Order of Proof
Defendant OSHIMA
Running Commentary
After Defense Document 2862, Affidavit of Oshim®, Hiroshi.
In order to corroborate the statement of Oshima, I should
like to call the attention of the Court to the following exhibits
and witnesses:
1.
As to paragraph 6, (5)> b, concerning Oshima's under-
standing of the purpose of the 4nti~Comintern Pact:
1) Ex. 1+81+, Transcript pages 2 2,1+80-22,1+82 and 22,1+8322,1+88, explanation by Premier Hirota and Foreign Minister
Arita at the Privy Council session.
2) Fx. 2,762, Transcript pages 2l+,739, affidavit of
Ribbentrop, in which Ribbentrop stated that "he never had
an impression that Japan might use the pact in her policy
toward China ar the South Sea area."
3) Fx. 1+86A, Transcript pages 5^97^, showing the view of
the German Government that the China Incident is in contravention of the Anti-Comintern Pact.
1+) Fx. 2,1+87, Transcript page 20,623, and Fx. 2,1+88,
Transcript pages 20^671-20,675, which show that the General
Staff sent instruction to the troops on the sp«t not to
aggravate the matter.
5) Fx. 2,1+97, Transcript pages 20,8l8-9, to show that
the Japanese Government endeavored to limit the scope of the
China Incident and to settle it locally.
2.
Is to paragraph 7 of the affidavit:
Ex. 2,762, Transcript pages 2i+,739, Ribbentrop's affidavit,
in which Ribbentrop says that "I remember also talking-quite
frequently to Oshima about the attempt to make peace with
China, and Oshima showed a desire in the same direction.
3.
Is to paragraph 99 (8), concerning the purpose of the
treaty between Japan, Germany and Italy which Oshima negotiated in
938-9:
1)
2619, Transcript pages 22,51+2, the draft of the
treaty which was the result of Oshima's negotiations.
2) Ex. 2,735,A, Transcript page 24,290, in which Prince
Konoye stated that there was a fundamental difference of
nature between the treaty negotiated under the Eiranuma
Cabinet and the Tripartite Pact concluded in September 1940
4.
As to paragraph 10, (.2), protest of the Japanese Govern-
ent to the German Government concerning the Non-Aggression Treaty
between Germany and Russia:
Ex. 506, Transcript pages 6,124-6, memorandum of
Weizsaecker, in which Weizsaecker stated that Oshima was evidently
honestly endeavouring to hand the note of protest to the
German Government.
5.
As to paragraph 11, (2), testimony of Stahmer, Transcript
pages 24,554-24,555, where Stabmer says that Oshima never sent
telegrams or letters to Ribbentrop through the German Embassy in
Tokyo.
6.
As to the paragraph 12, (1), Ex. 2744, Transcript page
,402, Stahmaer's affidavit, in which Stahmer says that Oshima
after his return from Germany was completely retired and was never
engaged in political
activities.
7.
As to paragraph 12,(2), Ex. 2744, Transcript page 24,404.
8.
As to paragraph 14, (l):
1) Ex. 2,762, Transcript pages 24,740-1, affidavit of
Ribbentrop.
2) Testimony of Admiral Kondo, Vice Chief of the Naval
General Staff, Transcript pages 26,678-26,683.
3) Testimony of Captain Miyo, member of the operational
section of the Naval General Staff, Transcript pages 26,91926,920, and 26,916.
Ribbentrop testified here that "I cannot
imagine that Oshima told me that the plan to attack Singapore
would be ready by the end of May
Oshima would hardly have known.
1941.
In the first place,
If Oshima had known, he
most certainly would not have told me, because the Japanese
never tell such things.
If this was said it was for propaganda
purposes and was not proposed by Oshima."
5B
Kondo and Miyo say that the Japanese Navy made no preparation
for an attack on Singapore prior to May 19^1*
^nd the opera-
tional planning was not commenced until after 6 September 1^1.1.
General Tanaka of the Army General Staff also made the same
statement,
9.
As to paragraph 15, (3)> namely, concerning the fact th
Matsuoka did not tell Oshima the contents of his talks with the
German leaders in Berlin:
Ex. 582, Transcript pages 6,5k3~k, where Matsuoka said to
Hitler and Ribbentrop that he could not utter in Japan a
single word of all that he had expounded before Hitler and
Ribbentrop, and that this would cause him serious damage in
political and financial circles.
10.
As to paragraph 1 6 :
^x; 2762, Transcript page 2l\.,rjl\.Z, affidavit of Ribbentrop,
in which Ribbentrop said that "Judging from the attitude'of
Oshima and the Japanese Government, I got the impression that
Japan did everything possible to keep out of the conflict with
Soviet Russia."
11.
As to paragraph 1 7 ,
(l), concerning the testimony of
Oshima that he was never informed by the Japanese Government
con-
cerning the Japanese-American negotiations, the Liaison and the
Imperial Conferences:
1) Testimony of witness Yamamoto, Transcript pages
26,119-26,121.
2) nx, 3000;* Transcript pages 26,570-1, affidavit of
Admiral Nomura.
12.
As to paragraph 1 7 ,
(5),
concerning Oshima's testimony
that the outbreak of the Japanese-American war was a complete surprise to him and the Germans:
1) Ex, 2 7 6 2 ,
Transcript page 2].i,7li.2, Ribbentrop's
2 ) Ex. 2 7 6 3 ,
Transcript page 2li,7i|9, testimony of Schmidt
affidavi
in N u m b e r g Trial.
13.
w
As to paragraph 18 of the affidavit, testimony of Admiral
omura to the effect that Oshima was not concerned with the Mili-
tary Agreement Japan-Germany-Italy, Transcript pages 26,599-26,600.
5c
lL|.*
As to paragraph 19:
Affidavit of Admiral Nomura, Ex. JOOO, Transcript page
26 , 5°9> i n Which Nomura testified as to the inactivity of the
Mixed Commission of the Tripartite Tact.
15*
As to paragraph 20:
Testimony of Admiral Nomura denying the murder of crews
of the torpedoed merchant ships by submarines, Transcript
pages 26,579-26,581.
5D