CHAPTER
VII
PRESSURE GROUPS AWO POLITICAL PARTIES
Electioneering, Funding & Hospitality
A pressure group must be distinguished from a political party
which is concerned with the formation of governmental policies.
A
political party is concerned with obtaining control over governmental
machinery, so that its leaders are in a position to determine public
policy guided by party principles.
A pressure 'group, on the other hand,
has no aspirations of controlling the machinery of the government, but
to influence the process of governmental decision making for the benefit
-j
of its members.
Unlike the trade union organizations, the business
organizations are not controlled by political parties.
However, the
business organizations do not stand at an equidistance from all the
political parties.
Many groups have close traditional, empirical and
even administrative links with parties, which will have them added
strength when policies relevant to their group interests are being considered.
In modern days the parties also recognize the importance of groups and
make direct appeals to them.
Formal connections may exist between a
political party and pressure groups.
While there may be no formal
connections, a group may demonstrate its consistent support of a political
party by giving tho latter financial aid or a group may use its resources
to promote the cause of a particular society.
Sabulal Fadia, ibid, pp.
-)3 f
p. 21
Of all the political parties
128
the C o n g r e s s in spite of i t s soci a l i s t d e c l a r a t i o n s was the most
favoured party of the
Indian business.
The a s s o c i a t i o n of the
congress a n d the busin e s s i s n o t a ne w p h e n o m e n o n .
there since
pre-independence
the c o n g r e s s u/as the beli e f
Gujarat
days.
The p r i n c i p a l reason for supporting
that it e n s u r e s
large bearing on g o v e r n m e n t a l act i o n s an d
to c o ncentrate
working comm i t t e e
France,
stability,
la w a n d order.
till the c o n g r e s s split was g o v e r n e d by o ne dominant
poli c i e a l party and p o l i c i e s a n d p r o g r a m m e s
gro u p s have
It has been
of the c o n g r e s s
decisions.
have a
Therefore,
thoir e n e r g i e s on the a i d a n d c o n g r e s s
for f avourable a c c e s s a n d rec o m m e n d a t i o n s .
A s in
so in India, p a r t i e s and i n t e r e s t g r o u p s do n o t const i t u t e
d i f f erentiated,
one another.
autonomous
political
sub-systems.
They i n t e r p e n e t r a t e
There are some parties w h i c h more or less,
interest g r o u p s e.g.
con t r o l
c o n g r e s s party of India at the centre.
Till 1970
one-party
dominance by c o n g r e s s had i n f l u e n c e d the d e v e l o p m e n t of
Gujarat.
But central i n t e r v e n t i o n in c o n g r e s s affa i r s a n d Guja r a t
politics was virtually a b s e n t during this period.
with e c o n o m i c
Political
s tability
d e velopment c h a r a c t e r i s e d it s g o v e r n m e n t a l perfor m a n c e
and m a i n t e n a n c e of cord i a l r e l a t i o n w i t h big business h o u s e s o f the
stats p r o v i d e d no scope to gre a t public c o n t r o v e r s y .
scenario c h a n g e d wit h the
The whole
turn of the deca d e aro u n d the c o n g r e s s split.
Stability both of the g o v e r n m e n t and p o l i t i c a l varieties g o t g r e a t l y
disturbed.
Command,
The i n c r e a s e d i m p a c t of the c e n t r e an d c o n g r e s s
all c e n t e r e d a r o u n d
the Prime M i n i s t e r Mrs.
Indira
High
Gandhi,
129
broke open the congress organization for the penetration of the
central politics.
Gujarat hitherto a thermos model vis-a-vis the
national mainstream flowing from New Delhi became now a thermostat
model in terms of centre-state relationship.
Its open door policies
and absence of a farsighted recruitment strategy made congress a
melting-pot and a hot-bed of rabid Factional powerplay that neither
allowed it to enjoy its dominance effectively in spite of a big
majority nor allowed it to sit down to the task of performance.
2
Another factor responsible for instability has been the influence
exercised by the oil lobby and increasing resort to politics of
manipulation by the ruling elite.
Oil Lobby
Gujarat produces about 80$ of the groundnut produced in the
country.
The groundnut producers and the oil mill owners, known as
the 'Oil Lobby' are comprised mainly of the well off Kunbi-Patidar
and some Gnrasia farmers who dominate the politics of Saurashtra.
After the merger of the Saurashtra with Gujarat also, the distance
between the dominant group of the main land congressmen led by
Morarji Desai and the Saurashtra group remained practically unbridged.
This phenomenon was crystallised in the ousting of the Oivraj
Ministry (Saurashtra group) in 1963.
political eclipse.
2
P.N. Sheth, ibic.
This group smarted under
The same congress leaders of Saurashtra were,
pp.
7,
p. xxi
130
therefore,
first to join congr e s s
" D e s a i ’s congress" in Gujarat.
(R) w h e n it uas formed to challenge,
In the n e w congress,
S a u r a 3 h t r a group le d by A d a n i had an i m p o r t a n t
mors a m e n a b l e
the oil
to the oil
lobby of their region.
lobby has i n c r e a s e d its infl u e n c e
post-1970
congress politics.
irrespective
place and
the
they are
The r e s u l t is that
b e y o n d i m a g i n a t i o n in
As a result,
of their p a r t y character,
there f o r e ,
g o v e r n m e n t s aft e r governments,
found it d i f f i c u l t
to resist
their d e m a n d s like e x p o r t of edible oil or fixation of the prices
of g r o u n d n u t an d oil a n d its lobby.
As one h i g h - p o w e r e d e d i b l e - o i l s
executive
states "we in the oil trade have our very own Mafia....
There ar e
people in
occasions
carry crores a r o u n d in a t t a c h e
country's
best Supreme
the trade who i g n o r e
Court lawyers on
laws c o mpletely,
cases, who have
wh o on
some of the
their pay roll a n d who could,
3
if
they so wished,
creates dile m m a
to tho oil
whi c h in
have a n y o n e
bumped of f a t w i l l ..... ..."
for the g o v e r n m e n t s for as a result of the conce s s i o n
lobby,
the oil pri c e s go up a n d its supply b e c o m e s scarce
its turn i m m e d i a t e l y causes c o n s t e r n a t i o n a m o n g
number of consumers an d the common people
centres.
Gujarat is one
as m e r c u r i a l an issue,
Maharashtra.
out
fact
"once
that
to change
3
Sunday
fel]
All this
state where
politically, as
"Tho Chima n b h a i
only beca u s e
Observer, Hay
the urban
price of g r o u n d n u t oil is
sugar is i n n e i g h b o u r i n g
oil prices ro s e
too high."
1983
the
three m o n t h s of
poin t e d
A g a i n the
the P r e s i d e n t ' s Rule a n d Solanki
thrice during
8-14,
p a r t i c u l a r l y in
Congress M i n i s t r y " as one Gujarati
the g o v e r n m e n t s under
thnj.r policy
the
the vast
had
November,
131
February, 1977 indicates the successful politics of pressure that
is played by the dominant forces of Saurashtra,
In fact, the
powder-peg in the pre-Nav Nirman days was detonated by the sudden
price rise and scarcity of the edible oil.
Thus, almost every
1
government has to face this dilemma of satisfying the oil lobby
of Saurashtra and the consumers need of the common man.
And this
regularly injects certain amount of instability in State politics
of Gujarat.
The second factor giving scope for the interest groups to
come closer to political parties, as we have said, is the increasing
resort to politics of manipulation by the ruling elite.
The function
of converting demands into general policy alternatives is called
interest aggregation.
Before independence, interests were usually
aggregated either by the colonial British Government or by the
nationalist movement.
By the late 19?0 s the congress party, in its
effort to reconcile diverse movements within it, articulated an
ideology emphasising a broad socialistic outlook which still guides
the party.
After independence many of these diverse interests were
aggregated by the congress party leadership - or, more accurately
by the congress working committee, the congress parliamentary party
and the council of ministers.
The congress party has constantly
been in power and those who wanted to influence government policy
had to turn to the congress.
Autonomous economic interest groups,
such as business and landlords, tried generally to work with the
132
congress fold especially after 1952 elections.
And it is amazingly
true that the congress party aggregate myriad diverse interests more
effectively than other parties of the world.
It is just like an
omnibus in which various sections of people are joyfully riding
and getting down at convenience whenever their ends are not served.
The desire to seek wide spread electoral support compels it to include
in its policy package those demands which have very broad popular
support and to avoid alienating the most .prominent interest groups.
In a political culture where the parties aggregate in terms of certain
of general considerations, the policy alternatives are likely to be
more clear cut and consistent.
But in India as also in Gujarat,
where a chiof objective is the election of partisan candidates the
ruling party has a strong incentive toward aggregating at least the
most prevalent patterns of demands.
Since the ruling party has the
means of "distribution of resources" at its command the articulated
interests feel spontaneously inclined to aggregate thoir demands
in the party.
The function of leadership recruitment has been the sole
prerogative of the political parties but like other Functions
(particularly decision-making) the interest groups have exerted a
great deal of pressure in this field also.
The congress party yields
to such pressures mainly because it has not contributed to the
function of political socialization which it apparently left to the
4
B.K. Srivastav, ibid, pp. 49 , P« 217
133
pressure
groups
catch hold
potent
of a
enough
winning
themselves.
few g r o u p
do
a particular
party
T he
have
citizens
victorious
thus
out
their
concentrate
to
on
making
After
independence
others
now
felt
that
and rarely
joined
by
party membership would
group
some
leaders,
look
for
for
upon
in
come
which
they
of
career,
or
power,
gain.
otherwise
business
rich
activities.
industrialists
national movement,
to
the
political
of
the da y s of
reasons
or
out
representatives
their advant a g e .
b u s i n e s s m e n , .l a w y e r s
who,
their
be
have
the m a t e r i a l
a
of
people.
the inte r e s t s
businessmen,
the
the
Gone are
o f o n e ’s p r o f e s s i o n a l
was
and
tradition
and
but who
The
such
o f 'British
work not as
a
career
ah avocation.
The
Gujarat.
are
sacrifice,
had remai n e d o ut of
parties
The
failing
licences.
joined politics
of
those who
group politics.
and
has now a t t r a c t e d
professional
Contesting
wishes
wangling Ministry,
people
congress
who
the
party
and American
the
only from a m o n g s t
quotas,
to
the e l e c t i o n m a n i f e s t o
politics generally means entering
such
but as
when
favour.
that
with
easier
thought enlightened and
in i t s
endorsed
f e l t it
concerned with persuading
politics an a d j u n c t
congress
votes
conflicting
permits,
and
other
choose
patriotism,
Now e n t e r i n g
been
groups and
national movement
prestige',
has
largely
respective
the
leaders
whom it
not actually mean
of t h e
e l e c t e d are
political
leaders,
to m o b i l i z e
elections
The
caste and group
In
recruited
Gujarat
feelings
Vidhan
from a m ongst
Sabha
plays miracles in
the
the
h i g h e s t n u m b e r of
the a g r i c u l t u r i s t s .
They
elections
in
representatives
have a l s o
got
the
134
highest c o n t e s t i n g capacity.
This n u m b e r als o i n c l u d e s m o s t l y two
groups -
the reserved seats of the s c h e d u l e d
the r i c h
landlords.
theii
Even among
g r o u p leaders,
recruited as
ional elite.
an d urb a n
casts a nd tribes, and
the s c h e d u l e d castes a n d tribes,
who have emerged a s
the rural power elite,
they have a m u t u a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g
The rich l a n d l o r d s have
centres.
They ar e
and the gover n m e n t .
their
the a c t u a l link
with the cas t e
bases both in
work
inte r e s t s w h i c h cut acr o s s caste b o undaries.
fact­
the rural
between the rural men
The u r b a n e c o n o m i c elite,
and big b u s i n e s s m e n on the other hand,
the i n d u s t r i a l i s t s
for their o w n e c o n o m i c
They i g n o r e
caste
appeal if it does not coincide wit h their e c o n o m i c i n t e r e s t s .
that sense,
and their
since
they have
are
In
become more secu l a r in their p o l i t i c a l behaviour
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n in the a s s e m b l y is g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s i n g
1967.
Table
B u s i n e s s m e n / A g r i c u l t u r i s t s R e p r e s e n t a t i o n in
Gujarat Uidhan Sabha
Year
Businessmen
Number
P ercentage
10.0
floriculturists
Number
Percentage
10
10.0
1960-62
10
1962-67
11
7.21
31
20.52
1967-71
14
8.7
41
25.41
1972-74
22
13.7
45
28.12
1975-78
22
12.94 ’
70
41.18
1980-85
27
14.5
Sources;
1.
2.
109
59. 8
1L okshahina D h a b k a r a 1 . G u j a r a t Uidhan Sabha, 16 years
(1960-1976); G u j a r a t Uidhan Sabha L i b r a r y - Sarkari
lladhyasth Press, Gandhinagar.
Sixth G u j a r a t
Uidhan Sabha
(1980-85).
Gujarat Uidhan Sabha Sachiv a l a y a ,
Parichaya
Gandhinagar
Pustika,
1981.
Pattern of representation in
Gujarat
Vidhan
Sabha
While in Indian Parliament the percentage of business/industry
representation has steadily grown down (In the first Lok Sabha
it was as less as 10$>), the business/industry representation in
Gujarat is comparatively high. It is not our concern here to find
out any: explanation for this, but it tends to underline that unlike
the rest of India, the commercial culture of Gujarat might have
given a little more political clout or credibility to the business/
industrial elite in Gujarat. There has been fluctuation in the
percentage of business representation in the elections of the
Vidhan Sabha over the years since 1960.
Similar has been the case for the farmers representation.
Both
these groups emerge politically- significant groups in Gujarat.
But
the farmers emerge as far more powerful groups which has sustained,
political support in growing representation in the Vidhan Sabha.
The farmers constitute a large bulk of the rural society in Gujarat.
According to the Land Commission (M.R. Patel Report) it is the
middle farmer who constitute the bulk of Gujarat peasantry. Again
owing to their participation in the struggle for independence, the
farmers as a community havB undergone a long period of political
socialization eg. their participation in the Satyagrah of Kheda,
Ras, Barsad and Hansa which were fought mainly over agricultural
issues.
It is in this light of the peculiar role the farmers have
acquired in the political life of Gujarat that they seem to over­
whelm the business people in political representation. Otherwise,
viewed in the overall context, the business representation in
Gujarat may be considered significant.
136
Both duri n g a n d a f t e r e l e c t i o n s the g r o u p s hold the key
e x p l a n a t i o n of mu c h par t y behaviour.
of opinion,
uously
the parties a t elec t i o n
As
leaders in
time
hardly matt e r s .
the f ormation
seek supp o r t m o r e a s s i d ­
than th<.t of a g g r e g a t e of i n d i v i d u a l s .
individual
to the
The vote
of one
A s such the candidate n e v e r cares for
an i n d e p e n d e n t e d u c a t e d voter u/hom ha thinks p o l i t i c a l l y unimportant.
He catches
hold of the headman of e v e r y group a n d e v e r y
a r e s of his const i t u e n c y
It is
through
mho comm a n d s
the votes of m a n y mute voters.
these headmen that m o n e y is d i s t r i b u t e d a m o n g such
vote r s as labourers,
s cheduled caste an d
a l w a y s a l o o f frum such game to avo i d
c a m p a i g n e r s manag"
th« real
strategic
for him.
tribes.
The c andidate is
legal co m p l i c a t i o n s .
In e l e c t i o n campaigns
The
thi s m e a n s
that
signif i c a n c e of the p l a t f o r m o n which pa.rty n o m i n e e s
run
for e l e c t i o n can be fou n d only in the e x p r e s s e d or i m p l i e d desires
5
of the groups s u p p o r t i n g
l e g i s l a t i o n and rule
the
parties
the c a n d i d a t e s .
Thus,
the cont r o l of
f o r m a t i o n has s h i f t e d i n large m e a s u r e from
to the lobb i e s and a l l i e d o r g a n i z a t i o n s .
which polit i c a l p a r t i e s hear now is
The voice
the voice of g r o u p s rat h e r than
that of political l e a d e r s who prefer
to speak
for the people.
. Indian b u s i n o s s o r g a n i z a t i o n s a c t i v e l y sou g h t to i n f l u e n c e
the g o v e r n m e n t ' s p o l i c y from the very beginning.
C o n g r e s s is the
loading and d o m i n a t i n g
It is like an u m b r e l l a u n d e r w h i c h al l
i n t e r e s t s and o p i n i o n s get together.
5
Babulal
Farliu, i b i d , pp. 13,
p.
23
The
Indian National
party in I n d i a n politics.
shades of peo p l e wit h d i f f e r e n t
From the time of the first
137
Civil D i s o b e d i e n c e c a m p a i g n s
the inte r n a l
history of
party was
the r e c o n c i l i a t i o n of a m u l t i t u d e
different
points of view.
the cong r e s s
of special i n t e r e s t s and
After independence
the cong r e s s
ceased
to be a m o v e m e n t a nd has b e e n c o n v e r t e d i n t o a r e c o m m e n d a t o r y
forum
l
for the g o v e r n m e n t a l organs.
example,
The c o n g r e s s work i n g c o m m i t t e e ,
e m e r g e d as a "legi s l a t u r e
behind
the
le g i s l a t u r e . "
for
The
working c o m m i t t e e is not only the e x e c u t i v e of the c o n g r e s s but is
a k i n d of s h a d o w cabinet w i t h more re a l power and i n f l u e n c e
regular cabinet.
the c o n g r e s s
than the
It is no t wrong that t e n s i o n s a nd fact i o n s within
stimulate a n d are
stimu l a t e d
by the pres s u r e
of outside
groups.
A big political l e a d e r of the state wa s once a s k e d as to what
exac t l y was
the crite r i o n of giving a c o n g r e s s party ticket.
reply was
that it was too sim p l e a logic
candidate
"who can e a s i l y w i n in a p a r t i c u l a r
is here th a t pressure g r o u p s count:
are
the q u a l i t i e s that deter m i n e
When a c a n d i d a t e who i s n o t
becomes a
elect i o n
Caste,
the a b i l i t y of a
constituency".
An d it
m o n e y a n d p e r s o n a l i n fluences
the c a n d i d a t u r e in G u j a r a t State.
thrust u p o n
the voters,
c a p t u r i n g of votes
tact rather th a n a s p ontaneous e x e r c i s e of f r a n c h i s e .
The
camp a i g n i n v o l v e s a lot of money, men, m a t e r i a l a n d time.
The g r e a t e s t r e q u i r e m e n t i s money.
speaking about
affec t i n g
to judge
The
this matt e r ,
legislative
of financing
One m e m b e r
of p a r l i a m e n t ,
in
refl e c t s that one of the c r i t i c a l ways of
d e c i s i o n s is that of provi d i n g a c e r t a i n amount
for polit i c a l
parties a n d p o l i t i c a l c a n d i d a t e s .
groups e x p e c t that, in r e t u r n
for the outlay,
The
those e l e c t e d wil l not
138
than proceed in the legislature to favour of legislation not
wanted by the group.
This is not always the way things u/ork cut
in reality,.but it happens often enough to warrant the continuation
of this kina of financial support.
It is widely understood among
group leaders, members of the legislature, political observers
almost anyone with a sharp political nose - that single industries
and industrial associations make financial contributions to the
electoral campaigns of candidates they favour.
One businessman
of Gujarat puts it in this way: "The industrialist who says he is
uninterested in politics will very often be the same one who
contributes a considerable sum of money to guarantee that there
will be in the legislature a minimum number of representatives
who will support the business of the industrialist groups."^ During
the recent elections of the U.P, Assembly, a prominent Hindi Weekly
published a general survey of the average money spent by each •
candidate.
The Election Commission specified a limit of Rs. 13,500/-
but the way tho different parties and their candidates were campaigning
it was apparently estimated that no candidate would have spent less
than a lakh.
The candidate who were capable of exploiting their
parties or some other vested interests spent even five lakhs.
Legally a MLA is not supposed to earn that much of money in his full
tenure of five years.
The election campaigns of Gujarat were reported
to be equally expensive.
6
Based on personal interview
139
Campaign finance is more complex than the saying mould
indicate.
Certainly some campaign contributions are thinly disgu­
ised bribes, that is, payments to persons mho have the pouter to
exercise official discretion to the advantage of the contributor’s,
hare often, however, although the contributor may hope th:t h. will
receive a guld pro r;uu, ha has no expectation based on explicit
promise.
Perhaps even more generally the expectation of reward
is not in terms of a specific desired action, it is rather a belief
that the general trend of events mill bo more favourable if one
candidate win; rather than another.
7
The contributor pays his
money, keeps open on avenue of access and takes his chances.
If
his own party wins, he feels right-thinkingmen like himself will
regard his problems very sympathetically, end the fact that he has
made a campaign contribution will not be htld against him.
The
following empirical analysis will show how during the mid-term poll
the hu~-ne~smen bargained with the government.
"It is alleged by the opposition parties that after the
dissolution of the Lot. Sabha certain industrialists werd granted
licences wee ti. Re. 700 to Rs. 800 crores, so that they could help
the ruling party in the mid-term elections.
Accordingly, the Chief
Election Commissioner directed the Ministry of Information and
broadcasting to collect the requisite information on the issue.
7
V.u. Key, ibid.
po.
15,p- 526
140
Dr. Karan Singh, M.P. also put an' identical oral question in the
Lok Sabha to which the Minister of Industrial Development replied
as under;
"With the announcement of the neu/ Licensing Policy in
February, 1970, the number of industrial licence applications
increased very considerably during the year and a total number of
2226 applications were received besides 80? applications for the
licences in respect of industries which required licences after
announcement of the new policy.
The position of disposal during
the period from 27 December, 1970 to March, 1971, showed that 161
letters of intent were issued.
88 licences were also issued in
respect of industries which had been delicensed prior to 18th
February, 1970."
Thus the statement of the Minister virtually confirmed the
allegations.
161 licences were quite unusual and the distribution
of these licences was not democratically made.
In the matter of
issuing licences the big industrial houses were shown special favour
in many ways.
For example licences were granted to Kasturbhai Lalbhai
for his Super Phosphate project, particular parties were intimated
and approached in advance about certain projects and asked to apply
accordingly after it is already approved.
In some other cases while
most applications took months and years for final decision, applications
141
of some f a v o u r e d parties ware d i s p o s e d of at gre a t speed under
definite i n s t r u c t i o n s from above.
8
E l e c t i o n funds come m a i n l y from five
consists
and
their f r i e n d s and d o n a t i o n s
Another
is
of p^rty m e m b e r s h i p fees,
sources.
c o n t r i b u t i o n s by the c a n d i d a t e s
c ollected from the mas s e s in general.
source is the c o m m u n i t y of small traders.
the l a n d e d gentry.
agenc i e s as me 11.
important one,
The thi r d source
M o n e y is at times r e c e i v e d from fore i g n
But the f i f t h source is b e l i e v e d to be the mos t
the big business.
from each source is diff i c u l t
that b u s i n e s s
One source
The exa c t p r o p o r t i o n of c o n t r i b u t i o n s
to assess.
It is,
however,
provides a b o u t 90 per cent of -the elec t i o n
estimated
fun d s in
9
India.
B u s i n e s s has no s y s t e m a t i z e d m e t h o d
to poli t i c a l
the mon e y
parties.
for giving
C o n t r i b u t i o n s ar3 m a d e in several mays,
d o n a t e d is n o t a l w a y s
"White."
In the early
i n d u s t r i a l i s t s and p o l i t i c i a n s star t e d u t i l i z i n g
a mea n s of
financing polii.ical parties.
for w h i c h the
Subseq u e n t l y
Committees,
8
9
clubs and o b t e n s i b l y p h i l a n t h r o p i c
'India's E c o n o m i c Policy,*
Bangendu Ganguly, Mira
C alcutta,
been devised.
the routing of funds to p a r t i e s
Charan Singh,
p. 64.
1982,
p 56,
and
1970s the
the s o u v e n i r s as
Corporate advertisements
s h a r e h o l d e r s p a i d became a m a j o r
ne w chan n e l s have
these ways is
contributions
The
source of funds.
The m o s t i m p o r t a n t of
through a ho s t of
trusts.
G a n d h i a n Blue P r i n t ,
Ganguly, D i m e n s i o n s of E l e c t o r a l B e h a v i o u r .
142
The major source of political contributions has been private
contributions made directly to individuals collecting funds for the
party or to individual candidates themselves.
In the early years,
the outstanding fund collector from Gujarat was Vallabhai Petel.
Later Horarji Dasai performed this task.
At the state level, it is
the Chief Minister who is the supreme collector of party funds..
In Gujarat, the congress appears to have been the biggest
beneficiary of big business contributions upto the Lok Sabha election,
1977.
Some of the business houses which regularly contribute to
congress funds are: Lalbhai group, Ambanis-, jarabhai, Mahendra group,
etc.
But this does not mean that business houses do not give funds
to other parties.
Some leaders of the Danata Party openly admitted
that they had received funds from various business houses.
Sometimes
the election expenditure of some important party leaders are mainly
financed by some rich business men of their own constituency.
Individual contributions are also made directly to selected MPs.
These MPs are influencial members of Parliament who provide easy access
to the bureaucracy and particularly to ministers.
They were also
expected to argue specific cases for particular individuals to provide
advice on how to approach government, and to raise questions in
parliament that would bring pressure to bear on ministries or on the
bureaucracy.
Because
of tight party discipline, the financing of
individual HP is regarded as a means of accomplishing specific obj­
ectives rather than as a may of influencing the formation of larger
party policies.
Private business contributions mere also used to support
selected political figures mho approved to have bright future but
needed f i n a m i n g to build their career.
Aid mas channelled in the
form of campaign contributions and funds for publicity and supplementary
expenses.
The hope mas that the bright young men tuho gained positions
of authc;ity mould be sufficiently grateful to be a major asset to
the individuals tuho had sponsored them.
At the state level, by and large, political contributions
stemming from business have been individual, and not collective,
and they have been given for individual and not collective benefits that is to ensure access for the purpose of obtaining an industrial
licence, permit, or other such benefits.
Elections in India have
become progressively more costly over the years, partly because parties
must nom pay for mhat mas once volunteered.
As the memories and
loyalties of the nationalist movement fade, the parties must reach
the vast electorate through party mechanism rather than through local
notables or vote banks.
Often one menders as to horn and on mhom this
big amount of money mas spent as apparently in the name of campaign
jeeps mere seen running helter-shelter, microphone seething in the
144
bazar, crowcband posters pasted on the walls.
Somewhere public
meetings were organised incurring the cost of microphones, chairs
and dias etc.
expensive.
All these things, even if superfluous, are not very
The real expenditure was so secretly made that unless
one had gone in the inner texture of campaign, it was very difficult
to be understood.
But now it is no more a secret either.
The group
plays miracles in the elections.10
A time hunoured method of fund collection from industrial
corporations and big business is through publication of sourvenirs.
The method is not illegal and has been widely utilised for humanitarian
and cultural causes, but it was converted into a normative system for
electioneering and organizational build-up of political parties.
A
page in the souvenir could cost as much as Rs. 10,000 ostensibly for
advertisement.
In the 1977 elections, each company was asked by the
ruling congress party to buy a number of pages so that a minimum amount
of Rs. 1 lakh was made available.
The opposition parties are no angels
in this regard, but they do lack the strategic advantages of the party
in power.
It is a common practice to print only a small number of
souvenirs to comply with the law governing company donations.
Money and politics have thus an "Adulterous relationship."
In a democracy, all political parties need money.
As Mrs. Gandhi in
an interview to National Herald said, "It is not true that the congress
10
B.K. Srivastav, ibid, p. 244
145
alo n e
money,
gets the m c n e y or gives
but e verybody
g u i l d y of seeking
does.”
11
the f a v o u r s . , ..... . we do collect
Whi l e a ll p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s are
the supp o r t of trade a n d commerce a no big business,
the p a r t y in power has a distinct a d v a n t a g e over others.
There is
a s e m b l a n c e of c o l l e c t i o n s from i n d i v i d u a l a d m i r e r s a n d i d e o l o g i c a l
adherents,
posi t i o n
but it is no mo r e
to m e e t the
trickle, whu else is in a
dem a n d w i l l i n g l y or u n d e r p ressure,
i n d u s t r i a l i s e s an d big
to gain.
than a
business m a n uiho has m u c h a t stake a n d more
There are p e r s i s t e n t a l l e g a t i o n s
in M a d h y a Pradesh have
that the ric e mill e r s
d o n a t e d Rs. 52 lak h s to the c o n g r e s s in the
e x p e c t a t i o n of lax e n f o r c e m e n t of r e g u l a t i o n s and rice
three m o n t h s in
1974.
than the
One estimate
control for
from Gujarat State is
that the
oil e x t r a c t i o n plan t s a s s o c i a t i o n has g i v e n to c o n g r e s s Rs. 52 lakhs
in 1974.
The Gujar a t i s are by n a t u r e n o n-violent.
b u s i n e s s m e n - captains of indu s t r y an d
to violence,
T h e y are good
trade, wit h a singu l a r a v e r s i o n
but clue to their p r o m i n e n t p o s i t i o n in trade and c ommerce,
it will not be surprising, if there are more whi t e c o l l a r offenders,
amo n g
them.
Thus Viren Shah from G u j a r a t
Indian M e r c h a n t Chamber of Commerce)
r e m a r k s : " c a n we say
not c o n t r i b u t e d to c o r r u p t i o n by bribing
c l a n d e s t i n e c o n t r i b u t i o n to party f u n d s ? "
Ajit Roy,
12
Political
(outgoing P r e s i d e n t of the
those in a u t h o r i t y or m a k i n g
12
Power in I n d i a . Naya Prakash,
ibid. p. 62.
that we have
p. 61
146
Speaking from the f o r u m to e r a d i c a t i o n of c o r r u p t i o n
Dr. K a r a n Singh,
then Minis t e r
for Civil Aviat i o n and
Tour i s m
p o i n t e d out that e l e c t i o n s mere beco m i n g
so costly
be fought only with black money.
the e l e c t i o n s
U.P. Assembly,
com m a n d of
for w h i c h
During
the ruling p a r t y mere e x p l o i t e d it became
that the sugar
k i n g s of Guja r a t mere a s k e d to donate
for the e l e c t i o n
been mad e
of the
the who l e n a t i o n ' s resou r c e s at
news for national d a i l i e s
funds
that they could
campaign.
the
the banner
lords a n d the grou n d n u t
l i b e r a l l y to the
Donat i o n s ,
supposed
party
to have
through black m o n e y did not come to public e y e but the
rewa r d s given to the c a p i t a l i s t s c e r t a i n l y caught the e y e s of the
...
13
public.
I
We believe in free a n d fair e l e c t i o n but in p r a c t i c e it has
become a myth.
capitalists
terms of
cult u r e
The p o l i t i c a l par t i e s rec e i v e mon e y fr o m the
to cont e s t e l e c t i o n s and i n ret u r n pay t h e m off in
financial g a i n s
by conc e d i n g
to their demands.
reflects i t s e l f in the p o l i t i c a l
feel th a t e l e c t i o n s ma y
The poli t i c a l
b ehaviour of g r o u p s whi c h
be cont e s t e d a n d won m a i n l y by m o n e y duly
s u p p o r t e d by t r aditional groups of cas t e s and c o m m u n i t i e s .
This vast d i v e r g e n c e between
the i d e a l and
the a c t i o n has
c r e a t e d a confused,
ambiguous,
p o l i t i c a l culture.
It has e n c o u r a g e d the view that p o l i t i c a l
13
B.K.
Srivautav,
ibid,
h y p o c r i t i c a l and u n e t h i c a l sort of
pp. 48 ,
p«
114
147
independence
had dons little mor e
a n a t i v e p r i v i l e g e d group.
than d i s p l a c i n g a f o r e i g n with
This p r i v i l e g e d g r o u p has beon mainly
r e s p o n s i b l e for c r e a t i n g m a n y grou p s a n d i n d u c t i n g
in the
ional
poli t i c a l sys t e m
interests.
through leade r s h i p r e c r u i t m e n t a n d a s s o c i a t -
Ho s t of- the l e g i s l a t o r s do not feel s a t i s f i e d
with on l y a seat in the house.
benches,
an d for this,
remain in
v e s t e d interests
they
They crave
to sit in
the treasury
have to i n d u l g e in f a c t i o n a l i s m and
the vanguard of party politics.
They wis h to wo r k as
support chan n e l s to win elect i o n s an d m a n o e u v r e with the
to m a i n t a i n
the m a j o r i t y of their party in
chamber
legislature.
G e n e r a l l y the side wit h the m o s t m o n e y win in the electoral
campaign.
The ques t i o n has a r i s e n here,
larger purse win because
of the purse,
or does it r e c e i v e
because it is in the habit of w i n n i n g ? "
little of both e l e m e n t s
Danata P a r t y after
(February,
but they
for a s Mr.
198?) said,
The r e is u n d o u b t e d l y a
Vajpayee,
"Party work e r s
President of the B haratiya
did their best in the campaign,
could not m o b i l i z e e n o u g h f i n a n c i a l
support.
La c k
too c o n s p i c u o u s in the l i g h t
fina n c i a l s u p p o r t w h i c h the c o n g r e s s
t h e ’c a m p a i g n . "
the m o n e y
his p a r t y ' s defe a t i n the last Delhi e l e c t i o n
r e s o u r c e s with the party became
massive
"Does the side w i t h the
of
of
(I) n o m i n e e s g o t during
148
But there are campaigns in which the most generous expenditures
would not have turned the tide.
The 1977 election was definitely a
turning point in the history of voting behaviour that the exclusive
economic groups could not play a dominant role in the elections.
The electorate virtually without any external aid showed a mettle
that the masses of India had a real power to change the government,
however, strong and wealthy the persons holding the authority might
be.
Furthermore, the recent state elections in Andhra Pradesh,
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu have also proved that the most potent factor
in changing the minds of voters is not expensive publicity but the
personal and individual appeal of the party worker or other partisans
of tho candidate.
It may be that the most inexpensive type of political
propaganda may outweigh heavy expenditures.
It need not be supposed that the power of wealth is the only
means of gaining influence in party councils and in the formulations
of public policy.
The rise of agricultural groups to a position of
great power in party activities and in government of Gujarat itself
has not been accomplished by means of lavish campaign contributions
by agrarians.
Labour, similarly achieved considerable influence long
before it became of importance in party finance.
In weighing the significance of campaign finance it is also
well to place the problem in a larger setting.
Campaign finance is
merely one aspect of the broader issue of access to the electorate
149
through media of communication.
The sympathetic support of those
controlling the mass madia - the press, radio, television - plays
during and between the campaign a significant part in the battle
for the control of men's mind.
Moreover, the events between campaign
often far outweigh the tumult of the campaign in conditioning the
attitude of the voters.
Those events may fall quite impartially,
aiding or hindering candidates and parties without much regard to
the length of their purse.
Besides financial assistance another pre-independence tradition
which has survived to become a means of securing access is the provision
of hospitality and services to political leaders.
Business houses
in India maintain guest bungalows in various parts of the country. •,
These bungalows provide facilities that are appreciated by touring
Ministers.
Perhaps the most elaborate hospitality is provided during
meetings of filCC and Annual sessions of the congress party.
Indian
business provides funds for setting these tamashas, feeding the
ordinary delegates, supplying fleets of vehicles for party use, and
also provides accommodation for VlPs^including chief ministers and
members of the cabinet and council of ministers.
14
Perhaps even more important is the patronage which business
is capable of providing to the sons and nephews of those in power,:
Some of the most prominent examples of such employment are found in
14
S.K. Kochanok, ibid.
PP. 50,
P* 297.
150
th e f a m i l i e s of Union M i n i s t e r s l i k e S.K. Pal i l and H o r a r j i D e sa i,
At the time tuhon S.K. P a t i l was a M i n i s t e r , h i s son uias employed
by th e Timas of I n d i a i n t h e i r c i r c u l a t i o n d e p a rtm e n t and h i s soni n - lam mas employed by B i r l a .
H o r a r j e e D e s a i ’ s son K a n ti Desai mas
employed f o r some time by a f o r e i g n firm ru n by one S h r i P.N.
BalasubrJiiiaidu!!1..
un 1 1 .6 .1 9 7 9 , he i s r e p o r t e d to have w r i t t e n a
l e t t e r t o h i s a d v o c a te S h ri R.K, Garg to th e e f f e c t t h a t he had
c o n n e c t i o n s - b u s i n e s s and p o l i t i c a l w ith S h r i K a n ti D e sa i f o r th e
l a s t two d ecades and t h a t on a c c o u n t o f h i s i l l h e a l t h , he had
s to p p e d h i s b u s i n e s s , b u t c o n t i n u e d t o pay him a s a l a r y d e s p i t e
th e f a c t t h a t he had c e a s e d working f o r t h e firm and had become a
p riv a te s e c re ta ry to h is f a th e r .
When th e J a n a t a governm ent mas
formed i n 1977, u n d e r th e guid an ce o f h i s f r i e n d K a n ti D e s a i , th e
same S r i P.fJ. Balasubrarnanium r e - s t a r t e d h i s b u s i n e s s and became
q u ite r i c h . ^
S r i C.B. G upta, t r e a s u r e r o f t h e J a n a t a P a r t y p u b l i c l y a d m i t te d
t h a t on h i s a u t h o r i t y , K a n t i l a l D esai had c o l l e c t e d huge f u n d s i n the
name o f t h e J a n a ta P a r t y .
T i l l today n e i t h e r the names o f t h e donors
nor th e a c t u a l amounts have been d i s c l o s e d .
16
I t ijjy be p o i n t e d o u t h ere t h a t t h i s p a t t e r n o f p a r t y f i n a n c e s
and h o s p i t a l i t y being s u p p l i e d by b u s i n e s s p e o p le i s n o t p e c u l i a r to
G u j a r a t o r Indi,i a s s u c h .
S.V. Rao,
p. 2 8 .
‘ C ritT H S
I t has been n o t i c e d i n many o t h e r c o u n t r i e s
i n our S o c i e t y . 1
Vikas Publishing House, 1983
151
like
the US1, D n t a i n ,
that,
Japan arid Germany.
I t may perhaps be s a i d
i t h the e x c e ; i t i : n o f the s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s f o r o b vi o us
reasons,
the "st ory i s i n f a c t monotonously
Gut "nowhere i n the worl u i s
the same e v e r y w h e r e . "
corruption as widely d is c u s s e d as i t
i s i n I n d i a , " s a y s S . n . Korhomk .
Yet many o f the d e v i c e s used
by bu' 1n o c 3 fur m a i n t a i n i n g a c c e s s t o m i n i s t e r s v e r s o more on
c u n f l i L t of i n t e r e s t t ha n o u t r i g h t c o r r u p t i o n .
Guru r, 1 El. c t i u n of
1967, most o f g r o u p s , however, a do p t e d a
n e u t r a l a l t i t u d e t o u a . d e the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .
th-t i f
A f t e r the Fourth
they i d e n t i t y
They r e a l i s e d
t h e m s e l v e s moi e w i t h the c o n g r e s s p a r t y ,
t he y may l u _ c t h e i r i n f l u e n c e on thu government i f
c.-iiies t o power.
is
to r e l y
t h e o t h e r par ty
Even among thu committed gr oups the t e n d e n c y now
l u e s on p a r t y c o n n e c t i o n s . n d more on g o v e r n m e n t a l
c o n s u l t a t i o n s , no m a tt e r which p a r t y i s i n power i n o r d e r t o
safeguard their i n t e r e s t s .
Thus,
the b u s i n e s s g ro ups r e l y more
on con. u c u t i a l c o n s u l t a t i o n s wi th thu government now than i n
tfm.ii c o n n e c t i o n s wi t h t he c o n g r e s s and o t h e r p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .