urn:nbn:de:0070-ijcv-2012113
IJCV: Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime:
Professional Associations and the Islamist Movement as
Alternative Arenas in Jordan
Pénélope Larzillière, Institut de recherche pour le développement, Paris, France
Vol. 6 (1) 2012
Editorial (p. 3)
Focus:
Radicalization and
Deradicalization
Guest Editorial: Processes of Radicalization and De-Radicalization Donatella Della Porta / Gary LaFree
(pp. 4 – 10)
Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime: Professional Associations and the Islamist
Movement as Alternative Arenas in Jordan Pénélope Larzillière (pp. 11 – 25)
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Radical Islam in Post-Suharto Indonesia Felix Heiduk (pp. 26 – 40)
Electing Not to Fight: Elections as a Mechanism of Deradicalisation after the Irish Civil War
1922–1938 Bill Kissane (pp. 41 – 54)
State Violence and Oppositional Protest in High-Capacity Authoritarian Regimes Hank Johnston
(pp. 55 – 74)
The States Must Be Crazy: Dissent and the Puzzle of Repressive Persistence Christian Davenport /
Cyanne Loyle (pp. 75 – 95)
Intra-Party Dynamics and the Political Transformation of Non-State Armed Groups Véronique Dudouet
(pp. 96 – 108)
Neo-liberal Governing of “Radicals”: Danish Radicalization Prevention Policies and Potential
Iatrogenic Effects Lasse Lindekilde (pp. 109 – 125)
Open Section
Internal and External Collective Memories of Conflicts: Israel and the 1948 Palestinian Exodus
Rafi Nets-Zehngut (pp. 126 – 140)
Cool Minds in Heated Debates? Migration-related Attitudes in Germany Before and After a Natural
Intervention Claudia Diehl / Jan-Philip Steinmann (pp. 141 – 162)
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NoDerivatives License.
ISSN: 1864–1385
12
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime:
Professional Associations and the Islamist Movement as
Alternative Arenas in Jordan
Pénélope Larzillière, Institut de recherche pour le développement, Paris, France
How does political commitment develop when actors are confronted with authoritarian processes? Under a liberal authoritarian regime, even the creation of democratic institutions may mean authoritarian stabilization (contradicting classical transition theories) rather than open an arena for political protest. However, alternative
contentious arenas may appear, where resourceful organizations can be partially transformed into a basis for protest with challenging frames of reference. In the Jordanian case, the professional associations (in contravention of corporatism theory) and the Islamist social movement have thus gained oppositional capacity. However,
apart from repression, their own economic and social roles, and their integration in the regime frame and limit the kind of political commitment they can lead. Ambivalence arises between challenging and integrated positions and when alternative arenas become so integrated in the regime that they lose their contentious role, radicalization processes appear. Both cases underline the versatility of political arenas and their relational characteristics. These political arenas are also the places where
alternative ideologies are produced. At that level, the Islamist movement has a very specific position as a hegemonic ideological producer with no hegemonic power
and position. The case thus supports an analytical separation between power position and ideology and confirms the need for less state-centred definition of ideology.
Authoritarian regimes attempt to control, repress, or even
eradicate any political challenge. Repressive settings reduce
the possibility for collective action and increase the risks of
political commitment, but do not eliminate contentious
politics. However stable the regime may appear, the dynamics of opposition are in play and lead to an ebb and flow
of mobilization. So how does political commitment develop
when actors are confronted with coercive processes? What
arenas, dynamics, and repertoires of action are involved? Is
it possible to identify processes of (de)radicalization in such
contexts? A meso-level analysis of the Jordanian case addresses these questions and identifies arenas of mobilization
and the different ways they interact with the state, from cooptation to anti-system positioning (Albrecht 2009, 7).
In Jordan, alternative political arenas have been found to
exist outside the very well controlled democratic inI would like to thank André Bank and the two
anonymous referees for their insightful comments
on and criticisms of a first version.
stitutions. They have gained oppositional capacity by combining a widely recognized social utility (professional and
charitable roles) with political activities. I will argue that in
repressive settings (de)radicalization processes are linked to
the emergence of such alternative political arenas. These
arenas, in which political commitment is institutionalized,
are framed by a constantly shifting relationship with the regime, in that sense they can be analyzed as relational action
fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2011; Goldstone 2004). The
notion of relational action field is useful in allowing a nonstatic view of political commitment in authoritarian regimes and a focus on its institutionalization in different
arenas. However, rather than proposing a purely strategic
analysis of these action fields, the study articulates it with
an analysis of the frames of reference and ideologies used
by incumbents and challengers and the legitimacy processes at work. I argue that forms of cultural hegemony
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
13
may appear outside the state, confirming the need for less
hegemonic and more differentiated analysis of the state,
even in authoritarian contexts, as well as a less statecentered definition of ideology (Hall 1982).
mited opening of 1989. Before 1989, all parties were forbidden and activists operated under semi-underground
conditions, except for the Islamists, whose movement was
the only authorized one.
I will first analyze the repressive and authoritarian processes at work in Jordan and assess their impact on political
commitment. Democratic institutions have not truly
opened up a protest political arena, but rather confirmed
the shift toward a liberal authoritarian regime, contradicting classical transition theories. I will therefore focus
on the alternative arenas of mobilization represented by
professional associations and the Islamist social movement,
and how they have had deradicalizing effects. While professional associations in Jordan do indeed open space for
opposition (in contravention of corporatism theory), the
Jordanian case also shows how integration may have radicalizing effects when the possibility to change the political
agenda is denied. Lastly, I will analyze how political disaffection is channeled by the regime through use of tribal
networks, and identify the link between this depoliticization and intertribal social violence, especially by youth.
In 1989, King Hussein announced a democratic opening
with the intention of calming unrest and social demands,
and in 1992 political parties were authorized. However,
substantial limitations on the functioning of parties and
democratic life have remained in force, reducing the real
difference between the two periods. Scholars have many
terms to describe this ambivalent change: “defensive democratization” (Robinson 1998; Bennani-Chraïbi and Fillieule 2003, 44) or “paradoxical liberalization”
(Droz-Vincent 2004, 197). This is an authoritarian power
where democratic institutions and political opposition
exist but there are severe limitations on the issues that can
be raised. Although this was the time when democratic institutions came into existence, the process was in no way a
democratic transition. The shaping of the political space
stayed completely under the monarchy’s control. At that
level, the Jordanian regime is another example of how
democratic institutions are not incompatible with authoritarian processes. Indeed, most authoritarian regimes
possess such institutions. Contrary to the claims of classic
democratic transition theories, such a “democratic opening” may in fact mean authoritarian stabilization (Camau
2005) rather than democratization. Albrecht points out the
democracy bias of theories “based on the assumption that
authoritarian regimes would experience systemic change
along certain waves of democratization processes” (2009,
2). On the contrary, democratic institutions are integrated
into the system. Rather than being the basis for contentious
politics, authoritarian elections become a way of permitting co-opted figures to appear.
1. Stability and Change in Authoritarian Control of Political Commitment
The Jordanian regime’s apparent stability is based on complex, changing authoritarian processes operating in different arenas. This is the background to the many
complexities of the political situation, where coercive
measures coexist with legitimacy. In this context, democratic institutions may be created in a context of authoritarian stabilization, and will consequently not be the
place where political commitment and opposition occur.
Jordan has been a constitutional monarchy with an elected
parliament since 1952, but politically it is a system of exclusion where “participation is not a legal right but accorded top-down” (translated from Droz-Vincent 2004, 208).
The constitution itself gives almost absolute power to the
king, who appoints the government and can dissolve parliament to rule by decree. Many coercive processes have
been implemented, and the security apparatus is omnipresent. The political scene is highly constrained, and defined
by strict limits and “red lines” that the monarchy imposes.
Two phases can be distinguished: before and after the li-
1.1. Building Authoritarian State Legitimacy
In parallel to coercive processes, the Hashemite monarchy
has historically constructed a legitimacy based on a specific
Jordanian identity with ties between social elites and political power, and weakened challengers by integrating them
into a national identity framed by the monarchy while dividing them along social lines. Jordan is a relatively new
state (created in 1921) and was not based on any specific
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Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
14
national movement, although Arab nationalist anticolonialist movements were present. Locally it is often considered to be purely a creation of the British. However,
ninety years later, even its most extreme opponents, still arguing about its artificiality, nonetheless position themselves
within the state framework. Even actors who deny the legitimacy of the monarchy and consider it subordinate to
American foreign policy, permanently refer to its institutions as their frame of experience. That they do so on a
daily basis is not only because Jordan is a repressive state
and that they fear its security apparatus; the State’s institutions, especially the army and the legal system (Massad
2001), have indeed played an integrative role. The creation
– out of nowhere – of a specific Jordanian identity is one of
the greatest successes of the Hashemite monarchy.
person one-vote” electoral law (a one-round uninominal
system), whose purpose is to favor a vote along tribal
rather than partisan lines. The move was part of Hussein’s
strategy of tribalization of society, and has been successful.
Tribalization was seen as a method of depoliticizing society
and weakening the opposition. Indeed, whatever their
political role, tribal networks are not an ideological power.
The new role they have been given, notably through electoral laws that under-represent urban areas, has further increased the importance of these networks (Chatelard 2004,
333). Depoliticization has been reinforced by a political
1
and economic strategy of “brain export,” encouraging intellectuals to emigrate. This is seen as having a double advantage: exporting skilled manpower provides economic
benefits, but is also a way to export protest (Cantini 2008;
De Bel-Air 2003, 21).
One element of the strategy deployed by the monarchy
since the 1950s to build a specific Jordanian identity was to
gradually transform the post-1948 Palestinian-Jordanians
and the Palestinian national movement into a foreign figure, an “Other” (Massad 2001, 274). In the same paradoxical mode, King Hussein called for unity yet fostered
divisions between the two groups by specifically recruiting
Transjordanians to the public sector, which led Palestinians
to remain mainly in the private sector. Tribes have been
promoted as the core of the Transjordanian identity. The
monarchy’s differential treatment of the two populations,
clearly designated as Palestinian or Transjordanian, has created two different communities with different backgrounds
– which was not necessarily the case at the beginning.
While these differences are often denied by opposition
leaders, they are clearly segmented along these lines.
1.2. Tribalization and Depoliticization
The creation of links between the monarchy and the tribal
networks and the tribalization of political life represented
another way for the monarchy to find social support in
King Hussein’s time. This does not mean that tribal networks automatically supported the monarchy; in fact they
had to be won over. In 1992, the king introduced the “one1 Rather than “brain drain” in this case, because it
is a deliberate economic and political strategy (Larzillière 2010).
1.3. Authoritarian Liberalism
While the opposition remains segmented, the transition
from King Hussein to King Abdullah II has led to changes
in the basis of the monarchy’s legitimacy and social support. Here, authoritarian stability does not exclude real
evolution in implementation processes. Abdullah II is not
the expert in tribal networks that Hussein was and has not
enjoyed the same legitimacy in that field. When he came to
power in 1999, he was portrayed in numerous political
jokes and talks as a foreigner speaking better English than
Arabic. Political criticism was expressed in a more public
way at that time. Now, some years later, the atmosphere has
changed, with Abdullah II, like his father, dissolving parliament and ruling by decree (Bank and Valbjørn 2010, 311).
He has steered the monarchy towards a kind of authoritarian liberalism with strong priority given to economic
reforms, in a concomitant process of economic liberalization and authoritarian consolidation that is not specific to
Jordan (Kienle 2008). This also means that the monarchy
now relies more on businesspeople and experts than on
tribal networks (even if the two are not mutually exclusive:
a businessman can be chosen from the same tribe where
previously a traditional notable would have been favored).
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Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
One of the results of the 2007 elections was that the “old
guard” lost its seats to an economic – and very wealthy –
new guard with no political background, which was backed
by the monarchy. Many electors sold their votes to it, and
promises were made on the basis of the wealth of the candidates. Indeed, the role of parliamentarians is increasingly
perceived as one of patronage and dispensing services
(Clark 2010; Lust-Okar 2001), and political position is not
really at stake. While this capitalist new guard has formed a
bloc in parliament, “the national brotherhood,” it does not
appear to have a real ideologically coherent liberal platform
(Rantawi 2009). Votes for them do not mean that liberal
economic reforms are well accepted. There have been reactions against privatization policies and the price increases
implied by the proposed and partially implemented ending
of state subsidies.
The case of the “new guard” shows how elections in an
authoritarian system can be mere democratic “window
dressing” for the regime, where parliament has no real
political role and the electoral process is massively biased.
At the same time, the electoral process is used to permit
new co-opted elites to emerge, as in Morocco (Barwig
2009) or Egypt (Koehler 2009), and “elections are more
frequently contests over access to state resources” (LustOkar 2006, 468). The success of such an operation is only
short term, since the favored figures that emerge in this
way fail to acquire the legitimacy that the Islamists obtain
by other means.
In the absence of a real partisan system, the focus of politicization and mobilization has been much more on the creation and development of alternative arenas than on
participation in these “democratic” institutions. This has
taken two main forms in Jordan. On one hand, professional associations have taken advantage of their expertise, which is needed by the monarchy, to express some
limited opposition. On the other hand, the Muslim
Brotherhood has created a grassroots social network based
on charitable associations. The definition of these different
2 Although currently members who do not pay
their subscriptions are rarely excluded from the profession.
15
arenas is also linked to the theoretical evolution in the
analysis of authoritarian regimes, which “insists on juxtaposing different political arenas with different logics,
rather than analyzing them as a homogeneous entity”
(translated from Dabène, Geisser, and Massadier 2008, 21).
If a limited political pluralism characterizes authoritarian
regimes, and does not exclude extensive social pluralism in
the same regimes (Linz 1975), it is a “pluralism by default”
which emerges from the limitation of authoritarian processes and not from a political project (translated from
Camau 2005, 21). Alternative arenas are part of this pluralism; however, the analysis also shows the limits of their
political role and, in that sense, their status is ambivalent.
2. Ambivalent Alternative Arena of Mobilization 1: Professional Associations
When political parties are forbidden or tightly controlled,
professional organizations are one of the rare places, along
with universities, where collective action and mobilization
are possible. Their professional role guarantees them institutional existence, even in authoritarian regimes. That is
why their possible politicization is an issue, and why such
associations face important state pressures, in particular
during their internal elections. In the Arab world, their positioning vis-à-vis the political power takes two forms. One
is “corporatism,” where the state instrumentalizes professional associations for power implementation (Ayubi
1995; Bianchi 1989; Schmitter 1974). In the second case, associations use their professional activity and economic
utility to gain leeway and become a place of opposition, an
alternative to political parties.
In Jordan both cases exist. The former concern workers’
unions (niqâbât al ‘ummâl), in which membership is not
compulsory; the latter corporative “professional unions”
(niqâbât mihaniyya), here referred to as associations
(where membership is compulsory in order to work in the
2
field concerned). The latter have three functions: providing services for their members, defining the profession, and
political activity. They emerged from groups of professionals who wanted to organize themselves, often arising
16
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Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
through the legal transformation of informal associations
into official professional associations.
The situation of the workers’ unions is totally different. In
1953, workers obtained the right to form trade unions, but
these were created top-down by government order, which
could easily be revoked (Hamayil 2000, 74). The regime
was highly suspicious of this working class trade-unionism,
which was strongly influenced by left-wing political currents, in contrast to the professional associations that were
perceived as a potentially supportive elite. The trade unions
were involved in political mobilization and protest for a
time, but since the 1990s their leaders have been co-opted
by and financially dependent on the regime. Following a
common model in the Arab world, they contribute more
than the professional associations to a “state-centered corporatism” (translated from Gobe 2008, 269). Longuenesse
explains this difference by the absence in the trade unions
of a strong socio-professional identity, while there has been
on the contrary a drive for mobilization and unification in
the professional associations (2007, 109).
2.1. Politics and Expertise
The twelve professional associations which exist today in
Jordan had about 130,000 members in 2011.3 The professional and political aspects have both been present since
their creation, mainly from the 1950s to the 1970s. Their initial purpose was to regulate the profession by limiting access
to those who had certain qualifications. In addition, professional schemes (training for example) and social services
(pension fund, social security, and so on) were soon provided. These professional associations are financed by membership fees, returns on investments, donations and, in some
cases, subsidies from the Jordanian state. The associations’
professional role has given them financial capabilities and a
specific legitimacy based on knowledge. Composed of lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professionals, they already
3 Common council of the professional associations, January 2011. The newly formed teachers’ association will add 105,000 members: Jordan Times,
March 30, 2012.
4
Source: Engineering Association, October 2009.
represented elite groups whose opinions could not easily be
ignored and who are indispensable for the implementation
of modernization policies in the country. Politically, the six
professional associations housed in the historical main
headquarters building are the most important: doctors, engineers, pharmacists, agronomists, lawyers, and dentists.
4
With 70,000 members , the engineers have the largest professional association, which is fully financially independent
with substantial resources (Longuenesse 2007, 137). Ali H.,
engineer, explains the power relation:
The organization of work is a role where the state cannot replace
us, that is what gives us our power, and if we withdraw, the country would be totally disorganized. For example, as engineers, we
control the plans for each building project … The government
does not have the capacity to do that.5
Beyond their professional expertise, the professional associations enjoy another source of public legitimacy: they
are the only institutions with truly democratic electoral
procedures. The role of the professional associations was
not diminished by the establishment of political parties in
1992, which are legally restricted and remain weak. Indeed,
the leaders of the professional associations are better
known than most parliamentarians, with the exception of
those from the Islamist movement. Their political evolution echoes that of the political movements: mainly controlled by leftists and the PLO in the 1970s and 1980s
(Al-Khazendar 1997, 112), the Islamists now have the majority, especially in the governing councils of the professional associations. Indeed, the Islamists have held the
presidency of the engineering association since 1988, and
later acquired the majority on its council.
Islamist political predominance is clear, but should not be
overestimated. The direct election of presidents favors wellknown figures regardless of their political affiliation, which
can differ from the majority of the association’s council.
5 Translated interviews, Amman, November 2007
and November 2009. This independent leftist activist is a civil engineering consultant and speaker for
the professional associations. Aude Signoles describes a similar process (2003), showing how Palestinian engineers have become central political actors
by obtaining responsibility for the technical verification of all building permits.
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
17
There are well-known leftist and nationalist figures, and
the Islamists lost the presidency of the medical association
to an Arab nationalist in 2009. Moreover, the Islamist campaigns focus on reprofessionalizing the professional associations, which limits their political relevance. A decrease
in election participation and payment of dues can be observed, in parallel to increasing unemployment. This decrease also means that the base on which Islamists are
elected is not as broad as it seems (Clark 2010).
available political arena. This is particularly true for longterm activists, whatever their generation.6 After universities,
the professional associations are the institutions that are
most strategically important for pursing mobilization.
Many political struggles in Jordan take the form of a fight
for the creation of new professional associations.7 Even in
the trade unions there is now a reform current seeking to
give workers’ unions some degree of independence.
2.2. A Limited Space
Whatever their main political affiliation, their great legitimacy and social utility has allowed professional associations to institutionalize a power relationship with the
monarchy and they have never been banned, even if leaders
have sometimes been imprisoned. That is why they can be
described as an “oasis of opposition in a desert of authoritarianism” (Harmsen 2008, 121). The main theme of
political mobilization is support of the Palestinian cause,
which is the objective of several committees that cut across
professionals associations: the Palestine committee, the
prisoners committee and antinormalization (of the relationship with Israel) committee. However, professional associations have also taken a stand on internal issues
including democratization, martial law, and freedom of expression. There is a broad consensus on political positions
that strongly support for the Palestinian cause and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (but not for Palestinians
in Jordan). This cause is less problematic for the Jordanian
regime than internal freedoms, as long as Jordan’s foreign
policy towards Israel is not targeted. Consequently, it is the
particularly active and well-known antinormalization committee that has faced particular repression and been declared illegal several times, with its members experiencing
imprisonment or intimidation.
Professional associations in Jordan constitute an alternative
mobilization space that is used by many activists as the only
6 Sixty-two careers of long-term activists from the
different political currents in Jordan were documented through qualitative interviews held between
2006 and 2010 (Larzillière 2012a). Leftist and
nationalist leaders were mainly born between 1946
and 1955 while Islamist leaders were mainly born
Nevertheless, the scope of independence is still very limited, both in action and mobilization capacity. The monarchy has often modified or threatened to modify laws
defining the professional associations’ status – especially
their election arrangements – in order to control them
more effectively. Each time the reactions of the professional
associations, which also used their links with the elite of
the regime, allowed them to maintain their status. In such
periods, the professional associations sustain their capacity
for action by insisting on their professional role. This restrictive situation is created by a combination of direct injunctions issued by the monarchy and self-censorship by
the professional associations, which do not want to involve
themselves in direct confrontation. It is comparable with
the Moroccan case, where institutionalization of the opposition has also led to the emergence of limits and forms
of closure (Vairel 2008, 231). As in Morocco, these forms of
closure are spatially visible, as the professional associations’
main form of action is meetings in or near their headquarters rather than demonstrations circulating in the city.
Therefore, although the exact terms of the power relationship change a little according to the political situation, it
remains constrained within a very narrow space.
In addition to coercive processes, a second kind of limitation
of the themes and form of mobilizations stems from the
class heterogeneity of the professional associations. For
example, the head of a professional association may be respected as a political opposition figure but at the same time
between 1956 and 1965 Here the prosopography just
confirms the other data about the evolution of these
movements.
7 One good example is the long struggle for the
creation of a teachers’ association. First requested by
activists in 1975, it was repeatedly refused and the
demand was put forward again by teachers who organised demonstrations and sit-ins. In the context of
the Arab mobilization of 2011, the creation of this
association has been authorised but with specifications forbidding any political activities.
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
18
have a negative reputation as a manager because of the pay
and working conditions at his firm. This will limit his capacity for political mobilization while his position at the head
of the association impedes social conflicts over working conditions. Heterogeneity also plays a role in relations with the
state, where professionals have different interests depending
on their position in the rent economy and the “neopatrimonial redistribution circles” (translated from Dieterich
1999, 316) and are therefore more or less inclined to criticize
the economic system. Moreover, if these professional associations become not just one place of political opposition
but the place of political opposition, the social basis for
political commitment is restricted. Members must have a
degree, even if there has been some social evolution from
the nationalist and leftist period, when leaders were drawn
8
mainly from the traditional elite and notables, to the Islamist time, where leaders come more from the middle class.
ripheral” and non-hegemonic countries,9 although it is
more visible there. One of the consequences is a reduction
of the radical contestation posture, which does not satisfy
all opponents and leaves important issues to one side. Consequently, revolts may appear in other places, beyond the
control of the acknowledged and tolerated opposition (Dabène, Geisser, and Massadier 2008, 24).
Inside the professional organizations there are debates
about the objectives of political commitment. This relates
not only to their positioning in a repressive national context, but also concerns a general evolution of political activism towards greater use of political expertise. In the
professional associations, this trend results from a set of
three ongoing forces. First, the direct influence of international donors and the theme of “good governance,”
which emphasizes normative administrative practices and
downplays ideological discourse on values. Second, the
Jordanian regime itself has tended to apply the economic
norms of international organizations, since Abdullah II
subscribed to a liberal economic agenda. And finally, oppositional activism orients itself increasingly towards advising or reforming the state’s actions. A whole NGO sector
has emerged and professional associations are also well
positioned as their status places a premium on knowledge
and competence. Here they find economic niches by ensuring a high level of competence for their members and contribute to Jordan’s national economic plan. This relatively
new general trend in political practice is not limited to “pe8 Although in the 1980s, the possibility of scholarship in the USSR somewhat changed the leftist social profile.
Another kind of space has also emerged as an alternative
arena of politicization: the grassroots social movement of
the Muslim Brotherhood. The same ambivalent tension
between contestation and integration can be observed
here, with the same ambivalent consequences for activism. As mentioned above, the mainstream Islamists
have lately been very present in professional associations
and some Islamists are leaders in both arenas. But the distinction between the two arenas highlights the specific
legitimacy and repertory of action of the social movement
and charity network, which differs from the professional
association scene.
3. Ambivalent Alternative Arena of Mobilization 2: The Islamist Social Movement
The Islamist movement of the Muslim Brotherhood has
become an alternative arena of mobilization not through
its economic role, but by becoming the main social force –
mainly through a charitable network that represents a real
alternative to failing state institutions. It was long considered an ally by the monarchy and therefore less vigorously repressed than leftists and nationalists (Budeiri 1997, 199).
The Muslim Brotherhood has never really been anti-monarchy, which has allowed them to occupy the social field as
they were not really seeking political power. In spite of its
opposition role, the Muslim Brotherhood has frequently
had the same enemies as the monarchy, which has created a
bond between them. Thus, this mainstream Islamist movement has slowly gained a kind of social hegemony (in the
sense that they have no real challengers) while other movements (leftist and nationalist) have lost ideological significance along with their political place.
9 Non-hegemonic or “peripheral” countries occupy a subordinate position in international power
relations and lack the means to influence international agendas. They may, however, have some au-
tonomy to format their national agenda and choose
their cooperation partners. See Losego and Arvanitis
(2009).
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
3.1. Social Hegemony?
Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been present in
Jordan since independence in 1946, the movement only
started to gather real support in society during the first
intifada (1987–1993), when it organized a campaign
under the slogan “Islam is the solution” (to which it still
adheres). So its leaders positioned it as a very important
social provider and the champion of the Palestinian cause
(which it redefined with a religious vocabulary). These
have been the two main pillars of the Muslim Brotherhood’s development in Jordan, two justifications that
have had the advantage of not setting up the movement
as a challenger to the monarchy, unlike the leftists and
nationalists. Indeed, Islamist support for the Palestinian
cause has largely taken the form of humanitarian aid for
the West Bank and Gaza, and relates more to an incantatory nationalism as it never truly opposes the king’s peace
policy with Israel. In this sense, the Islamists have been a
deradicalizing factor, offering a vehicle for support of the
Palestinian cause and a repertory of actions based mainly
on collecting aid and organizing memorial meetings. In
this way, the Muslim Brotherhood has consolidated its
position without challenging the monarchy. Nonetheless,
once legitimized, it went a step further, adding domestic
demands concerning political freedom, social justice, and
anti-corruption. These issues have also won them considerable public support.
Beyond their important role as a provider of services and
aid, the Muslim Brotherhood is especially visible as an
ideological power, in the sense that it has had a major
impact on the paradigms through which the society
understands itself and projects itself into the future.
Many of the references they use have their source in
other political trends; however, the Muslim Brothers have
been able to recompose religious, nationalist, and even
leftist references in a kind of syncretism in which they
are now unchallenged. Their reformulation of Palestinian nationalism has already been mentioned; the same
can be said about Arab nationalism. They have also integrated the social justice of the leftists. Above all, in a field
where the religious reference has become the main
source of legitimacy, their struggle to secure the monopoly on interpretation of Islam has been especially ef-
19
fective. This does not mean that they have no challengers
at that level, but even their challengers tend to argue
within a religious paradigm heavily influenced by the Islamist movement.
This is facilitated by the lack of real conflict about the liberal economic perspective, which is now essential to the
monarchy and its foreign donors. Although the Muslim
Brothers conflate liberal economic policy with the question of social justice and poverty, they fundamentally
agree with the liberal perspective on the economy. The
only real point of opposition is dependency on foreign donors, which they want to reduce while the regime often
sees foreign aid as a solution. Their syncretic capacity became visible again in the 2011 mobilization where the
Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan (as in Egypt: Ben Néfissa
2011) quickly integrated some of the main demands raised
by other actors.
However, their quite hegemonic position, especially in the
most populous, predominantly Palestinian urban areas,
reflects more lack of rivals than any massive support. With
regard to both charity work and ideological impact, they
have no real challenger. While leftists have massively converted themselves into NGOs and human rights associations (Larzillière 2012b), these rather elitist
structures have never given them the legitimacy of the Islamic charity network. To acquire funding, they have to
advance the priorities of international organizations,
often creating a rift with the expectations of the population, which prefers the more “ad hoc” and personalized
Islamic aid. These difficulties were highlighted when a coalition including the left was set up in Jordan in 2002
under the banner of anti-imperialism, but the dominant
position of the Islamists allowed them to impose their
themes. It therefore seems to many left wing activists that
the step of forming a coalition was a strategic error, because they have been unable to oppose the Islamist argumentation. As one observed:
It is very difficult to convince people with our left discourse because you always have to face the fact that it comes from Western
countries and then explain that not everything that comes from
the West is bad. The Islamist argumentation is very simple:
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Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
20
When we were good Muslims we created empires, since we have
abandoned Islam we have been divided.10
defining of the historicity of the society,12 were it not for
the real difficulty of transforming it into an efficient political opposition. This also specifically illustrates the ambivalence of such alternative arenas of mobilization under
authoritarian regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood does not
confront the monarchy but has managed to create real
spaces of influence, which in a way “short-circuits” political power, while channeling and deradicalizing opposition.
The Muslim Brotherhood never reacted in a militant
manner to repression. On the contrary, it even had a calming influence during riots provoked by the rising cost of
living (1989), or during student revolts at Yarmouk Univer13
sity in 1984 and 1986. This policy did, however, lead to a
rift between local Muslim Brotherhood leadership at the
university, who co-organized the demonstration with leftist
elements, and the head of the movement, who wanted to
avoid confrontation with the State.14 The Muslim Brotherhood participated in the parliamentary elections of 1993,
while officially boycotting those of 1997, which were characterized by massive abstentions.15
The recently created leftist social forums allow new kinds
of mobilization for short-term projects, where activists
seek agreement on a mode of action and demand rather
than on general ideology.11 Their flexible membership
offers an alternative to the tight controls of the associations
by the regime. However it has not been sufficient to give
them a broad social base.
The specific social and ideological capacity of the Islamists
in Jordan must be clearly distinguished from their access to
political power. Here we can distinguish a social hegemony,
in the sense of social leadership, ideas, and ideologies
which do not flow down from the regime. The monarchy
has never been the source of the predominant ideology.
Gramsci’s categories allow us to distinguish the apparatus
for direct domination, which belongs to the monarchy,
from social and cultural hegemony (1978, 314). However,
hegemony is generally understood as a creation of those in
power, albeit an indirect one. Theories of ideology are
mainly theories of distortion, whose purpose is to legitimize the power system (Ricoeur 1997, 17). Therefore, on a
more theoretical level, this case leads us to reconceptualize
categories such as hegemony and ideology in a manner that
is less centered on the state. As Hall’s media analysis shows,
ideologies do not mechanically produce consent for the
state and there is competition and struggle at that level
(1982). The Jordanian case seems to lead us one step
further in that direction, showing how cultural hegemony
can appear outside the state.
3.2. Integrated Opposition
The articulation between the social and cultural importance of the Muslim Brotherhood and the political apparatus is indeed highly problematic. The Muslim
Brotherhood could be considered a social movement under
Touraine’s definition, which combines social force and the
10 Interview, Amman, December 2005.
11 Interviews with members of the social forum,
Amman, November 2009.
12 Touraine defines “historicity” as the cultural
field where conflicts on normative orientations op-
Here the Muslim Brotherhood maintains its delicate position of conflicting participation, as much through selfcensorship as direct repression (Öngün 2008). They receive
the greater part of their legitimacy through an aura of purity and integrity that is contingent on their distance from
political power. They want to maintain this critical position
while at the same time entering the political game enough
to influence it. A position that is all the more delicate because: “since the critical decline of the left, the Islamist
movement has become the main target of the government
strategies of co-optation and exclusion” (translated from
Krämer 1994, 278). The Muslim Brotherhood is held up as
proof that there is indeed a real democratic process, since
there is opposition. They have lost part of their radicalism
and can be defined as an integrated opposition (Albrecht
2006; Bozarslan 2011), which rather consolidates the position of the monarchy.
erate. According to his theory, this field and the
struggle over symbolic representations is essential to
social movement (Touraine 1978, 87–88).
13 Following Sami Al-Khazendar (1997, 142–45).
14 Interview with one of the leaders of the student
revolt, Amman, March 2007.
15 It is not certain, however, that the abstentions
were a consequence of the boycott. It is also possible
that the Islamists anticipated the development and
boycotted the election for that reason (Augé 1998,
246).
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Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
21
The events of the parliamentary elections of 2007 and 2010
were particularly indicative of the limits of this “conflicting
participation” policy on the part of the Muslim Brotherhood. Since 2005, the Islamists have been confronted with
an intensification of government intervention, which has
introduced new laws forbidding speeches in mosques,
tightening control on the media and charities, and limiting
the activities of professional associations (ICG 2005, 15).
Confronted with this situation, two competing trends arose
16
inside the Islamic Action Front. The “doves” supported a
cooperative attitude under the motto “participating not
overpowering”; “the hawks” favored more confrontational
methods, with some calling for a boycott of the elections.
During the selection process, activists favored candidates
from the hawks. The party leadership, however, decided
not to take this path and instead appointed dove candidates. The Islamists candidates were accused of cooperation with the government while being repressed by it
nonetheless, and became the real losers of the elections.
The results have strongly destabilised the doves inside the
party and their strategy was partly delegitimized. This was
confirmed two years later when new parliamentary elections took place in November 2010. This time the Islamists
boycotted the elections, challenging the electoral law that
favors tribal votes and rural areas. The changes in their
position toward official democratic institutions, sometimes
boycotting and sometimes participating, illustrates the dilemma for the opposition when a system is well controlled
but not totally blocked. The opposition considered participating in well-controlled institutions a “no-win” situation which would have negative consequences on their
own legitimacy and social support. The risk in that context
is becoming too integrated to be considered as opposition,
and thus losing legitimacy in the eyes of some activists.
creasingly associated with the Jordanian regime and its policies. This marginalization stems not from the success of
other political trends but rather from dissatisfaction with
the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus creates a real political
vacuum (Hroub 2007, 3). Finally, indiscriminate repression
against Muslim Brothers during certain periods, regardless
whether they preach cooperation or radical opposition, has
also contributed to the delegitimization of the cooperation
option and to the radicalization of Islamist groups.
3.3. Delegitimization and Radicalization
These political developments have consequences in terms
of the public perception of the Muslim Brotherhood and
its popular support, especially by youth (ICG 2005). Their
legitimacy has gradually decreased because they seem in16 The Islamic Action Front is the political party
created by the Muslim Brotherhood when political
parties were authorized in 1992.
Thus, the policy of destabilization of the mainstream Islamists undermines the moderates and leads to a radicalization of the movement or support for other more radical
Islamist movements. Some of their sympathizers have
turned towards what they consider a more radical and less
integrated opposition, the Salafist movement. Salafists are
divided mainly between reformist and jihadist Salafists
over the question of political violence. Heated arguments
occurred between strategically opposed reformists and jihadists and only the latter can be considered a real opposition (Caillet 2011). The jihadists are distinguished by their
refusal to cooperate in any way with the regime and by
their informal network structure, maintained to avoid repression. They do not hesitate to launch fierce verbal attacks against the Muslim Brotherhood (Caillet 2011). They
appear to have recruited among the poorer classes most affected by the economic crisis. The number of activists is
said to be very limited, but they claim nearly as many sympathizers as the Muslim Brotherhood (Wiktorowicz 2000,
223–24). In the context of the 2011 mobilization, Salafists
organized meetings and demonstrations, some of which
ended in violent confrontations with the police and led to
mass arrests.
Another sign of the weakening of the mainstream Islamists
and the way this can lead to specific forms of radicalization
is seen in the recent proliferation of tribal clashes, especially involving youth (Masri 2009). This non-political
violence is clearly linked to depoliticization and tribalization as elements of repressive politics. Up to now, the
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Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
22
state’s tolerance for tribal violence and crime has been
much higher than for political violence. Lucrative tribalbased trafficking (in stolen cars for example) continues.17
Clashes between tribal groups have been allowed to occur
in universities whereas the smallest political demonstration
was harshly repressed (Cantini 2008). As a consequence,
the effect of depoliticization seems particularly strong
among youth and is particularly visible in the universities,
which were previously an important place of political activity. Even the leaders of the student movement
thabahtoona, whose political activities could have been
seen as a counter-example, mention their difficulty in
mobilizing and how tribal identities now seem more im18
portant to the students.
Reaction in Jordan to the events in Tunisia since January
2011 also shows how regional mobilization can impact
political commitment, even in the absence of direct
changes in the national political configuration. This has reinforced the opposition capacity of both the professional
associations and the social movement of the Muslim
Brotherhood. They were not the initiators of the first demonstrations in support of the revolt in Tunisia (unlike the
important demonstrations in 2009 against the Israeli attack
in Gaza where Islamists and professional associations were
involved at the very beginning). It was the leftists, marginalized but taking a more confrontational stance, who
started this new movement, together with some long rarely
seen actors: youth and Palestinians from the camps. However, Islamists and professional associations soon caught up
with the movement, bringing in a much greater capacity of
mobilization than the first actors. They have supported social demands like price controls and pay rises (there is no
minimum wage in Jordan and one-third of the population
is categorized as poor by international agencies).
Violence resulting from active tribalization processes to
marginalize ideological opposition is not specific to Jordan. The regime’s policy designed to weaken political opposition has in fact engendered violent effects that were
initially considered to be unimportant for a well-controlled state with extensive security services, but have gone
further than expected. The proliferation of tribal clashes
worries tribal leaders and fosters criticism about political
19
use of tribes and interference in choice of tribal leaders.
There is here a dual process at work: first an increase in intertribal violence and then an increase in the tribes’ confrontational stance vis-à-vis the monarchy. As long as
tribes could be used as a largely unified network and identity, this strategy was indeed effective in strengthening the
monarchy and weakening the political opposition. However, this policy has also intensified identity segmentation
inside tribal networks. Paradoxically, the process has generated non-political violence with very political consequences, jeopardizing the monarchy’s security order and
tribal support. In the arenas of the professional associations and the Muslim Brotherhood, the process
underlines the shifting frontiers of politicization and
mobilization and the changing status of actors, even under
conditions of authoritarian stability.
17 Interview with Geraldine Chatelard, Amman,
October 2009.
At first, political demands concentrated on the usual and
authorized criticisms against the parliament and the government: inefficiency and corruption. The monarchy made
concessions. King Abdullah II changed the cabinet and officially asked the government to implement a more active
social policy. Immediate salary and pension increases were
announced. However, on the initiative of the Islamists, the
movement has gone one step further, demanding that the
prime minister be elected and no longer chosen by the
king. In taking this step, the Islamist movement is going
beyond its previous position of integrated opposition because this policy is a real challenge to the monarchy. It represents a radicalization of the opposition’s demands but
not of its repertory of action. The Muslim Brotherhood
had more and more trouble with its position of “integrated
opposition,” which makes generational renewal difficult
and leads some activists to radicalize or leave. Thus, they
have slowly changed their strategy and are now using the
18 Launched in April 2007, this is a movement for
the defense of student rights and the creation of a
students’ union. Interview with one of the movement’s leaders, Amman, November 2009. See also
Adely 2010.
19 Interview with a professor and political columnist, independent Islamist, Amman, November 2009.
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
new impetus given by a regional mobilization to adopt a
more confrontational stance.
Above all, the reaction of the Jordanian opposition shows
the impact of international and regional processes on
national political commitment and the complex articulation of these three levels (international, regional,
national) should be further explored (Bank and Valbjørn
2010). Globalization has an impact on political commitment, and some trends in Jordan are clearly related to more
global trends like the evolution of activists towards expertise (Larzillière 2012b; Signoles 2006; Wagner 2004). Their
ideological references are mainly regional. Even when they
refer to global theories, their understanding of them is
clearly embedded in the regional history. As the 2011–2012
mobilization has shown, even if the national power relationship does not seem to change, regional events appear to
impact activism more through identification than direct
relationships. While the power relationship has not been
directly impacted, the regional mobilization has, however,
generated a “shared sense of uncertainty” among challengers and incumbents. The process confirms how such
changes in perception are crucial to the occurrence of contentious episodes (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 9).
4. Conclusion
Politicization is a specific and sensitive issue in authoritarian regimes, as it concerns the very possibility of a
political arena appearing in front of a regime that seeks to
erase any challenge. This approach is more classical than
the recent focus in more democratic contexts on politicization as the inclusion in institutional policies of new issues
23
(Arnaud 2005, 15; Lagroye 2004, 360; Ion 2005). The Jordanian case shows the possibility of dissociation between
democratic institutions and political arenas. This does not
mean that democratic institutions have no role at all, but
rather that they serve as an intermediary for the regime in
the process of forging integrated elites and patronage
structures. Other contentious arenas appear too, where well
positioned and resourceful organizations can be partially
transformed into a basis for protest with challenging
frames of reference. Apart from repression, their own resources, economic and social roles, and their integration in
the regime frame and limit the kind of political commitment they can lead. Ambivalence arises between challenging and integrated positions. Professional associations
hesitate to jeopardize their elite role while the Muslim
Brotherhood may be content with its social hegemony.
Both cases underline the versatility of political arenas, their
connections and relational characteristics. When one arena
is too controlled, political forces invent new ones, while
there is a perpetual back and forth between contentious
arena and regime. Under authoritarian regimes, radicalization processes, both in repertory of action and ideology,
appear at the turn, when alternative arenas become so integrated in the regime that they lose their contentious role.
These political arenas are the places where alternative
worldviews and ideologies are produced and shared. At
that level, the Muslim Brotherhood has a very specific position as a hegemonic ideological producer with no hegemonic power and position. The case thus undermines the
analysis of ideologies as mere reflection of positions in
power relationship and supports an analytical separation
between political power and ideology.
IJCV : Vol. 6 (1) 2012, pp. 11 – 25
Pénélope Larzillière: Political Commitment under an Authoritarian Regime
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