The Reorganisation of Local Administration in South
Korea: The Debate on Democracy and Efficiency in Local
Governance
HEIKE HERMANNS
Inha University
ABSTRACT
Local democracy is an important part of a democratic system, serving as a ‘school of
democracy’ and offering citizens many opportunities of political participation. Although
in recent decades, models of local administration focus on service provision rather than
participation, local elections continue to be part of democratic traditions in many
established democracies. In newly democratising countries, local democracy can serve as
an indicator of democratic deepening. Korea’s century-old tradition of centralised
administration ended in the 1990s, when (some) powers were devolved to lower
administrative levels. A democratic layer in the form of councils and directly-elected
heads of administration was added, greatly increasing opportunities for political
participation and administrative accountability. The first fifteen years of local democracy
have not been without problems, and criticism is raised regarding the (perceived) high
costs and lack of relevance of local politicians. In order to increase efficiency the current
government is set to restructure administrative divisions. While several reform plans are
circulating, the debate focuses on administrative gains, without regard for the political
effects of the reform, indicating that the role of local democracy in the progress of
democratic deepening remains undervalued.
INTRODUCTION
Korea can look back to centuries of centralised administration. Efforts to introduce local
autonomy and democracy in the Republic of Korea bore little fruit in the 1950s and
centralised rule continued throughout the years of authoritarian rule by Park Chung-hee
(1961-1979) and Chun Doo-hwan (1980-1988). The opposition movement included the
introduction of local autonomy and local democracy in their demands to break the power
of the central government. In the 1990s, a new democratic layer in the form of councils
and directly elected heads of administration was added to the existing administrative
system, without considering reform of the long-standing divisions first. Local democracy
added over 4.000 electoral positions to the political arena, greatly increasing opportunities
for political participation and administrative accountability. The first fifteen years of local
democracy have not been without problems, and criticism is often raised regarding the
(perceived) high costs and lack of relevance of local politicians. The discussion about the
need of local self-government and the form suitable for South Korea continues. In 2008,
the government announced plans for local government reform, aiming at greater
efficiency. So far, there has been little discussion about the reform’s effects on local
democracy, indicating that the connection between local democracy and democratic
consolidation is undervalued.
This phenomenon is not unique to Korea. The need for local democracy has been
under discussion by both politicians and political scientists, in studies on public
administration as well as democracy and democratisation. Attitudes on local democracy
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are often informed by the focus of the analysis: on input or output orientation. The former
stresses the participatory approach of local democracy while the latter focuses on service
provision. Many newly democratising countries are overcoming a history of central
administration, so that local democracy takes on additional importance in the process of
democratic consolidation. The consolidation process is a multi-faceted phenomenon
conceptualised from various analytical angles, such as political actors, institutions, and
political parties. In this paper, the focus is on one particular institution, namely local
government. In a mature democracy, democratic institutions can be found at all levels of
government, from the national government down to the lowest level of district and city
administrations. Democratic consolidation is thus not complete until democracy has
permeated through all levels of government. With this understanding, the Korean
opposition movement in the 1980s had hoped that local autonomy would deepen
democracy, revitalise citizenship and open local administration to public scrutiny.
Since the introduction of local councils in 1991, decentralisation in Korea has
progressed slowly. Central government agencies are reluctant to devolve power and still
hold control over many aspects of local government, including work responsibilities,
organisation, staffing and, most importantly, finance of local governments (Lee 2006).
After the position of administrative head has become subject to regular elections,
administrative transparency improved but opportunities for participation remain few. The
involvement of local parties and civil society groups is limited, as they failed to advance
neither civic engagement nor governmental responsiveness. The promise of local
democracy has thus so far not been fulfilled. As a result, this aspect of local government is
largely disregarded by both politicians and the general public in the debate on
administrative reform.
This paper takes the current discussion of local government restructuring as a
starting point to look at the development of local democracy in South Korea, its
shortcomings and also at attitudes towards local democracy. The first section looks at the
literature on the role of local democracy, while the second part presents the local
administration system in Korea and its shortcomings. In the third section the reform
proposals and their outcomes are presented. The final section sums up the argument and
stresses the need for more debate on the benefits of local democracy on democratic
deepening in Korea.
LOCAL DEMOCRACY
Local democracy is an often-neglected aspect in the discourse on democracy and
democratisation. Popular discussion often focuses on national-level politics and assumes
that local democracy is a given. In a similar vain, most of the literature on democratisation
overlooks local democracy and concentrates on the national level.1 The virtues of local
democracy have been praised since the mid-19th century. Alexis de Tocqueville stressed
the importance of local government, writing in 1835: ‘In the township as everywhere, the
people are the source of social powers, but nowhere do they exercise their power more
immediately’ (2000, 59). Mill (1910) describes local government as 'school of democracy',
as local self-government extra opportunities for political participation, both in electing and
being elected to local office, for citizens who otherwise would have few chances to be
politically active. Moreover, local politics deals with issues that have direct relevance to
the daily life of citizens, such as traffic conditions and environmental problems. For this
reasons, locally based groups can form around local issues and activate local participants
1
Exceptions include Held 1996; Sørensen 1998; Stoker 1996.
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who are directly affected. Participation in local groups reduces financial and time
constraints for participants who otherwise would have to be present in the capital to exert
influence. Advocates of local democracy also suggest that access to politics is easier for
new participants at local level (Elkin 1999). Local government thus spreads political
power to a wider group of participants.
At the same time, local activities are ascribed with further far-reaching effects on
behaviour and attitudes regarding democracy per se. Local politics provide the training
ground for a democratic citizenry with increasing civic participation in local politics and
empowerment in the broader democratic process. Participation at local level is seen as
promoting individual liberty and democratic values, ideally transforming the way people
think and behave (Barber 1984). Moreover, advocates stress the importance of democracy
at the local level for a healthy democratic system as part of the division of power within a
state. On the horizontal level, power is balanced between executive, legislative and
judiciary while vertically, the different levels of government control each other. In unitary
administrative systems like Korea, regional and local governments should cover this role.
In administrative terms, local governments show the virtues of limited scale. Being
local, they remain accessible to their citizens, serve as a first port of call for all citizens,
reinforce local identities, and distribute resources in the light of specialist knowledge. A
centralised administration, especially if based in the cities, often fails to address
adequately the needs of outlying areas, such as fishing communities. Opponents of local
government, on the other hand, point out that this can also facilitate parochialism and
separatism within one country (Langrod 1953). Localism is seen as undermining national
equity. Centralised rule guarantees nationwide uniformity and equal and uniform
treatment of all parts of a country, but fails to take regional diversity and differences into
account (Jones and Steward 1983).
Centralised rule means fewer opportunities for direct input by citizens, thus
affecting local democracy negatively. Democratisation implies greater equality between
the different levels of government, thus challenging the notion of centralisation. In order
to activate internal autonomy, administrative decentralisation needs to include the
devolution of powers from the centre beyond the delegation of tasks to lower levels. Local
government should enjoy discretion in the decision-making process without the
intervention and influence of central government agencies (Page 1991). Important
components of local government are the transfer of personnel matters to lower levels and
the power to make independent decisions on finance, regarding both revenue raising and
spending. As part of decentralisation, there should be a shift in attitudes in the central
administration, away from a culture of control and regulations to one of co-operation and
assistance. Local administration becomes more accountable to citizens when elections for
local officers and councillors are held and other measures such as referendums and recalls
are introduced. However, this is often little more than window dressing if no measures for
decentralisation and the delegation of powers to lower levels are undertaken.
Local government has undergone substantial changes since the idealistic writings
of de Tocqueville and Mill in the 19th century. In the aftermath of World War II, many
countries extended services for welfare provision, which was placed largely in the domain
of local governments. As a result, attitudes towards local governments changed and a
more utilitarian approach was promoted. The size of bureaucracies increased while rules
and funding were largely provided by the central government, limiting the flexibility of
local governments. Output and results were stressed over participation, and the importance
of results was enhanced rather than bureaucratic procedures (Hood 1994). Towards the
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end of the 20th century, some countries implemented measures to downgrade local
government in favour of service provision, labelled as ‘new public management’. In this
approach, governance becomes a keyword, indicating many services are cut or outsourced
while citizens are treated as customers who are consulted directly, without the need for
representatives. Local governments are expected to engage in market-oriented reforms and
encouraged to become efficient and customer-led authorities. Local governments strive to
reduce the direct provision of services by delegating tasks to private organisations. In this
model, local representative democracy is hollowed out, as elected representatives play
only a minor role and have little influence on policy making. Accountability shifts from
citizens (through elections) to the central administration (through supervision and audits).
This approach was favoured, for instance, in the 1980s in the United Kingdom but
it also revealed two contending views of local democracy: local institutions either ensure
financial and technical accountability or electoral and political accountability (Cochrane
1996). The later position stresses popular participation and local government as a site for
collective decision-making. Democracy is measured by citizens’ input, emphasising
‘government by the people’. In contrast, the output perspective focuses on efficient
administration and sees local government as efficient service provider, representing
‘government for the people’. These two beliefs are not mutually exclusive but reinforcing
and complementing. Ideally, local governance sustains democratic legitimacy by
combining input legitimacy as well as output legitimacy. 2
In many countries, the balance between the two positions has shifted over the
years, and South Korea is not immune to this trend, except that the shift is happening in a
compressed timeframe. Local democracy was introduced in the early 1990s but calls for
streamlining and greater efficiency have been constant over the last fifteen years.
Corruption scandals mar the system and falling voter turnout indicates citizens’
disenchantment with local democracy. The current government is promoting territorial and
functional restructuring, with a firm focus on improving output. The development of local
democracy is largely absent in the discussion, although it was one of the main demands of
the pro-democracy movement in the 1980s. The following explores the reasons for this,
before turning to the current reform proposals.
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTH KOREA
For centuries, Korea had been characterised by a highly centralised governmental system.
Power concentrated at the national level, in the capital while local governments merely
followed policies and directives. The Republic of Korea, created in 1948, was established
as a unitary state, with a three-tiered administrative system. The country is currently
divided into 16 regional governments and 230 local governments.3 At the regional level,
there are seven metropolitan and nine provincial administrations.4 The lower level consists
of city (si), county (kun) and district (ku) governments. The units are further divided into
up, myon, and dong for purely administrative purposes. Elections for mayors and local
councils were held in the 1950s and in 1960, but local democracy was suspended under
the authoritarian regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan. The lower
administrative levels thus stayed under direct central control until the early 1990s. The
Ministry of Home Affairs (now Ministry of Public Administration and Security, MOPAS)
2
See Scharpf (1999) for further discussion.
With growing urbanisation, these numbers are constantly changing. Currently, there are 69 districts, 86
counties and 77 cities, including two in the special province of Cheju-do.
4
Seoul is dedicated as a special city under direct control of the prime minister’s office while Cheju-do has
been designated as a special administrative island.
3
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appointed the heads of local administration who merely implemented the policies of the
central administration.
The Korean constitution grants local governments the power to take actions that are
not explicitly prohibited or assigned elsewhere. At the same time, the constitution also
allows the central government to use regulations to control the lower levels. The central
government uses this proviso to tightly control local spending and taxation, thus limiting
the scope of local decision-making substantially. As a result, local administration in Korea
in practice follows the ultra vires principle, which permits lower level governments only
to engage in activities the central government has specifically assigned and authorised.
Under a ultra vires system, administrative decentralisation therefore is particularly
important for the development of democracy at the local level but also more complicated
(Smith 1985). This affects both the locus of administrative power, i.e. devolution, as well
as greater citizen involvement, i.e. local democracy.
During the 1980s, the demands of the Korean pro-democracy movement included
greater local autonomy (Oh 1999; Pae 1988). The opposition hoped that local elections
would create alternative centres of power throughout the country that could be utilised as
local bases to challenge the power of the central government (Kim and Chung 1993). The
involvement of many decision-makers in many different localities also promised the
diffusion of power within the country. Moreover, the opposition expected to recruit
supporters and activists at grass-root level to broaden their bases and to spread democratic
values across the country (Lee 1992). In addition to the revitalisation of citizenship at
lower levels, it was hoped to open local administrations to public scrutiny and thus
improve services. The logic of the opposition was thus mostly driven by input-orientated
legitimisation beliefs.
The implementation of local democracy and decentralisation progressed slowly. In
1991, elections for the newly created regional and local councils were first held for the
first time, and in 1995 both councils and the heads of administration offices were directly
elected. Since 1998, elections are held in four-year intervals, two years after National
Assembly elections. The electoral system has been changed in each round of elections,
confusing some voters. Initially, local parties only competed at the regional level, with no
direct party involvement at the local level. This was changed prior to the 2006 elections,
leading to further politicisation of local government (Hwang 2006).
As in many other countries, voter turnout for sub-national elections is lower
compared to the national level and has declined over the last fifteen years, from 68% in
1995 to just over 50% in 2006. Politicians at the national level continue to regard local
politics as an extension of national politics. Since the local elections are held at the midterm point of the National Assembly, politicians and voters alike treat them as a
referendum on the national government (Kang 1999). In 2006, for instance, the main
opposition party (GNP) campaigned under the slogan:”Stern Judgment on the Central
Government”, while many voters saw the election as a precursor for the presidential
elections in the following year (Lee 2009). Local issues generally play only a minor role in
local election campaigns and local races are largely overlooked. In the media, there is a
distinct focus on the “big races” for the gubernatorial positions in Seoul, Pusan and
Kyonggi Province.
The division of power between a council and a directly elected administrative head
reflects the power structure at national level, a weak legislative and a strong executive.
Mayors, governors, and county and district heads are popularly elected and cannot be
recalled by the councils. Mayors take the initiative in the policy-making process and are
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often the public face of the administration, receiving most press coverage. Local
councillors have not increased their visibility as their influence is restricted by their
limited powers. In order to push projects and policies, councillors often seek the favours of
the mayor, leading to a patron-client relationship between mayor and council (Park 2000).
The balance of power is therefore in favour of the mayor (Park 2006). While citizens are
now better represented in the decision-making process at the lower levels of
administration, these councils have limited powers and cannot vote the mayor out of
office. A motion to allow citizens to recall mayors was introduced in 2007 but so far, no
mayor has been recalled (although notions have been filed in Hanam City).5 Effectively,
elected leaders are only held accountable by citizens every four years; in-between
elections, the central government continues to be the control mechanism of local
administrative leaders. This is reinforced by the position of administrative vicegovernor/mayor, one of generally two deputies. While the deputy for political affairs is
selected by the administrative head, the deputy for administrative affairs is appointed by
the central government, usually a high-ranking career bureaucrat.
The development of local democracy is often hindered by underdeveloped local
party sections as well as the lack of meaningful networks among local interests. The local
government system is affected by the party system at national level and its problems.
Political parties remain weakly institutionalised and lack distinctive political programmes.
Regionalism continues to influence election outcomes substantially, although to a
declining degree (e.g. Kim, Choi and Cho 2008). There are three main political regions in
Korea, the Honam area in the southwest dominated by the Democratic Party (DP), the
Kyongsang area in the southeast dominated by the Grand National Party (GNP) and the
central region, dominated by a third party (currently named Liberty Forward Party
[LFP]).6 With one party dominating in one particular area, many councils are virtual ‘oneparty states’. Effective conditions of party competition are absent, contravening the
democratic ideal (Hwang 2006).7 In general, parties have low membership rates and are
weak at the grassroots level. Since 2004, party offices below the city and county level are
prohibited by law to avoid corruption and wastage of funds. Local parties are thus often
little more than support groups for the sitting representative in the National Assembly or
regional and local council.
Other criticisms have been directed at the local government system. Over the last
fifteen years, many localities tried to create a unique image and pursue independent
policies. This ranges from the designation of local mascots to prestige programmes, such
as the construction of international airports. These activities have received substantial
criticism, especially from opponents of local autonomy (e.g. Chosun Ilbo 28 December
2007). For most of the history of the Republic, the state justified centralisation with the
need of balanced regional development – although in reality, the results are quite different.
Initially, many local governments imitated national strategies, so many special industrial
zones were created that never fulfilled their potential. Inter-regional competition
5
The recall has two phases, petition and vote. Petitions for the recall of administrative heads and council
members with a minimum of signatures (at least 10% for gubernatorial leaders, 15% for local leaders, 20%
for councillors) are submitted to local election commissions after a limited period of time. After validation, a
vote is called which needs a minimum quorum of 33% and a majority of votes to lead to a resignation. The
first recall motion in Hanam City stumbled over technical errors and low turnout in 2007.
6
Although party names do change, regional support remains remarkably stable.
7
At the regional level, many councils are dominated by one party, with a few proportional seats won by
other parties. In local councils, one party often dominates, and independents play a greater role. However,
these are frequently former party members who failed to gain party nomination, reducing the diversity of
views represented.
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increased, often labelled as divisive and wasteful (Kim 2002b). Recent examples are the
applications for international sports events like the Olympic Games by a number of local
entities. International bodies are careful to spread events across national and continents, so
too many concurrent applications reduce the chances of winning. One reason for the
failure of Pyongchang in Kangwon Province to be nominated as host city for the 2014
Winter Olympics lies in the earlier dedication of Inch’on as host of the Asian Games in
2011. Despite the setback, Pyongchang is set to try again for 2018. 8 At the same time,
Pusan is preparing a campaign to host the 2020 Summer Olympics. Some coordination
between the bids would certainly increase the chances of a Korean success.
The remuneration of local councillors is another point of contention. Initially,
councillors were only compensated for travel costs related to their work. Some
remuneration was introduced in 2006, but the amount is still relatively small, so that
representatives have to rely on other sources of income, often their personal wealth. This
excludes the less wealthy sections of the population, while existing local elites are more
likely to enter local politics. The prevalence of a local oligarchy can lead to arbitrary and
undemocratic behaviour when, for example, councillors are also part of the local business
community and pursue policies favourable for their friends and business partners (Lee
1996). The dominance of local landowners has been noted in some rural areas (Lee 2006).
While local elections opened many more opportunities for political activities many
citizens are lacking finances and support networks to stand in elections. These are less
than ideal conditions to encourage participation and citizen engagement, as envisaged by
Mill and other proponents of local democracy.
On the administrative side, the decentralisation process advances slowly, as the
central administration is reluctant to devolve power, in particular the power to raise
revenue. Legacies of pre-existing institutions tend to endure changes of internal and
external conditions (Stinchcombe 1965: 148-149). Despite the political will to promote
decentralisation, administrative procedures are changed much slower. Centralising
attitudes and tendencies still contravene decentralisation. The balance of power stays
clearly in favour of the central administration, creating only a ‘democratic façade’ (Seong
2000: 129). The independent activities of local governments were often limited to truly
local matters such as waste collection and tourist management. This is partly due to a
(perceived) lack of ability of lower level administrations (e.g. Korea Times 28 February
1998). Local governments, and in particular councillors, thus have limited opportunities to
pursue individual policies but are tied by tight finances and central control. A majority of
local entities is not financially independent but relies on transfers from the central
government that are often tied to specific projects (e.g. Oh 2002).
In spite of the noted limitations, decentralisation has brought administrative reform
to Korea, creating a more accessible and responsive administration. These modifications
bring tangible results for the everyday life of citizens such as easier access to the
administration and a reduction of paperwork (Im 1996). The bureaucracy is becoming
more transparent and approachable because the heads of the administration are no longer
appointed but popularly elected, giving them an incentive to plan and implement new
functions to improve services. This includes the modernisation of (unreasonable and
complex) administrative procedures, generally involving the use of new technologies such
as online applications (for examples from Seoul see Kim 2002a). However, these changes
do not register as a direct result of the introduction of local democracy, although they are
often instigated by elected heads. Positive outcomes are often overshadowed by negative
8
Pyongchang also lost an earlier bit for the 2010 Winter Olympics to Vancouver/Whistler.
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assumptions such as wastefulness and non-transparency. Examples include ambitious
projects like regional international airports becoming white elephants and a large burden
on local budgets (e.g. Chosun Ilbo 28 December 2007). Bribery scandals of both officials
and elected councillors have eroded the trust in government agencies. Elections are
invariably followed by a number of scandals over violations of election laws.9 Citizens’
trust in local government is low, with only a quarter of Koreans expressing trust in local
government (although this was slightly higher than the result for central government at
22.3% [Shin 2005, 59]). In terms of perception of corruption, local government also fares
better than the central government but 40% of the population still consider local
government officials to be corrupt.10 In light of the low regard for local democracy, the
future trajectory of local administration is under debate.
REFORM PROPOSALS
In recent years, the discussion of a fundamental restructuring of the country’s
administration has increased. Former President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) favoured the
physical relocation of the capital from Seoul to Chungch’ong-namdo as a measure of
decentralisation. Previous projects such as moving governmental agencies to Kwachon
and Taejon have been unsuccessful and Roh’s proposal was also scaled down
substantially. The relocation of national government agencies aside, Roh lacked a
systematic approach to decentralisation (Lee 2008). In 2008, the topic returned to the
agenda. Prompted by globalisation and economic restructuring, the three-tiered
administrative structure has been described as outdated, since it was created over 100
years ago and “no longer meet[s] the needs of our communities in this modern, 21stcentury digital era” (President Lee Myung-bak, 9 September 2008 at a KBS-Townhall
meeting). Larger units are expected to reduce duplicity and to increase the quality and
efficiency of public services. On the negative side, the voices of citizens may become less
prominent in the policy-making process since larger units tend to have less direct contact
with citizens.
The need for reform has been recognized, in particular the benefits of territorial
restructuring. There are substantial differences between units in terms of size and
population.11 This has been an ongoing process over the last decades, with an increasing
number of mergers of cities and counties in close proximity to each other. The latest
proposal to this end involves the incorporation of Masan, Changwon, Jinhae and Haman
into one city. A number of surveys confirm some consensus on the necessity of
restructuring. In December 2008, about two thirds of local councillors were found to be in
favour of restructuring (Herald Biz 2008). The support was lower among the mayors and
governors, as this group stands to lose its influence: 12 out of 16 higher level
administrative leaders opposed restructuring, while the views of lower level leaders were
divided: 97 (42.2%) were opposed while 116 (50.4%) favoured restructuring (Chosun Ilbo
8 Sep 2008). Citizens in Suwon also supported the need to reform the administrative
system: a quarter called it 'very necessary', while a further 46% thought it was ‘required’
(Suwon Ilbo 2008).
9
Between 1995 and 2006, 142 local government heads (22%) were prosecuted on bribery, election law
violations and other offences, as well as 763 local councillors (Kim 2008, 43).
10
45% thought central officials to be corrupt (Park and Bae 2008, 11).
11
Suwon and Songnam in Kyonggi Province, for instance, each have over 1 million inhabitants while
Kyeryong city in Chungch’ong-namdo only has 35,000 and many counties even less. In terms of territory,
Ulsan Metropolitan City is twice the size of Kwangju Metropolitan City. Among the lower units, differences
2
2
are even bigger: Andong City’s territory consists of 1520.6km , while Kuri City comes to a mere 33.3km .
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Local government reform has been contemplated before. In 2006, for instance, a
National Assembly committee was formed to consult on administrative reform but the
proposals brought no further action. In mid-2008, the discussion picked up again.
President Lee Myung-bak strongly favours a change as part of his policy of administrative
reform and streamlining, and the National Assembly formed another special committee in
November 2008. With the next local elections slated for mid-2010, changes in the relevant
laws become more pressing, especially if an extensive consultation period is included in
the process. Given the current antagonistic mood in the National Assembly, this seems
very ambitious. The Minister of Public Administration and Security amongst other
politicians is pushing to complete the restructuring process before the elections. The
necessity of a referendum has been discussed but dismissed by proponents for a quick
change (Yonhap News 7 October 2008; Chosun Ilbo 8 October 2008). In March 2009, a
GNP-committee working on local reform suggested holding a referendum in November
2009, so the changes can be implemented prior to the 2010-elections (Han’gyǒrye 27
March 2009). The discussion continues at the time of writing.
A report prepared by MOPAS in October 2008 warned that the process should be
extended to around ten years to guarantee a smooth transition of administrative processes
and personnel (DongA Ilbo 7 October 2008). A leading Korean civil society group, the
Citizens’ Coalition of Economic Justice, also called for a prolonged consultation period to
include the voices of local people and their views on mergers.12 There a valid reasons for a
more comprehensive approach. Undertaking the reform in a short timeframe increases the
likelihood of mistakes and the need for future adjustments. The burden of adjustment on
the existing bureaucracy will be substantial, as they have to decide on streamlining process
and ultimately redundancies to achieve the expected gains in efficiency. In addition to the
employees in the lower levels of administration, politicians will also be affected.
Completing the restructuring process shortly before the next round of elections will put
substantial strain on the current representatives and parties, as they will not know where
they will compete in the next elections. Regional and local councillors will fight each
other for nomination and seats, leading almost certainly to increase conflict prior to the
election. Other candidates will be frustrated to lose their constituency and leave local
politics. There are also potential side effects for national elections. Currently,
constituencies for the National Assembly follow the general geographical structure of
counties and wards. Local restructuring could also affect these constituencies, possibly
reducing their number.13 This will add another layer of debate to the reform agenda, as
decisions could be influenced by parliamentarians’ concerns about the electoral effects at
national level rather than potential improvements in local administration.
A number of proposals for local government reform are currently in circulation.
The proposals focus firstly on territorial restructuring, which in turn entails the merger of
units and thus reduction in employees and expenditure, affecting local government
functions. The restructuring follows existing boundaries, i.e. rich, urban areas will merge
with each other while rural areas around bigger cities are amalgamated, which might have
detrimental effects on the outlying areas. The DP and some GNP-members revived the
2006-proposal suggesting the creation 60 to 70 units by combining provinces and cities
into one level. Across the country, between two and five of the existing units are expected
to be combined into larger units. The capital area would be divided into several smaller
12
지방자치 현실 고려하지 않은 지방행정체제 개편 주장은 위험, 28 October 2008, at
http://www.ccej.or.kr/ISSUE/ accessed on 9 April 2009.
13
An interesting scenario would be a reduction of directly contested seats in the National Assembly and an
increase in proportional seats. See also Weekly Chosun 24 November 2008.
225
units, thus breaking the domineering influence of Seoul on national politics and economy.
This model eliminates the regional level of administration, the position of mayor and
governor as well as regional assemblies. The smaller opposition party LFP proposes a
confederate system, bringing urban and rural areas together but has not yet presented a
detailed proposal. The Blue House favours a ‘5+2 plan’: the abolition of the current
provinces into seven large districts, namely five different zones (the capital area, the
Chungch’ong-area, Honam, the Southeast, and Taegu/Kyungsangbukdo), plus two
economic blocks (Kangwon Province and Cheju-do). This would create economies of
scale, compared to independent units such as Shanghai and Tokyo, but critics already
point out that this model is prone to be affected by central government influence (DongA
Ilbo 7 October 2008). It also fails to address the existing imbalances between the different
regions, and cements the domination of Seoul over the nation. In March 2009, the GNP
proposed a combination of the reform plans: the unification of the cities and counties to
create 60-70 units as well as the abolition of provinces in favour of five to seven regions
(Han’gyǒrye 27 March 2009). The latter would not have councils but their leader would
be elected directly by citizens. These leaders would have substantial public profile and
overshadow other local politicians. At the same time, these positions could serve as
stepping stones for national politics, as Lee Myung-bak, a former mayor of Seoul himself,
has experienced. For ambitious politicians, this is a lucrative proposal but personalises
local politics further.
The discourse on local government reform focuses on increasing efficiency and
potential synergy effects but the proposals are far weaker in addressing the problems of
the current local government system noted above. This is reflected in the views of the
respondents in the Suwon survey: more than half of the participants cited ‘economic
effects’ as the main reasons for the need of change, while ‘local history’ came second with
18%. The knowledge about the plans among survey participants is rather limited; about
12% claimed to know a lot and a further 42.2% ‘a little bit’. That leaves about 45% of
people with little or no knowledge of the restructuring plans (Suwon Ilbo 26 November
2008). This is hardly surprising, given that reports in newspapers on reform plans are
infrequent. Journalists generally focus on the gains in efficiency of greater units without
providing details of the effect on political representation and participatory activities.14
Neither local democracy and the role of elected representatives nor the relationship with
the central government and the devolution of power are mentioned in greater detail in the
discussion. Exceptions include National Assembly representative Kwon Gyongsok who
raised the uncertainty of the central government’s influence on the new entities
(Han’gyǒrye 7 November 2008). Without this debate, however, the reform will limit the
development of local democracy and ultimately the consolidation of democracy in Korea.
CONCLUSION
The failure to include local democracy in the imaginary of citizens touches on other
problems in Korea’s democratisation, such as the underdevelopment of local civil society
(Kim 2006) and the lack of institutionalisation of political parties (Hermanns 2009). The
discourse on local reform focuses on administrative efficiency with little regard for local
democracy and the role of the central administration. Democratic legitimacy is mainly
defined by the results, the output side, treating citizens are customers. Input by citizens
and active participation are not encouraged. This trend can also be observed in other
countries that introduced ‘new public management’ measures in the 1990s (like New
Zealand and the United Kingdom). These are, however, established democracies with a
14
This is the topic of more detailed research that cannot be presented here for space limitations.
226
long history of local elections. There has been no talk of abolishing these elections, despite
low participation rates. On the contrary, measures to encourage participation are pursued
in many established democracies. In newly democratising countries like South Korea, the
importance of local democracy in the process of democratic deepening should not be
underestimated. For this reason, the importance of local democracy should be incorporated
in the discourse on administrative reform in South Korea. So far, the few comments in
favour of local democracy have not received the attention they deserve.
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Contact Details:
Dr Heike Hermanns, Department of Politics and International Relations
Inha University, Inch’on, South Korea
Email: [email protected]
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