The Impact of the EU on Minority Rights Issues
During the Accession Process
- New Ways to Ensure
Societal Security in Europe -
Pawel Grabowski (Wroclaw University)
Shayan Khawja (De Montfort University, Leicester)
Júlia Lampášová (Charles University in Prague)
Stephanie Schramm (Technische Universität, Dresden)
1
Contents
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3
1
2
3
Theoretical Considerations ................................................................................................. 6
1.1
The Concept of Societal Security ................................................................................ 6
1.2
Historical Background and the Identity Perception ..................................................... 8
Historically-rooted minority groups ................................................................................. 11
2.1
Legal Position of Minorities ...................................................................................... 11
2.2
Position of Minorities in Reality ............................................................................... 14
2.3
Recommendations for Turkey ................................................................................... 16
Roma Minority .................................................................................................................. 18
3.1
Legal Position ............................................................................................................ 18
3.2
Position of Roma in Practice ..................................................................................... 19
3.3
Recommendations ..................................................................................................... 20
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 22
Bibliography ............................................................................................................................. 25
2
Introduction
„Tension has increased between Slovakia and Hungary,
following recent attacks on members of Slovakia's sizeable
Hungarian minority. The SNS leader, Jan Slota, has referred to
Hungarians as a "cancer" and expressed regret that they had
not been expelled after World War II.“1
This quotation shows how deep the tensions between different ethnic, religious, or national
groups may be even within modern democratic states. In order to avoid these tensions, the
European Union (EU) has developed the „Copenhagen criteria‟ that “have been widely
viewed as constituting a successful incentive structure and sanctioning mechanism for the EU
in the promotion of human rights and the protection of minorities.“2
The issue of minority protection has been given highly rhetoric prominence by the EU. The
monitoring during the accession process involves recommendations and the requirements of
legal implementations in the given country. But the EU‟s main instrument for accession and
convergence, the Regular Reports, have been characterized by ad hocism, inconsistency, and
a stress on formal measures rather than substantive evaluation of implementation3. While the
European Commission proposed both short and mid-term recommendations, it rather looked
at fast achievements. Nevertheless, by pushing on the legal implementation of minority rights
and with the assistance of other international organizations, the EU helped substantially to
protect minorities and put the light on this issue. Because in „most states, minority protection
was a second-order issue at the outset of transition in the Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs), as these states prioritized the strengthening of central state capacity and
the position of the majority nation“4.
Multi-ethnicity is also viewed, more generally, as a significant issue for the political stability
of nation-states. The EU perceives it as a potential for instability, perhaps leading to the worst
1
2
BBC News: Row harms Slovak-Hungarian ties. August 2006.
Hughes; Sasse: Monitoring the Monitors: EU Enlargement Conditionality and Minority Protection in the
CEECs. In: Jemie; 1/2003.
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
3
possible outcome of violent secession. This potential is particularly associated with the
presence of territorialized minorities, like the Hungarians in Slovakia or the Russians in some
areas of Baltic states. Much of the research on national and ethnic conflict suggests that such
deeply divided societies can be stabilized by institutional designs which would accommodate
diversity. This is the focus the EU took. It tried to solve ethnical tensions by recommending
the implementation of minority rights. In practice, it put forward the naturalization process in
Estonia and Latvia, and focused on the establishment of language courses or put pressure on
the protection of the Roma in Bulgaria and Slovakia.
But still, even nowadays, there can be seen discrimination of the Kurdish people in Turkey,
tension between the Russians and Estonians according to the „Bronze Soldier Affair“ of 2007,
or discourse struggles between Hungarians and Slovaks.
The Policy Paper deals with the phenomenon of minority rights in the EU from the societal
dimension of security. It develops central arguments that show how important minority rights
are to stabilize a country and the region of the EU. The research question is following: Has
the EU securitization of minority rights (MR) improved or exacerbated societal security
problem? Or, in other words: Has the emphasis placed by the EU on the issue of MR during
the accession process made things better or worse?
The policy paper investigates two different aspects of minority groups protection in the EU –
historically-based minorities, and Roma. The paper examines minority protection in four
European countries – Bulgaria, Slovakia and Baltics (here Latvia and Estonia) as the
representatives of the new MS from the recent enlargements in 2004 and 2007, with the
precondition of implementing the Copenhagen criteria, and one candidate country - Turkey.
In all these countries, the minority issue is highly alert. The EU, along with other international
organizations as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Stability and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), and the Council of Europe (CoE), put an affort on the minority protection in
all these countries and discussed the development in their Regular Reports. It can be seen that
the EU focused mainly on the implementation of minority rights to secure the new members
as well as the Union.
4
The paper analyses the protection of minorities before, during, and after the EU accession
process with the help of five criteria:
identity perception,
legal position of minorities (constitution, citizenship),
educational system,
language,
political representation.
The content of the policy paper is divided into three chapters. The first one focuses on the
theoretical considerations – the theory of the Copenhagen School, from which the notion of
societal security is derived, and the historical background of the identity perception of
minorities within the given states, differentiating inclusive and exclusive identity.
The other two chapters are split according to the two chosen minority issues. The second
chapter focuses on the position of historically-rooted minorities, and the third on the Roma
issue throughout Europe. Both these chapters seek to provide results useful for
recommendations to other potential MS, especially for Turkey, where the minority issue is at
the top of the accession considerations.
The recommendations on the future treatment of the minority rights issues by the EU
institutions create the conclusion of the whole policy paper.
5
1 Theoretical Considerations
This chapter consists of two main parts. In the first part, the concept of Societal Security is
examined, with the main emphasis on the theory of the Copenhagen School, as well as on the
terms securitization, speech act and identity. In the second part, the historical development of
the countries is analysed, in order to show how important the historical memory of a country
can be if it tries to solve its minority issues.
1.1 The Concept of Societal Security
Since the civil war in Balkans during the 1990‟s, we have to be aware that the (inter)ethnical
conflicts and tension can destabilise countries, and even the whole regions. The conflict in
Balkans was caused by the existence of different national identities within one nation. It
shows that threats towards societal identity can escalate and cause war or violent action.
The (bad) treatment of minorities within one country is one possibility for a non-military
cause of conflict, as the European Parliament stated concerning the Russian minority in Baltic
countries.5 It is worth thinking how to avoid these conflicts and stabilize the regions within
the EU, or in its close neighbourhood.
Within the Copenhagen School of thought, the traditional dimension of security is widened.
The traditional notion of security considered state as a central object. The state representatives
are those who declare the emergency condition and have the right to use whatever is
necessary to block the threat. Whereas in societal security, described by the Copenhagen
School, the referent object is not only the state – it is formed by collective identities which
can function even independently from states.6
The referent objects are defined as things that are seen as essentially threatened and which
have a legitimate claim to survive. On the other hand, the actors are those who securitize these
issues by declaring them being existentially threatened. So the referent object may be really
everything what is essentially threatened.7
5
Statement of the European Parliament according to the Accession of the Baltic States into the European Union.
In: Mahler (2004).
6
Buzan, Waever (1998), p. 22.
7
Buzan(1991), p. 36.
6
The securitizing is constructed through the actor‟s speech act, which is an essential notion in
the Copenhagen School. In the traditional view of security, the government speaks for state,
so legitimization of the actor of securitization is clear. However, in the societal dimension,
where the actor may be any member of society, his legitimization may be questioned.
The most important criterion for the societal security is identity as the referent object. It
implies the claim of identity to survive and its capability of being securitised. Societal
security “refers to security of a collective group in relation to other communities or the
institution of the state in which they reside.”8 Identity is characterised by the creation of an
inside and an outside view. The implementation of “we” and the “others” creates essentially
different identity perceptions – the separation of oneself according in relation to “the others”.
On one hand, identity is formed by the society we live in, on the other hand, identity is
constructed and chosen by the people themselves.
There may, and do, exist different identities within one society. The issue in this case is the
question how they can live next to each other, while protecting their identity and, at the same
time, with neither the exclusion, nor the assimilation of one group within the society.
According to minorities, which have mostly another identity than the majority of the society,
they can be viewed as “we” or “the others” (inclusive or exclusive identity). In Bulgaria and
in case of Kurds and other Muslim minorities in Turkey, inclusive identity is applied, as
anybody living on the territory is perceived as Bulgarian or Turkish. In the case of Slovakia
and the Russian minority in Baltics, the different stay different, creating the exclusive
identity. In this case, two different identities live next to each other, try to protect themselves
and have a legitimate claim to survive.
The point within this view is that neither exclusive nor inclusive identity can protect the state
from ethnical tensions. The inclusive identity tends to ignore differences and that can result in
assimilation of the minority. Whereas the exclusive identities tend to overdraw differences
and create a huge border between the groups. The aim of majority in this case is to gain the
minority as little rights as possible.
8
Thiel: Identity, Societal Security and Regional Integration in Europe (2007), p. 9.
7
1.2 Historical Background and the Identity Perception
If we take a look at the countries and their identity perception, history plays an important role
here. In all countries analysed in the research, there exist historically-rooted hatreds between
different ethnic and national groups that may pose big threats to societal security.
In Slovakia, the hatred between Slovaks and Hungarians dates back to the existence of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire (1867 to 1918). Under the rule of Hungarians, characteristic for the
raised wave of Hungarian (Magyar) nationalism, Slovak minority, along with the others,
suffered of suppressed language and cultural freedoms. This past has never been forgotten,
and the anti-Hungarian sentiments of Slovaks remain very strong even nowadays, as well as
Hungarian “historical” claims on the substantial part of the Slovak territory.
As the European Commission against Racism and Intollerance (under the CoE) observed in
Slovakia, “politicians now freely fuel anti-Hungarian sentiment among population because
they know it can win votes.”9 “Due to the governing position of the Slovak national party,
radicalism becomes state policy in Slovakia. As a consequence, the unfriendly Slovak public
attitude (...) transforms into general public hatred.”10 The rising tide of xenophobia in the
Slovak society complicates the efforts to keep the balance between ensuring fundamental
minority rights for Hungarians and Slovakia‟s right of full territorial and cultural
independence.
To set another example: the Soviet occupation formed national identity of Estonians and
Latvians, that were „subjects of different western rulers since the 13th century“11 and were
conquered by the Russian empire in the 18th century. After a short period of national awaking
and independence, beginning in 1918, they were incorporated by the USSR in 1940. Russian
speakers from Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine entered Baltic states and caused crucial
demographic changes – predominant Soviet political and economic elites, as well as Soviet
soldiers have been shaping the society of both countries since 1940.
9
Stracansky: Slovakia: Getting Worse for Minorities (Global Geopolitics and Political Economy, 2009).
10
Hungarian-Slovak relations reach their nadir (10.12.2008);
http://www.cafebabel.co.uk/article/27506/hungary-slovakia-tensions-ethnic-violence.html.
11
Poleschuk (2000), p. 2.
8
During the 1980‟s, a protest movement against the Russian occupation developed.
Nevertheless, the Russian language became state language, while the Latvian nations‟ culture
and language were marginalised and it was impossible for them to bear their own identity.
The privileges of the Russian majority disappeared immediately as both countries gained their
independence in 1991. Even if in areas like Paldiski in Estonia the Russian speakers constitute
majority, in overall, they form minority in both countries. In the first years of independence, a
very rigid minority policy was pursued by the Latvian government during the process of the
recovery of the own identity. The Russian minority is seen as danger for the newly
independent states and rebirth of the culture and identity. Identity within these countries is
formed by the Russian occupation. After 1991 both countries began immediately to orientate
towards the West, seeing their independence as an important step out from the USSR
colonialism. Whereas the Russian perspective is different. The occupation is considered as a
victory and rescue from Germany at that time.
In case of the Hungarian minority, however, the identity perception is more exclusive, as the
Slovak anti-Hungarian sentiment causes that Slovaks perceive Hungarians not as a part of
their own community. And also Hungarians living on the Slovak territory identify themselves
as Hungarians, and not as Slovaks. Within Baltic states, everybody who lives there is called
Latvian, Estonian or Lithuanian. But according to the Russian minority, the reality is
different. Baltics have a very protectionist culture. After 1991, they tried to protect their
language, as a visible part of identity, by law. For example, Latvian became the only state
language. They have an exclusive identity perception as well, while Bulgaria and Turkey have
an inclusive identity perception. This means that, for example, Turkey may claim that all
citizens are treated equally, even if this is not the case for the controversial Kurdish
minorities.
For the creation of Bulgarian identity during the 20th century, two historical factors played
main role – the liberation from the Ottoman Empire, and the post-communist heritage.
Especially in the mid-1950‟s, when Bulgaria and Turkey found themselves on the opposite
sides of the Iron Curtain, the Turkish and Muslim Bulgarians were viewed as “the fifth
column of imperialism.”12 Also in the early 1990‟s the Bulgarian public and politicians
continued to be opposed to view that minorities existed in Bulgaria at all. Moreover, the fact
12
Lozanowa, p. 28-29.
9
that the state was revitalised at a number of international conferences created the feeling that
“somebody outside” determined the development of Bulgaria.13
The existence of the Kurds on the territory of Turkey dates back more than two millennia ago.
They live in a region that spans several countries, predominantly throughout Iran, Iraq, Syria,
and Turkey.14 Kurds, mainly farmers and traders, speak a distinct language and have their
own national culture. Because of their strong self-identity, they have been viewed with
suspicion by Turkish authorities, who banned the language and large parts of Kurdish cultural
expression as part of a campaign to forge one Turkish nation.15
While most Kurds do not pledge to separatism and seek mainly policies that allow autonomy
for use of the Kurdish language, cultural practices, and free movement across borders, an
armed insurgency aimed at creating a separate state was launched in 1984 by the MarxistLeninist Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), supported by the Soviet Union.16 Around 35,000
people were killed and one million people were displaced in the 15-year war, during which
Turkish military forces were accused of widespread abuses. The war ended with the capture
of the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1999.17
These cases show how important historical memory is when it comes to identity creation and
the implementation of minority rights, such as the freedom of expression or the use of own
language. On the other hand, the EU did manage to notice how sensitive this business is and
that ethnical tensions caused by the (bad) treatment of minorities can destabilize the country.
For example, the European Parliament noted that „[t]he treatment of the Russian minority in
Baltic states has the potential to destabilize the situation in those countries, and affect
adversely the development of relations with the EU, NATO and Russia.“18
13
Atanasova (2004), p. 359.
14
Democracy web: comparative studies in freedom, „Majority Rule, Minority Rights: Country studies Turkey‟, available at
http://www.democracyweb.org/majority/turkey.php
15
Ibid.
16
BBC, World: Europe Turkey captures Kurdish leader, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/77915.stm
17
Ibid.
18
Statement of the European Parliament according to the Accession of the Baltic States into the European
Union. In: Mahler 2004, p. 70.
10
2 Historically-rooted minority groups
This chapter tackles developments in protection of historically-rooted minorities in the
selected EU MS where they create at least 10% of the population – Turks in Bulgaria,
Hungarians in Slovakia and Russians in Baltics (particularly in Latvia and Estonia). The
historically-rooted minorities are, in majority of cases, the most numerous and influential
(sometimes also most problematic) ones, therefore they deserve a heightened focus in order to
preserve societal security of the European Union.
The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first section, the legal position of
minorities is examined, based on the constitution and other legal measures in the country.
Afterwards, the focus is shifted on the EU accession process, during which the countries had
to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, aimed also to prevent potential societal security threats
caused by the accession of the new MS. The requests and recommendations of the EU and
other European institutions referring to the level of minorities protection are analysed, as well
as the states‟ attempts to respond to them.
The second section then seeks to reveal how the legislative protection of minorities is being
applied in reality, on the basis of the common criteria such as obtaining of citizenship, the
right to use and be educated in the minority language, and the level of political representation.
The third section uses the findings from the previous analysis in order to provide
recommendations to the EU in tackling the problem of minorities in Turkey and other
accession countries.
2.1 Legal Position of Minorities
Constitution
Constitutions of all analysed countries comprise the protection of fundamental rights,
including bars against any form of discrimination. However, they differ substantially in the
way of perception of minorities, as well as in the extension of rights provided to them.
For example, Article 11.4 of the new Bulgarian Constitution (from July 1991) prohibits
creation of ethnically based political parties. Moreover, there is no term „minority‟ mentioned
in the Constitution, instead, individual rights of every citizen are protected, which may be
understood as the result of the long-lasting historical Ottoman rule over Bulgaria.
11
On the other hand, the constitution of the Slovak Republic (from 1 October 1992) is very
opened towards minorities on its territory, stating that “every person has the right to freely
decide which national group he or she is a member of” (Part 2, Chapter One, Art. 12(3)). The
rights of national minorities and ethnic groups create a whole chapter of the Constitution,
ensuring that “membership in any national minority or ethnic group may not be used to the
detriment of any individual.” Their rights comprise specifically the right to use a minority
language in education and official communication, the right to participate in decision-making
of the country, and to create and maintain education and cultural institutions, as well as the
right to receive and disseminate information in their mother tongue, or to promote their
cultural heritage. However, the exercise of these rights may not threaten the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic (Part 2, Chapter 4, Art. 34 (1-3)).
The constitutions of Baltic states also provide basic minority rights. The Latvian constitution
(which dates back into 1922) provides the right to all ethnic minorities to preserve and
develop their language, ethnic and cultural identity (Art. 114). Estonian constitution (from
1992) also secures several rights for minorities, such as the educational institutions
established for minorities with the right to be taught in their mother tongue, the right to
establish institutions of self-government, or the right to communicate with government in
their language (paragraphs 37, 50, 51).
Other legal measures
After 1989, Bulgaria‟s strict assimilation policy was reformed – ethnic minorities were
allowed to restore their original names, “assimilation” prisoners received amnesty, and the
Penal Code was also improved.19 Despite of these considerable changes, until 1999, the
existence of minorities had not been recognized by Bulgarian authorities.
In the last decade, mainstream political parties introduced the “Bulgarian ethnic model”,
based on the notion of a peaceful co-existence between minorities. It sends a message to the
EU and international NGOs that Bulgaria has successfully solved its minority problems 20, but
19
Regular Report on Bulgaria‟s progress towards accession (2004).
20
Rechel (2008), p. 345.
12
the position of minorities in reality still remains problematic, particularly for the strong
inclusive identity, still restricting some minorities from their ethnic self-identification.21
In Slovakia, there may be no doubts that the Constitution secures all rights of minorities.
Nevertheless, some other legal measures have been strongly objected by the Hungarian
minority. The most feared is the amendment to the State Language Act (passed in June 2009),
primarily aimed at stopping the language discrimination of Slovaks, as “in areas of mixed
nationality (they) are often denied the right of access to information in the state language.” 22
However, Hungarians fear that, in practice, they will lose the right to use their mother tongue.
But no such doubts proved, and even the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities,
Knut Vollebaek, regarded the act fully democratic, by “guaranteeing the right balance
between protecting and promoting the state language on the one hand and protecting the
linguistic rights of persons belonging to national minorities on the other.”23
Despite of the Baltic states‟ constitutions that provide fundamental minority rights, other legal
measures in the countries pose numerous restrictions to the real rights of minorities. After
gaining the independence, Latvia started the process of the recovery of its own identity, for
which the influence of the Russian minority was seen as a danger. Therefore, the country
pursued a very rigid minority policy24, embodied in the law on citizenship, posing barriers
based on the knowledge of the state language, history and constitution. Moreover, in 1995,
both countries implemented a new term for non-citizens – “Aliens”.
21
Ibid.
22
„The Language act and minority rights in Slovakia“, Ministry of Culture of Slovak Republic,
http://www.culture.gov.sk/aktuality/the-language-act-and-minority-rights-in-slovakia [2. 4. 2010].
23
Ibid.
24
cf. Schmied-Kowarzik, p. 98.
13
Fulfilling the EU requirements
In case of Bulgaria and Slovakia, the Commission‟s regular reports on the progress towards
accession focused far more on the situation of the Roma minority.25 The countries managed to
synchronize all required legislation, and there were no special requirements or objections
towards the relationship with the historically-rooted minorities. The Council of Europe even
pointed out on the improvements in the relationship.
Considering minority rights in Baltics, the European institutions criticized especially the
forced participation of Russians in the naturalization process and the complicated access to
citizenship and state language courses. Subsequently, the countries improved many areas of
minority rights, such as simplification of tests for citizenship, possibilities to learn the state
language, or a certain improvement in the position of non-citizens on the labour market.
However, in its regular reports, the Commission focused on ad-hoc actions of the national
governments, and did not focus on long term developments.26
2.2 Position of Minorities in Reality
Citizenship
Obtaining of citizenship poses a problem to minorities only in Baltics, where the majority of
the Russian minority resides without the right of citizenship. As the citizenship is a
precondition for the voting right at all levels of governing and for the exercise of several
professions, it poses a high level of discrimination of the Russian minority.
Language and education
Turkish is an optional language for Bulgarian pupils in primary and secondary education. 27
Turkish is taught mostly in Muslim denominational schools (as majority of Turkish in
Bulgaria are Muslims) and in private schools. Religious education is, therefore, well provided
25
For example, in its 1997 Opinion on Bulgaria‟s application for EU membership, the Commnission
concluded: “Although the Turkish minority seems well integrated, this is not the case with the Romany (tzigane)
population.”
26
cf.: Schmied-Kurvazik, p. 105.
27
In fact, only one fifth of Turkish pupils learn their mother tongue in schools, as English is more useful
for the future career.
14
for them, and is partially controlled by the Chief Mufti. In overall, since the transition of the
country, the proper education for Turkish minority is provided.
Under the pressure of Hungarian representation in Slovakia, educational system for their
minority in own language is at very high level. Even the Hungarian-language state university
was established in 2004.
Despite of the strict requirements of using state language, the educational system in Baltics
provided for minorities has developed considerably. Schools for minorities where pupils are
taught in their mother tongue already exist.
Political representation
As it has been already mentioned above, the Article 11.4 of the Bulgarian Constitution
prohibits creation of any ethnically based political party. Nevertheless, there exists the party
called Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF) that is said to be Turkish, even though it is
not officially ethnically based. It has a strong political position – has been represented in
every parliament since 1991, and in 2001, it even joined the governing coalition. Turkish
minority also participates in local authorities, especially in regions where the Turkish
community is strong enough. However, at the seaside, Turks are under-represented, since any
Turkish authority there is perceived as a threat to the tourist-dependent economy.
Generally, Hungarian minority is strongly represented at all levels of Slovak governing, and is
not officially prohibited by any law. The most influential political party of Hungarian
minority, the Party of the Hungarian Coalition (SMK) has been represented in the Slovak
Parliament since the independent existence of Slovakia, participating even in the government
coalition in years 2002 to 2006. In the last two parliamentary elections, it gained over 11% of
votes, and in the elections to the European parliament in 2004, even 13.24%.
In contrary, the Russian minority in Baltics is severely under-represented in all decision
making. As other areas of life, also the right of both active and passive voting are bound to
citizenship and state language28. Therefore, especially in Latvia, where the Russian minority
creates nearly 40% of the population, elections do not reflect the real expectation of
population, as it should be in any democratic society. Estonia, on the contrary, tried to include
non-citizens into political decision making process and allowed them to vote at the local level.
28
For the seat in the Latvian Parliament, the knowledge of the highest level of the state language is required.
15
2.3 Recommendations for Turkey
Turkey creates a different approach towards the legal acknowledgement of minorities on its
territory, as its minority groups are classified exclusively by religious attachment. 29 All the
minority rights policies in the country are based on the religious classification into three
minority statuses, first set out in the Treaty of Lausanne in 192330 – (1) non-Muslim
minorities recognized by the State at the signing of the Treaty; (2) non-Muslim minorities that
existed, but were unrecognized by the State at the signing of the Treaty; and (3) non-Muslim
minorities that did not exist at the time of the Treaty and remain unrecognized by the State.31
In other words, this classification means that only non-Muslim minorities are granted their
rights – the freedoms of living, religious beliefs and migration; the rights of legal and political
equality; using mother tongue in the courts, opening their schools or similar institutions; and
holding of religious ceremonies. All Muslim minorities “are denied recognition, and a
traditional emphasis on „Turkishness‟ over multiculturalism has left Kurds facing restrictions
on their language, culture and freedom of expression.”32
In comparison with the previously analysed EU MS, the Turkish situation is substantially
different, as none of them distincts minorities only on the religious basis. This is the main
point that must be reconsidered in order to give same rights to all minorities residing on the
territory of Turkey. In fact, following the 1980‟s military coup, there have been ongoing
attempts to make the Constitution more democratic, comprising also deeper minority rights,
such as the use of other languages besides Turkish.
Even though Turkey is still not within the EU, it has made numerous attempts to fulfill the
Copenhagen criteria. Applying to the minority rights, this was, for example, the new law
established in June 2004, allowing, for the first time, broadcasting in minority language.
Moreover, the Justice and Development Party acted to grant greater autonomy to Kurdish
regions. Nevertheless, while the EU securitization may have led to reforms, discrimination of
minorities in practice still pertains.
29
Country Report: Turkey (2005); http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6851&year=2006.
30
Karimova N & Deverell E, Minorities in Turkey, (2001).
31
Oehring, Human Rights in Turkey (2002).
32
Country Report: Turkey (2005); http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=6851&year=2006.
16
In case of education and the use of mother tongue, the most important for minorities is the
right to be taught in their own language. All analysed EU countries have made efforts and
improvements to provide this basic right. In Turkey, the Kurdish language is still not allowed
in political communication, only in non-formal use. The Turkish educational system has been
criticized by European institutions for a different aspect – the following of Muslim faith at
schools, with no opportunity to choose an education in accordance with another, minority,
religion.
In overall, each European state, eather the EU member or candidate, must make more efforts
to co-exist with its historically-rooted minorities. For Turkey, this must apply, first of all,
putting end to the forcible „Turkification‟.
17
3 Roma Minority
“On May 1, Europe’s Roma will become
the continent’s largest and most advantaged minority.”33
The Roma minority is a special one in the EU, not only due to amount of Roma living in
European countries, but mainly due to the character of this community and the fact that they
have been one of the most visible minorities in Europe for over 700 years. Roma have been
marginalised due to their negative public image, but have also cultivated their marginal status
because of their different culture. What is more, divisions in the Roma society such as tribes
and families are also very strong. They might seem to be homogeneous, but they are not.
Since the mass education appeared, Roma have to face the vicious circle, caused by problems
with inadequate education. For years, they have used to be a scapegoat, but, despite of their
poverty, they are free, and that is the foundation of their culture.
Despite many programmes that are set to include Roma minority into the European society,
their position in practice is still different from those that are postulated. The most important
spheres are political representation and education, and those two are subject of the following
research.
3.1 Legal Position
The legal position of Roma within the new MS has been the case of the majority of objections
from the EU and other European institution during the EU accession process. On the other
hand, these objection caused responses from the new MS complaining on the creation of
a double standard in treating Roma in old and new MS.
The Roma minority has been touched mainly by the welfare reforms in the countries, tying
benefits directly to those actively seeking work or seeking further education, as the majority
of Roma is dependent on state handouts. In Slovakia, their reaction were: “How can we live in
this country normally when there are no jobs (...) To survive, the Roma have two possibilities
– either move away or steal. Worst of all, we are doing criminal things and stealing food for
our children, but we don‟t want this.”34
33
CNN, Slovakia seeks help on Roma issue (16.4.2004).
34
Ibid.
18
3.2 Position of Roma in Practice
Political Representation
As it has been mentioned for several times, due to the Article 11.4 of the Bulgarian
Constitution, the creation of ethnically based parties is prohibited. Roma, generally, have low
level of political representation, which is said to be an effect of the widespread social
exclusion and marginalisation. Beside, it is almost impossible for any political party that
represents interests of community that makes up only about 5% of society to be eleceted into
parliament – because of the 4% electoral threshold. What is more, the issue of Roma is
considered politically unpopular among political parties that represent majority. At the local
level, things are different and Roma minority is better represented, but still not sufficiently.
This situation is caused by a wide range of reasons, of which the most important seem to be a
low level of education and serious divisions into clans and families. That problem and those
reasons are common in each Eeuropean country35 where Romani societies exist and despite
any efforts, it seems to be unable to solve them.
Political representation in Slovakian anti-Roma political environment is almost impossible.
An important role in the creation of this environment play also media, by creating numerous
anti-Roma prejudices. Moreover, some statements made by politicians make the situation
even worse, especially the statements of the former prime minister Vladimir Meciar. “Indeed,
there is general anti-Roma sentiment among Slovak officials at all levels.”36
Educational System
Despite Bulgarian prohibition of any discrimination in the access to education by law,
discrimination against Roma is pervasive and generates serious effects. The main problem
pose separate classrooms, schools or even special schools for mentally or physically disabled
in which majority of students are Romany. It seems to be primarilly rooted in residential
segregation, as many Roma still live in separate districts. These schools are usually
overcrowded, and the lack of basic facilities and well qualified teachers makes them offer
very low level of education37. In August 2002, new legislation on the education of children
35
Barany (1994), p. 326.
36
Roma in Slovakia; http://www.slovakia.org/society-roma.htm.
37
European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession (2001).
19
with special educational needs was issued to stop an uncontrolled acceptance of using welfare
criteria38. Another positive development is that some NGOs have pursued projects on
desegregation of Roma schools.
Similar situation to that shown above is in Slovakia, where schools are also segregated. It is
common that Romany children, who mainly learn in special schools for mentally
disadvantaged even if they are mentally healthy, are offered low level of education. Without
education, it is highly difficult to find a job, and that is the main cause of marginalization of
Roma, not only in Slovakia, but in almost each European country.
3.3 Recommendations
The former Slovak PM Dzurinda said about the Roma position in the country: “I think that
we do our best, but we need understanding. We need help. And I guess that issue, this
question is not only a question for Slovakia but a broader wider problem.”39 Roma issue is
common in almost every European country, but despite many implemented policies, it has not
been solved yet, and that shows us that the policy on Roma issue should be changed.
As shown above, lack of education among Romani communities is the primary problem to be
tackled if we want to solve other problems connected with the Roma issue. Development of
NGOs and projects on desegregation of Roma schools is not enough, but it could be a good,
first step. Second step should be done by government, as it has been the case in countries
outside the EU – the F.Y.R.O.M. with its desegregation policy, or Macedonia with the
educational system. These countries show the Union that it is possible to face the problem
without prejudices.
“Ideally, the problems of the Roma and other minorities should be solved on regional and
community levels. It is essential to create mechanisms for constant consultation between
communities‟ leaderships and minority representatives and organizations. (...) the central
government should create effective administrative and judicial mechanisms to remedy
discriminatory acts against Roma and other minorities. Furthermore, it should provide
38
European Commission, Regular Report on Bulgaria’s progress towards accession (2003).
39
CNN, Slovakia seeks help on Roma issue (16.4.2004).
20
services to the regions to help them more comprehensively integrate the development of
Roma and other minority communities.”40
The main problem concerning Roma minority rights is a strong anti-Roma prejudice,
prevailing in almost all European countries. Nevertheless, it can be combated, but more
efforts, time and money are needed to do so, and, what is the most important, the combat
should be well controlled. Law implementation must be a wide process, including more than
only some law changes, but also changes in people‟s prejudices – to do so, new policy on
Roma issue should be implemented, a policy of real desegregation.
40
Roma in Slovakia; http://www.slovakia.org/society-roma.htm.
21
Conclusion
In the previous chapters, minority groups position in several EU or applicant countries were
analysed on the basis of the same criteria. It was shown how complicated the situation is,
based on the historical hatreds, prejudices, and own identity protection. Nevertheless, it is
highly important to struggle these factors in order to avert potential threats to societal security
of the European Union and its states.
The purpose of accompanying recommendations for candidate countries (like Turkey) is to
encourage and facilitate the adoption of specific measures to alleviate tensions relating to
minorities and to ease the EU accession process. These recommendations aim to provide
some practical guidance in developing policies and law, in accordance with international
norms and standards, and based on international experience and best practice which can
balance and meet the needs and interests of all sectors of the population, both majority and
minority ones. Obviously, the recommendations need to be implemented in a way which is
sensitive to the specific situation in each State.
Over the last few years, there have been a certain recurrent issues and themes concerning
minorities which have become the subject of attention for both Turkey and more importantly
the EU. Among these are the issues of minority education and the use of minority languages
which are of particular importance for the maintenance and development of the identity of the
persons belonging to minority groups. Other important issues are the effective participation of
national minorities in the governance of the State and the use of minority languages as a
vehicle of communication in the broadcast media. According to the EU accession partnership
recommendation, the Turkish government should abolish the language restrictions on
television and radio broadcasting contained in the Supreme Board of Radio and Television
Law. It is worth noting, since June 2004 new laws allowed broadcasting in minority
languages (mostly Kurdish language) for the first time in Turkey.
Another issue that is worth recommending for Turkey is a stronger institutional mechanisms
to support the interaction and co-operation between police and the persons belonging to
minority groups. In combination with the lack of training for operation in a multi-ethnic
society, an often mono-ethnic composition of the police service and discriminatory practices,
police have generated negative reactions among minority communities in a number of
situations and even a conflict catalyst. An enhanced communication will benefit all parties.
22
The minorities benefit from policing which is more sensitive to their concerns and more
responsive to their requirements for personal protection and access to justice. The police
benefit from greater effectiveness, since good communication and co-operation are keys to
effective policing in any community. The state benefits both from the integration of minorities
and from the greater effectiveness of its policing.
The EU should also look into the candidate countries voting system, if minorities have a fair
part at it. Rights of persons belonging to national minorities be able to take part in the conduct
of public affairs, including through the right to vote and stand for office without
discrimination. Additionally the use of minority language in political institutions (the Turkish
Constitution does not allow the use of any other language besides Turkish in any political
debate).
Even thought the Turkish legislation grants minority rights protection, international
organizations frequently contend that the EU‟s Copenhagen criterion of „respect for and
protection of minorities‟ should be applied not only to the Jews, Greeks and Armenians
covered by the Treaty of Lausanne, but also to the Assyrians, Kurds, Laz, Romas and many
other Turkish minorities.
The UN‟s Special Reporter offers the following general recommendations, applicable to all
religious communities in Turkey:
„The Government should ensure that Islam does not become a political tool, a situation
that could escalate in ways that would promote religious extremism‟.
„The Government should ensure both more legal protection against discrimination
based on religion or belief, and the implementation and respect of these legal
safeguards‟.
„Minority religious communities should be protected from any political manipulation
in the context of Turkey‟s foreign affairs‟.
„The Government should undertake a true dialogue with minority religious
communities so as better to understand their needs and to promote a climate of respect
and trust‟.
23
„Turkey should take advantage of technical cooperation services of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights in the area of freedom of religion and belief,
with particular attention to minorities.
To sum it up, the improvements in all sectors of the minority rights need some level of
reconsideration. It is not effective to focus only on one or two aspects. If the rights are not
protected in all the aspects of minorities„ existence within a state, nobody can be sure that the
tensions between minorities and majority of the population will not escalate into a conflict
that may be harmful to all the European Union.
24
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