Question about the document you asked me about:
My Response:
Noshir Gowadia generated hundreds of documents containing classified facts related to
U.S. low observable or “stealth” applications and techniques, developed during his time
working in U.S. classified projects with defense contractors. Much of this U.S. classified
information was unlawfully possessed and used by Gowadia in presentations and
proposals to foreign governments and entities. At the inception of this investigation, the
document in question was part of a small number of documents which were seized at the
Port of Honolulu and were referred to the Department of Defense by the State
Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls for a determination on whether any
of the seized documents contained information subject to export controls. As part of this
review, the Department of Defense export reviewer, who did not possess the requisite
knowledge, access or classification guidance in U.S. classified stealth programs, rendered
the incorrect opinion that the document was not classified, but was only exportcontrolled. In the meantime, the same document was properly referred for formal
classification review, through other channels, to the U.S. classification authority for U.S.
stealth programs. That office, which has the exclusive clearance and classification
guidance in U.S. Air Force low observable or “stealth” programs, determined the
document to be classified at the SECRET/Special Access Required level. This
determination, conducted by the cleared experts in the field that supervise U.S. Air Force
stealth programs and technology is the controlling classification finding with respect to
this document. All of the Air Force classification determinations in this case were
presented to the federal judge in proceedings under the Classified Information Procedures
Act (CIPA) and were properly adopted and accepted by the Court. Furthermore, all of
Gowadia’s challenges to the government’s classification determinations were rejected by
the Court during those same proceedings. It is important to note that the document in
question, one of hundreds of documents submitted for classification review in the
Gowadia investigation, was not the subject of any charge in the trial of Noshir Gowadia.
Question about the message that convictions like Gowadia should send and why it is worth
prosecuting such cases:
My Response:
Anytime an individual is convicted of willfully providing classified information to a
foreign government, their conviction and sentence should serve as a deterrent to others
who would consider compromising our nation’s national security secrets for financial
gain or other reasons. The Justice Department and its partners in the law enforcement
and intelligence communities will continue to aggressively pursue anyone who betrays
America by providing classified information to foreign governments or to others not
entitled to receive such information. At the same time, we will continue to aggressively
pursue anyone who illegally exports American military technology, know-how and other
materials that are restricted for export. The restricted U.S. technology at the heart of our
export enforcement efforts is controlled for good reason: A growing number of foreign
states are actively seeking to illegally acquire restricted U.S. technology for their military
and economic advancement. Furthermore, in the wrong hands, such technology can pose
a threat to U.S. troops overseas or to our allies. Controlled U.S. technology can also tip
the strategic balance in a region, where one nation uses these materials against another or
against its own population. Ultimately, these restricted goods can also pose a potential
threat to Americans at home if obtained and employed by terrorists. Therefore, keeping
classified information and export-restricted U.S. technology from falling into the wrong
hands remains a top priority for the Justice Department and its partners.
Question about whether Gowadia’s sentence was too harsh.
My response:
A unanimous jury of his peers convicted Mr. Gowadia of statutes that carry a maximum
potential sentence of life in prison. Among other things, the jury convicted him of five
criminal offenses relating to his design for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of a
low-signature cruise missile exhaust system capable of rendering a PRC cruise missile
resistant to detection by infrared missiles. The jury also convicted Gowadia of three
counts of illegally communicating classified information regarding lock-on range for
infrared missiles against the U.S. B-2 bomber to persons not authorized to receive such
information. Gowadia was also convicted of unlawfully exporting classified information
about the B-2, illegally retaining information related to U.S. national defense at his home,
money laundering and filing false tax returns for the years 2001 and 2002. Although he
faced a sentence of life in prison for these crimes, a federal judge determined that
Gowadia should be sentenced to 32 years in prison.
Sentencing determinations are ultimately the purview of the judge presiding over the case and
depend on a wide variety of factors, evidence and circumstances unique to each particular case.
For instance, on July 16, 2010, Walter Kendall Myers, a former State Department official, was
sentenced in the District of Columbia to life in prison for his role in a conspiracy to provide
highly-classified U.S. national defense information to the Republic of Cuba. On Feb. 11, 2010
former Rockwell and Boeing engineer Dongfan “Greg” Chung was sentenced in the Central
District of California to more than 15 years in prison after his conviction on charges of economic
espionage and acting as an illegal agent of the PRC, for whom he stole restricted technology and
Boeing trade secrets, including information related to the Space Shuttle program and the Delta
IV rocket. On March 24, 2008, Chi Mak, a former engineer for defense contractor Power
Paragon, was sentenced in the Central District of California to more than 24 years in prison for
orchestrating a conspiracy to obtain U.S. naval warship technology and to illegally export this
material to the PRC. Mak was found guilty at trial in May 2007 of conspiracy, two counts of
attempting to violate export control laws, acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign
government and making false statements.
Gowadia's offenses involved one of the most protected capabilities in the U.S. military arsenal:
the capacity for stealth; that is, the ability to project U.S. military might into foreign, enemy
airspace with minimal risk of detection. This formidable capability forms and establishes, in
part, the balance of power between America and other nations. Stealth technologies took our
nation many years of effort to develop, and the cost of hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to
achieve. Gowadia's betrayal of his adopted country and his security oaths in assisting the PRC in
their development of stealth applications, such as a cruise missile, may threaten U.S. forces
operating in the Pacific for years to come and warranted the severe sentence imposed by the
Court.