Is the “Russian bear” entirely to blame for the war in Georgia and
Ossetia? If some facts are analysed without prejudice, we could
conclude that the Georgians are partly responsible. Moscow’s ex-
Georgia: the not so
innocent David
WAR&PEACE 1
by Piero Sinatti
cessive reaction arises from the fact that the government in Tbilisi
is fully focused on rearmament and NATO, while itching for a
show-down with Russia. Until…
he Russian-Georgian conflict caused an
international crisis. The worst since the
collapse of the USSR, affecting relations
between the USA and Russia, the two nuclear
super-powers; between Russia and the EU,
with the direct involvement of some of its
members (Britain, Sweden, Baltic States,
Poland and the Czech Rep.) openly backing
Tbilisi (and Washington) against Moscow; and
between Russia and the Ukraine, in the
middle of a political-institutional crisis, with
the president ostentatiously siding with Tbilisi
against Moscow, while the armed conflict was
still underway.
The crisis, no longer regional, but global,
instantly had even more alarming
repercussions on the question that – in
addition to NATO’s uninterrupted expansion
eastwards – poisons relations between the two
nuclear super-powers, USA and Russia: the
installation of elements of the American space
defence system in the Czech Republic and
Poland.
This picture – beyond NATO and the EU –
was confirmed by formal operating
commitments between Washington and
Warsaw signed on 20 August, right in the
middle of the Russian-Georgian crisis. This
showing the real purpose of the American
T
8
initiative: not the one, often asserted by
Washington, of defending Europe from
Iranian missiles. Or not just that one, anyway.
Moscow has often assured to be taking
“suitable” missile-strategic measures towards
Prague and Warsaw, having (on 10
September) two of its Tu-160 strategic
bombers land at a Venezuelan military
aerodrome.
The crisis, sparked by Georgian aggression in
Southern Ossetia, a day after Saakashvili’s
commitment to an “Olympic truce”, was caused
by the fact that Moscow did not just free
Southern Ossetia from the aggressors. Russia’s
armed forces entered deep into Georgia,
bombing and occupying crucial infrastructure
and military bases. A response that the
international community judged as “totally
excessive”, to be condemned in legal terms.
Russia was isolated. Even within its own
political-diplomatic-military alliances.
As a matter of fact, both the countries
belonging to the Shanghai Cooperation
_The crisis, sparked by Georgian aggression in Southern
Ossetia was caused by the fact that Russia’s armed forces entered deep into Georgia (facing photo, President
Mikhail Saakashvili)
Grazia Neri_AFP
GEORGIA: THE NOT SO INNOCENT DAVID
David against Goliath?
A skilful media campaign made sure that
the conflict between Georgia and Russia was
represented as an unfair fight between the
small and democratic Georgian David,
attacked and overwhelmed by the despotic
and overbearing Russian Goliath.
Undoubtedly, Moscow’s crushing superiority
and the warfare operations conducted in
Georgia by the Russian armed forces are
indisputable facts.
Nevertheless, we should not ignore either
historical events (see the box), or some of the
circumstances in which the conflict came about.
Let’s begin with the responsibility for the
conflict: it was the Georgian president
Saakashvili’s decision to start fighting when, on
the night between 7 and 8 August, Southern
Ossetia was attacked and semi-destroyed and
the Russian peacekeepers displaced there were
assaulted. Twenty of them were killed by
Georgians.
Another undisputable fact is the rearmament
undertaken by Georgia since 2004, the first
year of Mikhail Saakashvili’s presidency, also
called “Misha”, to be put in direct relation with
two fundamental and complementary
Olycom
Organization (SCO: in addition to Russia,
China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan
and Tadzhikistan are members), and those of
the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty
Organization, including countries of the CSI
like Belarus, Armenia, and the Central-Asian
countries above, as well as Russia) did not
give Russia the formal political support it
expected.
A fear reflex was certainly felt throughout the
entire area of the former USSR, also in those
countries, such as those mentioned, that until
then had been the closest to (or the least far
from) the Kremlin.
With Georgia leaving the CSI and the
termination of the international agreements
that from 1992-1994 (and 1999) had “frozen”
the conflicts between Georgia, Southern
Ossetia and Abkhazia, a dangerous political
and judicial vacuum has been created, which
the unexpected recognition of the two
separatist republics by Russia does not fill, but
rather aggravates.
Nevertheless, the West should not forget
about its dangerous precedent, recognising
Kosovo as an independent State. Moscow, in a
risky spiral, adopted the same strategy.
WAR&PEACE 1
The new Georgian army
This army consists of thirty-three
thousand professional soldiers, equipped
with “modern western weapons” mainly
supplied by America, Israel and the Ukraine,
in addition to old Soviet weaponry, plus
_The rearmament undertaken by Georgia since 2004 has
two objectives: on the one side, the recovery of Georgian
sovereignty over the three regions breaking away from
Tbilisi and the construction of a new style army
another 70,000 reserves. Fully equipped
military bases were built with American
cooperation, at Gori (about 40 km from the
border with Southern Ossetia), Senaki (on
the border with Abkhazi) and Kutaisi
(Central Georgia).
In 2007 alone, the USA allocated 65 million
dollars, mainly destined to FFAA and law
enforcement.
In total from 1992 to 2007 Washington
provided independent Georgia with 1.8
billion dollars. Important financing and
loans to Georgia also came from the EU, the
FMI and the World Bank.
Georgian military expenditure has grown
without interruption since 2005. In that year,
the Georgian government allocated about
10% – 1.2 billion dollars – of the entire
budget for that year to defence. The year
before military expenditure was 60 million.
In June 2007, the military budget, set at 315
million dollars, was increased by an
additional 260 million – as can be read in a
long report from the Institute for War &
Peace Reporting (IWPR) in London.
“Part of the sum”, the new and young
Defence Minister David Kezerashvili (with
Grazia Neri_AFP
objectives of his political programme: on the
one side, the recovery of Georgian sovereignty
over the three regions breaking away from
Tbilisi since the early Nineties – Adzharia in
the south of the country bordering with
Turkey, boasting an important port and oil
terminal like Bitumi; Southern Ossetia and
Abkhazia. On the other side, the construction
of a “new style army”, necessary for Georgia’s
future entrance into NATO and forcefully
requested by both Tbilisi and Washington, and
the adjustment of its FFAA to the standards of
that alliance.
GEORGIA: THE NOT SO INNOCENT DAVID
Georgian and Israeli passports) states to the
IWPR, “will be used to purchase the
equipment that a modern army needs, another
part will be spent on sending an increased
military contingent to Iraq (…).We are
building our army from scratch”.
In 2008 defence absorbed about a billion
dollars, after that the set defence budget of 723
million dollars was increased by 28% in the
spring, clearly coinciding with the rising
Georgian-Southern Ossetian-Russian tension.
There is a relation between this expenditure
and Saakashvili’s “sacred mission” to place the
separatist (or by now “separated”) regions
under Georgian sovereignty again. Four years
ago, in Kutaisi, the ancient Georgian capital, he
promised to fulfil it, swearing on the tomb of
the greatest king in Georgian history, David
Agmashenebeli, called the Builder (1089-1125),
who unified the scattered Georgian princedoms
in the XII century.
The highest growth rate in military spending
According to SIPRI (Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute),
between 2005-2007 Georgia recorded the
highest growth rate in military spending
worldwide.
This occurred in a small country, with no
energy reserves, with only 4.5 million
inhabitants, 13% unemployment and huge
emigration, where government debt reached
2.3 billion dollars in 2008. There are vast
areas of poverty, low salaries and worthless
pensions, even though statistics show rising
investments during Saakashvili’s presidency
(about 2 billion dollars), with a 10% growth
in GDP in the last three years.
“Misha” started out well. In May 2004, he
re-established sovereignty in Adzharia
almost without any fighting. Russia did not
intervene, despite having an important
military base at Batumi, on the Black Sea,
which it left three years later.
But the Adzharians are Georgians, who were
dominated by the Turks for a longer time
and had converted to Islam.
With Ossetia and Abkhazia, historically
hostile to Georgia, the task is much more
difficult to accomplish. To date all of Tbilisi’s
offers of wider independence have been
turned down.
These circumstances tempted Saakashvili
into using force, relying on Moscow not to
intervene and under the protective wing of
the West, which did not open.
A conflict coming from faraway
During its short-lived independence (1918-1921),
Georgia tried to forcedly curb the separatist
aspirations of South Ossetians and Abkhazians. In
those days it was headed by the social democratic
government (Menshevik) of Noj Zhordanija, visited
in 1920 by a prominent delegation of the Socialist
international (including Karl Kautsky), that
supported it against the Bolsheviks.
Those were the years of the Russian Civil War that
followed the decline of the Empire. Germany (before
its defeat), the powers of the Entente and, most of
all, Great Britain had sent diplomatic and military
missions to South Caucasus, for the reasons that
Joseph Stalin, then a soviet commissioner for
Nationalities, had clearly identified, as proven by
one of his statements made to the “Pravda” in
November 1920.
“The importance of Caucasus for the revolution (see:
Bolshevik Russia) does not only lie in the fact that it
is a source of raw materials, fuel and food, but also
in its position between Europe and Asia (…) as well
as in the presence of extremely important economic
12
and strategic communications such as BatumiBaku and Batumi-Erzerum. The Entente takes this
into account (…) it would like to open a direct way
of communication with the East through
Transcaucasia. Who will definitely settle in
Caucasus? Who will get hold of the oil and the
pivotal communication routes that lead to the heart
of Asia? The Entente or the Revolution (Bolshevik
Russia)? This is the problem” .
After the Bolsheviks achieved control over
Caucasus, Stalin himself gave South Ossetia (as a
region) and Abkhazia (as a republic) the status of
autonomous formations, though within Georgia, with
a view to mixing ethnic groups and trample on their
nationalist spirit, always strong in Georgia.
Seventy years later, between 1989 and 1993, the
collapse of the USSR proposed a similar scenario.
Once again the microimperialist Georgia forcedly
objected to the separatist desire of South Ossetians
and Abkhazians.
Under the catastrophic guide of the first president,
the chauvinist Zviad Gamsakhurdia (1991-1992), it
WAR&PEACE 1
A new army for Georgia
In an interview with the Russian newspaper
“Novaja Gazeta” (12 November 2007),
Saakashvili proudly stated that his army had
“modern equipment, artillery and electronic
devices that neither the separatist southernOssetians and the Adzharians owned, or even
the Russians”. Soviet fighter planes (Su-25)
adapted by Israeli specialists for night flights
and for the atmospheric conditions of the
Caucasus, where fog is common and visibility
can be zero.
“The Russian air force has nothing similar”,
Misha said. Just like they do not have night
viewers or unmanned spy planes, that Tbilisi
bought in Israel.
A career in the Georgian military has become
the most prestigious and the best paid. Trained
by American instructors, military management
can earn a thousand USD a month, including a
monthly premium for those attending foreign
language courses.
A teacher or a doctor earn just over 100-120
dollars a month.
Tbilisi is employing 150 military personnel in
Kosovo (a historical irony!) and 2000 in Iraq,
the third occupying contingent after the
Americans and the British.
A special antiterrorism unit has also been
formed of about 2000 men, trained by
specialists of the American mission from the
“Georgia Train and Equip Program”, beginning
in 2002, during the presidency of Eduard
Shevardnadze. Eduard Shevardnadze is the
man who opened the doors of Georgia to
American and British oil companies working in
the Azero-Caspian area, to construct a
fundamental section of the highly expensive
pipeline (the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, BTC),
desired by the Clinton administration to
“bypass” Russia and reduce its political and
economic influence in the Caucasian-Caspian
region. The “Silver fox” was sent away by
Saakashvili’s so-called “Rose revolution”,
supported by the Americans, who disliked the
(realistic) way in which that president seemed
to manoeuvre between them and Moscow.
organised expeditions of “ethnic cleansing” against
those two populations, in the name of the motto
“Georgia to Georgians”, everyone else out. South
Ossetians and Abkhazians reacted with equal
hardness, unofficially supported by Moscow (also
militarily).
Threatened by Chechen secessionism, Russia tried
to maintain a presence in Caucasus, also to the
detriment of Georgia. Furthermore, 5000 North
Caucasian volunteers, including Chechnyans,
intervened to defend Abkhazians. Caucasian
paradoxes.
Having sent Gamsakhurdia away, even the wiser
Eduard Shevardnadze and the military bands that
supported him, launched a campaign against
Abkhazia. It was a failure that intertwined with a
complicated civil war that risked destroying
Georgia. In Abkhazia, the “ethnic cleansing” hit the
Georgians of Abkhazia, who were a majority.
Finally, while Shevardnadze consolidated his
leadership and put an end to the civil war, the
Russian mediation, within the framework of
international agreements (under the protection of
OESD), imposed a ceasefire in the two regions
(1992 e 1993).
Under international protection (OESD), mixed
commissions and peacekeeping missions,
conducted mainly by Russian peacekeepers,
controlled the “conflict zones” and the boarder
areas.
Tskhinvali and Sukhumi acquired a de facto
independence, with popular referendums confirming
the secession and conflicts remaining almost
“frozen”, while waiting for peace agreements.
The advent to power of the nationalist Saakashvili
in 2004, the Georgian rearmament supported by the
USA and the attraction of the two regions in the
sphere of Moscow, contributed to rekindle the
conflict, which broke out last 8 August.
Not to forget: the previous conflicts in the nineties
had caused about ten thousand deaths in Abkhazia
and more than a thousand in South Ossetia. Plus
two hundred thousand refugees, mostly Georgians.
p.s.
A new army
In Georgia a new type of army has been
created – declared Saakashvili less than a year
ago. “While Russia keeps its semi-demoralised
derelict”.
However, its performance in the “five-day
war” was not breathtaking. Despite its
weapons, advanced methods and latest
13
equipment, dated Soviet weaponry still prevail.
Following the short-lived conquest of
Tskhinvali, triumphally announced by
Saakashvili on the morning of 8 August, the
army did not stand up to the Russian
counteroffensive that the president and
commander in chief did not expect. It was
literally brushed aside, leaving weapons, kits
and bases in Russian hands. Planes struck in
aerodromes and the few ships sunk in
harbours. A complete failure for a leadership
that had invested so much and wants to join
NATO so badly.
Grazia Neri_AFP
Grazia Neri_AFP
GEORGIA: THE NOT SO INNOCENT DAVID
reconstruction” (also military), was announced
at the beginning of September by the US VicePresident Dick Cheney during his visit to
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Ukraine, key
countries for the complex US objective to set
its influence in the former-soviet area, at the
southern borders of Russia.
Is “Misha” really so democratic?
Saakashvili had never received as many
testimonials of democracy as he did between
August and September. An international
political advisor to the democratic candidate
for the presidency Obama, Richard
Rearming Georgia
Holbrooke, former ambassador of the
Nevertheless, in the US, much more than in Clinton administration at the UN, even
the historical nucleus of the EU, “project
defined him as “immensely intelligent”,
Georgia” remains the cornerstone of the
adding that “if he lives, Putin loses” (“The
penetration and consolidation of the American Moscow Times”, 4 September 2008).
Saakhashvili has certainly kept his political
presence in Russia’s Southern and Southpluralism. He was elected with a consensus
Eastern flank, between the Black Sea and the
ranging from 90% (2004) to 54% (January
Caspian. A fundamental area for its economic
2008). However, the regions are all governed
profile, for the hydrocarbons and for its AsiaEurope communication channels. It is a bridge by prefects he appointed.
into the Near East, especially Iran, and towards Similar popular consensus was also enjoyed
by the paranoid despot Gamsakhurdija (see
the great crude and gas producers of Caspian
box) and his successor Shevardnadze, rooted
and Central Asian areas.
A line of full “support and aid” to the “young
out by Misha who accused him of poor
daring Georgian democracy”, sustained by
governing and corruption.
allocating a billion dollars “for the
Nevertheless, Saakashvili’s presidency is
14
Grazia Neri_AFP
_Thousands of Georgians protest the arrest of the then
Defence Minister Irakli Okruashvili in front of Parliament
in 2007. Facing photo: U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney
and Nino Burdzhanadze, Parliament speaker
marked by a recurrent phenomenon in
countries under personalist and
authoritarian guidance: the dismemberment
of the historical managerial core gathered
around the leader.
Let’s start with the trio of the “Rose
revolution”: “Misha” (president, who had
studied forensics in the USA), Zurab
Zhvanija (premier), and Nino Burdzhanadze
(Parliament speaker).
Zhvanija, considered the most intellectual of
the three, was found dead on 3 February
2005 in circumstances that his family define
as “obscure”. Investigations were quickly
over and the enquirers’ (featuring some
officials of the FBI) concluded accidental
death by poisoning. The hypothesis of
homicide was aired. Nino Burdzhanadze,
Parliament speaker from December 2001 to
the end of 2007, broke away from
Saakashvili between the autumn and the
spring, leaving the “party in power”: the
United National Movement. Sympathizing
with the West, in an interview at the end of
August the lady hoped for “normalization”
in the relations with Moscow, though within
a western style political framework. She
could be the western card to play for a
possible post-Saakashvili era.
Other former comrades of arms
Lining up against the President was
Salomè Zurabishvili, the former French
ambassador to Tbilisi, appointed as Foreign
Minister in March 2004 and obliged to resign
a year later. She repeatedly denounced
Saakashvili’s authoritarianism and
personalism. She spoke of a “syndrome of
fear and terror in Georgia”, during the period
of the large popular demonstrations against
“Misha” that took place in Tbilisi between 2
and 7 November last year.
These were quelled with an “excessive use of
force”, according to a report filed by the
United Nations official for human rights
Louise Arbour.
On that occasion, Saakashvili declared a state
of emergency and closed the main television
stations, including the popular and most
watched “Imedi”, owned by the billionaire
“Badri” (Arkadij) Patarkatsishvili.
“Misha” accused the opposition of being
“agents from Moscow”.
Only thanks to US intervention were these
15
GEORGIA: THE NOT SO INNOCENT DAVID
measures repealed and most of the detainees
quickly freed.
Patarkatsishvili, former member and right arm
of the Russian oligarch in exile Boris
Berezovskij, quickly changed from Saakashvili
supporter and financer into a critic and
relentless adversary, accusing him of despotism,
inefficiency and extortion to the detriment of
the Georgian business community.
Last February “Badri”, only 53, died in
London, where he had fled to avoid a warrant
for arrest from the Tbilisi prosecuting office.
The diagnosis mentioned infarction, but this is
disputed by family and friends, who say it was
homicide. At the presidential elections of
January 2008, “Badri” got 7% of votes.
Irakli Okruashvili, originally from Tskhinvali, a
jurist, was the Defence Minister from 2004 to
2006. Anti-Russian, anti-Ossetia and antiAbkhazia “falcon”, he broke away from
Saakashvili, after seven years of brotherhood.
In an interview broadcast by “Imedi” (25
September 2007) he accused his mentor of
authoritarianism, nepotism and corruption, in
addition to plots to kill Patarkatsishvili. He
revealed the alarming circumstances
surrounding Zhvanija’s death.
Two days later and “Okrua” is accused of
extortion, money laundering and abuse of
power and is arrested. On 8 October the media
is shown a video-tape in which he confesses.
Shortly after leaving prison by paying an
enormous bail, he flees to Germany, where he
accuses the authorities of extorting the
confession by intolerable psychophysical
pressure. Avoiding extradition (“it would be a
death sentence”, he states) last April he was
granted political asylum in France.
In an interview with the German “Der
Spiegel” (1 April 2008) Okruashvili said: “I
have made many mistakes. My supporters and
I were unable to stop a man like Saakashvili
from seizing absolute power”.
On 28 March, sentenced in his absence, he was
condemned by a Tbilisi court to 11 years of
confinement.
Also Giorgi Khaindrava, former filmmaker and
Minister for the Solution of the Conflicts
between 2004 and 2006, dismissed for his
moderate views and having moved to the
opposition, participated in the demonstrations
of November and was arrested.
In a recent interview, he accused the West of
“closing its eyes to the tyranny that
Saakashvili exercised in Georgia”.
16
Opposition: the truce is over
In the meanwhile, since the beginning of
September the opposition’s truce with the
President, deriving from urgent issues of
national unity concerning the Russian enemy,
has ended. The opening of a public discussion is
being demanded, which does not censor the
“responsibilities of the war” and the “current
grave situation of the country”.
The first to do so were eighty personalities
from the civil and political world, in a letter
published in the newspaper “Resonansi” (4
September). The letter accuses “the
authorities” of falling into a “trap set by
Moscow”, due to “a lack of professionalism”
and “anti democracy” (www.civil.ge/eng, 4
September 2008).
Some managers of the opposition parties, such
as the Labour party member Salva
Natelashvili, the Conservative party member
David Gamkrelidze “(“New Right”) and the
Republican David Usuapshvili agree in
declaring that at the basis of the defeat lies the
“personal decision of Saakashvili to bomb
Tskhinvali and attack it”.
According to the “Frankurter Allgemeine
Zeitung”, this accusation is backed by
representatives of the Georgian Ministry of
Defence at the NATO headquarters in Brussels,
who claim to have tried up until the end to
stop Saakashvili from taking this reckless step.
The three leaders mentioned above have
invited the President and the government to
resign, asking for new elections. A “new
government should be formed that is neither
pro-Russian or pro-American”, and is able to
establish new relations with the USA and
Russia (www.interfax.ru, 10 September 2008,
“Kommersant”, 11 September).
It is true that at least until the first ten days of
September, Saakashvili’s popular consent was
still high. Nevertheless, these initial dissonant
voices could mean an incumbent political and
institutional crisis.
It would be worthwhile for the West – and
especially for the wiser Europe – to listen to
them.