Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus
the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
For our part, we hold that the only guarantee against future aggression
which is worth considering is the creation of a League of Nations for the
enforcement of peace, with its corollaries, a general reduction in
armaments, and some modification of the system of alliances.
H. W. Massingham, December 1916.1
The prospects of an imminent peace burned brightly for the British Radical publicists
in the last month of 1916. They had every reason to expect that the widespread
revulsion at the futile mechanised slaughter on the Western Front would cause the
leaders of the warring nations to call a halt to hostilities and start negotiations.
Furthermore, as we have seen, speeches by Prime Minster Asquith and Foreign
Minister Grey that were friendly to the idea of a ‘league of nations’, coupled with
Bethmann-Hollweg’s 9 November declaration of Germany’s intention to be part of a
post-war ‘league of nations’, gave promise that this might be an opportune time for
the intervention of the world’s most powerful neutral nation, the United States. Within
the space of two weeks there were three sensational developments: Lloyd George
became the new British Prime Minister; Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg made a
dramatic peace offer; and President Wilson issued the American Peace Note. These
events set in motion a series of developments that were to have profound implications
on the duration, nature, and ultimately, the outcome of the First World War. At the
time, it was not clear to the Radical publicists where the tangle of events, which
occurred over the following few months, would lead. On the whole, though, the
Radical publicists were extremely hopeful that the prospect of the intervention of the
United States, preferably as a neutral, but possibly as a belligerent, offered the best
chance for an early and satisfactory peace. The high point for the Radical publicists
was the President’s so-called ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech. This was an
affirmation of all the Radical publicists’ convictions about the desirability of an early
negotiated peace and the building of a new world order with a ‘league of nations’ as
the centerpiece. However, as a new year dawned, it became apparent that, despite the
military stalemate, there were immensely powerful forces within each belligerent
nation that were determined to keep the war going. In Britain these forces gathered
under the banners of ‘fight to the finish’, otherwise known as the ‘knock-out blow’.
The struggle between these two rival ideas became deadlocked over February and into
March 1917. However, the Russian Revolution immediately transformed everything.
The Radical publicists were overjoyed by this momentous event. They hoped that the
combined forces of the American and Russian democracies could achieve a ‘peace
without victory’.
On 2 December 1916, Henry Massingham was encouraged by news of Lord
Grey’s favourable remarks regarding a post-war ‘league of nations’ in a telegram to
1
Nation, Events of the Week, 23 Dec. 1916.
73
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
American ex-President William Taft, then head of the League to Enforce Peace. ‘This
is most important, for it shows that Lord Grey contemplates a true international
settlement, and will therefore frame a peace in harmony with it.’2 However, whether
this indicated that the British Foreign Minister was now close to considering a
negotiated peace shall never be known, as Grey’s career as Foreign Minister was be
terminated three days later.3 Meanwhile, the recently re-elected President, Woodrow
Wilson, turned his thoughts to mediation. Within days of his election victory Wilson
had told Colonel House of his desire to write a note to the belligerents demanding that
the war be ended.4 This was despite the fact that one reason for Wilson’s success at
the polls was that he had kept America out of the war thus far. Pacifist sentiment,
particularly in the Democratic Party, was summed up in the phrase, ‘he kept us out of
the war’.5 Though Wilson did not use the phrase, he had not objected to it.6 Wilson’s
victory was also very much due to the fact that he had courted the pacifist and
progressive vote.7 The President’s economic and social reforms had done much to
endear him to them.8 Considering the slender margin of his victory, it is no
exaggeration to say that without the support of progressives and peace activists,
Woodrow Wilson would not have won the election of November 1916. In this regard,
the endorsement of Jane Addams had been critical to Wilson clinching the progressive
vote.9 It was perhaps one reason that she was invited to dinner at the White House on
Tuesday 12 December.10 The other reason Jane Addams was asked to dine with the
2
Nation, Events of the Week, 2 Dec. 1916.
Asquith and his ministers resigned on 5 December 1916. The Lloyd George coalition government was
formed on 6 December 1916. See below.
4
The President told House on 14 November that he planned to demand that the war be ended in order
to avert the need for U. S. intervention. Despite House’s protests, Wilson announced the following
morning that his mind was made up. Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era: 19101917 (New York, 1963), p. 256. On Colonel House’s reaction to this idea, John Thompson explains
that he was not keen on the idea. ‘The situation was quite different from the one he had envisaged a
year before. Then he had planned that the United States, in secret session with the Allies, would force
Germany to accede to a moderate settlement. Now an American initiative would be welcomed in
Germany and resisted by the Allies.’ John A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson: Profiles in Power (London,
2002), p. 130.
5
This slogan dovetailed nicely with Wilson making the ‘league of nations’ a central plank of his
election campaign.
6
H. C. Peterson, Propaganda for War: The Campaign Against American Neutrality, 1914-1917 (Port
Washington, 1939), pp. 278-279.
7
In addition, the strong campaigning on his behalf by ex-Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan,
was a factor. Ibid., p. 280.
8
The passing of the Adamson Act was the climax to Wilson’s social reforms. This had separated
progressive from conservatives more than any other issue and leading American Socialist party
members acknowledged Wilson’s accomplishment. His reforms had earned him the support of many
high profile progressives and socialists. At the Democratic National Committee, Jane Addams publicly
announced that she would be voting for Wilson. For further detail, see Knock, To End All Wars, pp. 8994.
9
In 1914, Jane Addams was the most famous American woman. The historian Jean Bethke Elshtain
has pointed out that Jane Addam’s praises had been sung in every quarter. She had been attached to
every major social reform in the United States since 1890. In 1912, she had served as delegate to the
Progressive party’s convention and had seconded the nomination of Theodore Roosevelt for president.
At the beginning of the war, she had spearheaded the formation of the Women’s Peace Party. Jean
Bethke Elshtain, Jane Addams and the Dream of American Democracy (New York, 2001), pp. 34-35.
10
Addams’ ‘Invitation to State Dinner’, Tuesday 12 Dec. 1916. Addams Papers, 10. Since her
endorsement of Woodrow Wilson in the election campaign Addams found she had increased influence
at the White House. This influence she was clearly not afraid to use as indicated by a letter to Colonel
House three days before her dinner at the White House. She sent a letter of introduction to Colonel
3
74
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
President and his family was the intense lobbying of the President by many of the
peace activists who had worked so hard for his re-election. Perhaps it was Wilson’s
aim to assure the American peace activists that they could rely on him to do his
utmost to end the War.11
It is not clear whether, on the night that Jane Addams dined at the White
House, the President confided to her that he had been drafting a peace note. It is
unlikely, since Wilson had always tended to play his cards close to his chest in his
conversations with peace activists.12 What is certain though is that Wilson, House and
Lansing had been debating the proposed peace message earlier that day. This had led
to significant changes to the draft.13 The President may have been in an ebullient
mood at dinner as he thought to himself about the dramatic act he was about to take.
There was spirited discussion about peace mediation that evening, as indicated in a
subsequent letter from Stockton Axson to Addams. 14 However, Wilson was unaware
at that time that he was about to be upstaged by the German Chancellor. BethmannHollweg issued his now-famous Peace Note. It is not clear whether Addams heard of
the German Note that night or the next day.15
‘A sharp break in the history of the war’,16 made in a ‘blaze of publicity, with
the world as its stage’,17 was how the Nation greeted the German Peace Note of 12
House for an American woman, married to a German, who had lived for many years in Berlin. This
woman was a friend of Graf Montgelas, a member of the Foreign Office. ‘She has recently seen him as
well as Dr. Zimmermann, now Minister of Foreign Affairs and has some more information from them
which she is anxious to transmit to President Wilson. Please give her an interview. Mrs. Pringsheim
was hospitable to American women of the Hague Conference when we were in Berlin.’ Jane Addams
to Colonel House, 9 Dec. 1916, Addams Papers.
11
Two days earlier, on 10 December, Jane Addams spoke at a large rally of the Woman’s Peace Party,
as did Professor Emily Greene Balch and Lillian Wald (Chairman of the American Union Against
Militarism – A. U. A. M.). Resolutions passed were: opposition to military training in schools; the
convening a Third Hague Conference; opposition to a military parade at the upcoming inauguration
ceremony; and an endorsement of the World Court League. Most importantly, all were resolved that
President Wilson should issue a public peace initiative as soon as possible. In addition, $5000 in
donations was raised at the meeting for the work of the Woman’s Peace Party. World, ‘$5000 to
Oppose War’, 10 December 1916. This article was found as a clipping in the papers of Lillian Wald.
Wald Papers, Reel 102 and Folder 2.9, Box 88.
12
For information on these contacts, see Louis P. Lochner, Always the Unexpected: A Book of
Reminiscences (New York, 1956), pp. 54-56.
13
Arthur Link asserted that the draft of 12 December, which was later submitted to Lansing on 17
December, was greatly inferior to the President’s first completed draft of 25 November. Link,
Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, pp. 257 & 260.
14
Axson mentioned that Addams spoke on peace prospects that night in the White House. He also
heaped praise on Addams and her fellow women peace activists: ‘You women are strong in the position
that your cause is so sane and so righteousness, as the thing you are combating so wild and
preposterous…. You women have the courage and the faith. It was a pleasure to meet you at the White
House. You are a potent agent of good.’ What Addams was apparently combating, since the dinner on
the 12 December, was the idea abroad that the German Note was a trick and a piece of shrewd
diplomacy. Stockton Axson to Jane Addams, 4 Jan. 1917, Addams Papers, 10.
15
Whether the news about the German Note had reached the White House that night is not clear.
However, Stockton Axson, the President’s brother-in-law, who was also at the White House dinner,
said in a letter to Addams that he did not hear of the German Note until the next day. 4 Jan. 1917,
Addams Papers, 10.
16
Nation, Events of the Week, 16 December 1916.
17
Nation, ‘The German Offer of Peace’, Politics and Affairs, 16 December 1916.
75
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
December 1916.18 The Nation observed that if the Entente agreed to an exchange of
terms then this would be a decision in favour of a negotiated peace. Massingham had
attempted to capture the mood in the streets of Berlin on 12 December as the German
Chancellor gave his speech to the emergency session of the Reichstag: ‘All Berlin
thronged to the streets in eager excitement. The step was obviously taken in this
dramatic way because the Chancellor wanted to convince the German people that he
is doing the utmost to obtain peace.’ 19 Massingham was alert to the argument, which
would be mounted against the German Note by those advocating a ‘fight to the
finish’. He conceded that the form and manner of the Note may be ‘graceless and
even vulgar’ but urged that it be taken seriously, and questioned whether fighting on
for another six to twelve months could secure better terms than an immediate peace.
The editor argued against outright rejection because the neutrals would then take the
view that Britain was fighting on merely to secure one or more of the aims of the
Allies.20 He envisaged that the Allies’ first step would be to wait for the German
terms, draft counter-terms, followed by some bargaining. If Germany repudiated all of
her annexationist claims, this would be ‘the test of her sincerity in promising to adhere
to a League of Nations’.21 Massingham argued that if the German peace offer was to
be rejected then this should only occur after a full discussion by all of the Allied
government. Further, if there was to be a rejection, then it must be a reasoned one, and
be accompanied by the Allies’ counter-claims.22 In the 23 December edition of the
Nation, Massingham made a plea that something be made of the German Note despite
its lack of specific aims:
Europe has to discover a way of international living superior to that which
exposed it to the frightful shock of August 1914. This may not yet be the
conscious view of European statesmanship. But it is, we are persuaded, the
line of movement along which travel the minds of millions of the sufferers
and actors in the war, as compared with the spectators or the critics of it.
In this case, a spiritual League of Nations is being imperceptibly formed;
and the meaning and the end of the war are being more and more clearly
perceived.23
Meanwhile, Lord Loreburn expressed his hope to Francis Hirst that the British
Government would reply to the German peace proposal by asking for their terms.
Therefore, he argued that the Government:
18
For a full text of the Note see, ‘The German Peace Note, December 12, 1916 in Documents and
Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims (London, 1919), pp. 1-2. For background to the
German Chancellor’s peace offer, there are numerous secondary accounts. The following are a
selection: Karl E. Birnbaum, Peace Moves and U-Boat Warfare: A Study of Imperial Germany’s Policy
Towards the United States, April 18, 1916-January 9, 1917 (Hamden, 1970), Knock, To End All Wars,
pp. 106-107, J. A. Thompson, Woodrow Wilson (London, 2002), pp. 130-132, H. C. Peterson,
Propaganda For War (Port Washington, 1969), Ch. XIV, Patrick Devlin, Too Proud to Fight:
Woodrow Wilson’s Neutrality (London, 1974), Ch. XVIII, Ernst R. May, The World War and American
Isolation: 1914-1917 (Chicago, 1959), pp. 400-404.
19
Nation, Events of the Week, 16 December 1916. For background to the German Peace Note see
Esther Brunauer, ‘The Peace Proposals of December 1916 to January 1917, Journal of Modern History,
IV, 4 (1932), p. 544-571.
20
Nation, ‘The German Offer of Peace’, Politics and Affairs, 16 December 1916.
21
Ibid.
22
Nation, Events of the Week, 16 Dec. 1916.
23
Nation, ‘On the Road to Peace’, 23 Dec. 1916.
76
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
ought to say, tell us what you mean, we cannot negotiate in the mire.
When we know what you propose we will tell you what we think of it.
Above all, the opportunity should be taken of asking what they mean. That
is my view and I think it is the best way of reaching peace, the one thing to
be wished.24
‘A stupendous sensation’, thundered the headlines in Common Sense on 16
December. Loreburn may not have gone as far as Hirst. Hirst tried to convey the sense
that the Peace Note was consistent with recent trends by Bethmann-Hollweg. The
editor suggested that the Reichstag speech was historically significant.25 Also
noteworthy, according to Hirst were the German Chancellor’s previous attempts at
peace diplomacy:
Various opportunities, before and after the Verdun failure, before and after
the great Push, before and during the Rumanian war, have been pursued
unavailingly by German diplomacy. More than once the German
Chancellor has made what could only be interpreted as peace speeches.
Now a peace proposal is issued with all formality.26
The Radical publicists were concerned about the charge that was made in the Tory
press that the German Peace Note failed to include specific terms. In answer to this
charge Common Sense predicted that the German Government would probably send a
second note with precise terms.27
One source of Hirst’s strong convictions on the need for a negotiated peace was
a regular flow of correspondence from soldiers at the front. In December a letter from
a lieutenant in the infantry expressed his views on the German Peace Note. The
lieutenant, recently invalided in the Somme Offensive, complained about the
vindictiveness towards the German Note in Britain. He accused the public of having
no conception of the horror of life at the front and being totally out of touch with the
sentiments in the Army. He argued that, for the sake of the soldiers, the German offer
should be give reasonable consideration:
Then some definite assertions ought to be made by a responsible
statesman as to our concise aims; and vague utterances such as the
‘crushing of Prussian militarism’ should give place to more substantial
statements.28
The lieutenant wrote that the Allies had said Germany must offer peace. Once she
had, the Government needed to consider peace before it finally committed to further
untold sacrifice of lives and resources. Furthermore, the lieutenant argued, Germany
had said she would join a ‘league of nations’, as had Grey. ‘Surely that in itself
constitutes some guarantee for the future’, concluded the lieutenant.29
‘Let the People Unite To End the Carnage.’ There was little surprise with the
Labour Leader’s headlines on the Bethmann-Hollweg’s peace initiative:
24
Loreburn to Hirst, 15 Dec. 1916, Hirst Papers, Aug.-Dec. 1916.
Common Sense, News From Abroad, 16 Dec. 1916.
26
Common Sense, ‘Why Germany Seeks Peace’, 16 Dec. 1916.
27
This information reportedly came from Bernstoff, German ambassador to the United States. Common
Sense, ‘German Peace Comment’, 23 Dec. 1916.
28
‘A Lieutenant in the Infantry’, Letter to the Editor, Dec. 1916, Hirst Papers, Aug.-Dec. 1916.
29
Ibid.
25
77
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
Germany has proposed negotiations for Peace. That is the outstanding fact
of the moment. Mr Lloyd George may deny that there are any proposals of
peace. All the War Councils of the Allies specially created for the purpose
may join in their declarations that there are no proposals of peace. It is
certain that not only the belligerent Powers, but all Europe, and the whole
world NEEDS peace.30
Meanwhile, the U. D. C. had been favourably disposed to peace negotiations before
Bethmann-Hollweg’s initiative. The Radical M. P., Philip Morrell, wrote in the U. D.
C. journal, of his belief that Britain could achieve its objects via a negotiated peace. In
Morrell’s view, the German government was ready and willing, and BethmannHollweg’s recent speeches were a basis for discussion. Like, Massingham and Hirst,
he also felt that the German people were ready for peace. To the view, espoused by
the proponents of a ‘fight to the finish’, that Germany had not yet been punished
enough, Morrell urged his readers to think about those young men who would have to
be sacrificed in the future, not only of those who had died so far.31 A month later, in
the next issue of the U. D. C., the editor, E. D. Morel, believed that the Allied
governments’ decision to treat the German peace offer as a ‘trap’, and ‘intrigue’, or a
‘noose’ into which the guileless Allied diplomats were being invited to place their
necks, was a grave tactical error. The Allied leaders’ reasoning that enemy countries
were at their last gasp was faulty, Morel asserted:
There is no evidence sufficient to warrant the belief that the Enemy
Governments are on their last legs, either militarily or economically. The
publicists who spread this belief have been proved wrong over and over
again – wrong on every particular and on every head, from manpower to
munitions and food supply.32 Again, the views of the U. D. C. impressed
their fellow travellers on the other side of the Atlantic.
Radical opinion was, at this time, more unified than it had been since July
1914. The Nation, Common Sense, the Labour Leader and even the Daily News and
the Manchester Guardian had come out in favour of peace negotiations being
commenced - or at least explored - on the basis of the German Peace Note of 12
December. The fact that both the Manchester Guardian and the Daily New were in
favour of taking up peace negotiations is significant. Both papers had opted to back
British intervention in the war in August 1914. In fact, in the United States, the radical
American Union Against Militarism (A. U. A. M.), was so impressed with C. P.
Scott’s paper’s coverage of the German Peace Note that the Committee decided to
send a telegram to the Manchester Guardian, expressing their approval of its attitude
towards the proposal that peace be discussed.33 A renewed sense of unity and
common purpose returned to the Radical publicists.
Meanwhile, Colonel House suggested to the Radical M. P., Whitehouse, who
was visiting America at the time, that the Radicals try to prepare British public
30
Labour Leader, ‘Peace On Earth and Goodwill to All Men’, 21 Dec. 1916.
Philip Morrell, M. P., ‘Why the Time Has Come’, Dec. 1916.
32
U. D. C., E. D. Morel, ‘The War Cannot Go On’, Jan. 1917, Vol. 2, No. 3.
33
Note those present at the meeting included Lillian Wald, Crystal Eastman, and Emily Balch – each of
them being prominent peace activists who, along with Jane Addams, consistently lobbied Woodrow
Wilson to act for peace. Minutes of the American Union Against Militarism, 15 Dec. 1916, Pinchot
Papers, Box 24, Folder 1.
31
78
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
opinion for Wilson’s note. The Radicals continued to offer encouragement and advice
to Wilson. Whitehouse himself sent several memos and C. P. Trevelyan told Wilson
that many people were ‘yearning for a great solution’.34 Buckler informed Wilson on
24 November that Massingham, the owner and editor of the Nation, had now come
around to peace by negotiation.35 Finally, the American President decided to act.
President Wilson’s Peace Note of 18 December 1916 flashed like a lightning
bolt across the headlines of the world press.36 It seemed that the President of
potentially the most powerful nation on earth had taken up the agenda of the Radical
publicists and now sought to implement their vision for a negotiated peace and a new
world order. The publication of the American Peace Note occurred barely one week
after the German Chancellor’s dramatic peace offer. As expected, the Radical
publicists were unified in their praise for the President’s bold peace initiative. Their
hopes soared that a negotiated peace was nearer than it had been since the beginning
of the war. Leaders of the Entente, who were opposed to a negotiated peace, were able
to dismiss the preceding German peace initiative with little trouble. However, the
‘fight to the finish’ political leaders faced a much more daunting task in fending off
the American Note. The Radical publicists, on the other hand, were overjoyed at the
President’s intervention. The hope that had emerged in the early weeks of the War,
that American intervention could play a part in ending the slaughter and help usher in
a new era based on a ‘league of nations’, had now blossomed. Woodrow Wilson, a
progressive liberal internationalist President, with this action, had embarked on a
mission to mediate an end to the war and to alter forever international relations for the
better. Woodrow Wilson’s bold attempt to kick-start mediation was not an impulsive
decision. Rather, it was a product of his own thinking over the previous year,
combined with persistent lobbying by both Radicals in Britain and peace activists in
America.
As stated above, Woodrow Wilson began contemplating his peace proposal
within a few days of his re-election. He set to work on it soon after his conference
with House on 14-15 November and completed the first draft by 26 November.37
Many Radical publicists gave both encouragement and suggestions about what the
Note should contain. In response to a letter by another Radical, Noel Buxton, Colonel
House assured him,
we are beginning to take up the loose threads now that the campaign is
over and we shall be able to pay more attention to those, in which we are
all so deeply concerned.38
34
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 120.
A. Havighurst, Radical Journalist: H.W. Massingham (London, 1974), p. 245. Not all Radicals urged
that Wilson remain neutral. Norman Angell, now living in America, urged Wilson to enter the war
arguing that neutrality was unsound if he really believed in collective security. Unless the United States
entered the war to end aggression, Angell argued, there would be a punitive peace and the seeds sown
for another world war in the future.
36
For a full text of the American Peace Note, see ‘President Wilson’s Note to the Belligerents,
December 18, 1916 in Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims (London,
1919), pp. 4-6.
37
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, p. 257.
38
E. M. House to Hon. Noel Buxton, 24 Nov. 1916, Massingham Papers, MC 41/93/4.
35
79
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
On 2 December, Wilson got a copy of a soon to be published letter by Charles
Trevelyan, another of the founding members of the U. D. C., entitled, ‘An Open
Letter to Americans’. Trevelyan advised the President:
However much you try to influence Prime Ministers and Chancellors, it is
far more important that your great, sane policy should be heard and
understood by peoples. I am certain you can evoke a spirit that will make
mediation possible.39
On reading Trevelyan’s letter, Wilson commented to House that Trevelyan’s letter
was most impressive and that ‘the time is near at hand for something.’40 However,
neither Colonel House nor Secretary of State Lansing were keen on the President’s
proposed peace move. House feared that if Germany accepted the peace proposals and
Britain rejected them then the United States would drift into war with the Allies.
Wilson was not deterred, though he was forced to delay the publication of his Peace
Note due to a week-long illness and the international outcry over recent German
human rights violations in Belgium.41
President Wilson issued his American Peace Note on 18 December 1916.42
The American President called for the belligerent nations to state their peace terms.
The Note stated that the objectives for which both sides proclaimed they were fighting
were virtually the same, in that they both sought to establish security for all, including
small nations. Insofar as the belligerents were sincere about these aims, the President
offered the services of the United States to assist in the achievement of these ends
when the war had ceased. He explained in the Note that he felt duty-bound to
intervene because the whole world had now become affected and the situation of
neutrals was now intolerable. Further, the conflict threatened to proceed towards
undefined ends by slow attrition until one side was totally exhausted. Such an
outcome would mean it would be less likely that resentment and hatred would be
cooled, and therefore, there would be less hope of a genuine recovery after the war
and less hope that a willing concert of nations could be formed.43 Once again, the
Radical publicists demonstrated a unity not seen since the days of July 1914. Common
Sense reacted with ‘joy and thankfulness’ at the ‘prospect of a speedy peace now
opened to the world by President Wilson’s offer of mediation.’44 Hirst said that
Wilson
knew that all the peoples needed peace, that bankruptcy and famine are
approaching, that neutral rights are invaded. And so, he suggested that the
parties should define their aims more clearly.45
39
P. W. W., C. P. Trevelyan, ‘An Open Letter to Americans’, 2 Dec. 1916, XL, pp. 124-125.
P. W. W., W. Wilson to E. M. House, 8 Dec. 1916, XL, pp. 178-180.
41
Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 75. Esposito also made the point that though House did
not prevent Wilson from issuing the Peace Note he did persuade him not to attach the prologue with the
Note. Esposito called this one of the worse disservices to the President. Esposito said that ‘although it
never saw the light of day, it is one of the most evocative and provocative works to come from
Wilson’s pen.’ In the prologue he argued that the bitter lesson learned from the horrors of the
‘mechanical game of slaughter’ in the trenches would provide a basis for a just and lasting peace. Ibid.
This was totally in line with the argument used by the Radical publicists.
42
The Note was not published in the British press until 22 December 1916. See The Times, 22 Dec.
1916.
43
For an outline and discussion of the German Peace Note see, Thompson, Woodrow Wilson: Profiles
in Power (London, 2002), p. 132.
44
Common Sense, ‘Peace In Sight’, 23 Dec. 1916.
45
Common Sense, ‘The Peace Notes’, 30 Dec. 1916.
40
80
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
E. D. Morel called the President’s initiative ‘the act of a great Democrat’ who
defended humanity against the ‘hired penman of national unreason’, that is, the Times
and the rest of the ‘pro-war press’.46The Nation noted with satisfaction that a
‘powerful volume of sentiment in favour of a League of Nations, with American as
the initiator and peacemaker, has been taking hold of the imagination of the more
intelligent classes.’47 Massingham called on the Allied governments to reply to
Germany and for Germany to reply to Wilson.48
The Radical publicists were soon aware that the dramatic developments of
mid-December 1916 had so far failed to bear fruit. In the last week of 1916 the
Radical publicists poured all their efforts into mustering support for the President’s
Peace Note. F. W. Hirst was most concerned at the effect that the ‘pro-war press’ was
having on the reception of the American peace offer. On 23 December, Hirst made
this cynical observation of the press:
Whatever turns the fortune of the war took; the moral drawn by the
official Press was the same. If the war went favourably, continue and
you will reap a complete victory. If unfavourably, continue until fortune
changes. If conditions, as they usually did, pointed to stalemate, only
fools could talk of ending the war without a military decision.49
The only sure result of this policy of the ‘pro-war press’, Hirst said, were ‘financial
exhaustion and a horror of war permeating the whole manhood of every country’.50
American peace activists were similarly concerned that the initiative was
being lost. Also on 23 December, Rebecca Shelley sounded a note of concern that a
resolution in Congress in support of the American Peace Note had not been passed.51
On 26 December, Massingham wrote to Walter Runciman, a moderate Liberal,
lamenting the failure of the Liberal ex-ministers who had just lost office upon the fall
of Asquith to say any word of encouragement to Wilson’s Peace Note. Indeed,
Reginald McKenna disappointed Massingham in particular because of a truculent
speech reported in the Times.52 He warned Runciman that ‘unless the Liberal party
can develop a policy, Lloyd George will smother it’, and that ‘Liberalism must either
lead this movement or expire in inaction.’53 Publicly, Massingham expressed his
annoyance at how the American Note had been ‘stupidly received’ in the press,54
while recognising the inadequacy of the German reply to the American note. The
German reply to Wilson’s peace offer came quickly. It thanked Wilson for his offer
but ignored his plea for a statement of terms. Rather the Germans proposed an
immediate meeting of delegates of the belligerents in some neutral place, thus leaving
46
Labour Leader, E. D. Morel, ‘President Wilson’s Message and the Times’, 28 December 1916.
Nation, ‘What America Thinks About’, 30 Dec. 1916.
48
Ibid. Also, Nation, ‘America’s Quo Vadis’, 30 Dec. 1916.
49
Common Sense, ‘Peace in Sight’, 23 Dec. 1916.
50
Ibid.
51
Rebecca Shelley to Lola Maverick Lloyd, 23 Dec. 1916, Schwimmer-Lloyd Papers, Series O, Lola
Maverick Lloyd, Box 04. Shelley also mentioned with approval, Bertrand Russell’s letter to the
President.
52
The Times reported a speech made by Reginald McKenna, Asquith’s former Chancellor of the
Exchequer at Pontypool. McKenna refused to offer any opinion on the American Note. He decided that
the successful prosecution of the war was the nation’s ‘definite and unshakeable resolve.’ Times, 23
Dec. 1916.
53
H. W. Massingham to Walter Runciman, 26 Dec. 1916, Massingham Papers, MC 41/98/61-73.
54
Ibid.
47
81
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
out the Americans from participation in any such conference. Cooperation with
America in preventing future wars could occur after the war was over, in the German
view. Massingham objected to the German response and protested that ‘the creation of
a League of Nations must not be postponed until after the peace.’ Rather, it must be
the ‘first article of settlement’ of the current war.55 However, it appeared that, as New
Year approached, the momentum for peace was slowing. At first, the Entente
governments greeted both the German and American peace notes with an ominous
silence, while the pro-War reactionary press repeated the mantra that negotiations to
end the war could not be proceeded with at this stage. In his first speech as Prime
Minister, Lloyd George told the Commons on 19 December that the German Peace
Note could not possibly serve as the basis of negotiations. Then, on 30 December, the
Entente powers issued a joint note rejecting the German offer. A midnight peace
demonstration was held in Washington D. C. on New Year’s Eve to ‘voice America’s
hope for peace,’56 that at the dawn of the New Year, a manifesto of good will be sent
to the ‘peoples of all nations.’57 The demonstrators felt that at this ‘hour of crisis’58 in
world history, the people of America should ‘speak for peace’.59 As the American
peace activist, Lola Maverick Lloyd commented on New Year’s Eve: ‘This was the
hight point of hope. From then on the tide ran the other way with increasing speed.’60
The attitude of the new Lloyd George Government was absolutely crucial if
peace negotiations were to be commenced on the basis of the German and American
peace notes. However, following hard on the heels of the German Peace Note,
Wilson’s Peace Note was greeted with dismay and even anger by the Allied
governments. In London, according to American Ambassador W. H. Page, James
Bryce was ‘profoundly depressed’, Asquith could not discuss the Note with anyone,
and the King wept.61 The Allied Press accused Wilson of working with the Central
Powers. The only people who were pleased with the Note were the U.D.C., according
to Ambassador Page.62 After the terse Allied reply to the German Note on 30
December,63 the Allies decided to reply to Wilson’s Note with greater astuteness, by
compiling a statement of terms. The British were the most co-operative, partly due to
urging by the Radicals64 that Britain should make a positive reply, but also because of
her financial indebtedness to the United States. Finally, on 10 January 1917 the Allied
governments issued their joint statement of terms as their reply to Wilson’s Peace
Note. This was a cleverly worded statement in which the Allies represented their
cause as a crusade for freedom for Belgium and various national groups such as the
Poles, and declared their support for a ‘league of nations’. However, the Allied
statement did not admit the French desire to reclaim all of Alsace-Lorraine, was silent
55
Nation, Events of the Week, 30 Dec. 1916.
‘New Year’s Eve Demonstration’, A Flyer, n. d., Andrews Papers, A-95, Box 30, Folder 363.
57
Ibid.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Janet Stevenson, ‘Lola Maverick Lloyd: I Must Do Something For Peace’ in Chicago History,
Spring 1980, p. 55. Lola Maverick Lloyd was an American peace activist associated with Jane
Addams.
61
Page to Lansing, 22 Dec, 1916. Quoted in Knock, To End All Wars, p. 110.
62
Ibid., p. 110.
63
‘The Allies’ Reply to the German Peace Note of December 12th. December 30, 1916’, in G. L.
Dickinson, (ed.), Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims (December
1916-November 1918), (London, 1919), pp. 7-10.
64
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 121.
56
82
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
on Russian and Italian territorial ambitions, made no mention of the fate of captured
German colonies, and made no repudiation of the protectionist Paris Resolutions of
June 1916.65
Although the diplomacy of peace was at last front-page news, the Radical
publicists noted with disquiet the political machinations of Lloyd George, the
advocate of a ‘fight to the finish’.66 In retrospect, out of the three dramatic events that
occurred in December 1916, the German and American peace overtures and the
coming to power of the Lloyd George government, it was the latter that consequently
had the most impact on the course of the First World War. Just what Lloyd George’s
influence would be in the area of peace diplomacy was not known when he assumed
the mantle of Prime Minister on 9 December 1916 and for some Radicals, Lloyd
George’s exact position remained unclear during the rest of December. Clearly the
Radical publicists were angered by his coup and the manner in which he ousted Prime
Minister Asquith and the May Coalition. Though the Radical publicists had little love
left for the Asquith government, resenting particularly the way it had taken Britain
into the War and the way it had proceeded to whittle away Liberal ideals, they were
divided over whether Lloyd George’s assumption of the Prime Ministership was a
good thing or not. Catherine Marshall, for instance, ‘rejoiced in the break-up of the
Coalition Government, even though it meant the instalment in power of the
Northcliffe influence.’67 She argued that Lloyd George should be given the benefit of
the doubt and that they should take a wait-and-see attitude to the fresh Government.68
Therefore, Marshall felt that ‘pacifists should not be too eager to rush into public
activity at this moment – at any rate not till a little time has been allowed to see
whether other forces will not develop along the lines we want.’69 Massingham called
Lloyd George ‘ruthlessly ambitious,’ though he conceded that he did have appeal to
the masses.70 However, now that Radical Liberalism was totally excluded from
power, it was argued that Disraeli’s ‘leap in the dark’ was ‘nothing compared with
this cataclysm.’71 Hirst was no easier on the new Prime Minister. He placed the blame
65
‘The Allies’ Reply to President Wilson’s Note of December 18th. January 10, 1917’, in G. L.
Dickinson, (ed.), Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals, pp. 10-13.
66
Hirst lamented the rise of Lloyd George to the position of Prime Minister and the potential effect of
his opposition to an American-mediated peace. ‘But for Mr. Lloyd George and his friends we might
have had an armistice at Christmas and an honourable peace on a firm basis before the end of winter.’
Hirst also criticised what he called the ‘unlimited Army policy of Mr. Lloyd George and Lord
Northcliffe, who proclaim themselves the saviours of the country because the Knock-Out interview has
prevented peace.’ Common Sense, ‘The Policy of the Coalition’, 9 Dec. 1916. For a study of how Lloyd
George became Prime Minister, see J. McEwen, ‘The Struggle for Mastery in Britain: Lloyd George
versus Asquith, December 1916’, Journal of British Studies, XVIII, (1978), pp. 131-156. Also, Michael
Fry, ‘Political Change in Britain, August 1914 to December 1916: Lloyd George Replaces Asquith:
The Issue Underlying the Drama’, The Historical Journal, 31, 3, (1988), pp. 609-627.
67
Catherine Marshall to H. N. Brailsford, 21 Dec. 1916, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/13. For a
biography on Catherine Marshall see Jo Vellacott, From Liberal to Labour with Women’s Suffrage:
The Story of Catherine Marshall (Montreal, 1993).
68
Ibid.
69
Ibid. It is interesting that, the night she wrote this letter, President Wilson’s Peace Note appeared in
the press. Brailsford did not reply to this letter for a few weeks as he was engaged in writing his book
on the League of Nations, but when his reply was made, it was extremely critical on Marshall’s views
on both Lloyd George and about pacifists keeping quite. H. N. Brailsford to Catherine Marshall, 15
Jan. 1917, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/13.
70
Nation, ‘A Leap in the Dark’, 9 Dec. 1916.
71
Nation, Events of the Week, 9 Dec. 1916.
83
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
for failure to achieve peace before December 1916 on Lloyd George’s ‘knock-outblow’ interview to the American journalist, Roy Howard, in September. Massingham
was convinced that Lloyd George’s statements at that time had been calculated to
snuff out any attempts at neutral mediation in the autumn of 1916:
But for Mr. Lloyd George and his friends we might have had an armistice
at Christmas and an honourable peace on a firm basis before the end of
winter.72
Though the Radical publicists viewed Lloyd George with both suspicion and disdain,
they also thought that the opportunistic streak in him might yet cause him to take on
the role of peacemaker. To Morgan Jones, for instance, Lloyd George was ‘a little
scoundrel’, but that did not mean that the chances of him securing a negotiated peace
should be ruled out:
I fancy he is clever enough to try to arrange peace even though he may
be bellowing ever so loudly about organisation for war. Does he want
peace do you think? I fancy he does.73
Whatever the Radical publicists thought of Lloyd George personally, and no matter
how they felt about his support for conscription, his betrayal of Asquith or his newfound aristocratic friends, they knew that achieving a negotiated peace would depend
very much on the new Prime Minister.
As early as 15 December, Lord Loreburn told Hirst that he hoped the
Government would not turn down the German proposal. On Lloyd George he
articulated the views of many Radicals:
But if he will bring peace, as I think he may, I would forgive him his
share in upsetting the old coach with its strained and broken-minded
team. I for one will support the new Government if they aim at an
honourable peace and would support the devil himself if he would for
once go straight and try to end this horror on honourable terms, but I will
never support any of the men who called themselves Liberals and made
this imbroglio for us.74
Philip Snowden was relieved at hearing that Lloyd George was leaving the
door ajar for a negotiated peace, by at least asking Germany for its peace terms.
However, Massingham expressed a note of concern in hearing Lloyd George use the
72
Nation, ‘The Policy of the Coalition’, 9 Dec. 1916. In addition, Merriman also expressed his
disapproval of Lloyd George: ‘Everything seems to crumble away. Surely old England must have
reached the very nadir in this Lloyd George combination.’ Merriman to Hirst, 1 Jan. 1917, Hirst
Papers.
73
Morgan Jones to Catherine Marshall, 22 Dec. 1916, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/13. Morgan Jones
was on the Committee of the No Conscription Fellowship (N. C. F.). By March 1917, Catherine
Marshall, for her part, had decided Lloyd George was ‘hopeless’. Catherine Marshall to Lord Parmoor,
21 March 1917, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/17.
74
Lord Loreburn to F. W. Hirst, 15 Dec. 1916, Hirst Papers, Aug.–Dec. 1916. One month later
Loreburn continued to express relief at the end of the Asquith Cabinet; ‘My belief is that the organised
hypocrisy that pretended to be Liberalism is at an end’ and ‘we are cornered by the unspeakable folly
of the men who got us into this.’ He still strongly believed there should be a negotiated peace a month
later and continued to hope that Lloyd George might bring it about. He questioned Hirst on his faith in
the value of public opinion, and told Hirst that democracy is only reliable ‘when it is informed truly of
the facts.’ See Lord Loreburn to F. W. Hirst, 13 Jan. 1917, Hirst Papers.
84
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
vague formula that the Allied terms would involve ‘complete restitution, full
reparation and effectual guarantees’:
For our part, we hold that the only guarantee against future aggression
which is worth considering is the creation of a League of Nations for the
enforcement of peace, with its corollaries, a general reduction in
armaments, and some modification of the system of alliances.75
Privately, Massingham encouraged Lloyd George to act positively towards the
German and American peace offers: ‘If you feel yourself able to support the
American offer of mediation, you will have no more loyal supporter than myself. I
myself think it is the best news since Bethlehem. God has put this [opportunity for
peace] in your hands. May you use it!’76 Meanwhile, Francis Hirst felt that perhaps
Lloyd George’s opportunism would prompt him to act for peace: ‘Lloyd George has
scented the popularity of peace and means to try to thrust himself forward as the
peace maker.’77 Even though Hirst believed that any of Lloyd George’s professions of
commitment to an ultimate peace were to be regarded with suspicion, he thought that
opinion and events were ‘moving fast towards peace.’78 In fact, as Entente leaders
met to draft a reply to President Wilson’s Peace Note, Hirst detected some
expectation among business firms in the city of London that the War would soon
end.79 There was a similar optimism regarding the imminent Allied Reply to
President Wilson’s Note among many American peace activists in early January
1917. Rebecca Shelley wrote to a colleague:
I rejoice with you that peace negotiations have begun. I have felt some
uneasiness since our meeting in New York for fear you would think I was
not in sympathy with opening peace negotiations. I was only doubtful
whether the calling of a neutral conference was the most important thing
to work for. As it proved so far, the neutral conference was not the
practical means of opening peace negotiation. I heartily sympathise with
the attitude of the President and with all your work.’80
75
Nation, Events of the Week, 23 Dec. 1916.
H. W. Massingham to Lloyd George, 22 Dec. 1916, Massingham Papers, MC41/63-69.
77
F. W. Hirst to Margaret Hirst, 1 Jan. 1917, Hirst Papers, Letters to Margaret Hirst 1896-1949.
78
At dinner with John Burns, ex-member of Cabinet who had resigned in August 1914, he found that
they were both of one mind on this aspect of Lloyd George. F. W. Hirst to Margaret Hirst, 4 Jan. 1917,
Hirst Papers, Letters to Margaret Hirst 1896-1949.
79
‘Everyone was saying yesterday that Lloyd George was in Rome and I believe it is so. The city, I am
told, is working on the basis of the war probably lasting about three months longer.’ F. W. Hirst to
Margaret Hirst, 5 Jan. 1917, Hirst Papers, Letters to Margaret Hirst 1896-1949. An exception to this
optimistic mood among Radicals at this time was Bertrand Russell. In a letter to Catherine Marshall, he
expressed his pessimism about the likelihood of Lloyd George acting for peace: ‘It is clear that Lloyd
George must have a great offensive before we can be allowed to have peace; he knows, of course, that
it will make no difference to him personally.’ On President Wilson, however, he was hopeful: ‘I quite
agree about writing to support Wilson.’ Bertrand Russell to Catherine Marshall, 3 Jan. 1917, Marshall
Papers, D/MAR/4/15.
80
Rebecca Shelley to F. F. Andrews, 3 Jan. 1917, Andrews Papers, Box A-96, Folder 363. The
American Neutral Conference Committee planned a conference, a nation-wide speaking tour and mass
meetings throughout the country, in a ‘direct attempt to hasten the end of the war, and to support
President Wilson’s efforts.’ Rebecca Shelly to Lillian Wald, 7 Jan. 1917, Wald Papers, Reel 103 or
Box 89, Folder 2.4. Emily G. Balch also urged support for the President. She stated that the peace
activists were aiming at gathering ‘a great mass of public opinion to support the President at this
critical hour when he is trying to restore peace to the world.’ Emily G. Balch to F. F. Andrews, 10 Jan.
1917, Andrews Papers, A-95, Box 30, Folder 363.
76
85
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
As far as the Radical publicists were concerned, the response of the Allied
governments to the two peace initiatives was the critical development if diplomacy
was to launch the process of a negotiated peace. Despite Radical pleas, both privately
and in the Radical press, the Allied Reply of December to the German Note amounted
to an outright rejection. Following the lead of the Tory press, the collective reply of
the Allied governments was extremely hostile.81 Philip Snowden despaired of the
‘puerile, undignified and evasive’ Allied reply to the German government:
The reply to the German Note closes the door to peace negotiations at
the present. The Central Powers cannot be expected to follow up with
further approaches. The Allied Note makes no request for a further
reply. It is couched in language which is obviously meant to put an end
to the suggestion of peace at present.82
Hirst speculated on the role played by Russia in drafting the Allied Reply.83 The
Radical publicists’ concern about the Allies’ rejection of the German Note was more
than balanced, however, by the hope that Wilson’s Peace Note would yet bear fruit.
Massingham thought that Germany would likely set up peace talks with the United
States on terms.84 As the Radical publicists now turned their attention to the Allied
reply to the American Note, they were unnerved, but perhaps also a little amused by
the inflammatory comments of the Australian Prime Minister, on a visit to England
fresh from the defeat of his referendum on conscription.85 Hughes was not
embarrassed to articulate his vision along ‘knock-out-blow’ lines:
This war is not as other wars. It is not only a war for national existence; it
is a war for commercial and industrial, as well as national supremacy. This
point cannot be too strongly emphasised. Germany’s military power must
be utterly crushed. We must smash Germany, not only in the military, but
the economic sphere. And to that end we ourselves must be born again, i.e.
born out of Free Trade into Protection.
The war has done great things for the Empire. Among other things it has
saved us. It has saved us from moral, aye, and physical degeneration and
decay.86
The views of the Australian Prime Minister represented just about everything to
which the Radical publicists were opposed. They hoped that the other politician of
Welsh origin, Lloyd George, would have the foresight to see that it was in everyone’s
81
See David Stevenson, The First World War, p. 105; Knock, To End All Wars, p. 110.
Labour Leader, Philip Snowden, Review of the Week, 1 Jan. 1917.
83
Hirst believed that Russia’s major war aim of securing Constantinople and the Straits may have had
an influence on the Allied reply to Germany: ‘Although the claims of Russia to Constantinople were
not advanced in the Allies’ Note, it will be remembered that the Russian Government alone among the
belligerents has already formulated its own terms.’ However, he said, ‘no British statesman has yet
expressed himself on the subject of the future of Constantinople and the Dardanelles.’ Common Sense,
‘The Allies’ Reply to the German Peace Note’, 6 Jan. 1917. The Russian claim to Constantinople, in
the secret Straits Agreement of March 1915, was published in December 1916. See Stevenson, The
First World War, p. 137.
84
Nation, Events of the Week, 6 Jan. 1917.
85
The Radical publicists had hailed this defeat as an indication that the tide had turned against reaction.
86
Common Sense, ‘The Message of Mr. Hughes’, 6 Jan. 1917.
82
86
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
interests to end the slaughter now. Furthermore, they hoped that this new British
Government would then proceed to build a peace based on the principles for which
the Radical publicists had been advocating since 1914, and championed by the
President of the United States.
The unity that the Radical publicists had demonstrated in their reactions to the
German and American notes was short-lived. Similarly, the initial reaction of the
Radical publicists to the Allied reply to the American Peace Note was positive but
soon the fault line of division in the ranks of the Radicals emerged as the ambiguity
of the Allied Reply became apparent. The Radical publicists had been expecting a
crudely worded statement about fighting to the bitter end. Instead, the Allied Reply
was cloaked in idealist phrases, proclaiming that the Allies were fighting for worthy
causes such as the rights of small nations and oppressed peoples.87 However, the
Radical publicists’ consensus on the merits of the Reply did not survive closer
scrutiny of the document over the following weeks. On closer inspection, the Radicals
became as deeply divided as before. Common Sense saw the Allied Reply as ‘a vast
improvement on the vague phraseology about the destruction of Prussian militarism
which led to much misrepresentation.’88 However, Common Sense also gave
prominence to a speech by ex-Chancellor, Lord Buckmaster who called for all peace
proposals to be ‘made at the earliest possible moment.’ 89 Likewise, American peace
activists responded positively to the Allied Reply:
I must confess it is much better than expected – chiefly on account of its
omissions and ambiguities. It can be interpreted moderately or extremely.
Some [people] think that the section dealing with the nationalities of
Austria-Hungary and also that one dealing with Constantinople, are so
dangerous that they should be publicly attacked.90
However, Massingham noticed the same aspect as Shelley did, namely the ambiguity
of the Allied Reply. Despite a somewhat positive review of the Reply, Massingham
described it as having a ‘certain amount of ambiguity about it.’91 So, for the Nation’s
editor, the proof of the pudding would be in the eating:
The test, therefore of the Note is whether or no it provides a true basis and
opening for a system of international control; whether it is a mere statement
of victor’s terms, based on a traffic of territories, or whether it is a just and
prudent conception of statesmanship. If the latter, there is no reason why the
war should not end in six months, and in an enduring peace. If the former, it
may go on for years.92
87
‘The Allies’ Reply to the German Peace Note of December 12th. December 30, 1916’, in Dickinson,
(ed.), Documents and Statements Relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims, pp. 7-10. For a
discussion of the Allied Reply, see Sterling Kernek, ‘The British Government’s Reactions to President
Wilson’s “Peace” Note of December 1916’, The Historical Journal, XIII, 4, 1970, pp. 721-766.
88
Common Sense, ‘More Peace Notes’, 20 Jan. 1917.
89
Common Sense, ‘An Ex-Chancellor of Peace’, 13 Jan. 1917.
90
Rebecca Shelley to Caroline Cumming, Jan. 1917, Shelley Papers, AA2, Box 1. Shelley was still
hopeful about the momentum for peace. She wrote: ‘One does feel that things must go on moving now,
that there will be another German pronouncement and so on. But I am afraid there will be a good deal
more horrible slaughter before the final end is put to it.’ Julia Grace Wales also viewed the Entente
statement of terms with great satisfaction. Wales to Family, 17-29 Jan. 1917, Wales Papers, M90-219.
91
Nation, ‘On the Road to Internationalism’, 20 Jan. 1917.
92
Ibid.
87
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
Noel Buxton agreed. He drew attention to one sentence in the Allied note that implied
the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. This, he argued, could only be
achieved by military defeat of the Austrians. However, the break-up of the AustroHungarian Empire without the parallel liberation of minorities in the Russian Empire
would destroy the balance of power and would involve an indefinite extension of the
war.93 Snowden also sounded a note of concern:
There is the wearisome reiteration of the nonsense about the dangers of an
inconclusive peace, and the necessity for completely destroying the
military power of Germany in order that the military power of Russia and
her present Allies may have no obstacle to their ambitions.94
Snowden despaired at what would be the fruits of this attitude, an indefinite
continuation of the War: ‘The alternative offered to the proposal to gain the objects of
the war by negotiation is the continuance of the slaughter until the Central Powers are
completely crushed.’95 Even in the most left-leaning Radical papers the response to
the Allied Reply was mixed, being positive initially, but then suspicious of the
ambiguity of the phrasing of the Reply. However, on the ‘right’ side of the spectrum
of Radical papers, it is noteworthy that both the Daily News and Manchester
Guardian accepted the Allied Reply at face value.96
Henry Brailsford was the most uncomfortable with the unfolding scenario
presented by the Allied Reply. Privately, he collected his thoughts on the subject of
the Lloyd George Government and the prospect of peace and penned a lengthy letter
to Catherine Marshall. Contrary to his Radical publicist colleagues, Brailsford saw
little cause for optimism. On Lloyd George, Brailsford had this to say:
I don’t think his mind at all likely to move on to any vision of a good
peace. Even if he learns by six months trial that he can’t ‘knock-out’
Germany. He won’t like the League of Nations idea, simply because
Wilson will be its architect, and the credit of it in history will not go to L.
G.. I see him keeping a ‘torpedo’ handy for it – a handy, subtle, under93
Nation, Noel Buxton, ‘The Note to America’, 20 Jan. 1917.
Labour Leader, Philip Snowden, M. P., ‘The War to the Finish’, Review of the Week, 11 Jan. 1917.
95
Labour Leader, Philip Snowden, M. P., ‘Blindness and Perversity’, Review of the Week, 11 Jan.
1917.
96
Alfred Gardiner’s Daily News approved of the Allied Reply, citing its clarity and disavowal of any
desire to destroy Germany. Daily News, ‘Holy Wrath and Potatoes’, 15 Jan. 1917. Manchester
Guardian, ‘The Allies’ Reply’, Summary of News, 12 Jan. 1917. Scott viewed the terms in the Allied
reply as maximum terms and believed that it would ‘pass muster’ in comparison with the compared to
the German reply and, most importantly, would please Wilson. Speculation about the confidential
communication of German terms to the President Wilson was discussed in the same issue. Manchester
Guardian, ‘The Two Replies’ and ‘The German Terms’, Summary of News, 13 Jan. 1917. C. P. Scott
elaborated further on his approval of the Allied Reply in an analysis of Foreign Minister Balfour’s
explanatory note that followed the Reply. Balfour mentioned the Allies’ desire to establish a ‘League of
Peace’, which Scott said was also his newspaper’s view. However, Scott believed the ‘success of the
Allies is, in our view, the condition precedent to a successful League of Nations.’ In addition, Scott
believed that the political boundaries of Europe needed to change to coincide with ‘national
aspirations’. Therefore, for Scott, there could be no settlement based on the status quo ante bellum.
However, Scott acknowledged that to ‘achieve such a redistribution of European frontiers is a task to
tax the highest statesmanship. But it will be conceded that the terms put forward by the Allies are all
aimed in that direction.’ Manchester Guardian, ‘Mr. Balfour’s Note’, 18 Jan. 1917.
94
88
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
water invisible torpedo; of the kind that killed the Conciliation Bill. His
notion of a sort of rival idealistic cry is obviously Imperial Federation.97
Brailsford felt that the Allied Reply had now committed the Entente to indemnities,
Alsace-Lorraine, the dismemberment of Austria, and the expulsion of the Turks from
Europe. ‘Could we ask more if we were dictating in Berlin?’ Brailsford questioned.
However, what really troubled Brailsford was the insipid response to the Allied Reply
in much of the Radical press, particularly the Daily News. He complained that A. G.
Gardiner of the Daily News had entered only a very timid note of reservation about
the Allied Reply. Brailsford thought the mild interpretation that Gardiner put on
phrases in the Allied Reply a bit forced, for example that the ‘liberation of the Czechs
from foreign domination did not necessarily mean dismemberment’ of the AustroHungarian Empire. ‘The plain meaning is dismemberment’, argued Brailsford.
Brailsford had clearly lost patience with the journalism of his Radical colleagues of
the Daily News:
The Daily News line of pretending that any of this is comparatively
innocent seems to me mere ostrich cowardice. I think the only line is to
say, ‘this is pure conquest. It’s bad statesmanship anyhow, and it means
years of war. We can’t realise it and we wouldn’t if we could.’ To talk of a
League of Nations on top of this policy of conquest is pure hypocrisy.
That, of course, is just how the Georgian torpedo will work.98
Brailsford felt compelled to expose the woolly thinking of his fellow Radical
colleagues and the rank hypocrisy of the Lloyd George coalition: ‘We ought to
attempt some destructive work – I mean to make woolly-minded people understand
what an outrageous program of conquest this is.’99 It is this zeal for the campaign for
a negotiated peace, which led him to finish his letter to his friend, Catherine Marshall,
with a mild reproach for her involvement in the No-Conscription Fellowship. ‘I
sympathise with the human call there, but politically I am sure that movement was a
blind alley which won’t bring us even infinitesimally nearer to peace. I wish your
energies were to spare for a broader effort of education and agitation.’100 Brailsford
despaired at the distractions and divisions among his Radical colleagues. He was
clearly frustrated that the energies of fellow Radicals were either wasted on vain
hopes that Lloyd George would come good or on ‘blind alleys’ such as opposing
conscription and helping conscientious objectors. Brailsford set his sights on ending
the war as soon as possible. For Brailsford, all hope for the future hinged on this.
After reflecting on the Allied Reply, Francis Hirst also expressed grave
concerns about the direction in which things were going. He wrote to C. P. Scott on
20 January and asked if he would include a letter in the Manchester Guardian that he
had drafted. His letter contained the following plea:
To prolong the War after its primary objects can be achieved, until it ends
in general financial ruin and almost universal famine, is not I submit a
97
H. N. Brailsford to C. Marshall, 15 Jan. 1917, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/15. This was in answer to
her letter of 21 Dec. 1916. Brailsford apologised for the delay in answering her letter. He had been
writing proofs for his book on the League of Nations. Brailsford said the contents of this letter would
be published in the Call.
98
Ibid.
99
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
89
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
mark of far-sighted patriotism or high statesmanship. Surely if a
satisfactory peace were obtainable now procrastination would be a blunder
and a crime.101
Hirst also reiterated the concerns of much of his writing, that is, the financial
implications of a continuance of the War. ‘An indefinite prolongation of the war
imperils the financial position of our allies and the immense loans we have made to
them.’102 Arguing that reparations would pay for Britain’s debts after the war was
nonsense, said Hirst:
No serious person expects that by reducing one’s enemies to complete
bankruptcy we shall be able to pay our war debt or obtain financial
compensation for Belgium or Servia. The amount to repair increases every
day and the power to repair diminishes as rapidly.103
However, more importantly, as Hirst insisted, ‘no reparation was possible for life and
limb.’104 In Hirst’s opinion, it was obvious that Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and
Turkey were ready for peace.105 Hirst concluded by saying that even though the
privations being experienced by Germany were undoubtedly severe, it did not follow
that their situation would deteriorate more rapidly than Britain’s. As far as Hirst was
concerned, Britain was in as good a position as she would ever be to obtain a
reasonable peace.106
By mid-January 1917, the momentum for peace, so promisingly pushed
forward by the diplomatic initiatives of December 1916, had slowed appreciably.
Vague phrases from the Lloyd George government and the refusal of the German
government to make any public declaration of war aims in response to Wilson, had
dented the confidence of many peace activists.107 All attention now focused on the
American President. Prominent Radical publicist, E. D. Morel summed up the
situation at that time. He reminded the readers of the U. D. C. journal of the advance
that had been made in promoting the U. D. C.’s ideas. The public now had a program
before them, guaranteed to ensure a lasting peace. However, the eventual triumph of
the U. D. C.’s agenda now depended on a settlement by negotiation. The U. D. C.
message had spread globally and organisations had sprung up everywhere to promote
the aims of progressive internationalism. Most importantly, Morel reminded his
readers that the President of the United States now championed the demand of the
people for frankness in war aims:
Today the first citizen of the greatest and most powerful Democracy in the
world makes himself interpreter of that demand in a message to the
Belligerent Governments, a message which invites the Belligerent
Governments to disclose their real aims to their suffering peoples and the
world. Today the dawn of a Negotiated Peace - the only Peace which can
101
F. W. Hirst to C. P. Scott, 20 Jan. 1917, Hirst Papers.
Ibid.
103
Ibid.
104
Ibid.
105
Argument such as: the Central Powers have not declared their terms; Germany has not been
punished yet; and that Britain needs to regain its prestige by having some significant military victories.
Ibid.
106
Ibid.
107
‘The German Reply to President Wilson’s Note of December 18th. December 25, 1916’, in G. L.
Dickinson, Documents Relating to Peace Proposals, p. 7.
102
90
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
preserve the peoples from utter destruction - appears upon a horizon
stained blood-red with the follies of contemporary rulers and politicians.
Clouds still obscure its rise. But they cannot stay it. For the peoples have
seen the promise in the sky and will now insist upon its consummation.
President Wilson has sounded the death-knell of the war.108
By the third week in January 1917, the Radical publicists realised that success
in achieving a negotiated peace now depended, largely, on the skill of President
Wilson’s diplomacy. They realised that the forces marshalled against a negotiated
peace were as strong and ever. Therefore, President Wilson needed encouragement
and assistance in the task that lay before him. There were numerous open letters of
encouragement addressed to President Wilson published at this time from those
interested in a negotiated peace. Francis Johnson’s letter to the President, on behalf of
the I. L. P, indicated the esteem in which Woodrow Wilson was held, even by people
in the Labour movement:
My council earnestly hopes that you will continue your great effort to
bring the Belligerent Nations together, and they pray that a speedy success
will reward you. You have already, by your Note, rendered the greatest
service to humanity, and by the continuance of your efforts in this
direction you will earn the undying gratitude to this and succeeding
generations.109
By this time the Liberals now looked to President Wilson as their de facto
leader. This was partly due to the American President’s appeal but also due to
the bankruptcy of the British Liberal Party, in the estimation of its Radical
critics. The historian, Marvin Swartz, explained the relationship thus:
Liberals who desired moderate war aims had to look abroad for a
Liberal leader. The Union’s [the U. D. C.’s] leaders encouraged this
support of Wilson as a means of breaking down the adherence to the
all-out war effort of the British government.’110
However, Woodrow Wilson’s next foray into the world stage gave the Radical
publicists even more reason to feel hopeful about a negotiated settlement.
The contribution of English Radicals again proved to be a significant
ingredient in President Wilson’s calculations regarding his next step. On 16
December, Colonel House asked Josiah Wedgwood,111 an Asquithian Liberal who
was in the United States at the time to draft some terms for Wilson’s next planned
peace move.112 While waiting for the Allied reply to his peace note, Wilson had
decided to draw up his own terms in a speech advocating a negotiated settlement to
the war, a speech that would serve as a rallying point for the Liberals. This was
108
U. D. C., E. D. Morel, ‘The War Cannot Go On’, Jan. 1917, Vol. 2, No. 3.
Labour Leader, Francis Johnson, ‘The I. L. P. to Mr. Wilson’, 11 Jan. 1917.
110
Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control, p. 130.
111
Wedgwood was elected to Parliament in 1906 as a Liberal. In 1919, he joined the Labour Party. For
a biography, see Anthony Burton, Wedgwood (London, 1976).
112
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 121
109
91
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
exactly the tactic that the Radicals had been urging.113 On 3 January, Wilson
discussed his planned ‘peace without victory’ speech with House.114 On 11 January,
after Wilson had completed his draft for the speech, House brought in letters from
Britain from Lord Bryce, the Liberal elder statesman, Noel Buxton, the Radical, and
William Buckler. These letters apparently confirmed Wilson in his thinking and he
decided against softening his draft speech as his Secretary of State, Lansing, had
requested.115
President Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech of 22 January 1917 was a
detailed manifesto for Liberal internationalism. Wilson announced that the corner
stone of a coming peace would be the formation of a ‘league of nations’. The
structural causes of the European conflict were analysed in detail, but the most
controversial part of his speech was his advocacy of a negotiated peace as being the
best way to end the war. To highlight his proposal Wilson coined the phrase ‘a peace
without victory’, a victory where neither side would crush or humiliate the other
side.116 This was indeed revolutionary. ‘Peace without victory’ ran counter to
everything the belligerent governments had been fighting for, and especially the
‘knock-out-blow’ policy of Lloyd George. The difference now was that the war aims
of the belligerent powers were no longer only the subject of confidential diplomatic
discussions, but were now open to full-scale public debate, whether the governments
liked it or not.
Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ address was a complete endorsement of the
principles long advocated by the British Radical M. P.s, the U. D. C. and the Radical
publicists.117 In fact, the speech was carefully tailored to appeal to the Radicals.
However, the speech had far wider appeal. At the Labour Party conference there was
so much spontaneous cheering, when Wilson’s speech was mentioned, that the
speaker could not go on.118 Philip Snowden was buoyed up by the President’s address:
He states what we have so constantly maintained, that a peace dictated by
the military power of either of the groups would be accepted in
humiliation, would leave a sting, a bitter memory upon which terms of
peace would rest only as upon a quicksand. Such an emphatic declaration
as this one is the most powerful condemnations of war which has yet been
uttered.119
Snowden noted that, at the Labour Party conference, there were emergency
resolutions passed, ‘with practical unanimity’, endorsing Wilson’s ‘league of nations’
policy and condemnation of an economic war after the war’s end. Snowden was
convinced that public opinion was ‘favourable to President Wilson, and is praying that
113
Knock, To End All Wars, p. 111 and Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 122.
Ibid., p. 111
115
Both Page and Lansing specifically objected to Wilson’s use of the phrase ‘peace without victory.’
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 123. Lord Bryce, in fact, urged Wilson to understand that Britain
‘must fight on at whatever cost.’ Buckler summarised the response of the British press to Wilson’s
Note, and included a copy of Noel Buxton’s speech in the House of Commons on 21 December in
support of Wilson’s plan for an international guarantee of any peace settlement, and a memorandum of
Noel Buxton’s against the idea of fighting on until Germany was utterly crushed. See Bryce to Wilson,
22 Dec. 1916, Buckler to House, 22 Dec. 1916, and ‘A Memorandum by Noel Edward Buxton’, in
PWW, 40, pp. 316-318, and 413-416.
116
Ibid., p. 112.
117
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 125
118
Labour Leader, ‘Labour Party Conference’, 25 Jan. 1917.
119
Labour Leader, Philip M. Snowden M. P., ‘President Wilson’s Speech’, 25 Jan. 1917.
114
92
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
he will continue his magnificent efforts to bring the war to an end.’120 George
Lansbury of the Herald, also representative of views in the labour movement, was
ecstatic that the American President advocated ‘peace without overwhelming and
overweening triumph, peace concerted and not dictated, peace without rancour and
hatred and the seeds of future war.’121
Henry Massingham was also exultant. The Nation described Wilson as a ‘great
statesman’ and asserted that his speech outlined the only way out of the war.122 Hirst
was full of praise in Common Sense. Woodrow Wilson represented the ‘best in the
American democracy as no man has done since Abraham Lincoln, and, for his
position in the world to-day we can find no parallel in the past. If the pen is mightier
than the sword, it is surely in such words as these.’ 123 Hirst’s correspondence with
Liberal M. P.s, business friends, and new acquaintances in the labour movement,
indicated a growing faith that Wilson’s latest intervention was transforming public
opinion and was likely to break the diplomatic deadlock.124 To Catherine Marshall,
Hirst confessed that he ‘longs for the day when the British government can declare
that it welcomes the mediation of President Wilson.’125 Even A. G. Gardiner in the
Daily News called Wilson’s speech to the Senate a ‘remarkable speech,126 while C. P.
Scott, in the Manchester Guardian, stated that Wilson’s terms ‘are our terms, or if
they are not, they ought to be.’127 Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech had won
wholehearted praise from the Radical press. However, the Asquithian Westminster
Gazette sounded a note of criticism,128 and the pro-Lloyd George Chronicle thought
the phrase was ‘not one that many Englishmen would want to hear.’129
120
Snowden claimed that whenever the people were left to decide things for themselves, they were in
favour of ending the War through negotiation on just and honourable terms. He complained that the
widely circulated newspapers in Great Britain did not represent public opinion. Philip Snowden, ‘Note
by Mr. Philip Snowden M. P., on Reception of President Wilson’s Overtures by the British Labour
Movement’, 31 Jan.1917, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/15.
121
Herald, ‘Well Done Wilson’, 27 Jan. 1917.
122
Nation, ‘The Only Way Out’, 27 Jan. 1917.
123
Common Sense, ‘President Wilson’s Speech’, 27 Jan. 1917.
124
Liberal M. P. Percy Molteno wrote: ‘We ought to concentrate on the acceptance of Wilson’s offer to
help bring about peace.’ Molteno to Hirst, 29 Jan. 1917. On 31 January, J. Edward Hodgkin wrote: ‘It
is my firm conviction that a very decided change is coming over the country, … I believe a strong
neutral move for armistice and negotiation would be welcomed by the mass of the people, though the
daily press would of course decry it.’ J. Edward Hodgkin [Royal Automobile Club], to F. W. Hirst, 31
Jan. 1917, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/15. The Lib-Lab M. P. Thomas Burt wrote: ‘I agree with
Wilson’s proposals.’ A few days later Burt was less optimistic due to Germany’s resumption of
unrestricted submarine warfare, but he still favoured a negotiated peace, yet Hirst put a powerful case
to him for negotiation now. Burt replied in agreement: ‘I cannot believe that diplomacy can do
anything effective for peace at the present time. We should, however, I agree, seize any opportunity
that offers itself to bring this war to a satisfactory end.’ Thomas Burt to F. W. Hirst, 5, 10 and 13 Feb.
1917, Hirst Papers, 1917.
125
Hirst also quoted a banker friend’s letter to Marshall that he interpreted as meaning that business
people in London believe reasonable peace terms were now possible and that further military effort
would not gain much more. In addition, he reported that both Lord Morley and Lore Loreburn were
‘very much in favour of U. S. mediation’ and were ‘doing what they can to advance.’ F. W. Hirst to
Catherine Marshall, 1 Feb. 1917, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/16.
126
Daily News, ‘Mr. Wilson on the End of the War’, 23 Jan. 1917.
127
The Manchester Guardian, Editorial, ‘How Peace Can Be Secured’, 23 Jan. 1917. See also, Herald,
‘Well Done Wilson’, 27 Jan. 1917.
128
Winkler, The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, p. 141. The Saturday Westminster
Gazette was qualified in its praise. After giving a very detailed summary of Wilson’s speech objections
were then stated: ‘If the Americans had been fighting an unscrupulous foe for two and half years would
93
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
The praise in the United States was glowing, with some editors even
comparing his address to the American Declaration of Independence or the
Gettysburg Address. This was the first time that a world statesman had delivered such
a stinging critique of European imperialism and militarism. ‘Thus Wilson had spoken
to every major issue and had offered an answer to every important question the war
had raised, or would raise.’130 Reaction to the ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech, by
American peace activists, was also overwhelmingly positive. In a letter to Jane
Addams, Ida Tarbell gave her opinion on Wilson’s initiative: ‘I hope you are as
thankful for the President’s message as I am. It seems to me the highest call that this
country has had from any man since Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address. It is the most
powerful expression of the idea of universal peace which the world has heard.’131 An
historian and peace activist at the time, William Hull,132 was impressed by the historic
nature of the speech:
The President’s message of the day before yesterday to the Senate has in it
possibilities of becoming the most important state paper which I have met
with in the history of the world. It contains twelve propositions any of
which is truly magnificent from the point of view of international
statesmanship.
Fraught with possibilities of the highest welfare to the human race,
humanity may well hang breathless on its fate, and every lover of mankind
is challenged to accord it its ardent support.133
Addams saw the President’s speech as part of other positive developments: ‘Isn’t it
wonderful the way our cause is moving lately?’134 On the same day, obviously in an
elated frame of mind, Jane Addams sent a telegram to Woodrow Wilson and
expressed her gratitude for his
brilliant statement of the hopes of modern internationalists and that you
have placed before the world well considered standards by which the
warring nations must ultimately test their claims and be judged by
neutrals. 135
In addition, Addams said that Wilson’s timing was propitious as ‘certain liberal
elements’ in both Britain and Germany were being hard-pressed by those who wanted
the war to keep going. To these groups it was ‘as if you have held out a cup of cold
they like a third party to say they must end the war without winning it? Was Lincoln at any time willing
to end his war without winning it, and what was his attitude to European intervention in the Civil
War?’ Saturday Westminster Gazette, ‘The Week’, 27 Jan. 1917.
129
Winkler, The League of Nations Movement in Great Britain, p. 141.
130
Ibid., p. 115.
131
Ida Tarbell to Jane Addams, 26 Jan. 1917, Addams Papers, 10.
132
William Hull was a distinguished professor of history and political science at Swarthmore College,
Pennsylvania. Hull was well known for his teaching and writings on internationalism, peace, and
disarmament.
133
William Hull to Fred Lynch, 24 Jan. 1917, Hull Papers, 5.
134
Women in Finland and Scandinavia had just formed an International Committee of Women for
Permanent Peace (I. C. W. P. P.), and Louis Lochner brought good news from his work over 1916 in
Europe with the Neutral Committee for a Continuous Peace. Jane Addams to Emily G. Balch, 23 Jan.
1917, Addams Papers, 10. Addams expressed much the same to Lochner himself. See Jane Addams to
Louis Lochner, 23 Jan. 1917, Addams Papers, 10.
135
Jane Addams to President Woodrow Wilson, 23 Jan. 1917, Addams Papers, 10.
94
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
water.’136 Also, the American Neutral Conference Committee sent a telegram to the
President praising his speech.137 However, the American peace activists were
concerned at the criticism of the President’s speech by the British Government. This
was indicated by Lillian Holt’s letter to Addams in which she described President
Wilson’s speech as ‘wonderful’ but despaired at Bonar Law’s reply.138 Similarly,
David Starr Jordan saw cause for optimism on 30 January 1917:
The struggle of the future is between democracy and its opponents, and
to break the traditional hold of the favoured castes over war aims
diplomacy. I think that the President’s letter and speech has opened the
door to peace so widely that it cannot be closed and after peace comes
then begins the struggle. I shall not go to Europe now until some sort of
a truce is called. 139
However, the following day, Jordan had reason to be concerned about the attitude
of the British government:
I wish there were some way in which the democratic leaders in Great
Britain (instead of Lord Cecil, Lord Northcliffe or Horatio Bottomley)
could appeal to the democratic elements in Germany. I do not know
what can be done officially but I do know that the pan-Germanists have
been driven from power in Germany and that what holds that nation
together now is the general fear of disruption if they yield any point to
the Allies.140
The mainstream British press were quite another matter, however. The
‘patriotic’ Allied press was quite hostile towards Wilson’s speech and the same could
be said of the Allied governments. In fact, the attacks by the Allied governments and
the Allied press depressed Wilson.141 On the other hand, the German press noted
Wilson’s impartiality but doubted that Wilson’s terms were workable in the light of
the Allies uncompromising war aims of 10 January.142
President Wilson’s ‘Peace Without Victory’ speech marked a high point in the
war for the Radical publicists. They had never been more pleased or united in their
view of Woodrow Wilson than they were at this time. For the Radical publicists, the
‘Peace Without Victory’ address represented the yardstick against which all other
ideas about ending the war and securing the peace would be measured for the rest of
the war. However, the German decision to embark on a policy of unrestricted warfare,
a decision communicated to Wilson on 31 January, halted the momentum for peace
136
Ibid.
American Neutral Conference Committee to President Woodrow Wilson, 23 Jan. 1917, Addams
Papers, 10. In response, the President sent a printed letter of support to all those who had sent messages
of support. Printed ‘Letter of Thanks’ from President Wilson, undated, Addams Papers, 10.
138
Lillian S. Holt to Jane Addams, 25 Jan. 1917, Addams papers, 10. In a speech at Bristol on 24
January, Bonar law argued that Britain needed ‘stronger guarantees’ for future peace than those any
league of nations might achieve. Britain required victory. In a phrase that won much applause, he
claimed that ‘what President Wilson is longing for we are fighting for.’ Times, 25 January 1917.
139
David Starr Jordan to Guerard, 30 Jan. 1917, Guerard Box 1, Folder 6.
140
Ibid.
141
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 125.
142
Knock, To End All Wars, p. 114. See Knock’s assessment of the Peace Without Victory speech.
Ibid., p. 115.
137
95
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
that had been building since the previous summer. The German action also came as an
extreme shock to all those who had been campaigning for a negotiated peace in
Britain and America. Perhaps no one was more shocked than President Wilson
himself. He had ‘stuck his neck out’ for ending the war through negotiation, and
though this stance won him the deepest praise from British and American peace
activists, it earned him the opprobrium of the Allied governments and the mainstream
press in Allied countries. Woodrow Wilson was to some extent publicly humiliated by
Germany’s ham-fisted diplomacy and he was now adrift without a viable policy. On 3
February 1917, however, he did take a decisive step: diplomatic relations with
Germany were broken. While the British and American press, as well as many
Congressmen, called for war on Germany, the President kept his counsel and looked
for a way of avoiding war while still pursuing the fading possibility of a negotiated
settlement.143 Again, the Radical publicists were faced with a dilemma. This new turn
in the war pushed the idea of a negotiated peace into the background. While many
peace activists maintained the campaign for an early end to the war, others became
resigned to the prospect of American intervention in the War as a belligerent rather
than as a neutral.
The Radical publicists were by no means unanimous in their reaction to the
prospect of American belligerency. As a group, their preferred option was that the war
end through American mediation. However, once American intervention took on the
air of inevitability, the Radical publicists took an optimistic view that America’s entry
into the War would bring definite benefits. However, there were notable exceptions to
this pro-U. S. entry view. Some Radical publicists looked at the prospect of American
belligerency with trepidation and found themselves more in sympathy with the
American peace activists who were totally opposed to their country going to war.
The Radical newspapers which had opted to support British intervention in
August 1914 were, not surprisingly, enthusiastically supportive of the prospect of
American belligerency. Their editors had few problems supporting the call to arms for
America. The Star was unquestioning of all the atrocities that the Germans were
accused of committing on the high seas, and praised President Wilson for breaking off
diplomatic relations with Germany.144 The Star was also full of praise for Wilson’s
character and welcomed the ‘moral force which President Wilson’s action gives the
demand of the Allies, and the courage which it will give the trembling neutrals
shivering on the edge of the pit.’145 C. P. Scott’s Manchester Guardian argued that it
would be very difficult for the United States to stay out of the war. Furthermore, if the
U. S. did come into the war it would put Germany at war with the ‘civilised world’,
and the ‘civilised world would be bound to win.’146 Furthermore, ‘whatever the
political or military result, Germany’s latest act will complete her moral isolation in
the world.’147 Scott assumed that American belligerence would mean an end to the
143
The most detailed accounts of the evolution of Wilson’s policy between the German declaration of
unrestricted submarine warfare of 1 February 1917 and Wilson’s war message of 2 April 1917 are
Ernest May, The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917 (Cambridge, 1959), Ch. XIX, and
Arthur S. Link, Wilson, Vol. 5: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917 (Princeton, 1965),
Chs. VII-IX.
144
See Star, ‘The Freedom of the Seas’, 3 Feb. 1917, and Star, ‘Hail Columbia’, 5 Feb. 1917.
145
Ibid.
146
Manchester Guardian, ‘If America Came In’, 2 Feb. 1917.
147
Manchester Guardian, ‘Towards Outlawry’, 3 Feb. 1917.
96
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
‘peace without victory’ approach to ending the war and that America would now
require ‘securities against any second outbreak of the same kind.’148
Henry Massingham had no doubt about the significance of Germany’s
decision to pursue a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. The Nation portrayed
American entry into the war as inevitable and saw this in positive terms: ‘With the
entry of America, the balance sets definitely to the side of Democracy. Henceforward,
Western democracy is safe, and its ideas must definitely permeate the central and the
Eastern European world.’149 Furthermore, the Nation believed that Wilson would have
a ‘moderating effect on the settlement’ and the settlement would be ‘enhanced’. He
believed that Wilson would oppose peace by dictation and the United States would
not enter the war for any selfish cause.150 The Nation’s coverage of the GermanAmerican crisis in February manifested an absolute faith in the actions and words of
the American President. Wilson was portrayed by the Nation as leading and steering
the progressive movement: ‘The President has seized the progressive movement in
America, snatched it from Bryan’s sentimentalism, intellectualised it, interpreted it to
itself, and given it work to do.’151 Massingham was convinced that America would
exert a moderating influence on the War and, most significantly, ‘will aim at a
moderate and an early peace.’152 These were most extraordinary assumptions to make.
Firstly, for the United States to ensure a moderate peace upon the termination of the
war would require tremendous coercive power. At this point the only thing that could
be used to exert an influence was the Entente’s financial indebtedness to America.
This was no small thing, but would it outweigh the massive sacrifices of human life
by the Entente powers? Secondly, what guarantee was there that once in the war the
United States would aim at an ‘early peace’? It is interesting that Massingham
assumed Wilson would retain his ‘peace without victory’ convictions after entering
war, while Alfred Gardiner assumed he would ditch this principle and go all out for
military victory. Though both publicists spoke with certainty, there was no way of
really knowing at this time just what Wilson’s approach would be once committed to
war. Not even Wilson’s closest advisers really knew what American intervention
would ultimately mean. Even the nature of a military commitment was undecided,
with some advisers to Wilson assuming the deployment of a large military force to
Europe, while others assumed that the American contribution would be limited to
economic resources and that no U. S. soldiers would be sent to Europe.153
Massingham continued his high praise of the American President in the issue
of 24 February, portraying Wilson as a man of destiny:
It is one of the few happy accidents of these times that the political
office which by its constitutional function carries more of real power
148
Ibid.
Nation, ‘Enter America’, 10 Feb. 1917.
150
Nation, ‘The Last Neutral’, 10 Feb. 1917.
151
Nation, London Diary, 10 Feb. 1917. Note that William Jennings Bryan was a Christian pacifist and
a powerful leader within the Democratic Party. Bryan had been a candidate for the Democratic
nomination in the 1912 presidential election. Wilson appointed Bryan as his Secretary of State on
becoming President. He had been the major link between the administration and the American peace
movement until he resigned in June 1915 over President Wilson’s handling of the Lusitania crisis.
Knock, To End All Wars, pp. 21-23. For recent biographies see Kendrick Clements, William Jennings
Bryan: Missionary Isolationist (Knoxville, 1982) and Donald K. Springen, William Jennings Bryan:
Orator of Small-Town America (New York, 1991).
152
Ibid.
153
See David M. Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson: American Aims in World War I (Westport,
1996), Ch. 4.
149
97
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
than the headship of any other State whatsoever, and to which the
circumstances of the war have given an unparalleled world-influence as
well, should be filled by an intellectual Liberal whose mind is flexible
enough to grasp the outstanding truth of the war: that if the ideals of
national democracy, which represent the Allied cause, are to live at all,
they must grow into ideas of international democracy. These four years
are an opportunity, unparalleled in modern history, not only for Mr.
Wilson, but for Europe.154
Massingham’s faith in Wilson knew no bounds. This can only be explained by the fact
that he was the only statesman at the time who, in Radical eyes, had not been
discredited by duplicitous behaviour and hypocrisy. Wilson represented everything
that a person in the Radical Liberal tradition would find appealing and in this he was a
total contrast to Asquith and Grey. However, not all the Radical publicists were as
uninhibited as Massingham in declaring their faith in the President.
Common Sense was also full of praise for Wilson. Hirst wrote that, ‘there is no
figure in American public life that has shown more perseverance, determination and
fearlessness.’155 Hirst contrasted Wilson’s admirable moderation with the ‘fight to the
finish’ attitude that continued to hold sway in the corridors of power in England:
Anyhow, the average elderly middle-class Englishman feels happy in his
strength when, over a glass of port after a good dinner, by a warm fire,
he declares his unalterable opinion that this is a Fight to the Finish.156
Like Massingham, Hirst believed that the President had all the necessary credentials
to achieve his aims: ‘His keen knowledge of human nature, [and] his fearlessness of
the truth have been the exasperation of his political opponents and brought him almost
the unanimous support of his countrymen, regardless of party affiliations.’
Nevertheless, Hirst had faith that the Americans would continue to seek peace.157 It is
vital to note that, like Massingham, Hirst assumed Wilson would still seek an early
peace by diplomatic means once America had entered the War. However, Hirst
deviated from Massingham and his fellow Radicals in demonstrating some empathy
with the Germans in their decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare.158 Hirst,
alone among the Radical publicists, noted that even prominent socialists in Germany
depicted the resumption of the submarine war as a response to the Allies’ prompt
rejection of the German peace offer.159
154
Nation, ‘When America Comes In, Politics and Affairs, 24 Feb. 1917. Also, on 16 February
Massingham thought Wilson’s latest speech was ‘the best ever he has delivered.’ Nation, A London
Diary, 16 Feb. 1917.
155
Common Sense, ‘The President’s Plans’, 3 Feb. 1917.
156
Common Sense, ‘The Fight to the Finish’, 3 Feb. 1917.
157
Ibid.
158
Common Sense, ‘The Crisis: Germany and the United States’, 10 Feb. 1917.
159
Hirst observed that the Socialist Majority voted for credit but expected their government to be
always prepared to enter into peace negotiations to guarantee a lasting peace. He noted that the
‘Extremists’ had been making ‘another attack of the German Chancellor but apparently his position is
still strong. Public opinion in Germany wants peace and thinks that the Chancellor is more likely to get
it than anyone else is. The main difficulty is that the German Government dare not publish the terms
which it would accept if the Allies were ready to negotiate.’ Hirst reported that Scheidemann had said
that Germany was waging a war of defence and that the Allies’ rejection of the peace conference
proposal had forced Germany to intensify the submarine campaign. Common Sense, ‘Germany’s
Finance and Peace Policy’, 3 Mar. 1917.
98
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
A week after Germany’s escalation of maritime war, the Labour Leader did
not appear to express the same level of outrage against the German gambit, nor to
express the same faith in the effect that America’s entry would have on the conduct,
character and duration of the War. A feature article from E. D. Morel put the case
once again for peace by negotiation, notwithstanding the latest escalation of the
conflict. Indeed, Morel added a rider to his article that it was written before the latest
German move.160 However, it is interesting that Morel did not want the German action
to divert him from his main task, his argument against the new Spring offensives,
despite the fact that the rest of the press was consumed by the high drama of the
submarine issue. In a well-researched article, filled with historical detail, Morel made
his case that each belligerent power had been and was still driven by the ‘lust’ for
conquest both before and during the war. Morel deplored how history had been
twisted to justify British Government policy:
What I have recorded in these two articles is history. What our unfortunate
people are given today, and what they have been given for the past two
years, is a falsification of history on a scale, and with an unblushing
effrontery, surely without parallel in our annals or in the annals of any
people.
Falsehoods can never, in the long run, help any national cause. It is
because I believe, with growing intensity of conviction that a national
policy, based on the murder of truth, must conduct the nation which
tolerates it into the gravest national perils, that I denounce once again the
injustices to the British people which those responsible for it are guilty.
To lead a nation into perilous, and, it may be, disastrous courses by
falsifying history is the greatest crime that statesmen can commit. It is but
an aggravation of that crime that they should use as their accomplices for
the delusion of the people a press which has lost all sense of its
responsibility to the nations and has sunk to the level of a mere
commercial undertaking.161
For Morel, Germany’s escalation of the war at sea did not change his argument. The
war was unjust and founded upon lies; it must be ended by negotiation. This explains
why he felt no need to put this article aside and write a new one on unrestricted
submarine warfare. However, from newspaper accounts in February and early March
1917 it is clear that Hirst and Morel were in a minority; the majority of Radical
publicists saw that the German submarine campaign, and the resulting likelihood of
U. S. intervention, transformed everything.
Within days a number of Radical and Liberal editors began writing about
American intervention in the War – and the prolongation of the war - as if these
developments were now inevitable.162 However, President Wilson did not hold this
160
Morel acknowledged that his article was written before the last German move, which he considered
‘one of the most conspicuous of the many follies which Germany has committed since the war.’
Labour Leader, E. D. Morel, ‘Why Must the Springtime Be Red?: The Coming Slaughter and Its
Attempted Justification – Part II’, 8 Feb. 1917.
161
Ibid.
162
For example, the Westminster Gazette saw that ‘America especially is right, in laying plans for the
future on the assumption that the war will be prolonged,’ because if the U.S. compromised now there
99
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
view. On 2 February, Wilson told his Cabinet that he did not wish to see either side
win,163 but reluctantly, and possibly due to pressure from his cabinet, Wilson broke off
diplomatic relations with Germany the next day.164 However, Wilson wanted to leave
the door ‘wide open’ for peace.165 Wilson still tried to avoid the war by attempting to
win over Austria-Hungary with a British promise not to dismember it,166 and by
following a policy of ‘armed neutrality’ for the United States.167 On 7-9 February
Wilson wrote the Bases of Peace, which was his last plan for a settlement written
from the standpoint of a neutral.168 Wilson added two new elements to his platform in
the Bases of Peace. Firstly, he announced that he would accept territorial changes
after the war as long as they were reasonable and could be expected to remain
permanently. Significantly, Wilson added a clause stating that there should be no
economic war after the war’s end, which brought him even further in line with
Radical thinking.169
While Radical publicists analysed the current situation, I. L. P. and Radical M.
P.’s engaged in a great debate in the Commons, on 20 February 1917, on the issue of
war aims and a negotiated peace.170 Before this debate, H. B. Lees-Smith reported
what he saw as a changed mood in Parliament. He claimed that the ‘knock-out blow’
assumption had now been tacitly abandoned. He believed that a majority of M. P.’s
would accept a ‘good peace’ without ‘troubling about a military victory.’171 Most
significantly, though, he claimed that a definite move for negotiations would win
widespread support in the Parliament. However, Lees-Smith acknowledged that
without Government support nothing would happen:
could at any time in the future be a renewal of ‘sea-warfare conducted by a small number of trained
seamen in a thousand submarines.’ Westminster Gazette, ‘America and the War’, 8 May 1917. Also,
the Westminster Gazette argued the familiar Asquithian line that a lasting peace could not be
guaranteed ‘so long as Prussian autocracy remains unchanged.’ Westminster Gazette, ‘Democracy and
War’, 7 May 1917. When the U.S. broke off diplomatic relations the Star speculated that it was only a
matter of time before the U. S. entered the war. The Star observed that ‘no friend of Peace could enter
into war with hands more unspotted than those of the President,’ and welcomed ‘the moral force which
President Wilson’s action gives to the demands of the Allies and the courage which it gives to the
trembling neutrals shivering on the edge of the pit.’ Star, ‘Hail Columbia’, 5 Feb. 1917.
163
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 126.
164
The Senate approved of breaking off relations with Germany by 78 votes to 5. Saturday Westminster
Gazette, 10 Feb. 1917. For a detailed assessment of Wilson’s reluctance to be rushed into a fateful step,
and the debate in the Cabinet on a diplomatic rupture with Germany, see Link, Campaigns for
Progressivism and Peace, pp. 290-301.
165
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 127.
166
On the approach to Britain to repudiate the dismemberment of Austria-Hungary as a war aim, see
Link, Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, pp. 314-317.
167
On the decision for Armed Neutrality, Ibid., Ch. VIII.
168
Martin, Peace Without Victory, p. 127. For the original version of ‘Bases of Peace’, see Link, PWW,
vol. 41, pp. 160-164.
169
This had, in fact, already become the fifth Cardinal Point of the U. D. C. which stated that, ‘the
European conflict shall not be continued by economic war after the military operations have ceased,
and the British policy shall be directed towards promoting the fullest commercial intercourse between
nations and the preservation and extension of the principle of the open door.’ This was passed by the U.
D. C. General Council on 2 May 1916. Swartz, The Union of Democratic Control, p. 78.
170
House of Commons Debates, 90, 1179-1299. Hereafter, H. of C. Debs. will be used as the
abbreviation of House of Commons Debates.
171
H. B. Lees-Smith, ‘Opinion In Parliament on Peace Negotiation’, 2 Feb. 1917, Marshall Papers,
D/MAR/4/16.
100
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
The situation can best be summed up as saying that there is a great latent
support for President Wilson’s proposals. It would, however, be
misleading not to point out that this support would not mature into a
formidable force as long as it is opposed by the Government, at any rate
until after the next offensive. The fact, however, which is clear that at any
moment , is that if the Government decides on peace negotiations it will
receive practically unanimous support in Parliament.172
Radical M. P.’s and publicists alike, realised that all hinged on the Lloyd George
government’s attitude to a negotiated peace. They urged the removal of ambiguities
and the concealed imperialist aims from the Allied war aims as outlined in the 10
January Allied Reply to the American Peace Note. The Labour Leader called these
debates in the Commons the ‘Great Peace Debates’ and included the speeches of
Ponsonby, Trevelyan, Snowden, MacDonald and Lambert in the 1 March issue.173
Summarising the lines of the debate, Ramsay MacDonald concluded an article, a few
days later, with the observation that the grandiose objectives outlined in the Allied
Reply offered no solution and that in the end peace would have to be negotiated.174
Arthur Ponsonby agreed. Ponsonby listed all the territory captured by the Allies thus
far ‘for which such special and heavy sacrifices have been made and which
strategically and economically is a prize we are, it appears, not likely to relinquish.’175
Any suspicion that the Allies were fighting for the retention of these gains would
have made the Allies’ disinterested motives appear hollow and false.176 The stand
taken by the Radical M. P.’s and publicists did not go unnoticed across the other side
of the Atlantic, as indicated in a letter Massingham received from Colonel House on
25 February:
I wish you to tell Mr. Noel Buxton and Mr. A. G. Gardiner and other
friends like them how much their support heartens us here. One cannot
lose hope for the future when such men as these maintain their equilibrium
under such trying circumstances.177
Radical publicists received a lot of feedback from soldiers about the prospects
of a negotiated peace. H. B. Lees-Smith178 argued that the soldiers were far milder
towards the enemy than many on the home front:
There is a clear divorce of sentiment between the soldiers at the front
and civilians at home. At the front there is not the same hatred of the
Germans and the clamour of the newspapers leaves the soldiers cold.
They have a great contempt of the cheap and easy patriotism of the
‘stay-at-homes’, which they suspect would ooze out of their toes after
once ‘going over the top’.179
172
Ibid.
Labour Leader, ‘Great Peace Debate in Parliament’, 1 March 1917.
174
Labour Leader, ‘The Position Title’, 3 March 1917.
175
Labour Leader, ‘Great Peace Debate in Parliament’, 1 March 1917.have
176
U. D. C., ‘Is It Now War and Aggression’, March 1917, Vol.. 2, No. 5. See Sally Harris’ description
of this debate. Harris, Out of Control, pp. 134-136.
177
E. M House to H. W. Massingham, 25 Feb. 1917, Massingham Papers, MC 41/93/6.
178
H. B. Lees-Smith, a member of the I. L. P. and Labour member of the British Parliament.
179
H. B. Lees-Smith, ‘Opinion of the Army on Peace Negotiations’, 2 February 1917, Marshall Papers,
D/MAR/4/16.
173
101
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
Lees-Smith made it clear, in a note to Catherine Marshall, that the soldiers were not
willing to fight for aims implied in the Allied Reply of 10 January, but would give
nearly unanimous support for a peace based on the principle of ‘live and let live.’180
Hirst’s friend, G. S. Pawle, told Francis Hirst something similar. Pawle was disgusted
by how freely those back home squandered the youth of the country on the
battlefields of France. He yearned for it all to end:
This miserable disgraceful war which must go on until everybody is
exhausted. What I want is some practical plan for stopping this utterly
unreasonable slaughter of young lives. The present plan of old men sitting
at home and egging on young men to fight I have denounced for years
past: it is against the whole theory of the survival of the fittest.181
Meanwhile, at the beginning of February, the prospect of American
participation in the war began to divide progressive groups in the United States.
However, those who had been activists for a negotiated peace up to this time ran a
highly vocal and well-organised campaign to convince the President to keep the
United States out of the war. The only intervention these groups wanted was that of
mediation and of guaranteeing the post-war settlement through participation in a
‘league of nations’. American peace activists initially had faith that Wilson would
keep their nation out of the war. This gradually changed by the beginning of March
when it began to be apparent that Wilson was considering taking the United States
into the war. A letter from Garrison Villard to Jane Addams on 15 February is
indicative of this faith that Wilson would do the right thing by America’s peace
activists:
We have to rely more than all else upon the President who will keep us out
of war if that were humanly possible. Our Evening Post stands almost
alone for peace. The attitude of the majority of suffragists in following the
leaders in preparing for war is very sad.182
The idea of ‘Armed Neutrality’, being pursued by the Wilson Administration during
February 1917, worried the peace activists.183 Americans opposed to intervention
mobilised all their forces. The Woman’s Peace Party urged its members to wire
congressmen to support a resolution that there should be a referendum on the issue of
peace or war.184 The A. U. A. M. leaders sent a letter to the President that outlined
how armed neutrality could work. The organisation argued that this would enable
America to stay open to the possibility of negotiation.185 The Emergency Peace
Federation sent a letter to the President expressing concerns over the decision to arm
180
Ibid.
Ibid.
182
Garrison Villard to Jane Addams, 15 Feb. 1917, Addams Papers, 10.
183
Alice Thacer Post to Jane Addams, 7 Feb. 1917, Addams Papers, 10.
184
‘Woman’s Peace Party of New York City’, Letter to Members, 9 Feb. 1917, Morgan Papers. In
addition, the Emergency Peace Committee was formed at the national office of the W. P. P. to plan
mass meetings. ‘The Woman’s Peace Party’, Letter to Members, 9 Feb. 1917, Wald Papers, Reel 038
(Box 36, Folder 1.1).
185
A. U. A. M. to President Woodrow Wilson, ‘Memorandum Concerning Proposed Armed
Neutrality’, 28 Feb. 1917, Wald Papers, Reel 102 (Folder 2.5, Box 88). Paul Kellogg sent a similar note
to the President. See Paul Kellogg to President Woodrow Wilson, 28 Feb. 1917, Wald Papers, Reel 103
(Box 89, Folder 2).
181
102
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
merchant ships, viewing it as a ‘dangerous step to war.’186 On 28 February, the
President received a delegation from William Hull, Jane Addams, Emily G. Balch
and Joseph D. Cannon. They represented a conference of delegates from 22 leading
peace societies that had been held in New York on 22 and 23 February. The
delegation had a one-hour interview with the President. Addams put the case that the
United States must not be precipitated into war by the ‘hypernationalism’ that had
forced the European belligerents into war, because of America’s unique
‘cosmopolitan character.’187 Due to the confidential nature of the discussion the
delegation did not, at the time, repeat publicly what the President had said in response
to their pleas for peace. However, Hull jotted down a few notes on what the President
said. Wilson declared that he cared nothing for the munitions manufacturers or
special interests. He said that Germany had the power to force war on the United
States, which was why he was trying to get the bill through Congress to arm merchant
ships. The President declared himself for proper terms, proper future guarantees and
announced ‘I am absolutely for peace. Even with Zimmermann and Junkers.’188 This
last sentence is quite astounding. The Zimmermann Telegram, known to the President
on 25 February but not published in the American press until 1 March, does not
appear to have been the decisive factor to incline Wilson towards intervention.189
However, Addams recalled what might have been one of the major factors in
Wilson’s mind prompting his decision for war. Wilson said that only by participating
in the war would he be able to have a seat at the peace conference. If the United
States remained a neutral, then it would only be able to ‘call through a crack in the
door.’190 At the end of February, President Wilson was still determined to stay neutral
and the only sort of intervention he desired was to be a mediator.191 Despite Wilson’s
reassurances to the delegation, peace activists continued campaigning.192 Some drew
encouragement from their activism,193 while others were beginning to feel that the
tide might be running against them.194
However, anti-war American peace activists were up against increasing
pressure in America for entry into the war. On 25 February, the Laconia, a British
liner, was sunk with the loss of two American lives. Then the Zimmermann
Telegram, originally dated 19 January 1917, in which Germany promised to help
Mexico if war broke out, was published, as we have seen, in blazing headlines on 1
186
Emergency Peace Federation to President Woodrow Wilson, 8 Mar. 1917, Morgan Papers. This
letter was then sent to members. Lella Faye Secor to Members, 14 March 1917, Morgan Papers.
187
‘A Visit to the President’, 28 Feb. 1917. Hull Papers.
188
Ibid.
189
On the Zimmermannn Telegram and its impact on Wilson, see Link, Campaigns for Progressivism
and Peace, pp. 342-354.
190
Jane Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War (Boston, 1960), p. 64.
191
William Hull, ‘Notes on Delegation to Wilson’, 28 Feb. 1917, Hull Papers, 5.
192
William Hull followed up his meeting with President Wilson with a telegram representing the views
of the citizens of Swarthmore, which urged the President to ‘resort only to peaceful means of settling
our existing difficulties with Germany and England. We respectfully urge you to consider the plan of
creating a joint commission of enquiry and conciliation with Germany and England respectively which
may be able to establish at least a modus vivendi perhaps on the basis of the Declaration of London,
until the end of the present war. We tender you our loyal, unflinching support in your noble efforts to
find a peaceful solution.’ William Hull and Paul M. Pearson, ‘Draft Telegram to President Wilson, 3
Mar. 1917, Hull Papers, 5.
193
Lochner reported an encouraging mass meeting at Carnegie Hall. ‘The auditorium was jammed to
the roof. We got $4000.’ Louis Lochner to William Hull, 10 Mar. 1917, Hull Papers, 5.
194
See Lola Maverick Lloyd to Rosika Schwimmer, 7 Mar. 1917, Schwimmer-Lloyd Papers, Box A86.
103
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
March.195 When in mid-March the City of Memphis, the Illinois and the Vigilancia, all
U.S. merchant ships, were sunk by German submarines, the Cabinet of 20 March
1917 recommended to Wilson that he declare war. Wilson his war message to
Congress on 2 April. The Senate voted for war on 4 April, and the House of
Representatives followed on 6 April, Good Friday.196
While the Radical publicists pondered the implications of imminent American
entry, and American peace activists did everything in their power to prevent this
happening, an event occurred of truly shattering proportions. After three days of street
fighting in Petrograd, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia abdicated on 15 March. The March
Revolution in Russia came to be invested with just as much, if not more, significance
by the Radical publicists than the prospect of American mediation or American entry.
The Radical publicists began to form the opinion that if America alone could not be
the circuit breaker to bring about a negotiated peace, then perhaps combined with a
transformed and democratic Russia, she could do so. To Wilson, the fall of Russia’s
autocratic Tsar may have made the Allied side more palatable, but it did not reverse
Wilson’s opinion of the Allies.197
Today, reading the Radical publicists’ responses to the Russian Revolution, it
is hard to appreciate the significance they attached to this event. It was as if they had
been at war with Tsarist Russia and now the war was won. ‘The greatest tyranny in
the world has fallen’,198 is how the Nation greeted the news of the Russian
Revolution. The revolution in Russia of March 1917 changed everything for the
Radical publicists. Henry Massingham hailed the Revolution: ‘The glorious news of
the successful Russian Revolution will send a thrill of joy through democratic
Europe, and will make men feel that life is worth living.’199 Massingham described
this as a victory for Liberalism and asserted that association with the Tsar had been ‘a
curse and an incubus.’200 Furthermore, the Russian Revolution was viewed as a ‘great
miracle’ and ‘the virtual solution of the problems of the war,’ because ‘when America
comes in’201 she will join the Entente in a moral united front of Liberal powers.202
Massingham and the Nation’s ecstatic response eclipsed even their earlier responses
to the prospect of American mediation.
It was common for Radicals to be exultant over developments in Russia. In
Francis Hirst’s letterbox for example, was one typical letter, from Percy Molteno, the
Radical M. P. He wrote to Hirst that any ‘competent statesman’ could use the Russian
195
Esposito, The Legacy of Woodrow Wilson, p. 79.
It is interesting that one of the fifty who voted ‘no’ was Jeanette Rankin from Montana who was the
first woman to sit in the House of Representatives. Fleming, The Illusion of Victory, p. 41.
197
On entry into the war Wilson made the United States a wartime ‘associate’ rather than an ally.
Wilson told House, after being shown copies of the Allies’ secret treaties by Balfour, that ‘England
and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means.’ However,
Wilson felt that after Germany’s defeat he could ‘force them to our way of thinking, because by that
time they will, among other things, be financially in our hands’. Wilson to House, July 21, 1917, PWW,
XLIII, 238 (original emphasis). Also, Knock asserted that ‘both Wilson and the Allied governments
knew full well that a day of reckoning was inevitable.’ Knock, To End All Wars, p. 138.
198
Nation, Events of the Week, 17 March 1917.
199
Ibid.
200
Nation, A London Diary, 17 March 1917.
201
Ibid., and Nation, ‘The Holy Alliance’, 17 March 1917.
202
Ibid.
196
104
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
Revolution to bring about a peace.203 Hirst had reason to harbour private doubts. He
had been warned about the imminent revolution in Russia in a flow of correspondence
from his friend Harold Grenfell, naval attaché in the British Embassy in Petrograd.204
Grenfell was pessimistic about the prospect that the Revolution would cause a
positive change in the War. He warned Hirst about getting his hopes up regarding
Russia because the Allied leaders would care little for the ideals of the
revolutionaries:
The dry officer mind will come in and spoil this, one of the few really
gorgeous opportunities for a sudden and great advance and improvement
of humanity that the ages have ever thrown up. Besides how could, how
can, our rulers honestly welcome this movement to liberty, with their
record of what they have done for us in the opposite direction these last 30
months? They regard it, you will see, only in terms of how it will affect
the War – and this emotional, intellectually sensitive and naturally
extremely intelligent people will feel and recognise the essential
selfishness of our attitude, with what chilling and in every way unfortunate
results, you yourself can guess!205
Nevertheless, in Common Sense Hirst barely concealed his enthusiasm for the
transformation of Russia ‘from the least to the most-free country in Europe.’ 206 Like
Massingham, Hirst dared to hope that Russia might play a part in the Liberal
settlement of the war. A letter Hirst received from a soldier friend also reflected deep
joy at the news from Russia: ‘I felt drunk with joy when the news came. Russia could
end the war now, and may do so – in spite of what our Northcliffe papers say. For the
first time in two and a half years I feel a gleam of happiness dawning over this dark
earth.’207
Even those Radical publicists who often allied themselves with the
Government line gave very positive assessments of the Russian Revolution and its
implications for civil liberties in Britain. The Manchester Guardian editor, C. P.
Scott, wrote enthusiastically to L. T. Hobhouse on 25 March:
Don’t you feel the Russian Revolution rather stirring in your bones and
making the growing invasion of personal liberty here more intolerable?
The coldness with which this tremendous movement of political and
spiritual emancipation was received by a great portion of our press, and
society – bitterly felt by Russian residents here – seems to show how far
we have drifted from the tradition of liberty. I feel that perhaps we have
not fought hard enough against the real persecution of the conscientious
objectors.208
A. G. Gardiner, editor of the Daily News was equally, if not more, enthusiastic
than Scott, though he saw more immediately the wider implications. On 17 March,
203
‘The Russian Revolution in regard to the War has not been digested yet but it must modify
Germany’s fears and a competent statesman here has the materials for the making [of] a peace [if] what
stands in the way is the desire here for a Victory and the German retreat encourages that.’ P. A.
Molteno to F. W. Hirst, 11 April 1917, Hirst Papers.
204
Harold Grenfell to F. W. Hirst, 25 Feb. and 20 Mar. 1917, Hirst Papers, 1917.
205
Harold Grenfell to F. W. Hirst, 20 Mar. 1917, Hirst Papers.
206
Common Sense, ‘Russian Revolution: Suspension of the Duma’, 24 March 1917.
207
D. G. [by Caesar’s Camp, Wimbledon Common] to F. W. Hirst, 25 Mar. 1917, Hirst Papers, 1917.
208
Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C. P. Scott, p. 272.
105
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
Gardiner compared the events in Russia with the storming of the Bastille and
proclaimed, ‘Russia is free.’209 He then went on to explain why he had previously
muted his criticisms of the Tsarist government ‘for the sake of the alliance.’ On 22
March he welcomed the victory of ‘spirit of liberty’ in Russia.210 In his diary,
Gardiner called the Russian Revolution the ‘greatest blow struck for freedom in the
last 130 years.’ Gardiner believed that ‘if Russia is free, the world is set free. With
Russia on our side, the victory of liberal ideas, those which unite the democracies of
the Atlantic, is assured. It changes the very form of the war.’211
Even Robert Donald, editor of the Daily Chronicle, was supportive of the
revolutionary Government in Russia. However, for this he earned a rebuke from
former First Sea Lord, Sir John Fisher who was amazed at Donald’s statements so
passionately in praise of the Russian Revolution. Fisher’s only thoughts were that
hopefully Germany would descend into revolution next:
I’ve struggled to respond to your desire for a rousing telegram to the
Russian people, but I couldn’t evolve anything good enough beyond,
STICK TO IT!! AND THE HOHENZOLLERNS WILL GO NEXT AND
SO END THE WAR!
I tell you solemnly that if every newspaper …. would with one voice say
to German people that: WE WILL NEVER MAKE PEACE WITH A
HOHENZOLLERN. The German people would THEN have a revolution
much easier than the Russian!212
It was not surprising that Fisher, an unwavering ‘never ender’ should show no
enthusiasm for a development in Russia that might imperil the military fortunes of the
Entente. But the reactions of some other prominent Liberals could surprise. For
example, a week after the revolution in Petrograd, Catherine Marshall was busy
assisting in the organisation of the public meeting to welcome the Russian
Revolution; visited by Lord Bryce, she found him reluctant to agree to the themes
chosen by the organisers, namely to link the triumph of civil liberty in Russia with the
on-going campaign for the preservation of civil liberty and opposition to conscription
in Britain.213
The meeting to welcome the Russian Revolution was at the centre of the
Labour Leaders’s rhapsodic response to the birth of the new Russia. The issue of 29
March reported that a great mass meeting, at Albert Hall on Saturday 31 March,
would be held to congratulate the people of Russia.214 Among the advertised speakers
209
Stephen Koss, A. G. Gardiner and the Daily News (London, 1973), pp. 224-5.
Ibid. Note that Gardiner, had been vocal in condemnation of Russia at the end July 1914, but then
changed tack with the British declaration of war. See Daily News, ‘Our Duty’, 31 July 1914.
211
A. G. Gardiner, Typed Diary Extract, April 1917, Gardiner Papers, 3/5, Diary.
212
Lord John Fisher to Robert Donald, 29 Mar. 1917, Lords, Box 188, Folder D/4, Item 17. (original
emphasis).
213
Lord Bryce had come to see Catherine Marshall in the morning about a meeting being planned to
honour the Russian Revolution. He was not in favour of linking Russia with civil liberties. Catherine
Marshall to Lord Parmoor, 22 March 1917, Marshall Papers, D/MAR/4/17.
214
Labour Leader, ‘Russia Free’, 29 Mar. 1917. Connected to this was the printing of ‘Russia’s Charter
of Freedom’. Catherine Marshall asked Lord Parmoor to be chairman of the Albert Hall meeting.
Catherine Marshall to Lord Parmoor, 27 Mar. 1917, D/MAR/4/17.
210
106
Chapter 2: ‘Peace Without Victory’ versus the ‘Knock-out Blow’:
December 1916 – March 1917
was the editor of the Herald, George Lansbury.215 The Labour Leader also reported
Ramsay MacDonald’s public speeches. MacDonald said that Russia had given them
‘new hope’ and ‘a message of deliverance for the whole of mankind.’216 However,
Morel’s article in the Labour Leader, on 5 April, warned, in a similar way to Harold
Grenfell, that people were trying to exploit the Russian Revolution for ‘knock-out
blow’ purposes. Lloyd George’s recent statement that more ‘vigour’ was needed was
a case in point.217 As the Russian Provisional Government neared the end of its first
month in office, Philip Snowden highlighted what was to become one of the major
themes of the Radical publicists’ writings for the rest of 1917. Snowden argued that, if
Russia’s new democracy was to be consolidated and the foreign policy of Russia and
the Allies to be harmonised, what was required was a new statement of Allied war
aims.218
To recapitulate the key developments of the winter of 1916-1917, it is clear
that by this time ideas developed by the British Radical publicists – ideas daringly
subversive of the conventional wisdom of warfare – were beginning to dominate
international political discussion of the war. Since August 1914, British publicists had
been absolutely committed to a project of immense significance: to develop new
international mechanisms to achieve and then guarantee a just and lasting peace. The
U. D. C., a majority of Radical publicists, and numerous other organisations and
individuals, had articulated these ideas. The chief proposal was that a form of
collective security be established to prevent a recurrence of war in the future. The idea
of a ‘league of nations’ had blossomed on both sides of the Atlantic. President
Wilson’s decision to commit the United States to post-war membership of the League
and to make this the major plank of his 1916 campaign had placed the ‘league of
nations’ at the centre of the political and diplomatic debate in the autumn of 1916. As
we have seen, Bethmann-Hollweg’s acceptance of a post-war League in November,
followed by the German and American peace notes in December had raised the hopes
of many that peace was near. Radicals everywhere were heartened too by Woodrow
Wilson’s ‘Peace without Victory’ speech of 22 January 1917. In this address, the
President outlined systematically the progressive internationalist approach to world
order, a new vision that was identical to the Radical publicists’ viewpoint. However,
with Germany’s decision to resume unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917,
it seemed the President’s attempts to mediate an end to the war were doomed. This
greatly worried American peace activists who felt that progressive internationalists
would be under threat if America went to war. However, British Radical publicists
were less concerned about the prospect of America entering the war as a belligerent.
By this time British Radical publicists had developed such trust in the American
President that most felt that, as a belligerent, Wilson would seek an early end to the
war as well as a just peace. Then, while the United States stood on the brink of war,
the sensational news of the revolution and birth of the new democratic Russia had
provided fresh inspiration for all those who toiled to resolve the disaster of the war
now in its thirty-fourth month.
215
The speakers were Israel Zangwill, W. C. Anderson M. P., Commander Wedgwood M. P., Dr.
Lynch M. P., Robert Smillie, Robert Williams, and Maude Royden. Labour Leader, ‘Russia Free’, 29
Mar. 1917.
216
Labour Leader, Ramsay MacDonald, ‘Mr. MacDonald at Glasgow’, 19 April 1917.
217
Labour Leader, E. D. Morel, ‘Exploiting the Russian Revolution’, 5 April 1917.
218
Labour Leader, Philip Snowden, Review of the Week, ‘The Russian Situation’, 19 April 1917.