Championing U.S. Conditionality
Phoebe Benich
Brief No. 6.2
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Championing U.S. Conditionality
A Strategy to Counter Chinese Economic Influence in Africa
APRIL 2014
Phoebe Benich
Championing U.S. Conditionality
A Strategy to Counter Chinese Economic Influence in Africa
Since 2009, Chinese investment and aid to Africa have exceeded that of the United States. The
subsequent increase in Chinese influence undermines U.S. security initiatives on the continent,
threatens access to key resources, and increases China’s power in multilateral bodies. However,
growing African resentment towards China’s predatory economic practices creates an
opportunity for the United States to counter Chinese influence in Africa. The United States
should fund nongovernmental organizations interested in promoting strong labor practices,
governance and capacity building, thereby drawing attention to the flaws of Chinese economic
activities. Additionally, Washington should publicize the domestic political and economic
benefits of U.S. foreign aid conditionality to implicitly critique questionable Chinese behaviors.
By contrasting the two countries’ relationship with Africa, the United States can regain
grassroots support on the continent.
Introduction
China’s economic involvement in Africa has grown dramatically since the 1980s, causing
concern among many in the U.S. foreign policy community. For example, in May 2013, Senator
Chris Coons, who sits on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stated that “China, which has
made dramatic inroads across the continent in recent years, may undermine or even counter
value-driven U.S. goals in the region, and should serve as a wake-up call for enhanced American
trade and investment.”1
Despite such concerns, China’s economic practices in Africa—which hinders government
transparency, exploits workers, and fails to build local capacity—have evoked a growing popular
backlash among citizens of the continent. This emerging resentment provides an opportunity for
Washington. Instead of viewing U.S. conditionality as a liability relative to China, the United
States should robustly champion the political and economic benefits for African’s of
conditionality, while supporting local groups that focus on good governance and building
indigenous economic capacity. Such a policy would: (1) build grassroots support for the United
States among Africans by highlighting the extractive nature of Chinese practices, and (2) may
alter China’s approach to development in Africa. This proposed policy also would require a more
vigorous, coordinated, and focused approach to U.S. public diplomacy and aid allocation on the
continent.
Growing Chinese Influence in Africa
This heightened engagement in Africa by China since the mid-1990s has important
implications for the United States. China now offers African countries another political
1
and especially economic alternative to the United States and the West generally.
− Ambassador David Shinn, 20112
Beijing has spent the past three decades building a relationship with Africa based on aid,
investment, and trade, with little attention paid to political conditions on the continent or building
local capacity.
Growing Chinese Economic Involvement in Africa
China has contributed enormous sums of resources towards African development through
Official Development Assistance (ODA), investment, and trade.
Increasing Chinese foreign aid. China spent $84.4 billion on African development aid
between 2000 and 2012. This aid can be broken down into three categories: Official
Development Assistance (ODA), Other Official Flows (OOF), and remaining unspecified
contributions.3 ODA is defined as aid given by official agencies, “with the promotion of
the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective.”4
OOF are transactions that do not meet the requirements for ODA because their primary
purpose is not development.5 “Unspecified” indicates any transaction that does not fit
into either category due to lack of sufficient information.6 Figure 1 highlights the relative
small size of Chinese ODA, which is focused on promoting the development and welfare
of a recipient nation, compared to China’s OFF and unspecified contributions.7
Figure 1: Chinese Aid to Africa
Unspeci3ied"
18"
OOF7like"
16"
ODA7like"
14"
In#U.S.#Billion#Dollars#
•
12"
10"
8"
6"
4"
2"
2000" 2001" 2002" 2003" 2004" 2005" 2006" 2007" 2008" 2009" 2010" 2011" 2012"
Year#
2
•
Increasing Chinese investment. China also invests heavily on the African continent. Such
investments include Foreign Direct Investments and Joint Ventures. Estimates of the total
of Chinese investment in Africa from 2005-2011 reach roughly $13.5 billion.8
•
Increasing Chinese trade with Africa. In 2009, China surpassed the United States as
Africa’s largest trading partner. Three years later, Chinese two-way trade with the
African continent reached $198 billion, doubling that of the United States.9 Ambassador
David Shinn writes that easy financing by Chinese banks and lower bids by construction
companies, “make it difficult for American and Western companies to compete.”10 This
policy is leading to a dominant Chinese economic presence on the African continent.
Figure 2: Total Trade with Africa
250,000"
In#USD#Millions#
200,000"
150,000"
100,000"
50,000"
2000" 2001" 2002" 2003" 2004" 2005" 2006" 2007" 2008" 2009" 2010" 2011" 2012"
Year#
China"
U.S."
The Threat of Growing Chinese Influence
Chinese growing involvement in Africa jeopardizes United States’ security interests—both on
the continent and globally.
Chinese Influence Undermines U.S. Security Initiatives
By providing African governments with an alternative source of economic support, Beijing’s
involvement in Africa serves as an obstacle to political reform and contributes to the grow of
radicalism and narcotrafficking on the continent.
3
•
Hinders U.S. efforts to encourage political reform. In contrast to Washington’s
development standards, China contributes to Africa regardless of regime type or
government practices. Consequently, African leaders prefer the ease of Chinese aid over
the conditionality of U.S. aid. Even Washington’s close allies in Africa such as Ethiopia,
Kenya, Angola, Ghana, and South Africa selectively apply guidance from the United
States to improve their human rights and governance practices because they can rely on
China for support.11
Furthermore, Angolan journalist Rafael Marques indicates that Angola is encountering a
reverse democratization process in which the government has revived a regime similar to
Beijing’s one-party system but without China’s economic growth. This results in a
system in which the African ruling elites maximize their profits, while allowing China to
gain control of key economic assets through privatization.12
•
Hinders U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The Chinese contribute investment and aid to
Africa regardless of regime type or willingness to cooperate with anti-terrorist operations.
These contributions insulate African nations from U.S. pressure to cooperate on antiterrorism initiatives by offering an economic alternative. 13 For example, Chinese
investment and aid to Sudan allows the government to ignore U.S. pressure that seeks to
alter Khartoum’s support for radical groups.
•
Hinders U.S. efforts to combat narcotrafficking. The instability of African governments’
and their lack of resources makes the continent an inviting region of transit for
narcotrafficking. The United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control
stated that, “Illicit activities surrounding the West African drug trade jeopardize U.S.
goals in the region. The drug trade destabilizes governments and funds terrorist
organizations, including Hezbollah and Al Qaeda in the Land of the Islamic Maghreb.”14
However, China indiscriminate invests in nations that are centers of drug trafficking, such
as Ghana, insulates governments from U.S. pressure to combat narcotrafficking.15
Chinese Involvement Jeopardizes U.S. Access to Resources
By building an economic relationship with Africa, China has gained significant control over
African rare earth metals and other natural resources, compromising U.S. access to these
resources.
•
Competition for rare earth metals. Rare earth metals are crucial for many defense
applications such as “jet fighter engines, missile guidance systems, antimissile defense,
and satellite and communication systems.”16 Rare earth metals also are essential for many
products such as rechargeable batteries and medical devices.17 The PRC already controls
80 percent of the world’s output of rare earth metals, leaving the United States heavily
dependent on imports of rare earth metals from China.18 Discovery of rare earth mineral
deposits in Africa provide a possible long-term alternative to Chinese sources. 19
However, with China currently mining these deposits in Africa, Beijing is still in a key
position to control access to these metals.20 China demonstrated its ability to capitalize on
4
this power in 2010 when it withheld rare earth metals from Japan over a maritime
dispute.21
•
Competition for African minerals. With its growth in industry, China competes with the
United States for other resources in Africa. In 2012, 81 percent of U.S. imports from subSaharan Africa were mineral products, including oil and precious stones.22 Eighty percent
of China’s imports from Africa also consist of mineral products.23
China threatens U.S. production capacity through its control over African resources. In some
cases China maintains a strategic monopoly over these resources, with the potential of cutting off
international access in times of conflict. In other cases, China is a major competitor of the United
States for African resources.
Chinese Influence Threatens the United States’ Power in Multilateral Bodies
Growing Chinese influence in Africa increases the PRC’s power in international institutions. By
building financial relationships, China cultivates a strong partner in many African nations. This
relationship translates into African support for Beijing’s, rather than Washington’s, interests in
multilateral bodies. With 54 member states, African nations form the largest regional group in
the United Nations.24 The U.S Department of State believes that one of China’s three main
objectives in providing aid to Africa is to increase China’s global reputation as a leader of the
developing world.25
Current U.S. Policy in Africa
The United States currently promotes its partnerships in Africa; however, growing Chinese
involvement in Africa requires a more robust and coordinated response.
General Promotion of U.S. Values in Africa
The United States currently operates under a policy of minimal involvement in China’s
relationship with Africa. Instead of entangling itself in China’s missteps, the United States
focuses on improving its relationship with many African nations.
•
Promotes African business. The U.S. Department of State has a number of programs that
promote the development of African business. Through the Bureau of African Affairs’
Office of Economic Policy’s Commercial Unit, the State Department provides
specialized counseling on expanding business on the continent. The Department of
Commerce also works to help U.S. investors and facilitate U.S.-African trade through
their Trade Informational Center.26
•
Builds capacity. One of the key components of the State Department’s efforts to build
5
indigenous capacity in Africa is the variety of education and leadership programs that it
sponsors, such as the President’s Young African Leaders Initiative.27 The Global Peace
Operations Initiative, for example, assists Africans in developing their own peacekeeping
training.28
•
Promotes African development. USAID engages in a variety of programs in Africa to
assist African economic development. The agency assists African businesses by
negotiating trade agreements with international economic partners and informing the
African businesses of opportunities to increase these links with the United States.29
Programs like the U.S. Global Health Initiative create partnerships between U.S. and
African governments and private organizations to promote health and wellness.30 USAID
also provides monetary resources to help African governments democratize, reduce
corruption, improve human rights practices, and quickly respond to humanitarian crises.31
An Emerging African Popular Backlash Against China
Many U.S. policymakers view China’s increasing economic involvement in Africa as cause for
concern. However, inadequacies in Beijing’s policy towards Africa have resulted in a backlash
among Africans.
Failure or Inadequacy of Current Chinese Policy
Chinese projects in Africa have contributed to development; however they suffer from three
main problems:
•
Hinders strong, transparent governance. China’s disregard for human rights and
corruption enables authoritarian regimes such as those in Sudan, Libya, and Zimbabwe.
Ambassador David Shinn notes that, “China gives its highest foreign policy priority to
developing strong links with governments irrespective of the nature of the governing
regime.”32 For example, Sudan is one of China’s crucial oil exporters in spite of its poor
human rights record. China invited Omar al-Bashir, the President of Sudan and a war
crimes suspect, to visit Beijing in 2011 to solidify friendly relations with China.33 This
contrasts with the U.S. opposition to Sudan on the grounds of its indictment by the ICC.34
Additionally, Amnesty International condemned China’s acceptance of Bashir, stating
that China risked becoming a “safe haven for alleged perpetrators of genocide.”35
•
Enacts unfair labor practices. Beijing has brought its notoriously poor labor practices
from China to Africa. Chinese involvement in Chad exemplifies the PRC’s exploitive
practices. In September 2013, for example, China dumped excess crude oil into ditches
south of Chad’s capital and then had Chadian workers to remove it without protection.36
Additionally, employees at Chinese-run copper mines in Zambia must work for two years
before receiving safety helmets. Fatal accidents occur almost daily when this dangerous
practice is combined with the poor ventilation of the mines. The Chinese avoid
6
condemnation for this practice by bribing union leaders.37
While the Chinese government has officially maintained that its businesses comply with
local laws, violators are rarely forced to answer to Beijing. Yoon Jung Park, a ChinaAfrica researcher with Australia’s Monash University finds that the migrant Chinese
living in Africa often fail to follow instructions from Beijing without significant
repercussions.38
•
Fails to build capacity. China hinders the development of African capabilities in three
categories:
1. Neglecting African managerial capacity. Africans depend on Chinese workers to set
up and manage aid projects. A Chinese researcher stated that in the case of Tanzania,
“Once the Chinese side stopped ‘blood transfusion,’ the projects could not operate
properly. Efficiency declined, machines became worn out, and finally the whole
project became paralyzed.”39 Deborah Brautigam confirms that issues with Chinese
projects in Africa forced the Chinese to commit to a long-term partnership. 40
Therefore, rather than building self-sufficient managerial capacity, China created a
continent of economies dependent on its guidance for operation.
2. Undermining Africa’s industrial capacity. By importing cheaper Chinese goods,
Beijing has damaged African industry and contributed to local unemployment.
Between 2001 and 2010, South Africa lost 78,000 jobs to Chinese imports.
Researcher Rhys Jenkins has stated that with Chinese imports, the African
manufacturing sector expels rather than absorbs labor.41 Additionally, estimates of the
number of Chinese migrant workers in Africa ranges from 270,000 to one million.42
These figures represent the number of Africans who lost their jobs to Chinese
workers.43
3. Building poor quality infrastructure. The Chinese often build projects with poor
infrastructure. For example, the Chinese Overseas Engineering Group Company spent
$8 million (contrasted with the $80 million Portugal spent to construct a private clinic
for the country) to build an 80,000 square hospital in Angola’s capital of Luanda.
However, in June 2010 cracks in the building walls and disintegrating bricks forced
the hospital to evacuate all staff and patients.44 Additionally, Angolan roads and the
roofs of building built by China often deteriorate quickly.45 These are only a few of
the many examples of China’s poor building practices.
Signs of an Emerging Backlash
As a result of Chinese practices, African resent of China has increased, manifesting in a variety
of ways:
•
Leadership dissatisfaction. Many African elites have expressed displeasure with Chinese
practices on the continent. Lamido Sanusi, governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria,
7
stated, “So China takes our primary goods and sells us manufactured ones. This was also
the essence of colonialism.”46 In July of 2012, South African President Jacob Zuma also
illustrated this attitude when he described his nation’s trade relationship with China as,
“unsustainable in the long term.”47
Additionally, after leading a strike against Chinese company, New Era Investments, for
breaching minimum wage agreements, General Secretary of the Metal and Allied
Namibian Workers Union Bernard Milinga commented on the 418 workers that were
fired as a result, “This is an unfair labor practice and the exploitation of worker of the
highest order.”48
•
Public opinion. China’s unfair labor practices and poor project quality have decreased
African approval towards the Chinese. A Gallup poll based on data from 2006 to 2008
found that 73 percent of Sub-Saharan African countries approve of American leadership,
while only 65 percent approve of Chinese leadership.49
•
Unrest. Africans also have expressed their displeasure through vandalism, strikes,
kidnapping, and even murder. 50 For example, on January 8, 2014, more than 200
Mozambican construction workers held a strike in January against alleged beatings by
their Chinese employers, poor working conditions, and unfair payments. A worker
reported, “These Chinese have no respect for the people. They insult us, beat and send us
away when they want and for no reason.”51
Given the prevalence of Chinese involvement in Africa, the backlash that has emerged could
potentially spread across the continent.
Troubling Trajectory
China’s practices have the potential to get worse—and the potential for an African backlash
greater—with time.
•
Stagnated growth. China’s rate of economic growth has slowed. Chinese GDP growth
fell from 9.3 percent in 2011 to 8.8 percent in 2012.52 Additionally, the growth of urban
household income declined from 9.7 percent in early 2012 to 6.5 percent in the same
period of 2013.53 China’s Development Research Council expects GDP growth to drop to
six percent by 2020.54 Given the millions of rural Chinese moving to cities, the Chinese
government has established 8 percent as the minimum annual growth rate necessary in
order to mitigate unemployment and prevent domestic unrest.55
•
Consequences for Africa. With this slower growth, at best, China’s extractive practices
in Africa are unlikely to change and, at worst, may deteriorate as Beijing seeks higher
rates of return from its investments on the continent. Thus China will increasingly exploit
Africa as a source of profit to boost its slowing growth rate. At the same time, it will
lessen its already minimal attention to labor practices, industrial capacity, and
infrastructure quality on the continent.
8
As the Chinese economy’s rate of growth decreases, the likelihood of Chinese foreign
malpractices increases. Chinese behavior will become more focused on profit and less concerned
with supporting Africa. Therefore, the United States should expect resentment among the
African people to grow.
Championing U.S. Conditionality and Values
Forward-thinking African leaders are seeking new investors, especially American
investors. They like the fact that when American companies invest, they hire, train and
promote local staff, they invest in the communities and they’re focused not just on taking
resources out of the continent, but investing in the human resources of the continent as
well.
- Michael Froman, United States Trade Representative, 2013
The United States should adopt a two-pronged initiative to indirectly challenge China’s
problematic economic practices in Africa and increase the appeal of U.S. development
assistance. First, the United States should provide NGOs with grants to promote good
development policies in Africa. Second, the United States should conduct a public relations
campaign to advertise the responsible, sustainable practices of its own agencies. Together, these
policies will draw attention to the wide gap between U.S. and Chinese economic activities in the
region and engender more favorable attitudes towards the United States among the African
public.
•
Grants program. The United States should offer grants to relevant NGOs to promote
good development policies in Africa. These organizations could trumpet the need for
foreign firms and development agencies to engage in responsible labor practices, respect
human rights, build capacity, and construct sustainable infrastructure. While the United
States already conducts similar activity with NGOs involved in Africa, Washington
should scale up its existing programs to increase the impact of these initiatives. As
awareness of good development practices grows, the African public is more likely to
embrace the conduct of U.S. aid agencies—in particular the conditionality of American
assistance. It is also likely that Chinese economic activities will face greater scrutiny and
sharper criticism—building opposition to China’s presence in the region.
Grants could be awarded to NGOs such as Global Hand, which teaches good business
practices to disadvantaged individuals in order to encourage entrepreneurship and help
them secure a stable income.56 Global Hand could use U.S. funds to encourage foreign
firms and development agencies to invest in developing African-owned businesses.
Another potential recipient is the Center for Democracy and Development, which
researches challenges to the democratization and development of West Africa.57 The
United States could offer the Center funds to investigate barriers to democratic
development on the continent. This research could ultimately reveal how Chinese aid and
investment are an obstacle to promoting good governance. There are a number of other
NGOs that would be good candidates to receive similar grants from the United States.
9
Funding independent organizations to seek to improve development in Africa will benefit
the United States in two ways. First, these NGOs will provide further evidence of the
divergence between U.S. and Chinese practices. Second, reports from these organizations
are more likely to be perceived as unbiased. As a result, they may build support among
the Africans (and eventually African governments) for U.S. development agencies—
perhaps at the expense of China. Beijing may object to this program. However, compared
to a more aggressive U.S. policy—one that openly criticizes Chinese practices—this
approach will likely have a minimal effect on Washington’s relationship with China.
•
Public diplomacy initiative. The United States should launch a campaign through the
Department of State, in particular the office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
and Public Affairs, that highlights the good development practices of U.S. agencies in
Africa, including their commitment to constructing sustainable infrastructure, assisting
management capacity, creating jobs, defending human rights, and supporting transparent,
democratic governments. The Department of State can build on existing initiatives, such
as a program in the Bureau of Public Affairs that connects local, regional, and national
foreign media with Department of State officials to facilitate information sharing
regarding U.S. foreign policy in Africa. Additionally, the Bureau of International
Information Programs distributes information about current U.S. policies and values
through social media and other websites to foreign audiences in order to increase
transparency about American foreign policy.58 The Department of State should charge
these programs with also highlighting U.S. development activities that deviate from
Chinese practices. Washington should target this campaign at areas of Africa in which the
Chinese are more heavily invested.
The practices of U.S. development agencies abroad are in stark contrast with those of
China. As the gap between American and Chinese values become more widely known,
resentment towards the Chinese in Africa may increase. As Ambassador David Shinn
observed, “The most serious tension over the short-term is likely to result from the
different approach that China and the West have on human rights and democratization in
Africa…The strength of the recent protests and calls for reform across North Africa has
clearly given China reason for concern. Beijing’s silence is deafening.” 59 Thus, by
advertising good U.S. development practices—and thereby implicitly critiquing Beijing’s
malpractices—the United States can intensify the backlash among Africans against
China.
Some policymakers may fault this policy for failing to confront the Chinese directly
regarding their questionable practices. However, a more aggressive policy would
unnecessarily heighten tensions with Beijing. By adopting the policy recommended here,
the United States can win over the African public, while eroding support for China—
without provoking significant conflict with Beijing. This approach is also more consistent
with U.S. values, by encouraging the African people to demand change.
Thus, the United States should implement policies that will serve to foment wider public
dissatisfaction with Chinese economic practices, encouraging African states to turn away from
China and seek development assistance from Washington.
10
Conclusion
The rise of China may undermine U.S. influence—how much is yet unknown. While, many U.S.
policymakers worry that Beijing’s aid to and investment in countries in Africa threatens U.S.
interests, China’s involvement in these countries creates an opportunity for Washington to shape
this future. By hindering strong governance, enacting unfair labor practices, and failing to
develop capacity in Africa, there is growing resentment towards China among many Africans,
which will only increase with a downturn in the Chinese economy. To shift the allegiance of
states currently partnering with China towards the United States, Washington should enact a twopronged initiative. It should offer grants to NGOs to promote responsible development policies
and conduct a public relations campaign to advertise U.S. standards in foreign development. This
initiative will encourage African states to replace Chinese aid and investment with development
assistance from the United States and thus counter Chinese influence in Africa. This policy
allows the United States to expand its influence even as China rises.
1
Doug Palmer, “U.S. losing ground to China on Africa trade, investment-sector says,” Reuters, March 7, 2013,
http://206.132.6.105/article/angolaNews/idAFL1N0BZ7UH2013"0307
2
“China’s Growing Role in Africa- Implications for U.S. Policy.” All Africa, November 1, 2011. ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/pais/docview/901494515/14335602C53312D50F/19?accountid=15053
3
As named by the College of William & Mary’s AidData database. See: “Frequently Asked Questions,” AidData.
http://china.aiddata.org/content/frequently_asked_questions#how_much_aid_does_china_give_what_is_the_differe
nce_between_odaoof
4
The OECD defines concessional as, “These are loans that are extended on terms substantially more generous than
market loans. The concessionality is achieved either through interest rates below those available on the market or by
grace periods, or a combination of these. Concessional loans typically have long grace periods.” “Concessional
Loans,” OECD, August 27, 2003, http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=5901
The World Bank defines a “grant element” as the measure of a loan’s concessionality, or, “the difference between
the loan’s nominal value (face value) and the sum of the discounted future debt-service payments to be made by the
borrower (present value), expressed as a percentage of the loan’s face value. Whenever the interest rate charged for
a loan is lower than the discount rate, the present value of the debt is smaller than its face value, with the difference
reflecting the (positive) grant element of the loan.” Grant Element Calculations,” International Development
Association, 2012, http://www.worldbank.org/ida/grant-element-calculations.html.
“Official Development Assistance-definition and coverage,” OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/officialdevelopmentassistancedefinitionandcoverage.htm
5
“Other Official Flows,” OECD, June 11, 2013, https://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=1954
6
All three of these forms of aid constitute China’s aid to Africa. See: : “Frequently Asked Questions,” AidData,
http://china.aiddata.org/content/frequently_asked_questions#how_much_aid_does_china_give_what_is_the_differe
nce_between_odaoof
7
AidData has tried to capture the flows; however, without membership in OECD’s Creditor Reporting System,
China lacks accountability and transparency. Therefore all of China’s aid contributions to Africa must be
categorized as ODA-like or OOF-like, since they resemble that type of aid but lack official classifications.
Additionally, the significant amount of “unspecified” contributions speaks to the lack of transparency by the
Chinese government. By withholding information regarding the nature of their contributions, China demonstrates a
model of opacity for African governments and prompting questions from the international community.
See: “Stat Extracts,” OECD, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=CRS1
11
Peaks in Chinese aid to and investment in Africa correspond with the years in which the Forum on Chinese-African
Cooperation held a conference. See: "Forum on China-Africa Cooperation," Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the
People's Republic of China, 2014, http://www.focac.org/eng/
8
Xiaofang Shen, “Private Chinese Investment in Africa: Myths and Realities,” The World Bank, January
2013, http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-6311
9
Gordon G. Chang, “America Versus China in Africa,” World Affairs, July 3, 2013,
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/america-versus-china-africa
10
“China’s Growing Role in Africa- Implications for U.S. Policy,” All Africa, November 1, 2011, ProQuest.
http://search.proquest.com/pais/docview/901494515/14335602C53312D50F/19?accountid=15053
11
China’s Growing Role in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on African Affairs, Senate, 112th Cong. (statement of David Shinn, adjunct professor,
Elliott School of International Affairs, Washington D.C.).
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/David_Shinn_Testimony.pdf
12
Rafael Marques de Morais, “The New Imperialism: China in Angola,” World Affairs, March 2011.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-imperialism-china-angola
13
Another U.S. security threat on the African continent includes piracy. While China participates in anti-piracy
operations in Somalia, Chinese aid also allows for piracy to thrive throughout West Africa. Beijing gives $28.5
million to Somalia while piracy continues to plague the nation. Somali pirates have abducted and commandeered
western ships that they contact while Western African pirates more strategically target oil barges. After eliminating
the crew, the pirates sell the oil on the black market. Sigurd Neubauer points out that, “Piracy and terrorism can also
be used as a means to exert economic warfare against the United States and the international community as maritime
attacks offer terrorists an alternative means of causing mass economic destabilization.” While China has attempted
to counter piracy in Somalia, it has yet to prove its intentions in Western African piracy. Therefore, China
demonstrates its self-interest driven foreign policy by cooperating to fight security threats only when it meets their
interests. See: Daniel Fineran, “U.S., Chinese navies in joint anti-piracy drills off Somalia,” Reuters, September 18,
2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-china-usa-piracy-idUSBRE88H0PY20120918
“AidData,” last modified April 4, 2014. http://china.aiddata.org/map
Sigurd Neubauer, “Somalia: Terrorist-Piracy Nexus?,” The World Post, May 22, 2013.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sigurd-neubauer/somalia-piracy_b_3320406.html
14
Eight Steps to Counter the Drug Trade in West Africa: United States Senate Caucus on International Narcotics
Control, 133th Cong. (2013). http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/files/serve/?File_id=0a8afe8f-f0864585-96cc-78c14bf1cbed
15
“Africa and the Middle East,” U.S. Department of State, 2006.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/62390.pdf
16
Marc Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, CRS Report R41347 (Congressional Research
Service: December 16, 2013). http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf
17
Marc Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, CRS Report R41347 (Congressional Research
Service: December 16, 2013). http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf
18
Chuin Wei Yap, “China Moves to Tighten Rare-Earths Control, Pave Way for Consolidation,” The Wall Street
Journal, January 3, 2014. http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303870704579298810741503846
Marc Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, CRS Report R41347 (Congressional Research
Service: December 16, 2013). http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf
19
Nicholas Jepson, “A 21st Century Scramble: South Africa, China and the Rare Earth Metals Industry, Governance
of Africa’s Resources Programme, March 2012.
http://www.eisourcebook.org/cms/June%202013/South%20Africa,%20China%20and%20the%20Rare%20Earth%2
0Metals%20Industry.pdf
20
Jon Herskovitz, “Analysis: Rare earth hunt leads to frontier Africa,” Reuters, March 4, 2011.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/04/us-africa-rareearths-idUSTRE72319620110304
21
Marc Humphries, Rare Earth Elements: The Global Supply Chain, CRS Report R41347 (Congressional Research
Service: December 16, 2013). http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41347.pdf
22
"Africa," Office of the United States Trade Representative. http://www.ustr.gov/countries-regions/africa
12
23
"More than Minerals," The Economist, March 23, 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-andafrica/21574012-chinese-trade-africa-keeps-growing-fears-neocolonialism-are-overdone-more
24
“Members of the General Assembly Are Arranged in Current Regional Groups,” accessed March 7, 2014.
http://www.un.int/wcm/webdav/site/gmun/shared/documents/GA_regionalgrps_Web.pdf
25
U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 110th Congress,
2nd Session, China in Africa: Implications for U.S. Policy, June 24, 2008, 4. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110shrg45811/pdf/CHRG-110shrg45811.pdf
26
“Investing in Sub-Saharan Africa,” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/investing/index.htm
Laws like the African Growth and Opportunity Act solidify this economic partnership. See: “African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA),” Office of the United States Trade Representative. http://www.ustr.gov/tradetopics/trade-development/preference-programs/african-growth-and-opportunity-act-agoa
27
“President’s Young African Leaders Initiative,” U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/pyali/index.htm
28
“Office of Plans and Initiatives,” U.S. Department of State. http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/index.htm
29
“Trade Africa,” USAID, February 28, 2014. http://www.usaid.gov/tradeafrica
30
“Public-Private Partnership,” U.S. Global Health Initiative, August 23, 2013.
http://www.ghi.gov/about/howWeWork/publicPrivate/index.html#.UytUW9xN1uY
Additionally, the State Department funds government organizations such as the President’s Malaria Initiative to
effectively target health threats in Africa. See: “Health Issues,” U.S. Department of State.
http://www.state.gov/p/af/rt/health/index.htm
31
“Africa,” USAID, April 1, 2014. http://www.usaid.gov/where-we-work/africa
32
David H. Shinn, “The Impact of China’s Growing Influence in Africa,” The European Financial Review, April
15, 2011. http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=2806
33
“China bolsters economic ties with Sudan,” Al Jazeera, June 29, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asiapacific/2011/06/201162952034878959.html
34
The ICC mandates that any member state should arrest Bashir if he visits their state. See: “China bolsters
economic ties with Sudan,” Al Jazeera, June 29, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asiapacific/2011/06/201162952034878959.html
35
“China bolsters economic ties with Sudan,” Al Jazeera, June 29, 2011. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asiapacific/2011/06/201162952034878959.html
36
Adam Nossiter, “China Finds Resistance to Oil Deals in Africa,” The New York Times, September 17, 2013.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/18/world/africa/china-finds-resistance-to-oil-deals-in-africa.html?_r=2&
37
“The Chinese in Africa: Trying to pull together,” The Economist, April 20, 2011.
http://www.economist.com/node/18586448
38
Ed Cropley and Michael Martina, “Insight: In Africa’s warm heart, a cold welcome for Chinese,” Reuters,
September 18, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-africa-china-pushbackidUSBRE88H0CR20120918
39
Deborah Brautigam, “Feeling the Stones,” in The Dragon’s Gift (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 59.
40
Deborah Brautigam, “Feeling the Stones,” in The Dragon’s Gift (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 59.
41
Ed Cropley and Michael Martina, “Insight: In Africa’s warm heart, a cold welcome for Chinese,” Reuters,
September 18, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-africa-china-pushbackidUSBRE88H0CR20120918
42
Emmanuel Ma Mung, “Chinese Migration and China’s Foreign Policy in Africa,” Johns Hopkins University,
2008. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_chinese_overseas/v004/4.1.mung.html
Daniel Flynn, “Africa Investment-China brings goods and roads, now Africa wants jobs,” Reuters, July 21, 2013.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/21/africa-china-idUSL6N0FI3TE20130721
43
The United States also exports goods into Africa. However, the United States exports mainly high-tech goods
while African manufacturers specialize in low-tech goods. By exporting low-tech goods into Africa, China directly
undermines African economies. See: "US high-tech companies ramping up exports: Survey," The Economic Times,
13
October 1, 2012, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-10-01/news/34198225_1_export-growthexport-target-free-trade
Abderlrasaq Nal and Mammo Muchie, "Industrial Upgrading in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Competitive Impact of
China on Supplier Linkage Development Potentials of Resident Asian Entrepreneurs," University of Oxford,
http://www3.qeh.ox.ac.uk/pdf/ptmd/SLPTMD-WP-034.pdf
44
Rafael Marques Morais, “The New Imperialism: China in Angola,” World Affairs, April 2011.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-imperialism-china-angola
45
Rafael Marques Morais, “The New Imperialism: China in Angola,” World Affairs, April 2011.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/new-imperialism-china-angola
46
Gordon G. Chang, “America Versus China in Africa,” World Affairs, July 3, 2013.
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/gordon-g-chang/america-versus-china-africa
47
Ed Cropley and Michael Martina, “Insight: In Africa’s warm heart, a cold welcome for Chinese,” Reuters,
September 18, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-africa-china-pushbackidUSBRE88H0CR20120918
48
Ellanie Smit, “Union not caving in to Chinese company,” Namibian Sun, August 15, 2011.
http://sun.com.na/content/general/union-not-caving-chinese-company
49
Ian T. Brown and Tao Wu, “China and the U.S.: Competing for Political Influence,” Gallup, May 22, 2009.
http://www.gallup.com/poll/118591/China-Competing-Political-Influence.aspx
50
For example, In November 2011, South Africans burnt four Chinese alive in an arson attack on their homes.
Additionally, Anti-Chinese protests in June 2012 forced the Malawi government to reinstate an old law that confines
foreign retailers to large cities. See: Ed Cropley and Michael Martina, “Insight: In Africa’s warm heart, a cold
welcome for Chinese,” Reuters, September 18, 2012. http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-africa-chinapushback-idUSBRE88H0CR20120918
In January 2012, “Twenty-nine Chinese workers were kidnapped from their construction site in Sudan on
Saturday… Allegedly the road being built by the Chinese would have helped the army bring weapons and supplies
closer to the rebels.”50 See: Simon Allison, “China in Africa: the blowback beings,” Daily Maverick, February 1,
2012. http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-02-01-china-in-africa-the-blowback-begins#.UuvcvGSVluJ
This violence has escalated to include murder. In August 2012, Zambian miners used a coal truck to crush a Chinese
supervisor to death as a result of a dispute over pay.50 See: Ed Cropley and Michael Martina, “Insight: In Africa’s
warm heart, a cold welcome for Chinese,” Reuters, September 18, 2012.
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/18/us-africa-china-pushback-idUSBRE88H0CR20120918
In the same month Bedouins kidnapped 25 Chinese workers for the release of four of their imprisoned tribesmen.
See: Simon Allison, “China in Africa: the blowback beings,” Daily Maverick, February 1, 2012.
http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2012-02-01-china-in-africa-the-blowback-begins#.UuvcvGSVluJ
51
“Mozambican workers strike, claim abuse by Chinese employers,” Modern Ghana, January 8, 2014.
http://www.modernghana.com/news/512703/1/mozambican-workers-strike-claim-abuse-by-chinese-e.html
52
Garry White, “China’s domestic over-capacity and stagnating global demand point to hard landing,” The
Telegraph, January 2, 2012. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/commodities/8987951/Chinas-domestic-overcapacity-and-stagnating-global-demand-point-to-hard-landing.html
53
Rob Schmitz, “China’s lopsided, slowing economy,” Los Angeles Times, October 22, 2013.
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/22/opinion/la-oe-schmitz-china-consumers-economy-20131022
54
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, “China may not overtake America this century after all,” The Telegraph, May 8, 2013.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/comment/10044456/China-may-not-overtake-America-this-century-afterall.html
55
"Reflating the dragon," The Economist, November 13, 2008. http://www.economist.com/node/12606998
56
In one project, Global Hand teaches Rwandan women basic business skills and allows them to sell homemade
products on Internet retail websites in order to provide them with a stable income. “Global Hand,” last modified
2014, http://www.globalhand.org/en/organisations/34724
57
Centre for Democracy and Development,” last modified 2014, http://www.cddwestafrica.org/index.php/en/aboutcdd/cdd-core
Finally, Green Africa creates community-based projects on the continent that teach the Africans practices intended
to improve capacity and environmental sustainability. The United States would offer grants to this NGO to reveal
14
Chinese inadequacy in building African capacity and environmental sustainability. See: “Green Africa Foundation,”
last modified 2014, http://www.greenafricafoundation.org
58
http://www.allgov.com/departments/department-of-state/bureau-of-international-informationprograms?agencyid=7188
59
David H. Shinn, “The Impact of China’s Growing Influence in Africa,” The European Financial Review, April
15, 2011. http://www.europeanfinancialreview.com/?p=2806
15