DOES POST-DEVELOPMENT THEORY FIND
ALTERNATIVES TO WESTERNIZATION OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? AFRICAN
PERSPECTIVE
E WE L I N A R Ó Ż A LU B I E N I E C K A
I N S TI T U TE O F I N TE R N A TI O N A L R E L A T I O N S , U N I V E R S I T Y O F W A R S A W,
P O L A N D ; E LU B I E N I E C K A @ WP . P L
PAPER TO BE PRESENTED AT
THE 8TH
PAN-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS :
ONE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OR MANY? MULTIPLE WORLDS , MULTIPLE CRISES.
DAY: 21.09.2013 HOUR: 9:00AM - 10:45AM
SESSION TITLE:
SA07-6: CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF SPACE, BOUNDARIES AND
TERRITORIES – HOW TO CREATE THE OTHER?
UNIVERSITY OF WARSAW, 18-22 SEPTEMBER, 2013, WARSAW, POLAND
KEY WORDS:
post-development, development, Africa, westernization
ABSTRACT:
Purpose of this paper is to: 1) explain what the post-development concept means and
what is its philosophical background, 2) explain if post-development concept is applicable to
African countries, 3) explain if (and what) post-development alternatives can be found in
Africa’s social structures.
The theory of post-development (also known as anti-development) was formed in
opposition to the theory of development, Western political ideology perpetuated by imposing
hegemony over ‘underdeveloped’ states through social and economic mechanisms.
Development as a part of contemporary international relations is deeply rooted in the
foundations of thinking about the world and its political and social structure (dividing world
1
This is an early draft – please do not cite without the author‟s permission
into ‘developed’ / ‘developing’ / ‘underdeveloped’), and has its assumptions and praxeology
(problem-solving attitude / achievement of objectives, efficiency and effectiveness)
originating from Euroatlantic philosophy of action. The theory of post-development opposes
the Enlightenment tradition and Modernization theory, which were based on a belief in a
gradual, one-way growth model for social change1.
The concept of development is seen by post-development theorists as a tool in the
hands of the political elites of Western countries – a pattern for consolidation of hegemony.
Development, its definition, conditions and its effects are an expression of the imbalance in
the world (of power, property) between standard-setting Global North and subordinated
Global South, which reproduces North’s path. Nevertheless African perspective has been
raised by post-development rarely – the theory was developed mainly regarding Latin
America and East Asia (vide Escobar, Kothari, Rahnema).
1. WHAT IS THE POST-DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT?
The symbolic start of the ideology of development was provided by the speech of
Harry Truman (known as the SPEECH OF THE FOUR POINTS) on January 20th, 1949, when he
said: “Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of
underdeveloped areas”2.
As Gustavo Estera notes, word ‘underdevelopment’ was used before Harry Truman in
the context of “economically backward areas” in 1942 by Wilfred Bendon from International
Labour Organization and then was occasionally used in some UN documents, but didn’t make
a big echo that time3.
“The last forty years can be called the „age of development‟ […]. But development has
been much more than a socio-economic endeavour. It is a perception which models reality, a
1
Part of paragraph was also used by the author on the paper CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN S UB-S AHARAN AFRICA –
CAN BEIJING CONSENSUS BE EXPLAINED UNDER WORLD-SYSTEMS CONCEPT? presented at the 8th Pan-European
Conference On International Relations, session title: TB01-3: Asia's Power: Hard Versus Soft Power, September
19th, 2013.
2
H. S. Truman, INAUGURAL ADDRESS , January 20th, 1949, http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres53.html
3
G. Estera, DEVELOPMENT , in: W. Sachs [ed.], THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GUIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS
POWER, Zed Books, 1996, p. 7.
2
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myth which comforts societies and a fantasy which unleashes passion” writes Wolfgang
Sachs – one of the most important post-development theorists – in the introduction to THE
DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY :
A
GUIDE
TO
KNOWLEDGE
AS
POWER, classic reading for the
study of development.
Further: “like a towering lighthouse guiding sailors towards the coast „development‟
stood as the idea which oriented emerging nations in their journey through post-war history”.
Focus on development is typical in international relations at least since the end of World
War II. ‘Neighbourly’ North-South relations were considered in terms of development and
support for the development – but to finally achieve this goal is now as far as 50 years ago.
The development just did not work, as the post-development concept theorists believe (“the
idea of development stands like a ruin in the intellectual landscape”). Sachs calls for apostasy
from the dogma of development, as from the idea born on the myths, fantasies and emotions
rather than on the reality. He calls for the end of the “arrogant interventionism from the North
and pathetic self-pity in the South”.
Although post-development theorists’ thesis may be perceived as harsh and
uncompromising (as for example Wolfgang Sachs’ words, that development hidden agenda
was “nothing else than the Westernization of the world” or that “the „Other‟ has vanished
with development” 4 ), it should be clearly defined what ‘development’ means in their
discourse.
Scholars indicate two groups of factors responsible for Africa’s being somewhere in
the periphery of the world economy: internal and external ones5. First can be associated with
poor governance, corruption, lack of transparency, lack of clear vision in public policies.
External, with nature of contemporary international economy, in other words in something
that Sally Matthews calls “post-World War II development” (PWWII development) and
defines as “the theories and practices which have since the 1950s been associated with the
term „development‟”6. This specification is needed because development as a concept in its
dictionary sense (“the process in which someone or something grows or changes and
4
W. Sachs [ed.], op.cit., p. 1 and on.
5
A. Thomson, AN INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN POLITICS . THIRD EDITION , Routledge, London and New York
2010, p. 189.
6
S. Matthews, POST-DEVELOPMENT THEORY AND THE QUESTION OF ALTERNATIVES : A VIEW FROM AFRICA , in:
“THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY”, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2004, p. 375.
3
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becomes more advanced”7) is not and should not be rejected according to post-development
theorists. Development in this broad, philosophical sense is not something that postdevelopment theorists (or at least majority of them) want to deny. At least in the sense in
which the word ‘development’ was used before Darwin in biological sciences: as a
transformation of organisms toward more ‘appropriate’ form (that means to form which fulfils
its genetic program), not ‘ever more perfect’ form. It was only in the time of Darwin when
development and evolution became synonymous.
Word ‘development’ was adopted in social sciences by Justus Möser (1720-1794) and
then Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), in whose works development was homogenous
way of changing in the manner projected by God. After rejecting this divine connotations,
development became more popular, also because of the Marxist philosophy, which assumes
unidirectional way of changing the world, of achieving one’s final, eternal destiny – so that as
Esteva concluded “the metaphor of development gave global hegemony to a purely Western
genealogy of history, robbing people of different cultures of the opportunity to define the
forms of their social life”.
As the post-development theorists admit, it is impossible to rob the word
‘development’ of its historical context in which it gained this universal meaning of growth
and maturation, but it still imposes someone else’s expectations to the majority of the world.
They rather call for “supporting the flourishing and enduring of an infinitely diverse natural
and social life” as they oppose the unidirectional and universal assumptions of development8.
Their enthusiasm for grassroots initiatives and new social movements is a visible sign of
having positive attitude towards change or transformation (despite their enormous diversity
and social background: as K. Ravi Raman writes “the new social movements taking shape
across the continents do not necessarily conform to any single theoretical framework but
rather rely on methodological interactionism as a privileged mode of enquiry” 9 ). Ana
Agostino clearly writes that in post-development literature, there are alternatives not only ‘in
7
CAMBRIDGE ADVANCED LEARNER'S DICTIONARY & THESAURUS , Cambridge University Press.
8
G. Estera, op. cit., p. 8-10.
9
K. Ravi Raman, PLACHIMADA RESISTANCE . A POST-DEVELOPMENT SOCIAL MOVEMENT METAPHOR ?, in: A. Ziai
[ed.], EXPLORING POST-DEVELOPMENT. THEORY AND PRACTICE , PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES , Routledge,
London and New York 2007, p. 171 and on.
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the discussion’ about various items of development agenda but also ‘in the practices’ of new
social movements10.
According to post-development theorists, economy as impulsion of PWWII
development is not more than social construct. In other words there is no such thing as
absolute, objective, natural economic laws (with its assumptions of law of scarcity and
allocation of means as a base)11. Development in international relations discourse was initially
strictly connected to economic development. It was only in 1960s when (during the First UN
Development Decade) the social factor was underlined in development agenda, when it was
noted by U Thant that “the importance of human factor is overriding” and that the success of
development decade depends both on economic and social issues12. At the same time (1963)
United Nations Research Institute of Social Development was established. As the First UN
Development Decade somehow tried to glue social development after having realized that
economic development (seen as growth of indicators such as GDP) is not all that should be
taken into account, the Second UN Development Decade united this two spheres from the
very beginning. In 1975 dissatisfaction of development agenda pushed to creation of the
report of the Dag Hammarskjold Foundation and of the United Nations Environment
Programme WHAT NOW: ANOTHER DEVELOPMENT which was distributed during United
Nations General Assembly in 100,000 copies in six languages. ‘Another development’ was
defined there as an approach “designed to satisfy human needs on the basis of self-reliance
and harmony with the environment”13.
It should be though noted, that this kind of ‘alternative development’ projects aren’t
convincing for post-development theorists. They believe that every idea which tries to soften
the hard assumptions of development (e.g., ‘sustainable development’) just tries to fix
something, that should be destroyed and rebuild from the very beginning14.
10
A. Agostino, POST-DEVELOPMENT . UNVEILING CLUES FOR A POSSIBLE FUTURE , in: A. Ziai [ed.], op. cit., p.
205.
11
G. Estera, op. cit., p. 16.
12
ITEM 17.10 OF THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA. THE UN DEVELOPMENT DECADE , United Nations, Paris,
November 9th, 1962, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0016/001604/160471eb.pdf.
13
THE 1975 DAG HAMMARSKJOLD REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION PREPARED
ON THE OCCASION OF THE SEVENTH S PECIAL S ESSION OF THE U NITED NATIONS G ENERAL A SSEMBLY, New York,
September 1975, p. 23.
14
S. Latouche, IN THE WAKE OF THE AFFLUENT S OCIETY: AN EXPLORATION OF POST-DEVELOPMENT, Zed
Books, London 1993, p. 155 and on.
5
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There are four evidences of the fall of the ideology of development, as postdevelopment theorists believe.
First, the assumption that Western societies are standard (model) and reached a peak
of human possibilities, turned out to be false, as evidenced by the environmental problems
(too intensive use of limited natural resources, waste disposal, pollution of the hydrosphere
and atmosphere) and the related fact “of moving toward a precipice”.
Second, geopolitical reality, as seen by Harry Truman, has changed: in 1949, he
wanted to win over the colonial states, to convince them to stay on the road of democracy and
economic liberalism, calm the world giving it order and a strong leader (the United States).
The disintegration of the bloc system has led to polycentric international relations – Truman’s
idea of governance has become obsolete. As Karin Tomala notes, assumption that economic
development can take place only within democratic governance must be revised, when
compared to East-Asia situation15.
Third, the gap between the rich and the poor is widening16. Wolfgang Sachs writes “in
1960, the Northern countries were 20 times richer than the Southern, in 1980 46 times”.
Fourth and finally, the idea of development was misguided from the very beginning; it
is the idea which, if fulfilled, would lead to the development of some kind of monoculture,
which would be dangerous for the diversity (of both the individuals and social groups and
countries). Universality of the world becomes now the reality, so “the mental space in which
people dream and act is largely occupied today by Western imaginary”. The dictate of
development idea has led to a decline of creativity and to not seeking alternative routes to the
West path labelled by industrialization, economic growth, increasing interdependence and the
growing role of capital and financial markets17.
Surprisingly, given the crucial importance of this concept in the study of international
relations, development is undefined, although the term is used by all the society, who sees its
15
K. Tomala, ZMIENIAJĄCE SIĘ MIEJSCE CHIN W ŚWIECIE . CZY DOMINACJA ZACHODU SKOŃCZY SIĘ W XXI
in: W. Dziak, K. Gawlikowski, M. Ławacz [eds], CHINY W XXI WIEKU. PERSPEKTYWY ROZWOJU ,
Instytut Studiów Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warsaw 2012, p. 28.
WIEKU?,
16
See also p. 10.
Paragraphs concerning evidences of the fall of the ideology of development were also used by the author on
the paper CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN S UB-S AHARAN AFRICA – CAN BEIJING CONSENSUS BE EXPLAINED UNDER
WORLD-S YSTEMS CONCEPT? presented at the 8th Pan-European Conference On International Relations, session
title: TB01-3: Asia's Power: Hard Versus Soft Power, September 19 th, 2013.
17
6
This is an early draft – please do not cite without the author‟s permission
goal in it (politicians’, democratic and authoritarian rulers’, economists’, NGOs’, warlords’,
revolutionaries’ and ordinary people)18.
1.1. IVAN ILLICH.
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS' OF POST-DEVELOPMENT
Philosophical foundations of post-development concept can be found in the works of
Ivan Illich (1926-2002), Austrian philosopher and priest of the Roman Catholic Church 19, the
friendship with whom the authors of THE DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY refer to. Ivan Illich was
a multi-dimensional character, a man with extensive biography and broad interests. His works
are maybe more related to emancipatory pedagogy than to political science or international
relations, however philosophical background of his views may be universally adopted in
different sciences.
Illich noted that in modern times people begin to have too much free time, which is a
result of development, specifically technological development. What is more they do not
know how to spend this time, cause unemployment is a consequence of technology.
“Technology provides man with discretionary time he can fill either with making or with
doing”20. This leads to an increase in the production of newer and newer products, which are
designed to fill the extra time and stimulate a man, but they also lead to frustration – of those
who are excluded. Illich calls for a spontaneous and independent ‘doing’ (‘praxis’), and for
limiting the ‘making’ (‘formulating’, ‘poesis’) and for limiting the institutions associated with
any kind of formation (schools, prisons, nursing homes and orphanages). According to Illich
besides that kind of institutions (‘right-wing institutions’), there exist also social institutions
(‘left-wing institutions’), based on communication and organized in the network (for example,
telephone networks, post21).
18
W. Sachs [ed.], op.cit., pp. 1-4.
19
Until 1969, when he resigned from the priesthood as a result of accusations of “political immorality” from
Vatican, see: H. Kostyło, I. ILLICH 1926-2002: I. Illich, O DSZKOLNIĆ SPOŁECZEŃSTWO, Fundacja Bęc Zmiana,
2010, s. 22.
20
Translated from Polish by author of this dissertation: “Technologia daje człowiekowi czas, który może on
spędzić na tworzeniu lub działaniu”: I. Illich, op. cit., p. 116.
21
Illich has not yet wrote about the Internet (the book was published in 1971), although the Arpanet – which was
a prototype of an academic Intranet network was initiated by the Department of Defense – began to be tested and
extended from the late 1960s and 1970s of the XXth century. It seems to me that the Internet network fulfills the
conditions for a ‘social institution’ that Illich understood as spontaneously formed an ad hoc group of people
7
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Illich has also interesting insights on the highway network in the context of
development strategy. Highway is seen as a network serving the public (and therefore should
belong to the ‘left-wing institutions’), but in fact it is a false public utility: “to plan a highway
system as a true public utility would discriminate against those for whom velocity and
individualized comfort are the primary transportation values, in favour of those who value
fluidity and destination”22. Illich writes that the highway system that poor countries also want
to develop is handy only for socially advantaged minority, for those who move quickly, who
provide services to other privileged groups – and they are all educated people. Illich
concludes that the elite (graduates) of poor countries wants to take advantage of the
technology produced in the rich countries – because of that at some point outdated technology
of rich countries is imported to poor countries.
Similar convergence of expectations also affects the society in the context of schools.
Illich notes that the modern schools of rich and poor regions of the world are more alike (in
terms of equipment, standards and obligations) than at the end of the nineteenth century23.
Illich calls for a reduction of consumption (the use of more durable goods and not those of the
strictly planned life-cycle) and organizing institutions in a communication-friendly manner.
2. IS POST-DEVELOPMENT CONCEPT APPLICABLE TO
AFRICAN COUNTRIES?
Critical voices from African political scene concerning the idea of development aren’t
maybe really audible in the post-development discourse. The majority of post-development
theorists origin from Western countries, some of them are Latin Americans, some were born
in Asia. Voices as that of Julius Nyerere, first Tanzanian president, who opted for treating
development as “political mobilization of people for attaining their own objectives” and not
the objectives set by the others, are rare24. But it’s obvious that beside a couple of successes,
PWWII development projects in Africa were ineffective, so post-development concept should
be considered from African perspective.
who want to learn something from each other (e.g., Internet forums). Internet undermines also thesis about the
monopolization of knowledge by elites criticized by Illich.
22
I. Illich, DESCHOOLING S OCIETY, Harper & Row, 1971, p. 58.
23
Ibidem, p. 61
24
G. Estera, op. cit., p. 7.
8
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As Sally Matthews notes, Africa is a visible sign of PWWII development not working,
“Africa has been subjected to development initiative after development initiative, and yet it
remains impoverished”, even though new initiatives as New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) still see development as a priority25. However, despite the obvious
interest in development shown by African politicians and scholars, there is perhaps only a
handful of African scholars who have published work on development from anything similar
to post-development perspective26.
Although there are several issues which seem to have improved in Africa since 1950s,
it is neither as straightforward nor as obvious as it was assumed by architects of post-colonial
development agenda (mainly economists from the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund). On the one hand, life expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa is somehow 20 years less than
in Europe (Sub-Saharan Africans die on average in their mid-fifties). The gap between SubSaharan Africa and other regions has been widening since the 1960s. Furthermore, what is
worth noting, Sub-Saharan Africa is the only region where the trend of growing life
expectancy reversed in 1990-95 (see Table 1).
25
S. Matthews, op. cit., p. 377.
26
See p. 14.
9
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TABLE 1. LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH FOR WORLD AND UN REGIONS, 1960–2010 27
1960-
1965-
1970-
1975-
1980-
1985-
1990-
1995-
2000-
2005-
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
World
51,06
56,52
58,82
60,71
62,40
63,99
64,76
65,62
67,10
68,72
Africa
42,28
44,36
46,46
48,66
50,56
51,80
51,74
52,14
52,91
55,55
Sub-Saharan
40,65
42,59
44,69
46,71
48,28
49,20
48,92
49,22
50,01
52,94
Asia
46,31
54,43
57,72
60,06
62,10
64,03
65,41
66,66
68,76
70,28
Europe
69,17
70,02
70,61
71,03
71,64
72,82
72,57
73,07
73,76
75,28
Latin America 56,91
58,91
61,03
63,22
65,20
67,15
68,93
70,68
72,14
73,45
70,17
70,47
71,41
73,25
74,46
75,04
75,84
76,62
77,39
78,36
63,86
65,04
66,37
68,17
70,18
70,91
72,53
73,71
75,28
76,84
Africa
and Caribb.
Northern
America
Oceania
Similar trend may be observed in infant mortality rates in Sub-Saharan Africa. The
infant mortality rate dropped for more than 60% since 1960s on a global scale, but in SubSaharan Africa this drop was 49% (in Europe in the same time: 81%), so the gap between
Sub-Saharan Africa and other regions widens also in this area (see Table 2). What is worth
noting: this indicator in Sub-Saharan Africa is still two times more than in Europe in 1960s.
27
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, WORLD POPULATION
PROSPECTS : THE 2012 R EVISION , June 2013.
10
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TABLE 2. INFANT MORTALITY RATES 28 FOR WORLD AND UN REGIONS, 1960–2010 29
1960-
1965-
1970-
1975-
1980-
1985-
1990-
1995-
2000-
2005-
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
World
115
94
86
80
71
63
59
55
48
42
Africa
156
144
133
121
111
104
103
94
84
73
Sub-Saharan
156
144
133
123
116
112
111
102
90
79
Asia
127
98
88
82
71
61
55
50
43
37
Europe
37
30
25
22
18
15
13
10
8
7
91
80
69
57
47
38
32
25
21
26
23
18
14
11
10
9
7
7
7
49
45
42
38
33
31
28
27
25
22
Africa
Latin America 101
and Caribb.
Northern
America
Oceania
Even in the area called by Alex Thomson as “Africa‟s post-colonial success story” –
education – it is still much to be done, as ~40% of Africans are illiterate30.
The purpose of this paper is not to write about colonial patterns of economic policy
toward Sub-Saharan Africa and their consequences on current situation. It should be only
noted, that scholars agree that colonial era made Sub-Saharan Africa economies dependant on
export to the West (as there was little demand from African markets for merchandise as
tobacco or coffee 31 ) and didn’t focus on leaving new technologies and training skilled
28
Probability of dying between birth and exact age 1. It is expressed as average annual deaths per 1,000 births.
29
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, WORLD POPULATION
PROSPECTS : THE 2012 R EVISION , June 2013.
30
A. Thomson, op. cit., p. 189.
31
Michael Barrat Brown counted African countries where one, two, three or four primary products accounted for
over 75% of a state’s total export earnings in 1982-86. As much as 15 African countries were dependant in this
sense on one product (oil – Algeria, Nigeria, Angla, Congo, Libya, Gabon; coffee – Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda,
copper – Zambia, uranium – Niger, diamonds – Botswana, bauxite – Guinea, livestock – Somalia or cocoa – Sao
Tome), 14 countries on two products, 8 countries on three products, 4 countries on 4 products and 11 countries
on 5 or more products. See: M. B. Brown, AFRICA ‟S CHOICES : AFTER THIRTY YEARS OF THE WORLD BANK,
Penguin, London 1995, p. 28.
Moreover, that was one of the reasons for African debt crisis. As Alex Thompson points out, Ghanian income
from cocoa exports (Ghana was one of the countries dependent on two products in mentioned classification) in
1981 was only 25% of 1973/74 cocoa export value. In 1991 it was even worse and counted for only 50% of 1981
value. Other example is cooper-dependant Zambian economy (cooper export counted for 97% of export income
before oil crisis). Since having gained independence Zambia has been growing quite well and without bigger
11
This is an early draft – please do not cite without the author‟s permission
manpower on continent32. It is still a problem, as during my journey to Togo in 2013 I visited
coffee region near Kpalime, where I talked to the biggest coffee plantation owner in this area.
He admitted that it would be far more profitable to prepare coffee beans for final consumer in
Togo, but unfortunately there is no-one in the country who possesses such technology – that’s
why he has to sell raw coffee grounds to Western companies. It results in somehow bizarre
situation, where in a country with coffee crops it is impossible to drink local coffee (there is
only imported instant one).
Furthermore, Africa’s situation in terms of trade consequently worsened, also
indicating that development economic policy as seen by financial institutions doesn’t have
expected effects (of course we can identify multiple reasons for worsening terms of trade in
that time, from which oil crisis in 1970s is probably the most notable)33. It’s only after 2000
(see Table 3) when terms of trade of African and Latin American economies improved..
disturbance under the presidency of Kenneth Kaunda, who was capable of using British experts in developing
economic policy and gained Chinese money to build an important raliroad to Dar es Salaam. Oil crisis and
declining prices for cooper in world markets heavily hit Zambian economy, so the goverment was forced to loan
money. See: A. Thomson, op. cit., p. 194.
32
Not everyone would probably use as harsh words as often cited Walter Rodney: “the vast majority of Africans
went into colonialism with a hoe and came out with a hoe” W. Rodney, HOW EUROPE UNDERDEVEOPED
AFRICA, East African Educational Publishers, Nairobi 1972, p. 239.
33
The consequences of oil crisis can be seen in two dimensions: on the one hand – as was stated in BERG
REPORT – in 1970s African countries spend ~1% of its GDP on oil imports, in 1980s it increased to ~6%, on the
other – Western financial institutions gained petrodollars from OPEC countries, which were then loaned to
African countries. See: A CCELERATED DEVELOPMENT IN SUB-S AHARAN AFRICA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION (THE
BERG REPORT), World Bank 1981, p. 18.
12
This is an early draft – please do not cite without the author‟s permission
TABLE 3. TERMS OF TRADE OF GOODS AND SERVICES (PERCENT CHANGE, 1995-2013) 34
Advanced
1995
2000
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
-0.06
-2.02
-1.43
-1.16
0.40
-1.84
2.45
-0.96
-1.62
-0.74
0.17
1.80
-2.88
-0.87
-0.43
0.16
-2.89
4.03
-5.68
-2.36
0.83
0.03
4.68
3.88
7.28
2.66
3.38
-6.17
8.23
4.84
-1.76
0.82
3.14
26.98
20.11
6.88
2.88
11.54
-17.23 10.68
13.52
0.73
-1.67
-1.80
7.80
9.11
6.33
3.99
6.72
-9.99
7.96
0.01
-2.63
economies
Developing
Asia
Latin America 11.72
and Caribb.
Middle East
and North
Africa
Sub-Saharan
11.14
Africa
Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP) were introduced to help countries to get out of
the closed debt circle, which means that many countries were not even capable of paying the
interest for the previous loans35. Financial institutions had blamed state-driven and publicoriented development strategies of African countries for being unfair and ineffective (what
probably was true concerning for example buying by African governments domestic harvests
at depressed prices and then selling them on the world market at market prices), so they
decided to change those strategies in a market-driven manner based on Western experiences.
Structural Adjustment Programs were of limited accessibility: they were subjected to
several conditions, which can be summarized as liberalization of the economy (in the same
time when financial institutions demanded from African governments to stop subsidizing
import industries and to open domestic markets to international competition, Western
economies were subsidizing and heavily protecting its agriculture industry) 36.
34
International Monetary Fund, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK DATABASE, April 2013.
35
The service of the Africa’s total loans cost in 1980s and 1990s ~20% of its export income each year, as noted:
A. Thomson, op. cit., p. 194.
36
John Williamson, American economist from Washington-based think tank, named International Monetary
Fund’s and the World Bank’s policies toward developing countries as Washington consensus. He listed the
following ten elements constituting it: 1) Fiscal discipline; 2) Public spending focused on areas with high utility
(health, education, infrastructure) and not on subsidies; 3) Tax reform; 4) Financial liberalization: moderate real
interest rates and the abolition of preferential interest rates; 5) Competitive exchange rates; 6) Trade
liberalization: the replacement of quotas by tariffs and reducing the latter in the long term; 7) Equal treatment of
13
This is an early draft – please do not cite without the author‟s permission
TABLE 4. TOTAL EXTERNAL LONG-TERM DEBT 37 IN DEVELOPING ECONOMIES IN AFRICA (USD
MILLIONS, 1980-2010) 38
1980
1990
2000
2005
2010
Debt outstanding
90 299
235 385
250 363
251 394
235 903
Disbursements39
19 421
21 528
14 550
23 691
33 402
Debt service40
11 561
23 034
22 271
30 770
21 441
Principal repayments
6 512
14 680
15 337
20 688
15 475
Interest payment
5 049
8 354
6 934
10 082
5 966
Net transfers on debt41
7 861
-1 507
-7 721
-7 079
11 961
Even though financial institutions intensions were full of goodwill (for example in the
case of African farmers being paid fair, market prices for their crops), the effects of SAP are
seen in ambiguous way by different scholars42. In this context words written in 1994: “By
embracing structural adjustment, Africa is now taking the crucial first step in creating a
favourable economic environment for sustainable growth and development”43 may be now
seen as unproven.
SAP economic impact was different in each country, economic indicators in some of
them improved, in others deteriorated 44 . For sure one of its results was putting focus on
domestic enterprises and foreign investors (the removal of barriers); 8) Privatization; 9) Deregulation; 10)
Guarantee of the property rights. See: J. Williamson, W HAT WASHINGTON MEANS BY POLICY REFORM, in: J.
Williamson [ed.], LATIN AMERICAN READJUSTMENT : HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED, Institute for International
Economics ,Washington 1989.; A. Tausch [ed], THREE PILLARS OF WISDOM : A READER ON GLOBALIZATION ,
World Bank Pension Models and Welfare Society, Hauppauge, Nova Science, New York 2003
37
Long-term debt is defined by UNCTAD as debt that “has an original or extended maturity of more than one
year and that is owed to nonresidents and repayable in foreign currency, goods, or services”
38
HANDBOOK OF S TATISTICS , UNCTAD 2012.
39
Disbursements on long-term debt are defined by UNCTAD as “drawings on loan commitments during the
year specified”.
40
Long-term debt service payments are is defined by UNCTAD as “the sum of principal repayments and
interest payments in the year specified”.
41
Net transfers on long-term debt are is defined by UNCTAD as ‘disbursements’ minus ‘debt service payments’.
42
For example positive opinion about SAP in Africa in: ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA: REFORM, RESULTS AND THE
ROAD AHEAD, World Bank 1994; more negative in: AFRICAN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK TO S TRUCTURAL
ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES FOR S OCIO-ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND TRANSFORMATION , United Nations
Economic Commission on Africa 1989.
43
ADJUSTMENT IN AFRICA : REFORM, RESULTS AND THE ROAD AHEAD, World Bank 1994, p. 220.
44
Ibidem, p. 222-258.
14
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exporting agricultural and other primary products, which had to finish in decreasing world
prices for those commodities, as their supply in the world market increased.
On the other hand, social impact of SAP is seen in more one-dimensional way: it
resulted in bigger unemployment rates, cut in public sector spending (of course it should be
remembered that public spending and employment in administration before SAP were
excessively high) and the former had negative impact: on education (in some cases previously
free education required now fee) and on food prices (government food subsidies were cut off).
It was only in the late 1980s when World Bank leaned over the social consequences of SAP
and put more effort on combating them. From 1980 to 2005 total debt in developing
economies in Africa increased by 160% with also big increase in debt service costs. It’s only
in 2010 when this sum dropped, which made possible increasing disbursement rate, so that net
transfers on debt became positive (see Table 4).
Social impact of SAP programs entailed dissatisfaction of Africans, which obviously
resulted in changing attitude towards African governments, seen as responsible for negative
changes and blamed for stopping providing client-patron relation, which hitherto was a base
of post-colonial society-government mode of living45.
3. IF (AND WHAT) POST-DEVELOPMENT ALTERNATIVES CAN
BE FOUND IN AFRICA’S SOCIAL STRUCTURES?
Post-development theorists call for ‘alternatives to development’, even though their
ideas concerning how that can be realized are rare46, so that post-development concept is quite
an easy target for scientific critique47.
What might be a little surprising, post-development concept rather rarely focuses on
African countries and African researchers are not among well-known post-development
theorists, although this continent situation seems to be ‘easy’ to apply to post-development
45
Paragraphs concerning SAP were also used by the author on the paper CHINESE ENGAGEMENT IN S UBS AHARAN AFRICA – CAN BEIJING CONSENSUS BE EXPLAINED UNDER WORLD-S YSTEMS CONCEPT? presented at
the 8th Pan-European Conference On International Relations, session title: TB01-3: Asia's Power: Hard Versus
Soft Power, September 19th, 2013.
46
One of a few in: S. Latouche, IN THE WAKE OF THE AFFLUENT S OCIETY: AN EXPLORATION OF POSTDEVELOPMENT , Zed Books, London 1993.
47
K. G. Nustad, DEVELOPMENT : THE DEVIL WE KNOW?, in: “THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY”, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2001,
pp 479–489.
15
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frames. It should not be forgotten, that using African countries examples, seeing its diverse
and different from Western ways of living in the past and nowadays may be (and surely
would be) with great advantage for those post-development theorists, who feel responsible for
seeking rarely established ‘alternatives to development’ (and not only ‘alternative
development’)48.
Africa’s unique tradition may be a valuable source of seeking other than Western
values, which can be a base for a new model of social transformation now, when it turned out
that PWWII development idea didn’t succeed.
For example Emmanuel N’Dione points out that conventional development theorists
presume that Person A will give what he / she has in excess to Person B with the expectation
that Person B will in turn give what he / she has in excess in proportion to the value of what
he / she has received from Person A. However, some Senegalese communities believe in
something quite different: they assume that to give confers respectability on a person, and that
Person A, who has in excess, will give without any expectation of an equivalent return,
because the act of giving (rather than having) confers prestige49.
Something very similar was observed by Ghanaian-American philosopher, cultural
theorist and professor at Princeton University, Kwame Anthony Appiah. He points out that
what is unusual for tourists visiting Kumasi (Ghana), what is even striking for him, as
someone who has grown up in Ghana – that it is something natural, that people expect
something from you, and it’s not the case of “beggars, from whom many are physically
handicapped – blind old women and men assisted by seeing children, who take them to your
car‟s windows, victims of the Heine-Medina disease moving on crutches, lepers with fingers
destroyed by disease”50, but that’s the case of ‘everyman’, who asks about possible gifts,
taking him / her to your country etc. Appiah says, that it is the part of Ghanaian culture, where
success was (and is) conditioned by the network of people you’re in, relations you have. The
majority doesn’t have such a position which determines one is able to achieve things like
48
S. Matthews, op. cit., pp. 374, 380.
49
E. N’Dione, REINVENTER LE PRESENT. QUELQUES JALONS POUR L‟ACTION , ENDA/GRAF, Dakar 1994; E.
N’Dione, P. De Leener, J. Perier [et al.] REINVENTING THE PRESENT: THE CHODAK EXPERIENCE IN SENEGAL, in:
M. Rahnema, V. Bawntree [eds], THE POST-DEVELOPMENT READER, Cape Town 1997, pp. 364–376.
50
Translated from Polish by author of this dissertation: “Nie chodzi o żebraków, z których wielu jest fizycznie
upośledzonych – ślepe stare kobiety i mężczyźni w towarzystwie widzących dzieci, które prowadzą ich do okien
twojego samochodu, ofiary choroby Heinego-Medina na kulach, trędowaci z palcami wyżartymi przez chorobę”,
K. A. Appiah, K OSMOPOLITYZM . ETYKA W ŚWIECIE OBCYCH, Prószyński i S-ka, Warsaw 2008, p. 115.
16
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getting passport or obtaining construction permit, so they need ‘a patron’51 (as Appiah and
Thomson name it) – a person who is perceived to be wealthier and with better connections. So
it is seen as patron’s duty and a matter of honour to help (as also an expression of prestige).
Appiah cites in this context Ashanti people proverb: “if someone hates you, he won‟t ask you
for anything”52.
As Alex Thomson writes about this client-patron mode of seeing social relations:
“Government institutions were recognized as the key providers of employment services and
resources […]. This is how a political system based on client-patron relationships emerged in
the post-colonial period. Clients would offer their support to governments in return for
benefits such as jobs in the public sector, administrative „favours‟, new schools for their
region […], and so on. It was this client-patron interdependence that provided the societal
„glue‟ that bound the whole political system together […]. SAPs consciously aimed to break
these client-patron relationships, as they were judged to be economically (if not politically)
inefficient”53.
Development philosophy has become a foundation of the policy of Western countries
(international organizations, non-governmental organizations) to non-Western states.
Development concept fills the frames of international assistance policies created by the
Western institutions.
According to post-development theorists, development is a tool in the hands of the
political elites of Western countries – tool which is perpetuating Western pattern, and
perpetuating hegemony. Of course, it should be remembered that philosophy under which
PWWII development project was born, was an expression of specific historical experiences.
With all the respect to the history, it should be obvious, that if something doesn’t fulfill its
assumptions, it should be checked and revised. Assumption that there is only one path for all
the world seems to be obsolete.
51
Patron-client relation was also similiar in ancient Rome.
52
K. A. Appiah, op. cit. pp. 115-117.
53
A. Thomson, op. cit., p. 202.
17
This is an early draft – please do not cite without the author‟s permission