CHAPTER
25
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATR E
EHIND India ' s eastern bulwark, where the Allied forces would hav e
B a chance to regain their fighting strength, security was no foregone
conclusion . The sea approaches to both Calcutta and Ceylon were practically unbarred and this, as Wavell wrote later in his despatch on th e
campaign, was "India 's most dangerous hour". 1 The British Eastern Fleet
had insufficient air defence to venture into the north-eastern waters o f
the Bay of Bengal where, late in March, reconnaissance crews found that
a strong Japanese naval force was operating . This force, which was in
fact covering the approach of a large convoy to Rangoon, was a caus e
of heightened anxiety at Calcutta where a large number of Allied ships
were lying.2 Lacking naval defence, Wavell's headquarters ordered al l
vessels to clear the port and disperse through the Bay of Bengal . One
key to their safety lay in avoiding detection by Japanese reconnaissanc e
aircraft, a probability greatly increased when, on 23rd March, the enemy
had captured Port Blair in the south of the Andaman Islands and established there a squadron of long-range flying-boats .
The former No . 139 Squadron, recently re-formed as No. 62, had only
three serviceable Hudsons, but these were the only aircraft with th e
range needed for an attack on this base and they could gain that rang e
only by refuelling at Akyab . If the "eyes " of the enemy were to be blinded ,
only the Hudsons could do it and so to their crews fell the hazardou s
task of making two mast-height sweeps over Port Blair . Two attacks wer e
made, each by two aircraft, the first on 14th April and the second four
days later . In both these raids they found the enemy's flying-boats conveniently moored in line . They destroyed two twin-engined and thre e
four-engined flying-boats and severely damaged most if not all the others .
The Hudson crews were attacked by Zero fighters during their secon d
sweep. One aircraft got back to base though severely damaged by gunfire ,
but the other failed to return . This was the price paid for a most valian t
and valuable operation in which the enemy had, in fact, been blinded t o
the movement of 70 ships, totalling about 250,000 tons, all of which mad e
safe passage through the Bay of Bengal . 3
On the eve of the fall of Rangoon Wavell had cabled to the Chief s
of Staff an appreciation in the course of which he expressed the opinion
that "an undue proportion of our very inadequate land and air resource s
. . . was being allocated to the defence of Ceylon" .4 But the War Cabine t
1 A. P . Wavell, Operations in Eastern Theatre, based on India, from March 1942 to December
31, 1942, para 5 .
2 This convoy reached Rangoon on 6th April with large Japanese reinforcements in troops and
equipment .
, No Japanese flying-boat reconnaissance flights were made over the Bay of Bengal for th e
next four months .
*Wavell, Operations In Eastern Theatre, based on India, from March 1942 to December 31, 1942,
para 3.
496
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE
Mar-Apr
ruled that the defence of the naval bases in Ceylon must have priority .
At the end of March the air strength in the island was three Hurricane ,
one Blenheim and two Catalina squadrons, plus some Fairey Fulmars
and Albacores of the Fleet Air Arm . Australians in substantial number s
were serving with No . 11 (Blenheim) Squadron and with the three fighte r
units, one of which—No . 258 (Hurricane) Squadron—was based on th e
Colombo racecourse with No . 11, while No . 30 (Hurricane) Squadro n
was at Ratmalana, the city's civil airport, and No . 261 (Hurricane )
Squadron at China Bay air base close to Trincomalee on the opposite sid e
of the island . The two Catalina units were at Koggala in the south .
The Eastern Fleet had been built into a considerable force by the en d
of March, when it comprised 5 battleships, 3 aircraft carriers, 7 cruisers ,
15 destroyers and 5 submarines, under the command of Admiral Sir
James Somerville.6
On 31st March elements of the Eastern Fleet were at sea searching fo r
an enemy fleet said to include a strong aircraft carrier force and to be
moving to attack Ceylon . The British ships made no contact with th e
enemy and so the main force withdrew to the Maldives for refuelling ,
leaving the cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall to return to Colombo and
the carrier Hermes to move to Trincomalee .
At 4 p .m . on 4th April a Catalina crew on reconnaissance reported
a large enemy surface force steering on a north-westerly course in a
position about 360 miles south-east from Colombo . No more signal s
were received from this Catalina, the crew of which failed to return. A
second Catalina then took up the search . Shortly before midnight its cre w
reported sighting a naval force of what appeared to be 3 battleships, 2
cruisers and 7 destroyers in position about 250 miles south from Colombo .
The identity of these ships was quickly revealed when a salvo of shell s
burst, harmlessly but close enough to rock the Catalina .
As the Eastern Fleet, 600 miles away, was refuelling in the Maldives ,
well out of combat range, shipping that could move immediately wa s
ordered to clear Colombo Harbour . About 48 vessels put to sea, includin g
the Dorsetshire and Cornwall which had orders to rejoin their fleet.
Radar units in Colombo were not yet ready to operate, but, after th e
warning received from the Catalina crews, 36 Hurricanes from Nos . 3 0
and 258 Squadrons and 6 Fulmars were on stand-by ready to " scramble "
when, at 7 .40 a .m . on Easter Sunday, 5th April, more than 50 Japanes e
Navy bombers, escorted by about 35 Zeros, were sighted approaching
Colombo from the south . As some of the enemy formations descende d
from 12,000 feet to bomb shipping and dock installations from betwee n
1,000 and 2,000 feet, others made a high-level attack on the harbour an d
Ratmalana aerodrome . The Hurricanes and the Fulmars gained altitud e
in time to engage the enemy, 19 of whose aircraft were believed to hav e
been shot down, 7 probably destroyed and 9 claimed as damaged, for a
6 Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Somerville, GCB, GBE, DSO, RN . (Served Dardanelles 1915-16. )
C-in-C East Indies 1938-39 ; comd Force "H " 1940-42 ; C-in-C Eastern Fleet 1942-44 ; Head of
Admiralty Delegation to USA 1944-45 . Of Somerset, Eng ; b. 1882 . Died 19 Mar 1949.
Apr1942
BRITISH CRUISERS SUNK
49 7
loss of 15 Hurricanes and 4 Fulmars . The anti-aircraft batteries claime d
5 more enemy planes . It was a spectacular battle lasting an hour and 2 0
minutes, in which there were many "dog-fights " over the city, on e
Canadian pilot making a forced landing on the lawn in front of the Gall e
Face Hotel . Flying Officer Caswell,' an Australian pilot with No . 30
Squadron, RAF, shot down two enemy aircraft by making dives straigh t
through their formation before he was killed in combat with a third .
Considering the strength of the attack the enemy aircraft accomplishe d
little ; two naval vessels were sunk, a merchant ship was set on fire an d
the base workshops were seriously damaged . Damage to Ratmalana airfield
was slight .
At 8 .30 a .m . 10 Blenheims, from No . 11 Squadron, 1e crews of whic h
had been briefed before the raid began, took off from Ratmalana in searc h
of the enemy naval force . They flew south for 150 miles and searched i n
vain, returning with their bombs still in the racks . Apart from heavy clou d
in the probable target area the crews had failed because they had bee n
incorrectly briefed on information from a Catalina which relayed a n
S .O .S . from another aircraft in such a way that it was mistaken for its own .
But much of what the raid on Colombo lacked in achievement wa s
made up for the Japanese by a formation of navy bombers which intercepted the British cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall on their way to rejoi n
the Eastern Fleet . The cruisers far beyond aid from shore-based aircraf t
were dive-bombed with deadly accuracy and both were sunk . After 3 0
hours spent in the water 1,122 of the 1,550 men on board were rescue d
by H .M .S . Enterprise and two destroyers which responded to an S .O .S .
from a Fleet Air Arm reconnaissance aircraft .
For the next three or four days the enemy warships busied themselve s
with considerable success in hunting Allied merchant ships in the souther n
waters of the Bay of Bengal . Fifteen vessels were sunk by aircraft an d
eight by warships . Enemy aircraft also raided Cocanada and Vizagapata m
about midway up the east coast of India on the 6th, but they achieve d
little .
The British naval base at Trincomalee was the nd'xt major Japanes e
target . The first warning of the attack was received about 3 p .m. o n
the 8th when a Catalina reported three battleships and a carrier south east of Trincomalee steering north-west . Shortly after daylight on the 9th ,
again a Catalina sighted the Japanese force, but before this aircraf t
could signal details of composition and position it had been shot down .
Radar equipment was operating at the naval base and about 7 a .m . this
too gave warning of the enemy 's approach—about 50 bombers with abou t
60 Zeros as top cover . Coming in at from 12,000 to 15,000 feet the y
were met by 17 Hurricanes from No . 261 Squadron and six Fulmars,
which had been sent ashore from the carrier Hermes . The attack wa s
concentrated on the dockyards and the China Bay air base . A munition s
e
F-O G . E . Caswell, 404709 . 123, 124 and 30 Sqns RAF. Overseer ; of Toowoomba, Qld ; b .
Rockhampton, Qld, 6 Feb 1918 . Killed in action 5 Apr 1942.
498
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE
9Ap r
ship was sunk in the harbour and the cargo which had just been unloade d
from her was destroyed when a bomb hit a munitions store on shore .
Among the Hurricane pilots, one Australian—Pilot Officer Rawnsley 7
—had claimed one enemy aircraft probably destroyed and had definitel y
shot another down into the sea in flames before a burst of enemy fir e
all Sp attack 9 April
n, mpalee .Airpuack 9 April
•
British A(C sighting
5April
0
INDIA N
1st British A/C sighting
• 4pm .4 April.
200
100
30 0
400
wounded him in the left ankle. He made a forced landing but his woun d
prevented him from leaving the cockpit . Japanese fighters, which ha d
followed him down, were attacking when a R .A .F . pilot, Flying Officer
Edsall, 8 ignoring their gunfire raced to Rawnsley and dragged him t o
safety . Edsall then made a dash to save the aerodrome's only petro l
tanker and in doing so was mortally wounded . Another Australian pilo t
—Flight Sergeant Mann9—had also claimed one enemy aircraft as probably destroyed when his Hurricane was damaged by enemy fire . He bale d
out into the sea and since two enemy fighters were circling him he discarded his conspicuous Mae West life-jacket along with his parachut e
and swam away from them, under water for part of the distance . Th e
0
F-Lt L . T . Rawnsley, 402753 . 122, 261 and 17 Sqns RAF. Bank officer; of Binnaway, NSW;
b . Auckland, NZ, 3 Jul 1918 .
F-0 E. F . Edsall, DFC, 81368, RAF . 54, 222, 602 and 261 Sqns RAF. Caterer ; of London;
b . Wimbledon, London, 16 Jun 1918. Died of wounds 12 Apr 1942 .
F-Lt K . A . S . Mann, 402377; 261 Sqn RAF. Shipping clerk ; of Rose Bay, NSW; b. Sydney ,
10 May 1918.
(4ietru :zua War ,ilezuunu~
General Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces, South-West Pacific Area ;
General Sir Thomas Blarney, Commander, Allied Land Forces ; and Major-General Georg e
C . Kenney, Commander . Allied Air Forces, at Port Moresby, 2nd October 1942 .
(Australian War Memorial )
A Zero fighter, forced down near Port Moresby in April 1942, was salvaged and brought i n
comparatively intact for Intelligence investigation .
l
t
The United States Liberty ship Starr King sinking off Port Macquarie after being torpedoed
by a Japanese submarine on 10th February 1943 . During six months from 18th January
1943 Japanese submarines attacked 21 Allied ships totalling 109,651 tons off the east Australian coast and ships totalling 50,022 tons were sunk .
(R .A .A .F_ ,
Catalinas from No . 3 Operational Training Unit at Rathmines . New South Wales, on a
formation flying exercise . Previously known as the Seaplane Training Flight, this unit provide d
the final training for the crews of Nos . 11, 20, 42 and 43 Squadrons in the multiple task s
of long-range reconnaissance, supply-dropping, bombing . and minelaying .
9Apr
BOMBER ATTACK FAILS
49 9
enemy did not attack and Mann swam the considerable distance to th e
shore . As he swam he saw a Hurricane crash after combat with abou t
six Zeros . The pilot, who was killed, proved later to be a fellow Australian, Sergeant Pearce .' Of only three Australians serving as pilots i n
No . 261 Squadron at this time, one had been killed, one wounded an d
the third forced to bale out .
Before the enemy raid began the 14 crews of No . 11 Squadron wer e
being briefed for an attack on the Japanese naval force, now known t o
include several aircraft carriers and battleships . Engine and armament
faults prevented four aircraft from leaving the ground but at 9 .20 a .m.
10 Blenheims left Colombo to attack . En route to the target engine failur e
reduced the force by another aircraft. Of the nine Blenheims which finall y
attacked two of the crews were all-Australian, and there were Australian s
in all other crews but one.
The Blenheims, carrying a varied bomb-load of 500-lb and 250-l b
general-purpose and 250-lb anti-submarine bombs, found their targe t
"dead ahead" : 5 aircraft carriers, 3 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers and a
variety of other craft—a total of more than 40 warships . The Blenheims
came down to 11,000 feet and began their bombing runs against a larg e
carrier. The enemy ships held their fire until the Blenheims were practically overhead, perhaps mistaking them for their own aircraft ; the n
practically every ship in the fleet opened fire . Several near misses wer e
the best the Blenheims could record with their bombing but all cam e
safely through the barrage of gunfire . Enemy fighters—between 45 an d
50 of them—then attacked. One bomber piloted by a Rhodesian, Flyin g
Officer C . H . Adcock, with two Australians as crew—Flying Office r
Burgan 2 (navigator) and Sergeant Gray 3 (wireless air gunner)—wa s
immediately shot down . Other Blenheim crew members saw the trace r
coming from the Blenheim's gun as Gray continued firing until the last .
Another Blenheim piloted by a South African, Lieutenant D . Knight ,
with two Australians as crew members—Flying Officer Evans 4 and Sergeant McAuley 5—was shot down when flying low over the sea, and a thir d
which had an all-Australian crew—Sergeants Maclennan 6 and Travers '
and Flight Sergeant Nell 8—also went into the sea after a fierce runnin g
fight just above the water . Other crews thought that Maclennan's crew ha d
Sgt W. E. Pearce, 402825 . 64 and 261 Sqns RAF. Clerk; of Sydney ; b . Sydney, 31 Mar 1919 .
Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
2 F-O G. S. Burgan, DFC, 407284 . 37 and 11 Sqns RAF. Transport driver
; of Woodville, SA;
b. McLaren Flat, SA, 7 Jul 1916 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
8 Sgt M. C . Gray, 407152 ; 11
Sqn RAF. Chaff merchant ; of North Walkerville, SA ; b. Prospect,
SA, 21 Jan 1918 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
4 F-0 D . H . Evans, 406203 ; 11 Sqn RAF . Farmer ; of Cottesloe, WA ; b. Cottesloe, 30 Ju n
1911 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
e Sgt L. E . McAuley, 402093 ; 11 Sqn RAF. Grazier ; of Yelarbon, Qld; b. Brisbane, 22 Ma y
1915 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942.
e Sgt H . A . Maclennan, 404107 ; 11 Sqn RAF . Bank officer ; of Brisbane ; b. Toowoomba, Qld,
5 Sep 1914 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
Sgt A . R . Travers, 408017. 211 and 11 Sqns RAF . Farmer ; of Sulphur Creek, Tas; b. Hobart,
10 Jul 1910 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
8 F-Sgt F . J . G . Nell, 400120; 11 Sqn RAP . Bank officer; of East St Kilda, Vic ; b . Casterton,
Vic, 7 Nov 1918 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942.
500
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE
9Ap r
accounted for two Zeros just before the bomber hit the sea. The Zeros
claimed their fourth victim when they shot down a bomber piloted b y
another Australian (Warrant Officer Stevenson 9 ) .
Meanwhile the leader of the Blenheim formation, Squadron Leade r
Ault,' whose wireless operator-air gunner was an Australian (Sergean t
Eckersley 2 ), now free from enemy fighters, headed back to base .
When approaching the Ceylon coast, this crew met a formation of 5 0
enemy bombers and fighters which appeared directly ahead . The fighters
broke off and attacked Ault 's aircraft which was shot down only 15 mile s
from the coast . Against tremendous odds No. 11 Squadron had suffere d
severely . Without achieving any success it had lost five crews and aircraft ,
and the four crews that escaped were fortunate to reach their base . They
estimated that four enemy fighters were shot down .
The enemy formation, from which fighters had broken off to attac k
Ault 's Blenheim, was in fact returning from another phase of the Japanes e
assault. While Trincomalee was being raided two enemy reconnaissanc e
aircraft found Hermes about 60 miles out to sea . All available Britis h
fighter aircraft were deeply engaged over China Bay, and so the Britis h
carrier and her escort, the Australian destroyer Vampire, were bereft o f
air cover. It was not long before the two ships were being fiercely attacke d
by a force of 85 enemy dive bombers and nine fighters . The onslaught ,
as described later by Captain A . J . S . Crockett, a marine gunnery officer
in Hermes, was " carried out perfectly, relentlessly and quite fearlessly " .
"The aircraft," he added, "peeled off in threes, coming straight down o n
the ship out of the sun on the starboard side ." 3 Both ships were hit
repeatedly and 20 minutes after the attack began Hermes and Vampire
had both been sunk . Hermes and Vampire accounted for four enemy aircraft between them ; 20 officers and 296 ratings, mostly in Hermes, lost
their lives .
This series of attacks—as it happened, their last over these waters —
had profited the Japanese to the extent of two British cruisers, an aircraf t
carrier and a destroyer, all sunk, and some damage to British installation s
ashore and vessels in the harbour . Thanks to the Catalina crews ' warnings the damage in the port was but a fraction of what it might hav e
been had the harbour not been cleared . The Japanese had also accounted
for a number of the defenders' aircraft . Though all the Japanese ship s
were virtually undamaged, at the time it was thought that Admiral Nagumo
had paid a dear price for his successes, having suffered severe losses i n
carrier aircraft . Post-war calculations, however, indicate that even in thi s
respect the cost was comparatively small . A British naval historian ha s
commented, "At the time we believed that the defending fighters ha d
e W-O N . L . Stevenson, 407083 . 223 and 11 Sqns RAF . Assistant accountant ; of Adelaide ; b .
Adelaide, 23 Apr 1918 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
' Sqn Ldr K . Ault, 33214, RAF . 139, 218 and 11 Sqns RAF . Regular air force off r ; of Usk,
Monmouthshire, Eng ; b. Usk, 1 Jan 1916 . Killed in action 9 Apr 1942 .
2 Sgt G. K. Eckersley, 404290 ; 11 Sqn RAF. Accountant; of Tarragindi, Brisbane; b . Tarragindi,
19 Jun 1918. Killed in action 9 Apr 1942.
' D . Richards and II. St G . Saunders, Royal Air Force 1939-1945, Vol II, p . 75.
Apr-May
RAID ON CHIENGMAI
50 1
inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese carrier planes, especially ove r
Colombo ; but it is now plain that the claims were greatly exaggerated .
According to Japanese records the whole operation only cost them seven teen aircraft ." 4
Remote as they were from all these naval aviation engagements i n
the waters off Ceylon, the American Volunteer Group in north-east Burm a
were still fighting in their own spectacular way in the same theatre of
war . The Allies had further reason for gratitude to the pilots of th e
group when, on 24th April, they took revenge for the enemy's assault
on Magwe . In a stealthily executed raid by Kittyhawks on Chiengmai ,
a strong Japanese base in the teak forest just across the Thai border ,
the American pilots believed that they destroyed at least 30 aircraft jus t
as they were preparing to take off, besides wrecking barracks and hangar s
and leaving fuel stores blazing . Though it cost the A .V .G . two of it s
best flight leaders, this raid checked the enemy's air operations lon g
enough to allow the R .A .F . to complete the evacuation of refugees fro m
the battered Magwe base, which prompted Stevenson to signal to Chennault, "Many thanks for the breathing spell furnished by your magnificen t
attack on Chiengmai. "
Depletion in men, aircraft and supplies had meanwhile caused Chennault to send (perhaps understandably) a bitter message to China' s
Foreign Minister, Dr Soong, then in Washington as head of the Chines e
war supply mission . Chennault's message reported that the group ha d
only one effective squadron left and that the usefulness of the A .V.G .
and of himself would "finish by 15th April" unless immediate action was
taken . 5 About this time Chiang Kai-shek wanted the A .V .G . to provid e
air support for his own armies in Burma, but Chennault held tha t
without adequate air-to-ground communications, trained liaison officers
and a reliable Intelligence service, such support was impracticable . H e
compromised by flying "morale" missions to let the Chinese troops se e
the now legendary spiked sun and shark-tooth insignia of the Chinese owned fighters .
With these troubles mounting within the A .V.G ., the enemy had raide d
their base at Loiwing on 8th April . The Japanese loss was 10 Zeros t o
the defenders' 2 Hurricanes in combat and 2 Kittyhawks on the ground .
When the Japanese returned two days later 9 Kittyhawks were damage d
on the ground in a dawn raid during an atmospheric radio blackout bu t
the enemy lost 8 fighters .
Much of Chennault's success lay in his knowledge of Japanese traditio n
and psychology . It was this which enabled him to anticipate, for example ,
a Japanese air assault timed, as he predicted it would be, a day in advance
* S. W . Roskill, The War at Sea 193945, Vol II (1956), p . 28 .
*In April the United States Army Air Force formally recalled Chennault to active duty an d
promoted him to the rank of brigadier-general, but meanwhile he was being intensely critica l
of the War Department for, as he phrased it, their "indecision, obstruction, non-support an d
passive inactivity [in the] Far East " .—Chennault, Way of a Fighter, p . 154.
Apr1942
BOMBERS OVER TOKYO
503
of Emperor Hirohito's birthday (29th April) to gratify him with "goo d
news" on that occasion . On the 28th the raiders duly appeared—2 7
bombers with fighter cover. The battle, fierce but brief, ended with th e
score believed to be 22 to nil in favour of the A .V .G .
In the adjacent jungle the Japanese did achieve good birthday new s
for the Emperor on the 29th when they overwhelmed the Chinese force s
and captured Lashio . The Chinese troops then withdrew from Loiwing ,
Chennault' s most useful base with its valuable aircraft overhaul depot .
The A .V .G . had no choice but to follow after abandoning valuable facilities and destroying by fire 22 Kittyhawks which were under repair an d
could not be flown out . The A .V.G . force retired to Kunming, while
the pilots of No. 17 Squadron, who had been operating with them fro m
Loiwing, returned to India by way of Myitkyina, to be re-equipped wit h
Hurricane Its and so take their part in the defence of Calcutta .
There was a dramatic interlude in the C .B .I . Theatre about this time—
one born in the mind of strategists in the United States, and of dee p
interest to President Roosevelt . It was planned deliberately as a psychological shock to the Japanese and a stimulant to Allied morale . An American naval task force including two aircraft carriers, destroyers and oilers ,
under the command of Vice-Admiral Halsey, was heading through th e
north Pacific Ocean to a point about 800 miles east of Japan . From thi s
point the carriers were to proceed alone . On the flight deck of one of
the carriers, U .S .S . Hornet, were 16 Mitchell medium bombers lined u p
for take-off . Their leader was Lieut-Colonel James H. Doolittle and th e
crews now manning the bombers were all volunteers for a low-level ai r
attack on Tokyo . Halse y ' s squadron, having traversed more than 4,000 mile s
of the north Pacific, had now, at 6 .45 a .m . on 18th April, sighted an
enemy patrol vessel . The outward sea voyage ended soon afterwards . An
enemy air strike on Halsey's task force could now be expected, and ,
while Doolittle had hoped that the carrier would take him within about
500 miles of Japan, it had been planned that the safety of Halsey's force
should not be jeopardised and that, in these circumstances, the bomber s
would take off even though they might not reach their bases in easter n
China .
So it was that at 7.25 a .m . the first of the Mitchells, piloted by Doolittle,
roared down Hornet's flight deck and took off into a 40-knot gale tha t
was sending seas over the carrier's bows . The other 15 bombers followed ,
each pilot accomplishing safely a take-off never before undertaken . Halsey
turned his force about and set course back across the Pacific, a voyage accomplished without enemy interference .
Doolittle's formation had 668 miles to fly before reaching Tokyo . This
gave the crews one advantage : though doubtless Tokyo had been warne d
by the patrol vessel of the presence of Halsey's force the Japanese woul d
not expect any attack until at least the following day . Thus the raiding
Mitchells were unopposed when they crossed the Japanese coast and roare d
in over the capital at a height of about 1,000 feet . By chance the Tokyo
504
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE
Apr1942
defences (it was learned later) were then engaged in air raid practic e
and Doolittle had loosed his load of incendiaries on the target before th e
real raid alarm was sounded . In succession other Mitchells released th e
three 500-lb bombs and a single incendiary cluster that made up thei r
bomb-loads . Some attacked Tokyo's oil stores, factories and defence installations and (by overshooting the target in error) some bombed thickly
populated centres . Other aircraft bombed targets at Kobe, Yokoham a
and Nagoya . At Yokosuka naval base a carrier in dry dock was hit b y
at least one bomb . Only one of the Mitchells was hit by anti-aircraf t
fire and the damage was slight. All sixteen aircraft cleared the Japanes e
coast and, with an unexpectedly strong tail wind, headed for selecte d
airfields in eastern China where they were to refuel and then fly t o
Chungking to remain in China under General Stilwell's command . But ,
since they had been forced to take off ten hours ahead of the planne d
time, the bombers were now flying in darkness and, it happened, throug h
rain and dense overcast . Some crews baled out and others crash-landed .
All the bombers were lost but 14 of the crews survived . Of the 50 me n
who parachuted all landed safely but one, who was killed . All the crew
of one bomber that crash-landed were injured, some critically . One crew
flew too far north and landed beyond Vladivostok ; the Russians interne d
them . Two crews landed in Japanese-held territory and became prisoner s
of war ; two of their number were later executed after a military trial .
As for its value, the assessment, of course, varied with the point o f
view . It made the Chinese unhappy because 16 of their precious medium
bombers had been lost on a mission that so emphasised to the Japanes e
the strategic value to the Allies of the airfields in Chikiang province that
they made haste to capture them before they could be adequately defended .
The Japanese, though they must have known that such raids could not
be sustained, were persuaded by this one to keep four army fighter group s
in Japan even when, later, they were urgently needed on one or othe r
of the battle fronts .
China, too, was to be the unexpected destination of a substantial grou p
of members of the R .A .F . When all the airworthy aircraft had been with drawn from Magwe after the enemy's attack on 21st-22nd March, there
had been no air transport to take out the R .A .F. ground staff . Therefore Burwing Headquarters and the ground elements of Nos . 45
and 17 Squadrons and those of No . 113 Squadron who had remained
behind when their unit had moved earlier to India, had gathered wha t
transport was available and made their way by road to Lashio . With the m
was a group of aircrew, including several Australians, who had been left
without aircraft. From Lashio they set out on 27th April in two moto r
convoys for Myitkyina . The journey was through mountainous country ,
periodically drenched by the pre-monsoon rains, and across stream s
spanned only by native-built makeshift bridges . The way was crowde d
by refugees making for the same destination, and the R .A .F. convoys
crawled along the difficult road, held up at frequent intervals by traffic
1942-43
REFUGEES FROM BURMA
50 5
blocks . Passing through Namhkam, close to the China frontier, the y
reached Myitkyina on 2nd May . Here they divided . As air transpor t
offered, the aircrew members were flown to Dinjan, whence they mad e
the final stage of the journey to Calcutta by rail . The ground staff—2 0
officers and 324 airmen—could not be so evacuated . They therefore se t
out in motor transport on a long and hazardous journey into China, t o
Chengtu, where they were to await the arrival of Hudson aircraft that ,
in fact, could never be sent, and where, known as " Rafchin", they wer e
to spend the next year assisting the Chinese in the development of air
bases and in training ground staff . They were also able to give their allie s
some elementary instruction in the use of radio direction finding, for they
took with them the original unit they had used in the defence of Rangoon .
While General Alexander's columns were still in occupation of Mandalay on 3rd April the Japanese Air Force struck . A direct bomb hi t
wrecked the fire station and unchecked fires and bomb explosions destroye d
all but about one-fifth of the ancient town . Hundreds of the inhabitant s
and of the many refugees who had gathered there perished .
Aircrews flying on operations over Burma in this period were acutely
conscious that two evacuations were in progress from Lower Burma . On e
was the organised civil and military evacuation, planned and execute d
with all the care and efficiency possible in so grim a situation . It wa s
attended by many hardships but it saved many lives . The other was th e
unorganised evacuation of civilians . This was an aspect of the loss o f
Rangoon—the key to the loss of Burma—which had its origin in th e
initial Japanese bombings of the city . It is not appropriate here to describ e
in detail the mass evacuation of half a million people—chiefly Burmese ,
Chinese and Indian—but no account of the air warfare in Burma shoul d
ignore its significance or its consequence . Valiant work was done by th e
civil and military administrators in an endeavour to lessen the plight o f
these people, but terror stifles planning, and so they set out, hundred s
of thousands of distracted human beings, in a terrible mass migration .
Between them and their goal—the safety of Indian territory—lay th e
Himalayas, unsurmountable save for an occasional wild caravan route .
Perhaps 400,000 reached Indian sanctuary, perhaps 100,000 died on th e
way . There can be no accurate statistics for such terrible journeying, n o
record of the number who perished from disease, from starvation, fro m
exhaustion ; nor indeed, of those who, having reached India, soon die d
from the effects of their journey .
After Mandalay became a bomb-wrecked, fire-gutted shambles, th e
greatest concentration of these afflicted people was at Myitkyina, hig h
in the mountains, the most north-westerly railhead in Burma . It was
here that the magnificent work of the air transport crews reached th e
peak of their achievement in the relief of suffering. No . 31 Air Transport
Squadron, R .A .F ., had been made available to Stevenson's command ,
first with DC-2 aircraft and later with Dakotas (the military version o f
the DC-3) . Seven members of the R .A .A .F . then served as aircrew with
506
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE
Apr-May
this unit . Three of them—Sergeants Akers, 6 Hauser 7 and Perkin$—were
mentioned in despatches for devotion to duty in the Burma campaign .
Though singled out, these men were typical . Until late in April the unit
had been based at Dum Dum, but now, since Myitkyina was their onl y
reasonably safe terminal and the focal point for their missions, they wer e
based on Dinjan in north-eastern Assam . Their operations were beset continually with difficulty . On the 28th only two sorties could be flown becaus e
the fuel pumps were out of order with water in them and the work ha d
to be done by hand . The aircraft took off so heavily laden that thei r
pilots often had difficulty in clearing the trees at the end of the runway ,
but there were no accidents . The daily serviceability rate was only abou t
three aircraft . The evacuation of wounded and the dropping of supplies t o
the fighting troops had priority ; then came the dropping of supplies alon g
the three routes being followed by the civilian refugees, and the evacuation of as many of them as could be lifted from the concentration points .
Late in April the R .A .F . squadron was joined by an American air
transport organisation with 13 civil aircraft . Their crews made a magnificent contribution . Chinese aircraft and the redoubtable Lysanders als o
helped by dropping supplies .9 The crews undertook a three-fold struggl e
—against insufficiency, enemy pressure and time . They flew unarmed an d
usually through dense cloud to avoid fighter interception . They crosse d
mountain ranges, the peaks of which rose to 17,000 feet . They flew s o
many sorties that maintenance (or rather lack of it) became somethin g
of a nightmare . It was not unusual for a R .A.F. Dakota to have different
power ratings for its two engines or for the propellers to be of a mak e
never intended for this aircraft . The number of sorties was increased a t
the crews' own request after they had seen refugees dying beside th e
runway . Loadings reached the maximum in daring—even to the fantastic ally high rate of 71 passengers in an aircraft designed to carry 24 . And ,
apart from the pressure of the enemy, the monsoon period was approaching and the task became a tense race against the rains .
On 6th May, the worst happened . As the first two R .A .F. Dakotas
for the day were loading refugees enemy dive bombers swept down ove r
Myitkyina aerodrome . Their bombs killed two women and a child and ,
as the remaining passengers leaped from the aircraft and fled for cover ,
the enemy planes returned to rake the airfield with gunfire . The same
day they came again and destroyed two Dakotas on the ground . Even s o
the pilots of the remaining transports decided on one more sortie eac h
at dusk . These were achieved safely but they were the last ; early next
morning Myitkyina belonged to the enemy .
e F-Lt S. C . Akers, 400767 . 31 Sqn RAF, SEA Air Cd 1943-44, and 36 Sqn . Clerk ; of Essendon,
Vic ; b . Moonee Ponds, Vic, 26 Apr 1917 . Killed in action 3 May 1945 .
7 F-Lt R . Hauser, 401168 . 31, 353 Sqns RAF and 34 Sqn . Sharebroker 's clerk ; of Brunswick, Vic ;
b . Brunswick, 16 May 1916 .
F-Lt A . R . Perkins, 407035 . 223, 24, 45, 215 and 31 Sans RAF . Fitter 's mate ; of Semaphore,
SA ; b . Semaphore, 15 May 1917 .
e The aircraft lifted a total of 8,616 refugee and military passengers, including 2,600 wounded ,
the American transports carrying about one-half of the total . They also dropped more than
109,500 pounds of supplies to the army column and to the refugees .
1942
LONG
RETREAT
ENDS
50 7
Still striving to aid the army in Burma, the Blenheim crews had bee n
ranging right across Burma as when, on 24th April, three aircraft o f
No . 113 Squadron (now based on Asansol, 110 miles north-west of Calcutta), two of them piloted by Australians—Flying Officers Bassingthwait e
and Hansom—bombed positions at Sandoway and Taungup on the Araka n
coast and damaged an armed sloop at sea . Bomber reinforcements had
reached India on 13th April when No . 215 (Wellington) Squadron, i n
which a number of Australians were serving, landed at Asansol . On 7th
May a detachment from this unit was diverted to assist No . 31 Squadro n
in supply-dropping operations . In mid-May, too, No . 60 Squadron bega n
operating again with its own aircraft . They joined in the final air effor t
to support General Alexander's forces over whose positions Bassingthwait e
and his crew made a notable reconnaissance flight on the 8th . This wa s
a special mission to relate the positions of the British and Japanese troops .
They found Alexander's force to the south-east of Kalewa and, by drawin g
anti-aircraft fire, located the forward Japanese troops at Ye-u . These continuous sorties were not without cost, in which the Australian crews o f
No. 113 Squadron shared . On the 19th one crew—Flying Officers Hickey
and Rogers 3 and Flight Sergeant Campbell4—failed to return from a rai d
on Akyab on which there was fierce interception by Zeros, and were poste d
missing believed killed . Four days later another Australian crew—Flyin g
Officers Pears e5 and Griggs and Flight Sergeant Germei n 7—were all killed ;
the wreckage of their aircraft was found in the Chin Hills after an attac k
on craft on the Mayu River . Between 8th April and 20th May the squadron had flown more than 90 sorties .
When, on 20th May, General Alexander's forces reached Imphal, thei r
long fighting retreat ended, and with it the task of the always undermanne d
and under-supplied air units that had striven so hard to support them . Bu t
their struggle continued .
China now had no land communication with the outside world save th e
age-old Silk Road that traversed the Turkestan Desert to Russia—a rout e
of no practical value because of Russia's intense pre-occupation wit h
the German invasion . Thus, for a supply-line to China there remaine d
only the air transport service .across the Himalayan "Hump" . For th e
rest of 1942 the men who began this service—the Assam-Burma-Chin a
Ferry—and who in doing so prepared the way for the more highl y
r F-Lt G . W . L . Hanson, 400986 . 113, 31 Sqns RAF and 38 Sqn . Bank clerk ; of Wangaratta ,
Vic ; b. Melbourne, 12 Feb 1921 .
2 F-0 M. M. Hickey, 406527 ; 113 Sqn RAF . Estate agent ; of Mt Lawley, WA; b . Perth, WA ,
19 Dec 1915. Killed in action 19 May 1942 .
s F-0 R . L . Rogers, 407276 ; 113 Sqn RAF . Clerk ; of Underdale, SA ; b. Wolverhampton, Eng ,
17 Feb 1921 . Killed in action 19 May 1942.
4 F-Sgt E. E . MacK. Campbell, 406139 ; 113 Sqn RAF . Jackeroo ; of Mullewa, WA ; b . Perth ,
WA, 19 Mar 1920. Killed in action 19 May 1942 .
5 F-0 E . F . K . Pearse, 406490 ; 113 Sqn RAF . Pastoralist ; of Mt Magnet, WA ; b. Geraldton ,
WA, 27 Aug 1912 . Killed in action 23 May 1942.
e F-O C. D . Grigg, 406382; 113 Sqn RAF. Civil engineer; of Fremantle, WA; b. Fremantle ,
16 Jan 1914 . Killed in action 23 May 1942.
7 F-Sgt J . F . Germein, 407362 ; 113 Sqn RAF. Clerk; of Berri, SA; b . Renmark, SA, 11 Jul
1921. Killed in action 23 May 1942 .
508
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
THEATRE
lan-Ma y
organised American Air Transport Command service which took over in
December, fought a battle with nature at her worst . But in eight month s
their aircraft carried from Dinjan to Kunming passengers, petrol, oil ,
bombs, ammunition, medical supplies, food, aircraft parts, a jeep and eve n
two trainer aircraft that had been disassembled—a total of more tha n
1,400,000 pounds . 8
In the first stage of the Burma campaign the performance of th e
Japanese air units was in very marked contrast with that of the Malaya n
campaign and it fell considerably short of their command ' s somewhat
pompous directive :
First the air units will destroy air power in Burma and gain air superiorit y
and at the same time cut off the enemy communication route in the Malay area .
In the ground operation the air corps will cooperate in annihilating the Burma
Army and also the Chinese Army which is expected to invade from the south eastern China. [Then came a qualification .] When the air corps cannot use to o
much power in the Burma area on account of the Southern Malay operation . . .
[it] . . . will continuously destroy the landing area of enemy airfields and decreas e
the activities of enemy air power . This will be repeated over and over on Victori a
Point and Rangoon . When the military strength of the Southern Malay operatio n
is available, a crushing blow will be dealt on the airfields at Victoria Point
and Rangoon at the opportune time .
At the outset the Japanese had 150 aircraft disposed on airfields i n
Thailand—insufficient, it proved, to master the A .V .G . and R .A .F . Thes e
were from units originally allocated to the 5th Air Division for the Philip pines invasion but diverted to Thailand to support the XV Army in
Burma . When, about the end of the first week in January, the 5th Air
Division itself was freed by the collapse of American resistance in th e
Philippines, it moved to Thailand and brought the Japanese aircraft
strength for the Burma operations to about 300 . This was still insufficient
for, until the large-scale attack on Rangoon began on 23rd January, thi s
force contented itself mainly with night bombing .
Meanwhile the XV Army, pressing back the British ground forces i n
the Tenasserim Peninsula, were complaining because the Allied air operations were so vigorous that the 33rd and 55th Divisions could move only
by night . With the fall of Singapore the strength for the "crushing blow "
—units from the 3rd Air Division, including a fighter brigade (the 12th )
—was released, but the ground forces had to capture Rangoon before
the air units could become effective . Thereafter the 5th Air Division wa s
able to maintain a series of fierce assaults on the now very vulnerabl e
Allied air bases to the north . To keep pace with the XV Army's advance ,
units of the 5th Air Division moved with the Akyab expeditionary forc e
which left Rangoon on 14th April and on 4th May they occupied th e
Akyab airfield . "The enemy had retreated before the attack could b e
made," one Japanese account stated, adding, "although the natives welcomed us the enemy planes counter-attacked often ." In the reports o f
8
Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol 1, p. 508.
June-Aug
MONSOON HALTS OPERATIONS
50 9
the air operations in July and August there was a significant change o f
tone, thus : "The English Army strengthened their defensive positions i n
India during our operations in Burma . The English forces in north-west
India were transferred to the eastern boundary area . The American Arm y
was strengthening its air force units consisting mainly of bombers . A
few have arrived but more reinforcements are anticipated in the future .
Looking at the . . . situation it was thought better to take the initiative ,
especially to capture the important airfields in eastern India . The Army
would make preparations and researches on the India operations whic h
would commence some time in August under the command of the Souther n
Army . . . . However, the battle situation in the South Eastern Pacifi c
became serious . Imperial Headquarters gradually selected and took troop s
from the army, especially from the force transport unit . They were sen t
to New Guinea ; therefore the quick application of the plan became difficult . "
On 10th July the 3rd Air Army was formed with headquarters i n
Singapore . The 5th Air Division was the nucleus of this force, whic h
controlled air operations in Burma, Malaya and the Sumatra-Java areas .
A majority of the air regiments (five fighter, two light bomber, three heav y
bomber and two reconnaissance units) were allocated to the Burma campaign . 9
In India the monsoon had come and with it a sullen quiet . The enemy
doubtless had much to do to consolidate his hold on Burma, and whil e
torrents of rain made the movement of armies virtually impossible and
curtailed air operations, Wavell's staff worked day and night to complet e
a task he gave them in April—the preparation of a plan for the reconques t
of the whole of Burma . His instructions included the provision of " airfields and the maintenance arrangements for a large air force . . . sinc e
air superiority was the first requisite for operations against Burma b y
land or by sea" . 1
Meanwhile the depleted fighter forces which had been evacuated fro m
Burma were being re-formed hastily to provide Calcutta with air defence .
However, one of the greatest shortages in Bengal at that time was of all weather airfields . Temporary or "kutcha" landing strips, although easil y
constructed, could not be used once the monsoon rains started .
Some idea of this shortage of all-weather landing strips can be gaine d
by describing the ingenious use of a main road in the centre of Calcutt a
as a runway . The expedient of using Red Road, as it was called, whic h
ran through the middle of the central park of the city, proved a grea t
success during and after the monsoon rains in 1942 . Two statues were
removed from the road to give approximately 1,100 yards of unrestricte d
The 3rd Air Division moved to China at this stage and stayed there for the remainder o f
the war.
i wavell, Operations In Eastern Theatre, based on India, from March 1942 to December 31 ,
1942, para 27 .
9
510
THE
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
THEATRE
1942
runway though with a bend of about five degrees along its length . It was ,
of course, narrow by comparison with an ordinary runway and was ampl y
cambered, a fact which demanded particular care on landing as it aggravated any tendency to swing. A further flying hazard was the heavy ornamental balustrade which had been built on either side of Red Road's
narrow grass verge . Use was also made of the tree-lined side roads i n
the park for dispersing the fighter aircraft based on it . The pilots found it
quite novel to take meals in restaurants in Chowringhee, the main stree t
of Calcutta, yet still be able to meet the time requirements of fighte r
readiness .
For many months the road was used this way without a single accident .
At a later stage in its life as an airfield the balustrade began to loo k
somewhat the worse for wear as a result of encroachments by aircraft
with " a poor sense of direction " . Later still, Red Road was to becom e
a maintenance airfield and be enlarged by taking in a grass area of th e
park as a runway for dry weather use . During this time even twin-engined
aircraft could be seen letting down to land on this airfield in the middl e
of a city .
While the enemy's air effort in the next few months was almos t
negligible except for isolated raids, the Allied air forces under Air Marshal
Peirse as Commander-in-Chief maintained a series of harassing raids .
These operations were conducted for the most part in appalling weather .
Norgroup had been re-formed as No . 221 Group (on 12th March) wit h
Stevenson as A .O .C . of all bomber and fighter units in north-east India .
There was, too, the United States Tenth Air Force whose commander ,
General Brereton, had established his headquarters at New Delhi to b e
close to Wavell ' s headquarters . The force itself was being assemble d
at Karachi, chosen because Calcutta was no longer a safe port of entry .
Brereton ' s force had only 10 Kittyhawks and a handful of heavy bombers .
The Kittyhawks had come with the crews, ground staff and such administrative units as were available . Having left Australia on 22nd February they
were diverted to India while on their way to Java, reaching Karachi o n
12th March . As for heavy bombers the Tenth Air Force had, in thes e
days, only the 5 Flying Fortresses and one Liberator which Brereton ha d
brought with him from Java, and two more Fortresses ferried in from
Africa . Others were somewhere on the way, and some of them did arrive ,
but often with their engines so worn from the long flight across Afric a
to Karachi that they needed replacing.2 The combat capacity of the Tent h
was thus extremely limited at this time . Some of the heavy bombers were
put to work immediately as transports—they took 29 tons of supplie s
and an Indian regiment from Asansol to Magwe and brought out mor e
than 400 civilian refugees on the return flights . But few aircrew had ye t
had any operational training and Brereton refused to commit men to comba t
until this training had been completed . "I had had enough of fighting i n
2 Craven and Cate, Vol I, pp . 493-5 .
Feb-July
RAID ON PORT BLAIR
51 1
dribbles," he wrote in his diary on 28th February ; "I insisted on building
a striking force with a punch to it." 3
Karachi, moreover, was 1,000 miles from the combat area, and thi s
set many problems . One of these was transport. The Indian railways wer e
short of rolling stock and there were four different gauges ; the roads were
practically useless for heavy traffic in the monsoon season ; there were to o
few boats to gain much aid from the great waterways, the Ganges an d
the Brahmaputra, and much aerodrome construction had to be done
before an air force of any size could operate effectively from that par t
of India .
On the night of 2nd-3rd April Brereton had relaxed his decision not
to commit his force when he received a report from Wavell's headquarters of enemy shipping lying in the harbour at Port Blair, out of rang e
of the Blenheims . Brereton led an attack himself, his aircraft bombin g
in bright moonlight, and his crew claiming a direct hit on a cruiser . A
transport was also hit and both ships were left burning . The enemy
anti-aircraft fire was heavy and two of the bombers were damaged bu t
all returned . Two other Fortresses were ordered to raid Rangoon on th e
same night but one crashed on take-off, killing all the crew, and the missio n
was cancelled .
This then was about the measure of Brereto n's force and sharp harassing
raids were all that could be undertaken . The plan was to build it up to a
strength of 10,000 officers and men with an ultimate increase to mor e
than twice that figure . Its initial mission was to support General Stilwell's
Chinese force in China and Burma ; its ultimate purpose to operate agains t
the enemy's lines of communication and to launch direct air attack s
against Japan from bases in China . 4
At this stage American plans for developing air strength in Chin a
included the induction on 4th July of the A .V.G. into the U .S .A .A .F. a s
a full American pursuit group operating in China . 5 This would form the
beginnings of the China Air Task Force (C .A .T.F.), a force to be assigned
to the Tenth—but under Chennault's command . On 2nd June a flight
of six Mitchells earmarked for the C .A .T.F . arrived at Dinjan . They left
early on the 3rd to bomb Lashio on their way to Kunming . Their attac k
was made but only two reached Kunming ; three crashed into a mountain
in heavy overcast at 10,000 feet and one was abandoned when it ran out
of fuel. Six more Mitchells reached Kunming safely within the nex t
fortnight, several of them flown by pilots who had taken part in th e
Doolittle raid.
In their last day of combat—4th July 1942, "induction day"—th e
A .V .G . pilots shot down five more enemy fighters without loss . This
'
The Brereton Diaries, p . 106 . About this time Brereton recommended to General Arnold tha t
in future all crews should be fully trained and equipped before being sent overseas, whateve r
the cost in delay .—Craven and Cate, p . 496 .
*Brereton, pp . 109-110.
The AVG contracts were due to expire on 4th July and no more action was planned afte r
that date .
512
THE
CHINA-BURMA-INDIA
THEATRE
June-Dec
brought their claims to 299 enemy aircraft destroyed and 153 probabl y
destroyed for a loss of only 12 Kittyhawks in combat and 61 on th e
ground, including the 22 which had to be burned at Loiwing . Four pilot s
had been killed in air combat, 6 by anti-aircraft fire, 3 by enemy bomb s
on the ground and 3 had been taken prisoner . Ten had died as a result
of flying accidents . So ended a dramatic and gallant air venture whic h
began with a call for mercenaries and ended with a group of aviator s
trained to fight with skill, determination and courage . Only five pilots
and a few ground staff elected to stay with the A .A .F . in China though
20 pilots agreed to remain till replacements arrived .
By the end of June the Tenth Air Force had 600 officers and 5,00 0
enlisted men . One Mitchell squadron and 4 fighter squadrons were a t
Kunming, 2 heavy-bomber squadrons were at Allahabad, the advanc e
parties of 2 fighter squadrons were at Dinjan, and another mediu m
bomber squadron was expected to begin operating from Andal at the en d
of the monsoon. But this promising increase in strength was not to b e
used for the reconquest of Burma . The Middle East and Far East
theatres were regarded by the Combined Chiefs of Staff as interdependent ,
and Rommel's forces in Africa were gaining ground to such an exten t
that on 23rd June Brereton received orders to go to the Middle Eas t
with all available bombers and assume command of the American force s
there . He was authorised to take all needed staff, all the transport an d
aircraft required, and to appropriate what might be needed from India bound cargoes passing through the Middle East . On 26th June he left
India, soon to be followed by the heavy bombers . His successor, Brigadier General E . L. Naiden, was left with a "crippled air transport system, a
skeleton staff and virtually no combat strength outside the task forc e
in China " . 6
Air Marshal Peirse's command meanwhile was using the monsoon i n
every way possible, keeping up a steady assault on the enemy 's communications and building up air strength behind the weather curtain . Th e
Japanese Air Force remained very quiet except in defence when it s
main bases were raided—notably Akyab, Magwe, Kalewa and Mandalay ,
which appeared in that order of importance on the R .A .F . strike records .
In the second half of 1942 about 25 per cent of the aggressive effor t
of Peirse's force was directed at Akyab . At the beginning of July Ai r
Commodore Hunter was placed in command of No . 221 Group at Chittagong and No . 224 Group was re-formed at Calcutta to control all fighter
units .
The achievements in this period were considerable . When set alongsid e
those for the period of the Burma retreat the operations records were impressive . The strikes ranged from single aircraft sorties to attacks by
24 bombers with 12 fighters as top cover . An example of the majo r
attacks was one on Akyab Harbour on 9th September when 13 Blenheim s
from Nos . 60 and 113 Squadrons and 6 Hudsons from No . 62 Squadro n
e
Craven and Cate, Vol I, p . 513 .
Sept-Nov
LIBERATORS ARRIVE
51 3
made a low-level approach and obtained four direct hits on ship s
and damaged the wharf . Enemy fighters intercepted as the bombers wer e
leaving the target area and the cost was heavy—5 bombers—though no t
all the crews were killed . Two Australians in one Blenheim—the pilot ,
Flight Sergeant Reid,7 and the navigator, Sergeant Wilson8 (who wa s
serving as a member of the RAF)—were taken prisoners . 9 Their aircraft
was shot down into the sea four miles off Akyab Island, after havin g
been set on fire by machine-gun fire from a ship in Akyab Harbour
and cannon shells from Japanese fighters . Despite being wounded an d
blinded, Sergeant L . A . White, R .A .F., the wireless operator-air gunner ,
was able to launch the dinghy . They were captured by Japanese 22 hour s
later, north of Akyab, and had what Reid described later as the "uncomfortable experience of being held for a time in the same building as th e
Jap survivors of the crew of the ship we had helped to sink" .
One of the original Australian pilots of No . 113 Squadron, Flyin g
Officer Loane, and two other Australians, Flight Sergeants Bell i and
Barnard,2 failed to return and were posted missing as were the crew o f
another Blenheim in the same flight with whom an Australian, Sergeant
Hall, 3 was the wireless operator-air gunner . One of the four Hudsons wa s
shot down by fighters and another crashed and was wrecked when landin g
at Chittagong. An aircraft flown by one of No . 113 Squadron's original
crews—Bassingthwaite, Gordon and McKerracher—was so severely damaged by gunfire from the attacking fighters that the pilot had to mak e
a forced landing at Dum Dum .
The crews of Nos . 113 and 60 Squadrons made an incisive attac k
on railway facilities at Mandalay on 12th September . In October No . 11 3
Squadron at last received some new aircraft—Bisley Mark Vs .
Among the fighter units morale was also very high . Flight Lieutenan t
Cotton, who had returned to combat duty in October after recovery fro m
wounds received eight months earlier, in November was given comman d
of his old unit, No . 17 (Hurricane) Squadron . That month No . 17 began
intensive night-interception practice over Calcutta .
The appearance of a squadron of Liberator heavy bombers (No . 159) ,
three aircraft from which made the unit's first attack on 17th November,
was an indication of slow but progressive increase in striking power and ,
most important, in range . Air Vice-Marshal Stevenson led the Liberato r
flight in to attack Mingaladon as pilot of one of the three aircraft .
7 W-O J . P . F. Reid, 404362 ; 113 Sqn RAF. Civil flying trainee; of Brisbane ; b. Brisbane,
21 Feb 1921 .
6 Sgt P . K . Wilson, 1252303, RAF; 113 Sqn RAF . Grazier; of Barraba, NSW; b. Armidale, NSW,
17 Oct 1914. Killed in aircraft accident, 1958.
9 In April 1945 Wilson escaped in Rangoon and with the aid of a friendly Burmese mad e
his way through the Japanese lines to the British front at Pegu . Reid was released soon
afterwards when the Japanese guards quit their posts at Rangoon gaol .
F-Sgt T . Bell, 402184 . 211 and 113 Sqns RAF. Articled clerk ; of Mosman, NSW ; b. Neutra l
Bay, NSW, 17 Aug 1919. Killed in action 9 Sep 1942.
9 F-Sgt R. E . Barnard, 404464 ; 113 Sqn RAF . Grazier; of Broadbeach, Qld; b . Rockhampton ,
Q1d, 24 Jan 1913 . Killed in action 9 Sep 1942 .
Sgt G. R . Hall, 401034 . 36, 60 and 113 Sqns RAF . Clerk ; of Elwood, Vic; b . Elsternwick, Vic ,
17 Mar 1922 . Killed in action 9 Sep 1942 .
514
THE CHINA-BURMA-INDIA THEATRE
Nov-Dec
With him as second pilot was an Australian, Pilot Officer Muirhead . 4
The bombs were well on the target and fires were burning in the are a
as the bombers turned back . Then on the following night another ne w
unit, with bombers new to the command—No . 99 (Wellington) Squadron
—began operations with an attack by eight aircraft on Meiktila .
Late in November a Blenheim of No . 60 Squadron piloted by Fligh t
Lieutenant Morphett5 took Major-General Wingate, 6 leader of the Chindit
operations behind the enemy's lines, on an aerial reconnaissance of the
territory in Burma selected for the first of his ventures .
Enemy fighter interception increased sharply and as the year was endin g
they also began counter-raiding . On 5th December 24 bombers escorted
by about 12 fighters attacked Chittagong but the bomb aiming was ver y
poor and the damage slight . On the other hand the largest raid the
R .A .F . had yet mounted was made on Mandalay's railway yards on 7t h
December by 24 bombers covered by 20 Hurricanes . Stevenson again fle w
in the leading aircraft .
The raid on this target (Mandalay) was repeated on the 12th wit h
the A .O .C . flying with Bassingthwaite who was now a flight lieutenant .
There were 19 other Australian aircrew on the operation . The railway
installations were heavily bombed and Stevenson in messages to the
units that took part said he was "tremendously impressed by the high
war efficiency . . ." adding "I shall not, repeat not, forget . "
407724. 159 and 355 Sqns RAF . Medical student ; of Adelaide ; b.
' F-Lt M . J. C . Muirhead,
.
Adelaide, 6 Jul 1920
Sqn Ldr J. E . Morphett, DFC, 407533 . 60 and 159 Sqns RAF ; comd 355 Sqn RAF 1943-44.
School teacher ; of Kingswood, SA; b . Norwood, SA, 25 Feb 1911 .
e Maj-Gen O . C. Wingate, DSO . Comd Long Range Penetration Groups, Burma, 1943-44 .
Regular soldier; b . Naini Tal, United Provinces, India, 26 Feb 1903 . Killed in aircraft acciden t
24 Mar 1944 .
6