Turkey:
Worry on Two Fronts
TURKEY
Ambitious Ankara is eager to bring the West back to the bargaining table with Iran to avert what could
be a catastrophic military engagement. At the same time, it has its hands full dealing with the Syrian
calamity, which is closer to home and shows no
signs of stabilizing.
text by Soli
Ozel photos by Giulia Gioacchini
or nearly a decade Turkey benefited from a strategic
environment that allowed it to raise its profile, create a wider zone of autonomous action in its surrounding regions and aspire to become a regional power in the
Middle East. This may sound counterintuitive since the
American-led war against Iraq, the occupation and the
ensuing sectarian violence in Turkey’s southern neighbor as well as the creation of a Kurdish federal government across the border would be considered detrimental to Turkish interests.
Problematic though these developments were, the situation benefited Turkey at a macro level. The many failures of the American misadventure in Iraq that Turkey
objected to from the beginning and ultimately refused to
be a part of, shook the regional balance of power. The
Arab state system remained paralyzed, Iran gained enormous strategic advantages. As the American invasion
empowered Iraqi Shia and the Kurds, it also broke the
centuries old strategic balance between Shi’a Iran and
the Sunni world.
In this environment Turkey formulated a policy of engagement with all its neighbors by accepting the existing
status quo as given. Ian Lesser from the German Marshall
Fund, an American think-tank, identified these conditions as a “benign environment” whereby none of the
major actors would be able to counter Turkey’s designs
and policy moves. In fact Ankara pursued policies towards Iran and Syria that were objected to by Washing-
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ton. As the military’s influence over the making of foreign policy waned, Ankara gradually dropped its perennial fears concerning the assertion of Iraqi Kurdish political identity. The government’s policies channeled the
exploding economic energy of the nascent provincial entrepreneurial classes toward widespread trade and market creation, thereby transforming Turkey from a national security state to a trading state, or so says European studies Professor Kemal Kirisci.
Both at this economic and at the political level though,
the government pursued its own goals with great intensity trying to transform the environment within which it
operated. It presented itself as a side in all the unresolved
problems of the surrounding regions, made strenuous efforts to mediate between Iran and Ankara’s alliance partners to find a way out of Iran’s nuclear program impasse.
It was a pity that the resourceful Brazil-Turkey-Iran
swap agreement was immediately undercut by the U.S.
administration. That and the ill-advised “no” vote at the
UN Security Council on new sanctions against Iran strained relations between Washington and Ankara. Since
then Turkey’s Iran policy took a sharp turn on the nuclear
issue as Ankara signed on to NATO’s missile shield project and accepted that one of the radar systems be located on Turkish soil.
While maintaining close relations with Israel that
came to fruition in the mid-1990s, the government pursued policies on the Palestinian issue that generated friction and irritations in the relations between Ankara and
Tel Aviv. These culminated in the tragedy of Mavi Marmara when Israeli troops killed eight Turkish citizens
and one Turkish-American and the Israeli government
ultimately refused to apologize for the horrific deed.
That Turkey could be so active and autonomous was
partially a function of its ability to simultaneously pur-
east . crossroads europe
sue European Union entry, strengthen its economy and
engage in a careful policy of creating a zone of interest in
the vicinity. The precondition for the success of the policy was the existing status quo particularly in the Middle East that came to an end with the Arab uprisings and
the American withdrawal from Iraq.
With the advent of the Arab uprisings and the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq the environment
within which Turkey operated changed. The conditions
in this new environment would be less conducive to autonomous action than before. So far, what is clear is that
in the absence of a strategically acting EU Turkey builds
closer relations with the U.S., is in stiff competition with
Iran both in Iraq and Syria and will have to deal with a
more assertive Russia eager to prove its great power credentials in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.
Syrian conundrum
o other case demonstrated the limits of Turkey’s options as clearly as the Syrian upheaval. As the slaughter in Syria continues those who wish to do some-
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thing to stop the bloodletting look at Turkey. After futile
attempts to convince the Syrian President to listen to the
opposition’s demands and lead the transition to a more
open system the Turkish government has unequivocally
staked a position for the departure of Bashar al Assad and
is actively trying to secure a legitimate framework for intervention.
Turkey has a long, 900-kilometer border with Syria,
close societal ties inside the country, possibly good intelligence network. If ever the international system finds
a legitimate way to intervene in Syria, Turkey’s participation and military contribution to any operation would
be automatically assumed. But despite tremendous pressure from its allies and others Ankara is unlikely to step
in militarily in a unilateral fashion or arm the rebel army
in its territory.
Such is Ankara’s impasse in a situation that tests its
claims to be a regional “order builder.”
The Turkish government like the rest of the world was
caught by surprise at the dawn of the Arab revolts. Although Ankara saw these developments as positive and
Istanbul, near the bazaar.
number 41 . april 2012
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An old woman fishes
SOAPY POWER
from the Galata Bridge.
auspicious, it had to improvise its
policy trying not to veer from its
principles. The unfolding events
were seen as the final liquidation
of the legacies of colonialism and
the Cold War and the dawn of the
normalization of Middle Eastern
history.
This approach enabled Turkish
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to be the first leader anywhere
to call on Egypt’s former President
Hosni Mubarak to go, which he ultimately did. Other cases were not
as simple to navigate though because interest and principle clashed. The case of Libya
proved quite a challenge for the government caught between economic interests and its unilateralist instincts
for regional diplomacy on the one hand, and its alliance
ties on the other.
In the end Turkey joined its allies in implementing resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council but adamantly
opposed any ground troop involvement. In sum when
the chips came down Turkey once more, and unlike Germany, chose to work with its allies.
Syria proved to be a more complicated case. Over the
past decade Turkey has invested heavily in Syria. In the
wake of the Iraq war and the 2005 assassination of
Lebanese President Rafik Hariri, Ankara gave cover to the
besieged Baathist regime there. A serious rapprochement
took place between the two neighbors that historically
had very adversarial relations. Trade grew tenfold. Many
agreements were signed. The lifting of visa requirements
led to a massive increase in the number of visitors going
in both directions. Joint cabinet meetings were scheduled to take place regularly.
Turkey worked relentlessly to broker a peace agreement between Israel and Syria and brokered proximity
talks for nearly two years. Just when Ankara believed its
efforts were bearing fruit and direct talks were in the offing Israel started “Operation Cast Lead” against Gaza that
destroyed the peace talks and severely damaged Turkish-
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urkey is trying to breach the doors of Vienna, as ever the
symbol of the West. But the tools of the attempt aren’t
weapons but videotape. The country is busy trying to sell domestically made soap operas, often with great success. The
efforts range from Singapore to China to Eastern Europe, but
have been particularly intense in the Middle East.
The pattern fits with observations made in 2008 by Graham E. Fuller, a political analyst and the former CIA bureau
chief in Kabul, in his book “The Political Future of Islam.”
Fuller asserted that Turkish TV soaps produced more interest
in the Middle East than anything linked to the policies of
then-President George W. Bush.
Four years later, Turkish soaps are booming more than
ever. It’s a kind of amorphous “soft power” that while lacking any specific political or governmental based uses market
demand to transmit powerful messages. Turkey has 27 commercial TV stations in fierce competition, with most shows
produced thanks to private sector funding. The technical and
artistic production values are well above average.
Turkey’s recent success on the international commercial
market seems to have finally buried old vestiges of the country made famous by British director Alan Parker's “Midnight
Express,” a 1978 film that portrayed the arrest of a young
American for drug smuggling and his subsequent detention
in a squalid Turkish prison. The controversial film, denounced
by Turkish authorities, conveyed a vision of a brutal and antediluvian country, conjuring visions of a dangerous authoritarian state and setting tourism back decades.
The “Midnight Express” days are long gone. Turkish soap
operas are dominant even in Greece, where actors are often
featured on the cover of major magazines.Turkey’s first major breakthrough with homegrown shows was with “Gumus”
(“Noor” in Arabic), which aired in 2007. The daily show follows the trials and tribulations of a beautiful young woman
named Gumus, which means silver in Turkish, played by the
Turkish actress Songül Öden, who marries into a wealthy
family. The plot lines, which violated a number of Muslim
taboos, riveted viewers throughout the Middle East. In Saudi Arabia alone, some four million viewers said they watched
the show. The final episode, which aired last August, attracted a record 85 million Arab viewers. In the show, Muslim characters drink and have premarital sex. The male lead, called
T
Israeli relations as well. All along the Turkish side believed that by so engaging Syria Ankara could lure Damascus away from its close alliance with Tehran. Indeed
both Syria and Lebanon were stages of strategic competition between Iran and Turkey. This record led the Turkish leadership to expect that they could prevail over the
Baathist regime and help engineer a smooth transition to
a more open political system.
After eight months of relentless but ultimately futile
attempts to bring the Assad regime to a reasonable
course, Ankara ended up calling for regime change and
asking Assad to go. The limits of its influence on the
neighboring regime despite so much cajoling belied
Ankara’s claims that Turkey is an “order builder.”
The Turkish government now firmly sided with the
Syrian opposition whose representative organization,
Syrian National Council, is located inside the country.
The Free Syrian Army is centered in Turkey. Ankara has
no easy options in Syria particularly in the wake of the
Russo-Chinese veto at the Security Council.
To deal with the current impasse over Syria its allies
expect Turkey to take the lead. Ankara would not move
unless sanctioned either by the UN Security Council (unlikely given the Russian and Chinese positions) or another legitimate international body. It refrains from either
opening a humanitarian corridor, or establish a security
zone or a safe haven inside Syria. It also claims not to be
east . crossroads europe
by Seyda Canepa
number 41 . april 2012
Muhannad in the Arabic version, treats his wife as an equal
and supports her career as a fashion designer. But the success of “Gumus” came at a price. Some imams issued fatwas
against the show, calling it a bad model for Muslim women
who might be tempted to emulating some of the strong and
independent nature of some of the show’s key characters.
One Saudi cleric insisted the show was “replete with evil,
wickedness, moral collapse and a war on the virtues.” Uzbekistan banned it in February 2011, saying the content was “inappropriate” for the country’s female population.As from the
Uzbek case, the stars of the new wave of Turkish soaps are
considered major stars throughout the Middle East. While
touring, the socially conscious stars usually make a point of
visiting nursing home and orphanages. Their popularity, and
that of their shows, has spread desire among some Muslim
states to more resemble Turkey, seen as the “most Western”
state in the Islamic world. Major cities in the Middle East and
North Africa now boast billboards promoting Turkish soaps
and with the faced of Turkish stars promoting local products.
Teen women have images of their Turkish heartthrobs on
their t-shirts and many families name the children after the
names of lead characters.
hough Turkey produces dozens of soap operas, the most
popular seem to be the ones that portray large, rich and
powerful families who live in luxury homes on the shores of
the Bosporus. Their lives are framed in terms of passionate
love stories. The current crop of shows is led by “Magnificent
Century,” which in Turkey is aired by Star TV and seen in 40
countries. It’s loosely based on the life and times of Ottoman
Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and contains plot lines rife
with power struggles, harem intrigues, illicit love affairs, all
set against a highly stylized and ornamental backdrop. “With
the decor, costumes and visual effects, ‘Magnificent Century’ is one of the most ambitious series in Turkish TV history,"
says its production company. Despite criticism from Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan (he attacked it for portraying
Turkey in “a negative light to the younger generations.”), the
show has survived and thrived. At the DISCOP international
media fair, held last February in Istanbul, Turkish and international broadcasters snapped up a number of new Turkish
productions.
They sold in a total of 20 countries before even having
been aired at home. For experts, it’s only the beginning.
T
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ABOVE Eceabat, on the Dardanelles: a souvenir of Trojan days.
LEFT The Süleymaniye Mosque in Istanbul.
arming the rebel army. At one level the Syria crisis is
Turkey’s moment but it also highlights the limit of
Turkey’s unilateralism and prowess as a regional power.
This brings me to a concluding observation concerning
Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East. After the extraordinary events of 2011 and the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq, Turkey’s room for autonomous ac-
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tion has narrowed. Ankara’s competition with Iran over
Iraqi politics and the crisis in Syria has intensified although both parties continue to have a dialogue on the
nuclear program issue. Turkey has a keen interest in
bringing the parties back to the negotiating table and
averting a catastrophic military operation against Iranian nuclear facilities. In the meantime Ankara’s need and
inclination to work with Washington increased (just as
Washington is very enthusiastic about working with
Turkey on the matters of Iraq on Syria and Iran). For better or worse the status quo in the Middle East unraveled.
Turkey still has a role to play as this story unfolds. But
changing circumstances necessitate a process of reassessment and recalibrating. The real strengths of Turkey are
its functioning economy, secular democratic system and
its ability to mediate between its western allies and a region that is longing and at long last joining the mainstream of the 21st century.
How Turkey comes out of the Syrian debacle will determine its role and place in the painful and protracted
transformation of its immediate neighborhood.
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east . crossroads europe