Early Warning by NGOs in
conflict areas
EDWIN BAKKER
Introduction
Although the activities of non-governmental organisations in conflict areas
are earning a growing literature, their part in signalling and reporting
potentially dangerous situations and developments is still not very clear.
This chapter investigates the role and importance of non-governmental
organisations in conflict areas with regard to the early warning of events
and developments that have the potential to escalate into violent conflicts.
In other words, it focuses on what NGOs do and aims to find out whether
their activities matter or not.
The outline of the chapter is as follows: The first part defines the
concept of early warning and gives a brief summary of developments in
this field. The second part investigates the performance of nongovernmental organisations with regard to early warning and sheds light on
their strengths and weaknesses to distinguish the potential for conflict and
to warn of conflict escalation. This leads to a comparison of the advantages
and disadvantages of NGOs over governmental organisations with regard
to early warning. Next, the chapter focuses on co-ordination and cooperation of non-governmental organisations with state actors and on
obstacles between early warning and concrete conflict prevention measures
and strategies. Finally, it argues why the early warning activities of nongovernmental organisations do matter.
Early warning
Recent catastrophes in Rwanda, Yugoslavia and elsewhere, as well as the
realisation that it may be easier to deal with conflicts at the earliest stage
has led to growing consensus on the importance of conflict prevention in
the United Nations and among many (trans-)governmental and nongovernmental organisations (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999).
1
The cost-effective aspect of prevention of conflicts also explains the
increasing interest in conflict prevention: tackling conflicts before they
reach the point of armed conflict or mass violence is very inexpensive
compared to the exorbitant bill for relief, protection, reconstruction and
reconciliation activities in conflict areas. According to Van Tongeren
(1996, 18), ‘The overall costs of intra-state conflicts are much higher than
the eye-catching material damage and human casualties. There are also the
political costs of the demolition of the democratic system and even the
disintegration of states, the ecological costs caused by a scorched-earth
policy …, the social costs caused by the separation of families and
communities, the psychological costs of conflicts, which can easily drive
people to new violence, and the spiritual costs of the undermining of values
and the meaning of life’.1 Obviously, societies and the ‘international
community’ could gain a lot by conflict prevention. Attempts to collect the
financial, political, ecological or social profit that can be gained from
conflict prevention are, however, never certain and never easy.
Would-be peacemakers need to understand fully the roots and
political, social and/or economic contexts of existing conflicts and
escalation dynamics. They also need to define the precise nature of
challenges posed by particular tensions or conflicts before attempting to
intervene or to prescribe cures. Subsequently, they need to know what
forms of prevention are effective, and what are the circumstances under
which they can work? It is of importance that the economic, military, or
diplomatic actions and policies of outsiders not exacerbate dangerous
situations. Even well intentioned efforts, if not carefully planned can make
matters worse (Carnegie, 1997). Finally, would-be peacemakers have to
question themselves whether conflict prevention is desirable or not, as
conflict can be a creative and necessary means of bringing about social
change.
Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1999) distinguish two general
types of active measures to prevent conflict; ‘light prevention’ and ‘deep
prevention’. In the context of post-Cold War conflicts, light prevention
generally means improving the international capacity to intervene in
conflicts before they become violent, through, for instance, preventive
diplomacy. Deep prevention means building domestic, regional or
international capacity to manage conflict. In both cases, prudent decision
making and effective conflict prevention measures require a capacity to
anticipate and analyse possible conflicts and to be warned in time about
developments that threaten peace in a particular region. In fact, early
warning of (a potential) escalation of tensions is essential to be able to
come up with preventive measures and strategies in the early stages of
2
conflict development as to have the highest chance of success (cf. Van
Tongeren, 1996).
Definition
Early warning, as used above, can be defined as ‘The systematic collection
and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of
anticipating the escalation of violent conflict, the development of strategic
responses to these crises, and the presentation of options to key decisionmakers’ (Schmid, 1998). The importance of formulating strategic responses
and policy options is also stressed in the definition of Jentleson (1996)
according to which early warning is the provision of relevant institutions,
groups and organisations with essential information about escalatory
developments, far enough in advance in order for them to react timely and
effectively with preventive measures. These relevant institutions, groups
and organisations can be (a combination of):
1. The prospective victims and groups at risk;
2. The perpetrators (in order to deter them);
3. Trans-governmental organisations, such as the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe and NATO, as well as United
Nations agencies;
4. Governments of nearby or neighbouring countries willing and able to
provide their good offices;
5. The secretary-general and Security Council of the United Nations;
6. Non-governmental organisations concerned with relief.
7. The mass media and public
8. Eminent persons who can lend credence to the early warning.
Meaningfulness and research
The meaningfulness of early warning to preventing violent conflict has
been acknowledged by scholars at least since the late 1950s as illustrated
through Kenneth Boulding's early ambition to create early warning conflict
'data stations' with a view to timely preventive action. He saw these stations
as analogous to networks of weather stations, which would gather social,
political and economic data to identify ‘social temperature and pressure’
and to predict ‘cold or warm fronts’. These stations would perform two
central tasks with regard to monitoring potential conflict: first,
identification of the type of conflicts and location of the conflicts that could
3
become violent; second, monitoring and appraising their progress with a
view to assessing how close to violence they are (Boulding, 1962; Reichler,
1995; Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1999).
The basis for monitoring potential conflict and achieving early
warnings are indicators or signals from conflict areas. There are many
different predictors, precursor events or other signs of trouble that could be
used in forecasting situations that have the potential to escalate into violent
conflicts. A growing number of scholars and academic institutions is
involved in research on such conflict indicators.2 Prominent current
research in this area includes the work of Ted Gurr and his ‘Minorities at
Risk’ project3 and that of the Interdisciplinary Research Program on Causes
of Human Rights Violations (PIOOM). Both employ methods used in
econometric forecasting and large data sets with numerous variations, such
as demographic data and quantified evaluations of the level of communal
conflict (the Minorities at Risk project) or indicators of poor governance
(the PIOOM project). In general, important indicators of imminent violence
include widespread human rights abuses, increasingly brutal political
oppression, inflammatory use of the media, the accumulation of arms, and
an increase in organised killings (Carnegie, 1997). Much research is
conducted rather isolated. There are, however, a number of co-operation
initiatives. The ‘Minorities at Risk’ project and PIOOM, for instance, both
participate in a project called ‘FEWER’. This Forum on Early Warning and
Early Response is a global and multidisciplinary coalition of organisations
working together to provide early warning and prevent violent conflicts and
civil wars. Its objectives are to offer technical, financial and administrative
support to a number of local non-governmental organisations involved in
gathering information, monitoring open sources, and analysing events in
conflict-prone regions. FEWER currently consists of 26 members,
including NGOs such as the organisation International Alert4, and research
centres, such as the research institute Clingendael (The Hague), the Centre
for Strategic and International Studies (Washington D.C.) and the Center
for International Development and Conflict Management of the University
of Maryland (Baltimore) that houses two major global databases.5
Combining the expertise and experience of its members, the Forum on
Early Warning and Early Response distinguishes five criteria for a good
early warning system:
1. partnership and direct lines of communication between local and
regional organisations and their international counterparts;
2. partnership and co-operation between the non-governmental sector,
academia, governments, and inter-governmental agencies;
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3. regular monitoring, collection and analysis of information from open
sources about the outbreak, resurgence or escalation of violent conflict;
4. identifying and assessing potential opportunities for conflict prevention
and peace making; and
5. providing realistic, impartial and feasible policy options to influential
actors at the national, regional and international levels that would
support sustainable peace. (FEWER, 1999).
Difficulties and obstacles
Despite the above-mentioned indicators, initiatives and criteria, achieving
early warning of conflicts remains a difficult and delicate exercise. It
requires overcoming two fundamental problems. First, one has to deal with
the informational problem of obtaining both the necessary quantity and
quality of intelligence in a reliable and timely fashion. Second, one has to
overcome the analytic problem of avoiding misperception or other faulty
analysis of: the likelihood of diffusion and/or escalation of the conflict; the
impact on interests; and the potential risks and social, economic, military
and political costs of both action and inaction (Jentleson, 1996; 1999).
However, in the process between the first signs of tensions and
disputes and proper action to prevent the escalation of these troubles, the
biggest obstacle is not signalling the first signs nor the analysis of the
situation, but a lack of political power and will among governments and
trans-governmental organisations to act. In fact, early warning actually has
been less of a problem than often asserted and assumed. A great deal of
information was available in the Yugoslav case, the Somali case, the
Rwandan case and the recent Kosovo case. One difficulty is that the signals
in all of these cases had to compete with, at the time of their escalation,
concomitant, louder and sometimes even more troublesome international
events. The second difficulty is linked to the dilemma of the rewards and
costs associated with recognising and correctly appraising the signal.
Unfortunately, taking available warning seriously always carries the
'penalty' of deciding what to do about it. Given the strong tendency of
policy makers to put off hard choices as long as possible, the main problem
is that of mustering the political will to both listen and act. The core of the
problem is that governments and trans-governmental organisations,
although knowing of new threats of peace and stability, are preoccupied
with current crises and are not willing or capable to focus their attention to
the emerging crises of tomorrow. Moreover, governments and transgovernmental organisations still seem to act on behalf of peace only when
it serves their interests or when the financial, military or political costs of
5
conflict are too painful to endure. They may also just hope that early
warnings of political or ethnic tensions will turn out to be a false alarm or
that the situation will be less threatening than predicted. Sometimes, they
simply do not know what to do or do not have the necessary means to act as
most existing international security mechanisms -- such as the United
Nations Security Council -- are still not capable to quickly respond to early
warning.
Early warning by non-governmental organisations
Non-governmental organisations in conflict areas
Due to the global political context, the activities of non-governmental
organisations in conflict areas was relatively limited during the Cold War.
Today, the major international NGOs have thousands of people operating
around the world in countries beset by war. Those organisations whose
activities are directly or indirectly related to conflict prevention are
advocating human rights and/or democracy, work in the field of
humanitarian aid and social and economic development, or promote interethnic dialogue. The Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere
(CARE), for instance, had operations in 24 countries in 1995 that were in
conflict. In that same year, the Nobel Prize winner Medicins Sans
Frontières had more than 2,500 people in the field in more than 65
countries. The most general role these and other NGOs in conflict areas
play with regard to conflict prevention is the spread of information about
developments in these regions. The rapid spread of new, easier and less
expensive ways of communicating within and among states have allowed
these organisations to become key global transmitters for information on
situations in even the most remote parts of the world.
Some NGOs do more than just transmit information. An increasing
group of human rights campaigners, women's groups, humanitarian aid
agencies, peace activists, actively try to contribute to the prevention of
conflicts. A number of them work at the frontiers of building the political
foundations and international arrangements for ‘deep prevention’ of
conflicts. They work on problems of the environment, arms control, world
health, inter-ethnic tensions and a host of other global issues. Three broad
categories of non-governmental organisations offer especially important
potential contributions to the prevention and resolution of conflicts:
1. human rights and other advocacy groups;
2. humanitarian and development organisations; and
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3. the small but growing number of ‘Track Two’ groups that help open
the way to more formal internal or international peace processes
(Carnegie 1997, pp. 111-113).6
These domestic or international NGOs may monitor conflicts and provide
insight into a particular conflict, convene the adversial parties by providing
a neutral forum and/or pave the way for mediation and undertake
mediation. They may also carry out education and training for conflict
resolution, building an indigenous capacity for coping with ongoing
conflicts and help to strengthen institutions for conflict resolution. They do
so by fostering the development for the rule of law, by helping to establish
a free press with responsible reporting on conflict and by assisting in
planning and implementing elections (Van Tongeren, 1996; Carnegie,
1997). Although one could argue about the extent of their influence, these
non-governmental organisations have increasingly played a complementary
role in the field of foreign affairs (cf. Schennink, 1999). Without doubt,
these NGOs -- with their knowledge and experience in the field of
humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring and advocacy, development
projects and/or conflict prevention -- are very important providers of early
warning.
Strengths and weaknesses
By both location and activity, non-governmental organisations in conflict
areas are often the first to notice increasing tensions in potential conflict
areas (Van Tongeren, 1996; Jentleson, 1999). They have a wealth of
information regarding the conditions and grievances that give rise to
violence. Indeed, the disruption of normal NGO operations is itself an early
warning signal that conditions are deteriorating dangerously, a signal that
governments often miss (Carnegie, 1997). The hallmark of nongovernmental organisations is their activity at the grass-roots level or
working on the front lines to provide humanitarian assistance and
protection. Non-governmental organisations are sometimes even the only
sources of information from which the international community can learn
about a situation in cases were international links are largely non-existent,
such as in the case of Cambodia throughout the 1980s. The same holds for
very remote conflict regions, such as the south of Sudan, parts of Congo
and northern Uganda. DeMars (1995) even claims that all early warning
initiatives rely on humanitarian non-governmental organisations as primary
sources of information on emerging conflict and humanitarian crises. This
bold statement is based on the idea that many non-governmental
7
organisations have deep knowledge of regional and local issues, cultures
and relationships, and an ability to function in adverse circumstances even,
or perhaps especially, where governments cannot. This particularly holds
for domestic NGOs and international ones with long-term presence in a
country or region. These organisations can provide essential information on
potentially dangerous situations and escalatory developments. However,
one could argue whether they should be the ones to issue an early warning.
Perhaps NGOs should leave that particular delicate task to governmental or
trans-governmental organisations, for instance in order to increase the
chances of concrete conflict prevention measures or strategies by state
actors.
Compared to NGOs, representatives of governmental or transgovernmental organisations have closer access to the most powerful
political and diplomatic instruments for preventive diplomacy or other
instruments of conflict prevention. Moreover, governments have already
developed procedures and systems to keep themselves abreast of the
essential information necessary to operate in dangerous circumstances.
Their tools include military intelligence services and diplomatic missions.
Increasingly, they also invest in the capacity to assess the validity and make
use of information available from ‘outside’ sources, such as the media and
non-governmental organisations. Nonetheless, specifically with regard to
developments in conflict areas, governmental and trans-governmental
organisations are still far less aware of what is actually playing in divided
societies than non-governmental organisations in these regions.
The main problem of governmental organisations concerning early
warning is, however, not a lack of specific information about specific
developments in specific regions. Even when a government is aware of an
escalation of tensions, issuing an early warning to the international
community is not a step which is taken easily. In contrast to NGOs in
conflict areas, the threshold to push an early warning is a lot higher in
governmental organisations as analysts, officers or departments within
these organisations run serious risks when sounding the alarm bell. For
instance, they risk ‘shoot the messenger’ penalties of being blamed for the
bad news they bring even if it is accurate. And, if inaccurate, the ‘cry wolf’
label may follow. Such an appellation may damage professional reputations
or that of departments, offices or diplomatic missions. For foreign service
officers, the bureaucratic disincentives are arguably even greater. Because
of the uncertainty, they often adopt the stance that it is far better to wait and
see (Krumm, 2000). As a consequence, within these circles, the practice of
planning ahead, of taking strategic diplomacy beyond the issues of the
week, are not deeply ingrained. Preventive diplomacy and other forms of
8
early warning and early action, however, require the ability to sniff trouble
in its early stages and then take steps to avoid it (Jentleson, 1996).
To domestic and international non-governmental organisations in
conflict areas it is of vital importance to be able to foresee trouble. They
must be prepared or have to evacuate when tensions escalate into violent
conflicts. This sheer need to act in time in such situations makes the abovementioned disincentives of (trans-)governmental organisations to sound the
alarm bell less relevant to NGOs. Therefore, non-governmental
organisations have an extra advantage in addition to being on the spot.
Another advantage of non-governmental organisations over state actors is
the reputation for non-partisanship and a-politicalness that many of them
have earned. This gives any information they provide and the warnings
they issue substantial credibility. Finally, NGOs in conflict areas can
rapidly spread information to a larger audience, either directly through their
members or indirectly through their contacts with the media.
There are, of course, difficulties involved when these nongovernmental organisations take on information and early warning roles.
The information these groups provide is not always accurate or balanced
which can lead to misperceptions or even harmful political and diplomatic
reactions. Some non-governmental organisations tend to be moralising
which is not always helpful either. In addition, different NGOs may issue
different warnings. Some of these warnings are not consistent or vaguely
formulated. Many domestic or international NGOs in troubled regions are
not experts in complex conflict processes simply by being active in these
regions. Some non-governmental organisations prosper on conflict and may
not always be objective when signalling an escalation of tensions or
disputes. Moreover, NGOs that operate regularly within or near crisis areas
may develop their own agendas that often do not conform to those of
parties to the dispute and of governmental or trans-governmental
organisations. In addition, non-governmental organisations may be
reluctant to provide information that can be used to undermine one or
another of the parties and generate allegations of spying and heightened
dangers for their field staff (Carnegie, 1997). This risk of retribution may
be particularly high for domestic and local NGOs (Rotberg, 1996). In
addition, an active role by non-governmental organisations in conflict
prevention and early warning may have a negative impact on:
1.
2.
3.
4.
their neutrality/impartiality;
access to local partners;
the sharing of information that could jeopardise humanitarian action;
the problems of advocacy versus neutrality and the delivery of services
to meet human needs (Leatherman, 1999).
9
Despite these risks, more and more non-governmental organisations are
active in the field of early warning. They issue statements, publish
documents or lobby in order to persuade governments and transgovernmental organisations to take conflict prevention measures. In
addition, a growing number of non-governmental organisations take such
measures themselves. The activities of the earlier-mentioned ‘Track Two’
groups are the most extreme example of such initiatives.
Co-ordination and co-operation
Comparing the advantages and disadvantages of both governmental and
non-governmental organisations, it is evident that neither NGOs nor state
actors can be considered to be ultimately best suited to issue early
warnings. Both are confronted with specific and common difficulties and
challenges. These can be overcome by improving the mutual understanding
between academia, (trans-)governmental organisations and NGOs. For the
latter this means commitment to a slow process of building confidence and
constructive relationships with key actors and services throughout the
foreign policy structure. In order to help this process, NGOs can organise
and host regular meetings and events to ensure contact and communication
with planners, policy makers and political leaders. In this way, there is
increasing mutual understanding of the complexities and constraints faced
by either side. These forums can be used to discuss international events,
highlight new dilemmas, and discuss issues of coherence and present early
warning information.
Co-ordination and co-operation is also required to improve
practical value of early warning information. More often than not, early
warnings are not combined with an analyses of how (state) actors with an
intervening capacity could or should use this capacity. These actors as well
as scholars such as Van de Goor and Verstegen (1999), stress the need for a
more policy-oriented approach and a ‘conflict and policy assessment
framework’ to increase the value and effectiveness of early warning
systems. The way in which early warning information is presented is
important as well and can also be improved. In general, statements and
reports should aim to be as concise and brief as possible. Policy-makers,
planners and desk officers value solid research inputs over straight forward
lobbying, and welcome alternative recommendations which are seemingly
feasible (Costy and Gilbert, 1998).
With regard to the political attitude and concrete activities of state
actors, improvements in co-ordination and co-operation in the field of early
10
warning are far more difficult to define. Despite a great deal of noise about
the importance of early warning and conflict prevention, a change of
attitude, the creation of new structures and institutional changes are needed
to make early warning more effective. Similar changes are also needed to
promote and improve concrete conflict prevention measures and strategies
succeeding early warning.
So far, calls in the first half of the 1990s by, for instance, the
United Nations General Assembly for early warning systems have not led
to portentous improvements in this field from the side of state actors.7 This
does not mean that there have not been any positive developments. Most
noticeable are the initiatives and activities of the Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe. Its long-term observation missions in
(potential) crisis areas and its High Commissioner on National Minorities
are excellent examples of systematic gathering of information on potential
conflicts by a governmental actor that is also provided with (limited) tools
for early action. Furthermore, in several countries, such as Canada,
Norway, Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands, there is growing cooperation among different sectors and kinds of organisations active in the
field of early warning and early preventive action. In these countries and
elsewhere, joint platforms are established to ensure broad support in society
and to exchange ideas, information and experiences (cf. Van Tongeren,
1996). An example of such a platform is the Great Lakes Policy Forum in
the United States which aims to exchange information in a timely fashion
and craft creative approaches to non-violent problem solving. One of the
best examples of government-NGO co-operation that aims to overcome the
gap between early warning and response is the so-called ‘Norwegian
Model’. This framework for Norwegian efforts is provided by the
Norwegian Emergency Preparedness System (NOREPS) and the
Norwegian Resource Bank for Democracy and Human Rights (NORDEM).
They provide information, tools and flexible standby arrangements and
foster close co-operation between government, voluntary, private sector
and academic entities. NORDEM is a resource bank of experts that assists
the United Nations and others on short notice in areas such as human rights,
electoral assistance, and other forms of democracy support. NOREPS
provides assistance by making relief items and lifesaving equipment that
have been propositioned in disaster-prone areas rapidly available. It also
organises a standby force of more than 400 professionals who are trained
and prepared for deployment in the field within 72 hours. In addition, it
assembles ‘service packages’ which combine the most suitable emergency
equipment with professionals in areas such as water and sanitation, primary
health care clinics, field hospitals, and de-mining. (Carnegie, 1997). In
other words, the ‘Norwegian model’ is an excellent example of positive
11
practice. Moreover, it is an example that deserves to be copied elsewhere. It
shows that co-ordination and co-operation of NGOs and state actors can
result in entrenching early warning and conflict prevention into common
practices. This makes Michael Lund’s (1996) idealistic idea of a more
systematic, global early warning system and preventive regime -- one that
draws on the strengths of individual states, trans-governmental
organisations, and NGOs -- ambitious but not naive.
Concluding remarks
In the field of conflict prevention, non-governmental organisations are
often excellent sources of information on situations and developments on
the ground as many are involved in conflict areas and potential conflict
zones. They also play an important role in achieving early warning of
growing tensions that have the potential to escalate into violent conflicts.
There is, however, room for improvement of the quantity and quality of
information on potentially dangerous situations and developments. This
also holds for the way non-governmental organisations provide early
warning and for the co-ordination and co-operation between nongovernmental organisations and (trans-)governmental organisations. Often,
the early warning activities of these two groups are overlapping or
complementary. Fruitful co-ordination and co-operation between nongovernmental organisations and between non-governmental organisations
and (trans-)governmental organisations is needed to address this problem
and to improve the early warning capacities of both. Ideally, these parties
should aim for a global early warning system somewhat in the spirit of
Kenneth Boulding’s late 1950s idea of a network of ‘data stations’.
Such a system, however, would not be any guarantee for early
preventive action. Even when early warning fulfils its criteria -- i.e.
providing the right information at the right time at the right place and in the
right form -- it often does not lead to a follow-up. Governments and transgovernmental organisations often seem reluctant or incapable to launch
adequate conflict prevention measures at the earliest stage. As a reaction to
the sovereignty dilemma, the limits of traditional diplomacy and other
handicaps for state actors to act in time, some NGOs -- human rights and
other advocacy groups, humanitarian and development organisations, and
‘Track Two’ groups -- have taken up concrete activities in the field of early
warning and conflict prevention.. Given the increasing co-operation
between these non-governmental organisations and state actors, such as
ministries of foreign affairs, one could argue that the activities of these
non-state actors do matter. In particular the fact that NGOs are often the
12
first to notice increasing tensions and that they are sometimes even the only
sources of information from which the international community can learn
about developments in remote areas has been widely acknowledged.
Although one could argue about the extent of their influence, it is safe to
say that non-governmental organisations play a complementary role in the
field of early warning. Further co-operation and co-ordination between
these organisations and state actors may improve follow-up mechanisms
and the development of scenarios and instruments for the purpose of
enabling a more effective response to imminent or re-igniting conflicts.
Obviously, such a fundamental change of attitude by governments and
international organisations will not be achieved overnight.
Notes
1
For a more elaborate study of the cost of conflict prevention see Michael Brown
and Richard Rosecrane (1999).
2
An excellent overview of research on conflict indicators and early warning
systems is presented by Luc van de Goor and Suzanne Verstegen (1999).
3
The Minorities at Risk project tracks, on a global basis, over 260 ethnic groups at
risk from discrimination or conflict.
4
International Alert is an organisation set up by human rights advocates as a
response to the rise in violent conflicts and the subsequent abuse of individual and
collective human rights.
5
These databases are the Global Events Data System that tracks daily interactions
of states and non-state communities in an attempt to support crisis early warning
and early response initiatives, and that of the Minorities at Risk Project.
6
The term ‘Track Two Diplomacy’ was coined in 1981 by Joseph Montville,
referring to a broad range of unofficial contacts and interactions aimed at resolving
conflicts, both internationally and within states. It usually involves unofficial
negotiations between citizen, academic, religious or other non-governmental
groups supplementing peace-seeking efforts by governments or other state actors.
Montville, then a United States diplomat, used the term in contrast to ‘Track One
Diplomacy’, which refers to diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts through the
official channels of government (Notter and McDonald, 1996).
7
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 called for: ‘the
systematic pooling, analysis and dissemination of early-warning information’.
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Schmid, A. P. (1998), Thesaurus and glossary of early warning and
conflict prevention terms. Abridged version, FEWER,
Http://www.fewer.org/research/index_01.htm
Tongeren, P. van (1996), ‘The role of NGOs in conflict prevention’, in
Dutch Centre for Conflict Prevention, ACCESS and PIOOM (eds),
Prevention and Management of Conflicts: an international
directory. NCDO, Utrecht, pp. 18-24.
1
For a more elaborate study of the cost of conflict prevention see Michael Brown
and Richard Rosecrane (1999).
2
An excellent overview of research on conflict indicators and early warning
systems is presented by Luc van de Goor and Suzanne Verstegen (1999).
3
The Minorities at Risk project tracks, on a global basis, over 260 ethnic groups at
risk from discrimination or conflict.
4
International Alert is an organisation set up by human rights advocates as a
response to the rise in violent conflicts and the subsequent abuse of individual and
collective human rights.
5
These databases are the Global Events Data System that tracks daily interactions
of states and non-state communities in an attempt to support crisis early warning
and early response initiatives, and that of the Minorities at Risk Project.
6
The term ‘Track Two Diplomacy’ was coined in 1981 by Joseph Montville,
referring to a broad range of unofficial contacts and interactions aimed at resolving
conflicts, both internationally and within states. It usually involves unofficial
negotiations between citizen, academic, religious or other non-governmental
groups supplementing peace-seeking efforts by governments or other state actors.
Montville, then a United States diplomat, used the term in contrast to ‘Track One
Diplomacy’, which refers to diplomatic efforts to resolve conflicts through the
official channels of government (Notter and McDonald, 1996).
7
The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 46/182 called for: ‘the
systematic pooling, analysis and dissemination of early-warning information’.
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