SENATOR HEINZ 29
ITEM #:
4143 (R)
salt ii - u.s. violates w/ 131st b-52 bomber
TOP/SUBTOPIC (1): defense/salt II
TYPE OF DOC.: issue
CREATE DATE:
UPDATE DATE:
AIDE: DC
DEC-12-86
DEC-12-86
ENCLOSURE
PCD:
KA
Thank you for contacting me regarding the SALT II Treaty and
arms control. Because there is no more important subject for our
nation and for the world than the control of nuclear weapons, I
share your concerns.
Recent developments have brought strategic arms control back
into the spotlight of public attention. Most importantly,
President Reagan's decision to exceed the numerical limits of the
unratified SALT II Treaty has caused concern in the Congress and
among our allies in Europe. The U.S. exceeded the central
sub-limit on multiple-warhead strategic weapons on November 28,
1986, with the deployment of the 131st B-52 bomber equipped to
carry cruise missiles.
I strongly oppose the abandonment of the SALT II numerical
limits on nuclear weapons as long as the Soviets continue to
abide by these ceilings. For this reason I joined 55 other
Senators in writing to President Reagan in December urging him to
change his policy and put the U.S. back within the SALT numerical
limits.
Furthermore, I once again joined with three of my colleagues
in order to form the leadership core for efforts on behalf of
continued U.S. adherence to SALT II limits. In the last
Congress, we introduced a sense-of-the-Senate resolution which
urged the Administration to continue to adhere to the SALT
agreements, a resolution which attracted 48 cosponsors and whose
key points were eventually incorporated into the conference
version of the Fiscal Year 1987 Concurrent Resolution on the
Budget.
My support for continued compliance with the SALT II
numerical limits is based on the conviction that until the United
States and the Soviet Union have forged a new arms control
agreement, we cannot afford to dispose of existing limits on both
countries that serve our security interests. The ceilings on the
numbers of strategic launchers, and related limits on the number
of warheads per launcher that are contained in the SALT II
framework, are the only barriers to an unrestrained
U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic arms race.
SENATOR HEINZ 30
I am aware of Soviet behavior that undercuts the arms
control process, such as the violations of SALT II restrictions
on new land-based missiles (the deployment .of both the SS-24 and
SS-25) and the excessive encoding of missile test data. The
Soviet Union should be held fully responsible for these serious
violations through appropriate and proportionate U.S. responses.
Nevertheless, I have heard no persuasive argument that throwing
away the numerical ceilings of the SALT framework, which both the
U.S. and Soviet Union continue to observe, will either contribute
to U.S. security or in any way counter the Soviet violations of
other provisions of the SALT agreements.
A U.S. break-out from the numerical limits of SALT has
opened up whole new areas of competition and could potentially
undermine key arms control practices that we now take for
granted. For instance, all observers agree that the Soviet Union
has the ability to add significant numbers of warheads to their
offensive forces without undertaking massive new investment or
modernization efforts. They have a three-to-one advantage in
missile throw-weight, or lifting capacity, which could be
exploited to add warheads to their forces. In addition, they
have modern Intercontinental Ballistic Missile production lines
in service which could provide new missiles without significant
new investment. As for adding launching sites, the Soviets built
300 missile silos per year in the late 1960s, which gives an
indication of their building capacity.
While I do not expect that the Soviets would necessarily
respond to a U.S. abandonment of SALT ceilings with a maximum
build-up, the Strategic Defense Initiative does provide a solid
rationale for the Soviets to add significant numbers of warheads
as a hedge against any American defense breakthroughs. In any
case, the Soviets could easily add forces that would represent
both an additional military threat and a significant bargaining
chip at the negotiating table.
A majority of the Senate and I will make it clear to the
President in the coming months that we support a policy of
continued observance of the SALT II limits that he followed until
very recently. I continue to believe that this policy serves
U.S. security and preserves the best possible environment for
real progress on arms control in Geneva and will do my best to
persuade the President to return to this policy. For your
further information, I have enclosed my most recent Congressional
Record statement regarding SALT II.
I appreciate your taking the time to inform me of your views
on this issue and hope that you will not hesitate to contact me
again on this or any other matter of concern to you.