A Policy Analysis of California’s
“Three-Strikes and Your’re Out” Law
Assembly Bill 971
By: Steve Adami and Stephen Bender
MPA Program, San Francisco State University
Contact Information:
[email protected]
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Since its passage in 1994 California’s Three Strikes law remains an unjust law disproportionately
impacting non-violent offenders. Its enduring relative popularity is a function of a durable and
cohesive stakeholder coalition willing to employ scare tactics to move the public opinion needle.
Knowing an emotive wedge issue when it sees one, the Republican Party, in league with the
National Rifle Association and much of law enforcement, has effectively marginalized the largely
token opposition among Democrats and civil liberties groups. In spite of multiple initiatives
allowing for sentencing discretion, three strikes remains a fiscal burden on California in a time of
tight budgets for a slew of competing needs such as education and health care. The most
problematic aspect of the policy regards its ongoing intensification of racial and economic
disparities by disproportionately impacting African American and Hispanic communities. In this
way, a fiscally wasteful, ineffective and ultimately cruel policy persists due to a frightened and illinformed public, narrow special interest group agendas, and craven politicians beholden to those
benefitting from the status quo.
I. INRODUCTION
Violent crime rates in California continued to rise through the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Citizen
outrage over lenient prison sentences of repeat offenders led the public and legislators in California to
reevaluate what was viewed as a systemic failure in public safety. Following media coverage of the
Kimber Reynolds and Polly Klass murders in California, citizens’ discontent impelled law makers to
legislate new public safety policies. Repeat offenders in California have been labeled the most difficult
“criminal offenders” to manage in the criminal justice system, deemed unresponsive to incarceration,
and undeterred by the consequences of their actions (Brown & Jolivette,2005).
Citizen and legislative supporters of longer prison sentences for repeat offenders based their
claims on two assumptions of reducing crime in the community. First, if sentences are enhanced, repeat
offenders would serve longer sentences, removing them from the community, hence limiting their
capacity to commit more crimes. Secondly, longer prison sentences would deter offenders from
committing crimes (Brown & Jolivette, 2005). According to Males, Macallair, & Taqi-Eddin (1999),
“[u]nder deterrence theory, individuals are dissuaded from criminal activity through the threat of stateimposed penalties. Selective incapacitation suggests that crime can be reduced by incapacitating the
small group of repeat offenders, who are responsible for a large portion of serious crime” (p.3).
What came to be known in California as “Three-Strikes and You’re Out” (AB 971), was an act
amending Penal Code 667. It enhanced sentences of repeat offenders with prior convictions of violent
or serious felonies, as defined by Penal Codes 667.5 (violent offenses) and 1192.7 (serious offenses).
Subsections (b) through (j) guaranteed longer prison sentences, prohibited probation, and reduced the
amount of good-time credits for repeat offenders. Offenders with previous convictions, as defined by
Penal Code 667.5 or 1192.7, would receive a prison sentence “twice the term otherwise provided as
punishment for the current felony conviction” (Vitiello, 1997a).
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In addition to receiving a sentence twice as long as called for by law, the repeat offenders would
serve 85% of the sentence, compared to other offenders who only serve 50%. The culmination of the
amendment is implied in subsection 667(e)(2)(A)—termed the “three-strikes provision”. Under this
section, if an offender has two prior felony convictions, as defined by Penal Code 667.5 or 1192.7, any
subsequent conviction of any felony would be punishable by a term of 25 years to life in a California
State Prison (Vitiello, 1997a).
Criminal justice policies are formulated by legislators in order to protect citizens when their right
to safety and security is being violated. Such social problems invoke principles of equality and justice
and raise demands from community members that their liberty not be infringed upon by the wrong
doing of others (Gen, 2013). Authoritative policy tools, such as regulation and enforcement, are used to
modify human behavior by tightening or loosening standards (Gen, Policy Tool Table, 2013). In essence,
it is believed that by imposing stiffer sentences, citizens in California would be less inclined to commit
crimes.
II. POLICY CYCLE
The punitive nature of California statutes concerning violent crime has been escalating in severity
since the early Deukmejian governorship of the early 1980’s. It would take however a pair of catalytic
events to propel the three strikes concept into and through the policy cycle. In fact, the policy dynamic
which culminated in the passage of three strikes in California would eerily resemble the imposition of
mandatory minimum sentencing in federal drug laws in 1986. At that time, the shocking cocaine
overdose of Boston Celtics top draft pick Len Bias – and the resultant media storm and public outrage –
would impact policy making with profound criminal justice consequences.
The opening salvo in the three strikes movement however was the grisly 1992 murder of Kimber
Reynolds, as it spurred her father Michael to push his vision for sentencing reform onto the agenda of
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the California legislature (Greenberg, 2002). In April of 1993, Reynolds appealed to Assembly Public
Safety Committee members to adopt AB 971, which his representative Bill Jones (R-Fresno) was
sponsoring. He was however rebuffed by legislators cognizant of the tough existing laws and wary of the
potentially high costs (Vitiello, 1997a). Frustrated after seeing AB 971 die in committee, Reynolds
decided to sidestep the legislature by use of the initiative process and introduce Prop 184.
The event that ultimately ignited the public firestorm over violent crime was the October 1993
kidnapping of Polly Klaas, due largely to her parents’ desperate public campaign to locate their
ultimately murdered daughter. In the intervening months, Mike Reynolds had managed to collect only
20,000 signatures; within days of the Klaas murder, his campaign “gathered 50,000 signatures and was
well on its way to becoming the fastest qualifying voter initiative in California history” (Vitiello, 1997a).
Their antennae finely attuned to the changing political winds, and pressed by Republican Governor
Wilson, the Democratically-controlled Assembly and Senate began scrambling to formulate a popular
policy response.
As the campaign season got into swing, California politicians began cobbling together numerous
iterations of three strikes legislation in an effort to appease cresting public outrage. Reynolds returned
to the legislature once more, this time with an ultimatum: “pass AB 971 or the voters will do it for you”
(Vitiello, 1997a). Although both law enforcement officials and Reynolds’ own advisors suggested
tailoring the legislation more narrowly to include only violent crimes, the bereaved and crusading father
was not to be swayed.
Four competing proposals were ultimately drafted by skeptics who felt AB 971 cast too wide a
net, even if they comprised approaches ranging only in degree of severity towards criminals and level of
expense to the taxpayer. The measure offered by Assembly Republican Richard Rainy “offered even
tougher sentences for some of the worst offenders and would have been less expensive than three
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strikes” (Vitiello, 1977a). Rainey’s tougher and cheaper AB 1568 was rejected on account of Reynolds’
rising media profile and hardline demand that no changes be made to AB 971 – a sentiment parroted by
Governor Wilson (Vitiello, 1977a). By now politically on the run, the Democrats who controlled both
chambers decided to wash their hands of the issue once and for all.
And so adoption of three strikes became a foregone conclusion. Willie Brown decided to send all
five bills to Governor Wilson’s desk and let him sort it out, as did his counterpart in the Senate. As for
the roll call for AB 971 itself, it easily cleared the Senate by a 29-7 tally, with notable dissenters being
Bay Area gadfly Quentin Kopp and left-wing activist Tom Hayden (Legislative Council of California). In
the Assembly, the vote was even more lopsided at 63-9, with Bay Area liberals such as now
Congresswoman Barbara Lee and lefty warhorse John Burton casting nays. Willie Brown, who neither
voted for nor obstructed the bill, summed up the resigned exasperation of AB 971 critics this way: "I got
out of the way of this train... I got out of the way because I'm a realist" (Taibbi, 2013).
And so, with the California legislators’ handiwork complete, it fell to a variety of public servants –
as opposed to a particular agency per se – to implement an unwieldy, politicized and expensive new
policy. As the three strikes policy stands today, Drew Soderberg, Senior Fiscal and Policy Analyst in the
Legislative Analyst’s Office (LAO), indicated that four entities are involved in differing facets of
implementation. In the judicial branch during the trial phase, tasks are “divided between district
attorneys (who decide who will be charged as 3rd strikers) and judges (who decide who will be sentenced
as 3rd strikers and whether to waive prior strikes) (Soderberg, 2013). Once the venue moves to the
correctional system, implementation is the province of state agencies and boards, such as “the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (who house the offenders and supervise them on parole
once they get released), and the Board of Parole Hearings (who decide which 3rd strikers get out when
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they begin coming up for parole” (Soderberg, 2013). Figure 1 depicts the initial policy cycle for AB 971
beginning in 1993.
Figure 1: Original Policy Cycle of AB 971
First Policy Cycle of AB 971: 1993
EVALUATION:
None
AGENDA: 1993
After the murder of Kimber
Reynolds, Mike Reynolds
and legislators sought after
tougher sentencing laws for
repeat violent offenders.
Then the Polly Klass murder
intensified the situation
FORMULATION: 1993-1994
State legislators debated effects of 3
strikes law—Proponents backed the
“get tough on crime laws” while
opponents stated it cast too “wide a
net”
IMPLEMENTATION: March 8, 1994
Since the law just amended pc 667,
Judges and DA’s were tasked with
implementing the law
ADOPTION: 1994
Assembly speaker Willie
Brown passed AB 971 and 4
alternatives and sent them all
to Gov. Wilson. March 7,
1994 Gov. Wilson signed AB
971 into law
SECOND POLICY CYCLE: ROMERO v CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT
The non-linear and ongoing nature of the policy cycle was exemplified by the series of events
that ultimately resulted in the Romero v. California Superior Court ruling. Critics of the three strikes law
made two contentions. They maintained that three strikes upset “the balance of power between
prosecutors and judges” through the elimination of the latter’s discretion and that since “the third
‘strike’ may be any felony, punishments under the law may violate the constitutional prohibition against
cruel or unusual punishment” (Vitiello, 1997b). These two dimensions were reflected in the case of
Jesus Romero, who was facing 25-to-life for possession of 0.13 grams of cocaine as the third strike
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following two prior residential burglaries. The particular issue at stake was whether a trial court could
“dismiss allegations of prior felonies in the furtherance of justice on its own motion” (Supreme Court of
California Resources). The holding was that “a court may act sua sponte (of its own accord) to dismiss
prior felony allegations in a three strikes case” (Supreme Court of California Resources). In this way, the
ongoing implementation of three strikes was modified by judicial evaluation, thereby returning the
policy cycle to the adoption of a slightly altered policy to be implemented by district attorneys and
judges alike. The Romero case forced an evaluation that lead to the second policy cycle. Figure 2
depicts the second policy cycle for AB 971.
Figure 2: Second Policy Cycle of AB 971
Second Policy Cycle of AB 971: 1994-1996
Romero vs. California Superior Court
EVALUATION:
None
AGENDA: 1994
6/4/1994: Jesus Romero’s
attorney argued the trial
court should be allowed
discretion to dismiss
allegations of prior
“strikable” felonies
IMPLEMENTATION: 1996
6/21/1996: Judges and
DA/trial Court may act sua
sponte to dismiss prior
felony allegations in a 3
strike cases. Defendants in
3 strikes cases were given
the right to file “Romero
Motions”.
FORMULATION: 1994-95
Cal Attorney General asserts
AB 971 allows discretion to
prosecutor/judge to dismiss
a prior “strike” in the
furtherance of justice or
insufficient evidence. Cal
Public Defender Assoc also
supports Romero.
ADOPTION: 1996
6/20/1996: Cal Supreme
Court vote in favor of
Romero and uphold that pc
1385 authorizes trial court
(Judge/DA) to dismiss prior
“strikes” in furtherance of
justice
THIRD POLICY CYCLE: PROP 36
Following the success of the Romero ruling, critics of three strikes mobilized to further limit its
scope. In 2004, Proposition 66’s intent was to mandate that the third felony charge be a violent or
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especially serious crime; it lost at the ballot box by five points. Reform advocates regrouped eight years
later by placing the comparable Proposition 36 on the ballot. On this occasion, a wider coalition of
interest groups, including a significant proportion of the law enforcement community and some fiscal
hawks, rallied to deliver a surprisingly lopsided 69% - 31% victory for reformers. In a by now familiar
pattern, the policy cycle returned to the adoption phase from the ongoing implementation and
evaluation stages. Figure 3 depicts the second policy cycle for AB 971.
Figure 3: Third Policy Cycle of AB 971
Third Policy Cycle of AB 971: 2012
Prop 36
EVALUATION:
None
AGENDA: 2004-2012
Citizens Against Violent Crime, Joe
Klass (Grandfather of Polly Klass),
and Jerry keenan proposed Prop 66
in 2004 that failed—the iniative
nd
rd
would have limited 2 and 3
strike to violent felonies only.
2012, The Committee for 3 strikes
reform, supported by Steve Cooley
(LA DA) & Gearge Gason (SF DA)
supported measure. Prop 36 was
placed on 2012 California ballot to
amend 3 strikes to violent crimes
only
IMPLEMENTATION:
Inmates serving life terms
under 3 strikes for nonviolent crimes can have
sentence overturned by trial
court -- Judge/DA
FORMULATION:
None
ADOPTION: 1996
11/6/12 Prop 36 passed
A slew of different organizations have evaluated and examined the impacts of three strikes. In
the year following adoption, both the LAO and the RAND Corporation conducted analyses weighted
more heavily towards implementation challenges, as opposed to evaluations with the benefit of some
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hindsight. Two other organizations however conducted analyses five and ten years after adoption,
respectively the Justice Policy Institute (JPI) and California District Attorneys Association (CDAA).
As its name suggests, JPI comes to the table with a somewhat more normative mode of analysis,
emphasizing effectiveness over fiscal cost. They dispute the claims of 1998 gubernatorial candidates
Gray Davis and Dan Lungren that three strikes was pivotal in falling crime rates. They charge that by
1999, “crime was dropping in every region [of the country] regardless of incarceration policies,” while
“crime rates were no different than states without three strikes laws” (Males, Macallaire & Taqi-Eddin,
1999). The questionable efficacy of three strikes was discernible at the municipal level as well. For
instance, in San Francisco, where three strikes was charged relatively sparingly, violent crimes dropped
more than 28% in the five years since the laws adoption (Males, 1999). Meanwhile, Sacramento “had
the highest rate of third strike commitments, yet it experienced only a 6% decline in violent crimes”
(Males, 1999).
The CDAA in 2004 produced a retrospective detailing the terrain prosecutors have faced in the
past ten years. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the district attorneys argued that three strikes had been a great
success and dubbed as fallacious charges that three strikes resulted in cruel and unusual punishment,
prison overcrowding, or court backlogs (Otero, 2004). They too point to falling crime rates, but ascribe
the decreases to the “substantial number of active career criminals [that] have remained in custody
because of three strikes” (Otero, 2004). They also point out that the number of persons charged under
three strikes annually had dropped to 500 for the years 2001 through 2003, after having reached a peak
of 1,248 in 1996, indicating that the law is being applied more discerningly (Otero, 2004). These clashing
perspectives underline the necessity of carefully examining both the biases and institutional imperatives
behind any given evaluation, while calling to mind Upton Sinclair’s maxim: It is difficult to get a man to
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understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it. Figure 4 displays the
timeline of the major focusing events in the span of AB 971.
Figure 4: Timeline of AB 971
Time Line: AB 971
-Three-Strikes and You’re Out LawJune 29, 1992:
18 yr old
Kimber
Reynolds is
murdered by
career criminal
October 1, 1993:
Polly Klass
kidnapped and
murdered
October 1992:
April 20, 1993:
Mike Reynolds
th
solicited 5 District
Court of Appeals
Judge James Ardiaz
in drafting 3 Strikes
legislation
Reynolds and 4 bus
loads of supporters
attend Public Safety
Committee in Capital.
AB 971 defeated in
Committee
1993:
Reynolds gets
Assemblyman Bill
Jones (R-Fresno) to
sponsor bill
November 1993:
Mark Klass backs 3
strike initiative by
Reynolds
March 7, 1994:
November 8,1994:
Governor Wilson
signs AB 971 into
law
Prop 184 passes with
over 71% of California
Voters
November 1993:
Gov Wilson in a race
for Gov uses Polly
Klass murder to
make political
speech and support
3 strikes law and
support of Reynolds
Nov 2, 2004:
Prop 66; amend 3
strikes law fails
May 1993:
Reynolds ops to use
initiative process,
backed by NRA and
Prison Guards Union
(prop 184)
1994:
March 1994:
Reynolds 3 strike
initiative on ballot
(Prop 184)
Assembly speaker
Willie Brown passes 5
3 strikes bills and
gives them all to
Wilson to decide
which bill he wants to
sign
Nov 6, 2012:
Prop 36 passes; amends 3
strikes law to only 3 strikes
for violent offenders
III. STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS
Mike Reynolds was pivotal in commencing the campaign for the three strikes policy. As his
campaign unfolded, the media, Governor Wilson, interest groups, and the public all rallied around
Reynolds and later Mark Klaas. With the support of legislators from both political parties, Reynolds and
his coalition of supporters flocked to Sacramento, only to see his bill—AB 971— die in committee. The
failed bill gave way to his initiative, Proposition 184. Immediately, stakeholders such as the National
10
Rifle Association (NRA), the California Republican Party, and the California Correctional Peace Officers
Association (CCPOA) financially backed Reynolds. In a tough re-election cycle for Governor Wilson, along
with legislators unwilling to appear weak on crime, Reynolds was able to use the media to assert his
power by demonstrating mass support for his measure. This ploy effectively leveraged legislators to act.
The support of the CCPOA drew more and more criticism by opponents of the bill and later on
the initiative. Prison guards, and their union, had a financial stake in the issue. Opponents concluded
that passage of the bill would inevitably lead to an ever growing prison population in California, as
inmates sentenced under the law would be serving longer sentences, which would lead to building more
prisons, thereby requiring more prison guards and growing union membership.
The tenacity of the media effectively exerted leverage over the formal players and brought
national attention, by turning a tragic murder into a human-interest story. Media coverage engages the
populace and effectively shapes policy through all phases of the policy cycle in that it “define(s) social
reality” (Cahn, 2013). Iyengar & Kinder (1987) also contend that television news has the capacity to
shape public opinion and thus “influence the governmental political agenda”.
Governor Wilson used this tragedy to back AB 971 and Prop 184 as he was in a tight
gubernatorial race with Democrat Kathleen Brown, sister of former Governor Jerry Brown. Wilson kept
Brown on the defense by contrasting his tough on crime rhetoric with Brown’s opposition to the death
penalty (Stall, 1993). Reynolds applied leverage to the legislature. Reynolds gave lawmakers a choice;
pass AB 971 or the people will pass Prop 184. “When the rage of Californians propelled crime to the top
of the political agenda in this election year, Reynolds was in the right place at the right time to focus it”
(Morian, 1994). Although the sizable majority of legislators voted for the crime bill, many did so with
deep reservations, whether moral or fiscal. As such, Table 1 identifies the key players, their preferences,
leverages, and their use of power to influence the legislation surrounding AB 971. (See Table 1)
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Table 1: Key Players in the policy process of AB 971.
Identification
Formal/Informal
Roles
Preferences
Relative Power and
Influence
Action Taken
Exec:
Governor Pete Wilson
Formal:
Agenda Setting
Adoption
Supported AB
971
*Formal Decision Maker
*Command of Bureaucracy
*Power of the pulpit
*Command of Public
Attention/Media
Made a speech after
Polly Klass murder in
support of AB 971.
Signed AB 971 into
law
Legislature:
Assemblyman Bill Jones (R)
Assemblyman Jim Costa (D)
Sen Wyman (R)
Senator Presley (D)
Ass. Willie Brown (D)
Bureaucracies/Agencies:
CDCR, Superior Court Judges,
District Attornies
Formal:
Agenda Setting
Formulation
Adoption
Jones, Costa,
Wyman, Presley
Supported AB
971. Brown
opposed it.
*Formal Decision Maker
*Oversight of
Implementation
Formal:
Implementation
Mixed group.
Some supported
AB 971, some
supported other
alternative, some
didn’t support
any new laws
*Technical Expertise
*Rule making
*Discretion
Used media. Pushed
through legislation.
Passed AB 971.
Brown passed 4
alternative Bills to no
avail.
Some court officials
supported the 3
strikes laws and
others opposed it as
it was viewed as
casting too wide a
net.
Citizens:
Mike Reynolds
Mark Klass
General Public
Informal:
Agenda/Adoption
Citizen campaign to
pass AB 971. Formal
role was Prop 184voter passed
referendum.
Supported AB
971 and Prop
184. Mark Klass
rd
wanted only if 3
strike was violent
crime
*Media
*Mobilization
*Public Voice
*Direct Action
*Lobbied
Interest Groups:
Cal Correctional Peace Officer
Assoc.
NRA
California Gun Owners Assoc
Informal:
Agenda Setting
Funded voter
referendum Prop 184.
Worked closely with
Mike Reynolds
Informal:
Agenda Setting/
Formulation
Republican-supported
AB 971 and Prop 184.
Democrats supported
alternatives to bill
Supported AB
971 and Prop 184
*Money
*Size
*Ability to mobilize
Republican Party
supported AB
971
*Signaling cues for voting
Republican party
used issue to make
Dems look weak on
crime and also
helped financed Prop
184.
Political Parties:
Republic Party
Democratic party
Organized citizens.
Leveraged politicians
with media and Prop
184. Used media.
After passage of AB
971 Klass came out
against AB 971 and
Prop 184
Funded and
supported AB 971
and Prop 184
Ex-Felons
Informal:
NONE
NO ACTION
Media
Informal:
Agenda Setting.
Led public to believe
crime rates were rising
Informal:
Agenda/Formulation
Lobby politicians
*Command of public
attention
Used events such as
Kimber Reynolds and
Polly Klass to bring
public attention.
As a beneficiary of
“get tough” on crime
laws, they lobby
politicians
Elites/Commercial
Corrections Corporation of
America
Support laws that
support their
industry—
housing inmates
*Money
*Symbolism
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The favorability of Assemblymen Jones (R - Fresno) and Costa (D - Fresno), along with State
Senators Wyman (R- Fresno) and Presely (D - Riverside), aided their ability to leverage bipartisan support
for AB 971. Speaker of the Assembly, Willie Brown (D-San Francisco) was not convinced that AB 971 was
the right bill. Unsatisfied with the lack of healthy debate to solve a critical issue, in frustration, Brown
promised to pass Reynolds bill as well as its competitors and put all five of on the Governor’s desk and
“let him deal with it” (Vitiello, 1997b). The media coverage of the Reynolds and Klass murders, coupled
with the coalition built by Mike Reynolds and citizens supporting tougher crime laws, effectively
leveraged lawmakers to act and pass AB 971.
IV. POLICY THEORY
While no one theory can adequately explain all or even most of the dynamics of the policy
process, elite theory provides one lens through which to interpret the agenda setting, policy formulation
and adoption stages. At its most basic, elite theory “focuses our attention on the role of leadership in
policy formation and on the reality that in any political system, a few govern the many” (Anderson,
2011). Dahl narrows the scope of the theory’s validity to the existence of “a controlling group, less than
a majority in size, that is not a pure artifact of democratic rules… a minority of individuals whose
preferences regularly prevail… on key political issues” (Anderson, 2011).
In the context of a privately held advertising-driven political campaign culture, money is the coin
of the realm, and elites are only too willing to provide it. Although Domhoff applies his variant of elite
theory to a social class highly concentrated in the corporate sector, as opposed to second order political
and special interest elites, his highlighting of the “opinion shaping process” is elucidating and can be
adapted to this particular case. He identifies a network of highly paid professionals, operating through
public relations firms, campaign consultancies and think tanks, who resort to “harsh media attacks on
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opponents,” such as the then more resonant Willie Horton-style fear-based appeals (Theodoulou &
Cahn, 2013).
Some caveats are necessary however. Profligate and punitive law enforcement approaches were
and remain popular in California. And there was something of a preexisting grassroots campaign
ongoing around three strikes before the Polly Klaas murder galvanized citizen engagement, thereby
prompting preemptive legislative action. While elites did dominate the financing of Proposition 184,
they were not a monolithic class of wealthy individuals or organizations asserting their vision contrary to
public opinion. And so, elite theory as presented here is not meant to be a totalizing explanation. It is
simply meant to shed light on the apparently decisive financial support and opportunistic political
decision-making by two sets of elites during the first three phases of the policy cycle.
And who were these elites? The first was the politico-strategic leadership of the California
Republican Party. The second was an allied ad hoc issue-oriented special interest coalition, elements of
which were more motivated by the prospect of financial gain than any particular policy preference. This
latter grouping was made up of wealthy individuals, a preeminent advocacy organization, and a
powerful labor union, suggesting a degree of pluralism within the elite group itself, a reality not
generally accounted for by elite theory.
A key player in this coalition actually first became involved in three strikes advocacy in 1992 in
Washington state. There the National Rifle Association (NRA) also rescued a floundering three strikes
initiative by sinking $90,000 into that ultimately successful campaign. Two years later in California, the
NRA would fund three strikes again to the modest tune of $40,000 in direct contributions. The group’s
real efficacy however lay in the less tangible but more valuable “undisclosed amounts of in-kind material
and human resource donations” such as “donat[ed] advertising space” and “shared grass-roots
organizing methods to increase dissemination of pro-Proposition 184 campaign materials” (Gibbs &
14
Bankhead, 2001). Additional members of the network included noted oil dauphin and conservative
Congressman Michael Huffington, who contributed $300,000, while the CCPOA chipped in another
$101,000 (Gibbs & Bankhead, 2001). Affluent self-styled activist Mike Reynolds himself spent $221,508,
while the Republican Party dished out a whopping $428,000 in the campaign’s final month alone (Gibbs
& Bankhead, 2001). And so another instance of inside players converting “a populist ideal into a special
interest tool for any organization with enough money to pay professional signature gatherers a buck or
two” came to pass in California (Domanick, 2004).
Although the governor signed AB 971 on March 7, 1994, the elite coalition nevertheless persisted
in pursuing the nearly identical Proposition 184 regardless. The public face of the campaign, Mike
Reynolds, maintained he wanted to block the legislature from watering down the more punitive
elements of the policy, and did so by inserting a provision mandating that only a 2/3 majority of the
legislature could override any Prop 184 provision. (Vitiello, 1997a) Those who bankrolled his crusade
from the shadows spent hundreds upon hundreds of thousands of dollars in order to keep fear of crime
in the public consciousness, even if for differing reasons.
The elite coalition members were also fairly explicitly acting in their own rational self-interest as
public choice theory would suggest. The Republican Party and Michael Huffington had a winning issue
that would yield dividends up/down the ballot and into the future. Meanwhile, the iron law of
institutions would dictate that swelled membership rolls and enhanced clout danced in the heads of
CCPOA and NRA leadership. Given such formidable opponents and a legislature terrified of being
labeled “soft on crime,” the outcome became a foregone conclusion. And so, the venerable and very
antonym of elite, the American Friends Service Committee, was the largest “anti” contributor with a
mere $10,000.
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V. CONCLUSION
California’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law remains an unjust law that has disproportionately
sentenced low-level offenders, based on their criminal past, rather than their current circumstances.
Under the original written statute, offenders with two prior felony convictions for violent or serious
offenses, received 25 years to life upon any subsequent felony conviction, even shoplifting or possession
of drugs. Through special interest scare tactics, political opportunism, along with a public transfixed by
violent crime media imagery in an era of the lowest crime rates in a half century, the three strikes law
continues to have deleterious impacts. In spite of multiple initiatives allowing for sentencing discretion,
three strikes remains a fiscal burden on California in a time of tight budgets for a slew of competing
needs such as education and health care. The most problematic aspect of the policy regards its ongoing
intensification of racial and economic disparities by disproportionately impacting African American and
Hispanic communities.
The intent of the three strikes law was to imprison repeat violent offenders inhibiting their
ability to reoffend, hence, reducing crime rates in California. In fact, AB 971, initially eliminated
discretion from the judicial process. The Romero case redefined that statute and as ruled by the
California Supreme Court empowered both judges and district attorneys. It gave district attorney’s the
ability to reduce and mitigate charges against repeat offenders, and provided judges to dismiss prior
strike allegations.
With the passing of California voter initiative, Proposition 36 (2012), three strike candidates must
be convicted of a violent or serious offense to receive a 25-to-life sentence under the law. Although
there has been many challenges to the California three strikes law, Proposition 36 (2012), has made the
single biggest impact redefining the law. Life sentences can now only be meted out when the third
strike is a serious of violent offence. Additionally, it permitted re-sentencing of criminals serving life
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sentences under the original statute if their committing third strike offense was not a serious or violent
crime. Consequently, for those serving life terms under AB 971 for non-violent offences, life sentences
for those offenders would be upheld if the prior convictions were sex crimes or murder.
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VI. BIBLIOGRAPHY
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Anderson, J. E. (2011). Public Policy Making. Boston, MA: Wadsworth.
Brown, B. & Jolivette, G (October 2005). A Primer: Three Strikes – The Impact After More Than a
Decade. The Legislative Analyst’s Office. Retrieved from:
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Cahn, M (2013). Institutional and Noninstitutional Actors in the Policy Process. In Theodoulou, S
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Johnson, P (1977). Senate Bill 42—The End of the Indeterminate Sentence. Santa Clara Law Review.
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Strikes and You’re Out Law. Justicec Policy Institute. Retrieved from:
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http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/99-03_rep_cathreestrikes_ac.pdf
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