20 November 2016
The Italian constitutional referendum: a brief guide
by Dr. Mariaelisa Epifanio (University of Warwick) and Dr. Fadi Hassan (Trinity College Dublin and CEP-LSE)
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The Italian constitutional referendum is a key moment not
only for Italy, but also for the political equilibrium in
Europe.
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The referendum asks voters to confirm or discharge
changes to the 1948 Italian Constitution. The key aspects
focus on the role and composition of the Italian upper
Chamber, the Senate; on the redefinition of the balance of
power between the Italian Regions and the central state;
and on the introduction of new instruments of direct
democracy.
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On the positive side, if approved, the referendum would
make the legislative process quicker and timelier, might
reduce the legislative conflict between the state and
Regions, would allow citizens to have a more direct
impact over the legislative process, and would partially
reduce public expenditure on political institutions.
On the negative side, a more efficient legislative process
would come at the cost of a lower representation of
minority parties. The reform would lead to a change of
Senate’s members during the legislature whenever there
is a regional election, complicating the parliamentary
activity. Many key elements of the reform are not defined,
especially the rule for electing the Senators. Finally the
debate has turned into a vote in favor of or against Prime
Minister Renzi, which is unfortunate given the stakes.
A key political moment in Europe
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On December the 4 , Italians will cast their vote in favor or
against a Constitutional reform, which would change the
institutional setting of the country. The Prime Minister Matteo
Renzi supports the reform and in many occasions he has
announced that he would resign if the referendum is
rejected. The referendum is generating a heated debate in
Italy and catching the attention of the international audience.
The Financial Times had negative comments on the reform
defining it a “constitutional bridge to nowhere”, while the US
President Obama got vocal about his wishes for Renzi
staying in power even if the referendum gets rejected. The
attention of the international community on Italian political
events is not surprising given the recent populist trends in
Europe and the USA. A rejection of the referendum could
trigger a serious political crisis in Italy and many worry about
the raise of populist movements. This means that none of the
big-four continental countries (Germany, France, Italy and
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Spain) would stand on solid ground exactly on the 60
anniversary of the European Union in 2017: Germany and
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France are entering an electoral year (together with the
Netherlands), while Spain was only recently able to form a
minority government after two general elections. In the
meantime, the EU needs to negotiate Brexit, it is still facing a
migrant crisis, and has to reinvigorate a slow moving
economy. The Italian referendum increases the political
uncertainty surrounding the European Union.
The main changes
1. The Senate: turned partially into a consultative
chamber and downsized
The Italian parliamentary system is characterized by a socalled perfect bicameralism, where the two Chambers - the
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies - have the same power
in the legislative process.
If the constitutional referendum is approved, the Senate will
turn into a chamber with advisory power for common laws
and with veto power for constitutional, electoral, regional and
EU-related laws. Common laws and motions of confidence to
the government will no longer require approval from the
Senate, but from the Chamber of Deputies only.
The lower Chamber could approve immediately most laws,
unless one third of the Senate decide to suggest
modifications, which must be delivered within 30 days (15
days for laws related to the annual budget). The Chamber,
however, can ignore the suggestions and pass the bill.
Nevertheless, if the subject of the law pertains to regional
issues the Chamber needs the absolute majority of its
components to approve the law without addressing the
Senate’s suggestions.
CHART 1: FEWER AND DIFFERENT SENATORS
Size and composition of the reformed Senate
page 1
Source:ItalianSenate,USCongress,INES
20 November 2016
Finally, as Chart 1 shows, the composition of the Senate
would change: i) Senators would decrease from 315 to 100;
and ii) the Senate, rather than being elected by citizens
directly, would include representatives elected by the Italian
regional Councils. The number of representatives per Region
would be proportional to their population with a minimum of
two Senators per Region. Among the 100 Senators, 74 will
be elected among regional Councilors, 21 among municipal
Mayors (one per Region) and 5 will be nominated by the
President of the Republic.
2. Central state vs. local entities: revision of regional
responsibilities and abolishment of the provinces
In the wake of the pressure exercised by autonomist
movements in the late 90s (e.g. Northern League), the Italian
Constitution was modified in 2001 through the concession of
wide-encompassing legislative powers to the Regions on
several issues, ranging from education and research, to
health, and cultural heritage. The 2001 reform introduced the
principle of concurrent legislative power between the
Regions and the state over several topics, which generated a
good deal of conflicts between the State and the Regions
about respective competencies and accountability in such
areas.
The reform introduces a more clear division of competencies
between the State and the Regions, giving more power to
the former. The reform abolishes the principle of concurrent
legislative power and it establishes that the State has more
power on core subjects (such as education, strategic
infrastructures etc.), whereas the Regions would preserve
their power over more local issues. Moreover, the reform
gives to the State the possibility to intervene over regional
subjects if a national interest needs to be preserved.
However, these aspects of reform would not apply to the
Regions with special status (i.e. Sicily, Sardinia, Valle
d'Aosta, Friuli-Venezia Giulia and Trentino-Alto Adige).
An additional aspect of the reform concerns with the
provinces. The Italian administrative units mentioned in the
current Constitution are Regions, provinces, and
municipalities, with an elected governing council and
president. A law approved in 2014 has already transformed
the Provinces into so-called metropolitan cities and territorial
entities, namely a network of municipalities that coordinates
local policies. The referendum would officially abolish the
provinces from the Constitution.
Finally, the reform would introduce the constitutional right for
the State to suspend regional and local Councils if they are
generating a financial distress to local entities. The reform
would also put a ceiling on the salaries of regional
Councilors, such that they can no longer exceed the
remuneration of the Mayor of the regional capital of the
Council (“capoluogo di Regione”).
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3. Direct democracy: new types of referendums
The Italian system allows, as forms of direct political
participation, the constitutional referendum (to approve or
reject changes to the Constitution) and the abrogative
referendum (to cancel a law, or parts of it). The reform would
introduce two new types of referendums: a propositive
referendum and a guideline referendum. These new
instruments could be an incentive for citizens to have a more
active legislative participation. However, the details of these
new types of referendums need to be defined by laws that
will put the constitutional principle into practice.
The reform would also change the quorum needed to
validate an abrogative referendum. Currently, an abrogative
referendum is valid if 50% of the electorate cast a vote. The
reform would lower that quorum for referendums that are
proposed by 800,000 citizens. In that case the quorum is
calculated as half the turnout of the latest general election.
For example, on the basis of the turnout of the 2013 general
election (72%), a referendum would be valid if 36% of the
electorate participates in the vote.
Finally, the constitutional reform changes the number of
signatures required to submit a so-called popular initiative’s
law (e.g. proposals that a group of citizens can submit to the
Parliament) from 50,000 to 150,000. The reform establishes
also that the Parliament should discuss this type of laws
within a certain number of days, to be specified by future
parliamentary rules.
4. Miscellaneous: new type of government law, gender
parity, and abolishment of the N.C.E.L.
The reform introduces a preferential channel for laws that the
government can push through the Parliament. The
government could ask the Parliament to deliberate within 70
days over a law on a topic that is deemed essential for the
realization of the Government’s agenda (the Chamber can
deny such request).
This innovation could reduce the recourse to government
decrees, which are emergency laws that have immediate
legal value and that the Parliament needs to convert into
ordinary laws within 60 days to remain into force.
Government decrees have often been used in the Italian
system as government’s shortcut to speed up its program
and avoid prolonged parliamentary discussions. Such
practice has increased the legislative power of the
government and decreased that of the Parliament. The
reform may lead to a stronger contribution of the Parliament
in the discussion and preparation of the law.
The reform introduces the constitutional principle that the
laws of the Italian Republic should promote gender parity in
political institutions. This principle is stated for both the
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20 November 2016
Chamber of Deputies and for regional and local councils. It is
hard to predict the practical implication that this norm will
have, though it could incentivize greater participation of
women in the political arena.
Finally the referendum would abolish the National Council for
Economics and Labor (NCEL) from the Constitution. This is a
consultative assembly of experts that can promote legislative
initiatives on economic and social issues. However, the
NCEL should not be thought of as the equivalent of the US
Council of Economic Advisers in the US. It is a relatively
unknown and not very active institution. Its abolishment is
quite uncontroversial.
phrasing by both branches of the Parliament. Currently there
is no limit to the number of repeated passages through the
two Chambers and the overall process, for some laws, can
be quite lengthy. While the higher scrutiny of proposed laws
can be a virtuous mechanism because it prevents the
adoption of controversial laws, it has often been abused for
dilatory and obstructive tactics by minorities or as a tool to
preserve lobbying interests.
2. Possibly a less turbulent Regions-state relation
1. It makes it quicker and timelier
The reform abolishes the principle of concurrent power
between state and Regions. It distinguishes the areas of
regional competences from the policies pertaining to the
central State and it pushes the balance of power in favor of
the State. The intended effect of this change is to reduce the
contrasts between state and Regions and allow for a
smoother legislative process.
As Chart 2 shows, in Italy the average length for approving a
bill proposed by the Parliament is about 485 days; 262 days
are spent in the Chamber of Deputies and 223 in the Senate.
As a comparison, although we are talking about two very
different systems, the US Congress takes about 263 days.
In addition, the change of the Senate composition, where
MPs would be chosen among regional Councilors and
Mayors, could improve the link between national and local
policies, with a more direct parliamentary representation of
local issues.
Why to vote Yes
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the Italian
Parliament is quicker at approving bills proposed by the
Government. Ordinary bills proposed by the government take
about 261 days (whereas those about the budget and the
conversion of government decrees take 54 and 42 days
respectively). The bills proposed by the Parliament and
ordinary bills proposed by the government are those that
would be affected by the reform and their current weighted
average time is 327 days.
CHART 2: BILLS PROPOSED BY THE PARLIAMENT TAKE
LONG
Average num. of days to approve a bill proposed by the Parliament
600
485
500
400
262
300
223
263
200
100
0
ItalianParliament, ItalianChamber
total
ofDepuEes
ItalianSenate USCongress,total
Source:ItalianSenate,USCongress,INES The reform aims at accelerating the legislative process by
limiting the so-called “parliamentary shuttle”; namely the fact
that a bill can transit back and forward between the two
Chambers until it is approved in the same wording and
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3. Direct democracy can get stronger
The reform introduces some incentives for a greater direct
participation of citizens in the political agenda. Firstly, there
are two new types of referendum that allow for a more proactive role of citizens into the legislative process.
Nevertheless, the details of the new referendums are
missing in the reform and are delegated to future
parliamentary laws.
In addition, the reduction in the quorum required to validate
an abrogative referendum if 800,000 citizens ask for it, could
stimulate a greater turnout on the voting day, given that
abstentionism has often been used as a political strategy to
prevent the validity of a referendum on the grounds of an
insufficient number of voters.
Finally, it is true that the reform increases the signatures
required to submit a bill for a popular from 50,000 to
150,000; but this is a low hurdle nowadays as compared to
the time the Italian Constitution was introduced in 1948. New
technologies and the rapid diffusion of information through
the internet make it easier to coordinate these types of
initiatives. The positive point is that the reform forces the
Parliament to set a deadline to deliberate over this type of
bills, whereas currently there is no time limit and they get
little priority.
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20 November 2016
4. There are some cost savings
The constitutional reform would generate some savings on
public expenditure. These come from: i) the reduction in the
number of Senators; ii) Senators get only the remuneration
for their activity as Mayors and regional Councilors; iii) the
abolishment of the NCEL; and iv) the abolishment of
Provinces.
The State’s General Accounting Department, which is a
technical and non-partisan body, estimates that the savings
from the changes in the Senate would be €49 million per
year and those from the abolishment of the NCEL would be
€20 million. The Accounting Department declares that it is
not possible to have an accurate estimate of the savings
coming from the abolishment of provinces, as it is not clear
what will happen to the public employees that work in such
institutions. Nevertheless the government and Roberto
Perotti, a former government advisor and professor of
economics at Bocconi University, estimates that the savings
coming from the abolishment of the provinces should be
more than €200 million. Although the exact number is
uncertain, the order of magnitude is tens of millions euro.
These savings are largely due to the reform already
introduced in 2014.
The size of such savings is a low share of the expenditure for
political institutions. A report by one of the main Italian trade
unions (UIL) estimates that the direct costs of central and
local administrative institutions was about €6.1 billion in
2013. In the best-case scenario, the reform would lead to a
reduction of such costs by less than 5%. It is not a
humongous change, but these are tens of millions of euro
that can be allocated to alternative and better activities.
Why to vote No
1. Does it bring a democratic deficit and risk?
The strongest critique of the reform is related to the
democratic deficit that it risks introducing into the
Constitution. This concern comes mainly from i) the lower
degree of checks and balance during the legislative process,
and ii) the fact that Senators would not be directly elected by
citizens.
The first point comes from the combined effects of the
proposed constitutional changes and the electoral law, the
so-called “Italicum”, which became effective in July 2016.
The Italicum allocates 340 seats in the Chamber of Deputies
(out of 630) to the party that wins the election. It implies that
the winner gets the majority of seats, with a buffer of 25
seats with respect to the absolute majority of 315. However,
the Italicum does not apply to the Senate and it does not
deliver a majority premium in the upper Chamber.
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How is the winning party determined? If the most voted party
gets more than 40% of preferences, it will win the 340 seats
in the Chamber of Deputies. However, if the most voted party
does not go above 40% of preferences, there would be a
second electoral round, where voters choose among the two
most voted parties in the first round. The party that receives
the majority of votes in this second round will win the 340
seats.
If the constitutional reform were approved, the legislative
power of the Senate would be strongly downsized. This
implies that the Chamber of Deputies would retain most of
the parliamentary power and the winning party would have a
very strong control over the legislative action of the country.
Many opponents to the referendum believe that this would
perpetuate a deficit of democratic representation in the
country and a lack of checks and balance during the
legislative process: if a party gets 25% of votes in the first
round, so it represents only a minority of the voters, it can
end up having full control of the Chamber; moreover, the
new consultative role of the Senate would not lead the
winning party to mediate its action with other parties.
If a citizen believes that political immobility is one of the main
structural weaknesses of Italy and gives more weight to the
government’s capability to rule effectively, then the
combination of the constitutional reform and the electoral law
offers a possible solution. However, people should keep in
mind that this comes at the cost of a lower democratic
representation and of a lower degree of institutional balance
that the Senate could play after the reform. The solution to
this trade-off depends on citizens’ political preferences.
An aggravating factor that is often mentioned as a
perpetuation of a democratic deficit is that the Italicum favors
a strong personal link between the party leader and the MPs.
Indeed, the electoral rule limits the space and the range of
choices of voters over party candidates. The implication is
that the winning party has leverage over 100 MPs (out of the
total 340 MPs assigned to it). The concern is that this
mechanism makes MPs more responsive to the party leader
rather than the electorate.
Finally, one of the strongest critiques to the reform is that
Senators would not be voted directly by the electorate, but
chosen among local Mayors and regional Councilors. Given
that Senators would represent the Regions, it is
understandable that candidates may not be elected through
a mechanism of indirect democracy, rather than a direct one.
However, it is hard to assess the degree of indirect
democracy that would characterize Senators’ election, as the
rules and mechanisms of their selection are not specified:
What would the share of Senators from minority parties at
the local level be? Would Senators really vote representing
their local entities or would they follow their party’s guideline?
All these aspects are key to judge the level of transparency
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20 November 2016
and democratic representation that characterize Senators’
appointment.
2. Iron-men Senators and political de-synchronization
between the two Chambers
The members of the Senate would need to cumulate their
tasks and work as both Senators in Rome and regional
Councilors and Mayors in their respective Regions. This
raises doubts of efficiency, as it is quite difficult to carry the
tasks of MP and mayor/regional delegate at the same time.
Moreover, once they are appointed as Senators, they
acquire parliamentary immunity, namely they cannot be
prosecuted in their activities as Senators without the
approval of the Senate itself. Given the corruption and
presence of strong criminal organizations in some Italian
Regions, there is a risk that some people become MPs in the
Senate to benefit of such immunity.
Finally, the reform establishes that the mandate of Senators
coincides with their mandate as mayors/regional Councilor.
So, when there is a local election there would be a turnover
of Senators during the Parliamentary legislature. This
“coming and going” of MPs in the Senate would make the
political process more cumbersome and hinder a stable and
timely coherent political activity in the Senate.
3. Too many uncertain points
The constitutional reform does not define some key aspects,
which leaves voters without some relevant and necessary
information to properly judge the reform.
For instance, it does not define how Senators will be chosen
among the regional Councilors and Mayors. This is relevant
to understand if Senators will truly represent local issues or
will simply be an additional parliamentary expression of their
own party.
Similarly, the two new types of referendums are simply
introduced into the Constitution, but their details have to be
defined by future laws; these will determine the true degree
of direct democracy that the reform would raise.
Finally, even if the Italicum has been approved, some
aspects of it are still a matter of negotiation between factions
within the ruling party and it is uncertain if the law will be
applied if the referendum is to be rejected. All this makes it
hard to identify the rule of the games that would apply in
case of approval or rejection.
4. Personalization of a constitutional vote
Changing the Constitution is an important and delicate step
for a society and requires a fair debate over the substantial
implications of the changes that would occur.
Nevertheless, the debate over the referendum has turned
into a vote in favor or against the current prime minister and
necessarily so given that the Renzi government has attached
its own political survival to the success of the reform.
Moreover, the debate of the last weeks raises the doubt that
the referendum is being used also as an instrument for a
political fight within the Democratic Party. In this respect, it is
evocative of the Brexit referendum that David Cameron
pushed through in the hope of isolating the Eurosceptic
members of the conservative party and gain full political
control.
Key constitutional changes should find the consensus of
large sections of the electorate, regardless of their party
affiliations and political biases. However, the referendum is
an expression and exercises of democracy. Its outcome will
signal voters’ preferences and the mood of the majority
without undermining the Italian democratic institutions
Authors
Moreover, the reform says that minority parties have some
rights over the legislative process, but these rights still need
to be established by future parliamentary regulation to be
agreed on by the two Chambers. This leaves uncertain the
role of check and balance that minority parties can play.
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Mariaelisa Epifanio
[email protected]
Fadi Hassan
[email protected]
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