedom of the individual which were created in Western European
conditions, what took root in Russia was the principle of all-powerfulness
of the state in the shape of “tsarist-theocratic authority.”48
Such an idea of the origins of Bolshevism has to raise justifiable
controversy and – as Marek Kornat rightly states – Jasinowski’s book
Wschodnie chrześcijaństwo a Rosja [Eastern Christianity and Russia] “has
to be read with caution.”49 Doubtlessly, however, it inspires an in-depth
reflection on the essence of Bolshevism, mainly by emphasizing cultural
and historical conditions which determine the uniqueness of incorporating
Marxism in Russia.
45
R. Imos, Wiara człowieka…, p. 69.
B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie…, p. 47.
47
B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie…, pp. 47-49.
48
B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie…, p. 179.
49
B. Jasinowski, Wschodnie…, p. LII.
46
Religion as One of the Subsystems of Modern Society in Ukraine
19
While analyzing communism from the perspective of its religious
nature, it has to be noted that one of the key elements of its Russian
version was atheism, understood as a programmatic, coordinated and
ruthless fight with religion. The fact that, as Eric Voegelin observes, the
revolution in Russia had little in common with Marx’s initial
eschatological project does not at all mean that eschatological issues
became indifferent to the shape of Soviet reality. This is proven by the fact
that practically, throughout the whole existence of the USSR, religious
believers and their communities, including – most interestingly for us –
those of the Orthodox and Greek Orthodox Churches, were persecuted and
destroyed because of their social function and due to what they essentially
were.
Objecting to the identification of ideology and religion in functional
terms, Hannah Arendt wrote in 1953 that function is not the same as
essence; and that two completely different things – for example, “belief in
the Law of History” and “belief in God” – cannot perform the same
function.50 That is why it is worth examining the history of the Russian
Orthodox Church in the USSR. Indeed, it was able to survive in the USSR
as an institution because its hierarchs decided to adopt a new function: the
factor which legitimized Soviet power – the power which openly and
ruthlessly propagated atheism and faith in the Law of History, which
publicly and with premeditation destroyed the Christian value system and
faith in God itself.51
Arendt underlines: “even if under certain queer circumstances, it
should occur that two different things play the same “functional role,” I
would no more think them identical than I would think the heel of my shoe
is a hammer when I use it to drive a nail into the wall”52. In principle, this
statement is perfectly legitimate. The problem is that in the social reality,
in essence it is difficult to find such an easy and uncomplicated element
and processes whose essence would be as evident as the example which
Arendt refers to. In relation to this, the metaphor used ought to be
considered less adequate to compare such phenomenon as religion,
Marxism or Leninism.
50
H. Arendt, Religion and politics…, p. 386.
It is difficult to agree at this point with Arendt, who observes that “Communism,
as an ideology, though it denies among many other things the existence of a
transcendent God, is not the same as atheism. It never tries to answer religious
questions specifically, but makes sure that its ideologically trained adherents will
never raise them”. H. Arendt, Religion and politics…, p.371.
52
H. Arendt, Religion and politics…, p. 386.
51
20
Chapter One
However, while analyzing the reality of post-Soviet societies, it has to
be taken into account that it stems from a system whose logic was built on
many circumstances which may seem “strange” to an outsider. Due to this
fact, what in terms of the essence may seem equally ridiculous or
paradoxical – as the example with the hammer and heel – becomes
understandable and logical from the functional perspective.
The circumstances shaped under Soviet conditions still exert an
influence on contemporaneity. They were “strange” enough to lead to,
among other things, far-reaching discrepancy between the essence of
religion and the Orthodox Church and the function which it performs. As a
result, for instance, Christian eschatology managed to become an element
of the neo-imperial, purely secular doctrine of “Russkiy Mir.”
It is worth noticing that today it must fulfill a similar role to that which
Marxism and Leninism, along with the theory of a world revolution, filled
some time ago. So, in a certain way, despite what Arendt states, “belief in
the Law of History” and “belief in God” can – independent of the
differences as to the essence of both “faiths” – fulfill the same role.
In this context, it is worth noting together with Larisa Andreieva that
dechristianization, which was the communists’ objective, does not have to
be identical with secularization.53 Abandoning Christianity (or any other
religion) does not necessarily have to mean the end of eschatology as such.
The need for it is inscribed in the human subconscious. Marxism
responded to this need and created a new religion which “deified man.”54
The tragedy of the Russian Orthodox Church was not only that it
constituted part of the social order destroyed by the Bolshevik revolution.
The real tragedy was the fact that Bolshevism created the new order (or
rather tried to create its beginnings) with its own religion. It was “the
official denomination” of the Soviet state,55 which spread its “gospel” in a
particularly ruthless manner. It could be said that communism was a
peculiar antithesis of the Orthodox Church.
No new “prophet” came after Stalin’s death. During the “thaw,” the
pantheon of Soviet “saints” was partially demythologized. The party
nomenklatura was formed which, instead of spreading and cultivating the
53
Лариса Андреева, Процесс дехристианизации в России и возникновение
квазирелигиозности в XXI векe;
http://www.krotov.info/lib_sec/01_a/and/reeva_la_2.htm, dechrystianizacja
54
Л. Андреева, Процесс дехристианизации…
55
R. Imos proposed the following definition of communism: “Atheistic, based on
Gnostic faith, characterized by dualism, universalistic in nature, complex religion
of battle, which was the official denomination of the Soviet state” – R. Imos,
Wiara człowieka…, p. 84.