ERICS. HEBERLIG
North
Carolina
at Charlotte
Universityof
BRUCEA. LARSON
GettysburgCollege
RedistributingCampaign
U.S.
House
Costs
of
Members:
the
Permanent
Funds
by
The
Spiraling
Campaign
In this article, we document and analyze the increase in the redistributionof
campaign funds by U.S. House members during the 1990 through 2000 election
cycles. By examining the contributionactivity of members' leadership PACs and
principal campaign committees, we show that House incumbents substantially
increased their contributions to other House candidates and to the congressional
campaigncommittees. The amountof money a memberredistributesis a function of
that member's institutionalposition: the greaterthe position's level of responsibility
to the partycaucus, the more campaignmoney the memberredistributes,particularly
as competition for majority control increases. Also, a member's capacity to raise
surplus campaign funds, his or her supportfor the party's policy positions, and the
level of competition for partisancontrol of the institutionall affect the amountthe
member redistributes.
As Jacobson(1985-86) pointedout, the individualreelection
donotsiteasilywiththecollectiveelecinterestsof Houseincumbents
will
toralinterestsof thecongressional
parties.Butwhileincumbents
"a
new
there
is
to
their
own
reelections,
clearly
alwaysgive priority
individual
andcollectiveinterests"
betweenincumbents'
accommodation
(Sorauf1992, 118). This new accommodationis illustratedby the
to
increasingsumsof campaignmoneyprovidedby Houseincumbents
their fellow party candidatesand to the congressionalcampaign
committees(BedlingtonandMalbin2003;Herrnson1997, 108-110;
Herrson 2000, 97-100; SabatoandLarson2002, 84-88).
and
This article offers an analysis of member-to-candidate
research
contribution
activityintheU.S.House.Earlier
member-to-party
by Wilcox(1989;1990),WilcoxandGenest(1991),andBaker(1989)
of membercontribution
considerablyadvancedour understanding
increase
activities,butthesestudieswereconducted
priortothedramatic
LEGISLATIVESTUDIES QUARTERLY,XXX, 4, November 2005
597
598
Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson
in these activitiesthatoccurredduringthe 1990s. Moreover,this article
builds on the primarilydescriptiveaccounts of member contribution
activities that have been offered by more-recentstudies (Bedlington
andMalbin2003; Hermson 1997; SabatoandLarson2002), providing
a theoreticalbasis for understandingthis activity.
House Incumbents as Campaign Contributors
House members have several ways of contributing to other
candidatesand to the partycampaigncommittees.First,memberscan
make contributionsthrough their principal campaign accounts, the
committeesthey use to raise and spendmoney for theirown elections.
Second,membersmay contributethrough"leadership"political action
committees, multicandidatecommittees sponsoredby incumbentsto
raise and spend money on political activities outside of their own
reelection campaigns. Contributionsfrom both types of committees
are, in effect, redistributionsof the campaign funds that incumbents
raisefromindividuals,
politicalactioncommittees(PACs),andpoliticalparties.Hence,we referto thisbehaviorgenerallyas "redistribution
activity."'
Different federal contribution limits govern donations from
members'campaigncommitteesand leadershipPACs. For both types
of committees, moreover,the regulationsgoverning contributionsto
candidatesdiffer from the regulationsgoverning contributionsto the
nationalparties.(See Table 1 for a summaryof the regulations.)
Theory and Hypotheses
We begin with the assumptionthatmembersdesirereelectionbut
also have goals of good public policy andpower within the institution
(Fenno 1973). We also assume that all memberswould preferto serve
in the majoritypartythanin the minorityparty.Since it is the majority
partythat structuresand controlsthe legislative process in the House,
majoritypartymembersget policy outcomes closer to theirideal preferencesthando minoritypartymembers(Sinclair2002; butsee Krehbiel
1998). Membershipin the majoritypartyalso gives incumbentssignificant fund-raisingadvantageswith corporateand tradePACs (Cox and
Magar1999),therebyhelpingto advancemembers'individualreelection
goals. Thus, we expect contributionpatternsto be responsive to the
level of competitionfor majoritycontrol(see also Currinder2003 and
KolodnyandDwyre 1998).As we will detaillater,this responsivenessto
competitionwill be especiallyimportantfor memberswho have institutionalpositionsthataremorevaluableto membersof the majorityparty.
606
Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson
Members'capacityto raise surpluscampaignfunds-funds over
and above what they need for their own reelections-should also be
relatedto the sums of campaignmoney that they redistributethrough
theirprincipalcampaignaccounts(althoughnot throughLPACs).5Thus,
we expect that the more campaign money with which a member
begins the election cycle, the more campaign dollars that member
will redistribute.Cash-on-handalso plays a particularlycrucialrole as
a control variablein our model. Consideringthe fund-raisingadvantagesthatmembersin formalpositionsof powerenjoy(GrierandMunger
1993), we thinkthese membersare likely to have largercampaignwar
chests than members without such posts. Including a cash-on-hand
variableensuresthatany relationshipfoundbetween holding a leadershippost andredistributingcampaignfundsis actuallydue to holdinga
leadershippost, andnot to the fund-raisingadvantagesassociated with
holdinga leadershipposition.
By affording members an advantage at raising money from
corporateand tradePACs (Cox and Magar 1999), membershipin the
majoritypartyprovidesincumbentswith an increasedcapacityto raise
surplus campaign funds. These advantages leave majority party
members particularlywell positionedto take advantageof the lessrestrictiveregulationsassociatedwith contributionsto the CCCsthrough
theirprincipalcampaignaccountsandcontributions
to candidatesthrough
LPACs. As a result, we expect that members of the majorityparty
will tend to channel greater sums of campaign money through the
CCC and LPACs,whereas members of the minorityparty will give
more money directly to candidates from their principal campaign
accounts.
Members'willingnessto contributeto collectivegoals also is likely
to be affectedby campaignfinancerules. In the 96th Congress(1979lawsto prohibitretiring
80), Congressmodifiedfederalcampaign-finance
membersfrom convertingexcess campaignfunds into personalfunds,
but membersof the 96th Congress "grandfathered"
themselves from
the prohibition.In 1989, Congresspassed anotherlaw statingthatafter
the 1992 elections, grandfatheredmembers still serving in Congress
would no longerbe permittedto takeadvantageof the exemption(Fritz
and Morris 1992, 83; Groseclose and Krehbiel 1994). Thus, through
1992, grandfathered members should be less likely than
nongrandfathered members to redistribute campaign funds from
their principal campaign accounts.
616
Eric S. Heberlig and Bruce A. Larson
give significantlymorethanothermembersto thepartyCCCs.Members
vying for leadershippositionsclearlypreferto give directlyto individual
candidates,who-if they win-will be part of the electorate in the
leadershipcontest.
Majority party control also affects contributionpatterns. The
evidence in Table3 suggeststhat,as predicted,membersof the majority
partytend to routelargersums of contributionsthroughthe CCCs and
LPACs,while membersof the minoritypartygive moremoney directly
to candidates.Substantively,majoritypartymembershiphas the biggest
influence on LPAC contributions:majorityparty incumbentsgive an
average of $7,675 more through LPACs than do members of the
minorityparty.As noted earlier,majoritypartymembershave a greater
capacityto raise money (Cox and Magar 1999) and can redistributeit
throughthe venueswith the leastrestrictivecontributionlimits.Majority
statusalso confersthe enhancedfund-raisingabilitynecessaryto market
an LPAC successfully.
As expected, a member'ssupportfor partypolicy also influences
contributions.Inparticular,
the statisticallysignificantestimatesforParty
in
all
three
Loyalty
equationsindicatethatthemorethatmemberssupport
their party's majorityon the House floor, the more campaigndollars
they redistributeto othercandidatesand to the party'sCCC. The Party
Loyalty estimatesare substantivelymodest, however:a one-standarddeviationincreasein PartyLoyalty centeredaroundits meanproduces
an averageincreaseof $629 in contributionsfrom members'principal
campaign committees to other candidates, $999 from members'
campaigncommitteesto the party CCCs, and $1,140 from members'
LPACs to other candidates.
A member's capacity to contribute also affects contribution
behavior.The more campaigncash a memberbegins the election cycle
with, the more that member gives to candidatesand to the CCCs.?1
But even relatively large increases in cash-on-handspur only limited
generosityamongincumbents.Forexample,the Cash-on-Handestimate
in the CCC equationindicates that a one-standard-deviationincrease
in cash-on-handcenteredaroundits mean-a change from $33,187 to
$257,062-led to an averageincreaseofjust $2,283 in contributionsto
the partyCCCs. Membersinvolved in uncompetitiveraces are significantly more likely thanmembersin competitivecontests to contribute
throughtheir campaignaccounts to other candidates,althoughnot to
the CCCs or throughLPACs.As predicted,membersexempted from
ethics laws prohibitingthe conversionof campaignfunds for personal
use upon retirementgave less to other candidatesbut no more or less
to the party CCCs.
RedistributingCampaignFunds
623
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