Interview with Leo Tindemans: the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (Brussels, 24 February 2006)
Source: Interview de Leo Tindemans / LEO TINDEMANS, Étienne Deschamps, prise de vue : François
Fabert.- Bruxelles: CVCE [Prod.], 24.02.2006. CVCE, Sanem. - VIDEO (00:08:39, Couleur, Son original).
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Last updated: 05/07/2016
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Interview with Leo Tindemans: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(Brussels, 24 February 2006)
[Étienne Deschamps] In 1975 you took part in the Helsinki Summit on the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe. What did it deal with, and what can you recall of these international negotiations and
the signing of this agreement?
[Leo Tindemans] This was an extremely important date and I am pleased to say that those who were
involved… for example, the former German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, has just written and said that a peak
in his political career was the Helsinki meeting and the Helsinki Agreements; the head of French diplomacy
at the time, who, as such, was therefore present in Helsinki, Andréani, has said in a speech he gave in
Brussels that in his view it was the diplomatic high point of recent years. I too was present and I was directly
involved; it was a high point, and I said so in my memoirs. Why was it so important? It was the meeting of
East and West so the Soviet leaders were there, the two Germanys were represented, all the other countries
were present, and the Finns had made careful preparations for it. Negotiations had been going on for several
years in Geneva; now it was time for the diplomats to come to a peace agreement among themselves, or let
us say to improve relations between East and West — that is, between the Communist world and the
Western world. How was this to be done? Was there a way, not merely to discuss disarmament —
discussions already took place sporadically — but to improve the atmosphere, to humanise relations
between people in the world during that period? The Geneva negotiations had taken place in an extremely
difficult climate. There had been no immediate agreement, and there had been interminable disputes on
matters of detail, but, in the end, the outcome was Helsinki. This may not be appreciated, but no Treaty was
signed in Helsinki. The document that was agreed was called the ‘Helsinki Final Act’, but there was no
formal Treaty, no Convention. This is sometimes overlooked.
It was the will, the assumed goodwill of the partners, which constituted the value of the Helsinki
negotiations. What was at stake? From the Soviet side, the emphasis had been, right from the end of the war,
that frontiers should be recognised officially — the European frontiers as they had been established at the
end of the hostilities. This, of course, therefore meant victory for the Soviet Union where there were Soviet
troops, and the confirmation that there would be no further attempt to modify the frontiers by recourse to
arms. That is what was at stake; that was the proposal. As a result, for a long time, the approach in political
circles was: ‘It is just not possible; it would mean an unimaginable victory for the Soviet Union.’ However,
others responded, rightly: ‘What you say is correct: it is a great victory for them. But it says ‘without
recourse to arms’, so fine. Can one say ‘no’ — with recourse to arms? Are we to insist that reform must be
possible even by resorting to arms? This will therefore mean that we are for war, and that we are going to
start a war in order to change these frontiers.’ But that was not possible either. How should we react in this
complex, ambiguous situation? What was the solution? How could this be done? At any rate, the Final Act
was prepared; we went to Helsinki, and so forth. On the Western side, we opposed Soviet claims regarding
the recognition of the frontiers in Europe as they existed at the end of the war. We demanded recognition of,
and respect for, human rights, freedom of speech and expression, the rule of law, the importance of rights in
justice and — what else? — all the things that we are very attached to, and for which the other side used the
same expressions and the same terms, but gave a quite different meaning. I could carry on listing these.
Then, when it was time to stop and leave for the Helsinki meeting, on the Western side several people said:
‘The Soviets are going to obtain a lot of real advantages — the recognition of these frontiers — what a
victory! Whereas on our side, it will just be paper.’ They can subscribe to foreign newspapers, they can read
foreign books or whatever; all that was in three baskets. We shall have to be content with words and paper,
while, for them, it is very real. This reached the point where even within the Belgian government, which I
was a part of, there were difficulties and some quite difficult discussions, some saying: ‘What are you going
to Helsinki for? It is pure theatre; it does not mean anything.’ Others, on the other hand, said: ‘Can Belgium
stay at home while others discuss extremely important issues — the most important issues in diplomatic
political life at present?’ In the end we went and I spoke there; I made a speech on behalf of Belgium, so I
was a part of all that. And Helsinki gave extraordinary results. The frontiers did not change at once, but the
revolution came from the people that lived there — not from the United States nor from the West nor from
NATO. But in Poland, in Budapest, in Hungary, in Slovenia, in Eastern Germany, it was the people who
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stood up against the regime. We were able to witness that: the fall of the Berlin Wall, and all that.
As for these texts, described disparagingly as ‘merely paper’, we then saw the establishment of several clubs
and associations in all these Central European and East European countries, which invoked the text of the
Helsinki Agreement when demanding from the authorities the right to read the foreign press, to read books,
to write more freely, to speak of human rights — things which were forbidden, for one was sent to prison or
to a psychiatric hospital when one dared to speak up, prior to Helsinki. This therefore gave rise to a
movement, an opportunity to come forward and express oneself more freely than before. Afterwards, a very
good meeting was held ten years after Helsinki, which I addressed; it took place in Geneva, and one was
right to say: ‘Not everything has been carried out.’ Helsinki is not always respected, but we can say it has
been carried out 40 %, 50 %, or 60 %, but that is already quite something. It is not the end, it is not all over,
one can still carry on. So, you see, Helsinki came to signify… how shall I put it… a change in the climate of
the Cold War in Europe. The great change. I am well aware that the Soviet Union expanded its activities in
Africa all the more, but nonetheless… Here in Europe it was, after all, the most dangerous place or continent
for conflicts or confrontations. Here, thanks to Helsinki, we managed to create a new climate and better
understanding, a victory for our conception of human rights and other freedoms.
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