Country Information and Guidance
North Korea: Opposition to the
Regime
Version 2.0
October 2016
Preface
This document provides country of origin information (COI) and guidance to Home
Office decision makers on handling particular types of protection and human rights
claims. This includes whether claims are likely to justify the granting of asylum,
humanitarian protection or discretionary leave and whether – in the event of a claim
being refused – it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under s94 of the
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Decision makers must consider claims on an individual basis, taking into account the
case specific facts and all relevant evidence, including: the guidance contained with
this document; the available COI; any applicable caselaw; and the Home Office
casework guidance in relation to relevant policies.
Country Information
The COI within this document has been compiled from a wide range of external
information sources (usually) published in English. Consideration has been given to
the relevance, reliability, accuracy, objectivity, currency, transparency and
traceability of the information and wherever possible attempts have been made to
corroborate the information used across independent sources, to ensure accuracy.
All sources cited have been referenced in footnotes. It has been researched and
presented with reference to the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for
Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), dated April 2008, and the European
Asylum Support Office’s research guidelines, Country of Origin Information report
methodology, dated July 2012.
Feedback
Our goal is to continuously improve the guidance and information we provide.
Therefore, if you would like to comment on this document, please email the Country
Policy and Information Team.
Independent Advisory Group on Country Information
The Independent Advisory Group on Country Information (IAGCI) was set up in
March 2009 by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration to make
recommendations to him about the content of the Home Office‘s COI material. The
IAGCI welcomes feedback on the Home Office‘s COI material. It is not the function
of the IAGCI to endorse any Home Office material, procedures or policy. IAGCI may
be contacted at:
Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration,
5th Floor, Globe House, 89 Eccleston Square, London, SW1V 1PN.
Email: [email protected]
Information about the IAGCI‘s work and a list of the COI documents which have
been reviewed by the IAGCI can be found on the Independent Chief Inspector‘s
website at http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/country-information-reviews/
Page 2 of 25
Contents
Guidance ................................................................................................................... 4
1.
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 4
1.1 Basis of claim ........................................................................................... 4
2.
Consideration of issues ................................................................................... 4
2.1 Credibility.................................................................................................. 4
2.2 Assessment of risk ................................................................................... 4
2.3 Protection ................................................................................................. 5
2.4 Internal relocation ..................................................................................... 6
2.5 Certification .............................................................................................. 6
3.
Policy summary ............................................................................................... 6
Country Information ................................................................................................. 7
4.
Human Rights situation .................................................................................... 7
4.1 Overview .................................................................................................. 7
4.2 Treatment of actual and perceived political opponents .......................... 10
4.3 Political prison camps ............................................................................. 11
5.
Illegal exit ....................................................................................................... 14
6.
Relevant South Korean statutory provisions .................................................. 17
6.1 The South Korean Constitution .............................................................. 17
6.2 The Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea 1997 ................................................................................. 20
7.
Treatment of North Koreans in South Korea .................................................. 23
Version Control and Contacts ............................................................................... 25
Page 3 of 25
Guidance
Updated: 04 October 2016
1.
Introduction
1.1
Basis of claim
1.1.1
Fear of persecution or serious harm by the North Korean authorities due to
the person’s actual or perceived opposition to the regime.
Back to Contents
2.
Consideration of issues
2.1
Credibility
2.1.1
For information on assessing credibility, see the Asylum Instruction on
Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
2.1.2
Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for
a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas
should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum
Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).
2.1.3
Decision makers should also consider the need to conduct language
analysis testing (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).
Back to Contents
2.2
Assessment of risk
2.2.1
North Korea has one of the worst human rights records in the world and
there are widespread and systematic human rights violations and crimes
against humanity. Fundamental freedoms, including freedom of speech,
press, assembly, association, religion and movement are severely curtailed
(see Human Rights situation).
2.2.2
Any political dissent or opposition is harshly punished. There is continued
use of political prison camps, which hold an estimated 150,000–200,000
people. Evidence from defectors and NGOs, collected over a number of
years, suggests that conditions are harsh and life threatening and that
severe human rights violations take place within the camps, including the
use of forced labour, torture, starvation, sexual violence against women and
executions for dissent. Political prisoners are subject to harsher punishments
and fewer protections than others (see Treatment of actual and perceived
political opponents and Political prison camps).
2.2.3
The North Korean regime does not allow emigration. Reports indicate that
tight security continues on the border, dramatically limiting the flow of
persons crossing into China without required permits. Those who leave
North Korea illegally are likely to face criminal sanctions on return to North
Korea. However, the severity of this punishment may differ depending upon
whether the person left North Korea for economic or political reasons.
2.2.4
Those who have left North Korea for political reasons (particularly those who
have claimed asylum abroad) are likely to face a minimum of five years hard
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labour if returned to North Korea. Generally, ‘defectors’ or those who have
sought asylum may face harsher prison sentences or may be executed.
Repatriated women have undergone forced abortions. Claiming asylum
abroad is viewed as a political offence by the North Korean authorities, and
attracts a harsh punishment which will amount to persecution. It is highly
likely that collective punishment of family members for such offences will
also take place, regardless of whether the family members concerned knew
of or were involved in any attempted defection (see Illegal exit).
2.2.5
A person who has come or is likely to come to the attention of the North
Korean authorities for opposition or perceived opposition to the current
regime is likely to face persecution in North Korea.
2.2.6
However, as noted in the country guidance case of GP & Ors (South Korean
citizenship) North Korea CG [2014] UKUT 391 (IAC) (20 August 2014), ‘all
North Korean citizens are also citizens of South Korea. While absence from
the Korean Peninsula for more than 10 years may entail fuller enquiries as to
whether a person has acquired another nationality or right of residence
before a travel document is issued (by the South Korean authorities), upon
return to South Korea all persons from the Korean Peninsula are treated as
returning South Korean citizens.’ [Headnote (3)]
2.2.7
The Upper Tribunal in GP & Ors also found that ‘there is no evidence that
North Koreans returned to South Korea are sent back to North Korea or
anywhere else, even if they fail the 'protection' procedure, and however long
they have been outside the Korean Peninsula’. [Headnote (4)]
2.2.8
GP & Ors further noted that ‘former North Koreans may have difficulty in
adjusting to life in South Korea and there may be some discrimination in
social integration, employment and housing, but this is not at a level which
requires international protection’. [Headnote (9)]
2.2.9
An application for asylum owing to a fear of persecution in North Korea is,
therefore, likely to fall for refusal on the basis that the person:
(i)
Will not be required to go to a country in breach of the Refugee
Convention (para 334(v) Immigration Rules); and
(ii)
Could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of
another country where he could assert citizenship (para 339J (v)).
Back to Contents
2.3
Protection
2.3.1
As the person’s fear in North Korea is of persecution/serious harm at the
hands of the North Korean authorities, they will not be able to avail
themselves of the protection of those authorities.
2.3.2
For further guidance on assessing the availability or not of state protection,
see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
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Page 5 of 25
2.4
Internal relocation
2.4.1
As the person’s fear in North Korea is of persecution/serious harm at the
hands of the North Korean authorities, they will not be able to relocate within
North Korea to escape that risk.
2.4.2
For further guidance on internal relocation, see the Asylum Instruction on
Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
Back to Contents
2.6
Certification
2.6.1
Where a claim is refused on the basis that the person will be admitted to
South Korea, it must be considered for certification under section 94 of the
Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as South Korea is listed as a
designated state; and it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under
section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
2.6.2
For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and
Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and
Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
Back to Contents
3.
Policy summary
3.1.1
Persons who have or are likely to come to the attention of the North Korean
authorities for opposition or perceived opposition to the regime are likely to
face persecution in North Korea.
3.1.2
Furthermore, those who leave North Korea illegally face criminal sanctions if
returned to North Korea. Generally, ‘defectors’ or those who have sought
asylum may face indefinite terms of imprisonment in conditions which are
likely to reach the Article 3 threshold or may be executed. Claiming asylum
abroad is viewed as a political offence by the North Korean authorities, and
attracts a harsh punishment which will amount to persecution.
3.1.3
However all North Korean citizens are also citizens of South Korea. The
application for asylum owing to a fear of persecution in North Korea is,
therefore, likely to fall for refusal on the basis that:
(i)
It will not result in the applicant being required to go to a country in
breach of the Refugee Convention (para 334(v) Immigration Rules);
and
(ii)
The applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the
protection of another country where he could assert citizenship (para
339J (v))
3.1.4
Former North Koreans may have difficulty in adjusting to life in South Korea
and there may be some discrimination in social integration, employment and
housing, but this is not at a level which requires international protection
3.1.5
Where a claim is refused on the basis that the person will be admitted to
South Korea, it is likely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section
94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Back to Contents
Page 6 of 25
Country Information
Updated: 04 October 2016
4.
Human Rights situation
4.1
Overview
4.1.1
The United Nations Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea (COI), set up by the Human Rights
Council (HRC), issued a report in 2014 documenting crimes against
humanity including extermination, murder, enslavement, torture,
imprisonment, rape, forced abortion, and other sexual violence, enforced
disappearance and prolonged starvation in North Korea. It concluded that
“[t]he gravity, scale and nature of these violations reveal a State that does
not have any parallel in the contemporary world."1
4.1.2
In January 2016 the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
reported that:
‘Two years have passed since the commission of inquiry published its report,
in which it found that crimes against humanity had been and were being
committed in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. Regrettably, it
does not appear that the situation of human rights in the country has
improved, and the crimes against humanity documented by the commission
appear to continue. While the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea has at
times indicated its willingness to engage with the international community on
some human rights issues, this has not yet led to any tangible improvement
in the situation of human rights.’2
4.1.3
The US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights for 2015:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, stated that:
‘The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) is an
authoritarian state led by the Kim family for more than 60 years. Shortly after
Kim Jong Il's death in late 2011, his son Kim Jong Un was named marshal of
the DPRK and supreme commander of the Korean People's Army. Kim Jong
Un's grandfather, the late Kim Il Sung, remains "eternal president." The most
recent national elections, held in March 2014, were neither free nor fair.
Authorities maintained effective control over the security forces.
‘Citizens did not have the ability to change their government. The
government subjected citizens to rigid controls over many aspects of their
lives, including denial of the freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
1
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the commission of inquiry on human rights in the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 7 February 2014, A/HRC/25/63, Paras 76 and 80
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/HRC/25/63 [Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
2
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 19 January 2016, A/HRC/31/70, Para 46.
:http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session31/Documents/A.HRC.31.70_EN.docx
[Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
Page 7 of 25
association, religion, movement, and worker rights. The government
operated a network of political prison camps in which conditions were often
harsh, life threatening, and included forced and compulsory labor.
‘Defectors continued to report extrajudicial killings, disappearances, arbitrary
detention, arrests of political prisoners, and torture. The judiciary was not
independent and did not provide fair trials. There were reports of female
victims of trafficking among refugees and workers crossing the border into
China. Forced labor was practiced domestically, through mass mobilizations
and as a part of the re-education system. NGOs noted that DPRK foreign
contract workers also faced conditions of forced labor.
‘The government made no known attempts to prosecute officials who
committed human rights abuses. Impunity was a widespread problem.’3
4.1.4
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2016 report stated:
‘North Korea's parliament, the 687-seat Supreme People's Assembly, is a
rubber-stamp institution elected to five-year terms. All candidates for office,
who run unopposed, are preselected by and from the [ruling] KWP [Workers
Party of Korea] and a handful of subordinate parties and organizations. Kim
Jong-un was among those who won seats in the most recent national
elections, held in March 2014. The official voter turnout was 99.97 percent.
‘North Korea functions as a single-party state under a dynastic totalitarian
dictatorship. Although a small number of minor parties and organizations
exist legally, all are members of the Democratic Front for the Reunification of
the Fatherland, a KWP-led umbrella group that selects all candidates for
elected office. The ruling party has been dominated by the Kim family since
its founding. Kim Jong-un serves as first secretary of the KWP, with the late
Kim Jong-il dubbed the "eternal general secretary" after his death.
‘Any political dissent or opposition is harshly punished, and even the KWP is
subject to regular purges aimed at reinforcing the leader's personal authority.
Various sources reported a number of high-level dismissals and executions
during 2015, though independent confirmation was often unavailable. In
April, for example, Defense Minister Hyon Yong-chol was reportedly
removed from office and put to death.
‘The North Korean government is neither transparent in its operations nor
accountable to the public. Information about the functioning of state
institutions is tightly controlled for both domestic and external audiences.
Most observers must glean evidence from state media, defector testimony,
or secret informants inside the country, and the accuracy and reliability of
these sources varies considerably.
‘Corruption is believed to be endemic at every level of the state and
economy, and bribery is pervasive. North Korea was ranked 167 out of 168
3
United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, Executive Summary.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252771 [Date
accessed: 16 September 2016]
Page 8 of 25
countries and territories assessed in Transparency International's 2015
Corruption Perceptions Index.
‘All domestic media outlets are run by the state. Televisions and radios are
permanently fixed to state channels, and all publications are subject to strict
supervision and censorship...Access to the global internet is restricted to a
small number of people in the government and academia, and others have
access to a national intranet on which foreign websites are blocked...Nearly
all forms of private communication are monitored by a huge network of
informants. ’4
4.1.5
In Resolution 70/172 adopted on 17 December 2015, the UN General
Assembly condemned “ the long-standing and ongoing systematic,
widespread and gross violations of human rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, including those which the commission of inquiry on
human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, established by
the Human Rights Council in its resolution 22/13 of 21 March 2013, has said
may amount to crimes against humanity, and the continuing impunity for
such violations”. The UN General Assembly expressed its “very serious
concern” at, amongst others things, the persistence of continuing reports of
violations of human rights, including the detailed findings made by the
commission of inquiry in its report, such as:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,
including inhuman conditions of detention; rape; public executions;
extrajudicial and arbitrary detention; the absence of due process and the
rule of law, including fair trial guarantees and an independent judiciary;
extrajudicial, summary and arbitrary executions; the imposition of the
death penalty for political and religious reasons; collective punishments
extending up to three generations; and the extensive use of forced
labour;
The existence of an extensive system of political prison camps, where a
vast number of persons are deprived of their liberty and subjected to
deplorable conditions and where alarming violations of human rights are
perpetrated;
The forcible transfer of populations and the limitations imposed on every
person who wishes to move freely within the country and travel abroad,
including the punishment of those who leave or try to leave the country
without permission, or their families, as well as punishment of persons
who are returned;
The situation of refugees and asylum seekers expelled or returned to the
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and sanctions imposed on
citizens of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea who have been
repatriated from abroad, leading to punishments of internment, torture,
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual violence or the
death penalty, and in this regard strongly urges all States to respect the
4
Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2016 - North Korea, 27 January 2016.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/north-korea [Date accessed: 16 September
2016]
Page 9 of 25
(v)
fundamental principle of non-refoulement, to treat those who seek refuge
humanely and to ensure unhindered access to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees and his Office, with a view to protecting the
human rights of those who seek refuge, and once again urges States
parties to comply with their obligations under the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967 Protocol thereto in
relation to refugees from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
who are covered by those instruments;
All-pervasive and severe restrictions on the freedoms of thought,
conscience, religion or belief, opinion and expression, peaceful
assembly and association, the right to privacy and equal access to
information, by such means as the persecution, torture and
imprisonment of individuals exercising their freedom of opinion and
expression, religion or belief, and their families, and the right of everyone
to take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives, of his or her country….’5
Back to Contents
4.2
Treatment of actual and perceived political opponents
4.2.1
The US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights for 2015:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, stated that:
‘Members of the security forces arrested and reportedly transported citizens
suspected of committing political crimes to prison camps without trial.
‘There were numerous instances of persons interrogated or arrested for
saying anything that could be construed as negative towards the
government.
‘While the total number of political prisoners and detainees remained
unknown, the KINU 2015 white paper reported that between 80,000 and
120,000 were detained in the kwanliso [political prisoner labour camps].
Political prisoners were held separately from other detainees. NGOs and the
media reported that political prisoners were subject to harsher punishments
and fewer protections than other prisoners and detainees. The government
considered critics of the regime to be political criminals. The government did
not permit access to persons by international humanitarian organizations.
Reports from past years described political offenses as including attempting
to defect to South Korea, sitting on newspapers bearing Kim Il Sung's or Kim
Jong Il's picture, mentioning Kim Il Sung's limited formal education, or
defacing photographs of the Kims.’6
5
UN General Assembly, Situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea :
resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 25 February 2016, A/RES/70/172,
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/70/172 [Accessed 16 September
2016]
6
United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, Section 1d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention, 1e. Denial of Fair
Public Trial, 2. A Freedom of Speech and Press.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252771 [Date
accessed: 16 September 2016]
Page 10 of 25
4.2.2
The same source continued:
‘Defector and refugee reports noted instances in which the government
executed political prisoners, opponents of the government, repatriated
defectors, government officials, and others accused of crimes. The law
prescribes the death penalty for the most "serious" or "grave" cases of
"antistate" or "antination" crimes, which included: participation in a coup or
plotting to overthrow the state; acts of terrorism for an antistate purpose;
treason, which includes defection or handing over of state secrets, broadly
interpreted to include providing information about economic, social, and
political developments routinely published elsewhere; suppressing the
people's movement for national liberation; and "treacherous destruction."
Additionally, the law allows for capital punishment in less serious crimes
such as theft, destruction of military facilities and national assets, fraud,
kidnapping, distribution of pornography, and trafficking in persons.
‘During the year NGOs reported that high profile public executions
continued, and in April, the press reported that 15 executions were carried
out in the first four months of the year as part of an ongoing purge of senior
government officials. The press widely reported that at least 70 officials had
been executed for various reasons since Kim Jong Un took power in 2011.
In May, Republic of Korea (South Korea or ROK) officials reported that North
Korean Defense Minister Hyon Yong Chol was publicly executed by
antiaircraft fire in front of an audience of hundreds. Other DPRK senior
officials including Vice Premier Choe Yong Gon were reportedly executed
around the same time. In April the Committee for Human Rights in North
Korea (HRNK) published a report supported by satellite imagery of a public
execution in the country using antiaircraft machine guns.
Private citizens were also subjected to public executions. For example, in
April Radio Free Asia reported the execution of the director general of North
Korea's Unhasu Orchestra along with three members of the troupe. Reports
stated they were first forced to strip naked and then shot by firing squad
wielding machine guns in front of 400-500 members of the Pyongyang
artistic community.’7
Back to Contents
4.3
Political prison camps
4.3.1
The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), in its White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea 2016, July 2016, stated that:
‘Although North Korea denies their existence, there are political prison
camps, called ‘kwanliso”, in North Korea. These political prison camps
(kwanliso) in North Korea have embedded in them fundamental factors that
violate human rights in that they are not official detention facilities. It is
identified that there are five political prison camps (kwanliso).’ […]
7
United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, Section 1a Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252771 [Date
accessed: 16 September 2016]
Page 11 of 25
KINU estimated in 2013 that there are at least between 80,00 and 120,000
political criminals imprisoned in the five political prison camps (kwanliso)
based on testimonies of North Korean defectors and interpretation of satellite
photos, etc.‘8
4.3.2
The report continued:
‘The political prison camps (kwanliso) in North Korea can be classified into:
those in the form of a town and those in the form of a prison camp
(kyohwaso); those with both total control zones and revolutionary zones and
those with only total control zones; those where only political criminals
themselves are imprisoned and those were criminals are imprisoned
together with their families; and those managed by the SSD [State Security
Department] and those managed by the MPS [Ministry of People’s Security].
‘While those who commit “absolute” political crime were imprisoned in
political prison camps (kwanliso) in the early stage of their operation, it is
identified that the scope of prisoners has expanded to include those who
have committed general crimes, who cannot easily be regarded as political
criminals. According to surveys so far, people are imprisoned mostly for
criticizing the North Korean regime or insulting Suryong, attempting escape
to South Korea, contacting South Koreans or making favorable comments
about South Korea, etc. There are also continuous cases of imprisonment
for engaging in religious activities such as religious services or for having
family members that defected from North Korea and went to South Korea.
‘It seems that legal procedures are not abided by in the process of arresting
political criminal suspects and imprisoning them in political prison camps
(kwanliso).’9
See the Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea 2016, which addresses the penal system in
general and provides an overview of prison life including on: extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary execution, forced labour, inhumane treatment and
restrictions on family life. 10
4.3.3
The US State Department, Country Reports on Human Rights for 2015:
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, stated that:
‘NGO, refugee, and press reports noted there were several types of prisons,
detention centers, and camps, including forced labor camps and separate
8
Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2016,
31 July 2016, (p398)
http://www.kinu.or.kr/servlet/Download?num=44&fno=51&bid=DATA04&callback=http://www.kinu.or.k
r/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp&ses=%27%27 [Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
9
Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2016,
31 July 2016, (400-403)
http://www.kinu.or.kr/servlet/Download?num=44&fno=51&bid=DATA04&callback=http://www.kinu.or.k
r/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp&ses=%27%27 [Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
10
Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2016,
31 July 2016
http://www.kinu.or.kr/servlet/Download?num=44&fno=51&bid=DATA04&callback=http://www.kinu.or.k
r/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp&ses=%27%27[Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
Page 12 of 25
camps for political prisoners. NGO reports documented six types of
detention facilities: kwanliso (political penal-labor camps), kyohwaso
(correctional or re-education centers), kyoyangso (labor-reform centers),
jipkyulso (collection centers for low-level criminals), rodong danryeondae
(labor-training centers), and kuryujang or kamok (interrogation facilities or
jails). According to the 2015 KINU white paper, the Ministry of State Security
administered kwanliso camps, and either it or the Ministry of People's
Security administered the other detention centers.
‘There were reportedly between 5,000 and 50,000 prisoners per kwanliso.
Defectors claimed the kwanliso camps contained unmarked graves,
barracks, worksites, and other prison facilities. NGOs reported the existence
of five kwanliso facilities, including Kaecheon (Camp 14), Hwasung (Camp
16), Pukchang (Camp 18), and Chongjin (Camp 25). During the year reports
continued to indicate that areas of Yodok (Camp 15) in South Hamkyung
Province were closed or operating at a reduced capacity.
‘Kwanliso camps are comprised of total control zones, where incarceration is
for life, and "rerevolutionizing zones," from which prisoners may be released.
Reports indicated those sentenced to prison for nonpolitical crimes were
typically sent to re-education prisons where authorities subjected prisoners
to intense forced labor. Those who were considered hostile to the
government or who committed political crimes reportedly were sentenced to
indefinite terms in political prison camps. In many cases family members
also were detained if one member was accused or arrested. The
government continued to deny the existence of political prison camps.
‘Reports indicated that conditions in the prison camp and detention system
were harsh and life threatening, and that systematic and severe human
rights abuses occurred. Many prisoners in political prison camps and the
detention system were not expected to survive. Detainees and prisoners
consistently reported violence and torture. Defectors described witnessing
public executions in political prison camps. According to defectors, prisoners
received little or no food and were denied medical care in some places of
detention. Sanitation was poor, and former labor camp inmates reported they
had no changes of clothing during their incarceration and were rarely able to
bathe or wash their clothing. The South Korean and international press
reported that kyohwaso held populations of up to thousands of political
prisoners, economic criminals, and ordinary criminals.’ 11
4.3.4
The same source also stated:
‘The penal code prohibits torture or inhuman treatment, but many sources
reported these practices continued. Numerous defector accounts and NGO
reports released during the year described the use of torture by authorities in
detention facilities. Methods of torture and other abuse reportedly included
11
United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, Prison and Detention Center Conditions
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252771 [Date
accessed: 16 September 2016]
Page 13 of 25
severe beatings; electric shock; prolonged periods of exposure to the
elements; humiliations such as public nakedness; confinement for up to
several weeks in small "punishment cells" in which prisoners were unable to
stand upright or lie down; being forced to kneel or sit immobilized for long
periods; and being hung by the wrists or forced to stand up and sit down to
the point of collapse. Mothers were in some cases reportedly forced to watch
the infanticide of their newborn infants. Defectors continued to report many
prisoners died from torture, disease, starvation, exposure to the elements, or
a combination of these causes.’12
Back to Contents
5.
Illegal exit
5.1.1
The February 2014 Report of the detailed findings of the commission of
inquiry on human rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea found
that:
‘The state imposes a virtually absolute ban on ordinary citizens travelling
abroad, thereby violating their human right to leave the country. Despite the
enforcement of this ban through strict border controls, nationals still take the
risk of fleeing, mainly to China. When they are apprehended or forcibly
repatriated, DPRK officials systematically subject them to persecution,
torture, prolonged arbitrary detention and in some cases sexual violence,
including during invasive body searches. Repatriated women who are
pregnant are regularly forced to undergo an abortion, a practice that is driven
by racist attitudes towards persons from China, and to inflict punishment on
women who have committed a serious offence by leaving the country.
Where a baby is born, it is then killed by the authorities. Persons found to
have been in contact with officials or nationals from the Republic of Korea or
with Christian churches may be forcibly “disappeared” into political prison
camps, imprisoned in ordinary prisons or even summarily executed.’ 13
5.1.2
The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), in its White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea 2016, July 2016, reported that:
‘Although a large number of North Koreans who fled the country are believed
to be residing illegally in other countries such as China and Russia, the
collection of accurate data on the exact number and details of individual
conditions is impossible due to their insecure status preventing them from
openly asking for help. The Tumen River region is normally used as the
12
United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, 1c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252771 [Date
accessed: 16 September 2016]
13
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the detailed findings of the commission of inquiry on human
rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 7 February 2014, A/HRC/25/CRP.1, (paragraph
489 p144) available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/530314234.html [Date accessed: 16 September
2016]
Page 14 of 25
defection route for many North Koreans because it is easier to cross than
other geographical points.’ 14
5.1.3
The KINU 2016 report continued:
‘Since the latter years of the first decade of the 200s, the number of
defectors living in China has dropped dramatically. The reasons are
assessed to be more stringent border defense and control, continuous
forced repatriations, fewer new defectors due to the increasing cost of
defection, increases in the number of legal visitors with an increase in the
issuance of border crossing cards, improved economic conditions in North
Korea including reinvigoration of marketplaces, etc. and increased
resettlements in South Korea or other third countries. It is identified that as
the SSD has reviewed the emergency measures to prevent defection since
2009, it has strengthened surveillance and identification of ideological trends
in families and relatives of defectors, ideological education, inspection of
travel permits and bed-checks in border regions, and inspection of border
guard commands. Moreover, it is identified that the North Korean authorities
have increased punishment of residents found using cell phones in the
border regions and intensified surveillance of coast guard personnel to
prevent defections by sea. During the mourning period following Kim Jongil’s death on December 17, 2011, the movement of people was tightly
controlled and every family along the border region was required to take
turns standing guard. Bed-check inspections were reinforced and each
inminban had to appoint a new informer.’15
5.1.4
The US State Department ‘s 2015 human rights report stated that
‘Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and press reports indicated that
border guards had orders to shoot to kill individuals leaving the country
without permission, and prison guards were under orders to shoot to kill
those attempting to escape from political prison camps.
‘Individuals who cross the border with the purpose of defecting or seeking
asylum in a third country are subject to a minimum of five years of “labor
correction.” In “serious” cases defectors or asylum seekers are subjected to
indefinite terms of imprisonment and forced labor, confiscation of property, or
death. Many would-be refugees who were returned involuntarily were
imprisoned under harsh conditions. Some sources indicated that authorities
reserved particularly harsh treatment for those who had extensive contact
14
Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2016,
31 July 2016, (p428)
http://www.kinu.or.kr/servlet/Download?num=44&fno=51&bid=DATA04&callback=http://www.kinu.or.k
r/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp&ses=%27%27 [Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
15
Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2016,
31 July 2016, (p429-430)
http://www.kinu.or.kr/servlet/Download?num=44&fno=51&bid=DATA04&callback=http://www.kinu.or.k
r/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp&ses=%27%27 [Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
Page 15 of 25
with foreigners, including those with family members resettled in South
Korea.’ 16
5.1.5
In January 2016 the UN Human Rights Council’s Special Rapporteur on the
situation of human rights in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
reported that “persons attempting to flee the country appear to face harsher
treatment than in earlier periods.”17
5.1.6
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2016 report stated:
‘There is no freedom of movement, and forced internal resettlement is
routine. Emigration is illegal, but many North Koreans have escaped via
China. Access to Pyongyang, where the availability of food, housing, and
health care is somewhat better than in the rest of the country, is tightly
restricted. Recently, this disparity has increased, with the capital featuring
more luxuries for a growing middle class. A person's songbun classification
[North Korea's Social Classification System which classifies people on the
basis of State-assigned social class and birth, and also includes
consideration of political opinions and religion] affects his or her place of
residence as well as employment and educational opportunities, access to
medical facilities, and even access to stores.’ 18
5.1.7
The Human Rights Watch World Report 2016 stated:
‘....It [North Korea] criminalizes leaving the country without official
permission, and in some instances state security services actively pursue
North Koreans into China, seeking to detain and forcibly return them.
‘During Kim Jong-Un's rule, the government has significantly expanded
efforts to stop irregular crossings of North Koreans into China. The
government has increased rotations of North Korean border guards, cracked
down on brokers who assist people trying to leave, and prosecuted use of
Chinese cell phones to communicate with the outside world. North Koreans
who left the country in 2014 and 2015 told Human Rights Watch that the
government was tracking down and publicly executing border guards who
allowed people to cross into China in exchange for bribes.
‘Increased patrols, barbed-wire fences, and security cameras on the Chinese
side of the border have also made crossings more difficult. Chinese
authorities have also targeted broker networks in China, resulting in fewer
16
United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, 13 April 2016, Section 1a Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life and 2d
Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252771 [Date
accessed: 16 September 2016]
17
UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 19 January 2016, A/HRC/31/70, Para 20
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session31/Documents/A.HRC.31.70_EN.docx
[Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
18
Freedom House: Freedom in the World 2016 - North Korea, 27 January 2016.
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/north-korea [Date accessed: 16 September
2016]
Page 16 of 25
North Koreans being able to complete the arduous journey through China to
Laos or Thailand, from which most are sent on to South Korea.
‘Former North Korean security officials who have defected told Human
Rights Watch that North Koreans handed back by China face interrogation,
torture, and consignment to political prison camps (known as kwanliso,
literally management centers) or forced labor camps. The severity of
punishments depend on North Korean authorities' assessments of what the
returnees did while in China. North Koreans who have fled the country since
2013 or have contacts inside the country allege that the government has
started treating all defectors as enemies of the country, sending anyone
caught and repatriated from China to political prison camps.’19
Back to Contents
6.
Relevant South Korean statutory provisions
6.1
The South Korean Constitution
6.1.1
The South Korean Constitution provides as follows:
‘Article 1
(1)The Republic of Korea shall be a democratic republic.
(2)The sovereignty of the Republic of Korea shall reside in the people and all
state authority shall emanate from the people.
Article 2
(1)Nationality in the Republic of Korea shall be prescribed by law.
(2)It shall be the duty of the State to protect citizens residing abroad as
prescribed by law.
Article 3
The territory of the Republic of Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula
and its adjacent islands.
Article 4
The Republic of Korea shall seek unification and shall formulate and carry
out a policy of peaceful unification based on the principles of freedom and
democracy.’ 20
6.1.2
Article 1 of the Nationality Act provides that the following are citizens of
South Korea by birth: persons whose father or mother was a citizen of South
Korea at the time of the person’s birth; persons whose deceased father was
a citizen of South Korea, if he died before the person’s birth; persons ‘born in
the Republic of Korea’ if the parents’ nationalities are unknown or they have
no nationality, and any child found abandoned in the Republic of Korea. For
these purposes, ‘born in the Republic of Korea’ means born anywhere on the
Korean peninsula, following Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution.
Article 3 of the Nationality Act provides that where a Korean citizen who is
19
Human Rights Watch, World Report 2016 - North Korea, 27 January 2016,
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/north-korea [Date accessed: 16 September
2016]
20
Constitution of the Republic of Korea [1948] (last amended 1987)
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4dd14.html [Date accessed 16 September 2016]
Page 17 of 25
still a minor, but who is not a citizen of the Republic of Korea (a ‘foreigner’)
reports to the Minister of Justice and establishes that his father or mother is
a Korean citizen and recognises him as their child, he shall attain Korean
citizenship when such report is made, subject to procedures to be
determined by Presidential decree. If the minor is under 15, Article 19
provides that he shall be legally represented for the making of any nationality
report. 21
6.1.3
Articles 4-8 of the Nationality Act deal with naturalisation provisions for
foreigners, including provision for the naturalisation of spouses and minor
children. Article 9 provides a procedure whereby a person who has lost their
Korean nationality can apply to the Minister of Justice for it to be reinstated,
subject to procedures to be set out in a Presidential decree, and to four
exceptions set out at Article 9(2):
‘Article 9 (Attainment of Nationality through Reinstatement of
Nationality)
(1)
A foreigner who was a national of the Republic of Korea may attain
the nationality of the Republic of Korea by obtaining permission for
the reinstatement of nationality from the Minister of Justice.
(2)
The Minister of Justice shall not allow the reinstatement of nationality
to a person who falls under any of the following subparagraphs, after
screening such person who has applied for the reinstatement of
nationality:
1. A person who has inflicted harm on the State or society;
2. A person whose conduct is disorderly;
3. A person who lost or renounced his/her nationality of the Republic
of Korea in order to evade military service;
4. A person for whom the Minister of Justice regards the
reinstatement of his/her nationality as inappropriate, for the
purposes of national security, sustainment of order or public
welfare.” 22
6.1.4
Articles 10-15 deal with multiple nationalities and the length of time for which
persons may have dual nationality and when they must elect. Article 15(1)
provides for automatic loss of nationality, where a person has voluntarily
attained the nationality of another country, which takes place at the time
when the foreign nationality is obtained. Article 15(2) provides for deemed
loss of nationality retroactively, unless within six months the Korean citizen
declares an intention to retain Korean citizenship, where another nationality
has been acquired in the following circumstances: by marriage to a
foreigner; by adoption by a foreigner; by acknowledgment by a foreign father
or mother resulting in acquisition of such parent’s nationality; or in the case
21
Republic of Korea, No. 16: Nationality Act [1948] (amended 2010)
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fc1d8ca2.html [Date accessed 16 September 2016]
22
Republic of Korea, No. 16: Nationality Act [1948] (amended 2010)
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fc1d8ca2.html [Date accessed 16 September 2016]
Page 18 of 25
of a minor or spouse of a person who has lost nationality in any such
circumstances. 23
6.1.5
Article 16 sets out that persons who lose their nationality are required to
immediately report such loss to the Minister of Justice. If a public official
finds that a person has lost nationality, he must also report it to the Minister,
who will notify the family registration office and the resident registration office
of the loss of nationality. Other procedures are to be set out in a Presidential
decree, as before. 24
6.1.6
Article 17 provides for all acquisitions and losses of nationality to be
published in the Official Gazette by the Minister of Justice. Article 18
specifies the loss of rights accruing to South Korean citizens when
nationality is lost, subject to a proviso for transfer of any transferable rights to
another South Korean citizen within 3 years. 25
6.1.7
Articles 20-22 provide:
‘Article 20 (Adjudication of Nationality)
(1)
Where it is unclear whether a person has attained or is holding the
nationality of the Republic of Korea, the Minister of Justice may
determine such fact upon review.
(2)
Procedures for screening and determination under paragraph (1) and
any other necessary matters shall be determined by Presidential
decree.
Article 21 (Revocation of Permission, etc)
(1)
The Minister of Justice may revoke permission or adjudication of a
person who has obtained permission of naturalisation, reinstatement
of nationality or adjudication of nationality by false or other wrongful
means.
(2)
Standards and procedures for revocation under paragraph (1), and
other necessary matters shall be determined by Presidential decree.
Article 22 (Delegation of Authority)
(1)
The authority of the Minister of Justice may be partially delegated to
the head of an immigration office or its branch office, as prescribed
by Presidential decree.’ 26
23
Republic of Korea, No. 16: Nationality Act [1948] (amended 2010)
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fc1d8ca2.html [Date accessed 16 September 2016]
24
Republic of Korea, No. 16: Nationality Act [1948] (amended 2010)
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fc1d8ca2.html [Date accessed 16 September 2016]
25
Republic of Korea, No. 16: Nationality Act [1948] (amended 2010)
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fc1d8ca2.html [Date accessed 16 September 2016]
26
Republic of Korea, No. 16: Nationality Act [1948] (amended 2010)
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fc1d8ca2.html [Date accessed 16 September 2016]
Page 19 of 25
6.2
The Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea 1997
6.2.1
The Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea 1997, defines its terms and purpose in Articles 1-4:
‘Article
1 (Purpose)
The purpose of this Act is to specify such matters relating to protection and
support as are necessary to help North Korean residents defecting from the
area north of the Military Demarcation Line (hereinafter referred to as "North
Korea") and desiring protection from the Republic of Korea, to adapt
themselves to, and settle down as quickly as possible in, all spheres of their
life, namely, political, economic, social and cultural life.
Article 2 (Definitions)
For the purpose of this Act,
1. "Defecting North Korean residents" mean persons who have their
residence, lineal descendants, spouses and workplaces in North Korea
and who have not acquired any foreign nationality after defecting from
North Korea.
2. "Protected persons" mean defecting North Korea residents who are
provided care and support pursuant to this Act.
3. "Settlement support facilities" mean facilities set up and operated to
provide protection of and settlement support for protected persons
pursuant to the provision of Article 10, Paragraph 1.
4. "Protection money or articles" mean money or goods paid, delivered or
lent to protected persons pursuant to this Act
Article 3 (Scope of Application)
This Act shall apply to defecting North Korean residents who have
expressed their intention to be protected by the Republic of Korea.
Article 4 (Basic Principles)
(1) The Republic of Korea shall provide protected persons with special
care on the basis of humanitarianism.
(2) Protected persons shall strive to lead a healthy and cultural life by
adapting themselves to the free and democratic legal order of the
Republic of Korea.” 27
6.2.2
Article 5 provides that in general, settlement support is available in special
facilities for a year and at home for two years after that, although there is
discretion to extend or curtail it for ‘special grounds’. Normally, under Article
5(2), protection is given to the individual but it may be given on a household
basis where deemed necessary. Under Article 5(1), support ‘shall
reasonably be determined in consideration of [the migrant’s] age,
27
Republic of Korea, No. 5259: Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea, [1997]: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html [Date accessed 16
September 2016]
Page 20 of 25
composition of the household, school education, personal career, selfsupporting ability, health conditions and personal possessions.’ 28
6.2.3
Article 6 set up a consultative council to determine protection and support
questions. Article 7 requires an application for protection to be made by the
migrant to the head of an overseas diplomatic or consular mission, who shall
without delay inform both the Minister of National Unification and the Director
of the Agency for National Security Planning. The National Security Director
is required to take ‘provisional protective steps’ immediately and report to the
Unification Ministry. Article 8 (1) sets out their respective responsibility in the
protection decision:
“(1) The Minister of National Unification shall, when he receives such
a notice as stipulated under the provision of Article 7, Paragraph 3,
decide on the admissibility of the application for protection following the
deliberations of the Consultative Council. However, in the case of a
person who is likely to attest national security to a considerable extent,
the Director of the Agency for National Security Planning shall decide
on the admissibility of the application, and inform or notify the Minister
of National Unification and the protection applicant of the decision
without delay.”
The protection decision is a shared responsibility of the Ministries of
Unification and Security. 29
6.2.4
Article 9 excludes certain categories of migrant from protection (that is to
say, from the benefits of South Korean citizenship):
“Article 9 (Criteria for a Protection decision)
(1)
In determining whether or not to provide protection pursuant to the
provision of the text of Article 8, Paragraph 1, such persons as stipulated in
the following Subparagraphs may not be determined as protected persons.
1. International criminal offenders involved in aircraft hijacking, drug
trafficking, terrorism or genocide, etc.
2. Offenders of non-political, serious crimes such as murder, etc.
3. Suspects of disguised defection
4. Persons who have for a considerable period earned their living in
their respective country of domicile; and
5. Such other persons as recognized by the Presidential Decree as
unfit for the designation as protected persons.” 30
28
Republic of Korea, No. 5259: Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea, [1997]: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html [Date accessed 16
September 2016]
29
Republic of Korea, No. 5259: Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea, [1997]: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html [Date accessed 16
September 2016]
30
Republic of Korea, No. 5259: Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea, [1997]: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html [Date accessed 16
September 2016]
Page 21 of 25
6.2.5
In addition, pursuant to Article 27, protection and/or settlement support may
be withdrawn in certain circumstances by the Unification Ministry of its own
motion, or on the application of a local government head via the Home
Affairs Ministry:
“Article 27 (Alteration in Protection)
(1) The Minister of National Unification may, where a protected person is
involved in one of the following Subparagraphs, suspend of terminate
protection and settlement support subject to the deliberations of the
Consultative Council.
1. In cases where he is sentenced to penal servitude not less than
one year and his sentence has been made irrevocable.
2. In cases where he intentionally provides false information contrary
to the interest of the state
3. In cases where he is judicially declared dead or missing
4. In cases where he attempts to go back to North Korea
5. In cases where he violates this Act or an order issued under this
Act; or
6. Such other cases as coming under such grounds prescribed by the
Presidential Decree.” 31
6.2.6
Articles 10-22 set out the protection scheme. In particular, Article 15
provides:
“Article 15 (Social Adaptation Education)
The Minister of National Unification may, pursuant to the determination of the
Presidential Decree, offer protected persons with such education as deemed
necessary for them to settle down in the Republic of Korea.”
6.2.7
The rest of the protection scheme includes provision for a personal
identification register (Article 12); for recognition of academic and other
qualifications (Articles 13-14); for vocational training (Article 16); for
employment assistance, including in agriculture (Article 17, 17-1, 17-2, and
17-3); and for discretionary appointment to public service or the South
Korean military by way of special appointment, for persons who held similar
posts in the north, on terms to be set out by Presidential decree.32
6.2.8
Other Articles deal with accommodation support, compensation for valuable
materials brought into South Korea on arrival, settlement money,
adjudication of housing disputes, educational support, medical care and
support for minimum living standards, including pensions. Article 30
establishes an Association of Supporters for Defecting North Korean
Residents to execute the various resettlement provisions already set out. 33
31
Republic of Korea, No. 5259: Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea, [1997]: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html [Date accessed 16
September 2016]
32
Republic of Korea, No. 5259: Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea, [1997]: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html [Date accessed 16
September 2016]
33
Republic of Korea, No. 5259: Act on the Protection and Settlement Support of Residents Escaping
From North Korea, [1997]: http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b4ef28.html [Date accessed 16
Page 22 of 25
7.
Treatment of North Koreans in South Korea
7.1.1
The Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), in its White Paper on
Human Rights in North Korea 2014, July 2014, reported that:
‘It is a mandatory procedure under the South Korean law to hold newly
arrived North Koreans and offer adjustment education. For this reason, some
of them have brought lawsuits against the government, claiming that they
were held under mandatory detention, and hence experienced violation of
certain human rights. These lawsuits, however, were dismissed, as the
investigations after arrival in South Korea were found perfectly legal. The
Korean Bar Association has formed a “task force” to improve, legally and
systematically, the human rights of North Korean escapees in the process of
settlement in the South.’ 34
7.1.2
The December 2015 Concluding observations of Human Rights Committee
on the Republic of Korea noted amongst its principle matters of concern that:
‘“defectors” from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are detained,
upon their arrival, in a particular centre and that they may be held there for
up to six months. While noting the information provided by the delegation
that detainees have access to human rights protection officers, the
Committee is concerned that they do not have access to counsel. It is also
concerned about reports suggesting that “defectors” from the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea may be deported to third countries without
independent review if it is determined that they do not qualify for protection
(arts. 9, 10 and 13 ).’35
7.1.3
Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2016 report for South Korea noted
that ‘[t]here were roughly 29,000 North Korean defectors in South Korea at
the end of 2015. Defectors are eligible for South Korean citizenship, but they
can face months of detention and interrogations upon arrival, and some have
reported abuse in custody and societal discrimination.’36
7.1.4
The 2016 Bertelsmann Foundation report considered that:
‘In principle, there is no discrimination on the basis of race, religion, age or
ethnicity in South Korea. In reality, however, migrant workers, handicapped
persons, refugees from North Korea, women and young professionals face
difficulties in terms of legal protection from abuse, access to job
opportunities, and/or obtaining just and equal wages. The public is slowly
September 2016]
34
Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU), White Paper on Human Rights in North Korea 2014,
July 2014, (p594)
http://www.kinu.or.kr/eng/pub/pub_04_01.jsp?page=1&num=40&mode=view&field=&text=&order=&dir
=&bid=DATA04&ses= [Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
35
UN Human Rights Committee, Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of the
Republic of Korea [CCPR/C/KOR/CO/4], 3 December 2015
http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/1930_1455107652_g1527536.pdf [Date accessed 30 September
2016]
36
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2016 - South Korea, 27 January 2016
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2016/south-korea [date accessed 30 September
2016]
Page 23 of 25
becoming more aware of problems with regard to the (mis-)treatment of
migrant workers. Refugees from North Korea receive initial guidance and
benefits, but are then basically left to their own devices.’37
7.1.5
The US State Department ‘s 2015 human rights report stated that:
‘Cultural and social differences posed adjustment difficulties, and many
refugees from North Korea alleged societal discrimination. In a 2014 survey
of 200 North Korean defectors, many complained that prejudice and
discrimination against North Koreans made them feel like second-class
citizens. The National Human Rights Commission reported five
discrimination cases related to North Korean defectors through July,
including job discrimination and failure to issue a passport.’38
7.1.6
In June 2016 the New York Times reported that ‘By law, the National
Intelligence Service can keep North Koreans who flee to the South at the
secluded facility outside Seoul for as long as six months for debriefing and to
ferret out spies. Human rights researchers and opposition lawmakers have
quoted some former inmates as saying they were subjected to abusive
language, violence and threats of deportation while they were held there.’39
Back to Contents
37
Bertelsmann Foundation, BTI 2016; South Korea Country Report, 2016
http://www.bti-project.org/fileadmin/files/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_South_Korea.pdf
[date accessed 30 September 2016]
38
United States Department of State, 2015 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Republic of
Korea, 13 April 2016, 2d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of
Refugees, and Stateless Persons.
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?year=2015&dlid=252773
[Date accessed: 16 September 2016]
39
New York Times, North Korean Defectors’ Detention Is Unlawful, Human Rights Lawyers Say, 21
June 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/world/asia/north-south-korea-defectors.html?_r=0
[Date accessed 30 September 2016]
Page 24 of 25
Version Control and Contacts
Contacts
If you have any questions about the guidance and your line manager or senior
caseworker cannot help you or you think that the guidance has factual errors then
email the Country Policy and Information Team.
If you notice any formatting errors in this guidance (broken links, spelling mistakes
and so on) or have any comments about the layout or navigability of the guidance
then you can email the Guidance, Rules and Forms Team.
Clearance
Below is information on when this version of the guidance was cleared:
 version 2.0
 valid from 05 October 2016
Changes from last version of this guidance
Update of country information
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