Page source: http://intersectionproject.eu//article/russia-europe/how-history-affects-politics
●
Author: Bronisław Geremek
How History Affects Politics
On the 15th May 2004, Warsaw University hosted a meeting of Professor Bronisław Geremek with students of
the elite scientific society “Collegium Invisibile”. It was organized - as a part of the seminar cycle “studenttutor” - by one of the “Intersection Project” Editorial Board’s members, Lukasz Adamski, Professor Geremek’s
student at that time. During the seminar, Professor Geremek commented on Mr Adamski’s presentation about
the German-Ukrainian relations. He also answered some of the questions from the audience. Several topics
were discussed: EU Eastern Policy, questions of relations between history and politics, as well as Polish
eastern policy after 1989, which had been conducted by Polish governments, with Mr Geremek’s active
participation.
Later, Bronisław Geremek authorized the transcript, and transferred the rights of its use for possible
publication to Mr Adamski.
We are presenting the transcript of this conversation, which is being published for the first time, to the
readers of the “Intersection”. Prof. Geremek’s influence on Polish and European politics, as well as his
significant position in European intellectual circles, makes the text an important historical source that
complements our knowledge of the backstage of the Polish-Soviet relations 1989-1991. At the same time, the
conversation provokes reflections on the relevance of the comments uttered eleven years ago.
The editors have not made any editorial amendments to the content and style of Professor Geremek’s
statement. We limited our intervention only to a division of the transcript into three separate articles, being
thematically related one to another. We also added titles. In addition, we changed the order of some
paragraphs, as compared to the original transcript, wishing to preserve the integrity of the discussed issues.
Part 3
Some speakers in this discussion wondered about what defines a country’s political weight and its relations. I
think of two factors: geography and history. Geography has to do with economic collaboration, and history has
to do with politics. Politics without history is nonsensical. History tells us what peoples have shared in their
past and what can they now invoke. And just think what we in Poland know about Belarus or Ukraine? Very
little indeed. We know more when we look at Belarus as part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, the country with
which the Kingdom of Poland merged in the past. Things did not go well with Ukraine, though. From the 17th
century onwards, Polish policy was ineffective from the viewpoint of Polish interests, and it was ineffective in
terms of our relations with the closest neighbours. But Ukraine is present in Poland’s collective historical
memory, and sometimes it is a very painful presence. We have disputes over which side murdered more
people. A Ukrainian poet once told me that we should produce a book and enter in it together all those
murdered on both sides. Only then will we cease mulling over who killed more and who killed fewer people. To
me, it is truly remarkable that the will to ask forgiveness can be found both among Ukrainians and among
Poles. This reflects well on both nations, and it also has its significance for the future of Europe.
Our geography-based argument is obvious to us, and geographic proximity also means economic interests. But
the argument of history – about Ukraine’s staying within the circle of European civilisation – is relegated to the
back seat. I remember my conversation held years ago with an outstanding historian, Dmitry Likhachev, who
first offered a rather stereotyped view that Russia has never been democratic. But he added that the country
had its democratic moments and some democratic traditions. The reason why Veliky Novgorod had such a
large market was to provide a meeting place for all of its inhabitants – and in the West you could not find an
example where the whole citizenship could meet together. To that I replied that there was such an example in
Poland, where the whole szlachta nation could meet together at Wola greens outside Warsaw to take part in
royal election proceedings.
***
Ukraine is indeed divided. Invoking various criteria, it is being dissected into post-Polish and post-Russian,
Greek Catholic and Orthodox, or pro-Western and pro-Eastern. What strongly sets Ukraine apart from Belarus
is the sense of national identity. To me, this is one of history’s psychological miracles. A people who almost
never had a state of their own – except for exceedingly brief periods – have generated among themselves the
will to live in such a state and a very strong national identity. Significantly, this sense of Ukrainian identity is
shared by local Russians. One in five Ukrainian citizens is an ethnic Russian, but when it came to choosing
between for and against Ukrainian independence, those Russians did not hesitate. They just voted for a free
Ukraine – in a very significant development which did not occur in Belarus.
And we should remember that under the Soviet Union, Belarus was something like a fair-haired boy.
Receiving inflows of resources and goods, Belarus was regarded by Moscow as a country that must be helped.
Consequently, the living standards in Belarus were relatively high. As for Ukraine, it had memories of a severe
famine, where deaths ran into the millions. That reflected the attitude of the USSR’s establishment who never
trusted Soviet Ukraine. Soviet Ukraine was always being humiliated. And to me, this explains why the sense of
national identity is pretty strong there.
***
For reasons of history, emotions, political interests, etc., geography sometimes tends to change. De Gaulle
used to say that only geography does not change, but geopolitics changes all the time. I think, though, that this
adage could sometimes be reversed. How strong sentiments Poles have always had for France, and how little
did we receive from this sentimental neighbour! They were coming here, carrying our women with them,
and making grand promises. Well, perhaps one benefit we received was the Napoleonic Code. But there is
such thing as emotional neighbourhood. Some of its signs can be detected in Kiev’s attitude towards Warsaw,
and towards Berlin – but not in Berlin’s attitude towards Kiev. Berlin indeed perceives Ukraine as very distant
geographically, and therefore it does not see that which it saw a half a century ago, or a century ago. Hence
the role for Poland. Poland’s drive to promote the Ukrainian cause will only be warranted if we can tell the
Germans this: “We saw the outside world as hostile to Poland, with the German threat on one side and the
Russian threat on the other. And as history demonstrated, that which threatened Poland also posed a threat to
the whole of Europe. But the German threat has been removed from the Europe horizon. Similarly, if we want
to get rid of the threat of a renaissance of Russian imperialism – which would be bad for Europe and bad for
Russia – then Ukraine’s independence is a matter of key importance.” This is an argument which invokes
geography, history and psychology alike. We have failed to use it in full so far, but it should give us some food
for thought.
Tags
история
география
Россия
Украина
Беларусь
Польша
Category
Russia / Europe