Our Place in the World - Duke Law Scholarship Repository

OurPlaceintheWorld:
ANewRelationshipforEnvironmentalEthicsandLaw
JedediahPurdy
Fortyyearsago,atthebirthofenvironmentallaw,bothlegalandphilosophical
luminariesassumedthatthenewfieldwouldbecloselyconnectedwithenvironmental
ethics.Instead,thetwogrewdramaticallyapart.Thisarticlediagnosesthatdivorce
andproposesarapprochement.Environmentallawhasalwaysgrownthrough
changesinpublicvalues:forthisandotherreasons,itcannotdowithoutethics.Law
andethicsaremostrelevanttoeachotherwhentherearelargeopenquestionsin
environmentalpolitics:lawmakersactonlywhensomeethicalclarityarises;butlaw
canitselfassistinthatethicaldevelopment.Thisistruenowinasetofemerging
issues:thelawoffoodsystems,animalrights,andclimatechange.Thisarticledraws
onphilosophy,history,andneurosciencetodevelopanaccountoftheethicalchanges
thatmightemergefromeachoftheseissues,andproposeslegalreformstofosterthat
ethicaldevelopment.
INTRODUCTION
I. “THENATURALORDERANDOURPLACEINIT”:LAWANDETHICSINANOPENMOMENT
II. THE DIVORCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ETHICS
A. So Much for Metaphysics
B. The Turn to Cost-Benefit Analysis
III. A NEW RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAW AND ETHICS
A. The Importance of Change in Environmental Ethics
B. Ways of Understanding Change in Environmental Ethics
1. Nature and Social Ethics: harm and solidarity
2. Personal Ethics and Environmental Value
3. Ethical and Aesthetic Response
4. Virtue Ethics: Acting, Being, and Seeing
IV. AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF ETHICAL CHANGE: THREE APPLICATIONS AND THE
CASE FOR ETHICAL CHANGE, REVISITED
A. Food, Agriculture, and the Value of Work
B. Animals and the Ethics of Encounters Across Species
C. Climate Change, Rationality, and Vision
D. Convergent Reasons for Law to Support Ethical Innovation
CONCLUSION:ONERELATIONBETWEENENVIRONMENTALLAWANDENVIRONMENTALETHICS
ProfessorofLaw,DukeLawSchool.

1
TowardtheendofATheoryofJustice,JohnRawlsturnsbrieflytothetopicof
“rightconductinregardtoanimalsandtherestofnature.”1Hisremarksarenot
partofthegeneralargumentthatthebookadvances,butratheraninstanceof
importantmoralquestionsthatfall,Rawlssays,outsidethescopeofatheoryof
justice.Theseremarksaremostinterestingfortheirclaimaboutwhatisnecessary
inreasoningaboutenvironmentalethics.Rawlsassertsthat“acorrectconception
ofourrelationstoanimalsandtonature”willdependon“metaphysics”:“atheoryof
thenaturalorderandourplaceinit.”2
Atoweringfigureinpoliticalphilosophy,Rawlshadagiftforseeingtothe
heartofanissue.Yethisclaim–thatenvironmentalethicsneedsmetaphysics–
seemssurprising,ifnotjustoffthemark,inthelegalacademytoday.Therehas
beenalotofnormativeworkinenvironmentallawinthefourdecadessinceA
TheoryofJusticefirstappeared,butverylittleofithasmuchtodowith“atheoryof
thenaturalworldandourplaceinit.”
Fromthis,onemightreachseveralconclusions.Maybenormativeworkin
environmentallawdoesn’trequireenvironmentalethics.Maybeenvironmental
ethicsdoesn’tneedmetaphysics.OrmaybeRawlswasright,inwhichcasethe
relativeabsencefromenvironmentallawof“atheoryofthenaturalorderandour
placeinit”imposessomelimitsontheworkwecanaccomplishinthefield.
Myanswerhasafewparts.First,whenRawlswrote,hisclaimcapturedthe
stateofthemostambitiousworkonenvironmentallaw.Itwouldalsohaveseemed
truebeyondthelegalacademy.InCongressandontheopinionpagesofmajor
newspapers,fromphilosophydepartmentstopopularbookstosocialmovements,
conversationsaboutnaturecirca1971supposedthatAmericanswererevisiting
theirideasoftheplanetandtheirplaceonit.Intheseconversations,itwasordinary
toassumethatthisreflectionwouldproduceanew,“ecological”viewofthehuman
roleintheworld,whichwouldhavedefinitepracticalimplications.Thiswasatime
ofenormousplasticityinenvironmentallawandideas,andinwhichtheperception
ofplasticityconsiderablyoutstrippedeventhisreality.
Second,thedecadesthatfollowedsawapartingofwaysbetween
environmentallawandenvironmentalethics.Ontheonehand,thenewfieldof
environmentalethicsmovedboldlyintothequestionsthatenvironmentallawand
politicshadputontheagenda:whatkindofvaluethenaturalworldpresentsand
howhumansshouldunderstandourrelationtoit.Ontheotherhand,normative
workinenvironmentallawcametorevolvearoundamuchnarrowerbandof
questions,albeitoneswithimmediatepracticalmeaning:theappropriateuseand
limitsofcost‐benefitanalysisinassessingenvironmentallawand,closelyrelated,of
market‐basedmechanismsinimplementingit.Afterjoininginearlycallsforan
1JOHNRAWLS,ATHEORYOFJUSTICE448(2nded.,1999).
2Id.
2
ambitiousethicalagenda,environmentallawyerslargelyturnedtheirbacksonthe
questionsthatphilosopherswerepursuing.
Thismightseemtoinvitethefirstinterpretationprofferedabove,that
environmentallawcangetalongfinewithoutenvironmentalethics.Evenifthat
weretrue,itwouldnotbethelessonoftheseevents.Rather,cost‐benefitanalysisis
aversionofanethicaltheory,welfarism,itselfaversionofconsequentialism.3The
question,then,isnothowenvironmentallawgotfreeofethics,buthowitgotso
heavilyinvestedinonemodeofethics.Partoftheansweristhat,asnew
environmentallegislationdriedupandenvironmentallawbecameembeddedinthe
administrativestate,thepracticalquestionsthatpresentedthemselvestodecision‐
makerswerenolongerexplicitchoicesofgoverningvalues,butinsteadproblemsof
balancingandmaximizationamongestablishedvalues.4Consequentialismis
especiallysuitedtothiskindofdecision,andsoonbothadministratorsandscholars
wereengagedinversionsofit.
Cost‐benefitanalysisalsoaspirestoneutralityinthefaceofclashing
substantivevalues.Inthetwentiethcentury,thishasarguablybeenamajorpartof
itsimportance.Thelate1960sandearly1970sbroughtapeculiarculturalmoment,
whenmanypeoplesaw“environmentalvalues”asbothradicalontheonehandand,
ontheotherhand,self‐evidentlyimportantandevenasobjectsofconsensus.This
momentdidnotlastlong.Thenextdecadebrought,andinsomecasesrenewed,
divisionsovernature’svalueandourplaceinit.Thisbothimpedednewlegislation
andmotivatedthesearchforneutralstandardsinadministeringexistinglaws.
Butthestoryhasanotherpart.Whileenvironmentallawturnedawayfrom
environmentalethics,philosopherswereaddressingthemselvestothesameissues
thattheearlierepisodeofplasticityhadseemedtoinvite.Thesequestions,
involvingthenatureofvalueandobligation,proveddramaticallyunhelpfulin
addressingpracticalproblems.Indeed,theytendedtoleadtoparadoxesthatallbut
disableddecision‐making.Becauseethics,soformulated,waslittlehelpto
environmentallawyers,thesedevelopmentsinvitedtheconclusionthatlawnotonly
couldgetbywithoutethics,buthadto,sinceitwouldnotgetusableguidancefrom
3Consequentialismholdsthatactsandpoliciesaregoodorbadbyvirtueoftheir
consequences.Welfarismtakeswell‐beingastheconsequencethatisrelevantfor
ethicalassessment.Intheversionthatcost‐benefitanalysisrepresents,
consequencesareassessedbythetotalsocialwealthproducedunderalternative
policies,measuredbyvarioustechniquesforattachingpricestovaluedand
disvaluedoutcomes.
4Foraparticularlysophisticatedandanti‐totalizingconsequentialistargument
developedexplicitlyfromwithinthestateofpost‐1970senvironmentallaw,see
DANIELA.FARBER,ECO‐PRAGMATISM(1999).
3
philosophers.Wemightsaythatethicsascendedtoametaphysicsthatlawcould
notuse.5
Idrawseveralclaimsoutofthisstory.First,developmentsinbothethicsand
lawneedtobeunderstoodincontext,asresponsestotheconstellationofthe
moment.Thesefieldsactinlightofwhatseemsobviousorunthinkable,urgentor
trivial,upforgrabsorclosedtochange,atthetimeagivenquestionisformulated.
Thenear‐divorceofenvironmentallawandethicsinthelastfewdecadessaysless
aboutwhateitherfieldessentiallyisthanaboutthedemandsandpromiseofthe
times.
Secondandmorebasically,environmentallawandethicsshouldrenewtheir
relationship.Eventherecentimpressionthatenvironmentallawcouldgoitalone
dependedonthesituationIdescribedabove:amainlyadministrativelawinsearch
ofneutralityinimplementingmostlystablestatutorygoals.Today,however,anew
setofissuesisrising,whichlawwillbeabletonavigateonlybyreferenceto
substantivecommitmentsthathavestilltobeworkedout.6Thesecommitments
willinvolve“atheoryofnatureandourplaceinit.”ThethreeissuesIwillconsider
areclimatechange,agricultureandfoodsystems,andtheethicalstatusofanimals.
Third,foreachoftheseissues,thereisawayforethicstoproceedhelpfully
thatisratherdifferentfromthepathittookduringitsgreatseparationfrom
environmentallaw,butnonethelesstakesseriouslychangeandconflictinvalues.
Insteadofseekingtoanswerultimatequestionsofuncertainorparadoxical
practicalimportance,environmentalethicscanhelpbyofferingpreciseorrich
expressiontovaluesalreadyemergingbutstillinchoateinexperienceornotfully
articulateasideas.Ethicswouldthenproceedasittendsinpracticetobegin:asa
collaboratorwiththelargerculturalandpoliticaldevelopmentofvalues.
5See,e.g.,BryanNorton,WhichMoralsMatter?FreeingMoralReasoningfrom
Ideology,37U.C.DAVISL.REV.81(2003)(metaphysicalquestionsareeffectively
irresolvableand,inrecentdecades,havedistractedattentionfromopportunityiesto
dealwithmoretractableissuesinapluralistandpragmaticway);butsee
ChristopherStone,DoMoralsMatter?TheInfluenceofEthicsonCourtsandCongress
inShapingU.S.EnvironmentalPolicies,37U.C.DAVISL.REV.13(2003)
(environmentalethicsshouldredoubleitseffortstoachieveacoherentviewofbasic
issuesinvaluetheory).
6See,e.g.,HollyDoremus,ConstitutiveLawandEnvironmentalPolicy,22STAN.ENVTL.
L.J.295(2003)(ontheunavoidablefeedbackeffectsamonglegalgoals,policy
instruments,andpersonalandsocialvalues,andtheneedtokeepallofthesein
viewatonce).
4
I.
“TheNaturalOrderandOurPlaceinit”:LawandEthicsinanOpen
Moment
LaurenceTribe’sclassic1974YaleLawJournalarticle,“WaysNottoThink
aboutPlasticTrees,”hasanexoticsavortoday.7Tribeengagedthe“metaphysical”
themesthatRawlshadcalledforthreeyearsearlier.Heaskedhowlegalactors
shouldconceiveofthevalueofnature,gaveananswerthatrestedinatheoryof
humanfreedom,anddrewapolicyrecommendationfromthisargument:lawshould
protectnaturalentitiesbyassigningthemrightsandproceduralstatus(suchas
standing)ratherthantreatthemasinertresourcestobedisposedofthroughcost‐
benefitanalysis.
Tribeaskedwhethercost‐benefitanalysiscancapturethefullrangeofvalues
relevanttoenvironmentalpolicy,anchoringonthisproblem:ifplastictreesbring
humanviewersasmuchsatisfactionasnaturalones,cancost‐benefitanalysis(CBA)
distinguishbetweenlivingwoodanddeadplastic?Ifnot,whatdoesthatreveal
aboutthetechnique?8
Tribe’sbasicobjectiontoCBAinenvironmentallawisthatCBAtreatshuman
satisfactionsasthesourceandsumofreasonstoact.CBAcouldaccommodateall
kindsofvalues,butonlyashumansatisfactions.9AccordingtoTribe,thispremise
inhibitedpeoplefromexpressinginlegalandpolicydebateswhattheyreallyfelt:
thatnaturalentitiesdeservedcareorrespectfortheirownsake.Usingthelanguage
ofCBAturned“obligationintoself‐interest.”10Thischangedistortedmoral
experience,becausethepointofobligation,sympathy,orrespectisnotthe
satisfactiononetakesinacknowledgingthem,butthequalityintheotherthat
evokesthem.11
WhenTribeembraced“rights”fornaturalentities,then,therealstakeslayin
humanconsciousness:“weshouldbecapableofperceivingintrinsicsignificance–
sanctity,ifyouwill–intheveryprinciples…accordingtowhichweorchestrateour
relationshipswith…thephysicalworldofwhichweareapart.”12Legalandmoral
conceptssuchasrightsassumedtheimportanceofthingsindependentofany
satisfactionofhumanpreferences.Theythereforesetinmotionaprocessofmoral
7LaurenceH.Tribe,WaysNottoThinkaboutPlasticTrees:NewFoundationsfor
EnvironmentalLaw,83YALEL.J.1315(1974).
8Seeid.at1315‐17.
9Seeid.at1325‐26.
10Id.at1331.
11Seeid.at1329‐31.
12Id.at1339.
5
reflectionontheimportanceofthosethings:theykeptthemindopentothevalueof
nature.
ThismatteredtoTribebecauseofatheoryofhumanfreedom.People,he
argued,arealwaystakingtwoverydifferentattitudestowardvalue.Ontheone
hand,wedecidewhatwevalue:wemakechoicesandcommitments.Wevote,pass
laws,andadoptandamendconstitutions.13Ontheotherhand,wedonotbelieve
thesechoicesarearbitrary:weacknowledgevalue,inotherpeople,institutions,and
nature,andourchoicesarepartofthisacknowledgement.Ifwehadnochoice,we
wouldn’tbefree;butifweever“justdecided,”wewouldnolongerbe
acknowledgingvalue.14TribearguedthatCBAtreatsourvaluingofnatureas“just
deciding,”andthattreatingnatureashavingrightsorstandingwouldkeepalive
bothsidesoftherelationship–acknowledgingandchoosing,inareciprocaldance.
Inthisway,freehumanbeingscouldidentify,adopt,andrevisewaysofrespectinga
morallyvaluableworld.15
IhavespentsometimeonTribe’sargumentbecause,besidesbeinga
foundingclassicinthefield,itcomportsbeautifullywithwhatRawlshadrecently
proposed.Itisalsodramaticallydifferentfrommostofwhatweexpecttodayin
environmentallawscholarship.Tribe’sargumentwashigher‐flownthanthemore
lawyerlyconcernsofmanyotherenvironmentallawscholars,buthisconcernswere
hardlyalientothefield.Inanotherlandmarkargument,ChristopherStone
proposedthatnaturalentitiesshouldhavestanding(viacourt‐recognizedtrustees),
lessfor“legal‐operational”16reasonsthanbecauseitmightcontributeto“aradical
newtheoryormyth–feltaswellasintellectualized–ofman’srelationshipstothe
restofnature….[inwhich]wemaycometoregardtheEarth…asoneorganism,of
whichMankindisafunctionalpart.”17LyntonCaldwell,thepolicyscientistwhose
proposalforanationalenvironmental‐planningregimeformedthebasisofthe
NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct,presentedthestakesofthis(today)pre‐
eminentlyformalstatuteinsimilarsubstantiveterms.Hearguedin1970that“two
majorwaysoflookingattheworldhavecharacterizedman’sattitude…thefirst
13Seeid.at1332‐38.
14Thelanguageof“acknowledging”and“deciding”ismine,notTribe’s,althoughit
trackshisargumentpreciselyand,Ithink,insomewhatclearerfashionthanhis
formulations.
15Seeid.at1341‐45.
16SeeChristopherStone,ShouldTreesHaveStanding?–TowardLegalRightsfor
NaturalObjects,45S.CAL.L.REV.450,480(1972).HollyDoremusalsopicksout
Stone’sarticleasanemblemofamomentofplasticityinenvironmentalvalues.See
HollyDoremus,SymposiumIntroduction,37U.C.DAVISL.REV.1,1‐7(2003).
17Stone,supran.__at498‐99.
6
maybetermedeconomic,thesecondecological.”18Thefirsthedescribedas
embracingasimpleethic:“tomakenatureserveman’smaterialneeds.”19Ecology,
bycontrast,adjustedhumanpurposesandvaluesinrecognitionofthecontinuity
andinterdependenceoflife.20AsCaldwellenvisionedit,NEPAwouldhelptoputan
ecologicalwayofthinkingattheheartofUSlaw.
Theseremarkableproposalsinlegalscholarshipfoundsupportfromall
directions:thecourts,alliedacademicfields,nationalpolitics,media,andsocial
movements.Theseminalenvironmental‐standingcase,SierraClubv.Morton,is
mostfamousforJusticeDouglas’sanimist‐toneddissent:“Theriverasplaintiff
speaksfortheecologicalunitoflifethatispartofit….Thevoiceoftheinanimate
object,therefore,shouldnotbestilled.”21Lesswellremembered,becauseless
colorful,isJusticeBlackmun’sdissent,whichalsocalledfor“animaginative
expansionofourtraditionalconceptsofstanding”inlightoftheurgencyof
environmentalproblemsandthe“sincere,dedicated,andestablishedstatus”ofthe
SierraClubwithrespecttoconservation.22AsJusticeBlackmunnoted,anumberof
federalappealscourtshadrecentlyfoundorganizationalstandingwherethe
plaintiffgroupswerecommittedtothesubstanceofthestatutorygoalstheysought
toenforceandacted,inthecourts’language,asagentsofthepublicinterest.23
Theseopinionswerepossible,eventhoughthelineofargumentdidnotultimately
succeed,ingoodpartbecauseoftheperceptionthattherewas,infact,aclear,
definitepublicinterestinenvironmentalprotection.Thiswasverydifferentfrom
theviewoftheareaasaconstellationofclashinginterestgroupswithvarious
enforcementandanti‐enforcementagendasthatwouldcometodominatestanding
doctrinefromthemid‐1980sforward.24
18LYNTONK.CALDWELL,ENVIRONMENT:ACHALLENGEFORMODERNSOCIETY237(1970)
(emphasisoriginal).
19Id.
20Seeid.at238.
21405U.S.727,743,749(1972).
22Id.at758.
23Id.at760(citing…)
24SeeLujanv.DefendersofWildlife,504U.S.555,561‐62(1992)(distinguishing
betweentheunproblematiccaseinwhichplaintiffis“himself”theobjectof
regulationandthemuchmorevexedcasewhereplaintiffcomplainsofgovernment’s
failuretoregulateathirdparty);AntoninScalia,TheDoctrineofStandingasan
EssentialElementoftheSeparationofPowers,17SUFFOLKU.L.REV.881(1983)
(arguingthatthecentraljudicialresponsibilityistoprotecttherightsofindividuals
againstgovernment,withassertionofpropertyrightsagainstregulationbeing
paradigmatic).
7
EveninCongress,thelanguageofchangingethicalconsciousnesswaxedbold
asmajorenvironmentalstatutespassedbyoverwhelmingmarginsbetween1969
and1973.25SpeakinginsupportoftheCleanWaterAct,SenatorJohnSherman
Cooperinsistedthatthebill“assertstheprimacyofthenaturalorder,onwhichall,
includingman,depends.”26SenatorJenningsRandolphofWestVirginiavoicedthis
moralviewoftheanti‐pollutionstatuteswhenhepraisedtheCleanAirAct’s
sponsor,EdmundMuskieofMaine,for“emphasiz[ing]thepersonalobligation…a
rebirth,Ishouldsay,ofresponsibilityonthepartoftheindividualcitizenofthis
country,”whichMuskiehastenedtoconfirm:“Therehastobeacommitmenttoitby
everycitizen,notonlywithrespecttotheactivitiesofothers,butwithrespectto
eachcitizenhimself.”27Itwasoutoftheconfidencethat“thewholeintent”ofsuch
statuteswas“tomakeanationalcommitment”28thatSenatorMuskieoptimistically
announcedoftheCleanAirAct,“ThisbillisgoingtorequirethattheAmerican
motoristchangehishabits,histastes,andhisdrivingappetites….Theconsumer
mustalsomakesacrifices[.]”29Thesestatutes,inshort,werenottobeunderstood
simplyastechnicalmeasures,thoughtheywerealsothat:inthemindsofsomeof
theirmostimportantsupporters,theyrepresentedadoptionofnewshared
principles,whichwouldhavetotakeeffectbothininstitutionsandinthevaluesand
habitsofindividuals.
Popularconversationwasstillfurther‐reaching.TheeditorsofTimeasserted
thatmoderneconomicliferestedonaviewof“technologicalmanasthe
personificationofFaust,endlesslypursuingtheunattainable”30andtraced“the
environmentcrisis”tothe“deeplyingrainedassumptions”that“natureexists
primarilyformantoconquer…[and]isendlesslybountiful.”31Speakingforarising
(ifephemeral)consensusamongliberalelites,columnistFloraLewiswroteof
ecology,“Theideas…aresofundamentallynew,sodrasticallyopposedtothe
heritageofmanycenturies,theyarepainfultoabsorb….Environmentalharmony
25SeeRICHARDM.LAZARUS,THEMAKINGOFENVIRONMENTALLAW69(2004)(“The
averagevoteinfavorofmajorenvironmentallegislationduringthe1970swas76to
5intheSenateand331to30intheHouse”).
26117CONG.REC.38,819(1971)(statementofSen.Cooper).
27116CONG.REC.42,392(1970)(statementsofSens.Randolph&Muskie).
28118CONG.REC.36,874(1972)(statementofSen.Muskie).
29116CONG.REC.33,906(1970)(statementofSen.Muskie).Theprevioustwo
quotesaddressdifferentlegislation,theCleanWaterActandCleanAirAct
respectively.Thediscussionofthetwoisremarkablysimilarintone.
30FightingtoSavetheEarthfromMan,TIME,Feb.2,1970,at56,62.
31Id.at62‐63.
8
requiresamuchdeeperreviewofwesternthought,nowchallengedonalmostevery
level.”32
Socialmovementsandpopularauthorssoundedthesamenotes.
Environmentalistsincreasinglyassertedthat“ecology[whichyesterday]wasa
science…hadbetterbecomesomethinglikeareligion,”33andcalledfora“cultural
transformation”markedby“personalcommitmenttoanewphilosophyandpoetry
ofecology.”34PaulShepardwroteinTheSubversiveScience,a1969treatmentofthe
politicalandethicalmeaningofecology,that“wemust…affirm[nature’s]
metabolismasourown–or,rather,ourownaspartofit.Todosomeans…awider
perceptionofthelandscapeasacreative,harmoniousbeing….[W]emustaffirmthat
theworldisabeing,apartofourownbody.”35Inthesamespirit,Buddhist
popularizerAlanWattsarguedthatcontinuityamongallthings,joinedwiththerole
ofperceptionincreatingexperience,meantthat,“Ourwholeknowledgeofthe
worldis,inonesense,self‐knowledge,”aconclusionheclaimedshouldbedeeply
reassuring.36Inaworkofsynthetichistoryandmoraladvocacy,RoderickNash,
authorofthelastinglyimportantWildernessandtheAmericanMind,arguedthatthe
evolutionofmoralandlegalconsciousnessovercenturiesshouldnowculminatein
recognizingthemoralimportanceofnaturalentities,livingandotherwise,fortheir
ownsake.37
AllofthisisunmistakablyinthespiritofTribeandStone’srecommendations
fortheco‐developmentandlawandethicalconsciousness.Thequestionof“the
orderofnatureandourplaceinit”seemedtobeonthenationalagenda,notjust
availablebutunavoidable,andopentoallkindsofnewanswers.Thiswastruein
law,politics,andthebroaderrunofculture.Thetaskseemedtobetorethink
traditionalfieldsofthoughtandpracticeinlightofecologicalprinciplesandthe
environmentalcrisis.Inthismoment,environmentalethicsandlawstoodback‐to‐
back,thenstroderapidlyinoppositedirections.
32FloraLewis,InstantMass‐Movement,L.A.TIMES,Apr.29,1970,atB7.
33ElizabethRogers,Protest!SIERRACLUBBULLETIN,Dec.1969,at11,20.
34ConnieFlatboe,EnvironmentalTeach‐in,SIERRACLUBBULLETIN,Mar.1970,at14,
15.
35PaulShepard,EcologyandMan–AViewpoint,inTHESUBVERSIVESCIENCE(1969),
reprintedinTHEECOLOGICALCONSCIENCEat56,59(RobertDisched.,1970).
36AlanWatts,“TheWorldIsYourBody,”inTHEECOLOGICALCONSCIENCE,at181,188.
37SeeRODERICKF.NASH,WILDERNESSANDTHEAMERICANMIND(1967);NASH,THERIGHTS
OFNATURE:AHISTORYOFENVIRONMENTALETHICS(1989).
9
II.TheDivorceofEnvironmentalLawandEthics
A.SoMuchforMetaphysics
Professionalethicistssoontookuptheinvitationtoilluminatethe
environmentalvaluesthatotherswereannouncingandengaging.Iftherewasa
“naturalorderofthings”thatdeservedmoralrespect,ifnaturehadvaluethatwas
notbasedonservinghumaninterests,ifamoralpointofviewshouldbeassignedto
thenaturalworld,howshouldpeoplemakesenseofallthis?Thesequestionswere
natural,evenunavoidable,inlightoftheturnthatthebroaderconversationhad
taken.Onemighthaveimaginedtheseethicalinquiriesworkinghandinhandwith
thenewperspectiveonnaturethatinnovatorsinlegalscholarshipsought.Instead,
theresultwasapartingofthewaysbetweenenvironmentalethicsandlegal
scholarship.
Thisarticledoesnotgiveanencyclopedicaccountoffortyyearsofworkin
environmentalethics.Insteaditsetsoutafewmajor,exemplarydevelopmentsand
theirrelation(orlackofrelation)toenvironmentallaw.Thefirstisvaluetheory,
theissueofwhatmattersandwhy.Somephilosophersarguedthatanewaccountof
thebasesofethicswasnecessarybecausetheinheritedconceptualvocabulariesof
humaninterests(inconsequentialism)andrights(indeontologicalandcontract
theories)referredsolelytotheclaimsofhumanbeings,aperspectivethatthese
ethicistsnowdeemedtooparochialtocapturethevalueofnature.38Amotivating
exampleinthislineofargumentenvisionedasolitaryhumanbeing,perhapsthelast
manintheworld,orperhapsRobinsonCrusoeabouttoberescuedfromanislandto
whichnoonewouldeverreturn.39Whyshouldthisperson,unboundby
considerationsrootedinotherpersons’rightsorinterests,notdespoilnature,kill
thelastpodofbluewhales,andsoforth?Surely,theargumentwent,aviewof
ethicsthatwasinarticulateaboutthisquestionneededadjustment.Whenadjusted
toaccountfornature’svalue,itcouldprovidebetterguidanceforournon‐Crusoe
circumstances,inwhichhumanrightsandinterestsaremixedupwithwhatever
naturalvalueshouldstayCrusoe’shand.
Thisissuegaverisetoasetofargumentsaboutwhethernaturehas“intrinsic
value,”and,ifso,whatthatvaluemeansforhumanjudgmentandaction.Some
arguedthat“anthropocentric”accountsofvaluemustyieldtoa“biocentric”view
locatingvalueinlifeitself(andotheraspectsofself‐organizingnaturesuchas
species,ecosystems,andeventheplanet).Attheoppositepolewastheresolutely
anthropocentricpositionthattheconceptofvaluemakesnosenseindependentof
38See,e.g.,RichardSylvan(Routley),IsThereaNeedforaNew,anEnvironmental,
Ethic?InENVIRONMENTALETHICS47,47‐52(AndrewLight&HolmesRalstonIII,ed.)
(HenceforwardLight&Ralston)(2003).
39Seeid.at49‐50.
10
humanbeingsforwhomthevaluematters.Aswithanyphilosophicaldebate,there
wereallmannerofinterveningvariations,bristlingwithdistinctions.40
Thisinquiryfacedtwobasiclimitations,thefirstconcernedwithitsinternal
conceptualdevelopment,thesecondwithitspossiblecontributiontoenvironmental
law.Conceptually,theissueofintrinsicversusnon‐intrinsicvaluerapidlyreachesa
dilemma.Ontheonehand,tospeakofavalueistoimagineitinthemindofsome
person,whereitpresentsitselfasareasonforactionoresteem.41Inthisrespect,
theanthropocentricperspectivehasanunbreakablegripontheissue:evenin
envisioningthedenudedworldleftafterthelasthumanbeinghaswreakedhis
destruction,weareimportingintothatworldourownmind,whichimaginatively
seesandrespondstoit.
Ontheotherhand,weoftenexperiencevaluenon‐instrumentally,thatis,
withoutreferencetoitsservinganyhumaninterest,noteventhepleasurable
40SeeHolmesRalstonIII,ValueinNatureandtheNatureofValue,inLight&Ralston
143,143‐53(arguingthateveryleveloflivingorganization,fromplantsthrough
speciesandecosystems,hasakindofmoralperspectivefromwhichitmaybesaid
tovalueitsowncontinuationandflourishing);KennethE.Goodpaster,OnBeing
MorallyConsiderable,75J.PHIL.308,308‐25(1978)(arguingthatacceptingthe
valueoflifeinallitsformsprovidestheonlynon‐arbitraryaccountofvalue,and
thatthisimpliesanethicofrespectforlifeinallitsforms);JohnO’Neill,The
VarietiesofIntrinsicValue,inLight&Ralston,131,131‐42(arguingthatalthough
thenaturalworldhasintrinsicvalue,thisfactdoesnotcreatenormativeobligation
forhumanbeings,becausenaturalvalueisafact,andthefact‐valuedistinction
forbidsdirectinferenceofobligation,unlessontakesthevirtue‐ethicsviewthat
respectforsuchvalueispartofaflourishinglife);ThomasE.Hill,Jr.,Idealsof
HumanExcellenceandPreservingNaturalEnvironments,5ENV’LETHICS211,211‐24
(arguingsimilarlytoO’Neill,butwithfargreaterfocusondevelopingthevirtue‐
ethicsperspective);EugeneHargrove,WeakAnthropocentricIntrinsicValue,inLight
&Ralston175,175‐90(althoughthehumanperspectiveisinseparablefromthe
perceptionofvalue,wevaluethingsforthemselvesratherthaninstrumentallyin
relationtoourinterests,andatoo‐stronganthropocentricaccountofvalueobscures
thisfact,whichcanbestyledanaccuratehumanperceptionofintrinsicnatural
value);A.MyrickFreeman,TheEthicalBasisoftheEconomicViewofthe
Environment,inTHEENVIRONMENTALETHICS&POLICYBOOK318,318‐26(VandeVeer&
Pierce,ed.)(XXXX)(welfare‐economicanalysisofParetoorKaldor‐Hicksform
appropriatelyrestrictsnormativeweighttothosefeaturesofthenaturalworld
actuallyvaluedbyhumanbeings,anddoessoinawaythatismaximallyattentiveto
theinterestsofallpersons).
41SeeEugeneHargrove,WeakAnthropocentricIntrinsicValue,inLight&Ralston
175,175‐87(soarguing);CHARLESTAYLOR,SOURCEOFTHESELF25‐52(arguingthat
perceptionofvalueanddistinctionsthereinareintrinsictohumanconsciousness
andagency).
11
mentalstateofperceivingsomethingvaluable.Thereforeanaccountthatpresents
thevalueofnatureexclusivelyintermsofitssatisfyingeffectonthehumanmind
seemstogettherelationbackward:infact,wetendtoexperienceourvaluationof,
say,anintactecosystemoramountainvista,asaresponsetovalue,notaconferralof
valuebasedonourpreferences,incontrast,say,tooursatisfactionatfindinga
turnippatchjustintimetoavoidstarving.42
Thesearchforatheoryofvaluethereforearrivesatadilemma.Ontheone
hand,anyclaimaboutthevalueofnaturemustbeintelligibleasanaccountof
somethinghumancanregardasvalues,thatis,whichtheycanimaginethemselves
aspursuingandrespecting.43Ontheotherhand,thisclassofvaluesmanifestly
containsmanythatpeopledonotexperienceasdependingonusfortheirstatus.
Thus,thisinquiryrunsintoreallimitstoitscapacitytoadvanceunderstanding
beyondapairoffairlycommonsensicalbutmutuallyinconvenientconclusions.
Thesecondkindoflimitationisthatvaluetheoryfailstoguideaction.
AlthoughitseemstoaddressjustthesortofquestionthatRawlsrecommendedfor
environmentalethics,ithasnopowertoanswerthequestionRawlshadinmind:
“Whatshouldwedo?”Itconsistsessentiallyinasetofcompetingcharacterizations
oftheexperienceofvalue,evenasthesubstantivecontentofthevalueremainsthe
same.Anyvaluecanberedescribedfromintrinsictoanthropocentricandback
againwithoutanychangeinthecourseofactionthatitrecommends.Thus,while
thereisahighlysimplifiedsenseinwhichitmightseem,forinstance,thatthe
EndangeredSpeciesActadoptsaviewthatspeciesmatterintrinsicallybecauseit
givestheirsurvivalimportanceindependentofanyotherhumaninterest,theESA’s
requirementscanbeequallywelldescribedasexpressingahumanpreferencefor
species’survival,withoutthisaccount’smakingadifferenceintheoperationofthe
Act.Theforayintovaluetheorymaybeofinteresttophilosophers–whateverthe
limitationsonitsprogress;butitdoesnotmakeadifferenceinformulatingor
implementingenvironmentallaw.Itthusseemstosupportthethoughtthat
environmentallawhasnoneedofenvironmentalethics,atleastinthisconnection.
Asecondlineofinquiryalsocomesuppragmaticallydryonaccountofits
paradoxes.Thisistheinquiryintoholismandindividualisminenvironmentalvalue.
Herethechoicebetweenthealternativesdoeshaverelevancetoaction,buteach
optionisdeeplyunsatisfactory,inasymmetricalway.
Aholisticconceptionlocatesvalueinself‐organizingsystemssuchas
ecosystems,species,or“nature”itself,andinthisrespectseemstocapture
42SeeBERNARDWILLIAMS,MustConcernfortheEnvironmentBeCentredonHuman
Beings,inMAKINGSENSEOFHUMANITY233,234‐36(1995)(makingasimilarsetof
observations,withtheobservationthat,whateverkindsofanswerswegivetothe
issueofvalue,they“mustbehumananswers”(234).
43Id.at234.
12
somethinggenuineabouttheexperienceofenvironmentalvalue.44Holism,though,
encountersapairofseriousdifficulties.First,itseemstounderminetheaimof
assessinghumanactionbyitseffectontherestoftheworld.Humanbeingsarealso
partofnatureandtheecosystemsthattheyaffect:indeed,thisisoneofthecentral
premisesofpost‐1960secologicalthinking.45Thispoint,however,seemsto
dissolvethedistinctionbetweenhumanandnon‐humanthatoneneedstoassess
“oureffect”on“thenaturalworld.”46Whyshouldahuman‐inducedextinctionor
climatechangebeanaffronttoholisticvalue,ratherthananotherinstanceofthe
operationofnaturalsystems,whichweknow,afterall,tobeunstableandtake
diverseformsovertime?Bydissolvingthehuman‐naturecontrast,holismdenies
environmentalethicsthegroundsonwhichtoask“Whatshouldwe(humans)do
withrespecttonature(whichisrelevantlydistinctfromus)?”Preciselybecausea
consistentholismincludeshumansinnature,theanswerthatholistvaluetheory
invites,“Actsoastopreservethevalueofnature”isnoansweratall.
Theseconddifficultywithholismisthatitfailstotakeaccountofthevalueof
individuals,orothersub‐systemicentities,suchasspecies.Ifnaturalsystemsand
theprocessesthatcomposeandmaintainthemaregood,thenillnessanddeathare
alsogood,assubsetsofthese.Indeed,evenextinction,presumablybadfromthe
pointofviewofaspecies,mighthavetocountasgoodfromthatofanecosystemor
planet(allofthisassuming,ofcourse,that“pointofview”isacogentmetaphorto
attachtoalocusofholisticvalue).This,however,seemstoobliteratewidelyheld
concernfortheinterestsofanimalsinnotsuffering,orspeciesincontinuingto
exist.47
Asymmetricaldifficultyarisesforethicalindividualism,whichlocatesvalue
intheinterests,pointsofview,or,perhaps,existenceofindividuals.Justaslocating
valueinwholesystemseffacesconcernforindividuals,solocatingvaluein
44SeeElliottSober,PhilosophicalProblemsforEnvironmentalism,inENVIRONMENTAL
ETHICS145,145‐56(ed.DavidSchmidtz&ElizabethWillott)(definingandexploring
problemsintheholisticperspective)(2002).
45See,e.g.,JedediahPurdy,AmericanNatures:TheShapeofConflictinEnvironmental
Law(settingoutthecontributionsoftheecologicalperspectiveonnatureand
lawmaking)(forthcoming,HARV.ENV’LL.REV.).
46SeeSober,supran.__at148‐52);WILLIAMS,supran.__at__(makingthis
observation);MarkSagoff,GeneticEngineeringandtheConceptoftheNatural,21
PHIL.&PUB.POL’YQ.2/3(Spring/Summer2001)2(ontheuselessnessofanall‐
encompassingaccountofthenatural).
47SeeMarkSagoff,AnimalLiberationandEnvironmentalEthics:BadMarriage,Quick
Divorce,inSchmidtz&Willottat38,38‐44(arguingthispoint);EricKatz,IsTherea
PlaceforAnimalsintheMoralConsiderationofNature?inLight&Ralstonat85,85‐
93(exploringthisdifficultyandarguingfora“balanced”approach).
13
individualsseemstoeffaceconcernforsystems.48So,forinstance,aconsistent
commitmenttoavoidingthesufferingofsentientbeingswouldseemtoimply
exterminatingpredators,evengeneticallyengineeringwildspeciessothatthe
survivalofsomenolongerrequiresthesufferingofothers–creating,thatis,aworld
eitherwithoutfoxesandgrizzliesorwithherbivorousversionsofthem.49While
suchaperspectivehasmuchtorecommenditongroundsofavoidingthesuffering
ofindividuals,itsblankindifferencetotheexistenceofspeciesorpersistenceof
naturalsystemswritesoutofconsiderationabasicandpervasiveaspectofmodern
environmentalconsciousness.
Asalternativesinvaluetheory,then,bothindividualismandholismseem
blindtoconsiderationsthatbelonginanyaccountofenvironmentalethicsthat
takesseriouslystrongandpervasiveexistingjudgments.Hereagain,valuetheory
runsintoparadoxes.Tryingtogettotherootof“theorderofnatureandourplace
init”producesmonolithicaccountsthatareimplausible,andimpractical,because
theyseizeononeaspectofenvironmentalvalueandexcludecompeting
considerationsintheserviceoftheoreticalconsistency.Thisdevelopment
reinforcestheimpressionthatenvironmentallawhadbettertrytogetalong
withoutenvironmentalethics.
B.TheTurntoCost‐BenefitAnalysis
Insteadofvaluetheory,themaininteractionbetweenenvironmentallawand
ethicsforthelastthirty‐plusyearshasbeenaroundwelfarism,thephilosophical
approachofwhichCBAisaninstance.Welfarismassessesstatesofaffairsby
referencetothewell‐beingtheyproduce.Unavoidablequestionsforwelfarism
includehowtomeasurewell‐being,whetheragivenmetriccanaccommodate
diversevalues,andwhetherconcentratingonoverallwell‐beingimplies
insensitivitytoindividualityandthevalueofeachlife.Thisfocusonwelfarefitsthe
situationinwhichenvironmentallawhasfounditselfsincethelate1970s.
Welfarisminitseighteenth‐andnineteenth‐centuryBritishur‐form,
utilitarianism(stilloftenusedcolloquiallytorefertoallkindsofwelfarismand,
indeed,allkindsofconsequentialism),aroseasadoctrineofsocialadministration,
whetherliterally,asinBritishgovernanceofIndia,orvialegislation,fordomestic
48See,e.g.,HarleyCahen,AgainsttheMoralConsiderabilityofEcosystems,inLight&
Ralstonat114,114‐23(settingoutthecasethatonevenmodestlyindividualistic
premises,itisverydifficulttoascribemoralimportancetoa“whole”suchasan
ecosystem);GaryE.Varner,CanAnimalRightsActivistsBeEnvironmentalists?in
Light&Ralstonat95,95‐104(settingoutthisbasictension).
49See,e.g.,Sagoff,AnimalLiberation,supran.__at42(makingthisargument);GREGG
EASTERBROOK,AMOMENTONTHEEARTH:THECOMINGAGEOFENVIRONMENTALOPTIMISM
(1996)(arguingforjustsuchmanipulations).
14
reformers.Itremainssuitedtothosetasks.Itsconcernisessentiallyaggregative.
Whetheritaimsatsimplemaximizationofsomedesideratumoradoptsdistributive
considerations,itsconcerniswiththesum(andmaybealsotheshape)ofthe
whole.50Muchofthenormative‐theoreticalengagementwithCBAinenvironmental
lawscholarshiprespondstoissuesthatthischaracteristicunavoidablyraises.
Nothingintheaggregativemethodpreventsdisregardingorsacrificing
inconvenientlysituatedindividualsorsloughingovervaluesthatsomepeople
treasure.51Indeed,whentheinquiryistrainedinacertaindirection,forinstance,to
thequestionofhowmuchriskofpreventablediseasetotoleratenextyear,orhow
muchtopermitgreenhouse‐gasconcentrationstoincreaseoveronehundredyears,
itisinthenatureofthemethodtoembracesuchsacrifices,eventhoughthepeople
sosacrificedcannotbeidentifiedinadvance.52Atacertainlevelofabstraction,this
simplymeansthatnomaximizingstrategy(evenonealsoconcernedwith
distribution)genuinelyapproximatestheindividualisticParetocriterion,withits
requirementthatchangesmakenooneworseoff.Maximizingstrategiesgenerate
distributivedecisions,which,forpracticalpurposes,alwaysdisadvantagesome
individualsrelativetoplausiblealternatives.Whenthethingbeingdistributedis
riskofpreventabledeath,castingthedisadvantagingasasacrificeofsomeforthe
benefitofothersilluminatespartofthelogicofthereasoning.Theseissueshave
drawnmuchofthenormativeenergyinenvironmentallaw.
Theseissuesarisepredictablyinasettingthatisdominatedbywelfarist
reasoning.Ittakesnothingawayfromtheirimportancetosaythattheyare
symptomsofthesameconditionsthathavemadewelfarismtheleadingnormative
50Ofcourseanytheorycanbuildinside‐constraints,andforpurposesof
implementationitisnaturaltodoso.Forawide‐rangingconsiderationofthe
alternativeswithinwelfarism,seegenerallyMATTHEWD.ADLER,WELL‐BEINGANDFAIR
DISTRIBUTION:BEYONDCOST‐BENEFITANALYSIS(2012).
51SeeJOHNRAWLS,ATHEORYOFJUSTICE24(Rev.ed.1999)(“Utilitarianismdoesnot
takeseriouslythedistinctionamongpersons.”).
52SeeLisaHeinzerling,KnowingKillingandEnvironmentalLaw,14N.Y.U.ENVTL.L.J.
521(2006)(decisionsguidedbycost‐benefitanalysisresultinknowingdecisionsto
killpersonsinviolationofanormagainstknowingkilling);FrankAckerman&Lisa
Heinzerling,PricingthePriceless:Cost‐BenefitAnalysisofEnvironmentalProtection,
150U.PA.L.REV.1553(2002)(cost‐benefitanalysispervasivelydistortsthevalues
itclaimstoorganizeanddisregardsthevalueofindividuallife);cf.DanielA.Farber,
RethinkingtheRoleofCost‐BenefitAnalysis(reviewingRICHARDL.REVESZ&MICHAELA.
LIVERMORE,RETAKINGRATIONALITY:HOWCOST‐BENEFITANALYSISCANBETTERPROTECTTHE
ENVIRONMENTALANDOURHEALTH),76U.CHI.L.REV.1355(2009)(someversionof
cost‐benefitanalysisisindispensableforrationalresourceallocation,butintheface
ofuncertaintyandbasicvalueconflictitcannotreplacemoreflexible,imaginative,
anddemocraticprocedures).
15
techniqueofthelastthreedecades.Anyversionofwelfarismworksbestwhen(1)
thevaluesmeanttoguidedecisionsarespecified,sothatethicalinquirycanfocus
onapplication;(2)thereisaworkablemetricforthesevalues,and(3)thereis
enoughknowledgeofthelikelyconsequencesofalternativestosupport
measurementthatismorethanspeculation.Moreover,welfarismisespecially
attractivewheredecision‐makersseekneutralityamongcompetingvalues.53
Consider,forinstance,theneutralityasbetweentheutilityofelitesandthatof
ordinarypeoplethatanimatedBritishutilitarianreformers,ortheneutralityamong
competingsubstantivevaluesorconceptionsofthegoodlifethatwealth
maximizationseemstooffertodayasapolestarforsocialpolicy.
TheseconditionsdescribethesituationoftheAmericanstatearound
environmentalvaluesfromtheendofthe1970suntilrecently.Thespateof
environmentallegislationthatopenedthe1970sadoptedavarietyofvaluesas
nationalpolicy:humanhealthandenvironmentalcleanlinessintheanti‐pollution
statutes,54conservationofbiodiversityintheEndangeredSpeciesAct,55anda
(mainlyignored)setofsubstantivestewardshipvaluesintheNational
EnvironmentalPolicyAct.56Withthevaluesbroadlyspecified,theissueslayinthe
quintessentiallyadministrativebusinessofforecastandassessment.Cost‐benefit
analysisprovidedthedominantmetric,aswemightexpectinthesecircumstances.
Cost‐benefitanalysisalsoachievedacertainkindofneutralitybyrendering
competingvaluesintoasinglecurrencyatatimewhenneutrality’svaluewasonthe
rise.57Forafewyearsattheendofthe1960sandthebeginningofthe1970s,it
seemedtomanylegalandpoliticalelitesthatpopularembraceofenvironmentalism
representedanewconsensus.OverwhelmingCongressionalmajoritiesforthenew
53SeeMICHAELSANDEL,DEMOCRACY’SDISCONTENT___(1996)(wealth‐maximizationasa
twentieth‐centurysocialpolicyservedtoachieveakindofneutralitywhileevading
andultimatelyhollowingoutmoresubstantivedebates).
54See33U.S.C.sec.1251(a)(1)‐(2)(2006)(AllU.S.waterwaysshouldbeclean
enoughforswimmingby1983,andby1985allwaterpollutionshouldhavecometo
anend);42U.S.C.sec.7408(a)(1)(A)(directingidentificationofregulatedair
pollutantsandlevelofpermittedairpollutiontothestandardof“publichealth”).
55See16U.S.C.secs.1532(6)&(20)(definingendangeredandthreatenedspecies,
theobjectsoftheEndangeredSpeciesAct’sregulation).
56See42U.S.C.secs.4331(a)&(b)(1)(2009)(NationalEnvironmentalPolicyAct
aimsatproducing“conditionsunderwhichmanandnaturecanexistinproductive
harmony”andenshrinesthe“responsibilitiesofeachgenerationastrusteeofthe
environmentforsucceedinggenerations”).
57Neutralitywasalwaysasmuchwished‐forasachieved.Forabalancedand
incisiveaccountofthetheoreticaldisputesthatragedaroundcost‐benefitanalysis,
seeDANIELA.FARBER,ECO‐PRAGMATISM35‐69(1999).
16
statutes,bipartisancompetitionfortheenvironmentalmantle,andadoptionofwhat
appearedtobesweepingsubstantivecommitmentsallpointedthisway.Sodidthe
easewithwhichmediaelitesassumedthatonesetofgoverningideasaboutnature
waspassing,anotherrising.Asdiscussedearlier,judgesexpressedthisperception
whentheyarguedforgrantingstandingtoconservationgroupsonthetheorythat
theyrepresentedthepublic’sinterestinenvironmentalprotection–thatis,thatthe
versionsofenvironmentalvaluesthatgroupssuchastheSierraClubrepresented
hadspecialstatusaboveandapartfromthevariousinterestsinthepoliticalhurly‐
burly.58
Theimpressionofconsensusprovedephemeral.Partoftherupturecame
frompoliticaleconomy:thenewenvironmentalstatutescamejustbefore,and
helpedtospur,achangeinthepoliticalattitudeoftheUSbusinesscommunity,
whichadoptedincreasinglyaggressiveresistancetoregulation.Ananti‐regulatory
perspectivethusbecameincreasinglyprominent,fromlobbyingandcampaign
contributionstolitigationandthink‐tanks,makingtheimpressionofapro‐
conservationconsensusimpossibletomaintain.59
Anotherchallengetothewould‐beconsensuscamefromtheinterplayof
politicaleconomywithculturalattitudesthatturnedoutnottohavechangedas
quicklyorcompletelyasmanyimagined.Therewasalong‐standing,culturally
influentialconstituencyforeconomicallyproductiveuseofnaturalresources.
Publicrhetorichadlonginvitedresourceusers–firstpioneers,thenfarmers,
miners,andsoforth–toidentifythemselvesastheeconomicandmorallinchpinof
thenation.Morepragmatically,thesegroupsenjoyedfavorableaccesstopublic
landsformining,grazing,andtimbering,andvirtuallyunlimitedlibertytodoas
theylikedonprivateland,otherthanthetraditionalrequirementsofmutual
accommodationinpropertylaw.60Traditionalresource‐usinggroupsralliedagainst
public‐landsreformsasearlyasthefirstrestrictionsontimberingfederalacreage,
58Seetextsupraat__.
59SeeTHOMASO.MCGARITY&WENDYWAGNER,BENDINGSCIENCE:HOWSPECIALINTERESTS
CORRUPTPUBLICHEALTHRESEARCH(2008)(describingpoliticaleconomyinwhichcost‐
benefitanalysishascometothefore);STEVENTELES,THERISEOFTHECONSERVATIVE
LEGALMOVEMENT90‐134(onthedevelopmentoflaw‐and‐economicsasaprominent
legal‐scholarlymethod,withitsskepticismofregulationandofanynon‐welfarist
ideaofpublicgood).
60See30U.S.C.§22(2006)(“[A]llvaluablemineraldepositsinlandsbelongingto
theUnitedStates,bothsurveyedandunsurveyed,shallbefreeandopento
explorationandpurchase,andthelandsinwhichtheyarefoundtooccupationand
purchase,bycitizensoftheUnitedStates....”);43U.S.C.§932(2006)(providing
“Thattherightofwayfortheconstructionofhighwaysoverpubliclands,not
reservedforpublicuses,isherebygranted”)(repealedin1976withthepassageof
theFederalLandsPolicyandManagementAct).
17
andtheyrespondedtothenewrequirementsofenvironmentallawwiththefirst
anti‐environmentalmovement,theSagebrushRebellionofthelate1970sand
1980s.61Thisvehicleofanti‐regulation,pro‐resource‐usesentimentputthecountry
onnoticethatotherviewsoftheproperuseofnatureprecededthenewlawsand
werenotgoingaway.Indeed,manyofthesameideasanimatedtheCounties
Movementthatchurnedwesternstatesinthe1990sandarepresentinstrandsof
theTeaPartytoday.62Allareremindersofthepersistentandbasicdivisionover
environmentalvaluesintheUnitedStates.
Inlightofallthis,thepressingquestionseemednottobehowtoget
advocacygroupsrepresentingthe“publicinterest”innatureintothecourtroom,as
JusticesDouglasandBlackmunsupposed,norhowtocultivateandexpandnew
ideas,asTribeandStoneurged.Forthosechargedwithadministeringnewlaws,
thechallengewasinsteadtomaintainakindoflegitimacybyseekingamodeof
decision‐makingthatcouldtranscendandintegratethesedividedvalues,rather
thansimplytakesides.Theturntowelfarism,then,isliketheearlyperiodofhigh
plasticityandcallsfor“metaphysics”inthefollowingrespect:eachofthesevery
differentwaysofconnectingenvironmentallawwithethicsreflectsthepractical
problems,institutionalarrangements,andculturallandscapeofitstime,ratherthan
revealinganytimelesstruthaboutenvironmentalethicsandlaw.
Todaythereisreasontothinkthatrelationshipmaybeshiftingasnew
problemsariseandnewattitudesbegintoforminresponse.Thisisalsoanoccasion
torethinkthegeneralrelationbetweenenvironmentallawandethicsinawaythat
canrecapturealargersenseofopennessandpossibility.
61SeeR.MCGREGGORCAWLEY,FEDERALLAND,WESTERNANGER:THESAGEBRUSHREBELLION
ANDENVIRONMENTALPOLITICS,71‐91(1993)(outliningsourcesandformulationsof
WesternobjectionstofederalpolicyaroundtheSagebrushRebellion);
62SeeTomKenworthy,BlazingUtahTrailstoBlockaWashingtonMonument,WASH.
POST,Nov.30,1996,atA1(describingWesternmembersofCountyMovement
engagedineffortstoassertlocalcontroloverfederalland);SeeDianeRoberts,The
EPA:theTeaParty’snexttarget,THEGUARDIANAug.3,2011(availableat
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/aug/03/epa‐
republicans‐tea‐party);MontanaHouseVotestoNullifyEndangeredSpeciesAct,
BOZEMANDAILYCHRONICLE,Feb.19,2011(TeaPartylegislatorsregardESAasinvalid)
(AssociatedPress)(availableat
http://www.bozemandailychronicle.com/news/article_85f9f742‐3c64‐11e0‐a5ec‐
001cc4c002e0.html)BenMcGrath,TheMovement:TheRiseofTeaPartyActivism,
THENEWYORKER,Feb.1,2010at40.
18
III.ANEWRELATIONSHIPBETWEENLAWANDETHICS
Nowistimetorecoversomethingfromthoseforty‐year‐oldcallstoreorient
environmentallawtowardchangeinthemoralandenvironmentalimagination.
Thisisnotthesameassimplyreturningtothoseambitions.Arenewedemphasis
onimaginativechangeattheintersectionofenvironmentallawandethicsmust
considerwhyearlierattentiontotheseissuesfadedandtrytoavoidthesame
outcome.Itcanbenefitfromaricherandmorenuancedpictureoftherolemoral
andenvironmentalimaginationhaveplayedinthehistoricaldevelopmentof
environmentallaw;ahumblerviewoftheauthorityofethics,whichwouldpresent
itasaparticipantinthedevelopmentofpluralisticandoftenclashingvalues,rather
thanarazororMosaictabletdistinguishingrightfromwrongthought;and,atthe
sametime,aparadoxicallymoreambitiousunderstandingofethics,informedby
recentprogressinunderstandingtheneuralcorrelatesandconceptualstructureof
thehumanexperienceofvalue.Areformedunderstandingoftherelationbetween
environmentallawandethicscanhelptomakethemproductiveforeachother.
Thiswouldbeverymuchtothegood.Environmentallawneedsethics,
thoughitneedsanethicsthatissensitivetothesourcesandactivityoflaw.
A.TheImportanceofChangeinEnvironmentalEthics
Environmentallawneedsethicsbecauseitisblindwithoutvalues.Thisisan
elementarypoint:action‐orienteddecisionisimpossiblewithoutdistinctions
betweenbetterandworse,fineandterrible,admirableandhorrid,thathelpin
sortingamongpossibleacts,consequences,andstatesofaffairs.63Theneutrality‐
seekingproceduresofCBA,oranyotherconsequentialism,canproceedonlyonthe
basisofapriorjudgmentaboutwhatcountsasgoodandbad.64Typically,that
judgmentiscrystallizedinanunderlyingstatute,whichestablishessome
substantivevaluealongwithaprocessforpursuingit.WhenCBAfollowsapure
revealedpreference‐trackingmodelandseekstomaximizesocialbenefitmeasured
63SeeTAYLOR,supran.__at25‐52(soarguing);CHRISTINEM.KORSGAARD,SELF‐
CONSTITUTION:AGENCY,IDENTITY,ANDINTEGRITY1‐26(soarguing).
64SeeDOUGLASA.KYSAR,REGULATINGFROMNOWHERE:ENVIRONMENTALLAW&THESEARCH
FOROBJECTIVITY46‐67(discussingcost‐benefitanalysisasaspecificanddebatable
formulationandapplicationofwelfaristtheory);JedediahPurdy,ThePoliticsof
Nature:ClimateChange,EnvironmentalLaw,andDemocracy,119YALEL.J.1122,
1180‐90(2010)(showinghowthesubstantivedebatesoverthegoalsofanti‐
pollutionstatutessetthetermsforlaterapplicationofcost‐benefitanalysis);Alyson
Flournoy,BuildinganEnvironmentalEthicfromtheGroundup,37U.C.DAVISL.REV.
53(2003)(environmentallawcontainsimplicitethicalcommitmentswhichrequire
intepretationandexcavation);LeeTalbot,DoesPublicPolicyReflectEnvironmental
Ethics?IfSo,HowDoesItHappen?,37U.C.DAVISL.REV.269(ethicalcommitments
pervadethepolicy‐makingprocess,althoughtheyareoftennotexplicit).Butsee
19
byapricemetric,itisaconduitforindividualjudgmentsofvalue.Withoutthose
substantivejudgments,thedecisionsthatgeneratedthepriceswouldhavebeen
impossible.Decisionrequiresorientingvalue,whetheritistakenatthepersonal,
legislative,oradministrativelevel.Arelativelymechanical,seeminglyneutral
decisionprocedureispossibleonlybecauseittakesitsnormativesubstancefrom
decisionsmadeatotherlevels.
Thisisamainlyconceptualpoint.Itwouldnothavemuchforceifthe
substanceofenvironmentalvalueswerestableandagreed‐on.Infact,however,the
historyofenvironmentallawmaking,andoftheculturalandpoliticalferment
behindit,revealsperennialchangeandcontestovervalues.Tospeaksweepingly,
theideasofgoodandbadinrelationtonaturethatmanyAmericansheldin1789,
1848,1917,and1960weresharplydifferentfromtimetotimeandoftenhotly
contestedinthemoment.65Ourwildernesssystem,nowabout107millionacres
permanentlyclosedtoalldevelopment,wouldhavebeenanathematothosewho
clearedthecontinentasarepublican“empireofliberty,”or,furthersouth,an
empireofslavery,andwhosawnationalmissionandcharacterinbringingwildland
undertheruleofaxeandplough.66Someofthosesettlersburntvasttractsofwoods
intheupperMidwest,alabor‐savingdevicebutalsoakindoffestivalofclearance,
somethingnotlikelytobecelebratedtoday,evenwhereforestisabundant.67The
ESA’ssolicitudeforlargepredatorswouldthoroughlyalienatepeoplewhowageda
warofexterminationagainstwolvesandsawtheirverypresenceonthelandasan
affronttosettlementandcivilization.68Theidealofclean‐flowingwaterwayswith
abundantnaturallifethattheCleanWaterActadopted,andtheAct’srejectionofthe
thoughtthatwaterwaysshouldserveaswaste‐disposalsystems,wouldhavebeen
mysterioustoAmericanswho,wellintothetwentiethcentury,sawriversasthe
workhorsesofindustrialandmunicipaleffluentprocessing.69(Wecongratulate
ourselvestodayonourenlightenedappreciationof“ecosystemservices,”butearlier
generationsgotthepoint:theyjusthadadifferentideaofoptimalservicelevels.)70
Thislastpointilluminateswhy,althoughaconventionalstorytreatstheCWAasa
responsetotheburningoftheCuyahogaRiver–anditwas–earlierinfernosonthe
65SeePurdy,supran.__(spellingoutthisclaiminconsiderablymoredetail).
66Seeid.at__.
67Seeid.at__.
68SeeBARRYHOLSTUNLOPEZ,OFWOLVESANDMEN137‐99(1978)(detailingcampaigns
ofexterminationagainstwolvesandtheculturalenvironmentinwhichthesetook
place).
69Seesupran.__(substantivecommitmentsofCleanWaterAct).
70See,e.g.,JamesSalzman,BartonH.Thompson,&GretchenDaily,Protecting
EcosystemServices:Science,Economics,Law,20STAN.ENVTL.L.J.309(2001).
20
samewaterwayhadnotstruckobserversasproofofanenvironmentalcrisis.71
OthervalueshadtochangeforfirestomarkproblemsratherthanPromethean
progress,forwolvestobeinspiringratherthanabhorrent,andforwildernessareas
tobesecularcathedralsratherthanbannersreading,“Nationalmissionnot
accomplished.”72
Torepeat,onereasonthatcommentatorsintheearly1970sproposeda
majorroleforenvironmentallawinengagingenvironmentalvalueswasthatsuch
valuesseemedextremelyplasticthen.Historyrevealsthattheplasticityofthattime
wasnotnew,althoughasthequieterdecadessincesuggestitwasunusualinits
intensityandthesweepoflawmakingitinspired.Historyalsoilluminatesone
reasonthatthebriefconfidencethatenvironmentalvaluesformedanewconsensus
provedill‐placed.Theconstituenciesthatopposedthenewregulatoryregimes
weredeeplyestablished.Boththeirmaterialinterestsandtheirethicalcommitment
toeconomicallyproductiveresourceusewereinterwovenwithlawandculture.
Thepost‐1960senvironmentaleradidnotwashawayitspredecessorsandbringa
newconsensus.Instead,itaddedalayertoapalimpsestofethicalviewsof
AmericannatureandlegalclaimsontheAmericanlandscape.Aproductiveviewof
environmentallaw’srelationtoethicsmusttakeaccountofthisdeepandabiding
disagreementaboutitscoresubjectmatter.
Historyalsohighlightsthatchangingvalueslieattheveryheartofchangesin
theenvironmental‐lawregime.Theperceptionthatthelastfewdecadeshave
invited,thatenvironmentallawgetsalongwellenoughwithoutengagingbasic
questionsofenvironmentalvalue,ismuchlessplausiblewhenoneappreciateshow
thoroughlyintertwinedtheyare,bothconceptuallyandhistorically.
Theargumentsofaristhatthekindofdecision‐makingthatenvironmental
lawdoescannotproceedwithoutreferencetothekindsofvaluesthat
environmentalethicsengages,eitherconceptuallyorinitsactualhistorical
development.Thisdoesnotyetamounttoadefenseofaspecificrelationbetween
thetwoinquiries.Thefurtheraimhereistoadvancetheideathatenvironmental
lawcanbegenerativeforthedevelopmentofenvironmentalethicsasTribeand
StoneonceproposedandothersinCongressandthecourtsbrieflybelieved.Law
canandshouldcontributetothedevelopmentofenvironmentalvalues.
Suchaproposal,ofcourse,presupposesanethicsthatcanrespond
productivelytotheopeningsthatlawprovides–anethicsthatisflexibleand
contextual.Thisarticledoesn’tattemptadefenseofthisviewofethics,butsimply
triestospecifywhatitis.AsBernardWilliamsobservedinasimilarconnection,
71SeeJedediahPurdy,ClimateChangeandtheLimitsofthePossible,18DUKEENVTL.
L.&POL’YFORUM299andworkscitedtherein(soobserving).
72Seeid.at298‐305.ThisisalsotheburdenoftheargumentofPurdy,ThePoliticsof
Nature,supran.__andAmericanNatures,supran.__.
21
“Thereisnospecialwayinwhichphilosophicalconsiderationsjointhepolitical
discussion.Theyjoinit,rather,invariousofthewaysinwhichotherformsof
writingortalkingmaydo:waysthatincludenotonlymarshallingarguments,but
alsochangingpeople’sperceptionsalittle,orcatchingtheirimagination.”73Thisis
thewayofreflectingonvaluethatStoneandTribehopedlawcouldassist:
articulatingchangesinperception,offeringconceptualstructurefornewaspectsof
imagination.74
Thisversionofenvironmentalethicsisverydifferentfromenvironmental
philosophers’inquiriesintovaluetheory.Whatevertheirvirtuesinconceptual
clarification,thosecalltomindWilliams’sremarkthat,“Toooften,philosophers’
contributionstothesequestionsseemdesignedonlytoreducethenumberof
thoughtsthatpeoplecanhave,bysuggestingthattheyhavenorighttosome
conceptionsthattheyhaveorthinkthattheyhave.”75Thatisquitedifferentfroman
ethicsthatbeginsfromexperienceandperceptionandtriestolendsomeclarityto
theirdevelopmentswhilesettingtheminproductiverelationtootherideas.
Thislatterstyleofethicsmightdevelopaproductiverelationto
environmentallawfortworeasons.First,changesinexperienceandperception,
andeffortstoarticulatethese,havebeencentraltothedevelopmentofAmerican
environmentalvalues,includingthevaluesthathavemotivatedpoliticalandlegal
action.Second,themostimportantroleoflawinthedevelopmentofenvironmental
valuesmaywellbeinshapingexperienceitself.Lawquiteunavoidablydoesan
enormousamounttoproducetheencounterswiththenaturalworldthatpeoplecan
have,delimittheusestheycanmakeofit,anddefinetheidealsofhuman‐nature
interactionthattheycanliveout.
Withthisinmind,wecanhopetobroadenthescopeoflaw’spossible
relationtoethicaldevelopmentbeyondwhatthevisionaryreformersofthe1970s
proposed,inawaythatmaybeatoncemorerealisticandmoreambitious.That
generationofscholarshipproposedtoembeddynamicenvironmentalvalueswithin
73Williams,supran.__at233.
74ThisisalsohowDouglasKysarconceivesofenvironmentalethics:asaproductof
imaginativeandperceptualleapsthatoftenprecedeconceptualizationandmay
evendefytheaimoftamingtheperceptionintoasetoforderlyconcepts.See
DOUGLASA.KYSAR,REGULATINGFROMNOWHERE97‐98,194‐99,242‐45(2010)(onthe
needforradicalopennesstonewethicalinsight).DanielFarberhascriticizedwhat
heseesasatendencytoirrationalisminpartsofthisworkandgenerously
associatedmewithamorebalancedview:forthemomentI’llneitherexpressa
judgmentnorsaywhetherIthinkIdeservethecompliment.SeeDanielA.Farber,
TakingResponsibilityforthePlanet,89TEX.L.REV.147,173(2010)(reviewing
Kysar,RegulatingfromNowhere).
75Williams,supran.__at233.
22
legalprocess,byinnovationsinstandingdoctrineandrights.76Thattheseproposals
havenotbornefruitneednotmeanthatlawcannotbeproductivefor
environmentalethics.Instead,thatambitioncanmoveoutsidelaw’sinternal
processes.Analternativestartingpointbeginswiththerecognitionthat
environmentallawcreatesageographyofpossibleexperience.77Throughlaw,
peopleturnideasoftheirplaceinthenaturalworldintomaterialrealities,shaping
landscapesofwilderness,enshrinedsublimity,industrialagriculture,andsuburban
pastoral.Interactingwiththeselandscapes,theycometonewwaysoflivingwith
andthinkingaboutnature,whichinturninspireotherlaw‐shapedlandscapes.
Spellingoutthefirstpoint,aboutchangeinperceptionandexperience,
requiressomecompressednarration.Thefirst100yearsofUnitedStateslaw
respectingthenaturalworldaimedrelentlesslyatmakingAmericansinto
economicallyproductivesettlersofthecontinent.78TheHomesteadActsandother
land‐disposalstatutesarearchetypalhere,astheyaimedtomakecitizensand
immigrantsintoforest‐clearersandfarmersand,cumulatively,forestsand
grasslandsintofarms.Otherstatuteshadthesamelogic,notablythe1872Mining
Law,withitsHomestead‐stylepolicyformineralsonpubliclands,andlaws
governingirrigationdevelopment(tellinglycalled“reclamation”),whichtookas
officialpolicythemaintenanceofmid‐sizedfarmsandindependentfarmersonwhat
hadbeendesert.79Astheseexamplessuggest,atleasttwoideaswereinvolvedhere,
oneaboutthenaturalworld,theotheraboutpeople.Thefirstwasthatnature
existedtoservehumanneedsrichly,butwouldnotdosogratuitously:ithadfirstto
befilledupandmadefertilebythelaborofsettlers.80Secondwasthatlaboronthe
76SeeKYSAR,supran.__at248‐54.
77HollyDoremusprovidesaterrificdiscussionofenvironmentalpolicythroughthe
lensofenablingpersonalencounterswithnaturethatcontributetothe
developmentofindividualvaluesand,cumulativelyandthroughdebate,shared
values.SeeHollyDoremus,ShapingtheFuture:TheDialecticofLawand
EnvironmentalValues,37U.C.DAVISL.REV.233,252‐67(2003);Doremus,
ConstitutiveLaw,supran.__;seealsoFlournoy,supran.__at68‐80(proposing
“stepping‐stone”valuesthatcouldmovepublicdiscussioninthedirectionofnew
ethicalconceptsandpractices).
78SeegenerallyPAULW.GATES,HISTORYOFPUBLICLANDLAWDEVELOPMENT(1968)
(comprehensivehistoryoftheroleoflawinthewestwarddevelopmentofthe
UnitedStates).
79See,e.g.,WILLARDHURST,LAWANDTHECONDITIONSOFFREEDOMINTHENINETEENTH‐
CENTURYUNITEDSTATES(1956)(arguingthatthefederaldesignofsettlementcarried
outapolicyofunleashinghumanenergyandinitiative).
80IsetoutthisideawithhistoricaldetailinJedediahPurdy,AmericanNatures,supra
n.__at__(PartI.A).
23
landwasdignifying:productiveworkwasabasisforself‐respectandtheesteemof
others.81
Pro‐developmentlawspromotedawayofengagingnaturethatenabled
peopletoexperienceatfirsthandthesenseoftheworldasconditionallybountiful
(theconditionbeinglabor)andtoliveoutanidealoftheadmirablepersonality.The
Jeffersoniangridanddisposalstatutesproducedageographywherethiswasthe
dominanthumanrelationtonature.Themissionofmakingthecontinent
productivewassoemphaticthatthelegalgeography,thesettlementgrid,swept
overliteralterrainthatcouldnotsupportitsidealofproductivelabor,suchasthe
semi‐desertoftheGreatPlainswestoftheHundredthMeridian.Theresultwas
wavesoffailedsettlers,probablythefirstecologicalrefugeesinAnglo‐American
history.82
ThesecondgreatmoralvocabularyofnatureinAmericanlife,theRomantic
one,wasalsorootedinamodeofexperienceandperceptionthatwasthoroughly
entangledwithlaw.Fromthisperspective,encounterswithnature’smostextreme
anddramaticplacesinspireepiphany:flashesofinsightintotheorderofthingsand
one’splaceinit.83Thethoughtthatoneencountersdivinityandone’sownselfamid
mountainpeaksanddeepcrevassesisconventionalinRomanticwritingatleast
fromWordsworthforward,anditsmosteffectiveAmericanpopularizer,SierraClub
founderJohnMuir,modeledhisliterarypersonaonbothWordsworthandthe
81SeeERICFONER,FREESOIL,FREELABOR,FREEMEN:THEIDEOLOGYOFTHEREPUBLICAN
PARTYBEFORETHECIVILWAR9‐38(1970)(describingtheinterlacedpremisesoffree‐
laborthoughtandtheprogramoffrontiersettlement).SeealsoGordonS.WOOD,
EMPIREOFLIBERTY357‐99(ontheJeffersonianprogramofwesternsettlement);DREW
R.MCCOY,THEELUSIVEREPUBLIC:POLITICALECONOMYINJEFFERSONIANAMERICA48‐100,
185‐208(1980)(describing“republican”conceptionofproprietor‐basedfreedom
andvirtue,andtheroleoffrontiersettlementinpromotingit).
82SeeWALLACESTEGNER,CROSSINGTHEHUNDREDTHMERIDIANXXX‐XXX(XXXX)
(describinginitialsettlementoftheGreatPlainsanditsfailure).
83SeeJOHNMUIR,MYFIRSTSUMMERINTHESIERRA129(“SouthDome...seemsfullof
thought,clothedwithlivinglight,nosenseofdeadstoneaboutit,allspiritualized,
neitherheavylookingnorlight,steadfastinserenestrengthlikeagod.”);id.at169‐
70(dropletsofwaterpassingfrom“formtoform,beautytobeauty,everchanging,
neverresting,allarespeedingonwithlove’senthusiasm,singingwiththestarsthe
eternalsongofcreation.”);id.at124(“Thewholelandscapeglowslikeahumanface
inagloryofenthusiasm,andthebluesky,palearoundthehorizon,bendspeacefully
downoveralllikeonevastflower.”).
24
TranscendentalistsEmersonandThoreau,whourgedself‐knowledgethrough
attentiontonature.84
WhatdistinguishedMuirandhisfollowers,andmadethemalasting
presenceinpoliticallife,isthattheydevelopedfromtheseliteraryrefinementsa
concretemodeofencounteringnature.Theirvocabularyofaestheticandmoral
responsewaskeyedtospecificfeaturesoftheSierraNevadaandtheirotherfavorite
landscapes,andtheybuiltasub‐cultureandsocialmovementaroundthoseplaces
andthefeelingsassociatedwiththem.85Theheartoftheirpoliticalprogramwasto
secureanAmericangeographyforthisexperience.Theyworkedtoensurethat
Americanlawdedicatedlargetractsofground,suchasYosemiteValley,tothe
encountersthattheysawasformingthehighesthumanrelationtonature.86Their
successwaspractical,inhelpingtodrivethemassivereservationsofpubliclandfor
recreationfromtheendofthenineteenthcenturythroughthetwentieth(and
beyond).Itwasalsoideological,or,perhapsbetter,imaginative:althoughmanyof
thenationalparkswereoriginallycreatedonthenon‐Romantictheorythatthey
wouldbegoodforpublichealthandcivicspirit,bythe1920sthestandardaccount
oftheirpurposewasthattheywereseculartemplesthatrestoredthespiritby
enshriningnature’sfinestaestheticqualities.87Theyexisted,thatis,tomakethe
Romanticwayofmeetingnatureintorealandwidespreadexperience.
Thissuccesssetinmotionafurtherdevelopmentinvalues,whichalso
dependedonthededicationofpubliclandstoRomanticexperience.Fromthe
1920sforward,asetofRomanticrecreationistsbuiltamovementdedicatedto
preservingwilderness,whichtheydefinedaslandinwhichasolitaryindividual
couldencounternatureasitwouldhavedevelopedwithouthumanexploitationor
development.Suchsolitude,theyinsisted,wasquiteadifferentthingfromthe
sceneryandrecreationthatmoremainstreamRomanticsprized.Thepsychic
experiencethatitpromptedhadlesstodowithecstasyandrevelation,morewith
reflectiononone’sownsmallnessandlackofpowerbeforeavastandancient
naturalworld.Wildernessadvocatesvaluedthenaturalworldlessforitsextreme
anddramaticqualitiesthanforitsextent,integrity,andessentialmystery:theywent
intothewildnotsomuchtorediscoverthedivineinthemselvesastobestrangers,
andlearnbythatexperience.88
84SeePurdy,ThePoliticsofNature,supran.__at1145‐49(settingoutthese
developments).OnMuir’scultivateddebttoliteraryromanticism,seeDONALD
WORSTER,APASSIONFORNATURE:THELIFEOFJOHNMUIR160‐61,336‐37(2008).
85SeePurdy,ThePoliticsofNature,supran.__at1149‐51(soarguing).
86SeePurdy,AmericanNatures,supran.__at___(PartIII.C).
87Seeid.
88SeePurdy,ThePoliticsofNature,supran.__at1160‐73(settingoutandanalyzing
thisdevelopment).
25
The1964WildernessAct,whichfollowedeightyearsoffocusedadvocacy
afteritsfirstintroductionin1956,setinmotiontheprocessthathaspreserved
morethan107millionacresasstatutorywilderness.89Therhetoricaland
conceptualinnovationbehinditmayhavebeenjustasconsequential.Indeveloping
alanguagetodefendwilderness,advocatesfoundwordsfortheirownexperience
andinturnmadethatexperiencethemorefullyavailabletoothers.Allthis
dependedontheexistenceofundevelopedlandwheretheencounterstheyvalued
werepossible.ThegeographythatRomanticpreservationistscreatedbyreforming
public‐landlawbothsustainedtheSierraClub’shigh‐countrypilgrimagesand
createdasettingforfurtherexperimentsinexperienceanditsinterpretation.
Theseexamplesaremeanttofilloutthethoughtthatenvironmentallaw
contributesmosttothedevelopmentofenvironmentalethicsasashaperof
experience–oftheencounterswithnaturethatformmuchofthematerialforshifts
inperceptionandimagination.Whenlawprecludescertainencounterswithnature,
italsoprecludes–oratleastinhibits–thegrowthofvalueandformsofidentitythat
treatthoseencountersasparadigmatic.Thisiswhywildernessadvocates,for
example,understoodthepushforthe1964Actasaboutthesurvivalofamodeof
experience,sothatSenatorFrankChurchofIdahocouldsayontheSenatefloorthat,
withoutwilderness,thecountrywouldbecomeacage.90Itisalsowhya
symmetricaltoneofurgencyentersthelanguageoftraditionalresourceusers,
followersinthesettlerideal,whoseeenvironmentalregulationasathreattotheir
culturalsurvival.91
B.WaysofUnderstandingChangeinEnvironmentalEthics
Inthinkingaboutchangeinenvironmentalvalues,ithelpstobeabletosay
whatitisthatremainsthesamewhilesomethingelsechanges.Otherwisethestory
isnotmuchmorethanWilliamJames’s“blooming,buzzingconfusion.”92Onmybest
interpretation,thevaluesthatgetformulatedasenvironmentalethicsdohave
certainqualitiesincommonbesidesthebarefactthattheyaddressthehuman
relationtothenaturalworld.Itis,tobecandid,trickytofindtherightwordforthe
formalcharacteristicsthatunitecertainenvironmentalvaluesacrosschangesin
89See16U.S.C.sec.1131,etseq.;JAMESRASBAND,JAMESSALZMAN,&MARKSQUILLACE,
NATURALRESOURCESLAW&POLICY636‐49(2nded.2009).
901961CONG.REC.18,365(StatementofSen.Church).
91See,e.g.,A.DanTarlock,CanCowboysBecomeIndians?ProtectingWestern
CommunitiesasEndangeredCulturalRemnants,31ARIZ.ST.L.J.539(1999)(on
culturalconflictoverresourceuseinWesterncommunities).
92WILLIAMJAMES,THEPRINCIPLESOFPSYCHOLOGY462(HarvardUniversityPressed.,
1981)(1890).
26
substance.Onecanthinkoftheformalcharacteristicsastemplates,asagrammar,
orasparticipatingina“familyresemblance”:thevaguenesshereisintentional
becauseIdon’twanttotakeonboardtoomuchmethodologicalcommitmentinthis
attempttoorganizeaninterpretation.93
Majorthemesinenvironmentalvaluehaveemergedaroundclustersof
ethicalissuesthattheysharewithother,non‐environmentalquestions.Broadly
speaking,therearethreesuchclusters.Firstissocialorinterpersonalethics
(although“personal”issometimesamisnomerintheenvironmentalsetting).94A
majorthemehereistheresistancetoharminganotherentitythatisrecognizedas
havingmoralvalue.Thisaversiontodoingharmhasorganizedmuchofthe
extensionofmoralconcerntoanimals,plants,andlessobviousentitiessuchas
speciesandecosystems.Suchextendedmoralconcernrecognizablysharesabasic
logicwiththeimpulsenottoslapanotherpersonacrosstheface.Thatimpulseis
“formal”inthesensethatitsmeaningdependsintenselyonchangingcontent:which
entitiescountasmorallyimportantothers?Asecondthemeissocialsolidarity:
viewsofnature’simportanceandproperusehaveplayedanimportantpartin
definingidealsofnationalpurposeandcitizenship.
Thesecondmajorclusterofissuesispersonalethics,concernedlesswith
rightbehaviortowardothersthanwithself‐regardfoundedinthekindofperson
oneis.Inthisregister,changesinenvironmentalvalueshavebeenconnectedwith
waysofpursuingdignityandauthenticity,twocardinalvaluesofpersonalethics.
Again,environmentalvaluesheretakesomeoftheirenergyfromthefactthatideas
ofnatureare,sotospeak,recruitedtohelppeopleengagedeeplyfeltproblems
abouthowtolive.Morethanonesetofsubstantiveenvironmentalvaluescanbe
understoodasaddressedtothisissue.
93SeeJohnMikhail,UniversalMoralGrammar:Theory,Evidence,andtheFuture,11
TRENDSINCOGNITIVESCIENCES(No.4)143(2007)(settingouttheoryofa“universal
moralgrammar”);JonathanHaidt&SelinKesebir,Morality,inHANDBOOKOFSOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY797,797‐832(ed.S.Fiske,D.Gilbert&G.Lindzey)(5thed.2010)(giving
afunctionalistaccountofarepertoireofevaluativeemotionalresponsesarguedto
structuremoralattitudesandprovidethepremisesofmoralreasoning);Joshua
Greene,CognitiveNeuroscienceandtheStructureoftheMoralMind(forthcomingin
1INNATENESSANDTHESTRUCTUREOFTHEMIND(ed.S.Laurence,P.Carruthers,&S.
Stich)(arguingforaconstellationof“innatefactors”thatorganizemoralresponse).
Theterm“familyresemblance”isassociatedwithLudwigWittgenstein’srejectionof
seekingnecessaryandsufficientconditionsfortheapplicationofwordsand
concepts,infavorofalooser‐knitstandardofcompetentuse,recognitionof
similaritiesandanalogies,etc.SeeLUDWIGWITTGENSTEIN,PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS65‐66(G.E.M.Anscombe,trans.,1953).
94BecauseIaddresseachoftheseinturninthediscussionthatfollows,Idonot
providecitationstotheliteratureinthisintroductorysummary.
27
Athirdsetofissuescanbecalledaesthetic,thoughthisisforlackofabetter
word.Thesubstancehereislessobviouslyethical:nature’saestheticvaluedoesnot
reallyspeaktohowtoact(socialethics)orhowtolive(personalethics).Instead,
thesubstancehereisthestateofmindinducedbyencounteringorcontemplating
thenaturalworld.Encounterswithbeauty,sublimity,anduncanninesshavebeen
centraltodiscerningandarticulatingthevaluesatworkinthenaturalworld.They
seem,respectively,tocapturethreeemotionalandmoralattitudestowardnature:a
restfulgratitudeandat‐homeness,astimulatingbutpotentiallyoverwhelmingsense
ofnatureasvastandalien,andanawedbafflementinthefaceofaworldfullof
consciousnessthatisbothlikeandunlikeourown.
Toacertainextent,thesethreesetsofissuesareintegratedinvirtueethics,
anapproachthatunderstands(1)socialpracticesandformsofcommunityas
restingon(2)personalhabitsorqualitiesofcharacterthat(3)involvehowone
perceivessituations,thevaluesonetakestobepresentinthem.AlthoughIdonot
makeacaseforvirtueethicsasasuperioraccountofmoralityingeneral,Idoargue
thatitcapturesimportantfeaturesofsomeenvironmentalvalues,especiallyin
emergingissuessuchasfoodandagricultureandclimatechange.
Thismodestlyformalapproachtoorganizingethicalexperiencehasmuchin
commonwiththepictureofmoralreasoningthatexperimentalpsychologistshave
beendeveloping.Inthispicture,abasicrepertoireofmoralresponsesstructures
muchoftheintuition,orperceptionofvalue,thatanchorsmoraljudgment.The
elementsofthisrepertoiremaybebroadlydescribedasformal:theyencompass
kindsofevaluativeresponse,suchastheaversiontodoingharm.95Thisworkis
highlystimulating,andIborrowsomeformulationsfromoneofitsleading
practitioners,JonathanHaidt,inmydiscussionofsocialethics.
Becauseofitsoriginsinexperimentalpsychology,thisapproachisinvolved
indebatesoverbothmoralreasoningandneuroscience;but,forpresentpurposes,
thereisnoneedtomakeanycommitmentwithinthose.Instead,Iusethisapproach
tostructurereflectiononmoralphenomenathatdisplaydifferentcontentin
differentsettingsbutnonethelesshaveconsistent,definingfeaturesthatcanbe
calledformal.Thisapproachhelpsto(1)integratereflectiononenvironmental
ethicswiththinkingaboutethicalresponsesmoregenerally,incaseswherebothare
involvedinthesamekindsofjudgments,suchaswhetheritisacceptabletoharm
certainentities,orevenwhethercertainactscountasharm;(2)identifyaspectsof
environmentalethicsthataredistinctfromtraditionalinterpersonalethicsandpick
outthelogicofthemotivatingenvironmentalvaluesinthesecases;and(3)inboth
cases,organizeapictureofpastchangeandpossiblefuturedevelopmentby
assumingthatpast,present,andpossiblefutureversionsofenvironmentalvalueall
sharecertainformaldistinctionsorkindsofjudgment.
1.Natureandsocialethics:harmandsolidarity
95See,e.g.,sourcesgatheredinsupran.__(excludingWittgenstein).
28
JonathanHaidtproposesasoneofthe“hypothesizedfoundations”ofmoral
psychology–basicallytemplatesinaformalrepertoireofmoralresponse–a
“harm/care”pairinginvolvedin“concernforthesufferingsofothers.”96This
formulationpicksupthestrongaversiontoinflictingdirectharmonanotherthat
experimentalpsychologistsfindatworkincertainhypotheticalethicalquandaries,
oftencenteringonthedecisionwhethertotakeonelifeviolently–strangleachild,
throwamanfromabridge–inordertosavealargernumberofothers.Althoughits
experimentalformulationhasbeenlodgedincertaindifficultieswithinthe
deontological‐consequentialistdebateinmoralphilosophy,theresponseisfairly
seenasexpressinganexperiencethatunderliesbothapproachestoethics:a
stronglyfeltandmotivationallyeffectiverespectforotherindividuals.97
Thesignalfactaboutthis“foundation”isthatitsmeaningdepends
thoroughlyonwho,orwhat,inspirestherespectorsympathythatstaysthehand.
Thegreateventbehindbothclassicalutilitarianism(theur‐versionofmodern
consequentialism)andalltypesofrights‐basedtheoriesistheriseofuniversalism
inethics,thatis,theembraceoftheequalstatusofallpersonsasastarting‐pointfor
reasoning.Thisisnotjustatheoreticalbreakthrough,butadevelopmentinsocial
andmoralimagination,inwhichsympathyforothersandrespectfortheirhumanity
burst–howeverimperfectly–familiarbondsofreligion,race,andnation.98Onecan
seemuchofthepoliticsofslavery,totakeoneexample,asacultural,political,and
legalcontestoverwhocountsmorally,inwhichappealstorights,religion,and
humanitariansympathyrevolvedaroundthatfocalpoint.99
Thisharm/care“foundation”hasbeenimportantinenvironmentalethics,
particularlyinthehumaneandanimal‐rightsmovements,withtheirfocusonthe
sufferingofindividuals.Itistellingthatthemodernhumanemovementarosein
closeconnectionwithanti‐slaveryabolitionism,andwithmuchthesamesuiteof
appeals.100Thesameharm‐focusedmorallogicseemtobeatworkineffortsto
“personalize”naturalphenomenaotherthananimals,suchastrees,riversand
mountains,species,andecosystems.AlthoughJusticeDouglas’s“theriveras
96Haidt,supran.__at822.
97SeeGreene,Innateness,supran.__at10‐14(describingtheseexperiments).In
thesecases,thedifferenceappearstobethatapplyingaconsequentialisttheory
requiresconsciouscalculationoverremotelives,whileapplyingacertainkindof
deontologysimplyrequiresnotharmingapersonimaginedtobestandinginfront
ofthedecision‐maker,or,inthecaseoftheinfant,cradledinhisarms.
98SeeTAYLOR,SOURCESOFTHESELF,supran.__at393‐401(sketchingaspectsofthis
development).
99SeegenerallyDAVIDBRIONDAVIS,THEPROBLEMOFSLAVERYINWESTERNCULTURE
(1969).
100[Sourcetocome.]
29
plaintiffspeaks”passagestillstrikeslawyerlyreadersaswillfullyeccentric,it
nonethelesshighlightsthat,inourculture,itisintelligibletodescribesuchentities
ashavingmoralpointsofview,opentodescriptionintermsofrightsand
interests.101Thereforecertainacts–emittingpollutionfromafactorywaste‐pipe,
blastingopenamountaintopwithdynamite,ordegradingthehabitatofaspeciesin
dangerofextinction–canregisterasharmingthoseentities.Thesameperception
seemstobeatworkinhearingacallto“save”aplace–MineralKingValley,
DinosaurMonument,HetchHetchy–asamoralimperativetoavoidadevastating
harm.102
EnvironmentalethicshasalsotappedanotherofHaidt’s“foundations,”what
hecalls“ingroup/loyalty,”andIwouldcallsolidarity:thesenseofobligationin
groupmembership,includingself‐sacrificeandvigilanceagainstbetrayalofthe
group.103Hereagain,itispivotalthattheformalcategorycoverswidelyvarying
content.Therelevantgroups,oftennations,arealwayspartlyimagined
communities,formedoutof“mysticchordsofmemory”asmuchasoutof
institutional,linguistic,andgeographicfacts.104Theriseofconservationpoliticsat
theturnofthelastcentury,whichcenteredonpublicadministrationofparks,
forests,andothernaturalresources,wasessentiallyintertwinedwithTheodore
RooseveltandotherProgressives’recastingofAmericancivicidentity.105They
profferedrobustnationalismforatimethattheyregardedasrequiringastrongand
extensivestate.Naturalresourcesexemplifiedwhyregulationwasnecessary:
withoutit,privategreedwouldwastethenationalpatrimony.106Naturalresources
101SierraClubv.Morton,supran.__at743(Douglas,J.,dissenting).
102SeeRODERICKNASH,WILDERNESSANDTHEAMERICANMIND__‐__(3rded.2001)
(describingtheseconflictsandtheirsignificanceinthedevelopmentofUS
environmentalpolitics).
103SeeHaidt&Kesebir,supran.__at822.
104SeegenerallyBENEDICTANDERSON,IMAGINEDCOMMUNITIES:REFLECTIONSONTHEORIGIN
ANDSPREADOFNATIONALISM(Rev’ded.2006).Thequotedphrase,ofcourse,comes
fromAbrahamLincoln,FirstInauguralAddress(Washington,DC,March4,1861).
105SeeTheodoreRoosevelt,TheNewNationalism,SpeechatOsawatomie(Aug.31,
1910),reprintedinTheodoreRoosevelt,THENEWNATIONALISM22(1910)(linking
nationalidentity,regulation,andconservation).
106SeeGIFFORDPINCHOT,THEFIGHTFORCONSERVATION48‐49(1910)(“Theconservation
ideacoversawiderrangethanthefieldofnaturalresourcesalone.Conservation
meansthegreatestgoodtothegreatestnumberforthelongesttime....
Conservationadvocatestheuseofforesight,thrift,andintelligenceindealingwith
publicmatters....Itproclaimstherightanddutyofthepeopletoactforthebenefit
ofthepeople.Conservationdemandstheapplicationofcommon‐sensetothe
commonproblemsforthecommongood.”).
30
alsoprovidedaparadigmforthetechniqueofpublicmanagement:expert
administrationforthebenefitofthewholecountryacrossgenerations.107
Atthesametime,publicrecreationalareasand,especially,parks,became
symbolsofnationalidentity.RooseveltandothersinvitedAmericanstoidentify
withemblemsonthelandscapethatmarkedthecontinentasbelongingtoaself‐
awarenation.Roosevelt’sfaceonMountRushmore,begunwellafterhisdeath,does
withclangingliteralnesswhatagenerationofparksadvocatesdidmoresubtlyand
justaseffectively:makepubliclandsatouchstoneofAmericancivicidentity.
Effortstomobilizesolidaritysincetheconservationdevelopmentsofthe
Progressiveerahavebeenmoreindifferentintheirresults.Appealstosolidarity
outsidethenation(toa“planetarian”identity)orthespecies(toAldoLeopold’s
“landcommunity”)arebetterdescribedasaspirationalsketchesthan
achievements.108Becausesolidarityhasbeensoimportantinearlierenvironmental
developments,bothlendingitselftoconservationandtakingenergyfromimagesof
nature,itisnonethelessworthkeepingwellinview.
2.Personalethicsandenvironmentalvalue
Thedevelopmentofenvironmentalethicshasbeencloselyinvolvedwithtwo
otherbasicvaluesthatarelessprominentinempiricalpsychologybutcentraltothe
aspirationsthatdefinemodernindividualidentity.Thesearedignityand
authenticity.109
Dignityencompassesqualitiesthatcommandtherespectofothersandthe
senseofoneselfascommandingthatrespect.110ItwasacenterpieceoftheU.S.
settleridentity:thepioneer,afreemanwhofreelylaboredonfreeland,qualifiedas
107SeeIRVINGFISHER,REPORTONNATIONALVITALITY:ITSWASTESANDCONSERVATION2
(1909)(“Theproblemofconservingournaturalresourcesispartofanotherand
greaterproblem‐‐thatofnationalefficiency[which]dependsnotonlyonphysical
environment,butonsocialenvironment,andmostofallonhumanvitality.”)
108SeeSarahA.Krakoff,PlanetarianIdentityFormationandtheRelocalizationof
EnvironmentalLaw,64FLA.L.REV.87(2012)(onlocaleffortstoputintopractice
moralidentificationwiththeplanet).
109Foranextremelyvaluablediscussionoftheseideasandtheirplaceinmodern
moralculture,seeCHARLESTAYLOR,ThePoliticsofRecognition,inPHILOSOPHICAL
ARGUMENTS225,225‐33(1995).
110Seeid.at226‐27.
31
amemberofarepublicancommunityofequals.111Thesourceofdignityfor
ordinarypeoplewasafraughtandurgentmatterinatimewhenaninheritanceof
socialhierarchycameunderpressurefromexpandingdemocracy.Usinglandand
otherresourcesproductivelybecameatouchstoneofAmericandignity,particularly
initsmasculineversions.Thelandscapeofenvironmentalvalueeversincehasbeen
markedbytheinvestmentmanyAmericanscontinuetohaveinbeingproductive
usersoflandandresources,notmerecontemplativetouristsorspiritualidlers.112
Authenticityisbeingoneself,notsomeoneelse’simageoracongeriesof
borrowedhabitsandstyles.113Dependingasitdoesonadistinctionbetweentrue
andfalseversionsofsomethingaselusiveastheself,ithaslongbeenundersevere
theoreticalpressure.Nonetheless,ithasbeenattheheartofwhatmanyinthe
Romanticstrainofenvironmentalimaginationhavepursued:thesanctifiedhigh
countryhaslongbeenthoughttobringclarityaboutwhooneis,aliberationfrom
theunreflectiveattitudesandhabitsofthelowlands.Inadifferentversion,someof
thepsychicandspiritualhopesattachedtotheageofecologyaimatre‐integrating
theselfandthenaturalsetting,recognizingthatoneis“really”continuouswitha
livingworld,notamonadcutofffromitbythewallsofbodyandmind.Ineachcase,
theexperienceofvalueinnaturehasbeeninseparablefromthesensethatnature
putsoneintouchwithaclearerexperienceofoneself,ausableformofself‐
knowledge.
3.EthicalandAestheticResponse
Athirdtypeofmoralexperienceisespeciallyconnectedtoaesthetic
responsestonature.Aestheticresponsediffersfromtheotherformaltemplatesin
thatitisnot,basically,amodeofrelationtoothersortotheself.Itismoredirectly
awayofexperiencingnature’simportanceandone’splaceinitthanitisawayof
enlistingnatureindevelopingorgroundingavaluethatworksmainlywithinor
amonghumans.Aestheticresponseinvolvesqualitiesinobjects,landscapes,and
naturalsystems,butalsothequalitiesofmindandemotioncalledforthinresponse
tothese.
Thetwoaestheticmodesthathavebeenmostimportantherearebeautyand
sublimity,arenicely(andrespectively)capturedinapassagefromBernard
Williams:“Humanbeingshavetwobasickindsofemotionalrelationstonature:
111SeeFONER,FREELABOR,supran.__;WOOD,supran.__(oncivicideologyoffreesoil
andfreelabor).
112See,e.g.,RichardWhite“AreYouanEnvironmentalistorDoYouWorkfora
Living?”:WorkandNature,inUNCOMMONGROUND:TOWARDREINVENTINGNATURE(ed.
WilliamCronon,1995)(describingwork‐basedanti‐environmentalistpopulism).
113SeeTAYLOR,PoliticsofRecognition,supran.__at228‐29.
32
gratitudeandasenseofpeace,ontheonehand,terrorandstimulationonthe
other.”114Beauty,amajorpreoccupationofearly‐modernaestheticand
psychologicaltheory,referstoregularity,gradualtransitions,softlines,and
evidenceofthemildnessandfertilityofaterrainthatcouldsupporthumanlife
richlyinanswertoamodicumofwork.115AdamSmith,aperceptivemoral
psychologistandnotthemostpoeticofsouls,wentsofarastoidentifybeautywith
mechanicaldesignthatlentitselftopracticaluse.116Despitethehintofinadvertent
self‐caricatureinthisexample,beautywasneverfarfromusefulness:itdescribes
harmonyandfruitfulness,asenseofbeingathomeinaplacemadeforone’swell‐
being.
Historically,beautyinnaturehasbelongedtotworatherdifferentsettings:
thewell‐workedpastorallandscape,ontheonehand,117and,ontheother,thewhole
metaphorichouseofCreation,viewedasasystemmadefortheflourishingofevery
creaturewithinit.118Theformerdescribes,initsmostoptimisticterms(often
repeatedinthecadencesofManifestDestiny)thesettlerprojectofmakingNorth
Americaagarden,thoughthesettlerswerecalledtobringforthbeauty,nottoenjoy
abeautyalreadyexisting.Thelatterfindsstrongexpressioninwhatonemightcall
theecologicalpastoral:theimageofawholeandharmoniousearth,whosemany
systemsinterweavetosustainspeciesandecologicalcommunities.Thisaestheticis
akeystoneofRachelCarson’snarrativeofenvironmentalapocalypse,Aldo
Leopold’sgreen‐pastoral“landcommunity,”andeveryimageofecologicalbalance
andhealthintheenvironmentalpoliticsofthelastfortyyears.
Thesecondtouchstoneaestheticmode,sublimity,involvesaverydifferent
experience:notbeingathome,butinsteadbeingthrownintoaworldofalien
characterandoverwhelmingdimensions,aworldpotentiallyhostile,but,more
basically,indifferentand–pastapoint–incomprehensible.119Sublimityhasbeen
114Williams,supran.__at238.
115SeeEDMUNDBURKE,APHILOSOPHICALINQUIRYINTOTHEORIGINOFOURIDEASOFTHE
SUBLIMEANDBEAUTIFUL112‐18(J.T.Boulton,ed.,NotreDamePress1968)(1757);
IMMANUELKANT,THECRITIQUEOFJUDGMENT42‐89(JamesCreedMeredith,trans.,
Oxford,ClarendonPress1952)(1790).
116SeeADAMSMITH,THETHEORYOFMORALSENTIMENTS257‐68(PrometheusBooks,
2000)(1759).
117SeeRAYMONDWILLIAMS,THECOUNTRYANDTHECITY13‐45(ontheaestheticsand
ideologyofthepastoral).
118SeeDONALDWORSTER,NATURE’SECONOMY:AHISTORYOFECOLOGICALIDEAS3‐55(2nd
ed.1977)(ontheloveofreassuringorderinthetheologicalandscientifictheoriesof
naturethatprecededmodernecology).
119SeeBURKE,APHILOSOPHICALINQUIRYINTOTHEORIGINOFOURIDEASOFTHESUBLIMEAND
BEAUTIFULsupran.__at39‐70;KANT,THECRITIQUEOFJUDGMENT,supran.__at109‐14.
33
associatedwithvast,uninhabitablesettingsthatdisplaynature’smorallyindifferent
andphysicallythreateningpower:theocean,sheercliffsandgreatgorges,scree
fieldsandrangesofalpinepeaks,cataractsandwhitewaterrapids.Various
interpretershaveassociateditwithenliveningterror,apurifyingreminderofthe
freewillthatcanovercomeinvoluntaryfear,andinspiringaweatthepowerofa
world(and,often,adivinitybehindit)entirelybeyondthescopeofeveryday
humanity.120ToputitinBiblicalterms,ifbeautybespeakstheGodandCreationof
Psalm23,sublimityfindsitsalienatinghomeinJob.Sublimitywascentraltothe
RomanticstraininAmericanenvironmentalthought,withparticularemphasisonits
uplifting,ratherthanalienating,effect.121
Thethirdpointwhereethicsandaestheticsintersectwithrespecttonature
isuncanniness.Itislesscanonicalthantheothertwobutjustasdistinctiveand,
potentially,asimportant.FamouslyassociatedwithSigmundFreud’sdiscussionof
thepeculiarcharmofcertainsciencefictionandfairytales,uncanninessrefersto
thebewilderingexperienceofuncertaintyaboutwhethersomethingisalive,
conscious,anotherintelligencelookingbackatthewatchingperson.122Freud’s
examplesweregolem‐likerobots,doppelgangers,andghosts.123Hearguedthat
storiesofsuchthings,orimaginedencounterswiththem,representedthereturnof
magicalthinking,whichwassetasidebutneverquiteabandonedwheninfantsgrew
upandanimistculturesmaturedintoascientificworldview.124
Freedfromitsdebttoauniversalistandevolutionaryviewofsocietyanda
highlyspecifictheoryofmind,theideaofuncanninesscapturesarealandpersistent
experience.Thisisthedisorientationthatcanarisefromknowing,ontheonehand,
thatweliveinaworldfullofnon‐humanpointsofview,experience,and
consciousness,and,ontheother,thatthosearenecessarilyopaquetous,permanent
mysteries.Theirmystery,however,doesnotfreeusfrommakingdecisionsthat
affectthem,massivelyandoftenmortally.Whatblinksoutofexistencewhenan
animalisslaughtered,whatisthemeaningofagazethatlooksbackatus,ofsounds
wehearasexpressingsatisfactionorpain?Thatwedonotknowenoughtoanswer
120Seesourcesgatheredinimmediatelyprecedingnote.
121See,e.g.,MUIR,MYFIRSTSUMMERINTHESIERRA,supran.__(gatheringpassagesto
thiseffect).
122SeeSIGMUNDFREUD,TheUncanny,in17THESTANDARDEDITIONOFTHECOMPLETE
PSYCHOLOGICALWORKSOFSIGMUNDFREUD218,218‐52(ed.&trans.JamesStrachey).
123Seeid.at__.
124Seeid.at__.
34
thesequestionsisthebasisofuncanniness.Thatwehavetoactasifwedidknowis
partofitsethicalrelevance.125
Theexperienceoftheuncannyinvolvesasortofrespect,butmore
complicatedthanthesortthatisinvolvedintheaversiontodoingharm.126Itisa
pauseinjudgmentarisingfromalimitinperceptionandunderstanding:weknow
somethingisthere,butwecannotsayquitewhatitis.Ourpauseexpressesthe
thoughtthatweowetheseotherpointsofviewsomeacknowledgementand
consideration,eventhoughwehavenoreliablewayofcalibratingthatresponse.127
Uncanniness,likebeautyandsublimity,describesbothawayofresponding
toanexemplaryaspectofthenaturalworld–ananimal,apastoralscene,avast,
fierce,andthreateningterrain–andapossibleattitudetowardthenaturalworldas
awhole.Asmentionedearlier,beautyhasbeenthedominantattitudeforcertain
contemplativetheologicalschools,andalsoforpracticalprogramsofremakingwild
natureinthemodelofauniversalgarden.Sublimityhasbeen,foracertainstrandof
Romanticthinking,theaspectofnaturethatmattersmost,thesubsistingand
powerfulworldthatliesbehindorbeneathallthatissettledandcivilized,
contradictingandsavingusfromaworldmadebyhandsandmachines.
Uncanniness,inturn,describesitsownwayofseeingtheworld,oneperhaps
especiallywellsuitedtotheageofecology.Nature,seeninthisway,presentsan
orderthat,ontheonehand,wecanfollowintellectuallythroughitsvastcomplexity,
and,ontheother,alwaysrecedesbeyondourunderstanding,intothedepthsoftime
anddistance,intoscalestoosmallforus,and,aboveall,intocomplexitythatoutruns
ourminds.Ifweoweitrespect,whichisoneofthebasicthoughtsofenvironmental
ethics,thisisinpartbecausewecanadmireandseehowwedependonitsorder.At
thesametime,thisthoughtalsoinvolvesusinthelimitsofourunderstandingand
thebasicdifficultyinmakingsenseofourexperienceofnature’simportance.This
importanceseemsatoncetoresideinitandtobeimportanceforus,inoureyes:to
resolveitintoeithersideofthatoppositionseemstocostushalfitsmeaning.But
themiddlepathisanobscureone.Itimpliesconfessingthatwecannotsayjust
whatthisimportanceis,aswecannotsaywhatkindofrespectweowethe
experienceofananimalwhosemindwecannotknow
4.VirtueEthics:Acting,Being,andSeeing
125SeeKYSAR,supran.__at176‐202(notusingtheterm“uncanny”butrelyingonthe
conceptinethicalrelationstootherformsoflife);TIMOTHYMORTON,THEECOLOGICAL
THOUGHT52‐54(2010)(ontheethicalrelevanceofuncanniness).
126SeeMORTON,supran.__at52‐54(socharacterizingtheexperienceof
uncanniness).
127SeeMORTON,supran.__at24(“’Giveusnowheretostand,andweshallcarefor
theEarth.’”).
35
Virtueethicsaskswhetheranactisthekindthatcontributestocertain
systemicvalues,ratherthanwhethertheactinitselfdoesprohibitedharmoris
detrimentalonbalance.128Theconcerniswiththequalityoftheactionratherthan
itseffect.Thatassessmentisessentiallyrelatedtothequalityofcharacterofthe
personwhowoulddoit.Virtuesaredefinedasthequalitiesofcharacterthattend
toproduceactionsofacertainkind.129Thoseactionshelptoconstitutepractices,
formsofactivitythatcontainstandardsofexcellence,waysofassessingone’s
participationasfineorshoddy.130Practices,inturn,helptomakeupformsoflife,
sharedunderstandingsofwhatconstitutesagoodexistence–inaphrase,shared
orientationsthatmakeaculturearesourceforthosewhoaretryingtojudgehowto
live.131Itmakessensetoenvisionvirtuesasbasicelementsinanemergentorder,
combiningtoconstitutemorecomplexpracticesandformsoflife,and,inturn,
takingsomeoftheirdefinitionfromthehigher‐levelordersthattheyhelpto
compose.
Althoughvirtueethicsisconcernedwithcharacter,themotivationit
imaginesisnotself‐concernedinthewaythatcommitmenttoone’sdignityor
authenticitycanbe.Itischaracteristicofvirtuousconductthatoneisnotmotivated
toitbyanambitiontobevirtuous,butbytheperceptionthatcourage,
reflectiveness,oranotherqualityofconductfitsthesituation.132Theaspirationto
beavirtuouspersonwouldbe,inBernardWilliams’sphrase(makingadifferentbut
relatedpoint)onethoughttoomanyinasituationthatcalledforcourage.133The
motivationistorespondappropriatelytothecircumstancesinwhichonefinds
oneself.
128SeeALASDAIRMACINTYRE,AFTERVIRTUE181‐204(2nded.1984)(onthenatureof
thevirtues).
129Seeid.at187‐91.
130Seeid.at191.
131Seeid.at187‐92.Thismaysoundabstractandfancy,butinfactitdescribesa
gooddealofhumanconduct:wewanttobegoodatthingsweconsiderworthdoing
andbeing,andweunderstandthatifwebecomegoodatthesethingsweacquire
qualitiesthatarenotonlytechnical,whetherreflectivenessinwriting,couragein
argument,constancyininstitutionalandintellectualcommitments,oradifferentset
ofvirtueskeyedtoalessacademiclifethantheonethissentenceimagines.
132SeeBERNARDWILLIAMS,ActingastheVirtuousPersonActs,inTHESENSEOFTHEPAST
189,189‐97(ed.MylesBurnyeat,2006)(makingthispointandobservingsomeof
itsdifficultiesforatheoryof“moralrealism”–notanissueinthisdiscussion,which
doesnotengagemeta‐ethicalquestions).
133SeeBERNARDWILLIAMS,Persons,Character,andMorality,inMORALLUCK1,18
(1981)(arguingthatmoralexplanationshouldspeaktowhatmakeslifemeaningful
fortheperson,nottoabstractcanonsofmoralobligation).
36
Virtueisthereforeconnectedwithperception:thetendencytoactincertain
waysisintegrallyconnectedwithseeingincertainways.134Itisbecauseone
experiencessituationsascontainingcertainvalues,andbecausethosevaluesare
motivating,thatoneactsappropriately.Inthismodeofethics,then,onemightsay
thatthefact‐valuegapisbridgedpsychologicallybythehabitofseeingcertain
patternsoffactsashavingdistinctethicalmeaning.Thatmeaningisfeltnotasthe
productofinferencebutasthefruitofperception.
Therelevanceofthisversionofethicstoenvironmentalproblemsistwofold.
First,thelinktoperceptionfitstheintenselyaestheticregisterinwhich
environmentalvalueshaveemergedandfoundvoice.Virtueethicslinksseeingand
action.Second,asIargueinthenextPart,virtueethicsisparticularlyaptintwoof
theareaswhereenvironmentalvaluesarechangingmostdramatically:food
systemsandclimatechange.Intheseareas,theconnectionbetweenwaysofseeing
andwaysofactingisparticularlyimportant.Moreover,thequestionstheseissues
raisegotoformsoflife,practices,andhabitualbehavioratleastasmuchasto
conceptsofharm,socialsolidarity,orpersonalethics.
Itmaybethatpartofthereasonenvironmentalethicshasnothadmuchto
dowithsuchvirtueconceptsinthepastisthattheactivityinwhichenvironmental
valuesareexpressedtendstobeexceptionalratherthanordinary:thehigh‐country
trek,thevacationtoanationalpark.Theonlywayofseeingthenaturalworldthat
Americanshavethoroughlyputintoeffectasawayoflifeistheagrariansettler
visionthatsweptacrossthecontinentinthenineteenthcentury.Dissentsfromthat
idealhavepoweredessentialinnovationsinvalue,butthosevalueshavenotfound
thesamesortofexpressionindailylivedlifeasthesettlerview.Althoughwriters
suchasHenryThoreauandAldoLeopoldarguablywroteinavirtue‐ethicsveinthat
aimedatcultivatingperceptionandconducttogether,thefruitoftheircontributions
hasbeenliteraryandimaginativemorethanpracticalandembodied.Thismayyet
change.
IV.AnEnvironmentalLawofEthicalChange:ThreeApplicationsandtheCase
forEthicalChange,Revisited
Inatleastthreeareasofenvironmentalpoliticstoday,thekindofethical
plasticitythatIhavebeendiscussingispresent.Theseareasfindpeopleuncertain
whattomakeofkeyencounterswiththenaturalworld,andinimportantwaysthe
issuesarisefromthatuncertainty.Theircontributionmightprovetobeachangein
ethicalvocabulary.
134SeeMARTHAC.NUSSBAUM,THEFRAGILITYOFGOODNESS305(1986)(“Practicalinsight
islikeperceivinginthesensethatitisnon‐inferential,non‐deductive;itis,centrally,
theabilitytorecognize,acknowledge,respondto,pickoutcertainsalientfeaturesof
acomplexsituation.”).
37
Thequestionforlawinrespecttotheseareasisnotjustwhichvaluesto
adopt.Theseissuesarealsoanopportunitytoreflectonthecontextthatthelaw
createsforthedevelopmentofvalue.
A. Food,Agriculture,andtheValueofWork
Whatissometimescalledthefoodmovementisdiverseinitsideasandhas
nocenter,organizational,institutional,orotherwise.Ithasgrownuparoundaset
ofperceptionsstrongenoughtomotivatechoicesabouthowtolive.135Inno
particularorderandwithnoclaimtoexhaustiveness,theseincludethefollowing.
Somephysicalwork,includingcooking,raising,andgatheringfood,isnota
necessaryevilbutanaffirmativesourceofsatisfaction.136Oneofitssatisfactionsis
knowledgeoftheecological,chemical,andotherprocessesthatmaketheworka
successfulengagementwiththenaturalworld:workdonewiththisinformed
appreciationisqualitativelybetterthanworkthatisequallyeffective,perhapsmore
efficientinquantitativeterms,butlessinformedandcomprehending.137
Asecondsatisfactionisknowingthattheworkpreserves,evenenhances,the
naturalprocessesthatitengages,ratherthantendingtoexhaustthem.138A
paradigmaticcontrastisbetween“integratedagriculture”thatreturnscropand
animalwastetothesoilasfertilizerandfarmingthat,ontheonehand,makes
animalwasteapollutantthattaxestheprocessingcapacityofwaterwaysand,onthe
other,drawssoilfertilityfromchemicalfertilizersthatmustbeextractedand
processedelsewhereinthesystemand,insomecases,literallymined(andalsorun
offintowaterways).139Theterm“sustainability”oftengetsatthiscontrast,rather
thanamoretechnicalconceptofindefiniteviabilitybywhatevertechnological
means.Similarsatisfactionholdsforfoodoneusesbutdoesnotgrow–byfarthe
morecommonexperience.Inthesecases,knowledge,particularlyofthefood’s
source,isoftenintegraltothevalueoftheexperience.
Thisisanoveldevelopmentinenvironmentalvalue.AlthoughAmerican
historyhasseenintermittentback‐to‐naturemovements,theshapersof
environmentalimaginationtendedtoseethefarmerasafigureofplodding
utilitarianlabor.ThoreauportrayedNewEngland’sfarmersasslavestotheirland,
135SeegenerallyWENDELLBERRY,THEUNSETTLINGOFAMERICA:CULTUREANDAGRICULTURE
(1977).Thisbookhasbeenatouchstonefortwo‐plusgenerationsofinnovators
aroundfarmingandfood.
136Seeid.at136‐40(onseeinglabortoproducefoodasapositivegood).
137Seeid.at87,137(ecologicalknowledgestructurestheexperienceofwork).
138Seeid.at85(onthevalueofagriculturethatreturnsitssourcesofenergyand
fertilitytothesoilthatfirstproducedthem).
139Seeid.at136(industrialagriculture“turnsfertilityintopollution”).
38
labors,andconventionalconduct,andEmersonremarkedthatthepoet’s
satisfactioninlandscapewasruinedbythesightoffarmersworkingonit.140When
Thoreaufamouslydescribedhoeingweedsinhisbean‐fieldatWaldenPond,he
concludedthathisnextharvestshouldbeleftentirelyforthebirds,and,asfor
eating,hewrotethemostasceticandself‐revoltedpassagesofWaldenonthe
repugnanceofthebody’sneedfornutriment.141JohnMuirtookasafoiladirty
shepherdwhowasresolutelyobtusetothewonderoftheSierraNevada.142Itisa
tellingfactaboutstatutorywildernessthatitsdedicatedusecentersonsceneryand
strenuousrecreation–admiringthelandscapeandpoweringone’sownwayacross
it–totheexclusionofprocuringfood.Thewildernessculturethatproducedthis
iconicmodeofpreservationsoughttopreserveconditionsforthemostelemental
humantransactionswithnature,butlefteatingfromnatureoutofthatpicture.
Wildernessisaplacewherethereismuchlifebutnothingtoeat.
ThegreatdeparturefromallthiscamewithAldoLeopold,authorofASand
CountyAlmanacandsuchtouchstoneessaysas“TheLandEthic”and“RoundRiver.”
Leopoldwasaseminalwildernessadvocate,anequallyimportantformulatorofan
ecologicalethic,anddeeplyinterested,asbothapracticalandaliterarymatter,in
restoringworn‐outfarmlandthroughresponsiblelabor.Leopoldunitedthese
themesinapreoccupationwithhowpeoplecouldparticipateinthenaturalworld
withfullawarenessofitsprocessesandtheaimofimprovingwhathecalledits
“beauty,stability,integrity.”143Writinginthesameveinalmostthreedecadesafter
Leopold’suntimelydeath,WendellBerry,amuseforthefoodmovement,tookup
thesamethemesmoreelaborately.Berryarguedin1977that“theecologicalcrisis”
wasalso“acrisisofagriculture,”becausethemovefromintegratedtoextractive
farming,andfromproducingfoodtoconsumingit,markedalargerdivorcefrom
140SeeHENRYDAVIDTHOREAU,WALDEN4‐11(ed.BrooksAtkinson,____)(____);RALPH
WALDOEMERSON,Nature,inTHEESSENTIALWRITINGSOFRALPHWALDOEMERSON,__,33‐
34(ed.BrooksAtkinson,__)(farming“mayshowuswhatdiscordisbetweenman
andnature,foryoucannotfreelyadmireanoblelandscapeiflaborersarediggingin
thefieldhardby”).
141SeeTHOREAU,WALDENsupran.__at146‐57(onraisingbeansasareflective
experience,notasourceofnutrimentorincome);203‐07(deploringsensualityin
eatingasinotherappetitesandcallingforself‐purification);
142SeeJOHNMUIR,MYFIRSTSUMMERINTHESIERRA,supran.__at129‐31(contrasting
thedivinity‐infusedlandscapeoftheSierraNevadawiththefilthyand
uncomprehendingshepherdwhoaccompanieshimthere).
143SeeALDOLEOPOLD,TheRoundRiver188,188‐99inASANDCOUNTYALMANACWITH
ESSAYSONCONSERVATIONFROMROUNDRIVER(____)(arguingforanecologicalviewof
agriculture,focusedonthesustainablehealthofthelandovergenerations,which
would“harmonizethewildandthetame,”incontrastto“cleanfarming…aimed
solelyateconomicprofitandpurgedofallnon‐conforminglinks”).
39
sustainableinteractionwiththenaturalworld,inwhichanextractiveand
quantifyingattitudereplacedapreservativeandqualitativeone.144Although
Berry’sargumentwasvulnerabletochargesofnostalgiaifassessedashistory,itset
upakeysetofnormativecontraststhatcastdifferentapproachestofarmingand
foodasemblemsofdifferentwaysoflivingonearth.
Allofthisofferedasolutiontoapuzzlethatwasimplicitinpost‐1970
environmentalthoughtand,asLeopold’swritingimplied,inanyefforttothink
ecologically.Anenvironmentalethicthatpeoplecanlivebyseemstoneedoneof
twofeatures.Ontheonehand,itcanmelditsvaluestopracticesorcommitments
alreadyinplace.ThisisroughlywhattheconservationpoliticsofTheodore
Rooseveltandhischiefforesterandconservationtheorist,GiffordPinchot,
accomplishedattheturnofthelastcentury.145Theymadepatrioticconcernforthe
long‐termwell‐beingofthewholecountryintoanallyofpublic‐landsconservation
byarguingthat,withoutsuchconservation,theUnitedStateswouldexhaustcritical
resources.146Ontheotherhand,anenvironmentalethiccanofferanewpractice
andidentity,awayofinteractionwiththenaturalworldandofconceivingofone’s
selfinthatencounter,thatitsadherentscanfollow.AsIarguedearlier,thiswasthe
achievementofthesettlerethicontheonehand,and,ontheother,ofthehigh‐
countrypilgrimagesoftheSierraClubanditssuccessorsinthewilderness
movement.147
Toacertainextent,thepost‐1970waveofenvironmentalideasand
lawmakingdidthefirstofthesebypresentingindustrialpollutionasapublic‐health
crisisandthreatfromrunawaytechnology–hazardsthatthecountryknewhowto
fearand,insomemeasure,howtomanage.Themoreaffirmativevaluesthatwe
earliersawallkindsofcommentatorsinvoking,though,wereelusivelyabstract.As
asynopticwayofthinkingandseeing,ecologicalconsciousnessstandstochange
everythingandnothing.
Thenewenvironmentallawsdidlittletosecurenewmodesofpractice.
Preciselybyworkingatthescaleoftheindustrialeconomy–industrialemissions,
automobileefficiencystandards,pre‐usereviewoftoxins,andambientpollution
standards–theselawsmadetheirchangesinvisibly,atleastfromthepointofview
ofsomeonenotinaregulatedindustry.Aswehaveseen,therewasconsiderable
appetiteforadoptingnew,“ecological”values;butthelawstheyinspiredhardly
helpedtomakethatadoptionconcrete.
144SeeBERRY,THEUNSETTLINGOFAMERICA,supran.__at43‐48(agriculturalpractice
andculturalvalueareindissolublylinked)andsuprann.__‐__(describingidealof
ecologicalagricultureasanexpressionofculturalvalue).
145Seediscussionsupraat__‐__.
146Seeid.
147Seesupradiscussionat__‐__.
40
Theidealofknowledgeableandsustainableparticipationinecological
processesseemsasconcretearesponsetothisproblemaswearelikelytosee.It
seemsplausiblethatthisidealisattractivepartlybecauseitcreatesalivedwayto
makeanabstractsetofvaluesone’sown,awaytoparticipateinanecologicalview
ofthehumanplaceinthenaturalworld.
Thisidealofecologicalparticipationmarksadeparturefromtheleading
waysofseeingfoodandagriculture,notjustinenvironmentalimagination,butalso
inthedominantnormativelanguageofpublicpolicy.Thereis,tobesure,aclear
andoften‐heardcaseforchangingfarmpolicythatsoundsincost‐benefitanalysis
andenvironmentaleconomics.Itconcentratesonthepollutionexternalitiesof
fertilizer,pesticide,andfossil‐fueluse,andthewaysthatfederalsubsidy,
particularlyofcornandsoybeancrops,shapestheagriculturallandscapeand
nationaldiet,withcascadinghealthcoststhatkeeppacewithenvironmentalharms.
Thesefamiliarnormativerubrics,though,arefarfromexhaustingthefood
movement’sclaims.InthequalitativeidealthatIhavebeendescribing,ecological
participationisafreestandingreasontoendorseafoodeconomythatmakessuch
activitypossible.
Whatmeaningdoesthisperspectivehaveforthelaw?Law’sroleinshaping
thefoodeconomyiswidelyrecognized,andIhavealreadyreferredtothefederal
subsidiesthatpromoteproductionofcorn,soybeans,andothercommoditycrops.A
largeshareofsubsidygoestoverylargeproducers,reflectingthatthereisno
priorityonencouragingtherelativelysmallscaleofproductionthatmakespersonal,
physicalengagementviableandcanrewardintegrated,multi‐cropoperationsover
single‐cropfarming.148Relativelylaximplementationofanti‐pollutionlawsin
agriculturegivesaneffectiveadvantagetolargeoperationswhoseconcentrationof
animalsproduceslagoonsofsemi‐liquid,off‐gassingwaste.149Regulationspermit
regimesof“sub‐therapeutic”antibioticsinconcentratedanimal‐feeding
operations.150Thisisnecessaryforconcentratedpopulationstosurvivewithout
148
See Doug O’Brien, Policy Approaches to Address Problems Associated with
Consolidation and Vertical Integration in Agriculture, 9 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 33 (2004);
Neil Hamilton, Reaping What We Have Sown: Public Policy Consequences of
Agricultural Industrialization and the Legal Implications of a Changing Production
System, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 289 (1997)
149SeeSamKalen,Agriculture,Food,andEnvironmentalPolicy,26Nat.Res.&Env’t1
(2011);KateCelender,TheImpactofFeedlotWasteonWaterPollutionUnderthe
NationalPollutantDischargeEliminationSystem(NPDES),33Wm.&MaryEnvt’lL&
PolicyRev.947(2009);ErinM.TegtmeierandMichaelD.Duffy,ExternalCostsof
AgriculturalProductionintheUnitedStates,2Int’lJ.ofAg.Sustainability1(2004).
150See,e.g.,JONATHANSAFRANFOER,EATINGANIMALS123‐43(2009)(describingdisease
threatsassociatedwithconfinedagriculture);MICHAELPOLLAN,THEOMNIVORE’S
DILEMMA173‐83(ontheuseofantibioticsasakeystoneofconfinedanimalfeeding
operations).
41
epidemics,eventhoughthepracticerisksbreedingantibiotic‐resistantstrainsof
animaldiseasesand,perhaps,bugsthatalsosickenpeople.Smallproducersface
interlinkedlogisticalandregulatorybottlenecks:slaughteringfacilitiesareoftenfar
fromproducers,addingtravelcost,fuelconsumption,andanimalstressatthelast
stageofraisingmeat.151Thisshortageisdifficulttoovercomeinpartbecauseofthe
smallnumberoffederalhealth‐and‐safetyinspectors,itselfagovernment
accommodationofindustryconsolidationthatwasexpectedtobeirreversible.
Theseconsiderationsaresometimesmarshaledasargumentsagainstthe
currentstateofthelaw,but,ofcourse,onstandardCBAanalysis,whetherthat
followsdependsonthebottomline.Variousdefensesofindustrial‐scaleagriculture
vindicateoneaspectoranotheraslessresource‐intensivethanthesmallerand
moreparticipatoryfarmingthatthefoodmovementembraces–even,notoriously,
incaseswheretheindustrialproduceinquestiontravelshalfwayaroundtheworld.
Theargumentforsmall‐scaleandlabor‐intensiveproductionsometimespiggybacks
onCBAandenvironmentaleconomics,butitisfarfrombeingcoextensivewith
those.
Bycontrast,ifonestartswiththequalitativeideal,thenthinkingof
agricultureentirelyinconventionalcost‐benefittermscomestoseemmisplacedin
muchthesamewaythatproposalstoprivatizeanddeveloptheentirecontinent
seemedinlightofthemovementfornationalparksandotherpublicrecreational
land.TheolderperspectivelostforceoncemanyAmericansacceptedthatthe
Romanticmodeofengagementwiththenaturalworldwasworthpromoting
throughfederalpolicy.Ontheviewthatfarmingoffersitsownkindofexperiential
value,thecaseforpoliciesthatreverseregulatorybiasestowardlarge,specialized
productionstandsonitsown,ratherthanrestingonderivativegrounds.Thatdoes
notmeanthatthecasemustprevail,ofcourse;butitsgroundsareitsown.Onthis
view,agriculturalpolicyis,inaserioussense,culturalpolicy,likeestablishing
nationalparks.Parkspolicyisaninvestmentinanexperienceofnaturethat
generatesthinkingaboutnature,humanity,andtherelationbetweenthetwo.
Similarly,agriculturalpolicythatsupportedsmall‐scaleandparticipatoryfood‐
raisingwouldbeaninvestmentintheconditionsofdevelopingenvironmental
ethics.
IdonotthinkIhaveputmyselfinapositiontoarguedecisivelyforthese
policies,butIhopeIhavesetoutwhatsuchpolicieswouldbeandwhatreasons
mightsupportthem.Understandingtheircontoursandplaceinthefermentof
environmentalethicsisessentialtopreparingforanyfuturedebateonparticulars.
151Fordiscussionsofregulatoryandinfrastructurebottlenecksthatimpedesmall
andunconventionalfarmers,andofpossiblereforms,seeNeilD.Hamilton,Moving
TowardFoodDemocracy:BetterFood,NewFarmers,andtheMythofFeedingthe
World,16DRAKEJ.AGRIC.L.117(2011);MichaelPollan,AnOpenLettertotheNext
Farmer‐in‐Chief,NYTIMES,Oct.12,2008.
42
B. AnimalsandtheEthicsofEncountersAcrossSpecies
Asnotedearlier,itdidnottakelongforenvironmentalethiciststoidentifya
paradoxinthinkingaboutthemoralstatusofanimals.Ifitisasindividualsthat
animalsarevaluable,thentheirinterestsseemtoinvite,evendemand,dramatic
departuresfromexistingpracticesrelations,whichinvolveconsiderableanimal
suffering.152If,instead,animalsarevaluedas“partofnature,”thentheirsuffering
seemsasnaturalastheirexistence.153So,indeed,mighthumanexploitationofother
species,whichonaholisticperspectiveisarguablynoless“natural”thanother
predators’useofthecreaturestheyeat.
Allofthisfloatssomewhatabovemorespecificquestionsabouthowtoshow
regardforanimals.Whatevertheconceptualforceoftheproblemthatsufferingand
exploitationarealso“natural,”thereisacoreofsituations,concerningdomestic
and,especially,agriculturalspecies,inwhichhumansexercisecomprehensive
controlovertheconditionsofotherspecies.Thesesituations–wecantakethe
factoryfarmasjustoneexample–arethoroughlyartificial:wemadethem.154
Atleastinthiscoresituation,itseemsplausibletosaythatindividual
animals’interests(ormoralimportanceotherwisedescribed)shouldfigure
prominently.Inadirectway,wecreateandcontroltheirsuffering,andthatfactis
thepromptforethicalreflection.Thedebateoverthetreatmentofanimalsisdeep
andconsequential.155Ifargumentsagainsteatingmeatandfactoryfarmingwin
152See,e.g.,Cahen,AgainsttheMoralConsiderabilityofEcosystems,supran.[46]
at114‐23(settingoutthecasethatonevenmodestlyindividualisticpremises,itis
verydifficulttoascribemoralimportancetoa“whole”suchasanecosystem);
Varner,CanAnimalRightsActivistsBeEnvironmentalists?supran.[46]at95‐104
(settingoutthisbasictension).
153SeeSagoffAnimalLiberationandEnvironmentalEthics,supran.[45]at38‐44
(arguingthispoint);Katz,IsThereaPlaceforAnimalsintheMoralConsiderationof
Nature?supran.[45]at85‐93(exploringthisdifficultyandarguingfora“balanced”
approach).
154Artificialityshouldnotbeopposedcategoricallytonature:indeed,muchofthe
reasonforthetroubledcharacterofthedistinctionisthathumannatureispartly
thatofhomofaber,thefabricator,ormaker.Surelypartofthepointofany
environmentalethicsistothinkthroughtakingresponsibilityforthismaker’s
power,andsothethoughtthatitwouldmakesensetopassoffanyandeveryform
ofdominationoverotherspeciesas“natural”seemsasignthatsomethinghasgone
wrong.
155SeePETERSINGER,ANIMALLIBERATION1‐24(settingouttheargumentforequalityof
moralconcernbasedonsuffering).
43
acceptance,theywillimplythatmostAmericansarenowengagedinamassive
violationofbasicmorality.156Thefoodsystemstandsalongsidetheprisonsystem
among(some)Americans’candidatesforthegreatwrongofourtime.
Iwanttoputforwardtwoapproachestothisissuethathavemarkedly
differentimplications,thenargueforathirdthatisnotsomuchanalternatemoral
metricasawaytothinkabouthowlawcancontributetoethicaldevelopmentinthis
area.Thefirstviewisbroadlyabolitionist,concludingthatthereisnomoraldefense
formostofthepresenthumanuseofanimals.157Thesecondapproachisthe
reformistonethatseekstorenovatehumanrelationswithanimalswhilepreserving
extensivedomesticationand/ormeat‐eating.158
Themostvisiblerecentreformistproposalcomesnotfromaphilosopheror
alawyer,butfromthejournalistMichaelPollan.InTheOmnivore’sDilemma,Pollan
arguesforaversionofanimalhusbandryinwhichanimalsenjoyextensivefreedom
tousetheirphysicalfaculties,interactwithnon‐industrial(classicallypastoral)
settings,andhave,sotospeak,lived(foreshortenedversionsof)thelivessuitableto
theirspecieswhentheygotoslaughter.159Thebasicstructureofthisquasi‐
Aristotelianargumentisthatdomesticatedspecieshavenoprospectofexistence
outsidedomestication,andsoanyinterestsassignedtoanindividualmemberofa
domesticspeciesmustbecompatiblewithalifelivedwithinanongoingsystemof
domestication.160Thisstandardexcludesfactoryfarming,whichdeniesanimals
nearlyallspontaneousactivity,appearstotraumatizeanyspeciescapableof
consciousexperience,andreducesindividualstoacaloricproduction‐function.161It
embracesneo‐traditionalfarmingofthekindthatPollan,WholeFoodsandsimilar
enterprises,andthefoodmovementhavedonemuchtopublicize.162
Theproblemswiththisapproachareseveral.Itpresupposesacontroversial
relationbetweenindividualandspeciesinterestsbylimitinganimals’intereststo
156Seeid.at95‐158(detailingfarmingpracticesasamassiveviolationofmorality).
157SeeGARYL.FRANCIONE&ROBERTGARNER,THEANIMALRIGHTSDEBATE:ABOLITIONOR
REGULATION?1‐102(2010)(settingoutthecaseforabolitionofhumanexploitation
ofnon‐humananimals).
158Seeid.at103‐74(settingoutcaseforreformratherthanabolitionofhuman‐
animalexploitation).
159SeeMICHAELPOLLAN,THEOMNIVORE’SDILEMMA304‐33(2006)(arguingforan
Aristotelianapproachtothetreatmentofdomesticanimals).
160Seeid.at319‐25.
161Seeid.at315‐19.
162Seeid.at328‐33.
44
thoseactivitiesthatwillinducepeopletokeeptheirspeciesalive.Inthesamemove,
itimplicitlyprizeshumanconvenienceoverethicallimits:Whyelsewouldthefact
thatwe“made”thesespeciesandsustainthemlimittheobligationswemighthave
totheirindividualmembers?Isitrightthatslaughteratasmallfractionofits
naturallifespaniscompatiblewithananimal’sinterestinalifeappropriatetoits
species?Thesamepointholdsforthecastrationofmostdomesticatedmale
mammals,apracticethatforeclosescertaincharacteristicactivityeventhoughit
leavesindividualsfreetoenjoysunshineandmud.TheobviousappealofPollan’s
positionisthatitproposestoreconcilepersistentandoppositeimpulses:to
continueourbasicrelationstootheranimalsandtochecksomeofthepalpable
enormitiesofthoserelations.Whetheritsucceedislessclear.
Ratherthanadjudicatebetweenreformandabolition,Iwouldliketo
emphasizeacommonalitybetweenthetwoandmakethecaseforathird,
complementaryapproach.Bothapproachesrestonaconfidentascriptionto
animalsofasetofinterests,or,morebroadly,aversionofmoralsignificance.An
abolitionistmightfindastonishing–toputitcharitably–Pollan’sconfident
judgmentaboutwhatitmeanstobeapig;buttheabolitionist,too,hasadefinite
viewaboutthesameissue,albeitonethatdisplayspolemicalclarityratherthan
cloyingsympathy.Each,then,dependsonhavingconcludedjudgmentonaquestion
that–asthecontinuingdisputeamongthoughtfulpeopleisenoughtoshow–has
notbeenconcludedinthelargerethical,political,andlegalargument.163
Thecontinuingdisputereflectsthedifficultyoftheproblem:howtointerpret
animalconsciousness,whichwecannotknowexceptthroughspeculationandwhich
likelyisverydifferentfromours.Genuinelydifficultproblemslikethisonecangive
risetoethicaldevelopment,whichlawmighthelporimpede.
Theethicalresourcethathasspecialpromiseinthisareaisuncanniness,the
mixedethicalandaestheticrecognitionofnotknowinganother’sconsciousness.To
experienceuncanninessinthefaceofananimalistoberightupagainstaquestion–
whatdoesthisotherconsciousnessmean?–thatwillnotresolveitselfintooneclear
answer.Thatisapositioninwhichwemighthopetolearnfromourown
acknowledgedconfusion.164
Lawmightmakethispotentiallygenerativeproblemmorepalpable.The
publicconversationaroundanimalssuggeststhatpracticeslikefactoryfarming
havefewopendefenders.Instead,theybenefitfromconcealment,anenforced
invisibilitythatcollaborateswiththetendencytoavoidwhatisunpleasant.Access
163Forafinelyexpressedexplorationofthiscontinuingculturalirresolutiononthe
question,seegenerallyJONATHANSAFRANFOER,EATINGANIMALS(2009)(engagingwith
sympatheticimaginationarangeofperspectivesonthebook’stitletopic).
164SeeKYSAR,supran.__at176‐202;MORTON,supran.__at52‐54(ontheethicsof
theuncannyinencounterswithanimals).
45
toconfinedfeedingoperationsandslaughterhousesisnotoriouslyrestricted,and
thereportsofthosewhoseekit(includingme)suggestthataccesspoliciesaremore
confininginactionthanonthebooks.165Thereiseveryself‐interestedreasonfor
livestockoperationstotakethisstance.TodayaswhenUptonSinclairwroteThe
Jungle,debatesaboutmeattendtoarisefromtriumphsofmuckraking.166Even
PeterSinger’stouchstonephilosophicalargument,AnimalLiberation,makes
extensiveuseofvividdescriptiontoconveyitscasefortheethicalimportanceof
animalsuffering.167Reflectioninthisareaseemstoarisemorefrombeing
confrontedwithwhatwehavemanagedtoavoidthanfromthinkingthroughthe
conceptualconsistencyofourattitudes.Whoeverfavorsethicalstasisthushasa
stronginterestinmaintainingacultureofavoidance.
Acultureofavoidancehasalegalinfrastructure:theconcealmentof
industrialfeedingandslaughteroperationsrestsonthepropertyrightofexclusion.
Themoststraightforwardwaytoinvitemoreengagedreflectiononouruseof
animalswouldbebystatutorycreationofa“righttoknow”thesourcesofone’s
food,implementedbyapublicrightofaccess,undercontrolledconditions,to
industrialfoodoperations.Dependingonconsiderationsofsafetyandconvenience,
physicalaccesscouldbesupplemented,andinsomecasesreplacedoutright,by
videotechnology.Slaughterhousesmightberequiredtoadmitindependentfilm
crewsproducingpubliclyavailabledocumentaries(onethinksoptimisticallyofthe
useWernerHerzogmadeofstrictlylimitedaccesstotheChauvetcaves),orsimply
toinstallwebcameras.Labelingrequirementscouldincludetheslaughterhouse
wheremeatwasprocessedandthewebaddresswherebuyerscouldobservethat
facility.Thepublicbenefit(whichisprobablytooblandlyupbeataword)wouldbe
theopportunitytoobserve,vividlyandofteninrealtime,thehuman‐animal
relationsthatproducemostmeatintheUS.
Onewaytounderstandsuchapublic‐accessrightwouldbeasaversionofa
disclosurerequirement.Elsewhereinenvironmentallaw,theToxicRelease
Inventory,whichrequiresregulatedfacilitiestodisclosetheirtoxicemissions,has
beengenerallycelebratedandassociatedwithemissionreductionsunderthe
165SeeFOER,supran.__at81‐94(onthwartedattemptstovisitfactoryfarmsby
permission,followedbyaclandestinetrespassintoone);ERICSCHLOSSER,FASTFOOD
NATION169‐70(2001)(describinganillicitvisittoaslaughterhouse).I,too,have
visitedanindustrialslaughterhouse,alsosmuggledin,afterbeingdeniedofficial
permission.
166SeeSCHLOSSER,supran.__at169‐78(describingaslaughterhouse);UPTON
SINCLAIR,THEJUNGLE(1906)(portrayingthelivesofimmigrantlaborersinthemeat
industry).
167SeePeterSinger,ANIMALLIBERATION95‐158(2002)(describingpracticeson
factoryfarms).
46
pressureofpublicdisapproval.168Disclosurerequirementsinfinancialregulation
andcorporategovernanceareastandardwaytoimproveactualmarkets’
approximationtotheidealofperfectinformation.
Thebasicdifferenceisthatheretheinformationisnotjustinstrumentally
valuabletopursuingestablishedgoals,suchasprofitoracertainlevelofcleanair.
Instead,theinformationthatcomesfromvisitingaslaughterhousefeedsintothe
formulationofgoals,or,putdifferently,thedevelopmentofvalues.Thisisanother
instanceofthewaylawestablishestheframeworkofexperienceinwhichethical
changehappens.Apublic‐accessright,then,wouldrepresentakindofcultural
subsidy,aregulatorythumbonthescaleforinformedethicaljudgment.
Thisproposalaimsatindustrialoperations,butthereareotherwaysto
encourageexposuretotheuseofanimalsthatisinethicalquestionhere.For
instance,agriculturalpoliciestopromotesmaller‐scaleandintegratedfarming,
describedabitearlier,increaseopportunitiestoobserveslaughter,castration,and
otheraspectsofanimalhusbandryatcloserange.Outsidetheindustrialsetting,
suchobservationswouldtestbyexperience’sPollan’sargumentthattherelation
betweenpeopleandanimalsinsuchoperationsisethicallydesirable.169
Participationinpoliciesthatassistsmall‐scaleoperationsmightbeconditionedon
providingcertainrightsofpublicaccessonthesameright‐to‐knowtheorythatI
havejustimaginedapplyingtoindustrialoperations.
Theseproposalsareconnectedwiththeuncannybecausetheyaimtomake
concretetheenigmaofanotheranimal’sexperience,suffering,anddeath.Meeting
thatenigmafirst‐handisonewayofenrichingthebasisforjudgmentsabouthowto
treatmembersofotherspecies,and,closelyrelated,whatsensewecanmakeof
theirexperience.Muchasencounterswithnature’smostdramaticandsevere
settingsoncestruckmembersoftheSierraClubandWildernessSocietyasessential
todevelopingasenseofthesublimeinnature,nowencounterswitheveryday
violencemightbeinvaluableinlearningtoassessthethingswealreadydobuttend
nottosee.Thequestionofnature’svaluehereisanongoingone,whose
developmentlawcanhelporimpede.
C. ClimateChange,Rationality,andVision
Climatechangeiswidelyrecognizedasauniquelyconfoundingchallengeon
standardaccountsofinstrumentalrationalityandthecollective‐actionproblems
thatstylizedrationalagentsencounter.170Itinvolvesspatialandtemporal
168See42U.S.C.sec.116,etseq.(establishingmandatorypublicdisclosureoftoxic
releases).
169SeePOLLAN,THEOMNIVORE’SDILEMMA,supran.__at333(notingthedesirabilityof
publicknowledgeofslaughteringpractices).
170Forafineintroductiontotheseissues,seeRICHARDTUCK,FREERIDING(2008).
47
externalitieslargeenoughtoswampinternalizedeffectsandmakeitthecollective‐
actionproblemthatatetheplanet.171Myinteresthereisdifferent:whetherclimate
changealsoconfoundsstandardethicalconcepts,and,ifso,whatsortofinnovation
couldmakeethicalsenseofitschallenges.Thebottomline:theethicalnoveltyof
climatechangepresentsrealdifficultiesforestablishedethicalframeworks.
Engagingtheseproductivelywouldmeantreatingenvironmentalethicsasafieldof
considerableplasticity.
Agooddealoftheclimatedebatehasconcernedquestionsofjusticeand
responsibilityamongindividualsandnations:assumingextensiveharmfrom
climatechange,whobearsresponsibilityforthisharm,towhomisthe
responsibilityowed,whatkindofrecompenseisappropriate,andwhatisthe
baselinefromwhichharmistobemeasured?Somearguethatthedispersed
characterofcausalcontributionstoclimatechangeandambiguousstatusofany
baselineconfoundethicaljudgmentontheseissues.172Othersrespondthatthe
questionsaretractable–thoughtheydonotagreeontheanswers.173
Thequestionforenvironmentalethicshasdifferentcontentbutsomeofthe
samestructure.Whatkindofspecificallyenvironmentalvalueisimplicatedin
climatechange,anddoesclimatechangeaffectthatvalueinwaysthatcallinto
questiontheadequacyofestablishedwaysofproceedinginthisarea?
Anoverlappingsetofissuesappliestothequestionsofjusticementioned
aboveandtheenvironmental‐ethicsproblemsconnectedwithclimatechange.As
sketchedintheearlierdiscussionofharmaversion,studentsofmoralpsychology
arguethatperceptionsofwrongandharmareconnectedwithpalpableA‐>B
transactionssuchashittinganotherpersonorpushingsomeonefromabridgeinto
harm’sway.174Perceptionsofharmweakenastheeffectofone’sactionbecomes
lessdirectandcorporeal,evenatthemodestthresholdofthrowingaswitchto
causeharm“indirectly”ratherthantouchinganother’sbody,andcomplexcausal
171SeePurdy,ThePoliticsofNature,supran.__at1132‐34(settingthisout).
172SeeDALEJAMIESON,CLIMATEETHICS(soarguing)(forthcoming,onfilewithauthor);
StevenM.Gardiner,APerfectMoralStorm:ClimateChange,IntergenerationalEthics,
andtheProblemofCorruption,15ENVIRONMENTALVALUES397(2006).
173SeeEricPosner&CassSunstein,ClimateJustice,96GEO.L.J.1565(2008)
(conceptsofdistributiveandcorrectivejusticefitclimatechangepoorly);PETER
SINGER,ONEWORLD:THEETHICSOFGLOBALIZATION14‐50(2002)(arguingforequal
globalpercapitaclaimsontheatmosphere,whichwouldimplysignificant
redistributiononimaginedgreenhouse‐gasmarkets);butseePosner&Sunstein,
ShouldGreenhouseGasPermitsBeAllocatedonaPerCapitaBasis?97CAL.L.REV.51
(2009)(arguingagainstthisproposalonbothwelfareandfairnessgrounds).
174SeeHaidt&Kesebir,Morality,supran.__at822.
48
relationssoonlosemuchoftheirpowertomovethemind.175Inwhatseemstobea
closelyrelatedphenomenon,moralresponsetoidentifiableindividualvictimsof
harmismuchstrongerthanresponsetonumerous,lessrichlyspecifiedvictims:
largenumbersandimpersonalrepresentationseemtostillmoralresponse
altogether,spellingoutthepsychologicalrealitybehindStalin’sgrimquipthatone
deathisamurder,amilliondeathsastatistic.176Ourmoralresponsesavert
murdersbetterthantheyassessstatistics.
Goingbythisdistinction,climatechangeisallstatistics.Greenhouse‐gas
emissions(atquitevariouslevels)bybillionsofindividualsacrossthelastseveral
centuriesproduceagloballydispersed,systemicchangethatintensifiescertain
atmosphericprocessesinaterrificallycomplexglobalphenomenon,allagainsta
naturallyunstablebaseline.Thatsaid,however,massivecomplexitymarksmanyof
theotherproblemsthatconcernenvironmentalethics,suchasairandwater
pollutionandtheeffectsoftoxins.Isclimatechangereallydifferent?
Thereisafaircasethatitis.Beginwiththeethicalintuitionofharmbehind
muchofmodernenvironmentallaw,that“pollution”introducesaharmful,alien
agenttoanotherwisehealthysystem,andthisagentfairlydirectlysickens
individualanimalsandpeople.177Thisisthenarrativethatrecursthroughout
RachelCarson’sSilentSpring,taprootoftheenvironmentalimaginationintheageof
anti‐pollutionstatutes,anditfairlycapturesthetoneofmostofthepublic
discussionaroundthosestatutes:humaneffluentswereseenasfillingupaclean
world,makingitunhealthfulandunsafeforthosewhohadevolvedtothriveinit.178
175SeeGreene,Innateness,supran.__;JoshuaD.Greeneetal.,AnfMRIInvestigation
ofEmotionalEngagementinMoralJudgment,293SCIENCE2105,2106‐07(2001)
176SeePaulSlovic,“IfILookattheMassIWillNeverAct,”PsychicNumbingand
Genocide,2JUDGMENTANDDECISIONMAKING(no.2)79‐95(2007).
177Thisdescriptionsmacksofa“foundation”ofenvironmentalethicsisthat
JonathanHaidtcalls“purity/sanctity,”amotivethatencompasses“[c]oncernsabout
physicalandspiritualcontagion,includingvirtuesofchastity,wholesomeness,and
controlofdesires.”Haidt&Kesebir,Morality,supran.__at822.AsMaryDouglas
argueddecadesago,theideaofpollutionthatpowersthemodernenvironmental
imaginationisnotonlyprudential:ithasstrongtonesofdesecration,of“pollution”
inthereligiousandritualsenseofthetaboo,theuntouchable,theurgentbarrier
betweenthesacredandtheprofane.SeeMARYDOUGLAS,PURITYANDDANGER(1966);
JohnCopelandNagle,TheIdeaofPollution,43U.C.DAVISL.REV.1(2009)(arguingfor
valueofabroadideaofpollutionthatparticipatesinthepurity/sanctitydivide).
Nonetheless,theconceptofharmseemsmoreusefultomehere.
178SeegenerallyRACHELCARSON,SILENTSPRING(1962);seealsoTheAgeofEffluence,
TIME,May10,1968,at52
49
Manyofthepollutantsthatshapedthisgenerationofproblemsaresynthetic
or,atleast,novelwhenindustrialprocessesintroducethemintoecosystemsinlarge
amounts.Moreover,theyaregenerallytoxic,oratleastharmful,whenindividuals
areexposedtothem.Traditionalpollutionalwayshadsomethingofthestatistic
aboutit,butitalsohadelementsofamorefamiliarharm:amarkedviolationofa
desirablebaseline(non‐violence,non‐pollution)andharmtoindividualsthat
seemedtofollowrelativelydirectlyfromthisviolation.
Thedifferencefromclimatechangeistwofold.First,themajorgreenhouse
gases,notablycarbon,arealreadypervasiveintheatmosphere,andtheirprocessing
ispartofglobalcyclesintegraltolifeasweknowit.179Theydonot,bythemselves,
harmindividualsbyexposureinconcentrationsremotelyresemblingtheir
atmosphericlevels.Evenifexposuretoatoxinatsub‐acutelevelsincreasesonlythe
probabilityofillness,anabstractandstatisticalharm,itdoessoinamoredirect
way,traceabletoamoremarkeddeparturefromaclearerbaseline,thanclimate
change.
Italsoseemsimportantmotivationally,thoughmaybenotconceptually,that
consumptionoffossilfuelsand,perforce,emissionofgreenhousegasesisas
thoroughlyentwinedwithourwayoflifeasanythingis,asessentialtoourpresent
socialexistenceassexualityistoourbiologicalbeing.Thereisahigher
psychologicalhurdleinseeingthesethoroughlyquotidianemissionsasaharmful
departurefromanappropriatebaselinethaninthecaseofspecifictoxinsthatwe
canaswellimaginedoingwithout.
Anothermajorclassofappealformodernenvironmentallawisthatofthe
charismaticindividual,species,orplace.Appealstosublimityandepiphanyinthe
RomantictraditionofAmericanpreservationreliedheavilyonthesanctificationof
certainlandscapesandpeaksaspilgrimagesites.JohnMuirevenwroteofseeing
the“faceofGod”inthesun‐washedgranitefieldsoftheSierraNevada,linkingthe
grandeuroftheplacetoadivinitythatwasatoncepersonalandpantheistic.180
Againandagain,callsforpreservationoflargenaturalareasandsystemswere
anchoredontouchstoneplaces,whetherYosemiteValley,theneighboring(now
inundated)HetchHetchy,orDinosaurMonument,thesiteoftheSierraClub’s
definingpost‐WorldWarTwopreservationfightandoccasionofagreatincreasein
179SeeMICHAELSHELLENBERGER&TEDNORDHAUS,BREAKTHROUGH!FROMTHEDEATHOF
ENVIRONMENTALISMTOTHEPOLITICSOFPOSSIBILITY105‐29(2007)(climatechange
breaksthe“pollutionparadigm”);butseeCarlPope,ThereIsSomethingDifferent
aboutGlobalWarming(respondingtotheabovewithanargumentthatthe
“pollutionparadigm”largelyholdsforgreenhousegases),availableat
http://grist.org/politics/pope‐reprint/(Jan.14,2005).
180SeeMUIR,MYFIRSTSUMMERINTHESIERRA,supran.__(quotesshowingthis
divinizationoflandscape).
50
theclub’smembershipandnationalattentiontoitsagenda.181Thesamelogicheld
inpassageoftheEndangeredSpeciesAct,whichbyitstermsmakesbiodiversitya
definingnationalpriority,butoverwhelminglypassedCongressonenthusiasmfor
theeagles,bears,andwolvesthatenvironmentalistshavelearnedtocall,with
eyebrowarched,charismaticmegafauna.182
Thepointisthatthedevelopmentsthatseemtointroduceamore
“ecological”ethicintothelaw–oneconcernedwiththeoperationofsystemsof
indirect,complicatedlymediatedeffects–seemoncloserinspectiontorelyon
traditionalconceptionsofharmandmorallycompelling“victims”–sometimes
includingspectacularplaces–inwaysthatdonotworkforappealsaboutclimate
change.Attemptstoanchoraclimatepoliticsontheprojectedfateofindividual
species,notablythepolarbear,arealsoadesperateattemptataheroic
synecdoche.183Ifapolarbearcubcanstandinfortheglobalatmosphere,thatmight
makeclimatechange’seffectsmorallycompelling.Thoughitissurelytooearlyto
drawconclusionsfromthefactthatthistacticseemsnottohaveworked,thatfactis
atleastconsistentwiththesuggestionIamadvancinghere:thatclimatechangeties
deedandresulttogetherbythreadsthataretoomany,long,tortuous,andobscure
tofitthefamiliarideasofvictim,harm,andresponsibilitythathaveremained
centraltothe“ecological”eraofenvironmentallawmaking.184
Thesedifficultiesinvitethequestionwhetherthereisawayoffinding
motivationintheverysortofecologicalcomplexitythatseemstoconfoundfamiliar
kindsofmoralpsychology.Thereisawayofrespondingtothiscomplexitythathas
muchincommonwiththetraditionalaestheticregisterofbeauty:appreciationof
theelaborateinterdependenceoflivingandnon‐livingsystems.AldoLeopold,
amongothers,arguedthattheculturalchallengeforecologicalthinkingwasto
181SeeRODERICKNASH,WILDERNESSANDTHEAMERICANMIND,supran.__(passages
discussionthishistory).
182SeeShannonPeterson,CongressandCharismaticMegafauna:ALegislativeHistory
oftheEndangeredSpeciesAct,29ENVTL.L.REV.463(1999)(describingspecies
invokedinCongressduringthedebateovertheESA).
183See,e.g.,TIMFOREMAN,THELASTLITTLEPOLARBEAR:AGLOBALCHANGEADVENTURE
STORY(2007)(usingpolar‐bearnarrativetoinspireconcernaboutclimatechange).
184SeeElisabethRosenthal,WhereDidGlobalWarmingGo?N.Y.TIMES,Oct.15,2011
(documentingdeclineinpublicconcernabouttheissueandinpoliticalleaders’
engagementwithit);FrederickW.Mayer,StoriesofClimateChange:Competing
Narratives,theMedia,andU.S.PublicOpinion2001‐2010(Dec.14,2011)
(documentingthefragmentationofUSclimatediscussionintocompeting
“narratives”)(unpublishedpaper,onfilewithauthor).
51
cultivatethisresponse.185Leopoldproposedtoassessactionsandhuman
institutionsbywhethertheytendedtosupportorerodetheprocessesthatsustain
complexecologicalsystems.Thushearguedthat“athingisrightwhenittendsto
preservetheintegrity,stability,andbeautyofthebioticcommunity.Itiswrong
whenittendsotherwise.”186Theseoldsentencesrepaycarefulattention.Athingis
broaderthanapersonalactionorasetoflaws,thoughitmaybeeither:italsomay
refertoculturalhabits,personalpropensitiestoactacertainway,oranythingelse
thatinvitesassessment.Leopold’sformulationsetsasidetheconfoundingtaskof
trackingtheeffectsofanyspecificactionorother“thing,”infavorofattentiontothe
tendencytoaffectnaturalsystemsinonewayoranother.Incharacterizingthose
tendencies,Leopoldalsosetasiderelianceonafixedbaseline,suchasthecondition
ofundisturbed“natural”systems,infavorofmoredynamicgoalsforactively
governinghowweinhabitandinevitablyshapethenaturalworld.Thetouchstone
hereisthequalitiesofsystemsthatenablethemcontinuerobustlythroughinternal
disruptionandexogenousshocks.Thisethicalapproachdoesnotrelyonany
thoughtofa“worldwithoutus”fromwhichtomeasureoureffect,butassumesan
inhabitedworldalreadyshapedbyouruse.Onemightaddressthesamequestionof
“integrity,stability,andbeauty”toawildernessareaoraheavilyfarmedregion,and
onemightthinkoftheglobalatmosphereandclimatesystemasitselfsucha“place.”
Leopoldincluded“beauty”inhislistofsystemcharacteristics,buthisaim
wastoredefinebeautyfromastablepastoralorder,tendingtosimplicityand
regularity,toaqualityresidinginsustainablecomplexity.187Healsoaimedto
reorientethicaljudgmenttoastandardcompatiblewiththisappreciationof
complexity:thetendencyofawayofacting,orawayofliving,tosustainorundercut
complexsystems.Theambitionhereistocultivateakindofvirtueethicsinwhicha
partofwhatthevirtuouspersonperceivesandrespondstointhenaturalworldis
anecologicalversionofbeauty,andinwhichcomplexitystandsasitsownvalueand
motivatesactionthatisconsistentwithpreservingit.
Thereareseveralreasonsthatthisapproachmighthavemorepromisethan
othersthathaverunupontheshoalsofclimatechange.Forone,thisaccountof
boththecriteriaofgoodactionanditsmotivationseemsbetterabletocapturethe
stakesofpersonalactioninclimatechangethantheconceptofharm,doggedasthe
latterisbydispersedanduncertaincausation.Whetheranactiontendstosupport
ordegradecertaincharacteristicsoftheatmosphericsystemisaneasierjudgment
185SeeLeopold,TheRoundRiver,supran.__at201‐02(callingfornew“ethicaland
aestheticpremises”builtinparton“universalcuriositytounderstandtheland
mechanism,”thatis,tounderstandecologicalrelations).
186ALDOLEOPOLD,TheLandEthic,inASANDCOUNTYALMANAC,supran.__at262.
187SeeLEOPOLD,TheRoundRiver,supran.__at__(callingforanagriculturethat
integrateswildandtameinasustainableandproductivesystem,andforlearningto
findbeautyandwonderinsuchasystem).
52
thanwhetheritharmssomemorespecificentityviatheclimatesystem,andisalso
easierthanwhetheritsomehow“harms”theclimatesystemitselfbymovingitoffa
“natural”baseline.Onecouldargue,ofcourse,thatdefininggoodsystem
characteristics(“beauty,stability,integrity”)isawayofsettingabaselineforharm,
butmy–contestable–claimhereisthatadifferentmoralgrammargetsengagedby
thevirtue‐ethicsquestion,whichdoesnotrequiredescribingtheharmedentityor
causalrelationwithanythinglikethesameprecision.
Foranotherthing,thecentralplacethatperceptionplaysinthisaccountfits
thefactthatchangesinperception–whatcanperhapsbebestdescribedasvalue‐
drenchedperception–havebeenvitalinenvironmentalvalue.Againandagain,
seeingthenaturalworldinanewwayhasbeenthewellspringofnewaccountsof
thevalueofnatureandofthehumanplaceinit.Tothinkabouttheethicsofclimate
changeinthesetermsistothinkofitasinvolvingaculturalandimaginative
challenge:tofindawaytoperceiveglobalandlargelyinvisibleprocessesinways
thatareresponsivetotheirbeauty,integrity,andstability,orcognatevalues.Even
tonamethischallengemarksthedifferencebetweenitsscaleandthatofearlier
changesinperception,whichinvolvedlearningtoseedifferentlysomethingwecan
infactsee,suchasabaregranitelandscape,oncemonstrous,thendivinized.Here
thechallengeisclosertolearningtoenvisionwhatwedonotliterallysee:
atmosphericprocessesandthecumulativeconditionofmuchoftheplanet.
Thinkingofthissortofchangeaspossiblepresupposesthatourexistingmoral
grammar,whichisthwartedbydispersedagencyandhyper‐complexcausation,is
notfixedonceandforall,butcanexpandtomakeperceptibleandsalientwhatwas
onceunavailableorimpossiblyobscure.Thesamemoralgrammarwhoseharm‐
aversiontemplateimpedesclearthinkinginenvironmentalethicscanalsoadopt
newperceptionsofvaluethroughitsaestheticandvirtue‐ethicalmodes.
Thereareacoupleofreasonsforoptimismaboutthisprospect,eventhough
theperceptualchangeitwouldinvolvemightseemqualitativelydifferentfrom
earlierchanges.Oneisthat,although“seeing”theplanetoratmosphericsystem
mightrequiretechnologicalmediationbecauseitisimpossible(forthoseofusnot
planningtorideSirRichardBranson’sfor‐hirespaceshuttle)todowiththe
ordinaryeye,thismediationisnotnewtodevelopmentsinenvironmentalethics.
AlthoughtheparadigmaticexperienceofRomanticpreservationforSierraClub
memberswasthehigh‐countrypilgrimage,anenormousamountofthesentiment
thatgatheredaroundRomanticenvironmentalpoliticscenteredonphotography,
withitspowertotransporttotheeyetoamemorializedsublimevista.188A
collectionofpicturesfromDinosaurMonumentwasacenterpieceoftheSierra
Club’spublicappealinthatemblematicconflict,andmostofthosewhoweremoved
188SeeHANSHUTH,NATUREANDTHEAMERICAN:THREECENTURIESOFCHANGINGATTITUDES
30‐53,87‐104(1990)(ontheimportanceofvisualcultureinthedevelopmentof
Romanticattitudestothenaturalworld).
53
todefendthatplaceneversawitinperson.189Theuseofpicturesgoesbacktothe
beginningofthismodeofpreservationpolitics,andprecedesitinthesublime
landscapepaintingsandpopularprintsthatpreparedtheculturalgroundforitin
earlierdecadesofthenineteenthcentury.190
Moreover,climatechangeisnotthefirstcasetopresentthechallengeof
capturingelusiveandfrequentlyinvisibleprocessesthroughconcreteactivitythatis
partlyaliteralengagementwiththoseprocesses,partlyamatterofsymbolic
relationtothem.AsIarguedearlier,foodandagriculturehavebecomeemblemsfor
ecologicalengagement.191Itiscertainlyimaginablethatsimilardevelopmentscould
happenaroundclimate.
Howmightlawcontributetothispossibleculturaldevelopment?Onestepis
forscholarsandcommentatorstoholdthemselvesopentothethoughtthatpolitical
effortstobuildlegalregimesmaymakeessentialculturalcontributionsevenif,
viewedaslawmakingorregulatorystrategies,theyseemfutile.Forinstance,
municipaleffortstoaddressgreenhousegasemissionsandcommunity‐level
attemptstodefineapersonalethicsoflow‐carbonliving,althoughpalpably
ineffectiveinoneway–theywillnotdirectlycontributemuchtoreducingglobal
emissions–maynonethelessturnouttobeeffectiveinsomewhatthewaySierra
Clubexcursionswere:asessaysinnewwaysofexperiencingclimatechangeas
important,andinnewsharedvocabulariesforexpressingandelaboratingits
importance.192Thatis,wemightregardlawandlawmakingasforumsinwhicha
culturalandimaginativeargumentproceeds–anargumentthatwillhelptolaythe
foundationofanylegalregimethateffectivelyaddressesclimatechange.Thisisnot
somuchamatterofwhatthelawshoulddoasitisabouthowallinvolvedinit
shouldunderstandwhatitalreadydoesandislikelytodo:provideaforuminwhich
wegiveincreasinglydefiniteshapetosharedquestionsthat,howeverregrettably,
wearenotyetpreparedtoresolve.193
189SeeWALLACESTEGNER,THISISDINOSAUR:ECHOPARKCOUNTRYANDITSMAGICRIVERS
(1955).
190SeeAngelaMiller,TheFateofWildernessinAmericanLandscapeArt,inAMERICAN
WILDERNESS:ANEWHISTORY91,91‐112(ed.MichaelLewis,2007)(ontheroleof
landscapepaintinginthedevelopmentofwildernesssentiment).
191SeesupraIV.A.
192SeeKrakoff,supran.__(soarguing);Purdy,ThePoliticsofNature,supran.__at
1198‐99(same).
193SeeBenjaminEwing&DouglasA.Kysar,ProdsandPleas:LimitedGovernmentin
anEraofUnlimitedLiability,121YALEL.J.350(2011)(arguingforseeinglaw’s
processes,suchastortssuitsonclimatechange,asmovesinaculturalandpolitical
debateoverbasicvalues)
54
Thislastparagraphcontainsanundeniablythinandabstractsetoflegal
proposals,especiallyinproportiontothelengthofthediscussionofmoral
psychologythatprecedesit.Thisreflectsinpartthefragmentationofclimatelaw
andpolicy,whichissuchthatthereisnopracticalandinstitutionalcorollarytothe
problemofclimatechange.194ThefailureofUSlegislationandconcomitant
guaranteethatglobalemissions‐controleffortswillbepiecemealandinadequatefor
theforeseeablefuturecoincidewith,andinsomewaysusherin,anewfocuson
adaptation.195Adaptationisnecessarilyasdiverseastheproblemsthatexisting
regimesarealreadyaddressing,fromcoastalmanagementtobiodiversity,which
willchangeastheglobalclimatedoes.196Havingfailedtobuildaregimethatunified
theproblemasalegaltopic,wearenowthrownbackondiverseapproachestoa
problemthatisatoncecoherent–thebasicscienceissimpleandglobal–and
terrificallyvariousinitseffects.Atthesametime,wearealsothrownbackonthe
continuingefforttomakeclimatechangeasawholetractableforethics.
Thepracticethatisemergingasalivedidealinthefoodmovementisone
pointofpossiblecomparisonbecauseitinvolvesassessingactsandwaysoflifeas
ethicalresponsestothecomplexityofnaturalsystemsandofhumaninvolvementin
them.LikethepossibilityIhavesketchedforclimatechange,itdevelopsanaccount
ofhowtointeractwiththenaturalworldthatispoweredbyanappreciationofthe
beautyofecologicalcomplexityandamotivationtoparticipatesustainablyinit.
Whetheranythingcomparablyconcreteand,sotospeak,felt,mightemergearound
climateisanopenquestion.
Onemight,alternatively,startfromthefragmentedstateofpractical
responsestoclimatechangeandaskhowanyofthesemightintegrateawarenessof
climateintoamorespecificandconcreteethics,aswiththefood‐systemsexample.
Eitherway,theessentialthingtoappreciatewouldbethatlawandotherpractical
measuresaredoingtwothingsatonce:tryingtofix,oratleastmitigate,aseriesof
problems,andgeneratingwaysofunderstandingthevaluesthattheproblems
194SeeJamesSalzman,ClimateChangeandtheLawoftheHorse(observingthe
fragmentationofclimate‐changelawandpolicy)(forthcomingarticle,onfilewith
author).
195SeeAlejandroE.Camacho,ALearningCollaboratory:ImprovingFederalClimate
ChangeAdaptationPlanning,2011B.Y.U.L.REV.1821(2011);Camacho,Assisted
Migration:RedefiningNatureandNaturalResourceLawunderClimateChange,27
YALEJ.ONREG.171(2010);DanielA.Farber,TheChallengeofClimateChange
Adaptation:LearningfromNationalPlanningEffortsinBritain,China,andtheUSA,
23J.ENVTL.L.359(2011);J.B.Ruhl,GeneralDesignPrinciplesforResilienceand
AdaptiveCapacityinLegalSystems–WithApplicationstoClimateChangeAdaptation,
89N.C.L.REV.1373(2011);.
196See,e.g.,Camacho,AssistedMigration,supran.__(specificallydealingwith
endangeredspecies).
55
engage.Aswehaveseen,thisisfarfromthefirsttimethatenvironmentallawhas
beenintensivelyembeddedinaculturalandethicalargument.Infact,thatis
frequentlyitssituation.AlltherecommendationsinthisPartareaimedat
recognizingandmakingbetteruseofthisroleoflaw:asagenerativeparticipantin
ongoingethicalargument.
D.ConvergentReasonsforLawtoSupportEthicalInnovation
Itisnotobviousthat,becausethereisplasticityinsomeareaof
environmentalvalue,lawshouldstructuretheareatosupportexploringthat
plasticity.Thereare,though,atleastthreekindsofreasontothinkthatitshould,
whichspeaktobasicallydifferentperspectivesonenvironmentalvalues.
Theargumentforplasticitythatemergedinthe1970stookadecidedly
liberal‐humanistapproachtothestakesofethicaldevelopment.Asdiscussed
earlier,Tribe’sargumentagainsttakingCBAasthemeasureofnature’svalueforus
turnedonthecasethatmoralperceptionisanessentialaspectoffreedom,inwhich
weatonceexperienceourselvesasrespondingtogenuinevaluesandchoosethose
valuesbyacceptingtheirclaimonus.197Ceasingthatprocesswouldforcean
unhappychoicebetweenfreedomandthegenuinenessofvalue.198Whetherornot
oneacceptsTribe’sformulation,thebasicthoughtisnothardtogetholdof:
developingmoralperceptioncultivatesaspecialblendofhumancapacitiesinwhich
weareatonceresponsibleandcreative,freeenoughtoremaketheworldandfixed
enoughtokeepourfootingaswedoso.Soseen,environmentalethicsiscentrally,if
notexclusively,anexpressionofsomethingaboutus,asetofpowerswecanputto
moreorlessappropriateuse.DouglasKysarhasrecentlyre‐engagedthesethemes
fromamorepost‐modernpointofview,emphasizingthattheliberalthing,thatis,
thefreeandfreedom‐respectingthing,aboutmoraljudgmentispreciselyitsrefusal
ofclosure,ofanyfinalanswertothequestionsofvaluethatitbothframesand
provisionallyresolves.199Likecertainmarinemammals,wehumansmustkeep
movingordrown.
Inasecondperspective,environmentalethicsisnotaboutus:itisthe
attempttoseeandhonoraccuratelythevaluepresentinthenaturalworld.The
pointofenvironmentalethicsisnotwhatitenablesustodo,butwhatitputsusin
touchwithorshowsus.Thiswas,forinstance,theconcernofAldoLeopold,who,
althoughhewasconcernedwithbuilding“receptivityintotheyet‐unlovelyhuman
mind,”wascentrallyconcernedwithwhatweshouldbereceptiveto:hiswasa
197SeeTribe,supran.__at1332‐38.
198Seeid.
199SeeKYSAR,supran.__at97‐98,194‐99,242‐45.Myuseofliberal,ofcourse,refers
totheword’setymologicalrootintheLatinforfreedom.
56
programofethicalchange,butoneworthundertakingbecausethenaturalworld,in
allitscomplexity,wastheretobevalued.200
Thecaseforpromotingethicaldevelopmentseemsmoststraightforward
here.Weknowenormouslymorethanweoncedidaboutthenaturalworld,and
ourknowledgeisgrowingexponentially.Correspondingly,ourpowerovertherest
ofnatureisvast.Manyofourhabitsofvaluingthenaturalworldcomedowntous
fromtimeswhentheworlditselflookedverydifferent–erroneously,itnowseems.
Manyofthepracticalquestionswehavetoresolveengageoptions–geo‐
engineering,forinstance–thatwouldhavebeensciencefictionatbestwhenour
existingenvironmentalvaluescameintobeing.Itseemsalmostunavoidablethat,in
thesecircumstances,therewouldbemuchlefttoappreciateabouttheethical
meaningofnaturalworldandtheattitudeswemighttaketowardit.
Thethirdapproachisquitedifferentinthatitregardsethicalperceptionas
instrumentaltofunctionalends,ratherthanasessentiallyabouttheperceptionof
valuethatisitsapparentbusiness.Thisfunctionalviewofethicshascomealong
withmuchoftherecentworkinexperimentalpsychology,reflectingtheinfluenceof
evolutionarythinkinginthatfieldandtoday’ssocialsciencesgenerally.Jonathan
Haidt,forinstance,setshisaccountofthebasic,trans‐substantivestructureofmoral
psychologywithinsuchatheory:ethicalresponsesenablehumanstosolve
collective‐actionproblems,“suppressselfishness”201andachievewidespread
cooperation.Thequestiontoaskaboutanyformulationofethicsishowitserves
thisbeneficialcooperationbyproducingandsupportingvirtues,practices,and
institutionsthatmakedefectionfromcooperationlessfrequentanddamaging.
Thisisnominallyadescriptivequestion,andHaidtandothersprudently
avoidpronouncementsonthephilosophers’territoryofmeta‐ethics.Nonetheless,
toproceedinthisveinjustistoassumethatcooperationandcollectiveflourishing
arebasicallygoodgoalsandsothatexplainingethicsintermsofitsservicetothose
goalsshowsthatethicsmakessense,notjustdescriptivelyasapatternof
phenomena,butnormativelyasastrutofareasonable,desirablehuman
achievement.Wereitotherwise,onecouldnotfinishadefenseofthefunctional
theoryofethicswiththefeelingthatcontradictionshadbeenresolvedintoalarger
purpose.ThusHaidtcandefend“asocial‐functionalistperspective”byasserting,
“Themanybiases,hypocrisies,andoutrageousconclusionsof…moralthinking…
appeartobedesignfeatures,notbugs.”202
So,fromthisperspective,itwouldseemtobeadesignfailureforasystemof
socialcooperationtoproducecollective‐actionproblemssoextensiveintheireffects
200SeeLEOPOLD,supran.__at295.SeealsoRalston,supran.[38](arguingaversion
ofthisidea);Goodpaster,supran.[38](same).
201Haidt&Kesiber,supran.__at800.
202Id.at814.
57
anddifficulttosolvethattheythreatenedtooverrunit.That,however,isprecisely
whatclimatechangeis:aphenomenonofexternalitiesproducedbythemassively
productiveintegrationofindividualself‐interestandsocialbenefitthatdefines
marketsocieties.Sofar,ourethicaljudgmentsdonotgonearlyfarenoughin
registeringcontributionstoclimatechangeasharm,orotherwisemotivating
individualorpoliticalresponsesthatapproachthescaleoftheproblem.Froma
social‐functionalperspective,itwouldseemthatourmoralpsychologyhasenabled
ustoproduceaformofsocialcooperationwithcollective‐actionproblemslarger
thananyofthosethatthesamepsychologyhelpedtoovercomealongtheway,and
whichthatpsychology,atpresent,cannotprevent.Ourfeature,likeKafka’sGregor
Samsa,haswokenuponedaytofinditselfabug.
IfIambasicallyonsoundgroundinascribingthisnormativeattitudetothe
functionalistperspective,despitedeliberatelymixingnormativeandpositive
inquiry,thensomeonestartingfromthisperspectivewouldbeinterestedin
whateverturnedournewlyrevealedbugsbackintofeatures.Onewaythismight
happenisthroughthedevelopmentofethicalperceptionsthatcanmotivatea
differentsetofpersonalandpoliticalresponsestoclimatechange.(Thisargument
doesn’tneedtoberestrictedtoclimatechange,andmightbeextendedtothehuman
ecologicalfootprintgenerallyoverthenextcentury,butclimateistheclearestcase
becauseofthecollective‐actionstructureoftheproblem.)Lawsthatfacilitate
ethicaldevelopmentwouldthereforerepresentaself‐awareefforttocreate
conditionsinwhichthefunctionalaccountofethicswoulddescribeasuccessrather
thanadevastatingparadox.
Conclusion:OneRelationBetweenEnvironmentalLawandEnvironmental
Ethics
ThepurposeofthisarticleisnottogiveanexpositionofJohnRawls’s
thought,butsomefeaturesofthatthoughtmakeitanappropriateplacetoendas
wellastobegin.AsfarasIknow,Rawlsdidnotreturnto“rightconductinregardto
…nature.”Readerswillrecallthathiscareerwasasteadytackawayfrom
metaphysics.In“JusticeasFairness:PoliticalnotMetaphysical”andhisfollow‐up
book,PoliticalLiberalism,Rawlsadoptedapositionthatrestednotonatheoryof
reasonorhumannature,butinsteadonwhathecalled“thepublic,politicalculture”
oftheUnitedStates.203Thiswasinpartaresponsetocommunitariancriticswho
arguedthatRawls’saccountofjusticereliedonanindefensiblyindividualistic
conceptionoftheperson.Inhislaterwork,Rawlsbuiltinterwovenaccountsof
justiceandpoliticallegitimacyonsuchmaterialsastheConstitution,SupremeCourt
203Thereareplentyofdebatesaboutwhether,onthebestreading,Political
Liberalisminfactdevelops,clarifies,orabandonsRawls’searlierproject.Ihaveno
intentofgettingintothosehere.
58
opinions,andtouchstonepresidentialaddresses,allinstancesoftheunderlying
“public,politicalculture”whosecommitmentsheaimedtomakesystematic.
ThisarticlearguesthatwhatRawlsconcludedaboutpoliticalethicsisalso
trueofenvironmentalethics.Thevaluesthatorientapoliticalcommunityarethe
productsofthatcommunity’sownstrugglesandeffortsatpersuasionand
discernment.Thereislittlehopeofspecifyingsuchvalues,andnoneofmaking
themauthoritative,outsidethatcommunity’sownexperienceandargumentative
resources.Whentheorizingaboutsuchvaluesaimstoengagethecommunitythat
livesbythem(orfailstolivebythem),itisunavoidablyengagedindrawingoutthe
possiblemeaningofwhatpeoplehavealreadysaidanddoneandproposinghow
they(orothers)mightcarryitforward.Inotherwords,ethicsdoneinacertainway
participatesself‐consciouslyinatraditionofexperienceandreflection,
disagreementandpersuasion.
Rawlswasright,though,thatenvironmentalethicsrelieson“theor[ies]of
thenaturalorderandourplaceinit.”Thatthesetheoriesemergethroughculture
andpolitics,ratherthanfromtheheadofZeus,doesnotmakethemlessessential.It
does,however,layduestressonthefactthattheyarepartandparcelofbroader
conflictsthatarenotlikelytoberesolvedbyanaptconceptualformulation.Ethical
reflectiondoesnottellpeoplewhattheymustorcannotthink.Bythesametoken,it
isnotinvolvedsimplyinscrupulousapplicationofwhattheyalreadythink.Itis
partofacontinuingargumentwhoseelementsincludeplasticityandcreativity.
Environmentallawisoneofthesettingswhereethicaldevelopmenttakes
place.Thishappensnotjustinlaw’sinternalprocesses,suchasstanding,orinthe
pronouncementsofcourts.Atleastasimportantisenvironmentallaw’sshaping
andframingofexperience.Inexperience,newkindsofethicalclaimsbecome
available,evenobvious,whichwouldoncehaveseemedstrange.Sometimesthis
developmentisrelativelyquiet,asdebatemovesaroundfamiliarissuesandsettled
compromises.Atothertimes,further‐reachingargumentscometotheforeinissues
notyetsettledorevenfullydefined.
Wearenowinatimeofthesecondsort.Boththehistoryofenvironmental
lawandpoliticsandastructuredsenseofthevocabularyofethicalchangecangive
uscompass‐pointsinthisterrain.Environmentallawwillinevitablyshapethe
experiencesandinflecttheinterpretationsthatwillgivetheseissuestheirshapein
thenextgenerationofwhatRawlswouldhavecalledourmetaphysics–acommon
yetcontestedviewoftheworld,whichwecannotdowithoutbutshouldnotexpect
evertoresolveintojustoneform.Shapingthelawtoplaythisroleactivelywould
meanembracingbothourcreativeethicalcapacityandoursenseofresponsibilityto
makesenseofanddojustice,ineverysenseofthatword,tothenaturalworld.
59