Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Social Science Research
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssresearch
Religion as resource: Religion and immigrant economic incorporation q
Phillip Connor
Princeton University, Department of Sociology, Princeton, NJ 08544, USA
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 27 January 2010
Available online 27 October 2010
Keywords:
Immigration
Religion
Immigrant
Immigrant religion
Economic incorporation
Employment
Earnings
Occupation
a b s t r a c t
Much of the immigration literature in the United States points toward a positive association between religious activity and immigrant economic adaptation. Immigrant congregations serve as informal job fairs, build social capital for entrepreneurial activity, and
provide a locale for leadership skill development. Using the New Immigrant Survey, this
hypothesis of religion as economic resource is tested among immigrants receiving permanent residency within the United States in 2003. Somewhat surprisingly, most findings
indicate a null relationship between religion and economic outcomes (i.e. employment,
occupation status, and earnings). However, in instances where a significant relationship
does exist, non-Protestant immigrants suffer the greatest economic penalty, particularly
among non-Protestants who are not regularly participating in a religious organization. In
contrast, non-Protestants who regularly participate have a higher likelihood of employment and higher earnings than their non-participating counterparts. Therefore, this paper
extends previous literature in specifying that the religion as resource hypothesis operates
best for non-Protestant immigrants who are actively involved in their religious
organizations.
Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In his discussion of the role of religion in immigrant incorporation, Charles Hirschman (2004) brings together historical
and contemporary evidence for three areas of immigrant adaptation that religion most influences. Coined as the three R’s of
immigrant religion – refuge, respect, and resources – these aspects for the role of immigrant religion in the greater adaptation process of immigrants have been thoroughly theorized within the American literature, both among migration and religion scholars.
The concept of refuge denotes the psychological relief immigrants experience through religious practice within religious
organizations, typically mediated by the common ethno-religious background of the organization’s membership. Immigrant
religious communities also provide institutional and individual level respect as immigrants chart their paths in the receiving
society. In this way, religious institutions provide educational opportunities and leadership platforms that can propel immigrants into high profile careers and respectful positions within the receiving society. Lastly, and of primary concern to this
paper, religious organizations are important resource centers for immigrants. Beyond assistance with housing, education, and
language skills, religious organizations also assist immigrants in securing employment. Ethnically homogeneous congregations often provide the enforceable trust mechanisms for entrepreneurial development (Hurh and Kim, 1984; Min, 1992;
q
This research uses data from the New Immigrant Survey, a research project designed by G. Jasso, D. Massey, M. Rosenzweig, and J. Smith, and funded by
NIH HD33843, NSF, USCIS, ASPE & Pew. Restricted Use Data, Version (1 or 2), May 2007. Retrieved August 2007. Persons interested in obtaining NIS
Restricted Use Data should see http://nis.princeton.edu/data/data_restricted.html for further information. Funding for this project is provided by Princeton
University’s Center for the Study of Religion and Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Grant No. 752-2008-0188. Comments from Robert
Wuthnow, Douglas Massey, and anonymous reviewers were very helpful.
E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected]
0049-089X/$ - see front matter Ó 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2010.10.006
P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
1351
Portes and Sensenbrenner, 2001) and can operate as informal job fairs whereby job opportunities are shared among congregants (Chen, 2008; Zhou et al., 2002). Additionally, immigrant involvement in religious centers provides leadership development opportunities (Chen, 2008; George, 1998) and also builds social networks to assist immigrants during times of
unemployment or job transition (Foley and Hoge, 2007). In sum, it is argued that all these experiences within immigrant
religious congregations provide an invaluable resource in assisting immigrant economic mobility.
At least in the United States, the narrative of religion for immigrant incorporation is largely positive. However, does
participation in a religious group always assist immigrant economic outcomes? For instance, do migrants affiliated with
minority religious groups receive the same economic benefits as majority religious groups? Using recent immigrant cohort
data from the New Immigrant Survey in the United States, this paper tests the religion as resource hypothesis. Holding
pertinent variables constant, findings generally demonstrate that religious affiliation and religious participation is not significantly related with economic outcomes such as employment, skilled occupational status, or earnings. However, in those
few instances when a significant relationship does exist, religious minorities (i.e. non-Protestants) are at an economic
disadvantage, particularly among those who do not regularly participate in their religious organization. This pattern is consistent for both men and women. In contrast, religious minority immigrants who regularly participate within their religious
organizations are more likely to be employed and have higher wages than their non-participating counterparts.
2. Background
Far beyond any other set of immigrant outcomes, the economic success of immigrants is most highly analyzed by migration scholars. Economic incorporation as measured by employment, earnings, and entry into native-born occupational fields
is often held as the ultimate set of indicators in assessing immigrant adaptation within the receiving society. Surrounding
this topic, many studies have examined whether the lower levels of economic advancement of some immigrant groups is
due to selection effects or changes in the labor market (Borjas, 1985, 1994). Other studies have examined the importance
of ethnic enclaves and how entrepreneurialism has become a common route of choice for immigrant economic achievement
(Portes and Manning, 1986; Zhou, 2004). Additionally, detailed research has examined the role of ethnic labor queues, and
how immigration persists despite high rates of unemployment among the native-born (Piore, 1979; Sassen, 1988;
Waldinger, 1999; Waldinger and Lichter, 2003). However, rarely does religion and religious practice become part of the
discussion in these studies.
A similar void of theoretical and empirical research examining the role of religion as an independent variable on economic
outcomes exists in the general population. Despite the importance early social theorists placed on religion in understanding
the rise of the capitalist system (Weber, 2003 [1904]) and its effect on economic relations (Marx, 1978), actual empirical research examining the relationship between religion and economic outcomes is largely non-existent (Wuthnow, 1994b).
Whether this is due to the controversial nature of religion within economics out of the pervasive secularism in the social
sciences (Ebaugh, 2002) or the complex nature of the relationship (Welch and Mueller, 2001), few scholars have examined
how religious belief and practice impact everyday economic outcomes such as employment and wages.1 Religion as an independent variable is mostly considered inconsequential, an oddity considering the largely important and seemingly positive
byproduct it had on economic outcomes centuries ago (Weber, 2003 [1904]).
Reflecting more specifically on immigrant economic incorporation, we also find a lack of research focused squarely on the
intersection of religious and economic life. Again, this is odd given the expansive scholarship on immigrant religion within
the literature (Alanezi and Sherkat, 2008; Alba et al., 2009; Cadge and Ecklund, 2006; Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000; Jasso et al.,
2003; Mooney, 2009; Warner and Wittner, 1998) as well as economic outcomes as a leading indicator of immigrant assimilation and adaptation (Aguilera and Massey, 2003; Borjas, 1994; Portes, 1995; Sassen, 1988). Most of the literature looking
at the relationship of religion and economic outcomes among immigrants is theoretical or ad hoc to other primary findings;
and, if specifically addressed, lacks nationally representative data to test the relationship.2
In order to manage the complexity the role of religion may have on immigrant economic life, a separation of religious
affiliation from religious participation is a useful dichotomy. Religious affiliation (e.g. Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Jew) is
increasingly viewed as an inherent, socially ascribed characteristic similar to race or ethnicity (Modood, 2007). Because of
this, religion has become an important variable of concern in studying labor discrimination (Huang and Kleiner, 2001),
and has been found to have unemployment effects similar to those of racial discrimination (Bertrand and Mullainathan,
2004; Pager and Quillian, 2005). Primarily through migration, the religious diversity of Western, industrialized countries
has increased substantially (Wuthnow, 2005, 2009). Subsequently, researchers have begun to examine how religious minority groups, in particular, experience an economic penalty. Given the fact that an increasing share of immigrants to the United
States represents religious minorities, these studies are of interest in assessing how religious affiliation may alter the economic situation of migrants.
1
Most of the literature addressing religion and economic outcomes uses educational attainment as a proxy for economic advancement. However, a few
exceptions exist (see Riccio, 1979 for a review of earlier work). Agreeing with earlier studies, Wuthnow (1994a) finds few differences between religious
attendance and occupational attainment among Americans. In a much earlier, yet classical work, Lenski (1961) finds that Catholics do worse economically than
Protestants. However, critics state that Lenski’s findings are not generalizable to a national level.
2
A notable exception is Jen’nan Ghazal Read’s work on immigrant women’s labor force participation among Arab-Americans. She finds that labor force
participation is conditioned by cultural-religious values (see Read, 1994a,b).
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P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
A number of empirical studies demonstrate an economic penalty for immigrants belonging to religious minorities. Model
and Lin (2002) find that foreign-born, non-Christians – more specifically Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims – suffer an employment
penalty in comparison to native-born Christians. This is found to be the case both in Canada and Britain. Again using data
from Britain, Lindley (2002) finds an Islamic penalty for employment and earnings controlling for migration status and race.
Similarly, Khattab (2009) finds that religion and ethnicity interact to create an economic disadvantage among Muslims (both
White and South Asian) as well as Sikhs. Although existent quantitative research for the role of religious affiliation on economic outcomes is mostly focused in Europe, it is interesting to note that Model and Lin’s (2002) study does not find any
systematic cross-national differences between Canada and Britain. This indicates the effect of religious affiliation is more
constant than different across differing societies, and through its comparative methodology, brings forward the hypothesis
that religious minority immigrants are economically disadvantaged in the West more generally.
The mechanisms by which this economic disadvantage exists for non-Christian immigrants can only be speculated. Like
religion and economic outcomes among immigrants in general, actual empirical evidence representing recent immigrant cohorts are fairly limited on this issue. It is possible that religious affiliation, particularly denoted by names indicating religious
minority groups, may operate as a negative signal to potential employers hiring Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, etc. In fact, a
recent job application experiment in France finds that Muslim job candidates are less likely to receive a call back than nonMuslim candidates (Adida et al., 2010). However, labor discrimination may not be the only mechanism at play. Immigrants
may be self-selecting themselves into a religious identity or type of religious practice that assists immigrant economic success. For instance, Protestant immigrants in the United States may have an inherent skill advantage over other religious
groups because Protestant congregations offer immigrants greater cultural knowledge for economic success in the United
States. In other words, given the predominance of Protestant religion in the United States, Protestant immigrants may have
greater access to cultural capital that more greatly assists immigrant integration, including economic mobility. Whatever the
mechanisms that may be operating, the literature is consistent with the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Immigrants affiliated with a minority religious group have lower economic outcomes than those immigrants
affiliated with a religious majority group.
Turning to religious participation, hypothesis testing using representative, national data for immigrant populations is largely unavailable. However, as already mentioned in the introduction, the general consensus in American scholarship is that
immigrant participation in a religious organization assists more than penalizes employment and earnings. For instance,
Korean church members in the United States can avail themselves of informal rotating credit unions and other forms of
entrepreneurial support for the community (Min, 1992). Religious attendance puts immigrants into contact with other
co-ethnics with information on job opportunities (Zhou et al., 2002). Regular religious participation also puts immigrants
into greater contact with broader social networks in which to find employment and promote their businesses, as well as provide enforceable trust mechanisms crucial to the growth of ethnic enclave economies (Portes and Manning, 1986; Portes and
Sensenbrenner, 2001; Zhou, 2004).
However, it cannot be overlooked that potentially high amounts of time devoted to religious commitments could have a
negative impact on economic outcomes among immigrants. For example, time spent in a religious organization could be
used to work longer for career advancement or to search for employment. Additionally, many religious organizations advocate more devotion to spiritual pursuits rather than to economic gains (Wuthnow, 1994b), which may lead to lower earnings
among immigrants with regular religious attendance. Therefore, the positive hypothesis for the relationship between religious participation and economic outcomes among immigrants may not be entirely the case, at least on the aggregate.
Regardless of the direction of the hypothesis, it does appear that a relationship between religious participation and immigrant economic outcomes does exist. Expressed in the negative direction, we have the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2. Immigrants regularly participating in a religious group have lower economic outcomes than those
immigrants who are not regularly participating in a religious group.
However, the question must be asked how religious affiliation interacted with religious participation results in a better
specification for the religion as resource hypothesis. At first glance, it is logical to think that religious minority immigrants
with high levels of religious practice are less likely to be employed as they become more isolated from mainstream society.
However, the literature actually indicates a counter-intuitive pattern. As already mentioned, one of the economic success
stories of recent immigrant waves to the United States is how ethnic minorities can profit from their minority status. Portes
and Manning (1986) identify how ethnic enclaves through close geographic proximity, expansive social networks, and common ethnic identity seal the enforceable trust mechanisms needed for entrepreneurial development. Waldinger (1999) also
notes how ethnic labor queues can assist ethnic minorities in securing employment, even when employment levels of the
native-born may decrease. Lastly, Granovetter (1995:155) states:
Ties of solidarity can substitute for ‘‘natural’’ factors that create barriers for entry. . . So it appears that the advantages of
immigrant or minority ethnic groups are especially pertinent where profit is disdained, under difficult economic conditions,
where credit is tight and the industry barely under way, in industries with low barriers to entry, and where trust rather than
technical knowledge is the most valuable commodity.
In other words, minority groups with high frequency of social contact, yet with a series of weak ties bound by an ethnoreligious common trust, can actually turn their disadvantageous situation into an advantage. This can be true even in the
P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
1353
most economically difficult time periods. If we were to apply the ethnic minority advantage within a religious setting then,
we would expect the following hypothesis to be true:
Hypothesis 3. Immigrants belonging to a religious minority and who also regularly participate in a religious group have
higher economic outcomes than non-participating immigrants affiliated with the same religious group.
However, we may not expect the same advantage when religious participation is interacted with a religious majority
group. Immigrants belonging to a religious majority group would then operate in the same manner as expected for the general population since they have no minority status in which to gain the same economic advantage. Therefore, we would
expect the following hypothesis to be true:
Hypothesis 4. Immigrants belonging to a religious majority and who also regularly participate in a religious group have
lower economic outcomes than non-participating immigrants affiliated with the same religious group.
3. Data, variables and methods
The New Immigrant Survey 2003 (NIS) sampled immigrants receiving their legal permanent residency (LPR) to the United
States during 2003 using a stratified random sample according to immigrant visa category (Jasso et al., in press). In all, 12,500
adults aged 18 years and older were selected with 8573 adult respondents interviewed, representing a 68.6% response rate.
Respondents were asked questions on a variety of topics including income, employment, and social activities including religious participation and religious affiliation. Therefore, the NIS represents a recent immigrant cohort receiving permanent
residency in the United States and contains all necessary economic outcomes (i.e. employment, occupation, earnings) as well
as necessary independent variables (i.e. religious affiliation, religious participation) to test the religion as resource
hypothesis.
3.1. Outcome variables
Three variables are used to assess labor market insertion: employment, occupation, and earnings. Employment is
measured as a binary variable as derived from the respondent’s current employment situation. From a list of responses,
respondents could indicate being unemployed, employed, or engaged in some other activity that would keep them from
full-time employment such as studying full time, staying at home, or retirement. Employed respondents were coded as
one, whereas those who were unemployed but still in the labor market (i.e. not a student, homemaker, or retiree) were
coded as zero.3
To indicate their occupation status within the NIS, employed respondents could choose from a detailed list of occupations. These occupations were recoded into a binary variable denoting skilled versus unskilled jobs.4 Earnings represent
the average hourly wage for employed respondents. This was calculated by taking the reported pay of the individual and
dividing it by the number of hours worked weekly in their primary job.5 Log wages are used as the outcome variable for
regression analysis.
In order to sufficiently account for selectivity on these dependent variables, findings are limited to respondents of working age (25–64). For employment, only those who indicate being in the labor market are included in the analysis, and only
employed immigrants are estimated for occupation and wage equations. Moreover, all regression results are specified by sex
to ensure that insignificant results in the full sample are not the result of counter effects between men and women.
3.2. Variables of interest
Religious affiliation groupings were coded by NIS staff to include Protestant (reference), Catholic, Christian Orthodox,
Muslim, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist, Other, and no religious affiliation. Regarding the hypotheses previously stated, it is challenging to agree as to which religious group(s) would be considered a religious majority group. Historically, we would expect
broad agreement that Protestantism would belong in the religious majority category; however, Catholicism, although representing over a quarter of the US population (Pew Research Center, 2008) is a relatively new religious group within the
United States when compared to Protestantism. Leaving these religious groups within separate categories permits the reader
to make their own interpretations. Further discussion regarding the religious majority/minority effects on immigrant
economic adaptation is provided in the conclusion.
Immigrant religious participation, as indicated by the immigrant respondent in the NIS, is the frequency count of how
many times the respondent went to a religious center of worship since becoming a permanent resident. This count was divided by the total number of months between the interview date and the date of receiving permanent residency (LPR). To
3
The majority of those indicating employment are working more than 35 h a week. In a few cases, respondents indicated they were unemployed but later
stated they were working more than 35 h. These cases were then coded as employed immigrants.
4
Recoding of this variable is available from the author upon request.
5
Respondents were asked to distinguish between primary and secondary jobs. For occupational attainment and wages, only the primary job is estimated.
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P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
keep interpretation simple, this variable was recoded as a binary measure of monthly or more to indicate regular religious
participation.6 A monthly count of one or more was coded as regular religious participation.
3.3. Control variables
Socio-demographic predictors used as control variables include age, sex, spouse in the residence, child(ren) in the
residence, and years of education. Although not displayed in the tables, the US Census region of the respondent’s current
residence is also controlled. Years of US residence as well as self-rated English proficiency are included in all models.7
Additionally, occupation (unskilled vs. skilled) is taken into account for earnings models.8
3.4. Methods
Separate multivariate models are estimated for the probability of employment (logistic regression), skilled occupational
attainment (logistic regression) and logged earnings (OLS regression). Country of birth fixed effects models are employed in
each model. Each multivariate regression equation includes religious affiliation, religious participation, and an interaction
between the two religion variables; therefore, religious affiliation coefficients represent non-religiously participating immigrants. The religious participation main effect represents the effect for the religious affiliation reference category or Protestants. Lastly, interaction coefficients represent immigrants who regularly participant in a religious group. Unfortunately, the
cross-sectional data permits us only to point to associations between religious affiliation and participation with employment, occupation and earnings. No causal analysis can be assumed without a second wave of NIS data.9
4. Findings
Before examining the relationship between religion and economic outcomes, it is helpful to get a sense of the sample population for these variables as presented in Table 1. In terms of those respondents within the labor market, 78% state they are
employed. Of these, about a third works in a skilled occupation while the average hourly wage for the full sample is $15.58.
In terms of religious affiliation, the largest group is Catholic (38%), followed by Protestant (15%). All other religious groups
represent about one-third of the sample with the largest non-Protestant/non-Catholic group being Christian Orthodox (11%)
followed by Hindu (9%) and then Muslim (7%). The Buddhist immigrant population is quite small (3%), with the Jewish portion of the sample being much smaller (less than 1%). Respondents stating no religious affiliation represent about 13% of the
sample. Lastly, approximately 44% of the sample attends a religious service monthly or more frequently. Given the wide distribution among these outcome variables and variables of interest (see standard deviations in Table 1), there is sufficient variation for further analysis in testing the association between economic outcomes and religion.
Before moving onto multivariate analysis, it is useful to investigate whether economic outcomes are significantly different across religious groups. In order to simplify means, religious affiliation in Table 2 is broken into two categories, Protestant and Catholic as representative of the two primary religious groups within the United States, and all other religions.
Across these two religious groupings, we do find significantly different levels of economic outcomes. A higher percentage
of Protestants and Catholics (81%) are employed compared to all other religious groups (74%). However, when it comes to
economic performance among the employed, it is all other religious groups besides Protestants and Catholics which fare
much better. Nearly 40% of those belonging to all other religious groups are in a skilled occupation whereas this is only
6
The continuous monthly count was used for all models. Unfortunately, few significant results emerged. The distribution of the count variable included
peaks at 1, 2, and 4 times per month; therefore, it appears that migrants were gauging their answer based on a less numeric count but on the regularity of
attendance as monthly, bi-monthly, or weekly. Therefore, this binary variable is deemed more reliable. Monthly as opposed to weekly participation is used as
not all religious groups consider weekly participation as regular. Monthly participation permits a greater expansion of the variable for those religious groups
who meet less frequently.
7
Due to difficulties in model convergence using country of birth fixed effect models, visa category (i.e. family, independent, refugee, other) is not included in
models; however, models using a continent of birth variable in lieu of country fixed effects does permit the inclusion of visa category. Compared to the findings
presented in this paper, these results are very similar using this alternative modeling strategy. It is believed that using country fixed effects modeling is of
greater profit than including visa category as a control variable as country fixed effects can indirectly control for ethnicity. Using a continuous variable for
duration time in the United States did not permit convergence when using country fixed effects; therefore, a categorical variable is employed.
8
A measure for religious participation in the country of origin prior to migrating is also available in the NIS. However, the results are not altered when this
variable is included in models. Therefore, it is not included. As posited by Lindley (2002), it is difficult to assess whether religion or race, or a combination of the
two alter economic outcomes for immigrants. Disentangling race and ethnicity from religion can also be challenging given the high level of correlation that
exists between the two variables, introducing potential hazards of multi-collinearity within regression models. Country of birth fixed effect models does assist
in controlling indirectly for race; however, it does not accurately take race into account. An additional reason for not including a race/ethnicity variable in this
paper’s analyses is that the NIS race variable contains many missing cases. In verifying the exclusion of a race variable within models, a race variable was
introduced into models not presented in this paper, again with little change in the estimates presented.
9
Since less than 2% of observations are missing for employment and occupation models, these missing cases were removed via listwise deletion. However,
nearly 18% of the wage variable is missing among employed respondents. Socio-demographic testing indicates that immigrants are older, are in higher
occupations, and have a higher level of English are more likely to have not responded to the earnings question. However, there is no relationship between the
test variables (i.e. religious affiliation and religious participation) with the missing wage cases. For this reason, the earnings results are presented using listwise
deletion as well.
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P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
Table 1
Descriptive statistics. Source: NIS 2003 (N = 5686).
Variable
Mean
Std. Dev.
Range
Outcomes
Employed
Skilled occupationa
Average hourly wagea
0.78
0.36
15.58
0.41
0.48
12.52
0/1
0/1
1/96
Religious affiliation
Protestant
Catholic
Christian Orthodox
Muslim
Jewish
Hindu
Buddhist
Other religions
No religion
0.15
0.38
0.11
0.07
0.01
0.09
0.03
0.02
0.13
Religious participation
Monthly or more religious participation
0.44
0.50
0/1
0.43
38.31
13.52
0.44
0.66
2.70
0.28
0.33
0.18
0.19
0.02
0.49
8.98
4.91
0.50
0.47
1.01
0/1
25/64
0/21
0/1
0/1
1/4
Socio-demographic
Female
Age
Education (years)
Child(ren) in the residence
Spouse in the residence
English (1 = not at all; 4 = very good)
Less than 1 year in US
1–5 years in US
6–10 years in US
11–20 years in US
More than 20 years in US
Note: Descriptive statistics limited to those who are in the labor market and are between
the ages of 25 and 64.
a
Limited to employed migrants.
Table 2
Economic outcome means by religious affiliation and religious participation. Source: NIS 2003.
Economic outcome
Employed
Skilled occupationa
Average hourly wagea
Catholic/Protestant
Other religions
Catholic/Protestant
Religious affiliation
Other religions
Participants
Non-participants
Participants
Non-participants
0.81
0.28
13.39
0.74*
0.41*
16.59*
0.82
0.26
13.39
0.79*
0.30*
13.40
0.74
0.38
15.48
0.75
0.45*
18.39*
Note: Analysis limited to those immigrants in the labor market. All models control for continent of birth and US region of residence.
*
p < .05, two-tailed.
a
Limited to employed migrants.
28% for Protestants and Catholics. Those belonging to non-Protestant and non-Catholic religions also make higher wages
with their average hourly wage being $16.59 compared to $13.39 for Protestants and Catholics.
Within each of these broad religious affiliation categories, we also find significantly different economic outcomes for
those who regularly participate in a religious group compared to those who do not. Within the combined Protestant and
Catholic category, non regular participants are slightly less likely to be employed (79%) compared to those who regularly
participate within their religious organizations (82%). However, the reverse is true for skilled occupation where a slightly
greater percentage of non-participants (30%) are in a skilled occupation compared to regular participants (26%). This latter
finding seems to support the negative direction to the religion as resource hypothesis in that regular religious participants
have lower economic outcomes than non-participants.
For all other religious groups, a similar economic advantage for non-participants seems to occur. Non-participants are
more likely to be in skilled occupations (45% compared to 38%) and also have higher wages ($18.39 compared to $15.48).
However, these results do not take into account competing factors that may explain economic outcomes, nor do they account
for patterns driven by migration from particular countries of origin. Lastly, a great deal of religious heterogeneity for these
broad categories exists. For these reasons, a multivariate model testing the interaction effect for religious affiliation with religious participation holding a set of competing variables constant is required.
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P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
Table 3
Logistic regression estimates for the probability of employment. Source: NIS 2003.
Full sample
Men
Women
Religious affiliation (REF = Protestant)
Catholic
Christian Orthodox
Muslim
Jewish
Hindu
Buddhist
Other
No religion
0.401
0.611
0.493
0.769
0.225
0.448
0.679
0.521
(0.216) (0.254)*
(0.297) (0.492)
(0.341)
(0.319)
(0.431)
(0.234)*
0.283
0.968
0.285
1.094
0.783
0.384
0.215
0.678
(0.328)
(0.369)**
(0.439)
(0.759)
(0.511)
(0.467)
(0.637)
(0.338)*
0.348
0.108
0.277
0.657
1.008
0.448
0.958
0.107
(0.300)
(0.372)
(0.450)
(0.745)
(0.490)*
(0.467)
(0.583)
(0.359)
Religious participation and interactions
Religious participation
Rel part Catholic
Rel part Christian Orthodox
Rel part Muslim
Rel part Jewish
Rel part Hindu
Rel part Buddhist
Rel part Other
Rel part No religion
0.468
0.521
0.371
0.317
1.141
0.253
0.023
0.718
0.355
(0.217)*
(0.255)*
(0.311)
(0.380)
(0.776)
(0.367)
(0.494)
(0.543)
(0.536)
0.247
0.196
0.492
0.437
1.152
0.194
1.141
0.630
0.046
(0.328)
(0.390)
(0.453)
(0.520)
(1.025)
(0.557)
(0.722)
(0.900)
(0.716)
0.552
0.578
0.136
0.174
0.748
0.020
1.325
0.838
0.321
(0.304) (0.355)
(0.452)
(0.635)
(1.344)
(0.530)
(0.761) (0.701)
(0.915)
Socio-demographic
Female
Age
Age-squared
Education (years)
Child(ren)
Spouse
English (1 = not at all; 4 = very good)
1–5 years in US (REF = less than 1 year)
6–10 years in US
11–20 years in US
More than 20 years in US
N
0.663
0.136
0.002
0.013
0.044
0.075
0.260
1.127
1.729
1.761
2.269
4900
(0.081)***
(0.035)***
(0.000)***
(0.011)
(0.092)
(0.091)
(0.058)***
(0.093)***
(0.144)***
(0.158)***
(0.415)***
0.154
0.002
0.010
0.362
0.057
0.146
1.301
1.696
2.244
2.966
2723
(0.052)**
(0.001)***
(0.017)
(0.145)*
(0.142)
(0.085) (0.139)***
(0.208)***
(0.254)***
(0.752)***
0.126
0.002
0.012
0.222
0.178
0.347
0.986
1.721
1.451
1.836
2058
(0.052)*
(0.001)**
(0.016)
(0.128) (0.126)
(0.085)***
(0.135)***
(0.209)***
(0.214)***
(0.533)**
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: All models control for US region of residence and include country of birth fixed effects.
p < .10, two-tailed.
*
p < .05, two-tailed.
**
p < .01, two-tailed.
***
p < .001, two-tailed.
For the remaining tables, separate regression equations are estimated for the full sample and then divided by sex, and all
coefficients are unstandardized. Multivariate analysis presents a slightly different picture than previously stated means
across religious affiliation groups and religious participants. In Table 3, the first test of religion as resource is presented with
employment as the outcome variable. In the full sample, we see that most religious groups have a lower probability of
employment than the reference category of Protestants. Exponentiating the logistic coefficients, Catholics are 33% less likely
to be employed than Protestants, whereas Christian Orthodox are nearly 46% less likely to be working. Similarly, Muslims are
at a similar employment disadvantage with their odds of employment being 38% lower than Protestants. Finally, those unaffiliated with any religion have the greatest employment penalty as 60% less likely to be employed than Protestants. If we
consider Protestantism to be the majority religious group in the United States, then these results support the minority religious penalty hypothesis.
However, the religious affiliation main effects represent only a part of the story since by virtue of the interaction with
religious participation in the model, religious affiliation coefficients represent non-participating, yet religiously affiliated
immigrants. Interaction coefficients present a slightly different perspective. The religious participation main effect
(b = 0.468), representing religiously participating Protestants, indicates that the odds of employment for Protestants are
37% less than non-participating Protestants. Conversely, religiously participating Catholics are 68% more likely to have a
job than non-participating Catholics. If Catholics are considered a minority religion within the United States, then this
finding supports the hypothesis that participants in minority religious groups have higher economic outcomes than nonparticipating immigrants affiliated with the same religious group. When the sample is specified by sex, we find a similar pattern as exhibited for the full sample. Among those coefficients that are significant, non-participating Christian Orthodox men
(b = 0.968) and non-religionist men (b = 0.678) are less likely to be employed than non-participating Protestants. For
women, non-participating Hindus (b = 1.008) are at a significant employment disadvantage. Likewise non-participating
Buddhists (b = 1.325) are less likely to be employed than participating Buddhists. Similar to the full sample, participating
women Protestants are less likely to be employed than non-participating Protestants.
1357
P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
Table 4
Logistic regression estimates for skilled occupational attainment. Source: NIS 2003.
Full sample
Men
Women
Religious affiliation (REF = Protestant)
Catholic
Christian Orthodox
Muslim
Jewish
Hindu
Buddhist
Other
No religion
0.238
0.023
1.016
0.305
0.156
0.513
0.180
0.197
(0.232)
(0.295)
(0.380)**
(0.556)
(0.365)
(0.409)
(0.507)
(0.239)
0.323
0.087
0.599
0.484
0.996
0.445
0.127
0.270
(0.330)
(0.427)
(0.510)
(0.928)
(0.536) (0.548)
(0.652)
(0.331)
Religious participation and interactions
Religious participation
Rel part Catholic
Rel part Christian Orthodox
Rel part Muslim
Rel part Jewish
Rel part Hindu
Rel part Buddhist
Rel part Other
Rel part No religion
0.166
0.155
0.420
0.400
0.105
0.111
0.319
0.832
0.634
(0.233)
(0.284)
(0.381)
(0.490)
(0.728)
(0.394)
(0.662)
(0.637)
(0.638)
0.007
0.092
0.121
0.263
0.493
0.226
1.223
0.067
0.288
(0.330)
(0.409)
(0.535)
(0.598)
(1.110)
(0.550)
(1.070)
(0.828)
(0.918)
Socio-demographic
Female
Age
Age-squared
Education (years)
Child(ren)
Spouse
English (1 = not at all; 4 = very good)
1–5 years in US
6–10 years in US
11–20 years in US
More than 20 years in US
N
0.198
0.045
0.001
0.247
0.167
0.075
0.652
0.816
1.089
0.878
1.013
3868
(0.099)*
(0.049)
(0.001)
(0.016)***
(0.112)
(0.115)
(0.071)***
(0.139)***
(0.156)***
(0.180)***
(0.358)**
0.053
0.000
0.256
0.166
0.360
0.671
1.158
1.318
0.883
0.856
2267
(0.068)
(0.001)
(0.028)***
(0.163)
(0.177)*
(0.103)***
(0.206)***
(0.227)***
(0.256)**
(0.492) 0.281
0.097
1.518
0.154
1.373
1.500
0.140
0.609
0.128
0.183
0.682
13.133
0.258
0.055
0.296
1.181
0.719
0.145
0.002
0.250
0.330
0.277
0.695
0.408
0.827
0.841
1.460
1469
(0.361)
(0.459)
(0.712)*
(0.788)
(0.578)*
(0.739)*
(0.861)
(0.389)
(0.367)
(0.441)
(0.600)
(411.5)
(1.044)
(0.678)
(1.075)
(1.085)
(1.152)
(0.080) (0.001) (0.027)***
(0.177) (0.172)
(0.112)***
(0.213)**
(0.246)*
(0.284)*
(0.662)*
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Analysis limited to employed immigrants. All models control for US region of residence and include country of birth fixed effects.
p < .10, two-tailed.
*
p < .05, two-tailed.
**
p < .01, two-tailed.
***
p < .001, two-tailed.
These significant findings for the probability of employment all agree with the expected direction of the hypotheses;
however, it must be mentioned that a sizeable portion of religious affiliation and religious participation effects were not significant. To an even greater extent, this null relationship persists when evaluating the relationship between religion and the
likelihood of being in a skilled occupation) (see Table 4). For skilled occupation, only six coefficients across all three model
specifications are significant. In the full sample, non-participating Muslims are less likely to be in a skilled occupation than
Protestants (b = 1.016); however, male, non-participating Hindus (b = 0.996) are more likely to be employed in a skilled
occupation compared to non-participating Protestants. For women, non-participating Muslims (b = 1.518), Hindus
(b = 1.373), and Buddhists (b = 1.500) are all less likely to be in a skilled occupation. No significant coefficients exist
for participating religious immigrants; however, with the exception of male, non-participating Hindus, all significant coefficients for skilled occupation support the direction of the hypotheses in that minority religious groups experience an economic penalty, particularly for immigrants who are not regularly participating in religious organizations.
Moving onto earnings (Table 5), significant findings once again support the direction of the hypotheses posited. Since
logged wages are used as the outcome, the interpretation of results can be understood as a percent difference between
groups. In the full sample, non-participating immigrants who belong to all other religions besides those included in the model exhibit a wage penalty of about 18%. A similar finding for other religious groups exists for the male specification
(b = 0.239) and Christian Orthodox women (b = 0.152).
As expected, religiously participating religious minorities experience a wage increase over their non-participating counterparts. For instance, participating Hindus within the full sample experience a wage increase of almost 17% over nonparticipating Hindus. This same direction and magnitude of effect for participating Hindus persists when men and women
are estimated within separate models. In a rare number of cases, there are immigrants within the sample who indicate no
religious affiliation but are still participating in a religious group on a regular basis. These cases are primarily from China
where the majority of the population are religiously unaffiliated, but upon entering the United States become increasingly
1358
P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
Table 5
OLS regression estimates for average hourly wage (logged). Source: NIS 2003.
Full sample
Men
Women
Religious affiliation (REF = Protestant)
Catholic
Christian Orthodox
Muslim
Jewish
Hindu
Buddhist
Other
No religion
0.001
0.019
0.042
0.035
0.066
0.042
0.181
0.022
(0.040)
(0.052)
(0.067)
(0.110)
(0.067)
(0.071)
(0.087)*
(0.044)
0.011
0.030
0.033
0.256
0.097
0.062
0.239
0.023
(0.055)
(0.073)
(0.086)
(0.189)
(0.090)
(0.093)
(0.120)*
(0.059)
0.038
0.152
0.036
0.078
0.130
0.027
0.124
0.002
(0.060)
(0.078) (0.110)
(0.141)
(0.107)
(0.115)
(0.126)
(0.069)
Religious participation and interactions
Religious participation
Rel part Catholic
Rel part Christian Orthodox
Rel part Muslim
Rel part Jewish
Rel part Hindu
Rel part Buddhist
Rel part Other
Rel part No religion
0.058
0.069
0.028
0.018
0.145
0.165
0.044
0.100
0.144
(0.042)
(0.049)
(0.069)
(0.086)
(0.151)
(0.069)*
(0.135)
(0.112)
(0.107)
0.091
0.104
0.018
0.032
0.038
0.178
0.205
0.182
0.144
(0.058)
(0.067)
(0.094)
(0.105)
(0.225)
(0.085)*
(0.231)
(0.152)
(0.150)
0.052
0.045
0.163
0.076
0.008
0.230
0.008
0.056
0.271
(0.064)
(0.074)
(0.103)
(0.193)
(0.245)
(0.133) (0.173)
(0.166)
(0.162) Socio-demographic
Female
Age
Age-squared
Education (years)
Child(ren)
Spouse
English (1 = not at all; 4 = very good)
1–5 years in US
6–10 years in US
11–20 years in US
More than 20 years in US
Skilled occupation
N
0.218 (0.017)***
0.019 (0.008)*
0.000 (0.000)*
0.012 (0.022)***
0.016 (0.019)
0.023 (0.019)
0.113 (0.012)***
0.149 (0.024)***
0.299 (0.028)***
0.262 (0.030)***
0.312 (0.060)***
0.536 (0.022)***
3217
0.030
0.000
0.011
0.015
0.076
0.101
0.200
0.334
0.329
0.335
0.541
1922
(0.011)**
(0.000)**
(0.003)***
(0.026)
(0.028)**
(0.016)***
(0.032)***
(0.038)***
(0.041)***
(0.076)***
(0.031)***
0.010
0.000
0.013
0.016
0.034
0.131
0.081
0.247
0.163
0.247
0.497
1295
(0.012)
(0.000)
(0.004)**
(0.028)
(0.027)
(0.018)***
(0.034)*
(0.041)***
(0.045)***
(0.108)*
(0.033)***
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Analysis limited to employed immigrants. All models control for US region of residence and include country of birth fixed effects.
p < .10, two-tailed.
*
p < .05, two-tailed.
**
p < .01, two-tailed.
***
p < .001, two-tailed.
involved in religious organizations (Chen, 2008; Yang, 1999). Even in these cases, participating non-religionists among
women have a higher wage (b = 0.271) than non-participating women who state no religious affiliation.
5. Conclusion
Religion as resource for immigrant economic incorporation is not as simple as the typology presented in the introduction
of this paper. In separating out religious affiliation from religious participation, we find very different results for different
religious groups as well as results being slightly dependent on the particular economic outcome. Largely, though, the bulk
of the findings in testing the religion as resource hypothesis are null. Nevertheless, significant results do support the expected direction of hypotheses presented earlier in this paper.
By far, employment outcomes have the strongest relationship with religious affiliation and religious participation. Including Catholics, non-participating immigrants representing religious minority groups are at an employment disadvantage
compared to Protestants. However, among Catholics, this employment penalty changes to an employment advantage for
religiously participating immigrants. Interestingly, religiously participating Protestants experience a lower likelihood of
employment than non-participating Protestants.
For occupational attainment, few differences by religious affiliation, religious participation, or the interaction of the two
present themselves in a consistent manner across statistical models. This lack of significant results seems to concur with
Wuthnow’s (1994a) conclusion that occupation and religious attendance have very little association with each other. However, among those results that are significant, they still follow the pattern of an economic penalty for non-participating religious minority groups. Among earnings outcomes, we find a similar pattern when comparing effects across religious
minority groups and interactions with religious participation. For earnings, it appears other religious groups non-specified
P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
1359
in the religious affiliation variable experience a wage penalty among non-participating immigrants. In contrast, participating
Hindus experience a wage increase relative to their non-participating counterparts.
In sum, it does not appear that immigrant religious participation on the whole is the most consistent predictor of higher
economic outcomes among immigrants to the United States. Given the high amount of literature indicating otherwise, this
comes as a slight surprise. However, earlier hypotheses about the positive association of religion and resources among immigrants cannot be fully abandoned. Among those religious groups who experience economic disadvantage due to their religious minority status, regular religious participation can actually reverse this trend into a more favorable economic
adaptation.
There are a number of theoretical implications based on this paper’s findings. First, religious participation is not always
positively associated with better economic outcomes for immigrants. Although the immigrant religion literature is quite
optimistic regarding the resources immigrant congregations offer for immigrants, particularly in the United States, this paper’s results indicate otherwise. This could be due to a methodological problem since the majority of immigrant research
examines immigrant congregations (Ebaugh, 2003). In this way, there is heavy selection on the independent variable with
little evidence of how immigrants who are not religiously active in a religious organization are performing economically.
As represented in this paper, further research should examine more representative immigrant populations of both religious
and non-religious immigrants.
Second, when it comes to economic performance, religion appears to have a similar role as ethnicity within minority
immigrant groups. Just as ethnic enclaves serve to encapsulate economic opportunities, both for employment and wages,
religious groups in a minority position can also provide additional opportunities for immigrant religious groups facing discrimination in the labor force. Although the findings presented in this paper do not pinpoint the social mechanisms at work,
the results appear to agree with previous literature denoting this exceptional communal benefit among immigrant minorities. Not only do immigrant minorities survive economically through the use of ethnic enclaves, they can also thrive. Further
research should examine how ethnic enclaves use religion as a mechanism for enforceable trust as well as provide for centers
of building social capital among participants. In this way, the ethnic enclave literature can be expanded to include ethnoreligious enclaves.
Third, these findings must also be linked to other aspects of immigrant religious adaptation. If migration is a disruptive or
alienating event for immigrant religious involvement (Connor, 2009b; Massey et al., 2011) resulting in a decline in religious
participation compared to that in their country of origin, how does this impact religious minority groups who might otherwise have economic gains available to them via continued religious participation? Moreover, if immigrants religiously adapt
to the participation patterns of the receiving society regardless of religious affiliation (Connor, 2009a), how might this impact
economic outcomes among religious minorities? With both these disruption and adaptation hypotheses in mind, we could
imagine a period of adjustment before regular religious participation can begin again for the immigrant and then increase
towards the relatively high levels across the United States compared to their country of origin. In this way, the economic
benefits found in this paper’s analysis for religious minorities may not result immediately, but take several years to develop
for the individual migrant and be somewhat dependent on the level of religiosity within the local receiving society. In other
words, we may expect religious minority immigrants living in the southern part of the United States where religious participation levels are high among the native-born to benefit even greater economically compared to the same immigrant group
living in other parts of the United States.
As with any study, this paper does have several analytical and data limitations that should be acknowledged. Of prime
importance is the cross-sectional nature of this data. Therefore, spuriousness both in terms of temporality and additional
variables could exist. Religious minorities could be self-selecting themselves into religious organizations by participating
more frequently in pursuit of the advantages indicated in this paper. In this manner, it is difficult to trace whether it is
the treatment of religious participation or the selection of immigrants towards regular religious participation that is occurring. Although it would be expected that religious affiliation would have less of a selection bias, there could be cultural institutions within particular religious groups that naturally assist or desist the economic adaptation of immigrants. Additionally,
the causal arrow in this analysis could be reversed in that it is better economic outcomes that lead immigrants within religious minorities to be active in religious life. This is altogether plausible since immigrants with higher earnings may not need
to work as long hours and therefore have more time to devote to religious activity within religious organizations. Further
research using data from the second wave of the NIS can remove many of these biases.
The second important limitation of this study is the lack of identification of social mechanisms. The NIS data does not
enable the testing of mediating factors that may explain the non-Protestant religious penalty among non-participating
immigrants, nor is there the capacity to test the social mechanisms for the economic advantage experienced by regularly
participating religious minorities. This requires additional ethnographic research for particular ethno-religious groups. Related to this, models were unable to be specified by nationality or dominant ethnic groups due to the limited sample size
such cells would represent. Although country of birth fixed effects were used in all multivariate models, the religious minority effect found in the analyses may be more about an ethnic minority effect rather than a religious one. Further study comparing the same ethnic group yet across two differing religious groups may prove insightful in teasing out social
mechanisms. Good examples for such a study could include Korean Protestants compared to Korean Buddhists or Indian
Protestants compared to Indian Hindus. Such a comparison may be able to better isolate whether the effect is indeed ethnic
or religious.
1360
P. Connor / Social Science Research 40 (2011) 1350–1361
Religion as resource is an important piece of the incorporation puzzle for immigrants arriving within the United States.
Religion serves an important civil society function for the native-born population; consequently, we would expect a similar
importance for religion within the immigrant population. Although this paper has demonstrated that the religion as resource
hypothesis was largely a null effect, we have extended this typology in examining the effect of religious affiliation, religious
participation, and the interaction of these two religion variables on a series of economic outcomes for recent immigrants to
the United States. However, there are two remaining R’s to Hirschman’s (2004) typology. Therefore, further examination of
religion as refuge and respect, as well as religion as resource, awaits migration researchers. It is hoped that this paper serves
an adequate template for further examination of the religion and immigrant incorporation question.
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