Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
Submission 25
Deborah Hunter
President, Friends of Great Western Tiers Kooparoona Niara
Conservation Officer, Mole Creek Caving Club.
Correspondence:
Submission for the Senate inquiry 15th April 2016
The response to, and lessons learnt from, recent fires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
affecting the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area, with particular reference to:
a. the impact of global warming on fire frequency and magnitude;
b. the availability and provisions of financial, human and mechanical
resources;
c. the adequacy of fire assessment and modelling capacity;
d. Australia’s obligations as State Party to the World Heritage Convention;
e. world best practice in remote area fire management; and
f. any related matter.
1 Preamble
This submission concerns the fire known as the Lake Mackenzie, Tasmanian Fire Service
(TFS) incident number 236227. It later became known as the Mersey Forest complex of
fires. We welcome any opportunity to make further representation should there be
hearings into the fires.
The catastrophic losses incurred elsewhere in the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage
Area (TWWHA) and high conservation value areas of recognised World Heritage status,
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
Submission 25
such as the Tarkine forests (takayna) are acknowledged but are beyond the scope of this
submission.
In making this submission, we express the greatest respect for all personnel involved in
the dangerous and protracted effort to control and contain the fires. We make this
submission in the spirit of helping to understand, address and prevent such devastation in
the future.
The first Tasmanians are respectfully acknowledged as traditional owners of this land, as
is the name kooparoona niara.
2 Summary
It is submitted that
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Research on climate change and fire response must be restored and increased
including CSIRO.
Inadequacy in response time and resources and skills in the Tasmanian fire
fighting is evident and preparedness must be improved.
TFS communications and response considerably lagged events, TFS
communications systems were not coping and failure of such protocols may have
been related to assessment and prediction failures that require investigation and
improvement.
Protection of what remains of the Central Plateau alpine vegetation and soils
(consistent with the recommendations of the UNESCO Reactive Monitoring
Mission to the Tasmanian Wilderness, Australia, 2015) and restoration of what is
possible must be done, utilising local and indigenous communities.
Fire fighting detection, monitoring, assessment, reaction, resources and capacity
must be restored and enhanced (consistent with the recommendations of the
UNESCO Reactive Monitoring Mission to the Tasmanian Wilderness, Australia,
2015). Volunteer fire fighting teams’ skills and capacities must be improved to
include advanced remote area skills in Tasmania.
A professional attitude that prioritises suppression of fires in reserved lands must
supplant traditional political attitudes.
The impact of the fires on the behaviour of the karst drainage systems, water
quality and karst ecosystems dependent on karst hydrology should be monitored
on an ongoing basis. Sufficient resources must be allocated for proper and expert
scientific methods to achieve this. The possible need to establish fauna sanctuaries
must be investigated. The impact on future water supplies must be assessed.
Coverage maps showing extent as well as grades of severity in loss of vegetation
and peat should be carried out as thoroughly as possible to learn as much as
possible from the disaster and monitor any recovery and restoration.
This submission urges protection of the Great Western Tiers World Heritage Area
(WHA) extensions in the secure conservation tenure of National Park, as
recommended in the Report by UNESCO’s mission to Tasmania recently, as soon
as possible. Inclusion in the new Park of the Central Plateau and other landscape
elements of high conservation value contiguous with the WHA extensions should
be considered as buffers and for long term viability. Remaining alpine areas must
be protected alongside these buffering escarpment forests with increased
firefighting training and allocated resources.
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A folio of before-and-after photography has been assembled (Appendix 1). Photographic
and written observations and records of the fire progress, extent and response to it were
made throughout the alert period and into the “advice” period (held by the author).
Website community information releases by the TFS were included.
The setting is shown in Figures 1, 2 and 3, including the locations of photography used in
this submission.
Figure 1: Location of photographs in this submission, showing popular walking tracks
including the Devils Gullet lookout and showing part of the World Heritage Area (purple
transparency). The route traversed for before-and-after photographs (Appendix 1) is
shown in the next figure. The scale bar shows 2 km. TheLISTmap, Tasmanian
government.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure 2: Route traversed for before-and-after photographs, including pseudokarst shown
in blue. The scale bar shows 1000 m. TheLISTmap, Tasmanian government.
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Figure 3: The location from which most photographs of the fire in progress were taken is
at “Fern-lea” (centre right). Marakoopa Café is shown at top, left of centre, while
Chudleigh and Mole Creek (not labeled) are located at top on the red-marked B12 road.
Liena is the cleared valley in top left, while Lorinna is just off-map to Liena’s north.
TheLISTmap, Tasmanian government.
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3 Submission to the terms of reference
3 (a) the impact of global warming on fire frequency and magnitude
The impact of global warming on the geographic area at risk of fires should be added to
this heading. In Tasmania this year, the geographic area affected by fires expanded into a
region of alpine vegetation that is not fire tolerant, and fire has burnt the peat soils that
vegetation grew upon. This alpine complex may not have experienced such fire for
thousands of years. Excluding infrequent localised spot fires throughout the Holocene
confined by waterlogged peat, the alpine vegetation of the region may have been
established since the Last Glacial.
It is apparent that rapid changes to the biosphere, atmosphere, hydrosphere and other
earth systems, as manifestations of climate change, are already contributing to increased
fire frequency and magnitude. A number of influences combined to result in the
magnitude of the fire event that arose and spread onto the alpine Plateau. These include
record dry and warm conditions over a long preceding period, a major dry lightning
storm on 13th January, adverse wind direction and strength and apparently tardy detection
of initial fires as well as tardy response.
Research on climate change and fire response must be restored and increased including
CSIRO.
3 (b) the availability and provisions of financial, human and mechanical resources
It was only luck of wind direction that spared the communities of Liena, Lorinna, Mole
Creek, Caveside and Western Creek. Instead, the highlands burned, while cinders and
smoke affected communities of the adjoining lowlands for nine days of alert status from
“watch-and-act” to “emergency.” Likely ignited by lightning on 13th January (Figure 4),
the smoke from the fires was affecting nearby residents by the 18th (Figure 5), yet were
only first officially reported by (or to) the Tasmanian Fire Service (TFS) on 19th of
January (Figure 6). Tourism businesses were forced to close, and local tourism losses
continued for up to three weeks (Figure 7).
Alerts were first issued and resources were first mobilised on 19th January (e.g. Figure 6).
Active fire-fighting including helicopter overflights continued until at least 12th March.
The combined Tasmanian fire fighting effort lasted until withdrawal of interstate and new
Zealand assistance on 14th March (TFS). The Lake Mackenzie- Mersey fire was the
second largest fire, burning a reported 21,974 ha of alpine vegetation not known to
regenerate after fire as well as commercial eucalypt forests and rainforests.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure 4: Lightning strikes over Fisher River valley from Devils Gullet lookout, 5.41 pm,
January 13th. Danny Wilkinson.
Figure 5: View from Caveside south-southwest across the escarpment of the Great
Western Tiers towards Fisher River and Devils Gullet, 5.44 pm January 18th. No fire was
yet reported. Deb Hunter.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure 6: TFS alert mapping, issued 7.24 pm on 21st January, showing fire first reported
on 19th January, some days after it ignited and some 36 hours after fire in the Mersey
valley was apparent to nearby residents. Tasmanian Fire Service.
Figure 7: Looking across Western Bluff on the Great Western Tiers escarpment from
Marakoopa Café, midday 21st January. The image shows the combined smoke from peat
and forest fires, only 48 hours after the fire was first officially reported. The location the
photograph was taken from is shown on Figure 3. Sarah Cooper, Marakoopa Café.
Inadequacy in response time and resources and skills in the Tasmanian fire fighting is
evident and preparedness must be improved. It was also evident to nearby residents from
resources allocated to the protection of snarers’ huts and infrastructure that World
Heritage Gondwanan alpine vegetation was of low priority in early fire suppression
efforts. This smacks of a political agenda that threatens the values of the World Heritage
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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property. A professional attitude that prioritises suppression of fires in reserved lands
must supplant traditional political attitudes.
3 (c) the adequacy of fire assessment and modelling capacity
As suggested in (b) above, impact on populated areas was avoided only by accident, since
the wind took the fire further into the WHA instead of across nearby populated areas. A
tardy and inadequate fire fighting response resulted in loss of the alpine vegetation of the
northern Central Plateau and subalpine scarp vegetation communities. This should have
been predictable under the extreme climatic conditions advised by the Bureau of
Meteorology since spring 2015.
A recent inspection of the fire-affected northern margin of the Central Plateau was
undertaken on foot (the route across the Plateau is shown on Figure 2). The greatest effect
of fire and loss of organic soil was observed closest to the edge of the precipitous
escarpment and generally at the farthest eastern reach of the fire along that edge. It was
apparent that as the fire approached the escarpment on a south westerly airflow, it
increased in energy with additional oxygen drawn from the 1,000 m altitudinal
differential as it approached the edge. The effect can be seen in majority loss of organic
soil (peat) and vegetation near the Plateau margin (Appendix 1). A further consequence
of the topographical effects of the Plateau edge and steep escarpment was the ignition of
strips of sub-alpine vegetation by cinders carried on atmospheric rotors (Figures 8 & 9).
Figure 8: Burnt sub-alpine vegetation at the base of the scarp, ignited by cinders carried
on turbulent atmospheric circulation during the burning of the peat above.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure 9: Derived from photographic records, sub-alpine scarp fires presumed to have
been ignited by atmospheric anomalies along the escarpment are shown in blue. The top
of Parsons Track at the west end of Mount Parmeener is marked. The LISTmap,
Tasmanian government.
Lessons must be learned from the impacts of the fires on precious remnant Gondwanan
relict ecosystems of the Central Plateau and fragile scarp vegetation. Some of the impacts
are documented in Attachment 1 using before-and-after photography.
TFS communications were demonstrably inadequate through the crisis. Because this
implied apparent inadequacies in assessment and modeling, the extent of inadequacy
must be identified and addressed. Nevertheless, it can be summarised that the fire
progressed in two stages, firstly from the Mersey valley up onto the Plateau (Figures 4 &
5), then on the 23rd along a broad swath of the greater Mersey Valley (shown in Figures
12 & 13 below, in temporal sequence).
While residents were observing what was clearly a major fire in the World Heritage Area
from 18th January, the fire was only first officially reported on 19th January. Over a
period of a few hours, the alert level was raised to “emergency,” and by late evening the
fire had crossed the Plateau and breached the escarpment above Caveside (Figures 10, 11
& 12).
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure 10: Flames framed the outline of Mount Parmeener from “Fern-lea,” Caveside, by
10.27 pm on 19th January, less than 12 hours after the first TFS alert. Deb Hunter.
Figure 11: Fire activity viewed from Caveside at 1.26 pm on the first day of fire alert.
Deb Hunter.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure 12: Fire coverage as shown on the morning of 20th January (Tasmanian Fire
Service). The start of the fire is shown as the darker spot just south of the confluence of the
Mersey and Fisher Rivers. The February Plains fire has started and is shown on the upper left of
the map.
However, it soon became evident that TFS communications and response considerably
lagged events. By the evening of 23rd January the fires had joined and the Lake Bill fire
further south was approaching the so-called Lake Mackenzie fire (Figures 13 & 14).
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure 13: Fires that ignited from a series of lightning strikes joined into a Mersey forest
“complex of fires” by 6.15 pm on 23rd January. By 6.30 am on 30th January, the Lake Bill
fire (lower right) had joined the Mersey complex fire. Tasmanian Fire Service.
The scale of the fire storm as the fires of the Mersey forests and Plateau combined was
readily apparent to residents of the nearby communities from the evening of 18th January
(Figures 13 &14). Rapid escalation of the emergency with southerly gusts threatened
Lorinna. TFS communications systems were not coping, and a number of residents in
other communities mistakenly received emergency text messages intended for Lorinna
late in the evening of 21st January.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
Submission 25
Figure 14: Smoke from the combined Mersey forest fires billowing past Western Bluff,
8.23 pm January 23rd. Deb Hunter.
It is unknown whether inconsistencies and inadequacies in other TFS communications
and evident protocols were related to assessment and prediction failures. For example, in
the author’s experience, adjoining neighbours variously received visits from volunteer
fires units to assess their fire plans and the defence potential for their properties while
others did not. This arguably ad hoc or incompetent approach potentially threatened lives.
The author is able to provide further details if and as required.
3 (d) Australia’s obligations as State Party to the World Heritage Convention
A large portion of the alpine, sub-alpine and forested WHA adjacent to the communities
of Lorinna, Liena, Mole Creek, Caveside and Western Creek have been destroyed by fire.
Much of the alpine vegetation community is unlikely to recover within hundreds or even
thousands of years. This geographical hinterland of the communities is culturally
important to the contemporary community and holds great potential for healing
relationships with the traditional owners through indigenous WHA cultural values. It is
imperative to act to protect the remaining alpine vegetation and soils of the northern
Central Plateau (consistent with the recommendations of the UNESCO Reactive
Monitoring Mission to the Tasmanian Wilderness, Australia, 2015) and restore what is
possible, utilising local and indigenous communities.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
Submission 25
3 (e) World best practice in remote area fire management
Fire fighting detection, monitoring, assessment, reaction, resources and capacity must be
restored and enhanced (consistent with the recommendations of the UNESCO Reactive
Monitoring Mission to the Tasmanian Wilderness, Australia, 2015). Volunteer fire
fighting teams’ skills and capacities must be improved to include advanced remote area
skills in Tasmania. Local teams must be able to affect rapid response on a local basis.
This response must be capable of extinguishing lightning strike fires while small before
they can spread, wherever possible, and rapidly controlling them where not possible.
3 (f) any related matter
3 (f) 1 Karst matters
Given the general paucity of awareness of karst issues and expertise in karst landscape
processes, a substantial emphasis of this submission concerns possible and probable
impacts of the fires upon the Mole Creek karst’s natural values and the karst resources
used by the human community. The TWWHA was extended from the edge of the Central
Plateau in 2013 to include much of the western escarpment of the Great Western Tiers
and the Mole Creek karst and its catchment (Figure 15).
Figure 15: Tasmanian World Heritage Area (purple translucent) overlying the Tasmanian
Reserve Estate layer, with the extent of karst shown in blue outline. The Mersey River
valley, including the tributary Fisher River, extends along the left of the map to Lake Rowallan
(lower left); the fire moved from the Mersey up the Fisher valley onto the Central Plateau, thence
northeast to the scarp of the Great Western Tiers and karst catchment. Courtesy TheLISTmap,
Tasmanian government.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
Submission 25
The Lake Mackenzie/Mersey fire has affected the Mole Creek karst, one of eastern
Australia’s largest and most densely cavernous karsts. The karst extends from the
midslopes of the Great Western Tiers (the Tiers) across the Mole Creek valley to the foot
of the Gog Range, measuring approximately 26 x 10 km. Its main catchment includes the
higher slope of the Tiers and the northern margin of the Central Plateau burnt in the Lake
Mackenzie/Mersey fire.
The Mole Creek valley is an important farming area, and the caves are important for
tourism and speleology. The values for which the caves of the Mole Creek karst are
recognised include a high degree of endemism in an obligate faunal assemblage and
troglophile fauna. The karst fauna are vulnerable species and research is incomplete.
Streams in the Mole Creek landscape, tributaries of the Mersey River, flow underground
for most of their courses for most of the year and surface water is scarce. The water
saturated (phreatic) zone of the karst is important for water resources in a landscape with
poor availability of surface water. The Mole Creek karst is a fluviokarst, one where the
water that flows through the karst systems arises not only from direct meteoric input upon
the surface overlying the karst, but more importantly, from topography abutting the
limestone at higher elevation.
There are two important perched aquifers that release water to the karst drainage systems
of Mole Creek and have long buffered inputs to the karst drainage systems. Firstly, thick
sediments eroded from higher slopes on the Tiers overlie the forested karst (geological)
contact. These sediments represent a substantial perched aquifer; a diffuse input that
releases water gradually into the karst drainage systems. However, the majority of the
obscured karst contact is now planted out to Eucalyptus nitens timber plantations;
plantations that are known for substantial interception of aquifer recharge in southeast
Australia by virtue of high water demand in rapid growth phase. Secondly, streams rising
upon the Central Plateau and upper escarpment of the Tiers directly input the karst
drainage systems. Most of these streams were maintained as small but permanent streams,
due to the sponge-like release of moisture throughout the year by the peat soils of the
northern Central Plateau.
The loss of the peat based soils of the northern margin of the Central Plateau in the fires
will result in compromise to their buffering effect on stream flows. Research had already
shown that broadacre plantations over the midslope perched aquifer had recently changed
the karst hydrology (author). The perched aquifers enabled gradual release along the
rivers over the seasons and release between potential meteoric phreas recharge events.
The likely effect most residents, water users and regular cavers will notice is higher
magnitude oscillations in cave stream volumes. The epiphreas will also fluctuate more
noticeably. Cave explorers (speleologists) and the cave fauna will be vulnerable to longer
dry spells and more frequent floods.
The impact of the fires on the behaviour of the karst drainage systems, water quality and
karst ecosystems dependent on karst hydrology should be monitored on an ongoing basis.
Sufficient resources must be allocated for proper and expert scientific methods to achieve
this. The possible need to establish fauna sanctuaries must be investigated. The impact on
future water supplies must be assessed.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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3 (f) 2 Impacts documented
The peat burnt more thoroughly the closer to the escarpment, fueled by an increase in
available oxygen. Sub-alpine impacts were patchy and limited by airflow characteristics.
To the ESE of Mt Parmeener lies a depression formed by a slumped field of dolerite
columns that can be regarded as a pseudokarst. Partly explored by the author some years
ago, it contained dark cave-like spaces with troglophillic fauna. The vegetation of the
depression was burnt in this year’s fires (Figures 2 & 16).
Figure 16: Pseudokarst field formed in blocks of dolerite slumped from the scarp. The
sub-alpine vegetation of this phenomenon ignited late on 19th January, likely by cinders
carried on atmospheric rotors that missed the vegetation closer to the peat fire behind the
camera’s viewpoint. Patchy burns can also be seen on the scarp top right. Deb Hunter.
Coverage maps showing extent as well as grades of severity in loss of vegetation and peat
should be carried out as thoroughly as possible to learn as much as possible from the
disaster and monitor any recovery and restoration.
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(f) 4 Protection of high conservation value lands from future fire
Protection of the remaining rare and fire-sensitive vegetation communities and
landscapes abutting the fire affected area should be afforded the highest and most urgent
protection. Priority for protection should exceed that of protection of infrastructure.
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
Submission 25
This submission urges protection of the Great Western Tiers World Heritage Area
(WHA) extensions in the secure conservation tenure of National Park, as recommended
in the Report by UNESCO’s mission to Tasmania recently, as soon as possible. Inclusion
in the new Park of the Central Plateau and other landscape elements of high conservation
value contiguous with the WHA extensions should be considered as buffers and for long
term viability. Remaining alpine areas must be protected alongside these buffering
escarpment forests with increased firefighting training and allocated resources.
References
Hunter, D., 2016: Unpublished records of the 2016 fire crisis.
Tasmanian Fire Service, 2016: <
http://www.fire.tas.gov.au/Show?pageId=colCurrentBushfires >
UNESCO, 2015: Final Mission Report: Reactive Monitoring Mission to the Tasmanian
Wilderness, Australia
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Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Appendix 1
Before and after photographs, Lake Mackenzie -Mersey complex fire(s). Locations: refer
Figures 1 and 2.
Figure A1: Moorland near the top of Parsons Track, looking northwest: November
2015(top) and April 2016 (bottom).
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A2: Moorland vegetation: escarpment near Central Plateau edge at eastern extent
of Mount Parmeener (alt. Parsons Track): November 2015 (top) and April 2016 (bottom).
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A3: Edge of Central Plateau at top of Parsons Track, December 2014 (top) and
April 2016 (bottom).
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A5: Edge of Central Plateau at eastern extent of Mount Parmeener: November
2015 (top) and April 2016 (bottom).
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A6: Plateau margin vegetation December 2014 (top) and April 2016 (bottom).
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A7: Edge of Central Plateau November 2015 (top) and April 2016 (bottom). Note
that the sub-alpine vegetation meets the edge at this point on the Great Western Tiers.
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A8: Plateau knoll viewpoint looking south December 2014 (top) and April 2016
(bottom).
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A9: Plateau knoll viewpoint looking south-west December 2014 (top) and April
2016 (bottom).
Response to, and lessons learnt from, recent bushfires in remote Tasmanian wilderness
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Figure A10: Plateau knoll viewpoint looking west December 2014 (top) and April 2016
(bottom).