Classifying Autocracies. Accounting for the variety of autocratic regimes
Paper prepared for the IPSA-ECPR Joint Conference, Sao Paulo, 16.-19.2.2011
Johannes Gerschewski
Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) and
Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences (BGSS), Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
[email protected]
Draft version. Please do not cite without the authors permission.
All comments highly welcome
Abstract:
In the last decade, the study of autocracies has undergone a renaissance in Comparative
Politics and has attracted renewed scholarly attention. However, the conceptual side of this
research area still lags behind. Since Linz’ typological attempt in 1975 to classify autocratic
regimes, progress in this regard has been very slow. Moreover, conceptual and definitional
issues are still a step-child in autocracy research. Against this backdrop, the paper tries to
connect to the influential finding by Barbara Geddes why single-party regimes last longer
than military and personalist regimes. While Geddes offers a game-theoretic argument, the
paper tries to build a complementary typology. By putting emphasis on concept building, it is
argued that legitimation, repression and co-optation are the three pillars of stable autocracies.
Making methodically use of fuzzy set ideal type analysis, three main country groups emerge
in the typological attempt. It will be shown that they follow different stabilizing paths and
these results will be interpreted in light of Geddes’ findings.
1. The inner variety of autocratic regime
In 2006, Richard Snyder asked “how relevant are Linz’s three dimensions for understanding
non-democratic regimes thirty years later?” (Snyder, 2006: 227). By posing this question after
an insightful review of how to classify non-democratic regimes, he implicitly points at a
remarkable shortcoming in the field of Comparative Politics. With him as one of the main
exceptions, it is safe to say that progress in classifying autocratic regimes was in general very
slow in the last decades. Still, the textbook typology of non-democratic regimes remains Juan
Linz’s inductive attempt in 1975 and his distinction between totalitarian and authoritarian
regimes. Linz magistral work is still the reference point when it comes to typologizing
autocratic regimes. Compared to the abundance of typologies that try to bring order to any
imaginable form of democratic political regimes, the mirror side of autocracies is much more
unsatisfactory. Other proposals have been both rare and have left just weak imprints on the
field. This is even more remarkable as the critique of Linz’s work follow a certain routine. As
it is widely known, Linz proposed to classify autocratic regimes along three dimensions:
pluralism, ideology and mobilization. The two main types resulting out of this classification
were totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. From today’s viewpoint, however, given the
empirical scarcity of existing totalitiarian regimes, given the intense debate about the
usefulness of the very concept of totalitarianism due to its pejorative use in both politics and
political science, and given its inherent statism, the typology seems to be somehow oldfashioned at its best, out-fashioned at its worst.
The demise of the concept of totalitarianism led to a (delayed) rise of the study of
authoritarian regimes. While in the 1980s some empirical studies that mostly focused on Latin
America introduced new types of authoritarian regimes, the success story of democratizations
overshadowed later on the study of authoritarianism. Routinely, the breakdown of the former
authoritarian regime has been seen as the ‘natural’ departure point of study. When at the end
of the 1990s a ‘disillusionment’ with the democratization processes set in and the high hopes
in the worldwide spread of liberalization have turned out to be (partially) over-exaggerated,
Barbara Geddes (1999) influential work marked the beginning of a renaissance of studies that
explicitly deal with the stability and maintenance of autocratic regimes. In recent years, this
debate has gained momentum and has offered refreshing answers.
Compared to recent efforts to explain the resilience of autocratic regimes by highlighting
different stabilizing factors, the conceptual work what an autocracy actually is, how we
should to define it, how we should account for the inner variety of autocracies, and how we
could typologize them lags largely behind. As indicated before, Snyder’s (2006) study stands
out. He proposes to ask four crucial questions around which an adequate typology can be
built: who rules, how do rulers rule, why do rulers rule, and how much do rulers rule? With
these questions he touches mainly upon the structure of “Herrschaft”, the use of repression,
the legitimatory base of “Herrschaft”, and the question of stateness. While the last can be seen
more as a necessary condition for classifying autocratic regimes in a meaningful way, the first
three questions will be at the heart of this paper.
In the following, I will use Barbara Geddes’ influential tripartition of autocracies into
military, one-party and personalist regimes as a starting point before general decisions and
steppping stones in constructing a typology will be discussed. I will then go on to propose a
typology that complements the findings of Geddes. This will be done by putting special
emphasis on concept-building and making methodically use of fuzzy set ideal type analysis.
2. The Starting Point: Barbara Geddes’ Tripartition1
The question who rules is at the center of Barbara Geddes (1999) typology. She differentiates
between regimes that are either ruled by a party, by the military, by persons or by some
amalgams of these pure types. In her regime type coding manual, she explains her procedure
in much detail. Based on 42 explicit questions, she classifies a regime as military if the
government is formed by a (retired) officer who relies on the support of the military and
establishes some routine mechanisms by which officers can influence policy decisions.
Hence, a one-party regime is defined by the existence of a ruling party that monopolizes and
controls access to power and that reaches with its branches to the local level. Personalist
regimes, in contrast, are regimes in which single leaders have consolidated its grip on power
and personnel recruitment and have marginalized the influence of other rivals. After having
classified all autocratic regimes, Geddes (1999:133) shows that the regime types differ in their
longevity. While military regimes between 1946 and 1999 last on average 8.8 years, personal
regimes endure for 15,1 years. One-party regimes have not just a higher average life span of
22,7 years, but also half of all one-party regimes have survived until 1999.
In her actor-oriented work, she explains this variation of the longevity by focusing on
incentive structures and possible intra-elite rivalries. Geddes makes here a game-theoretic
argument. In military regimes, the primary interest of the military is assumed t be corporate:
the survival, efficacy and cohesion of the military is valued the highest. This incentive
structure suggests a battle of the sexes game between the majority and minority factions of the
military. Nash equilibria exist when both either in agreeing to intervene in democratization
1
I would like thank Barbara Geddes very much for sharing her data with me and my colleagues at the Social
Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
processes or to stay in the barracks. One-party regimes, however, can be modelled as stag
hunt games as it is in the highest interest of party cadres to hold office. Here, the most likely
outcome will be that the majority and the rival faction find a common modus vivendi to
remain in office and not challenge either side. Personalist regimes, in turn, function as a game
tree in which everything depends on the ruler and the main interest lies in staying in the
privileged position.
Undoubtedly, Geddes deserves great credit for her work, but some critics remain. Hadenius
and Teorell (2006, 2007) have challenged the distinction and have put into question as to
whether personalist regimes can be seen as a distinct regime type. They argue that
personalism is in varying degree part of all regimes. Instead they propose to draw the
distinction line along “three modes of power maintenance” (Hadenius/Teorell 2007: 146), i.e.
to distinguish between monarchies based on hereditary succession, military regimes with
intra-military succession rules and electoral regimes which are then further differentiated
between no-, single-, and multi-party regimes. Unfortunately, Hadenius and Teorell include
many subtypes which makes the typology unwieldy. Also Koellner (2008: 356-357) has
stressed that they intermingle in their classification the modus of gaining and the locus of
political power. Moreover, the limited multi-party regimes bear more resemblance to hybrid
regimes than to autocratic ones which will be typologized within this paper. Besides the
personalism, two broader criticism need to be raised. Firstly, does the tripartition capture the
spectrum of autocratic regimes adequately and secondly, how convincing is the gametheoretic argument based on this classification. Before this will be discussed in more detail,
some general remarks on how to construct a typology are at place.
3. Decisions made in constructing a typology
A typology is a “coordinated set of categories that establishes theoretically important
distinctions” (Collier/LaPort/Seawright forthcoming). It results by cross-tabulating two or
more dimensions and distinct types emerge by combining the values of the respective
dimension (Nohlen 1994; Behnke/Baur/Behnke 2006: 104). The main aim of typologies
consists of reducing the manifold empirical reality towards analytically and theoretically
useful categories. Typologies are therefore used to describe and order empirical. Besides the
obvious task of ordering and sorting cases, however, Collier, LaPorte and Seawright
(forthcoming) have outlined several other tasks that range from revising and fine-tuning of
concepts to creating basic blocks of (causal) explanations. By identifying a certain type one
implicitly assumes that cases of this type will behave similarly in similar contexts which
marks a first step in a causal claim (Munck 2004).
The answer to the question of what to typologize is not as straight-forward as it seems at first
glance. It has indeed underlying implications. On the one hand, the choice of variables or
dimensions
of
the
typology
will
be
affected
by
the
“overarching
concept”
(Collier/LaPorte/Seawright 2008: 156) different for typologizing e.g. all political systems or
all democracies. But one should also not overlook that the choice of the “overarching
concept” carries some theoretical weight. In this example, to decide to dichotomise between
democratic and autocratic regimes and to construct a typology of autocratic regimes is
intertwined with a specific view on the relationship between these regime types. Instead of
dealing with intermediate types like hybrid regimes, the approach that is adopted here follows
Sartori’s (1970) line of thinking that democracies and autocracies should be seen as
contradictories and not just as contraries. The ontological decision has far-reaching
consequences. While the viewpoint of a contradictory relationship between autocracies and
democracies obeys to the logical law of the excluded third, the latter allows for it.
Intermediate categories are possible when democracies and autocracies are seen as contraries,
but then the burden of justification for intermediate regime types lies in finding defining
elements that unfold enough discriminatory power vis-à-vis democracy and autocracy (cf.
among numerous Tugendhat/Wolf 1983: 66-75).
At the heart of this classification lies the construction of distinct types by the classic rule of
definitio fit per genus proximum et differentia specifica. So, in order define (hierarchically),
two caveats need to be dealt with. On the one hand, a higher, overarching genus and a
delineating character need to be found. In the example of democracies and autocracies, the
genus could be regime or political system while the differentia specifica might be the (non)existence of elections. Also Geddes uses a dichotomization and her differentia specifica lies
in the existence of a meaningful opposition. That said, the introduction of hybrid regimes as
distinct regime types need to be justified on logical ground by a differentiating specific that
carry enough discriminating power – a task yet to be done.
Sartori, however, not just put emphasis on dichotomizing and argued against degreeism, he
also argued that concept formation is inherently a classificatory effort. He proposes a two-step
procedure: In justifying a dichotomous approach, one needs to first distinguish between
democracy and non-democracy as differences in kind before a more fine-grained analyses of
the democratic subtypes can be undertaken that makes use of a set of different (gradual)
criteria. It can be argued that they follow a distinct inner logic as “bounded wholes” (ibid, also
Collier/Adcock 1999). Against this background, I focus exclusively on autocratic regimes and
try to construct autocratic subtypes by relying on three (gradual) dimensions that will be
explained in detail below.
A further decision has to be made regarding the claim of the typology. As indicated above, a
typology can either serve as a sorting device that puts heavy emphasis on concepts or a
typology can claim to have causal and explanatory power. For the latter, George and Bennett
(2005) have developed a typological theory. The other approach that will be followed in this
paper is more conceptual in its design. In the following chapter I will outline the conceptbuilding behind the proposed typology.
A last decision needs to be done with regard to the choice of methods and the general
ontological understanding of a case. Two roads can be distinguished. On the one hand, at the
heart of the classical and most-widespread approaches is the ceteris-paribus clause that, all
other things equal, independent variable A affects Y with a certain intensity. On the other
hand, cases are understood as configurations, i.e. as combinations of conditions that are
understood as interdependent. While the first approach suggests techniques like cluster
analysis, the latter makes use of fuzzy set ideal types. In this paper, I try to highlight the
procedure of the configurational approach.
4. Proposing a Complementary Typology
As I indicated at the end of the second chapter, two caveats remain with the classificatory
attempt by Geddes. I do not intend to question her finding here why the three types of
authoritarian regimes have remained stable, but I would rather like to complement her
approach with a conceptual typology that focuses both more on the inner working
mechanisms of autocracies and thereby is better equipped to capture the variety of regimes
types. The ‘design’ of the proposed typology is conceptual and makes no claim about causal
explanations. The intention is just to see, as to whether certain patterns can be identified
within the complementary typology and as to whether they can be attached to the three types
that Geddes has spelled out. If these patterns have indeed explaining power, need to be shown
yet.
Against the backdrop of the existing literature on stabilizing factors of autocratic regimes, I
argue that there exist three strands of literature that can be synthesized into one theoretical
framework (see also Gerschewski 2010). Painting with a broad brush, the first area of
research concentrates on the enduring effects of formal and informal institutions of various
kinds to co-opt potential oppositional forces (e.g., Boix/Svolik 2008; Brownlee 2007;
Gandhi/Przeworski 2007; Lust-Okar 2006; Magaloni 2006). The second axis focuses more on
questions of repression and the credible threat of the use of coercion to suppress the political
will of the people or to deter potential intra-elite splits and defection (e.g., Acemoglu/
Robinson 2006; Wintrobe 1998). The last strand of literature deals with the sources and extent
of legitimation of autocratic regimes (e.g., Burnell 2006). These three pillars of stability,
namely legitimation, repression, and co-optation, are seen as interdependent and mutually
enforcing and enfeebling.
These three pillars represent the core functions that are crucial for the long-term stability of
autocracies.2 While the legitimation pillar needs to guarantee either active consent or passive
obedience, toleration or indifference, the function of co-optation can be characterized as the
inclusion of strategic (potential) oppositional groups and persons. Furthermore, it works via
formal and informal institutions as a transmission belt to reach intra-elite cohesion, settle
potential conflicts and, generally speaking, stabilize expectations. The basic function of
repression lies obviously in controlling the society – i.e. in terms of systems theory in
channeling and controlling the demands vis-à-vis the political system in a way that does not
endanger this system. Oppositional views need to be suppressed, repressed or at least
controlled.
Before, however, I engage into concept building in more detail, a general note seems to be in
place. In conceptualizing the three pillars, the insightful advice of Gary Goertz (2006, see also
Goertz/ Mahoney 2005 and Adcock/Collier 2001) will be followed. To my point of view, two
main caveats in concept-building need to be stressed. On the one hand, one needs to
distinguish between different levels or layers of a concept and ask how to grasp the
relationship between them. For the relationship between different levels, a distinction can be
made between a) a causal relationship b) an ontological relationship, i.e. a subsequent
dimension constitutes the ‘higher’ dimension, or c) a substitutable relationship, which means
that there exist different ways by which it is possible to arrive at the ‘higher’ dimension. In
the course of the paper, just the ontological relationship will be assumed. On the other hand,
concepts can be built more adequately if one pays attention to the relationship within the
levels. Here, the two most widespread ways are to distinguish between the logical AND,
which highlights the conjuncture of two conditions and uses therefore the logical MINIMUM-
2
It is supposed that deficits within one pillar can only be temporally compensated by the remaining pillars. The
overall stability of autocracies rests therefore on the conjuncture of these three pillars. While it is assumed that
autocratic regime survival depends in the long run on the ability to balance the respective pillar in a way that the
weakness of the pillar “under attack” can be counterweighted, the stability in the short-run depends on the
capacity to react to these attacks.
rule, and the logical OR, which in turn emphasizes equifinality, i.e. that both conditions can
lead to the observed outcome, and makes use of the MAXIMUM-rule.3 Equipped with this
toolbox in concept-building, I turn now to the three concepts of legitimation, repression and
co-optation.
a) Legitimation:
Legitimation is defined in a Weberian tradition as an empirical concept (legitimacy belief),
leaving aside the normative weight this concept usually carries. The basic template for
conceptualizing legitimation is borrowed from David Easton’s (1979) classical distinction
between “diffuse” and “specific support”. The premise here is that every political system, be
it autocratic or democratic need to have a legitimatory base to maintain stability over time.
Diffuse support is understood as any form of ideational support for the regime that can stem
from political ideologies, religious, nationalistic, religious, or traditional claims as well as
from the charisma of an autocratic leader (cf. Linz 1975, Brooker 2000, Burnell 2006). While
most scholars would agree this kind of legitimation is of importance, the obvious challenge
remains in the measurement. Two proxies have been identified until now, but obviously there
need to be some more additional work done. The two proxies are on the one hand one
question from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) that asks for legitimacy of the On
the other hand, the Weighted Conflict Index from Banks Cross-Sectional Time-Series
Database that integrates among others the number of major government crises, riots, and antigovernment demonstrations can give hints as to whether the national regime is legitimated.
The specific support is more short-term and performance-oriented per definitionem which
makes the measurement relatively easy. Macro-economic indicators as GDP growth,
GDP/capita, and the Human Development Index have been used here.
The question as to whether both ways to legitimate its rule should be characterized as
equifinal or conjunctural is not easy to answer. At a minimum level, specific as well as diffuse
support is both needed to maintain stability in the long run. Against this backdrop, I argue that
both dimensions have to be present and therefore lean more on the side of a logical ANDrelationship between the two dimensions of support. Both dimensions will be connected by
multiplication which resembles the idea of interaction terms. Multiplication is in general a
weaker statement than the maximum rule albeit following the idea of a logical AND.
3
The distinction can also be made by referring to necessary and sufficient conditions for the logical AND and to
family resemblance structures for the logical OR. In set-theoretic terms, the former is an intersection while the
latter is a union (see Goertz 2006: 27-67).
b) Repression:
Repression is undoubtedly one of the backbones of autocracies or, at least, a means of last
resort (Friedrich/ Brzezinski 1956, Shapiro 1972, Brooker 2000). State repression will be
defined in line with Davenport (2007:2) as the “actual or threatened use of physical sanctions
against an individual or organization, within the territorial jurisdiction of the state, for the
purpose of imposing a cost on the target as well as deterring specific activities.” Upcoming
dissent both among the people and deviant elite members needs to be repressed and further
conflicts are deterred. The instructive distinction by Levitsky and Way (2006) between “high”
and “low intensity” or between hard and softer forms of repression measures will be made
fruitful. Although the distinction is in practice often not as sharp has proposed here, I concur
with the main gist of their argument. They draw the distinction line along the targeted people
or institution and the form of violence used.4 Against this backdrop, high intensity coercion
can be characterized as visibility acts that are targeted either at well-known individuals like
opposition leaders, at a larger number of people or at major oppositional institutions. Concrete
measures encompass the (violent) repression of mass demonstrations, (violent) campaigns
against parties, and attempted assassination or imprisonment of opposition leaders. Lower
intensity coercion would then aim at groups of minor importance, are less visible and take
often more subtle forms. Concrete measures can be the use of (formal and informal)
surveillance apparatus, low intensity physical harassment and intimidation, but also nonphysical forms as denial of certain job and education opportunities as well as the curtailment
of civil rights like the freedom of assembly. For both forms of repression, the CIRI dataset
and the Freedom House Index will be used hereHere again, the conceptual relationship between hard and soft repression is not easy to grasp.
The problem occurring here is that the latter can be seen as a subset of the former. Regimes
that make use of hard repression also do mostly not shy away from exerting soft repression.
Nevertheless, the relationship between these two will be treated as being equifinal, as there
are two paths of either making predominantly use of soft repression or hard repression that
most often also imply softer forms of repression that can both lead to the stability of
autocracies.
4
A similar distinction is made by Davenport (2007: 2-3) who distinguishes on the form of violence used: Soft
repression are actions against the First Amendment Rights of the US Constitution (Free exercise of religion,
freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly and association. Hard repression refers to violations
against the personal integrity (with regard to individual survival and security, freedom from torture,
“disappearance”, imprisonment, extrajudicial execution).
c) Co-optation:
Co-optation will be defined within this paper as the capacity to tie strategic actors (or group of
actors) within or outside the political elite to the regime elite. This is exerted in a way in
which the actor must be “persuaded not to exercise his power to obstruct” (Shleifer/ Treisman
2000: 8-9) and instead use resources in line with the ruling elite’s demands. Co-optation
“implies [therefore] not dealing the stakeholders out of the game, but dealing them new
cards”, i.e. “transforming stakeholders from opponents to supporters” (Shleifer/ Treisman
2000: 8-9; see also Bertocchi/ Spagat 2001). It has long been assumed that in order to co-opt
strategic actors, the only viable instrument is the distribution and sharing of rents (Acemoglu/
Robinson 2006, Wintrobe 1998). Yet Gandhi and Przeworski (2006, 2007) convincingly
argue that a distinction between rents and policy concessions via formal institutions should be
made. Prima facie, democratic institutions like parties or elections seem to be no more than
window-dressing for autocracies, but they have indeed vital functions: “to mobilize
cooperation” and to “thwart the danger of rebellion”. Institutions as “humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction” (North 1990: 3) stabilize expectations by structuring
incentives, prolong time frames and reduce uncertainty. They also often include a sanctions
mechanism. To be sure, in the context of autocracies, the degree of institutionalization within
this pillar can be applied not just for parties, but also for other loci of power as military juntas
or elitist cliques. These institutions fulfil in general the function of producing and maintaining
intra-elite cohesion and of reducing the probability of internal splits.
By subsuming these lines of reasoning under the broader concept of co-optation, I argue that I
am able to integrate the more informal ways to reach unity within this stabilizing pillar. In this
regard, (neo-)patrimonialism as the most widespread mechanism of informal cooptation is
identified. Patrimonialism implies that the autocratic elite rules by and through a close
network of direct ties to subordinate actors. Patrimonialism refers to a strategy of generating
loyalty to the regime by sharing and distributing rents among actors who do not belong to the
inner circles of the political elite. The capacity of autocratic elites to maintain the balance
between competing subordinate actors and to avoid a situation in which one actor grows too
strong by simultaneously tying all relevant actors to the regime is crucial for the stability of
autocracies. As Stefes (2006) show, corruption can be an important tool of patrimonial
cooptation. It can be argued that both ways of co-opting, on the one hand via formal
institutions and granting of offices and policy concessions and on the other hand via informal
institutions and the distribution of rents can be seen as equifinal. Both forms can lead to
stability.
Figure 1: Concept Building - Overview
Mean between Banks,
Weighted Conflict Index
(1999-2008) and BTI,
question 1.2, legitimacy of
national state
Logical OR between PWT,
GDP/cap (2007) and
GDP/cap growth (19982007); then mean between
this and HDI (2008)
Mean between CIRI Phys.
Integr. Rights Index (19992008) and FH Civil Liberties
Index (1999-2008)
Mean between CIRI New
Empowerm. Index (19992008) and FH Political
Rights Index (1999-2008)
Ideational “diffuse
support“
multiplication
Performance,
“specific support“
Legitimation of
Autocratic Rule (claim
of legitimacy)
*
Hard repression
+
Repression
Stability of Autocracies
Soft repression
*
Mean between WB, DPI
Years in office of chief exec.
party (2008) and Banks,
Cabinet Size (2006)
Logical OR between SIPRI,
Ratio of Milit. Exp. as Ratio
of GDP (2008) and PWT,
Government share of GDP
(2007); then mean of this and
TI, CPI (2008)
Offices (formal
institutions as arena)
+
Rents (Informal
institutions as arena)
*
Strategic Co-optation
Logical OR
Logical AND
Causal Relation
Ontological Relation
Indicator for
On the indicator level, I will use the Corruption Perceived Index of Transparency
International, the Global Integrity Index for the informal institutions. Only when a certain
material level is reached, the ruling elite is able to co-opt. Therefore, the government’s share
on the GDP and the ratio of military expenditures vis-à-vis the GDP – as empirically most cooptation takes place among the military – will serve as necessary material conditions for cooptation. The number of years in office by the chief’s executive party from the World Bank’s
Database on Political Institutions and the numbers of cabinet changes in the last ten years as a
measure of the party’s inclusiveness will be made fruitful to assess the formal co-optation
mechanisms.
5. Fuzzy Set Ideal Type Analysis
In conducting a typology, I methodically make use of fuzzy set ideal type analyses that has
been used - to my knowledge – until now just for explanations of welfare state regimes (Kvist
2007, Vis 2006). The basic idea behind is to construct ideal types and then see to what extent
the cases under consideration fit to these types. This will be done by assessing the set
membership of each case to the respective ideal type. For the three concepts outlined above,
there are eight logically possible ideal types (2³) that can be visualized and be represented by
the eight corners of a cube. For example, the upper-left corner can be seen as the combination
of “no legitimation, repression and no co-optation”.5 This procedure obviously follows the
idea of Lazarsfeld’s property space.
Figure 2: Lazarsfeld Property Space: Legitimation, Repression, Cooptation
Repression
Co-optation
Legitimation
5
It has been a convention that the presence of a condition is written with a capital letter, the absence with a
lower case letter. This corner would then be written as “lRc”.
12
After having identified the eight possible combinations, the set membership of all cases to all
ideal types will be calculated by following the logical AND-rule. Due to Boolean algebra,
there exists only one solution in which the set membership of a case is above 0.5 in one of the
possible eight ideal types. In general, it applies that the higher the set membership of a case in
a possible ideal type, the better the case can be characterized by this configuration. All
indicators have been calibrated (see Ragin 2008).6
Descriptive Statistics
Variable
BTI Nat. Leg
Banks Conflict Index
HDI
GDP/cap growth
GDP/cap
CIRI Phys. Ind
FH Pol. Rights
CIRI Empow. Index
FH Civ Lib.
TI CPI
Ratio Mil. Exp
Govt Share
Years Office
Cabinet size
Mean
7.490196
432.6815
0.53098
3.059808
9431.723
3.613528
5.756944
4.212685
5.249907
2.892453
2.646154
17.97365
23.7027
29.14815
Std. Dev.
1.753121
631.1662
0.1698312
3.837895
12286.78
1.676033
1.118266
2.48516
1.035321
1.437221
1.80893
10.03928
14.50976
7.407222
Minimum
3
0
0.118
-9.09
414.04
0
2
0
2
1.3
0.4
3.24
1
16
Maximum
10
2906.2
0.839
15.49
57259
7.2
7
10.6
7
9.2
8.2
44.59
59
49
N Cases
51
54
50
52
52
53
54
54
54
53
39
52
37
54
Geddes identified 54 autocracies that exist until 2008 which I try to typologize. To be clear
about this, I do not intend to construct a typology of autocratic regimes, but the concepts I
have been using focuses on conditions for stable autocracies. The typology is therefore used
to complement the game-theoretic reasoning of Geddes by highlighting at different underlying
configurations. By using the above described coding rules for the three concepts of
legitimation, repression and co-optation, different, equifinal configurations lead to the same
outcome of stable autocracies. In the analysis, the following country groups emerge by fuzzy
ideal type analysis: While there are no empirical case for a configuration of high legitimation,
low repression and high co-optation (LrC) and only a few cases fit the best to configurations
of Lrc, lrC, lRc, and Lrc, three main country groups emerge. The largest group is described as
low level of legitimation but both high levels of repression and co-optation. Compared with
the second-largest group of high levels of legitimation, repression and co-optation, one can
conclude that as long as the repressive apparatus to suppress demands towards the political
system is functioning and the co-optation to maintain intra-elite cohesion, the legitimation
question is of secondary importance. The third group, however, suggests that the combination
6
The data and the calibration rule can be requested by the author.
13
Figure 3: Country groups
LRC (19)
LrC
Armenia (0,55)
Azerbaijan (0,68)
Belarus (0,64)
Cambodia (0,53)
Cuba (0,58)
Egypt (0,53)
Eritrea (0,77)
Gabon (0,55)
Jordan (0,57)
Kazakhstan (0,55)
Malaysia (0,69)
Oman (0,58)
Saudi Arabia (0,68)
Syria (0,57)
Tajikistan (0,56)
Turkmenistan (0,61)
Venezuela (0,65)
Vietnam (0,58)
Yemen (0,50)
LRc (6)
Kuwait (0,55)
Libya (0,61)
Singapore
(0,54)
Swaziland
(0,53)
Tunisia (0,55)
UAE (0,73)
Lrc (1)
Botswana
(0,53)
lRC (24)
lrC (1)
Burkina Faso
Algeria (0,51)
(0,57)
Angola (0,68)
Belarus (0,71)
Cameroon (0,6)
Centr. Afr Rep. (0,52)
Chad (0,68)
China (0,51)
Congo Rep (0,52)
Congo DR (0,75)
Ethiopia (0,55)
Iran (0,53)
Ivory Coast (0,56)
North Korea (0,82)
Kyrgyzstan (0,51)
Laos (0,55)
Morocco (0,52)
Mozambique (0,6)
Myanmar (0,77)
Sudan (0,55)
Tanzania (0,59)
Togo (0,50)
Uganda (0,69)
Uzbekistan (0,64)
Zimbabwe (0,58)
14
lRc (2)
Guinea (0,52)
Rwanda (0,6)
Lrc (1)
Gambia (0,51)
of a high level of legitimation and repression can lead with the absence of co-optation also to
stability. With the exception of Botswana, Burkina Faso and Gambia, all other regimes use
repression in their stabilizing configuration. This can be also explained by the coding rule and
the logical OR between soft and hard repression, i.e. the maximum rule. As both forms of
repression can be seen as equifinal, autocracies rely either on soft or on hard or on both forms
of repression suggesting repression as a necessary condition for stable autocracies. While
repression is an apt candidate for a necessity, this holds neither true for legitimation nor for
co-optation.
By simply cross-tabulating the results with the initial distinction by Geddes, the following
picture can be drawn. Unsurprisingly, the two existing military regimes in Myanmar and
Algeria (as well as to a certain extent the single-party military regime in Rwanda) rely on
repression and co-optation which is a widespread phenomenon among military juntas. The
results for the other regime types are more diffuse. Just two countries (Malaysia and Vietnam)
that are classified by Geddes as pure single-party regimes rely on all three pillars of stability,
i.e. have levels of legitimation, repression and co-optation beyond the 0.5 value. The other
regimes in this country group, Cuba, Eritrea, Gabon, and Turkmenistan (as well as Zimbabwe
and Uzbekistan for the lRC group) are described by Geddes as mixed type and have a strong
personalist element. Taken together with the eight pure personalist regimes with a LRC
configuration and the eleven personalist regimes that are described as lRC, one can conclude
that personalist regimes rely mostly on repression and co-optation.
The patterns for single-party regimes resemble to a certain extent the one for personalist
regimes. In general, this regime type can be either stabilized by following a LRC- or a lRCpath although it needs to be highlighted that countries that follow the former path have mostly
also a strong personalist note. Against this backdrop, it seems that on-party regimes do not
have to rely on legitimation – measured by multiplication of indicators of specific and diffuse
support – but much more on repression and co-optation. Particularly, working co-optation
mechanisms seem to be critical for survival.
In general, the patterns that emerge out of the complementary typology only fit partially to the
findings by Geddes. While the two military regimes follow both the lRC path, pure singleparty regimes follow the same path. This is surprising as Geddes shows the different
durability of these regime types. Single-party regimes last on average much longer than
military regimes. It would be interesting to see – when one includes the time dimension and
increases so he number of military (and one-party) regimes – if the same pattern for military
regimes holds. If it does, it would clearly ask for an explanation why the stabilizing paths lRC
15
Figure 4: Cross-Tabulation
LRC
Cuba (sppers)
Eritrea (sppers)
Gabon (sppers.)
Malaysia
Turkmenistan
(sppers)
Vietnam
LrC
-
LRc
Singapore
Tunisia
Lrc
Botswana
Military
Regimes
Personalist
Regimes
-
-
-
-
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Cambodia
Kazakhstan
Taijikistan
Venezuela
Yemen
-
Libya
-
Monarchies
Jordan
Oman
Saudi Arabia
-
Kuwait
Swaziland
UAE
-
Single-Party
Regimes
lRC
Angola
China
Ethiopia
North Korea
Laos
Mozambique
Tanzania
Uzbekistan
(sppers)
Zimbabwe
(sppers)
Algeria
Myanmar
Belarus
Cameroon
Centr. Afr. Rep
Chad
Congo Rep
Congo DR
Ivory Coast
Kyrgyzstan
Sudan
Togo
Uganda
lrC
-
lRc
Rwanda (spmil)
Lrc
-
-
-
-
Burkina Faso
Guinea
Gambia
Morocco
-
-
-
Own compilation. Syria, Egypt, Iran not classified.
sppers. = mixed type single-party personalist regime; spmil = mixed type single-party military regime
16
work better in single-party regimes than in military regimes. Single-party regimes, however,
that have a strong personalist imprint like in Cuba or Turkmenistan stabilize themselves by
relying on all three pillars. Here the presence of legitimation, repression and co-optation is
needed. Lastly, the fuzzy ideal type analysis suggests that personalist regimes who make up
the largest group of currently existing autocracies have two alternative ways to stabilize their
rule: Either follow the LRC- or the lRC-path.
6. Conclusion
The starting point of the analysis was the diagnosis of the current status quo in autocracy
research. While this field of study has in the last decade regained momentum and has attracted
again scholarly attention, it lags significantly behind when it comes to typologies and
concept-buildings. How can we account for the variety of autocratic regimes? How can we
typologize autocracies? And how can we define an autocracy at first place? This paper did not
aim to build a typology of autocracies per se, but focused on stabilizing conditions for
autocracies. In doing so, three pillars of stability, namely legitimation, repression and cooptation, have been outlined while emphasis was put on coherent and transparent conceptbuilding. By making methodically use of fuzzy ideal type analysis and arguing in a
configurational manner, three main country groups have been identified. High degrees of
legitimation, repression and co-optation (LRC) as well as repression, co-optation and a low
degree of legitimation (lRC) constitute the empirically most-widespread configurations of
currently existing autocracies.
While Barbara Geddes tripartition and of game-theoretic explanation of why the respective
regime type remained stable over time have been very influential, this paper sought to crosstabulate these finding. It was highlighted, that military regimes rely mainly on repression and
co-optation, while the legitimation pillar is not needed. The same can be said for single-party
regimes. When this regime type, however, encompasses a strong personalist note, the
legitimation pillar is built. Lastly, the empirical distribution between personalist regimes that
follow the LRC or the lRC stabilizing path is more or less equal. This suggests that
personalist regimes follow equifinal ways to stabilize themselves.
17
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