Emerging India's Policy towards Southeast Asia
during the Post-Cold War Era
I. BABU RAO*
If the 20th century was the 'American Century', it is equally true that
the 21st century is the 'Asian Century', as the region is associated
with the modernization and globalization of economic, political
and social life that has involved the spread of trade, industry,
tourism and connectivity. About the same time, India is also
emerging as an important actor of the Asian region by virtue of its
economic, political and military clout. It was the first Prime
Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, who envisioned the
prospects of India to become the 'Pivot of Asia', on account of its
apparent and latent material power as well as its geostrategic
location.
India's new initiative, Look East Policy, has begun strengthening
its partnership with the countries in Southeast Asia and Far East
in the post-Cold War era. It was identified as central to India's
Foreign Policy in the entire Asia-pacific. The Look East Policy has
a three pronged approach: first, to renew Political and economic
contacts with the ASEAN partners, second, to increase economic
interaction with the countries beyond Southeast Asia, and third,
to forge defence links with ASEAN countries as a means to
enhance political and strategic interests and understanding.
The present study attempts to anlayse India's post-Cold War
strategies towards Southeast Asia and the measures to maintain
the momentum of its meaningful engagement with Southeast
Asia to project itself as a great power in Asia.
India and Southeast Asia
India's links with Southeast Asia date back to first century A.D.
All over Southeast Asia one can find numerous symbols of these
ancient ties. Indian culture, religion, art, architecture and
* Dr. I. Babu Rao, Post-Doctoral Fellow, Centre for Southeast Asian & Pacific Studies,
S.V. University, Tirupati. E-mail:[email protected]
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Emerging India's Policy towards Southeast Asia during the Post-Cold War Era
languages have left an abiding impact on many countries of
Southeast Asia. Southeast Asia, located between two cultural
worlds namely, India and China, and situated between the Indian
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean comprises Myanmar, Thailand,
Malaysia, Singapore, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Indonesia,
Philippines and Brunei covering a total land area of 4.5 million
square kilometers. These countries together have a population of
about 510 million.1 Interestingly four of the ten Southeast Asian
countries are among the world's top 20 most competitive
economies. Southeast Asian geo-strategic significance is
enhanced by its sea-lanes through which the oil tankers and
freighters carrying oil to China, Japan and the US Pacific Coast
from Middle East and Eastern Coast of Africa pass each and every
day. Conscious of its inherent strengths, the region has begun to
play a greater role in global politics.2
Racial and cultural diversity is Southeast Asia's most outstanding
feature. All the countries of Southeast Asia have quite a few
minority groups each pursuing its distinct culture, language,
religion and social tradition. Being traditionally an open society,
Southeast Asia has received and absorbed major influences from
outside, thus the people of the region profess the “great
universalistic” religions, namely, Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam
and Christianity and speak about 1000 languages and dialects3.
Southeast Asia is also fast emerging as major manufacturer as
well as exporter of textiles, light consumer goods, electronics and
petroleum products. It also represents developing market with a
widening base of demand for consumer and capital goods and
technical skills. In a nutshell, Southeast Asia has rich potentials to
emerge as an economically vibrant region.
Southeast Asia is regarded as an important region for India's
security. Southeast Asia in the East and the Persian gulf in the
West constitute a close circle of Indian security. After World War
II, it was regarded that the security of India and the security of
Southeast Asia were interdependent. Geographically, Southeast
Asia is nearer to India. Apart from the geographical proximity,
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the region has a very significant strategic location between two
Oceans viz… the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. It controls
sea-lanes, which are regarded as the life line for the maritime
countries of the world including India. Andaman and Nicobar
Islands make India maritime neighbour of Burma, Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia. The distance between the Indian Island
called 'Indira point' and the Indonesian Island of 'Sabang of
Sumatra' is only about 100 miles. Southeast Asia, therefore, is
considered an important area from the point of India's defence
needs4. Further, India and Southeast Asia have reciprocal security
interests and cannot remain unaffected by the developments
taking place in each other's sphere. India was aware that its
neighbours serve as the spring boards for an attack on it which
nearly happened during the world war-II.5
India's policy towards Southeast Asia has been consistent and
there had been no major changes regarding her approach or
strategy towards the region ever since her independence. India
had always preferred close and friendly relations with individual
countries of the region. All the countries of the region faced more
or less similar problems in the Post-World War era but there were
glaring diversities among them from the point of view of their
colonial backgrounds and developed different socio-political
systems. As the process of decolonization began during postworld war II, efforts were again made to bring the two regions
close.
India's policy towards Southeast Asia during the Cold
War period:
With the end of World War II, the emergence of Cold War ushered
in an era of alliances and counter-alliances. India, in the
perplexing new global environment, indicated clearly that it did
not wish to be drawn into Cold War politics as non-alignment
emanated out of strategic compulsions and socio-economic and
political requirements of the country at that point of time. New
Delhi's response to the bipolar world, therefore, stood differently
from the experiences of the Southeast Asian countries, most of
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which were getting entangled with Cold War military alliances.
Obviously, India's foreign policy towards the Southeast Asian
countries during the Cold War years, had always been
determined by their super power relations and political
turbulence with in that region.
After the World War II, India and the countries of Southeast Asia
gained independence after a long and exploitative colonial rule.
India felt the need to rebuild relations with these countries.
Nehru's interest in the region was visible when he organized
Asian Relations Conference in March-April, 1947, “to bring
together the leading men and women of Asia on a common
platform to study the problems of common concern to the people
of the continent, to focus attention on social, economic and
cultural problems of the different countries of Asia and to foster
mutual contact and understanding”.6 Nehru offered to serve as a
mediator during the French-Indochina War (1946-1954), and
Korean War (June 1950 July 1953). He expressed pride in Japan's
victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 and opposed
punishing Japan at the post World War II Tokyo trails.7 India
vehemently opposed Dutch action in Indonesia and did not allow
the refueling of Dutch planes which were being used to quell the
freedom movement there.8 The organization of Conference on
Indonesia in New Delhi in 1949 and taking interest in organizing
the Bandung Conference in 1955 are only a few of many efforts
India made to redevelop economic and political relations with the
region as a whole.
India forged her links with the countries of the Southeast Asian
region, in terms of its non-aligned ethos based on the enunciation
of certain principles namely anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, nonalignment etc. Therefore, India's foreign policy in the 1950's and
1960's towards the Southeast Asian countries took the form of
“Diplomacy by Proclamation”.9 During these years, India in the
capacity of the Chairman of the International Control
Commission (ICC) for three Indochina states (Vietnam,
Cambodia and Laos), was mainly concerned with liberating
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Indochina from all external influences in order to ensure that the
independence and neutrality of these countries were guaranteed
by the great powers, especially, by the United States and China
and to make this area, conducive to peace and non-alignment.
However, this mission of India did not fully succeed. The only
discernible partial success of this policy, seems to be enduring
friendship that India could establish with Vietnam, which firmly
resisted the US imperialism and military expedition.
However, all the efforts made by India to befriend the countries of
Southeast Asia did not bring desired results. The countries of
Southeast Asia were not keen to keep India on their foreign policy
priority.10 They were more inclined to develop economic ties with
Japan, and Korea. The presence of a large number of Chinese
populations in many of these countries and its dominating
presence also kept them diplomatically engaged with China.11
Philippines and Thailand became part of US sponsored military
alliance called Southeast Asian Treaty organization (SEATO) and
part of Western alliances system. India's Southeast Asia policy
lost further momentum after the Sino-Indian border conflict of
September 1962. Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty of 1971
made these countries, especially Indonesia and Malaysia
skeptical of India's commitment to the policy of non-alignment.
The nuclear tests conducted by India in 1974, launching of a new
Joint Service Command, based in Andaman and Nichobar
Islands,12 and recognition of Vietnamese installed Kampuchean
regime of Heng Samrin made India unpopular with the countries
of Southeast Asia.
Therefore, India's interaction with ASEAN in the Cold War years,
can be described as a tale of missed opportunities. In other words,
India and ASEAN remained estranged during the Cold War years
and their ties, in addition to being tenuous, lacked real essence. In
New Delhi's calculations, cordial ties with ASEAN did not
produce any immediate and palpable gains, be it political,
economic or strategic.
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Shifting Trends in India's policy towards Southeast
Asia :
The years between 1989 and 1991, formed a watershed in the
history of the 20th Century witnessing a series of swift and
bewildering events-like the reunification of Germany, the
collapse of the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union and the eventual disintegration of the latter, the end
of the Cold War and the impact of the Gulf war on the functioning
of the United Nations Security Council13 and the Cold War giving
way to a new multi-polar world and new global order,
characterized by positional shifts among all the actors. The
ideological struggle between Capitalism and Communism
vanished in no time and paved the way for globalization.
The Cold War period foreign policy preferences changed, the
Western military alliances came to an end, India and these
countries gave a fresh thought to their role and preferences in the
changing world order. India started moving toward Southeast
Asia to build strong economic, strategic and political ties, and on
the other, Southeast Asian countries, leaving aside their past
inhibitions, began moving closer to India. These moves between
them can be seen in the context of numerous politico-strategic and
economic changes brought about by the end of Cold War in
international relations.
Change in India's attitude can be attributed to many reasons. The
open door policy adopted by China during 1980's had given it a
quantum jump making it an emerging economic giant in Asia. In
contrast, India still follows Fabian Socialist policies of Nehru Era.
China regarded this region as its natural sphere of influence and
had started expanding political, economic and military influence
there. Under the force of circumstances
domestic and
international-India had also to liberalize its economy to compete
with China and other international market forces in the region.14
By the time Cold War came to an end, India's economy was in the
doldrums. Rising inflation, government subsidies, and interest
payments and a concomitant decline in overseas remittances
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during the later half of 1980's, all contributed an overall decline in
India's economy. There was a substantial rise in non-productive
expenditure. Defence expenditure rose from 15.9 per cent of
central government spending in 1980-81 to 16.9 per cent in 198788 and to nearly 19 per cent in 1990-91. Subsidies grew from 8.5
percent in 1980-81 to 11.4 per cent in 1989-90.15
The percentage of trade in relation to GNP had actually fallen
from 12.4 per cent in 1984-85 to 11 per cent in 1988-89. The low
level to trade disallowed any flexibility in terms of India's
growing demand for petroleum and petroleum products to fuel
its industrialization. Keeping in view the small percentage of the
economy involved in trade, there was hardly any scope for
adjusting for any rise in the prices of oil within the overall trade
balance. The oil price rise that followed the 1990-91 Gulf crisis had
caused a 21.9 per cent rise in the import bill in rupee terms.16 It is
worth mentioning here that in 1965 India's energy imports
constituted only about 8 per cent of the value of its merchandise
exports, where as 1990 energy imports accounted for nearly 25 per
cent of the value of exports.17 These moves compelled India to
open up to the world economy.
The economic ascendance of East Asia and China had made India
watch and emulate its Southeast Asian neighbours. Manmohan
Singh, who became Finance Minister and the architect of the
Indian Economic Reforms, had been Secretary General of the
South Commission of the UN in Geneva from 1987 to 1990. He
had often repeated that Korea and India had the same GDP per
capita in the 1950's and that South Korean model of economic
growth could be emulated. In September 1995, he declared: “The
economic policies of India take into account the dynamism of this
region (Asia Pacific), which shall soon be the tiger-economy of
the world. We want to be participant in this process.18
In fact, Indian policy makers noted rather belatedly, the
implications of the 12-year head-start which China had in
opening-up, reforming and developing its economy much ahead
of India and in networking and strengthening the consequent
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political and economic linkages of China with the countries in the
Asia-pacific region. In this task, China was, of course, helped by
the presence in this region of a strong, hard working and
prosperous Chinese entrepreneurial class, which played an
important role in the economic development for not only China,
but also of the countries of this region, more particularly
Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand and to a lesser extent,
Malaysia and the Philippines.19 India drew inspiration from the
East Asian path of development and became more closely
associated with this region in economic terms. This desire was
officially expressed by Narasimha Rao, the Prime Minister of
India, in 1994 during his visit to Singapore. He said:
The Asia - Pacific could be the spring board for our leap into the
global market place ….. I am happy to have had this opportunity to
enunciate my belief in this vision of a new relationship between
India and the Asia-pacific from Singapore, which I consider the
geographic and symbolic centre of the Asia-pacific. I trust this
vision will be realized…. and that the next century will be a
century of partnership for us all. 20
In the unfolding new economic order India had less economic
interest in the Middle East. Although India possesses business
interests in that region and provides labour, and professionals to
the Middle East, the relationship had been more of a dependence
on the oil and remittances. Moreover, geopolitical instability and
the emerging threat of terrorism also dissuaded India from
undertaking worthwhile financial investments there. Southeast
Asia was politically more stable than the Middle East and had a
common stand and concern about the lethal and negative impact
of growing terrorist networks, many of which had emanated from
the Middle East. The economics of Southeast Asia due to their
rapid growth - were an attractive and better option for India.21 It
was thus natural for India to have an alternative which Southeast
Asia provided.
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Strategically also India had to device a policy, called the Look East
Policy, to engage and establish good relations with its immediate
eastern neighbours. Growing proximity between China and
Myanmar and concomitant support to the insurgent groups of
northeast, Chinese economic and military cooperation and use of
some islands of Myanmar as a strategic observatory,22 possible
basis for the activities of the northeast insurgent groups in
Thailand and the Philippines, underground arms market of
Cambodia which was becoming an important source of arms for
the insurgent groups; compelled India to take care of its national
security which could be threatened from the East. Gaining of
economic and military foothold in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri
Lanka by China was another point of concern for India.23
Therefore, it was absolutely necessary to seek the cooperation of
governments of these countries in dealing with such threats.
India, being a trading nation, could ill afford to tolerate unsafe Sea
Lanes Of Communications (SLOCs) around its shores. With the
rise in trade and commerce, dependence on shipping
overwhelmingly increased and it became essential to make
maritime trade routes safe.24 India also needed to collectively
tackle human smuggling, pollution, accidents, possible closure of
choke points, territorial disputes, arms and narcotics trade and
piracy in the high seas. As a matter of fact, contraband trade of
arms and ammunitions from Cambodia and heroine from
Thailand and illegal immigration from Bangladesh, Myanmar
and Sri Lanka have been major concerns for India. There were
also apprehensions of the ISI and LTTE infiltration in sparsely
islands of the Andaman and Nicobar for their illegal activities.25
T
his underlined the need for closer naval and military ties with
the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore.
Disappointing pace of regional integration through SAARC due
to usually strained relations between India and Pakistan was
another reason for India to Look East. So these concerns became
the factors behind India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia
after the Cold War.
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India's Look East Policy
India's post-Cold War foreign policy towards Southeast Asia
marked a strategic shift in India's perspective. It commenced
with the beginning of economic reforms and was seen as an
opportunity to enlarge its economic engagement. It was also an
effort to renew and revitalize the traditional linkages with
countries of Southeast Asia.
India's looking at the East is an outcome of its quest for a
redemptive recompense for missed opportunities. For a long
time the idea of courting rapport with the East refused to strike
the Indian mind habituated to incline to the west. India's policy of
Look East, however took a definite shape after P.V.Narasimha
Rao became Prime Minister in 1991. Indian economic reforms of
1991 and 1992 convinced ASEAN to grant India the status of
Sectoral Dialogue partner for Tourism, Commerce, Investments,
and Science and Technology. The same year India formally
launched the Look East Policy.26
There after, India embarked on a number of economic reforms
with the object of joining the market oriented countries and
entering the political mainstream of international community.
India's liberal approach attracted ASEAN community. Just as
India found ASEAN as a major economic space, ASEAN found
India a very attractive destination for export of its goods, services,
technology and capital. There were push and pull from both
sides. It was precisely that hastened the process of India
becoming a Sectoral Dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1992, and a
Full Dialogue partner in 1995. This enabled “India to make its
mark in the dialogue process not only with the ASEAN countries
but also with three East Asian Countries: China, Japan and South
Korea (ASEAN+3)”.27 As a Full Dialogue partner, India could
participate in the Annual Meetings of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF), a platform to discuss issues relating to peace,
stability and security of the region. India tried after 1999 for a
Summit Level Partnership with ASEAN. At the 7th ASEAN
Summit, held in November, 2001, at Darussalam (Brunei), the
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organization decided to upgrade its relations with India to
Summit Level, which culminated in the First India-ASEAN
Summit.
The further institutionalization of India- ASEAN relations came
with the first India- ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on 5th
November 2002 and was perceived as the success of India's Look
East Policy. It was considered an acknowledgement of India's
emergence as a key player in the Asia Pacific Region.28 This break
through came after a long and arduous effort on the part of the
Indian diplomacy to convince ASEAN Summit. This sentiment
was echoed in an article in a leading Indian news paper which
stated: “The first Association of Southeast Asian Nations India
Summit held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, sets the stage for India to
move purposefully ahead in developing a broad strategic
partnership with the countries of Southeast Asia”.29
There is a clear recognition in Indian political circles of the
economic and strategic importance of ASEAN to India's national
interest. At the Annual Singapore lecture in 2002, the then Indian
Prime Minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee stated, “The Southeast
Asian region is one of the focal points of India's foreign policy,
strategic concerns and economic interests”.30 The strategic
location of the ASEAN region places it among the most crucial
regions in the world. With Myanmar being included in ASEAN,
apart from sharing maritime frontiers with Indonesia and
Thailand and its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) with Malaysia, 31
India considered ASEAN to be the nucleus of the East Asian
region.
The first phase of the Look East Policy focused on developing
commercial relations and institutional links with the ASEAN
countries and in the second phase India aimed at political
partnership, physical connectivity through road and rail links,
free trade agreements, and defence cooperation. During this
phase India strived to build strategic partnership by holding joint
naval exercises with Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Myanmar, the Philippines and Vietnam. Annual naval exercise
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'Milan' symbolizes regular interaction and cooperation between
the navies of India and Southeast Asian countires.32 India also
signed MoUs on defence cooperation with the Southeast Asian
countries to provide training to MIG-29 fighter pilots, supply
spare parts and service for these air crafts.
This new shift in foreign policy was multi dimensional. In
pursuance of this policy, India initiated measures to develop
ASEAN level cooperation and individual relations with these
countries. Two other measures in this regard include the
BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical
and Economic Cooperation) and Mekong Ganga Cooperation
(MGC).
The Bay of Bengal Community: BIMSTEC Experiment
Yet another dimension of India's Foreign Policy towards
Southeast Asia was its association with BIMST-EC (the Bay of
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic
Cooperation). Historically, the communities and nations around
Bay of Bengal had interacted and established multifarious strands
of relationships. In tune with many other initiatives after the Cold
War came to an end, a new sub-regional grouping BIST-EC
(Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand Economic Cooperation),
the brain child of Thailand, was formally launched by the Foreign
Ministers of the perspective member nations in Bangkok June 6,
1997.33 The entry of Myanmar in December 1997, and Nepal and
Bhutan in 2003, demanded the reordering of the acronym BISTEC so as to read as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral
Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMST-EC).
BIMST-EC offered an opportunity to get its ties with its eastern
neighbours reinforced, much in conformity with the core of
India's Look East Policy. Describing BIMST-EC's relevance to
India Prime Minister Manmohan Singh noted:
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We consider our participation in BIMST-EC as a key element in our
'Look East Policy' and long standing approach of good neighbourliness
towards all our neighbours by land and sea. The challenge before us is
to transform the richness of our human and natural resources into
cooperative regional activities promoting development, enhancing
prosperity and the well-being of our people, and ensuring our collective
security in all its multifarious dimensions.34
The BIMST-EC has indirectly met the aspirations of some of the
smaller countries of South Asia which have been clamoring for a
large economic and political space in a world of rapid global
integration. This can be seen another Indian effort to link itself
with a part of ASEAN through Myanmar and Thailand. As China
and Pakistan do not belong to the Bay of Bengal community, India
is in a more comfortable position be an unchallenged leader of this
formation. The BIMST-EC brings together 1.3 billion people
comprising 21 percent of the world population, a combined GDP
of 750 billion US dollars and has the potential of 43 to 59 billion
dollar trade annually.35
BIMST-EC member countries had reached a milestone when they
joined in BIMST-EC Free Trade Area in Pukhet in February, 2004.
The BIMST-EC agreement aimed to create a free trade zone where
tariffs would be brought down to zero by 2012. Bangladesh and
Myanmar, the two least developed countries of the forum were
given extra time to drop their tariff rates to zero level by the year
2017. This agreement opened new vistas for economic and
commercial links amongst the member nations. It highlights the
necessity of interdependence among member nations in the
presently fast globalized economic world.
Mekong - Ganga Cooperation (MGC)
Mekong Ganga Cooperation is another important sub-regional
organization of South and Southeast Asia. The organization
gives opportunity to India to cooperate with the countries of
Greater Mekong sub-region. Since Ganga and Mekong are
regarded as two of the greatest rivers in Asia, the idea of the
project bloomed out of the need to create a linkage between the
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two civilizations.
The shared histories and geographical
contiguity with India accord a strategic value to this area. IndiaMekong countries provide a strategic accessibility to reach the
heartland of Asia-Pacific. These countries are relatively poor and
under-developed than other countries of Southeast Asia. As
Indian economy was registering better growth, its entrepreneurs
had fairly good chances of profitable investment and economic
cooperation there. For the fulfillment of the objective, India
announced at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting at Bangkok in July
2000, a new cooperative forum with five of its eastern neighbours
Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam called as the
Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC) Forum.36
This new six nation sub-regional forum seeks to promote tourism,
human resources, culture and transportation. Transportation
assumes greater importance as the signatories agreed to develop
transport networks which include the East-West Corridor and
ASEAN Highway. The basic thrust of the MGC is to undertake
economic development of the Mekong region by developing the
infrastructure facilities. For India, MGC offers immense scope for
creating 'Linkages' with the Mekong countries by connecting
them to the subcontinent's poorly developed North Eastern
States. Indian policy makers believe that the development of
northeast is crucial to the promotion of trade and industrial
cooperation with the ASEAN countries, the Mekong countries in
particular. Road construction linking the Northeast and MGC
will facilitate quicker overland transportation of goods between
the two regions. The ASEAN Highway on its completion will link
Singapore with the Indian mainland via the Mekong cities and the
Northeast.37 Mekong Ganga Cooperation has, therefore, become
a pillar of India's foreign policy towards Southeast Asia in recent
years.
India's New Southeast Asia Policy
India's foreign policy has undergone a sea change in the postCold War period. If India wants to keep the pace of its economic
development intact it has to be alive to the changing economic
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world order and the process of Asian Economic Integration.
India's policy of Look East is relevant to develop closer
cooperation with Southeast Asia as well as emerging Asia-Pacific
economic hub.
India has emerged as one of the largest economies not just in Asia,
but the entire world. With the third largest GDP and a growth
rate of 7-8 per cent, India is poised to emerge as a large economic
power 38 in the years to come. With a rising middle class and an
economy on an upward trajectory, India has large economic
potential and provides ample opportunities for economies in the
region to link up with its economic resurgence. ASEAN has
certainly taken note of this fact and is aware that it is in its best
interest to include India in a regional frame work and thereby,
capitalize on its emerging strength. One of the objectives of the
Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic
Cooperation signed between India and ASEAN is to facilitate the
more effective economic integration of the new ASEAN member
states and the bridging of development gap among the parties.39
There is growing awareness that regional disparities need to be
addressed and cooperation increased, to broaden the range of
countries that derive benefits from growth in the region.
India and ASEAN also share common interests with regard to
regional peace and security. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks
on the United States, terrorism has become a new threat to global
and regional security. Both India and ASEAN are faced with
grave vulnerabilities with regard to terrorism and it is in their
common interest to work together to build peace and security in
the region. Further, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise
in China's power in Asia. “One of the considerations ASEAN
took into account while according bigger status to India was
definitely the issue of China's rising power profile and especially
its naval incursions into the South China sea as also China's
expanding acceptance worldwide”.40 With the withdrawal of US
troops from strategic locations in the region following the
collapse deemed it appropriate to guard against Chinese
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influence by setting up vital Sea-Lanes of Communications
(SLOCS) such as the Taiwan, Malacca, Sunda and Lumbak straits.
From security perspective, too the policy is quite important and
relevant as it can take care of its strategic concerns such as free and
secure a sea lanes and security environment around its maritime
boarders. This is not possible without the active support and
involvement of the countries of the Southeast Asia. China as an
economic and military power is past building bridges in India's
northeastern neighbourhood. Through this policy, India can
counter China in these countries.
According to Prime Minister Manmohan Singh “Look East Policy
was a strategic shift in India's vision of the world and India's place
in the evolving global economy”. Addressing the North East
Council on 12th April 2005 in New Delhi, he again said that, “Full
advantage may be taken of the Look East Policy of the
Government of India. ASEAN markets provide big opportunities
for North Eastern Region (NER), particularly in the areas such as
promotion of horticulture, floriculture and medicinal herbs.41
ASEAN countries justifiably perceive India, with the largest
naval force in the Indian Ocean and nuclear capabilities, a
strategic partner to balance China's growing power in the
region.42
In 1980s ASEAN had apprehensions regarding expansion of
India's navy and India's nuclear capabilities. “But India's
willingness to accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia and its endorsement of the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) has gone a long way in assuring
the region of India's intent. The ASEAN looks at India's security
needs more as a factor emanating from the compulsions of the
geopolitical position that India holds, rather than being a
derivative of any hegemonic designs on India's part”.43
The increasing relevance of India in the East Asian framework has
contributed to its rising interaction with ASEAN. Though there
has been turbulence in their relations in the past, it is evident that
the importance of integrating in today's interconnected
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globalizing world has been recognized by countries in East Asia.
With ASEAN as the established hub and the framework of
regionalism in place in the region, it has been realized that it is
prudent to include India and allow it to participate for increased
benefits and growth.
Conclusion
India-ASEAN relations have come a long way since their
turbulent Cold-War phase. The 1990's have seen a distinct rise in
their interaction along with firm measures to integrate and
cooperate in the economic as well as political spheres. ASEAN
sees India as an emerging power in Asia which is keen to develop
relations with it that would be beneficial to countries within
ASEAN and to the region as a whole. It realizes that India
possesses large strategic capabilities and can be a strong
stabilizing force in the region. Economically India, with its
burgeoning middle class, can be a significant market for ASEAN
manufacturers and consequently, an important source of welfare
for the region. There is a lot that ASEAN can gain from India's
development in its service sector and it looks to develop wide
ranging economic partnerships.
The India-ASEAN partnership holds ample potential for a
successful future. As things stand, it is evident that both India
and ASEAN are keen to establish a strong relationship with a
long-term emphasis on greater cooperation and integration, apart
from the strengthening of economic and strategic ties. While
there are definite challenges to be addressed before achieving a
consolidated East Asian Community, it is evident that conscious
efforts are being made on both sides in developing synergies for
the shared prosperity and mutual benefit of India ASEAN and
the Asian region at large.
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42. Anand Mohit, India-ASEAN RELATIONS, n.30, p.6.
43. Ibid.
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