!
!
!
!
!
Ned Stark’s and Littlefinger’s Dilemma
Concepts: Trust in the Prisoner’s Dilemma
Illustration: Game of Thrones, season 1 (2011); episode 7: You win or you die
!
When King Robert Baratheon died, his young son Joffrey hurried to claim the vacant
throne before the King’s brother Stannis Baratheon returns from Dragonstone. Eddard
Stark, who was Robert Baratheon’s hand and the Protector of the Realm, wanted to stop
Joffrey and secure the throne for Lord Stannis.
!
Ned Stark was approached by Littlefinger, Master of Coin (the literature’s expression for
today’s minister of finance), who proposed him to support Joffrey because he would be
easy to manipulate. This would ensure a government wherein the Starks could rule
together with the Lannisters, but in which Littlefinger would have an influential position.
!
Ned Stark turned down this proposal, explaining that the throne is reserved for the
rightful hair—Lord Stannis. He then suggested Littlefinger to help him remove Joffrey
who already captured the throne by employing Golden Cloaks, a city watch troops which
are financed by Littlefinger. Littlefinger accepted the proposal, and he and Ned found
themselves in a Prisoner’s Dilemma. (The whole scene can be viewed here.)
!
The situation can be presented in the following matrix:
!
!
!
!
!
1
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
Littlefinger
Ned
Stark
cooperates
defects
cooperates
2, 2
0, 3
defects
3, 0
1, 1
The payoffs are expressed in ordinal values:
• 3 stands for getting closer to the throne by way of eliminating the other player;
• 2 stands for mutual cooperation in which case both would not be as close to the throne
as in the case of unilateral defection;
• 1 stands for having to live under the ruler who does not like you;
• 0 stands for death.
!
This dilemma ended in a different way than usual, though. Usually, Prisoner’s Dilemma
ends in an suboptimal position in which both players receive less than optimal payoffs ([1,
1] in this case). This happens because players are assumed to be instrumentally rational
and aware of each other’s rationality. Same kind of rationality helps them avoid the sucker
payoff ([0, 3] or [3, 0] in our example). They can also avoid both the suboptimal outcome
and sucker payoffs.
!
In our case situation is different because Ned is driven by different kind of rationality—
honor and vengeance (components of die Wertrationalität in Max Weber’s vocabulary.) In
contrast, Littlefinger is instrumentally rational (zweckrational). He knew that under
Stannis he would have received smaller prize than under the Lannisters. Toward the end
of episode 7, Littlefinger set Lord Stark up by paying the Golden Cloaks to kill his men
and turn him to Joffrey. Joffrey ulitimately rewarded Littlefinger by naming him the Lord
of Harrenhal, the biggest Castle in the Realm, with all the attendant lands and incomes.
!
This version of Prisoner’s Dilemma underlines not only the importance of trust between
players, but also the importance of, as it were, the same kind of trust. Players can make
Pareto improvement only if they trust each other about the same thing. Littlefinger had no
interest to support Stark’s plan because he was rational in a different way. To him, Stark
was fair game—he had to trust Littlefinger because he was loyal to the late king and had
no army to remove Joffrey by himself. When the other player cannot be trusted, the first
player receives sucker payoff, which is exactly what happened to Eddard Stark in the end
of the season.
!
!
Copyright © 2014 Equilibrium outcome studio, inc. All rights reserved.
2