Florida State University Libraries
Honors Theses
The Division of Undergraduate Studies
2013
A Fundamental Disagreement in the
Contemporary Inseparatist-Separatist Debate
Chris Freire
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS & SCIENCES
A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT IN THE
CONTEMPORARY SEPARATIST-INSEPARATIST DEBATE
By
CHRIS FREIRE
A Thesis submitted to the
Department of Philosophy
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation with Honors in
the Major
Degree Awarded:
[Spring, 2013]
1
The members of the Defense Committee approve the thesis of Chris
Freire defended on May 3, 3013.
______________________________
Dr. John Roberts
Thesis Director
______________________________
Dr. Frank Johnson
Outside Committee Member
______________________________
Dr. Stephen Kearns
Committee Member
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A Fundamental Disagreement within the
Contemporary Inseparatist-Separatist Debate
By: Christopher Freire
Florida State University
Department of Philosophy
Honors in the Major Thesis
Table of Contents
PART I: Introduction, Motivation, and Historical Considerations………………………..…3
Initial Motivation………………………………………………………………………...3
Historical Considerations…………………………………………………………….….8
Historically Separatist……………………………………………………….…..8
3
The Short(er) History of Inseparatism………………………………………..10
PART II: The Contemporary Inseparatist-Separatist Debate……………………………...12
Inseparatism…………………………………………………………………………….14
Separatism………………………………………………………………………………19
PART III: A Fundamental Disagreement…………………………………………………….22
Inseparatism and the Rabbit tail example…………………………………………….23
Separatism and the Mirror Example………………………………………………….26
Fundamental Representationalist Commitments…………………………………….28
Separatism and Externalist Representationalism…………………………….31
Inseparatism and Internalist Representationalism…………………………..32
Concluding Remarks…………………………………………………..33
PART IV: Objections & Responses……………………………………………………………33
Compatibility Objection……………………………………………………………….34
Disanalogy Objection…………………………………………………………………..37
Directionality Objection………………………………………………………………..39
PART V: Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………...44
Works Cited…………………………………………………………………………………….47
PART I: Introduction, Motivation, and Historical Considerations
Within the philosophy of mind there has recently been a debate between separatist and
inseparatists of intentional and phenomenal mental states. Phenomenal mental states are
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qualitative or experiential states such as the feeling of a sharp pain, the taste of chocolate ice
cream, or the red of a rose petal. Phenomenal mental states are often characterized by the qualia,
or "what-its-like" experiences that they consist of (Nagel, 1974). Intentional mental states are
mental states that are about something, or represent something (begins with Brentano, 1874). For
example, the belief that there is ice cream in the freezer, the desire to eat ice cream, and the fear
of getting cavities, are all considered intentional mental states. The inseparatist-separatist debate
is centered around questions of how to best understand the relationship between intentional and
phenomenal mental states. Generally speaking, the inseparatist contends that intentional and
phenomenal mental states are closely related; while the separatist contends that these mental
states are not closely related. These degrees of relation vary on different accounts within the
literature.
In this thesis, I will explain and analyze two of the leading contemporary inseparatist
(Horgan et al, 2002, 2011) and separatist positions (Millar, 2010), and will argue that the
fundamental source of disagreement between these views results from each side's underlying
representationalist commitments, which cannot be resolved solely through the inseparatistseparatist debate itself (as it is laid out by these two authors).
Initial Motivation
While the inseparatist-separatist debate is a small subfield within the philosophy of mind,
there are many important implications that can come out of the conclusions and discussions of
the debate. Before we begin to discuss the inseparatist-separatist debate itself, it is important to
see three important reasons why this debate is indeed an important one: 1) Implications for the
methodology of Psychology; 2) Implications for functionalism; 3) Implications for the general
metaphysics of the mind.
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The most practical implications for the inseparatist-separatist debate lie with it's
application to the field of psychology, specifically with how psychologists and neuroscientists
approach questions about the relationship between sensation/perception and objects in the
physical world. One general question that psychologists and neuroscientists seek to answer asks,
"How accurately do our sensations and perceptions represent the world?" Questions of this type
are constantly pursued by testing our thresholds for perception (i.e. how loud does something
have to be before we hear it), examining why our perceptions represent the world one way
instead of another (i.e. why people notice different things in the same picture), or simply how
accurately we can judge distance and size. Although these are primarily questions about how our
phenomenal mental states relate to the external world, we can also see how these psychological
studies can ask questions about the relationships between mental states.
For example, when a psychologist asks a participant "why do you believe object B is
farther away than object A", he is asking what phenomenal mental states justify the participant's
intentional state. What the psychologist means when he asks this questions changes depending
on which side of the inseparatist-separatist the psychologist lies. If the psychologist is an
inseparatist the question simply means "what are the phenomenal states that constitute your
intentional state?"; where as the separatist would mean "what phenomenal states (C) cause the
separate intentional state (D), and what about C justifies you in believing D?" While the first
(inseparatist) question considers the intentional state to be justified solely in terms of
phenomenal states (i.e. I believe object A is farther than object B, simply because object A looks
farther than object B!); a separatist explanation might require a slightly different type of
explanation. Because the separatist psychologist considers the phenomenal states independently
from the intentional state, the separatist psychologist would need to know what exactly it is about
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C, that makes the participant believe D aside from the phenomenal experiences of C. Thus, if
philosophers can show that either separatism or inseparatism is true, the types of questions
psychologists ask, the relevancy of types of research, and the types of acceptable conclusions can
be shaped in important ways by the inseparatist-separatist debate.
There are also important implications to be considered within the philosophy of mind.
The most obvious are to the doctrine of functionalism. Functionalism holds that mental states can
be understood in terms of their functional role is causing other mental states and behaviors. The
most common objection to functionalism point out that some mental states (specifically
phenomenal mental states) do not always have a functional role in causing other mental states.
The objection here is that while intentional states (such as beliefs and desires) almost certainly
are functionalizable, it is not clear that phenomenal mental states are also functionalizable. This
objection has obvious separatist commitments, as it uses the dichotomy of intentional and
phenomenal mental states as a platform for argument. For if inseparatism were indeed true, this
objection could not be made (at least not as easily), because it would be the case that phenomenal
states are necessarily dependent on intentional states. And because intentional states are
functionalizable, and phenomenal states are inseparably linked to intentional states, we would
not need to provide (or would atleast be less motivated to provide) a non-functionalist account
for these phenomenal states. Furthermore, if separatism were true, then the functionalist would
indeed be hard pressed to once again answer problems of qualia. That is, if phenomenal states
were completely independent from the functionalizable intentional states, a new argument would
certainly be needed to functionalize phenomenal states that does not merely try to mesh
intentional states together with phenomenal states. Although the conclusion of the inseparatistseparatist debate does not have definitive implications for functionalism, it is clear that
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inseparatism can be an consideration when forming and defending a functionalist thesis, and
separatism can be an equally important weapon for those pressing the problem of qualia as an
objection to functionalism.
There are also the general implications that this important debate has on our fundamental
metaphysical understanding of the mind. It is clear that a primary focus of both philosophy of
mind and philosophy in general is to understand the nature of the mind. Questions of this nature
ask "what is the relation between the mind and the environment?", "Is the mind physical or
nonphysical?", and "How can we best define the mind and understand it's functions?". The
inseparatist-separatist debate can give important insights to all three of these questions.
If separatism is true, then it seems like phenomenal states are what relate to the world
(i.e. seeing red is caused by something in the environment, whether accurate or not), while
intentional states relate our propositional states to the environment (i.e. I believe that the
environment is X, I desire it to be Y). This would be a different type of world than an inseparatist
one, where intentional states are dependent on and/or constituted by our phenomenal states. So
instead of phenomenal states relating to the world, and intentional states also relating to the
world; intentional states could only relate to the world through our phenomenal states. That is, "I
believe that X" (intentional state), because my phenomenal states tell me that X. While the
separatist considers the phenomenal independent from the intentional, and can therefore easily
relate both types of mental states to the environment in sometimes different ways; most
inseparatists contend that the content of intentional states depends on the content of phenomenal
states, and can thus only relate intentional states to the environment through their constitutive
phenomenal states (which can be problematic when considering problems of qualia and
inaccurate perceptions).
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The inseparatist-separatist debate can also have useful implications for the physicalismdualism debate. It is commonly thought that although our beliefs, desires, and other paradigmatic
intentional states might be reducible to physical processes in the brain, the qualia of phenomenal
experience (i.e. the experience of seeing red, the feel of a sharp pain) is not reducible to the
physical processes in the brain. What is relevant here is that if separatism is true, this would
provide reasons to believe that because intentional and phenomanal states are indeed different,
and might be have to be explained in different ways (physical vs. nonphysical). Contrastingly, if
inseparatism is true, and the phenomenal and intentional are mutually dependent, then this would
provide reasons to believe that both can be reduced in similar ways (whether physicalist or nonphysicalist).
Although these three types of implications are surely important, they are not necessary
consequences from the antecedent truths of inseparatism or separatism. These three types of
implications are simply hypotheses about what conclusions philosophers would be expected to
draw from the inseparatist-separatist debate. And like all philosophical conclusions, they require
carefully constructed arguments. My goal in bringing up the psychological (1), functionalist (2),
and metaphysical (3) considerations associated with the inseparatist-separatist debate, is to show
that this small subfield in philosophy of mind has important implications that extend far beyond
the debate itself, and is therefore a highly relevant topic to pursue.
Historical Considerations
Historically, philosophers of mind have favored the separatist position, and have often
used the dichotomy between phenomenal and intentional mental states as a background
assumption in discussions of functionalism, epiphenomenalism, problems of qualia, and more
generally in physicalist/Dualist debates. Jaegwon Kim, Daniel Dennet, and Hilary Putnam have
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all presupposed a separatist position in order to begin further types of discussion in philosophy of
mind. However, within the last decade or so, there has been somewhat of an inseparatist
revolution led by Graham, Tienson, and Horgan. In a series of articles, the inseparatist-separatist
debate is brought to light and focused on as more than a background assumption. Horgan,
Tienson, and Graham (among others) argue that an inseparatist position is in fact the correct
position to hold, despite the once widely held separatist commitments. Before I begin an analysis
and discussion of the current inseparatist-separatist debate, I will give a brief historical overview
of the separatist and inseparatist positions, and how they developed into what we see today.
Historically Separatist
Contemporary separatist positions are commonly thought of to have been first implicitly
argued for by the proponents of externalism in the 1970s. Kripke proposed that the reference of
proper names and natural kinds is determined at least in part by external causal and historical
factors (Kirpke, 1972). Arguably, the most famous argument was put forth in Hilary Putnam's
'twin earth' thought experiment (Putnam, 1975). Putnam imagines an earth exactly like our earth,
except where water is composed of XYZ, not H2O. He then reasons that the statement "this is
water" is true here on our earth so long as it is H2O, but would be false on twin earth because it
is not H2O. This is because the truth conditions of the statement is determined (at least partially)
by the external environment (the molecular composition of water), not our subjective experience
of the taste, feel, or sight of water.
From this, philosophers began to argue more explicitly about what exactly individuates
mental content. Daniel Dennett later gave a thought experiment to show that perceptions alone
cannot individuate content. Imagine a frog that has a perceptual 'belief' that he is eating a fly
every time a small dark object comes close to him. Now imagine that we toss a lead pellet near
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the frog, and the frog eats this pellet believing it is a fly. The inseparatist would be committed to
saying the frog's perception of the pellet and the fly, are beliefs with the same intentional content
because the perceptions of fly and the pellet are identical. But there is something initially
worrisome about this conclusion. Intentional content must be determined or individuated so that
there is a genuine difference between believing there is a fly nearby, and believing there is a
pellet nearby, and it is clear that phenomenal perception is not up to this task (Dennett, 1987).
While this thought experiment points out a problem with intentional content individuation by
phenomenology, Dennett himself is a nihilist about intentional content individuation, and
believes that there is actually no way to individuate intentional content (either
phenomenologically or physically).
A more moderate approach to defending separatism was put forth by Fodor claimed that
we can generalize about propositional beliefs (intentional state) without appealing to qualia
(phenomenal state) (Fodor, 1987). Consider two different people who believe George Bush is
president. Imagine one has only heard Bush on the radio, and the other has only seen him on the
television. What phenomenal experiences do these two people have in common? It seems clear
that these two person's beliefs can share little or even no phenomenological properties, but still
be about the same thing. Lormand (1996) and Wilson (2003) later develop Fodor's position.
Lormand explains that the inseparatist can simply be mistaken when saying that phenomenology
is what individuates content. Lormand brings up the possibility that any phenomenology
associated with intentional states can simply be accompanying mental states. That is, the
qualitative experience of seeing a rose, is not part of the intentional state of believing you are
holding a rose. This qualitative experience can give rise to your later intentional state, or can
accompany (occur at the same time as) your intentional states, but these two states are
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nevertheless independent. Also, consider a desire for chocolate ice cream. This desire might be
accompanied by phenomenal memories of the taste of ice cream, or the image of ice cream, but
these phenomenal states are not what constitute or determine the content of the intentional state.
The content of the intentional state is simply chocolate ice cream.
The contemporary separatist Boyd Millar (whom we will be focusing on to represent the
separatist position) explicitly argues for the separatist position by explaining a scenario where
our intentional states do not depend on phenomenal experiences. Millar tells us to imagine we
are observing a pillar through a mirror, and later discovering that you are observing a pillar
reflected in a mirror. Millar takes it as self evident that although these mental states share the
same phenomenal experience, they differ with regard to intentional content.
The Short(er) History of Inseparatism
Although much less prevalent in the 20th century, Inseparatist ideas can be traced back as
far as Descartes, who claimed that "there can be nothing in the mind... of which it is not aware"
(Descartes, 1993 reprint). According to Descartes, all mental states (including intentional states)
must be conscious, and must be experienced consciously. In Descartes' Meditations on First
Philosophy, he (implicitly) commits himself a strong inseparatist position in his defense of
philosophical rationalism. After establishing that our own consciousness is the most fundamental
knowledge we can have, Descartes defines mental states as conscious states. Simply put, in order
for a mind to be considered a mind, it must be a conscious mind. Because consciousness has a
certain phenomenology, he is committed to the idea that both the intentional and phenomenal are
constitutively determined by conscious experience, and are part of a unified mind.
Not many contemporary theorists agree with such a strong claims, however Goldman,
Searle, and Strawson made similar claims in the 1990's. John Searle proposed the connection
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principle, which stated that "intentional states are in principle accessible to consciousness"
(Searle, 1992). Searle argued that part of what it is to believe something, is to be aware (or at
least potentially aware) of this belief. Strawson claimed that intentionality requires an
experiencing being (Strawson, 1994). Strawson's contention was that in order for an intentional
state to be about anything, the belief must be had by a being with phenomenal states. For
example, in order for X to believe that A is larger than B, X must have conscious experiential
(phenomenal) evidence for believing that A is larger than B.
The most recent contemporary proponents take up a slightly different approach then
simply rehashing or elaborating on past arguments. Horgan, Teinson, and Graham begin by
asking "whether the intentionality of a conscious or phenomenal intentional state (i.e. of a state
that is both phenomenological and intentional) is the same, qua intentional, as the intentionality
of a non-phenomenal intentional state?" (Horgan, Tienson, Graham 2010). This question can be
thought of as asking what exactly determines and individuates content of an intentional state.
Horgan and Tienson argue for inseparatism by pointing to our everyday experiences, and
explaining that there is a pervasive type of phenomenology that constitutes all of our intentional
states.
We have been given a brief historical overview that has led to contemporary discussion,
have seen the major players, and the most influential arguments on both sides of the separatistinseparatist debate. In addition to the survey of the general literature, we have seen how the
inseparatist-separatist debate has recently been brought out of the shadows and into the spot light
in contemporary philosophy of mind, and how some big names in the later half of the 20th
century have contributed to this evolution. In the next section, we will cover the two most
prominent contemporary inseparatist and separatist positions, and focus specifically on how the
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individuation of intentional content shapes the objections, responses, and general philosophical
commitments of this lively contemporary debate.
PART II: The Contemporary Inseparatist-Separatist Debate
The inseparatist-separatist debate can first be broken down into two theses. The
phenomenology of intentionality and the intentionality of phenomenology. The intentionality of
phenomenology thesis claims that phenomenal mental states have intentional properties (sensory
experiences are about things). So, when one is experiencing seeing the red of a rose, this
phenomenal state has intentional properties as well (i.e. it is about a rose). The phenomenology
of intentionality thesis claims that intentional mental states have phenomenal properties. That is,
the belief that you are holding a rose also has the phenomenal properties of the image of the rose,
the feel of it in your hand, etc. I will focus on the phenomenology of intentionality debate, as this
is where the majority of the literature focuses, and this is where the most fundamental
disagreements lie.
The phenomenology of intentionality debate is centered around two specific notions:
intentional objects and intentional content. An intentional object is the object that the intentional
mental state is directed towards. The intentional content is the description or property ascribed to
the intentional object. For example if one is observing 'the picture hanging on the wall that is
crooked'; the intentional object is 'the picture hanging on the wall', while the intentional content
is 'that is crooked'. Once again, I will narrow the scope of this piece by primarily focusing on
surveying the various disagreements with the notion of intentional content, as this is the main
source of fundamental disagreement.
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Furthermore, the most promising and widely held positions on both the separatist and
inseparatist sides are the moderate positions. Take inseparatism, the distinction between
moderate and strong inseparatism can be seen in their respective goals. Strong inseparatism seeks
to establish that all intentional mental states and phenomenal mental states are necessarily
connected or ontologically interdependent. The strong inseparatist David Pitt argues that in order
for a mental state to exist it must have content, and in order for a mental state to have content it
must consist of phenomenal properties. Thus, intentional mental states necessarily have
phenomenal properties that constitute the intentional content of the state (Pitt, 2004). For
example, the content of the belief that you are holding a rose, consists of the red image of the
rose, the smell, the feel and so on. According to Pitt, without qualia or phenomenal properties, a
mental state has no content, and can not be considered a mental state at all.
Moderate inseparatism contrasts with some of the strict commitments of strong
inseparatism, and can better avoid some problems that arise for stronger versions of the thesis.
Moderate inseparatism states that uncontested intentional states have phenomenal content, but
perhaps not all intentional states such as unconscious/unperceived states do not (Horgan &
Tienson, 2002). By uncontested, the inseparatist simply means mental states that are
uncontroversially, or paradigmatically accepted. This means phenomenal mental states such as
pains, tastes, and color perceptions are considered uncontested. Likewise, beliefs and desires are
considered uncontested intentional states. This distinction between uncontested and contested
mental states is not elaborated on much in the literature, as it calls for an intuitively obvious
ground for distinction. The idea is, if it is not intuitively obvious that a mental state is either
phenomenal or intentional, then it is not uncontested.
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Now we can begin the discussion of the inseparatist-separatist debate while keeping in
mind the focus of this analysis: How the characterization of intentional content within the
phenomenology of intentionality debate for moderate separatist and inseparatist positions
establishes the separatist and inseparatist theses. For the separatist, we will be considering Boyd
Millar’s Sensory Phenomenology and Perceptual Content. The Inseparatist Position will be
represented with Terence Horgan & John Tienson’s The Intentionality of Phenomenology and
the Phenomenology of Intentionality.
Inseparatism
In The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, and
Horgan, Tienson, & Graham’s chapter in The Oxford Handbook for Philosophy of Mind, an
argument is put forth to establish what they call 'Moderate Inseparatism'. The argument (briefly
mentioned in the introductory section) will be expanded on here. Horgan et al seek to establish
the truth of inseparatism (specifically inseparatism of the phenomenology of intentionality) by
pointing to everyday experience, and asking what individuates mental state A from mental state
B; explaining that this process of individuation reveals that there is a kind of intentionality that is
determined by phenomenology (phenomenal intentionality); and finally, arguing that this
phenomenology is inseparable from the intentional state itself.
The thought experiment begins by telling you to imagine that you are traveling through
New Hampshire and are consciously believing that New Hampshire rabbits have long tails. You
are then asked to contrast this mental state with believing that New Hampshire squirrels have
long tails. According to Horgan Tienson & Graham, it is intuitively obvious that these are two
different mental states. They state, “It seems patently false.. that there is indeterminancy as to
whether you are thinking that New Hampshire rabbits have long tails or thinking that New
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Hampshire squirrels have long tails or thinking that Alabama rabbits have long tails..” (Horgan,
Tienson & Graham, 2011). This statement highlights the importance of the phenomenal
experience of the intentional state in changing the intentional content. The basic line of reasoning
in both pieces in this: There is a phenomenological difference between experiencing different
intentional states; and this phenomenological difference is what differentiates (individuates)
these mental states.
We can begin our analysis by carefully examining exactly what Horgan Tienson and
Graham are claiming. They are claiming that the phenomenology of experiencing intentional
states is common to all intentional states. This simply means that all your beliefs, desires, fears,
hopes, etc, all have a unique phenomenal aspect to them, and this 'phenomenal intentionality' can
be easily seen when we individuate the intentional states. By individuates, Horgan et al simply
mean what differentiates or distinguishes mental state A from mental state B. But how this term
is used needs some qualification to accurately capture what they had in mind. Remember,
Horgan Tienson and Graham are Moderate Separatists, which means they do not think that
phenomenology individuates all mental states (perhaps phenomenology doesn’t individuate
unconscious states, and perhaps unconscious states do not even have a phenomenal
intentionality). Horgan et al are only claiming that in this thought experiment, what makes
'believing that squirrels have long tails' and 'believing that rabbits have long tails' two different
mental states, is the phenomenological difference in experiencing these two different mental
states.
So, how do we undergo this process of individuation? We begin with the two mental
states (believing rabbits have long tails(A) and believing that squirrels have long tails (B)). The
next step is to reflect on ‘how it feels’ or ‘what it is like’ to believe A and believe B. The final
17
step is to decide which mental state is which (which is A, and which is B). Horgan et al
intuitively claim that it is quite obvious which is which. They claim there is no confusion to
which mental state is about rabbits and which is about squirrels. This is a seemingly
uncontroversial claim, so where exactly is the point of contention? It is certainly not with simply
having the two mental states in the first place, and it is not with the final decision about which
mental state is which. So could the problem lie with the ambiguous nature of the self-reflection
of ‘what it is like’ to experience A vs B? This might at first seem to be a promising route, but
upon further consideration this does not seem to be a substantial problem. This act of selfreflection is simply an intermediate step of introspection to become aware of each mental state.
This self-reflection is so fleeting and integrated into our experience that it is barely noticeable. In
fact, it is often thought that the self-reflective nature of mental states is simply part of the mental
state. One is (at least almost always) immediately aware of what it is like to be in that particular
mental state. If we try to break down the process any further we end up with the following
tautological analysis: What does it feel like to believe that rabbits have long tails? Well, it feels
like believing that rabbits have long tails! This process of phenomenal content individuation is
intended by the inseparatist to be an obviously true, incontestable example of how we distinguish
two closely related mental states.
The next step for Horgan et al is to explain how the individuation of A and B establishes
the existence of phenomenal intentionality. The goal of the rabbit tail example is to establish the
existence of phenomenal intentionality. Phenomenal intentionality is defined by Horgan et al as
"a kind of intentionality that is constitutively determined by phenomenology alone". Before we
begin our explanation of how the rabbit tail example seeks to establish the existence of
phenomenal intentionality, we must be clear about some key terms within the definition of
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phenomenal intentionality. The most important terms in this definition are "constitutively" and
"determined by... alone". The conjunction of these terms in the context of the definition is clearly
intended to mean a kind of mental state whose content/properties is made up by/defined by
phenomenology. Although explaining "constitutively" as content/properties, and "determined
by" as made up by/defined by seems like it could be a case of equivocation (because after all,
'content' is not always the same as 'properties'; and 'made up by' is not the same as 'defined by');
it is clear what general idea Horgan et al are trying to get across.
But surely, "close enough" is rarely close enough in philosophy, so we must dig deeper to
try and pin down exactly what Horgan et al mean by phenomenal intentionality. And because
Horgan et al do not offer any more precise definition, we must establish what type of definition
would be acceptable to make the claim "The difference between A and B establishes the
existence of phenomenal intentionality". We can be sure that "constitutively determined by...
alone" does not simply mean there are some phenomenal properties of A, that in some cases,
defines part of what A is about. This is far too weak an interpretation, and could even be granted
by the separatist while still maintaining that these phenomenal properties actually occur
separately or are separable from the intentional state itself. Therefore, Horgan et al must mean
that every intentional state (A) has a type of intentionality (X) which has its content defined
completely by it's phenomenal properties. That is, every belief about rabbit tails (A), has a type
of intentionality (X) whose content is defined solely in terms of phenomenal state, and this
phenomenal state is the phenomenal intentionality (what is feels like to believe that rabbits have
long tails).
With this definition of phenomenal intentionality, we can return to the task at hand and
ask "how does the rabbit tail example establish the existence of phenomenal intentionality?"
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More specifically, we can ask how the individuation of A and B establishes that A and B have
phenomenal intentionality. Horgan et al argue that what makes A different from B, is that there is
a different phenomenological experience in believing A and believing B. That is, A and B are
different because they have different phenomenal intentionalities (i.e. A is the experience of
believing that rabbits have long tails, and B is the experience of believing that squirrels have
long tails). We become aware of these different phenomenal intentionalities by reflecting on the
different ways it feels to believe A and believe B. Horgan et al thus conclude that because it feels
different to believe A and believe B, and believing is an intentional state that is made up with
phenomenal properties (what it feels like to believe), there exists this phenomenal
intentionality.1*
The final task for the inseparatist, is to show how the existence of phenomenal
intentionality shows that inseparatism is indeed true, and phenomenal mental states are
inseparable from intentional mental states. The obvious first issue is to pin down exactly what
Horgan et al mean by "inseparable" in the context of the claim "phenomenal mental states are
inseparable from intentional mental states". In The Intentionality of Phenomenology and The
Phenomenology of Intentionality, Horgan et al explicitly state the phenomenology of
intentionality thesis (PI) as: "Consciously occurring intentional states have phenomenal character
that is inseparable from their intentional content" (Horgan et al, 2002). The question is now, how
does the existence of phenomenal intentionality in the rabbit tail example show that intentional
states are inseparable from phenomenal states? This last step is established by giving the
1* Later I will argue that the thought experiment itself does not establish the existence of phenomenal
intentionality
(it only
establishes
that there
is some
difference
between
A&
difference
be
following
thought
experiment:
Imagine
three
minds, one
existing
asB,
webut
do this
in the
external can
world
interpreted as a difference in intentionality not phenomenology); the only way for Horgan et al to establish
phenomenal
thus(B);
inseparatism)
to include internalism.*
(A); intentionality
one as a brain(and
in a vat
and one as isa disembodied
Cartesian mind (C). Now imagine that
these three minds are having identical perceptual experiences about observing a picture hanging
20
crookedly on a wall. It is shown that there is one important mental state that is identical for each
of these minds. A, B, and C share the same phenomenal experience of 'believing that they are
observing a picture hanging crookedly on the wall'. This phenomenal experience of believing
(phenomenal intentionality), is present in all beliefs, and is therefore a type of intentional state
that has a phenomenology which is inseparable from the intentional state itself.
Separatism
Like inseparatism, the separatist position has been proposed in strong and moderate
forms. Strong separatism states that all intentional mental states and phenomenal mental states
are necessarily unconnected and ontologically independent. Moderate separatism states that
although it is possible for some intentional states to be conceived of as having phenomenal
properties, there are conscious intentional mental states that do not have phenomenal properties.
It is important here to note the distinction between moderate inseparatism and moderate
separatism, because at first glance they seem to be far too similar to be considered opponents.
While moderate inseparatism allows for some unconscious, unperceived intentional states to be
distinct from phenomenal properties, the separatist position contends that some (although
perhaps not all) conscious, perceived intentional states are distinct from phenomenal properties.
Once again, I will focus on surveying the moderate accounts of the characterization of
intentional content within the phenomenology of intentionality.
In Boyd Millar's Sensory Phenomenology and Sensory Content, a thought experiment is
put forward to establish that intentional states are separable from phenomenal states. ‘The Mirror
Example’ put forth by Boyd Millar in his 2010 piece tells us to suppose we are facing a mirror,
which at first appears to you as a window in which there appears to be a pillar in a separate
room. Later, you recognize that this ‘window’ is actually a mirror, and the pillar you are
21
observing is actually a pillar in the room you are in. When you look at the mirror the second
time, you accurately observe the mirror as a mirror, and then recognize the first observation as
illusory (Millar, 2010). Millar proposes that this example illustrates the possibility for two
experiences to share the same phenomenal properties, but differ in intentional content.
Millar contends that observation A (the 1st observation) and observation B (the 2nd observation)
differ in intentional content because they are about different objects. Observation A is about
looking at a pillar in a different room through a window, while observation B is about looking at
a pillar behind you via a mirror. What differentiates (individuates) the content of these two
mental states are what the mental states represent. So although the two mental states have
identical sensory experiences (phenomenal content), they represent the environment in two very
different ways (intentional content). Millar concludes that an experience's sensory
phenomenology does not determine or fix it’s intentional content, and phenomenal states are thus
separable from intentional states.
Although more straightforward than Horgan et al, Millar's argument requires a bit more
analysis. We can think of Millar's argument as being put forward in 3 steps: First, Millar explains
the scenario where you have the phenomenal experience of seeing a pillar through a window in
the room next to you (C), then you realize that you are actually seeing a pillar reflected in the
mirror that is in the same room you are in (D); second, Millar explains that the visual experiences
of C and D differ with regard to their intentional content; third, Millar explains that C and D
instantiate the same sensory (phenomenal) qualities. Because Millar goes through these three
steps rather quickly, we need some careful elaboration to see how he reaches his conclusion that
"the two experiences under consideration possess the same sensory phenomenology, but differ
with regard to their intentional content" (Millar, 2010).
22
The thought experiment is the most straightforward step of the three, and clearly proposes
an example where the same sensory experience might be shown to represent the environment in
two different ways. Millar's second step utilizes the mirror example to show that C and D have
different intentional contents because they represent the the pillar as being in two different
places. Millar believes this is evident because your first experience C, is an illusory
representation of a pillar in front of through a window in another room; while D is an accurate
representation of a pillar behind you reflected in a mirror. The important question for Millar is:
"why do two different representations mean that there are two different intentional states?"
Millar does not explicitly say exactly why this must be the case, rather, he simply dubs it "seems
natural to say that...". We can be certain that Millar believes this to be the case because of the
very definition of intentionality. The intentionality of a mental state is commonly understood as
"what a mental state is about". So in the example, C is about "observing a pillar through a
window in the room infront of you"; while D is about "observing a pillar reflected in the mirror
in the same room you are standing in". Millar believes that because the thought experiment
shows that C and D represent the world in two different ways, C and D are two different mental
states. *2
Millar's third step is similar to the second in that he uses the pillar example to reach his
conclusion. Millar claims that the pillar example shows how C and D have the same sensory
phenomenology. That is, X's visual field in C and D are exactly identical. In both C and D,
exactly the same visual experience is apparent to the observer. In C and D, the window/mirror
appears to be on the same place on the wall, the pillar appears to be in the same place, the
lighting is the same, the objects in the room are exactly the same, etc. Millar also glosses over
this final point in a few sentences because he believes it is easy to see how we can think of a case
23
where two experiences (C and D), instantiate the very same sensory phenomenology. Thus,
through the conjunction of Millar's second and third steps, Millar concludes that although C and
D have the same sensory phenomenology, they differ with regard to their intentional content.
Therefore, to Millar, there are many clear and obvious examples of intentional states that are
separable from phenomenal states.
PART III: A Fundamental Disagreement
In the following section we will examine the fundamental source of disagreement in the
contemporary separatist-inseparatist debate. I will begin by explaining that the fundamental point
of contention in the separatist-inseparatist debate are how Horgan et al's rabbit tail example and
Millar's mirror example contribute to their conclusions. I will then argue that these thought
experiments alone do not establish each sides' respective conclusions because the thought
experiments can be analyzed by their opponents to reach opposite conclusions (the separatist
could use the rabbit example to argue for separatism, and the inseparatist could use the pillar
example to argue for inseparatism). I will conclude by suggesting that the only way for each side
to reach their inseparatist and separatist conclusions is to employ (*presuppose?) broad
metaphysical commitments to externalist representationalism (for the separatist), and internalist
representationalism (for the inseparatist).
Inseparatism and the Rabbit tail example
2* Later I will argue that the thought experiments alone do not establish that C and D have different
intentional contents
(it only
that there
is some
difference between
A & B,
andthey
thisconsider
difference
Horgan
et alestablishes
seek to establish
moderate
inseparatism
by proposing
what
ancan be
interpreted as a difference in phenomenology not intentionality); the only way for Millar to establish that
intentionality
is what
makes
and D different
(and thusofseparatism)
is intentionality,
to include externalism.*
obvious
example
thatCestablishes
the existence
phenomenal
which in turn
establishes inseparatism. This inseparatist argument can be formulated as follows:
24
1. There is a difference between being in mental state A (believing that rabbits have long tails)
& mental state B (believing that squirrels have long tails)
2. What makes these two mental states different is the 'phenomenal intentionality'-difference in
phenomenal experience in believing A & believing B (A feels like believing rabbits have
long tails & B feels like believing squirrels have long tails).
3. All (paradigm) intentional states have a phenomenal intentionality, therefore these
phenomenal states (phenomenal intentionality) is inseparable from intentional states.
4. Conclusion: Moderate inseparatism is true
The point of contention arises in premise 2). Horgan & Tienson believe the rabbit tail
example establishes the existence of phenomenal intentionality because we become immediately
aware of the "what-it-is-like" experience of believing A vs believing B. The crucial step in the
rabbit tail example is when Horgan et al ask us "How do you know which mental state is
which?". This question, is about content individuation, and is simply asking "why do you think A
is different than B?". They say that the obvious answer is that when you are in mental state A, it
is clear that you are 'thinking that rabbits have long tails'; and while you are in mental state B, it
is clear that you are 'thinking that squirrels have long tails'. If we try to press the inseparatist
further and ask "what exactly is it that 'makes it clear' that you are in mental state A and not B?".
The inseparatist would simply answer "The experience itself ! "believing that rabbits have long
tails" simply feels like 'believing that rabbits have long tails'." So when asked "what makes A
different from B?", the inseparatist answers "A feels like believing rabbits have long tails; and B
feels like believing squirrels have long tails".
The inseparatist (Horgan & Tienson) take this individuation of content to show that
phenomenal intentionality exists. After all, believing is an intentional state, and a feeling is a
25
phenomenal state; therefore it seems obvious to conclude that the way a belief feels is it's
phenomenal intentionality. I will argue that even if we grant the inseparatist the analysis: 'the
way a belief feels is phenomenal intentionality', it does not follow that the rabbit tail example
illustrates a case where the content of the belief is the way it feels. I will argue that the content of
the beliefs in the rabbit tail example can be shown by the separatist to be intentional (like in the
pillar example), not phenomenal (like in the rabbit tail example).
To be clear, I will not be arguing that phenomenal intentionality does not exist, nor will I
be arguing that there is no way for the inseparatist to amend their argument to establish the
existence of phenomenal intentionality. I will only be arguing that the rabbit tail example by
itself does not establish the existence of phenomenal intentionality.3* Although the later is a
weaker claim than the former, it is still a substantial problem for Horgan & Tienson, that will
lead us to my conclusion that the fundamental source of disagreement in the inseparatistseparatist debate are each sides' commitments to internalist and externalist representationalism.
The rabbit tail example does not necessarily establish the existence of phenomenal
intentionality because the separatist could use the rabbit tail example to show that the content of
A and B could be individuated without phenomenal intentionality. Because phenomenal
intentionality is simply a kind of phenomenal state, What Horgan & Tienson consider
'phenomenal intentionality', could simply be written off by the separatist as a phenomenal state
that accompany the intentional state. The separatist could explain the state "what it feels like to
believe that rabbits have long tails" simply as a separable phenomenal state that accompanies the
intentional state "the belief that rabbits have long tails". Whatever phenomenal experiences that
come with the belief (i.e. images of squirrels, memories about how long their tails are, emotions
from childhood experiences of playing with squirrels, the overall what-it-is-ness to believe X,
26
etc), are nothing more than phenomenal states that contingently occur with the intentional state
itself (i.e. belief that squirrels have long tails).
Although it can be argued in the inseparatist's defense that these phenomenal states
usually (or even always) occur with the intentional state, it does not follow that these
phenomenal and intentional states are inseparable. It could still be the case that even if the
intentional state "belief that squirrels have long tails" always occurs with, causes, or is caused by
the phenomenal state "what it feels like to believe that squirrels have long tails"; the separatist
can maintain that these two mental states are separable. This can be shown by asking about the
content of the intentional states in question (A & B). The separatist could take the rabbit example
and say that what individuates the content of mental state A from mental state B is what each
state is about, and has nothing to do with “differences in phenomenal experience”. A is
individuated from B because the content of A is the intentional state “a belief that rabbits have
long tails”, while the content of B is the intentional state “a belief that squirrels have long tails”.
To the separatist, the content of A does not depend on 'what is feels like to believe A', the content
of A simply is the intentionality of 'being about A'.
Remember, I am not claiming that the rabbit tail example does not establish some
difference between A and B, nor am I claiming that there is no way Horgan & Tienson's position
can be amended to establish the existence of phenomenal intentionality. I am claiming that the
rabbit tail example by itself does not establish the existence of phenomenal intentionality. This is
because the separatist can show how the inseparatist's "phenomenal intentionality", is nothing
more than phenomenology, and more importantly, is a type of phenomenology that actually turns
3* In a later section, I will argue that the existence of phenomenal intentionality can be
established,
but onlyfrom
with the
the intentional
conjunctioncontent
of internalist
representationalism.*
out to be separable
of A and
B.
Separatism and the Mirror Example
27
The separatist (Millar) runs into the same problem the inseparatist does with the pillar
example. I will attempt to show here that the inseparatist could use Millar's thought experiment
to show that C and D are individuated on the basis of phenomenal intentionality, and thus prove
inseparatism to be true. First, lets consider Millar's argument for separatism:
1. There is a difference between being in mental state C (belief that you are observing a pillar in
another room through a window) & mental state D (belief that you are observing a pillar
behind you, reflected by a mirror)
2. What makes these two mental states different is the fact that they have different intentional
contents- (C is about a pillar in another room; while D is about a pillar reflected in a mirror).
3. Because C and D have the same sensory phenomenology, but different intentional content,
phenomenal states are independent from intentional states.
4. Conclusion: Moderate Inseparatism is true
The separatist establishes 2) with the pillar example. The pillar example is supposed to
illustrate a example where two mental states (C and D) have the same sensory phenomenology
but clearly differ in intentional content. Similar to the inseparatist, the separatist must now
explain what exactly makes C and D different mental states. To this, the separatist answers that it
is the fact that these two mental states are about the environment being two different ways. As
clearly put by Millar, "The first experience... is an illusory representation of a pillar in some
specific distance in front of you on the opposite side of a window; and your second experience...
is an accurate representation of a pillar located behind you and reflected in the mirror." (Millar,
2010).
28
Because C and D represent the environment in two different ways, the separatist quickly
concludes that the way C and D represent the environment, is what individuates C and D's
intentional content. Millar does not explicitly give any reason why he believes this, he simply
relies on what (he believes) intuitively follows from C and D's different representations of the
environment. I will now argue that the pillar example by itself does not establish that the
intentional content of C and D is determined by C and D's representation of the environment. *4
To remain clear, I am not denying that there is no way to show that representations determine
intentional content, nor will I even be arguing that the pillar example cannot be amended to help
reach the separatist conclusion. I am arguing that the pillar example by itself does not establish
that the intentional content of C and D is determined by C and D's representation of the
environment, and thus does not contribute to the separatist conclusion. To show this, consider
how the inseparatist could use Millar's pillar example to establish phenomenal intentionality and
inseparatism. The inseparatist could argue that what individuates the beliefs in the pillar
example, is that there is a certain phenomenal experience in believing that C, and there is a
different phenomenal experience in believing that D. That is, “there is something it is like to
believe you are observing a pillar through a window”, and “there is something it is like to believe
you are observing a pillar in a mirror”. The inseparatist can thus individuate these two mental
states solely on the basis of phenomenal intentionality, while ignoring Millar’s claims about
"representing the world a certain way". After phenomenal intentionality is established, the
separatist can go on their merry way concluding that this type of phenomenal state (phenomenal
intentionality) is inseparable from intentional states.
*4 Fundamental
Later I will argue
that the intentionalCommitments
content can be established by how C and D represent the
Representationalist
environment, but only with the conjunction of internalist representationalism.*
29
Much ink has been spilled on different varieties of representationalism and the
relationships between these views and their implications for related issues in the philosophy of
mind. Therefore, it is of considerable importance to be absolutely clear what I am referring to
when I speak of internalist representationalism and externalist representationalism. This as we
will see, turns out to be much less difficult than expected in the context of this thesis. Remember,
we are concerned with the relationship between the thought experiments and the individuation of
intentional content. To show the fundamental nature of the relationship between these two
concepts, I need only point to two new concepts (one for internalism, one for externalism). The
internalist representationalist position refers to the idea that the truth value of statements about
the environment is determined by the agent’s experience. The externalist representationalist
position refers to the idea that the truth value of statements about the environment is determined
by the external environment itself. Admittedly, these two characterizations seem frighteningly
vague, and need a bit more clarification before being applied to the task at hand. By truth value
of statements I simply mean what makes an utterance true or false. That is, the statement “I am
observing a red wall” would be false if I were observing a blue wall. The internalist
representationalist further contends that the objective statement “The wall is red” should be
considered true if I am indeed observing the wall as red, even if there is some matter of fact that
the wall is blue (similar to Shoemaker, 1992/1994). Although at first glance seemingly
implausible, this position does have the virtue of accounting for problems of qualia and inverted
spectrum cases. The externalist representationalist position can be better understood by consider
the same statement, but reaching a different conclusion. To the externalist representationalist, the
statement “The wall is red” is true if and only if there is some matter of fact about the wall
30
actually being red (i.e. the physical surface of the wall reflects on red wave length light) (similar
to Dennett, 1991).
Although one paragraph is surely not enough to do an entire subfield of philosophy of
mind justice, this account will suffice for our purposes. The basic idea is this: The internalist
bases accurate representation in the mind, while the externalist bases accurate representation in
the environment. Without pushing the distinction any further, we can see how these two very
different, very fundamental metaphysical assumptions about the mind can shape the separatistinseparatist debate.
Surely, both the Separatist and the Inseparatist share some representationalist views about
mind (although they differ greatly in scope and detail). Furthermore, some versions of
representationalism is implicitly and sometimes even explicitly acknowledged in their respective
separatist-inseparatist literature. For example, Horgan and Tienson use their rabbit example to
deny the existence what they call strong externalism. Specifically, Dennett's frog example
(mentioned in the introductory section) is commonly cited as an exemplar of problems that come
from representationalist positions. So some version of this relationship is not unknown or
unacknowledged in the relevant literature. However, my goal here is to show that this
relationship is under-acknowledged at best, and misunderstood at worst.
Whether you think the separatist or the inseparatist has the stronger thought experiment is
not relevant here. What is relevant is noticing that the thought experiments by themselves do not
confirm their respective conclusions. So, if the thought experiment's themselves do not directly
confirm the Inseparatist and Separatists conclusion, what bit of reasoning can be found in
representationalism that does?
31
Before I relate the internalist representationalist position to the inseparatist arguments I
cited earlier, and the externalist representationalist position to the separatist arguments; I want to
be clear to what my conclusion will be. I hope to show that not only does these
representationalist views guide the strength and scope of the separatist and inseparatist positions,
but representationalism serves as the fundamental, (*incommensurable) source of disagreement
between the separatist and inseparatist. These two representationalist views are the foundational
points of disagreement in the examples cited earlier, and without resolving these deepseeded
metaphysical positions, there can be no hope to resolve, or even make progress in the SeparatistInseparatist debate.
Separatism and Externalist Representationalism
Millar's reason for coming to the conclusion he does can be found in his externalist
representationalist commitments. Millar is committed to his conclusion by the idea that it is the
external environment that determines the truth value of statements about how his beliefs
represent the environment. Millar holds that belief C is individuated from belief D simply
because of the fact that the truth value of belief C and belief D change when considering objects
in the external environment. Belief C (seeing a pillar through a window) is false, while belief D
(seeing a pillar in the mirror) is true. The differences in 'phenomenal experiences' between the
two states are not even mentioned by Millar as contributing to the individuation, because he
believes that Phenomenology plays no role in individuating the intentional content. Millar
reaches the conclusion to his thought experiment by asking one final question: “Given the
previous steps in the thought experiment, what is the one relevant difference between mental
state C and mental state D?” To Millar, the difference is what changes the truth value of the two
beliefs when considering what they refer to in the external environment (externalist
32
representationalism). This is Millar's final' step in his thought experiment, and it is a step that is
shown to be so obvious to him, that he doesn't dedicate more than a couple sentences to
establishing it's truth.
Inseparatism and Internalist Representationalism
Millar's commitment to externalist representationalism is directly parallel to Horgan and
Tienson's commitment to internalist representationalism. The inseparatists also gloss over their
final step in only a few sentences by stating that it is obvious that there is a phenomenal
difference in experience from believing A and believing B. They believe that it is the subjective
internal characteristics of the mind that determines the truth-value of statements about how the
mind represents the environment. So when Horgan & Tienson ask themselves “Is it true that
mental state A is about rabbits?” they answer “yes” because there exists the phenomenal
experience of mental state A being about rabbits (phenomenal intentionality). To see the extent
of the representationalist view’s influence on their inseparatist argument, consider how they
would answer Millar’s thought experiment. When asked “Is it true that mental state C is about a
pillar in another room?” the inseparatist would say ‘yes’ because it is the phenomenal experience
of perceiving the pillar that makes the sentence true, not any facts about the external world
(notice this is a different question than “Is there actually a pillar in another room?”, to which the
inseparatist would say no). Notice the different answers to the same question. While Millar
maintains that the answer to “Is it true that mental state C is about a pillar in another room?” is
‘No’ because of the fact later revealed about the external world, that both mental states where
“about the same pillar” that was in fact reflected in a mirror. The inseparatist would say yes
because a mental state “being about a pillar” (like being about rabbit tails), is made true by
having the phenomenal experience of observing a pillar, and phenomenal experience only
33
depends on facts internal to the observer, not external facts about the world. This contrasts with
the separatist who holds that a mental state “being about a pillar” is made true by how accurately
the mental state represents the external world.
We can easily phrase the inseparist position in a way that allows for us to determine the
truth value of a statement. We can either say “belief A does have different intentional content
from belief B because of a difference in phenomenology”, or “belief A does not have different
intentional content from belief B because of a difference in phenomenology”. The Inseparatist
would then attach the truth value of True to the later, and False to the former. What determines
the truth value of these two statements is why the inseparatist believes that the two intentional
states are individuated. What determines whether they are individuated is whether the
phenomenal experiences are different for belief A and belief B. Because it is the internal
phenomenal experience that determines the truth values of the previous statements, we can
consider the inseparatists internalist representationalists. The inseparatist fundamental
assumption is that it is phenomenal experience that determines the truth values of the previous
statements. This is an obvious instantiation of their foundational commitment to internalist
representationalism.
Concluding Remarks
It has been argued here that once Millar's pillar argument, and Horgan & Tienson's rabbit
argument have been reduced to their most foundational components, there is a fundamental
disagreement about how to understand the relationship between the mind and the environment
(representationalism). More importantly, it has been argued that this disagreement cannot be
resolved simply by consulting the thought experiments, or caching out the applicability of terms
and concepts used by each side. In the following section I will address some possible objections
34
to this conclusion, and will further clarify the distinction between the scope of the inseparatistseparatist debate and the internalist-externalist debate to solidify the fundamental nature of the
relationship between these two interesting and important subfields within the philosophy of
mind.
PART IV: Objections & Responses
I will be considering three major objections in the following section: 1) The separatist
(Millar) is not in direct conflict with the inseparatist (Horgan & Tienson), so they cannot really
be understood as opponents; 2) There is a disanalogy between the two thought experiments
(inseparatism cannot properly be applied to the pillar example, and separatism cannot properly
be applied to the rabbit tail example because they describe two different types of intentional
states); and 3) Representationalism is not a background assumption, it is established by the
thought experiments themselves. I will argue that each of these objections can be over come with
some important clarifications and qualifications.
Compatibility Objection
The first objection I would like to consider claims that Millar's pillar example is not in
conflict with Horgan & Tienson's separatist conclusion. This concern seeks to establish that if
there is no conflict between the separatist and inseparatist positions, then they can have no
'fundamental disagreement based on representationalist commitments', because there is no
disagreement at all. To see the importance of this objection (and similar types), we need to
elaborate on exactly where this compatibility lies, and if it is a relevant enough 'compatibility' to
conclude that the separatist and inseparatist cannot be considered opponents in the way they are
portrayed to be (by both myself and Millar).
35
The objector would point out that Millar's thought experiment only establishes that a very
narrow kind of phenomenology is separable from intentional content: sensory phenomenology.
Millar only argues that the sensory information between C and D are the same (i.e. your sense of
sight is exactly the same in mental states C & D). But surely there is more to phenomenology
than sensory experience, so we can be sure that Millar's 'sensory phenomenology' does not apply
to all phenomenal states. Most importantly, Millar is not committed to the idea that the
phenomenology of the mental states themselves (phenomenal intentionality) are identical. The
inseparatist could grant the truth of Millar's thought experiment (grant that C & D have the same
sensory phenomenology), but still maintain that C and D differ in phenomenal intentionality.
After the inseparatist establishes that Millar's position is compatible with the existence of
phenomenal intentionality, the inseparatist can go on to conclude that phenomenal intentionality
is inseparable from intentional states. In conclusion, Millar's pillar example does not make any
claims about all phenomenal states (most importantly not phenomenal intentionality), and is
therefore consistent with Horgan & Tienson's inseparatism. Because the inseparatist and
separatist positions are not actually in conflict with each other, they can not be considered
opponents, and clearly cannot be represented as having some 'fundamental disagreement'.
Two responses can be put forth to adequately deal with this concern. The first is a way to
modify Millar's thought experiment so it can account for all phenomenology. The second is to
simply remind the objector that pointing out a weakness in Millar's argument does not mean that
the separatist and inseparatist are suddenly not opponents. The most obvious way out of this
dilemma is my first resonse, so I will begin there. Because the concern is that the pillar example
only takes into account a certain kind of phenomenology (sensory phenomenology), our first
36
goal should be how we can expand the pillar example to account for all relevant types of
phenomenology (specifically Horgan & Tienson's phenomenal intentionality).
Millar's pillar example can be revised to include a second person in the room with you.
With this revision, we can say that the first person (X) undergoes mental state C; while the
second person (Y) undergoes mental state D. In this example, it can be supposed that X has all of
the same phenomenological states in C and Y does in D. This can be so because the phenomenal
states associated with C are identical to the phenomenal states associated with D. But what about
phenomenal intentionality? Can't the objector still say that C and D differ with regard to
phenomenal intentionality? And here the separatist can answer "Sure! But now you must provide
an argument for the existence of this phenomenal state." What is important to note here, is that at
this point in the discussion, the separatist and inseparatist are once again at odds with one
another. Millar's revised pillar example now shows that C and D can have all of the same
phenomenological states. If the inseparatist wants to claim that there is one type of
phenomenological state (phenomenal intentionality) that differ from C to D, then the inseparatist
must return to their own arguments (i.e. the rabbit tail example). Millar's revised conclusion is
now that C and D have all of the same phenomenal states (not merely sensory phenomenology)
with different intentional contents, and are thus separable. This is clearly inconsistent with
Horgan & Tienson's conclusion that intentional states A and B both have a pervasive type of
phenomenology (phenomenal intentionality), and thus phenomenal and intentional states are
inseparable.
The second response to objection 1) points out that even if this analysis of Millar and
Horgan & Tienson was accurate, it is not relevant to the scope of this thesis. So even if Millar's
thought experiment turns out to fail to establish his separatist conclusion, and thus can be shown
37
to be compatible with Horgan & Tienson's inseparatism; this is a problem for Millar, not for me.
That is, just because Millar uses a weak and perhaps even completely false argument to try and
establish his conlusion, does not mean that the separatist and inseparatist conclusions are no
longer opponents. After all, Millar clearly explains that the inseparatist is his opponent, and even
explicitly sites Horgan & Tienson as his specific opponents. Millar even admits he is borrowing
the term separatism from Horgan & Tienson's 2002 piece: "the term 'separatism' was used in this
way by Horgan & Tienson..." (Millar, 2010). Therefore it would be petty to argue that the two
are actually not opponents, when both sides clearly acknowledge that the other side as the
opponent. Even though Millar's argument clearly need some work (perhaps a revision similar to
the one I proposed in the last paragraph), and there is a lot to be said about improving both
separatist and inseparatist arguments; this is simply not within the scope of this thesis. The scope
of this thesis is to examine the fundamental source of disagreement between the inseparatist and
separatist (i.e. commitments to internalist and externalist representationalism). And for these
purposes, it is reasonable to grant that the two disagree to begin with (whether obvious or not), or
at the very least, that there is an apparent/illustratable disagreement between the two positions.
We can now move forward by recognizing that even if the proposed thought experiments do not
clearly disagree, the proposed conclusions of the inseparatist and separatist are in clear
disagreement; which is enough for us to return to the relevant task at hand.
Disanalogy Objection
The second objection claims there is an important disanalogy between the two thought
experiments. It is objected to here that the separatist analysis cannot be properly applied to the
Horgan & Tienson's thought experiment, nor can the inseparatist analysis to Millar’s thought
experiment, because each describes two different types of intentional states. This objection is
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clearly important because if this is indeed the case, then my claim that "each side can use their
opponents thought experiments to reach their own conclusions" seems patently false.
One can point out that while the pillar example is about observational intentional states,
the rabbit tail example is about non-observational intentional states. So even though both are
intentional states in the sense that they are about something, one explicitly references
observation (Millar), while the other explicitly tells us to consider an intentional state without
referencing observation. To make this clearer, lets consider Horgan & Tienson's parody of the
rabbit tail example. Instead of contrasting belief state to belief state, lets contrast believing that
rabbits have long tails to wondering whether rabbits have long tails. It is clear that Millar could
not make the argument that an intentional state of 'wondering' has it's truth value determined by
anything external to the speaker, in the same way the belief about where a pillar is does. This is
because the truth value of whether someone is wondering something or not, depends solely on
whether the person is in the right type of mental state. This is obviously dis-analogous to an
observation of a pillar, whose truth value is determined by how accurately the observation
represents the environment. Because observing/believing is a different type of intentional state
than wondering, there is a disanalogy between Horgan & Tienson's new rabbit tail example and
Millar's pillar example.
My first response is simply a concession to this disanalogy. I can grant that Millar's
separatist analysis cannot be applied to the 'wondering state' in the same way that it is applied to
the mirror example. However, Millar does not need to commit himself to any such claim.
Remember, Millar is a moderate separatist, which means that he does not believe that all
intentional states are separable from phenomenal states. Thus, Millar can concede that an
intentional state of wondering is not separable from phenomenal states, while still maintaining
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that intentional states of observing and believing are separable from phenomenal states. The only
thing Millar needs to establish to be a moderate separatist is that the intentional state of believing
is separable from phenomenal content.
But is this so easy, as to disregard the claim that there is some disanalogy between the
mirror example and the rabbit tail example? Couldn't the objector still consider this a disanalogy
because the pillar example references observation, while the rabbit tail example does not? I will
argue that it is not a disanalogy because observational states can be understood as belief states,
and belief states can be understood as having their truth value established in the external
environment. So while the objector would try to claim that "The belief that rabbits have long
tails" does not have it's truth value determined by the external environment, Millar can argue that
it can; in the same way "The belief that you are observing a pillar in a mirror" can. Millar can
argue that whether or not you are 'believing that rabbits have long tails', does not depend solely
on internal factors, it also depends on the external factor "do rabbits actually have long tails?" If
rabbits do in fact have long tails, the belief is true; just like if the pillar is actually being reflected
in the mirror, then that belief is true. Millar can thus apply his separatist analysis to the rabbit tail
example, and use it to reach his conclusion that "what makes A and B different depends on
external factors", and therefore the phenomenal states in A & B, are separable from the
intentional states in A & B.
Likewise, the inseparatist can still interpret the pillar example as saying that "I am seeing
a pillar in the mirror" is a belief state equivalent to "I believe I am seeing a pillar in the mirror."
Therefore, the Horgan & Tienson could continue with their inseparatist analysis and say that
what makes C different from D, is the difference in phenomenal intentional in believing C vs
believing D. Thus, by examining how 'beliefs without direct observation' and 'beliefs with direct
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observation' are much more similar than the objector lets on, we can show that there is in fact an
accurate analogy between the mirror example and the rabbit example. And because of this
analogy, the inseparatist can analyze the pillar example, and the separatist can analyze the rabbit
tail example.
Directionality Objection
The third and final type of objection addresses a general concern with the directionality
between the inseparatist-separatist debate and representationalism. This objection starts on the
intuitive grounds that both Millar and Horgan & Tienson acknowledge some relationship
between their conclusions and representationalism. So couldn't it be the case that inseparatism
and separatism lead to conclusions about representationalism, and not vice versa? I will concede
that the inseparatist-separatist debate has certain implications for strong representationalist
theories, but not the relevant kinds of representationalism used by each side to reach their
inseparatist and separatist conclusions in the first place.
I will begin by considering the generally formulated objection that the thought
experiments themselves are used to reach representationalist conclusions. The inseparatist might
say that mental states A & B are different because they have different phenomenal experiences.
Therefore, the truth-values are determines by internal mental factors (internalism). The separatist
would then say that the mental states A & B are different because they have represent the world
as being different ways. Therefore, the truth-values are determined by factors external to the
mind. To be clear about the direction of this causal relationship, lets ask how do the inseparatist
and separatist come to their respective conclusions in the first place? Remember, the thought
experiments themselves have been shown to not establish the inseparatist and separatist
conclusions by themselves. Each needs to reference representationalist commitments to reach
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their conclusions in the first place! Therefore, representationalism can surely not be a conclusion
of the inseparatist-separatist debate if the inseparatist-separatist debate depends on the
representationalist notions of internalism and externalism. The most you can say is that
representationalism seems mutually reinforcing to inseparatist-separatist debate because they
adopt similar metaphysical commitments. But because the thought experiments do not reach the
conclusions on their own, the representationalist commitments must come first.
I will address the concern that the conclusion of the inseparatist-separatist debate has
certain implications for the representationalist views discussed earlier by illustrating the
difference between "the relevant representaionalist commitments" mentioned in the last
paragraph and the strong representaionalist position put forth as an opponent in Horgan &
Tienson's piece. I will grant that the truth of Inseparatism can pose a problem for the strong
externalist representationalist views put forward as opponents in Horgan & Tienson 2002.
However, it can still be maintained that the relevant forms of representationalism (the internalist
and externalist commitments of the inseparatist and separatist mentioned before) are not
threatened by either inseparatist or separatist conclusions. Rather, it is the internalist and
externalist representationalist commitments that lead inseparatism and separatism to their
respective conclusions. To reach this conclusion, we must first carefully examine how the
inseparatist and separatist could object that the conclusion to the Inseparatist-Separatist debate
does in fact have direct implications for representationalism.
In The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality Horgan
& Tienson argue that Inseparatism, specifically the existence of phenomenal intentionality, poses
a clear and direct problem for "strong externalist representationalist theories". Before we begin
our analysis we must be clear to what Horgan & Tienson mean by strong externalist
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representationalist theories, and what aspect of strong externalism and they think conflict with
inseparatism. Horgan & Tienson state that strong externalist views "assert that all intentionality
is grounded in causal connections between states of the cognitive system and states of the
external world" (Horgan & Tienson, 2002). Although this seems like a broad audience to argue
against, Horgan & Tienson later reveal that they have a specific opponent in mind: Anyone who
does not acknowledge that some intentional states (phenomenal intentional states) exist
independently from the external world.
Horgan & Tienson aim to show that there is a pervasive type of intentionality dubbed
"phenomenal intentionality" that exists independently from all states of the external world. They
give the following thought experiment: Imagine three minds, one existing as we do in the
external world (A); one as a brain in a vat (B); and one as a disembodied Cartesian mind (C).
Now imagine that these three minds are having identical perceptual experiences about observing
a picture hanging crookedly on a wall. It is shown that there is one important mental state that is
identical for each of these minds. A, B, and C share the same phenomenal experience of
believing that they are observing a picture hanging crookedly on the wall. It is then shown that
although A, B, & C have the same "phenomenal intentionality", none of these states represent the
same (or even similar) objects in the external world. Mind A represents a picture hanging
crookedly on a wall; while Minds B and C do not represent anything in the external world
because their beliefs are caused by a mad scientist and a Cartesian evil demon. Thus they
conclude that the phenomenal intentionality of the belief "I am observing a picture hanging
crookedly on a wall" does not depend on the existence of objects in the external world, but
instead consists solely in the phenomenal experience of being in this belief state. The existence
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of phenomenal intentionality is the aspect of inseparatism that conflicts with strong
representationalism.
Because strong externalists claim that no intentional states can exist without appropriate
causal relations to the external world, the existence of phenomenal intentionality in the previous
thought experiment poses as a clear counter example. If we accept the Inseparatist's conclusion
that there exists this phenomenal intentionality, we must then deny the strong externalist position
that all intentional states are grounded in the external world, because it is clear that there exists at
least one type of intentional state that is not (namely phenomenal intentionality). Thus, Horgan &
Tienson reach the intuitive conclusion that strong externalist representationalist theories are
fundamentally mistaken.
However, can the same worry be applied to the representationalist theories that I claim
are employed in the inseparatist-separatist debate? I will argue that this concern does not apply to
the relevant internalist and externalist representationalist theories. To refresh our memories, let’s
briefly review the context in which I claim the representational theories are applied. The
externalist position that Millar adopts holds that facts about the external environment are what
determine the truth value of statements. In order for my opponent to hold that inseparatism has
implications against the type of externalism that Millar adopts, it must be shown that the
acceptance of inseparatism can change the conclusion of his externalism. In other words, the
objector must relate the inseparatist conclusion to this externalist conclusion in the same way
Horgan & Tienson relate their own conclusion to the strong externalist conclusion.
For strong externalism, the problem was that the thesis was committed to the idea that all
intentional states must be grounded in the external world. However, Millar’s externalism makes
no such claim. Millar’s externalism is only committed to the idea that the truth values of some
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mental states (namely these belief states about the pillar) are grounded in the external
environment. But Millar’s externalism need not be restricted to only the beliefs in the thought
experiment. In fact, Millar can hold that all beliefs have their truth-values grounded in the
external world except beliefs where there is no external world (like in Horgan & Tienson’s
thought experiment). To better illustrate this point, let’s grant Horgan & Tienson’s conclusion
that inseparatism is true and there exists a pervasive type of intentionality that is independent
from the external world (phenomenal intentionality). Even if every mental state has a
phenomenal intentionality (which is stronger than the conclusion Horgan & Tienson come to),
this still would not threaten Millar’s externalism. All Miller is claiming is that there is some
aspect of these belief states that is grounded in the external world, and this aspect is what
differentiates one from the other. Millar could grant that these two belief states have a
phenomenal intentionality (there is something it is like to believe A and believe B), but still
maintain that you can individuate the content of A and B, by reflecting on how each mental state
represents the external world. Millar could still say “Belief A is a different intentional state from
belief B because each represents the external world as being a different way”, without saying
anything about the different ways A and B are experienced. The inseparatist conclusion only
limits the strong externalist in that there are some hypothetical cases where an intentional state
can be shown to not be grounded in the external world (because there is no external world). If
Millar was committed to the belief that externalism was true in all scenarios (even those where
there is no external world), he would be gravely mistaken. However, all Millar needs for his
externalism to work is that there are cases where the intentional states do in fact relate to the
external environment, which is something that even Horgan & Tienson explicitly grant (Horgan
& Tienson, 2002).
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PART V: Conclusion
One might be tempted to maintain that there is still some way to resolve or make progress
in the inseparatist-separatist debate without directly acknowledging the internalist-externalist
representationalist debate. To respond to this query, it will be useful to consider the difference in
scope between the inseparatist-separatist debate, and representationalism. The inseparatistseparatist debate is a strikingly small, specific area within the philosophy of mind, which boils
down to an even smaller area of contention (the individuation of intentional content). This debate
is directly concerned with nothing more than a specific kind of relationship between two types of
mental states. The inseparatist-separatist debate itself can only make claims about the extent to
which phenomenal states are present in intentional states and vice-versa.
Contrast this with the incredibly large, philosophically encompassing scope of the
representationalism debate. Representationalism concerns itself with not only the metaphysics of
mind, but also with metaphysics in general. Representationalism is concerned with the
relationships between mental states (i.e. can phenomenal states accurately represent the content
of intentional states), the relationship between the mind and the external environment,
epistemology (i.e. what determines the truth-value of statements), and metaphysics (i.e. what
should count as the external environment in the first place). From just these facts, it is easy to see
that just one small part of representationalism encompasses the whole of inseparatist-separatist
debate. If one is still not convinced, I welcome my opponent to try and succeed where the leaders
in the field have failed, and discuss the relationship between Intentional and Phenomenal mental
states without referencing some assumption regarding the Representational nature of the mind.
Let us now move to a concern that may still arise if one questions my final conclusion
that the inseparatist-separatist debate cannot be resolved without appealing to the internalist-
46
externalist representationalist debate. They might ask “What of it? Should we stop discussing
inseparatism and separatism until we resolve the seemingly unresolvable questions surrounding
representationalism? Can we not intelligently object and respond to each other’s arguments in
the mean time? Should we just give up this bit of philosophy?” To this I will respond “Heavens,
No!” I am certainly not attempting to snuff out this lively debate, nor do I think the inseparatistseparatist debate is a lost cause. On the contrary, I find this debate a very important tool in
attempting to understand the fundamental nature of mind. What I am suggesting, is caution. If we
are to learn anything from the relationship between representationalism and the inseparatistseparatist debate, it is this: Acknowledge it's importance.
By acknowledging this relationship the separatists and inseparatist now have a new tool
in which to debate each other. Each side can now continue the debate with renewed caution and
clarity. Instead of supposing the truth of their respective conclusion from their thought
experiments, they can now acknowledge the foundational assumptions of their opponents and
address these assumptions to either show they assumed too much or assumed too quickly. For
example, Millar can now acknowledge the inseparatist’s intuitions regarding his mirror example,
and argue that even if there is a difference in phenomenology, it is the different truth values of A
and B that can be thought to individuate A and B. Horgan and Tienson can now see how the
separatist might try to individuate the contents of their two beliefs, by recognizing some aspects
of the external objects referenced by the intentional states, instead of some wholly phenomenal
properties. By acknowledging the representationalist commitments of their opponents, each side
can expand upon their thought experiments, clarify the scope of their analysis, and avoid a priori
argumentation for their respective conclusions.
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The fundamental relationship between internalist and externalist representationalism and
the inseparatist-separatist debate offers a way forward through the apparent standstill that results
from each side’s objections and responses. Whatever improvements can be made on each side is
yet to be seen, but we can remain hopeful that this lively and increasingly important debate will
continue with renewed clarity, improved precision, and a newfound respect for it's profound
metaphysical foundations.
.
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