March 2017
Executive Summary
February proved to be an active month for the Central region of Africa. As we assessed last month,
Boko Haram increased its attempts to carry out suicide bomb attacks in the Lake Chad region. More
notably, however, was Boko Haram leader Abubakr Shekau’s alleged assassination of his spokesperson
for plotting against him. In Nigeria, Kaduna saw a considerable amount of action, with at least 20 killed
in Fulani raids in the state, and two Germans abducted in the village of Jenjela. At the same time, antigovernment protests were reported in Abuja and Lagos. Cameroon also experienced a steady pace of
anti-government action from the Anglophone community in the country’s west, which will continue in
March. In DRC, unusual clashes were recorded in Kimpese, Kongo Central Province, between security
forces and Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) rebels, which led to a stand-off in Kinshasa. At the same time, the
implementation of the December 31 accord between the opposition and ruling coalition continues to
stall. Meanwhile, peace talks between the opposition and government in Burundi continue to falter due
to the government’s to stall progress. Finally, in CAR, fighting centered around the town of Bambari.
In East Africa, Abdullahi Mohamed “Farmajo” was elected President of Somalia, amid a wave of alShabaab attacks in Mogadishu, and a notable Islamic State attack on a hotel in Bosaso. In Kenya, tourists
were evacuated in Lakipia amid clashes between herders and rangers. Meanwhile, in Ethiopia, various
forms of violent clashes were witnessed throughout the country, motivated by inter-communal and
political tensions. As expected, fighting persisted in South Sudan, with Greater Upper Nile Region
representing a focal point, while the SPLA experienced numerous defections.
In the West, another nun was kidnapped in Mali, this time a Colombian national highlighting a particular
risk for Christian missionaries in the country. Additionally, the installation of interim authorities in the
Kidal Region was temporarily cancelled on February 18 by the CMA. Meanwhile, in Ivory Coast, an
additional mutiny was recorded, in the city of Adiake, while protests by cocoa producers and agrobusinessmen took place in Abidjan. Senegal experienced a wave of violence in the Kedougou Region
related to the death of an artisanal miner in the region. The first full month in The Gambia since the
removal of former president Jammeh was relatively stable, amid indications of improved relations with
the outside world, but the arrest of 51 Jammeh supporters and the former head of the National
Intelligence Agency points to a bumpy road ahead. Ghana, on the other hand, saw a fair deal of
intercommunal violence surrounding chieftaincy issues.
In Southern Africa, the head of Zimbabwe’s #ThisFlag movement, Pastor Evan Mawarire was arrested
upon his return to the country, while Zim-PF leader Joyce Mujur expelled seven core party members on
suspicion that they worked for the ruling party. Meanwhile, doctors embarked on an indefinite strike. In
South Africa, politically-motivated fighting was reported between the EFF and supporters of President
Zuma, while the end of the month witnessed significant xenophobic violence, in a trend that is witnessed
on occasion in recent years. Finally, the FLEC separatist group in the Angolan exclave of Cabinda
resumed their activity, on a violent and political front.
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Global Risk Map/Africa
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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past month.
Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its link below.
Extreme Risk
LAKE CHAD ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4
CAR ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 5
SOMALIA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 6
SOUTH SUDAN ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8
High Risk
BURUNDI ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10
DRC ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 11
MALI...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13
NIGERIA .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 14
ANGOLA .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
Medium Risk
CAMEROON.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................16
ETHIOPIA ...........................................................................................................................................................................................................................18
IVORY COAST ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................19
KENYA ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 21
SENEGAL ......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 22
SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 23
ZIMBABWE.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................24
SUDAN ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25
Low Risk
EQUATORIAL GUINEA ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 26
THE GAMBIA ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................27
GHANA .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 28
Notable Dates ................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 29
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LAKE CHAD
Extreme Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
3
Suicide bomber killed
by Cameroonian forces
in Kerawa, Extreme
North Region
NOTABLE DATES
16
17
At least two civilians,
seven suicide bombers
killed in Maiduguri,
Borno State
22
Two killed, two injured
in suicide attack against
Wouro Dole, Extreme
North Region
24
Abubakar Shekau
allegedly kills Boko
Haram spokesman for
plotting against him
Assessments & Forecast
Purported assassination potentially indicative of
divisions within Boko Haram
Uptick in attempted suicide attacks illustrative of Boko
Haram will to demonstrate its relevance
While divisions amongst the militant group became
Since the supposed fall of Boko Haram’s stronghold in
evident with the proclamation of Abu Musab al-Barnawi
Sambisa Forest in late December 2016, a considerable
as the leader of the Islamic State West Africa Province
increase in both attempted and successful suicide attacks
(ISWAP) in August 2016, other demonstration of such
has been recorded both in northeastern Nigeria, and in
rifts have not been regularly witnessed. Thus, Shekau’s
Cameroon’s Extreme North Region. Maiduguri, the capital
purported assassination of a prominent Boko Haram
of Borno State has been the main focal point for such
member for allegedly plotting to usurp his leadership is
bombings, as demonstrated by the attempted attack
notable, and speaking to ongoing splintering within the
involving seven suicide bombers targeting three different
militant group. These divisions emanate not only from
locations on February 16-17. While a large extent of said
the diverse ethnic affiliations existent within the group,
attempts have been thwarted by both Cameroonian and
but also disagreements regarding ideological concerns,
Nigerians forces respectively, the attacks are illustrative of
and, perhaps most importantly, the strategy the group
the group’s lingering presence and capabilities across the
should follow. Such differences not only serve to
region. In light of the above, we assess that Boko Haram
overrule perceptions of the homogenous character of
will continue its attempts to conduct additional high profile
the militant organization, but most importantly are
suicide attacks across the area, particularly against
indicative of the current crisis facing Boko Haram,
Maiduguri, aiming to mainly disrupt economic activities in
especially regarding the strategy ahead, in light of its
the commercial hub of Northeastern Nigeria. This strategy
consistent territorial loses as a consequence of the
Would likely attempt to demonstrate the group’s resilience
ongoing multinational counterinsurgency efforts against
and continued relevance despite the Multinational Joint
them, and its consequent fragmentation. In this context,
Task Force’s (MNJTF’s) territorial gains over recent months.
Shekau is likely to perform additional shows of force in
While the MNJTF has bolstered its presence across the
the coming months in order to deter additional
region, subsequently thwarting a reasonable amount of
challenges to his leadership amid the group’s current
attacks, given the vast territorial scope, coupled with
crisis.
porous borders and Boko Haram entrenched presence
across the region, the group will continue to pose an
considerable security threat in the Lake Chad Basin Region
for the foreseeable future.
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CAR
Extreme Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
4-6
Heavy clashes between
rival ex-Seleka factions
recorded in vicinity of
Bambari, Ouaka Prefecture
NOTABLE DATES
11
At least two FRPC gunmen
killed as MINUSCA halts
their advance towards
Bambari
15
20
MINUSCA bolsters presence in
Bambari amid heightened
tensions between ex-Seleka
factions
UPC leader Ali Darassa
reportedly leaves
Bambari upon
MINUSCA’s ultimatum
Assessments & Forecast
Intra ex-Seleka tensions over control of Bambari, subsequent roadside, mining taxations intensifies amid
February did not see any notable developments vis-à-vis improved security in the country, with CAR’s outlying areas
remaining volatile and prone to rampant militia activity. The foremost example are the February 4-6 clashes between the
Front for the Renaissance of Central African Republic (FPRC) and the Union for Peace in CAR (UPC) ex-Seleka factions over
Bambari and Ouaka Prefecture, illustrating the two group’s continued competition for control of the lucrative illegal mining
industry and roadside extortion rackets therein. Thus, the aforementioned ex-Seleka factions, mostly driven by such
financial incentives, but also fueled by ethnic affiliations within the Muslim community will remain a source of unrest over
the coming weeks. More specifically, FPRC leaders have vowed to dislodge the UPC from Bambari itself, having mobilized
forces from their Kaga-Bandoro stronghold towards Ouaka Prefecture on February 11 to that effect. In this context, we
assess that Bambari will remain a main focal point for unrest in the coming weeks.
In light of the above, UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) has taken an notably
assertive stance regarding rebel factions in the last month, diverting from the largely reactive posture that have
characterized the UN peacekeeping force in the country. The centerpiece of this shift is a buffer zone around Bambari,
aimed at avoiding a possible inter-ex-Seleka confrontation, with the subsequent helicopter attack against the February 11
FPRC mobilization emblematic of this new-found resolve to deter such sallies. Similarly demonstrative of this resolve was
MINUSCA’s successful ultimatum, demanding that Ali Darassa, as well as several senior anti-Balaka and one FPRC
commander depart from Bambari in order to lower tensions in the city. Given this proactive posturing, we assess that
going forward, MINUSCA’s is posed to implement similar means to actively avoid a full scale escalation in the city.
Nonetheless, given the overall lack of MINUSCA manpower necessary to comprehensively secure Bambari and deter, for
the long-term, FPRC offensives against Bmabari. Indeed, on February 27 the group attempted, but was halted again only 5
km from the city. As such, and coupled with the significant presence of gunmen from both factions within the city
boundaries, we assess that possibility of largescale clashes within the city in the coming weeks cannot.
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SOMALIA
Extreme Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
Farmajo elected as
President of Somalia
Islamic State (IS) claims
attack aimed at hotel
killing 4 in Bosaso,
Puntland
24
19
20
Al-Shabaab releases
radio message
denouncing newlyelected President
Farmajo
Al-Shabaab car-bomb in
Mogadishu market kills
approximately 30
8
Grenade attacks against
Bosaso bank, Bari
regional HQ
Assessments & Forecast
problems, as jihadist poised to dash optimism
Bosaso to remain, intensify as focal point of competition
between pro-IS faction, al-Shabaab
February saw the surprise election of Abdullahi Mohamed
The February 8 hotel attack in Bosaso corroborates IS’s
“Farmajo”, who served as prime minister between 2010-‘11
previously less certain capabilities in the city. Largely
and built a reputation for transparency and being tough on
operating in Puntland’s outlying areas, the IS faction, we
corruption. Looking ahead, we assess that Farmajo is likely
assess, has been attempting to garner similar notoriety it
to begin leveraging his wide-margin victory and genuine
achieved in its previous capture of Qandala. To this point,
popularity to enact policy and reforms. That said, the
Bosaso, Puntland’s most populous city, represents a
extent to which the new administration can enact
valuable target. We likewise assess that this push is part of
substantial new statecraft, at least in the near term, is
that group’s broader struggle to compete with local al-
questionable given the endemic graft, limited faculties and
Shabaab networks, from which the IS faction broke off. To
lack of nationwide presence available to it. In this sense,
this point, the February 24 attacks, not yet claimed by
the forthcoming weeks will serve as an important trail for
either group, is therefore demonstrative of these divergent
the new Farmajo government. This is likewise true vis-à-vis
jihadist threats. Indeed subsequent February 25 raids by
the ubiquitous al-Shabaab threat. The group’s February 19
Puntland security forces, in which several dozen suspected
warning against Farmajo, and against any clan working with
militants were detained in nearby villages, underscore
him, suggests a possible push to violently dissuade
growing pressure on the autonomous administration to
cooperation with the new government. Indeed, al-
stem this threat. As such, more proactive
Shabaab’s February 20 car-bomb attack in Mogadishu,
counterinsurgency measures in the coming weeks are
points to efforts at dashing any optimism regarding the
likely, and may plausibly fall along the lines of previous
new president. As such, going into March, al-Shabaab is
remarks by the Bari Province governor regarding the need
poised to execute similar such punitive attacks in
for a crackdown on weapons proliferation and soldier
Mogadishu, striking government or civilian facilities, in
impersonation in the city. Regardless, and given the above
order to undermine possible perceptions of improved
dynamic, over the coming weeks, Puntland in general and
security or confidence in the new government.
Bosaso in particular will remain a primary arena for
conspicuous operations by the competing militant group.
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SOUTH SUDAN
Extreme Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
11
15
20
General Cirillo resigns from
SPLA citing Dinka abuses
SPLA captures White Army
HQ in Yuai, Jonglei State
UN declares famine in areas
of Unity State
Assessments & Forecast
Violence escalates between SPLA, SPLA-IO across
Greater Upper Nile Region
High-level Equatorian defections from SPLA highlights
Dinka entrenchment, fragility of ethnic cooperation
The Greater Upper Nile Region’s position as a main
At least six high-level defections from the government were
theater of conflict, linked to its status as an opposition
recorded in February, including the Minister of Labor and
stronghold, was underscored this month as the UN
five senior SPLA generals, among them the most senior
declared a famine in Unity State, amid an outbreak of
military officer to resign from the government since
violence in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. Clashes
violence renewed in South Sudan in July 2016. Notably,
between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and
each of these defectors are reported to hail from Equatoria
Aguelek Force, a Shilluk militia affiliated to the SPLA - In
Region, the ethnically heterogeneous territory that has
Opposition (SPLA-IO) broke out in late January, spurring
been a key battleground between the government and
continuous fighting up and down the White Nile for
opposition. Furthermore, several of these leaders
several weeks. Though this may have been catalyzed by
published letters of resignation that specifically criticized
the government’s steps to rejuvenate the oil sector at
the SPLA’s human rights abuses and ethnic discrimination,
the country’s only operational oilfield in Paloch,
providing a measure of insight into what top officials have
underlying the conflict are persistent ethnic and political
perceived the SPLA’s strategy to be as the civil war persists,
tensions as Shilluk locals resist Dinka rule while the
namely, a policy of Dinka entrenchment through
government continues to parcel out their lands. At the
systematic campaigns of ethnic cleansing and land
same time, in Jonglei State, the SPLA confronted the
grabbing, particularly in Greater Upper Nile, Western Bahr
Nuer White Army militia loyal to SPLA-IO leader Riek
el Ghazal, and Equatoria. This strategy, as stated in the
Machar and quickly seized control of the White Army
resignation letters, is additionally consistent with the
HQ in Yuai. The SPLA’s easy penetration into the Lou
violence witnessed across the country and abuses reported
Nuer heartland is highly notable and demonstrates the
by human rights watchdogs. Finally, the loss of non-Dinkas
apparent weakness of the Nuer SPLA-IO, particularly in
from the government underscores the shrinking ethnic
contrast with the Shilluk SPLA-IO in Upper Nile. We
coalition in the SPLA as other ethnic groups no longer see
assess that this is reflective of not only the SPLA’s
the possibility for cooperation. Moreover, as Equatorian
scorched earth campaigns to suppress locals’ moral and
officials exit the government and military, this only serves
physical support for the militia, but Machar’s own
to exacerbate concerns that the South Sudanese
inability to support his forces. Given the significance of
government is a primarily Dinka institution that serves
the Shilluk and Nuer territory and the prevalence of
Dinka interests, and this is liable to encourage further
opposition forces, the situation is expected to remain
defections and volatility in the country’s heterogeneous
highly volatile across Greater Upper Nile Region.
regions.
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BURUNDI
High Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
Government issues
statement announcing it will
not send delegates to peace
talks in Arusha, Tanzania
18
17
15
Council of Ministers establishes
commission to propose draft
amendment to constitution which
could remove term limits
Government demands
Tanzanian authorities arrest
CNARED representatives at
talks
Pro-government
protests denouncing
CNARED participation in
peace talks
Assessments & Forecast
Government perpetuates political stalemate, international isolation
Over the past month, President Pierre Nkurunziza’s regime has continued to take steps to ensure its dominance of
Burundi’s political landscape. The majority of these efforts have been in line with well-established practices, predominantly
its ongoing disinclination to engage in dialogue with the CNARED opposition organization on the basis that elements of the
platform are accused of having participated in a failed coup in May 2015, whilst others are said to be linked to armed
resistance groups. Meanwhile, pro-government protests denouncing both CNARED and human rights reports critical of the
regime have continued to take place. Whilst it would be inaccurate to suggest that the government is without public
support, these events have nevertheless transpired amid allegations that they are deliberately engineered by the regime
as an attempt to project an air of legitimacy and thus undercut criticism by the international community and human rights
organizations. In this manner, the government is likely attempting to mitigate both internal and external constraints on its
capacity to rule.
Against this backdrop, the establishment of a commission which looks to amend the constitution in favor of unlimited
presidential terms represent a novel development, but one firmly in line with the government’s current practices selfpreserving practices. It is also likely to succeed, should the party decide to proceed. Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD controls a 77
of the 121 seats in the National Assembly, whilst its partner in government, the Independents of Hope, control 21 seats.
The former party also controls 33 of 43 seats in the Senate. Furthermore, Nkurunziza holds firm sway over the security
forces, whilst the Supreme Court previously showed itself susceptible to intimidation and manipulation in 2015, when it
approved the current President’s third term bid. Thus, there appear no significant domestic hurdles to the removal of term
limits. The international community, meanwhile, has also proven largely ineffective in curtailing Nkurunziza’s political
ambitions thus far. This was perhaps most notably witnessed in 2016, when the African Union (AU) failed to implement the
deployment of a 5,000-strong peacekeeping force in response to the political crisis, amid resistance from Nkurunziza and
reticence from the elements of the UN Security Council (UNSC), whose approval is required for a non-consensual AU
intervention. Numerous sanctions have also been imposed on the Burundian government, but to little effect. It is plausible
that the prospect of the removal of term limits, in conjunction with the current humanitarian crisis in the country, could
create sufficient impetus for the adoption of a stronger stance by the international community, given that it would
represent something of an escalation for the regime. However, it currently appears doubtful that this will be enough to
spur the intervention that would likely be required to prevent the constitutional amendments being made.
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DRC
High Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
1
Opposition UDPS
leader Felix Tshisekedi
dies in Brussels
14
3
At least ten killed in clashes
between BDK, security
forces in Kimpese
15
Clashes, standoff in Kinshasa
between security forces,
followers of BDK leader
Assessments & Forecast
Implementation of December 31 accord between
opposition, majority continues to stall
Despite coming to an agreement in January on the
distribution of ministerial posts in the DRC’s transitional
government, the opposition and majority parties
Following a security crackdown on a late January
demonstration organized by separatist sect Bundu dia
Kongo (BDK) in Kimpese, Kongo Central Province, clashes
on February 3 between some of the sect’s members and
security forces, also in Kimpese, resulted in the deaths of
stopped short of forming a new government as
mandated by the December 31 “Saint Sylvester accord”
over the past month. The delay in the deal’s
implementation, which carried over from the previous
month, was likely exacerbated by the February 1 death
of opposition Union for Democracy and Social Progress
(UDPS) leader Felix Tshisekedi in Brussels. Tshisekedi’s
death left the opposition without one of its most
influential leaders, in addition to precipitating a new
dispute over the future of the Rally opposition
coalition’s leadership. More importantly, it left the
council tasked with overseeing the transition of power
without its president, throwing the transition into
eight BDK militants and three children. The confrontation
coincided roughly with the online release of a video
recording of BDK leader, Ne Muanda Nsemi, directly
threatening President Joseph Kabila. Security forces
responded in the overnight hours between February 13
and 14 by besieging two residences in Kinshasa belonging
to Nsemi, leading to armed clashes that left several BDK
supporters dead. Meanwhile, during a a subsequent
standoff on February 15 between security forces and
Nsemi loyalists, Nsemi reportedly fled, prompting a
manhunt for the leader. The aforementioned clashes signal
a potential resurgence for the BDK, which has been
banned since late 2008 and has called for the secession of
greater flux. Meanwhile, disagreement remains
between the government and opposition over the
process by which a prime minister is to be selected for
the transitional government. Given that existing
challenges to the implementation of the December 31
accord have been compounded by Tshisekedi’s death, it
is highly likely that the formation of a transitional
government will be suffer further delays in the coming
month. This, in turn, will deepen feelings of political
uncertainty throughout the DRC, potential increasing
the risk of unrest over the coming weeks.
Bundu dia Kongo (BDK) separatist sect reemerges
Kongo Central Province from the DRC as well as the
expulsion of all non-natives from the province. This new
spate of BDK activity, punctuated by Nsemi’s threat
addressed to President Kabila, is potentially the result of
renewed efforts by the BDK to press its demands in light of
the perpetual uncertainty surrounding the political future
of the DRC. This uncertainty has likely emboldened BDK
and other anti-government armed groups. In light of this,
and given the government’s ongoing efforts to apprehend
Nsemi, more clashes between DRC security forces and BDK
sympathizers are likely to be witnessed in the next month.
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MALI
High Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
2
7
One killed, one injured in Ansar Dine claimed
attack on gendarmerie checkpoint in
Tenenkou, Mopti Region, on axis to Diandiori
Colombian nun abducted by
four suspected jihadists in
Karangasso, Sikasso Region
18
28
Installation of interim authorities in
Kidal Region cancelled by CMA on
February 18, resumed on February 28
Assessments & Forecast
CMA temporarily cancel installation of Kidal interim
authorities
The implementation of the terms of the Algier’s Accords
continues to face numerous challenges. Over the past
month, this took for the form of the CMA rejecting the
government’s unilateral appointment of Sidi Mohamed
Ichrach as governor of the Region, as a result of
concerns regarding his supposed ties with GATIA. At the
same time, significant opposition was witnessed from
other, smaller armed groups, as well as elements of the
local population. The former issue was resolved
Militancy in central regions of Mali raises concern
In recent months there has been an uptick in militant
incidents in the Mopti and Segou Regions, dominated
mostly by Ansar Dine’s largely Fulani based Macina
Brigade. These have included the typical attacks on security
forces, as well as efforts at influencing the local population
through the closure of schools and media outlets.
Furthermore, they are suspected of involvement in several
killings of local leaders. This is not, in and of itself,
necessarily reflective of a concrete or permanent shift in
attention away from the northern regions, but does make
something of a change in focus for these groups.
following talks, and a new timetable for the
implementation of the authorities established, yet the
underlying drivers for hostility towards the authorities
remains. As intimated above, whilst the CMA and GATIA
are certainly the dominant political and armed actors in
central and northern Mali, they are by no means the
only such actors. Other organizations have expressed
their concerns regarding the impingement of the new
authorities on their capacity to govern areas they regard
as their own. Thus far this has proven disruptive rather
than violent in nature, and we assess that it will likely
remain so. CMA, GATIA and the government have
Meanwhile, the government’s concern with this threat has
been highlighted through several high-profile security
operations in locales suspected of being Macina Brigade
strongholds. However, such activities risk exacerbating
existing grievances among the local Fulani population vis-avis the central government, and thus potential engender
additional support for the militants. With this in mind, and
given the jihadists’ firm entrenchment within the very
fabric of these local communities, additional attacks and
security operations are liable to continue to be witnessed
in the area over the coming months.
invested significant political capital in the execution of
the terms of the agreement, and are unlikely to brook
significant opposition. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that
measures have been taken address concerns among
locals regarding the manner in which the authorities’
represent the population’s demands. As such,
additional opposition is likely over the coming months.
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NIGERIA
High Risk
NOTABLE DATES
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
6
9
Anti-government
protests held in Lagos,
Abuja
NLC, TUC lead anticorruption marches in Lagos,
Abuja
19
20
At least 20 killed in multiple
Fulani raids on communities in
southern Kaduna State
22
Two German nationals
abducted in Jenjela
village, Kaduna State
Assessments & Forecast
Anti-corruption protests amid economic slowdown
Persistent insecurity, violence in Kaduna
Nigeria’s economic problems continue to drive anti-
The events recorded towards the end of the month in
government sentiment, catalyzing multiple protests
Kaduna State are emblematic of the insecurity that plagues
over the past month. Those on February 6 were
much of the region, and indeed, Nigeria’s outlying areas at
relatively small in scale, drawing only a few hundred
large. Such is the extent of Kaduna’s instability the British
individuals in each instance following the withdrawal of
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and American
the events’ organizer two days prior. However, the
Embassy in Nigeria both advise against all by essential
protests of February 9 were much larger, as a result of
travel to the State, including the eponymous capital. This
backing from two of Nigeria’s largest labor unions. Many
insecurity poses not only a body risk to those residing in, or
of the issues addressed by the demonstrations, such as
traveling through, the area in question, but also, by
corruption and perceptions of poor governance are
extension, a broader economic threat. For instance, it is
long-standing, and despite promises to combat them
highly plausible that the security situation has contributed
being part of Buhari’s election platform, little significant
significantly to the decision by numerous international
progress has been made. The low value of the Naira
airlines to suspend fights from March 8 to April 19 whilst
and rising fuel prices have also contributed to the
Abuja’s Nnamdi Azikiwe International Airport (ABV) is
protests. The Naira has weakened over 35 percent since
undergoing repairs, rather than reroute to Kaduna Airport
last June, and it appears that the central bank is
(KAD). The response by the authorities to this continued
continuing to support it to some extent through trading
volatility is often limited, as evidenced with the above
regulations. It appears likely that a completely free float
Fulani attack, which was met with a simple curfew. As such,
would result in a further devaluation, and likely a
these efforts are unlikely to inspire confidence. An
further increase in domestic fuel prices. In this context,
enduring lack of robust security infrastructure to combat
there exists significant potential for additional large-
and deter criminal activity, absence of alternative avenues
scale protests to be recorded over the coming months,
for financial gain, and mediation efforts to attempt to
particularly in the event that the economic situation
address underlying ethnic grievances which drive much of
declines. Looking further ahead, it is plausible that these
this violence, means that this situation is liable to endure
enduring issues, combined with ongoing conflict in the
and self-perpetuate for the foreseeable future.
Niger Delta, a resurgence in Boko Haram attacks in
Borno State, and apparent health issues, may have
significant implications for Buhari’s decision as to
whether to run for President again in 2019.
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ANGOLA
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
1
FLEC appeals for boycott of
2017 elections
14
FAC declares blanket ban on
logging in Cabinda Province
FAC claim to have killed
nine Angolan soldiers in
two separate attacks
Assessments & Forecast
Low-intensity unrest persists in Cabinda Province
The actions of the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC) and its military wing, the Armed Forces of
Cabinda (FAC), over the past month are emblematic of the range of political, economic and military measures taken by the
separatist organization in its ongoing efforts to establish Cabinda Province as an entity independent of Angola. With regard
to the appeals for a boycott, the calls are somewhat notable in that they followed the announcement that Angolan
President Jose Eduardo dos Santos’ will not participate in the upcoming elections. As such, they may reflect perception that
dos Santos’ departure may presage a political or social environment more conducive to the group’s separatist aspirations.
Meanwhile, the band on timber is indicative of efforts to exert financial pressure on Luanda by denying access to timber
for export. Finally, the FAC attacks of February 14 represents the first notable clashes to be recorded in 2017, amid an
enduring low-grade armed insurgency.
Yet although the abovementioned events are notable, we assess that they will have little bearing on the current intensity
of the conflict in Cabinda. There is no tangible evidence to support the hypothesis that Dos Santos’ abdication of the
executive office will result in a significant change in longstanding government policy vis-à-vis Cabinda, or on public
sentiment to that effect. With this, Dos Santos has made considerable efforts to ensure his legacy once he steps down,
including installing two of his children as members of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
party’s central committee. Meanwhile, it appears unlikely that the FAC will be able to properly enforce the ban on logging,
or that that activity provides sufficient income to constitute a notable pressure point. The armed conflict has been ongoing
in Cabinda for over four decades, and despite witnessing something of an intensification in 2016, shows little sign of
impacting Angolan policy or impairing Angola military capabilities in the area. More broadly, Cabinda accounts for up to 70
percent of Angola’s oil output, and oil production and its supporting activities, in turn, contributes approximately 45
percent of the country’s GDP and over 95 percent of its exports. There consequently exists significant incentive for the
Angolan government to maintain its hold over this lucrative region. FLEC’s separatist ambitions will nevertheless persist,
and as such additional instances are liable to be recorded in Cabinda for the foreseeable future.
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CAMEROON
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
6
Fresh ‘ghost town strike
widely adhered to in
Western Cameroon
NOTABLE DATES
10
11
23
Two killed in clashes
between protesters,
police in Ndop,
Northwest Region
‘Ghost town’ amidst
Youth Day celebrations
widely adhered to in
Western Cameroon
CACSC calls for weekly
Monday ‘ghost town’
strikes
Assessments & Forecast
Anglophone leaders serves as district focal point for tensions unrest
Over the last month, the campaign led by the Anglophone Civil Society Consortium (CACSC), calling for an end to their
community’s perceived marginalization by the Francophone State and the reestablishment of a federal system in
Cameroon, remained the primary source of political tensions in the country. In this context, several ‘ghost town’ strikes
have been recorded across largely English-speaking Northwest and Southwest region, with isolated episodes of unrest as
seen in Ndop on February 10. Indeed, Yaounde has maintained a hardline stance towards said campaigns, particularly
against demands for the reestablishment of federalism in the country, which would significantly alter the current political
paradigm in the country. To effect this hardline stance, the state has sustained an almost five-week long crackdown on
internet services across Western Cameroon, a measure denounced in social media by the hashtag #BringBackOurInternet.
Moreover, said disruptions, which have considerably hampered the economy of the Anglophone regions, have been widely
criticized by international humanitarian organizations. With this in mind, looking to the month ahead, we assess that given
the entrenched character of the Anglophone populace grievances, coupled with CACSC’s overall popularity in said regions,
Western Cameroon will remain volatile. As suggested by CACSC’s February 23 call, said volatility will likely translate into
additional “ghost town” strikes, which are poised to see significant adherence across the English-speaking regions. In this
context, the renewal of the trial against CACSC leaders, slated to be held at the Yaounde Military Court on March 23, is
liable to represent a distinct focal point for tensions. In this regard, the trial and Consortium leaders’ possible
condemnation is highly plausible to provoke protests within the Anglophone Regions, which given precedent are liable to
be accompanied by security crackdowns.
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ETHIOPIA
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
6
4
Four soldiers killed in clashes
with locals in Sherkole,
Benishangul-Gumuz
NOTABLE DATES
7
Two Afaris killed in
Clashes, heavy bombardment
between government, militias confrontation as TPLF relocates
6,000 veterans to Afar Region
in North Gondar, Amhara
14
Ten Oromos killed, 30 wounded
by Liyu Police in Guji Zone,
Oromia Region
Assessments & Forecast
Small-scale clashes with security forces persist across
country in opposition to Tigrayan rule
Oromia Regions
Although the situation across Ethiopia has largely
The multiple reported Liyu Police raids in Oromia Region
calmed from the height of protest activity in the latter
witnessed in February were notable given their
half of 2016, February still saw intermittent
considerable distance from the group’s main operational
confrontations between security forces and locals.
theatre, in Ethiopia’s Somali Region. To this point, it
Emerging in different contexts and circumstances, these
remains plausible that the group, established as a
incident nevertheless underscore widespread endemic
government paramilitary force tasked with suppressing
grievances by non-Tygrayan Ethiopians, including
Somali rebels, sought to similarly target communities the
Amharas, Oromos and Afaris, against the Tigray-
state deems antagonistic or if they were otherwise driven
dominated political establishment. To this point, going
by more opportunistic goals. Indeed, whether Liyu Police
forward, we asses that certain dynamics are poised to
have specifically received authorization to operate along
remain focal point for unrest. The February 6 clashes in
the Oromia and Somali Regions’ mutual border given the
North Gondar, for example, point to the presence of
recent anti-government unrest in Oromia remains unclear,
armed anti-government elements who, in the coming
however given the wide latitude they enjoy to suppress
weeks, are liable to either target or be targeted by
rebel and oppositional elements, going into March, we
Ethiopian troops. Violence in the Benishangul-Gumuz or
assess that similar such Liyu Police raids may plausibly,
Afar region, meanwhile, suggest a more general risk of
albeit sporadically, happen in the abovementioned area.
popular unrest, as locals potentially seek to address,
Still, the group is more likely to pursue objectives in its
potentially forcefully, perceived injustices linked to the
traditional operating area. In this context, and since they
redistribution of land to Tigrayan gold explorers or
have been implicated in human rights abuses in Somali
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) soldiers.
Region as well as Somalia itself, the group is liable to
Should such scenarios occur they are almost certain to
continue operating with impunity therein.
incur harsh security crackdowns. Still, due to their
limited impact, such incidents ultimately do not present
a significant threat to the government, who is unlikely to
make any significant political concessions. Overall this
stability is paradoxically destined to perpetuate the
various group’s respective grievances, ensuring that
further unrest unfolds in the coming weeks.
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IVORY COAST
Medium Risk
Current Situation
NOTABLE DATES
FEBRUARY
16
Special Forces launch
Cocoa Producers protest
dispersed by teargas in
Plateau District, Abidjan
mutiny in Adiake
18
Agro-Businessmen protest,
dispersed with teargas in
Cocody, Abidjan
Assessments & Forecast
Special Forces mutiny in Adiake
Persistent social unrest across cross-section of society
While the mutiny in Adiake was seemingly connected to
Social protest, and labor actions continued to be
unpaid extra bonuses specifically designated for Special
widespread over the past month, following extensive
Forces, the event, following numerous similar acts of
strikes by public servants in January. At least five different
rebellion, highlights the pronounced inclination of
groups took part in notable demonstrations. These events
disgruntled elements to use force rather than dialogue
included protests by Agro-businessmen in demand for
to address concerns. Given the status of the Special
payment follow government decision to freeze the
Forces within the security apparatus, the emergence of
accounts of several companies in which they had invested,
protest within their ranks underscores the wide scope
and demonstrations by cocoa producers. This likely
of structural issues, and consequent volatility, present
evidences perceptions among Ivorian society that the
at every level of the army, as well as the relative failure
government is most responsive to protests, whist dialogue
of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
and administrative procedures are ineffective, highlighting
(DDR) process to create a unified security apparatus in
distinct weaknesses within the country’s governmental
the aftermath of the civil war in 2011. In light of the
institutions. Moreover, this sentiment may have been
alleged approval of the government to adhere to the
further augmented by the recent military mutinies, which
Special Forces demands, in addition to the Special
elicited rapid responses from the government. We
Forces’ apologies for their actions, it is unlikely that
anticipate that this overarching trend will continue over the
additional defiant will be undertaken by the unit over
coming months, and given precedent, any protests face
the coming weeks. However, mutinies emerging from
forcible dispersion by the Ivorian police. With respect to
other disenfranchised factions within the Ivorian Armed
the civil servants strike in particular, which was suspended
Forces remain plausible, particularly among former
for the month of February, we note that no official
members of the Defense and Security Forces of Ivory
agreement over the remaining issue of arrears payments
Coast (FDS), who are alleged to have not yet received
has been struck as of the time of writing, and thus a
payments following their mutinies in Yamoussoukro
resumption of the labor action, and the notable disruptions
and Bouake in January.
that such a course of action would entail, poses a
significant threat for the coming month.
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KENYA
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
24
11
15
Western tourists
evacuated as herders,
rangers clash in Lakipia’s Il
N’gwesi lodge
Appeals court reverses
jail sentence for
doctors’ union reps
Hundreds protest in
support of striking
Doctors at Nairobi’s
Health Minister’s HQ
VP William Ruto’s rally in
Bainrgo County disrupted
by clashes between police,
herders
Assessments & Forecast
protests as tensions continue
Land-grabs, cattle-rustling, to persist amid drought,
lawlessness, incitement to violence
February saw multiple large and volatile demonstrations in
Going into March, unrest is liable to continue erupting
Kenya, specifically in Nairobi, where protests by public
sporadically across Kenya’s outlying regions. As witnessed on
transportation operators, students, lecturers and doctors
February 11, aggressive and well-armed herders from several
either turned violent and disrupted traffic. Going into
tribal communities continue to encroach on restricted land in
March, we assess doctors and lecturers unions, whose
Laikipia County, destroying facilities, killing wildlife and
causes are far-reaching, and remain the most organized,
clashing with local authorities. The February 24 clashes in
are the likeliest to spur additional such manifestations. Vis-
Baringo County similarly illustrate this trend’s unpredictability
a-vis the doctors’ strike, the February 24 demonstration
and broad nature, with their proximity to the Vice President’s
illustrated the causes’ broad appeal, and given the
rally symbolizing the rampancy and impunity characterizing
longevity of the labor action, dragging on since December,
cattle rustling in the north of former Rift Valley Province. Over
the movement appears resolved to elicit substantial
the coming weeks, endemic lawlessness will continue
concessions from the government regarding the
incubating the enabling conditions for unrest and while the
dilapidated state of Kenyan healthcare facilities, and an
government has sanctioned stricter security measures for the
unfulfilled 2013 collective bargaining agreement. Moreover,
affected areas, including “shoot-to-kill orders,” any near-term
the reversal of a 30-day jail sentence for the doctors’ union
effects will be limited. This volatility is also attributable to
representatives likely worked to embolden the strikers, as
incitement by local, tribally affiliated politicians leveraging land
did gestures of solidarity from private sector health
ownership tensions to garner support ahead of elections in
professionals, who on February 13 launched short but
August. As such, looking ahead, said politicians are liable to
symbolic work stoppages. Meanwhile, we likewise assess
continue provoking violence for as long they believe it serves
that over the coming weeks, the over month-long lecturer’s
them, especially as elections near. Given these factors, we
strike may similarly remain a source of tension.
anticipate March to see anything between sporadic shootings,
Representatives of the Universities Academic Staff Union
small-scale skirmishes between herders and authorities, and
(UASU) have previously called for street demonstrations
outright raids and land-grabs across ranches and
nationwide, further advising faculties to disregard waring
conservancies in Laikipia, Baringo as well as in Turkana and
from their respective universities against striking. With this
the surrounding counties.
in mind, and given the possible involvement of outraged
students seeking to resume suspended academic studies,
the potential for protests in Nairobi and other major urban
centers is appreciable.
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SENEGAL
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
13
21
Killing of artisanal goldminer
sparks violent protest in Saraya
and Kedougou, Kedougou Region
Mayor of Dakar, Khalifa Sall,
questioned on February 21-22 on
suspicion of misuse of city hall funds
Assessments & Forecast
Unrest in Kedougou region amid killing of artisanal
miner
The killing of a young gold panner in Khossanto village
located in Kedougou region shed light on existing
grievances within the local population in regards to the
authorities’ treatment of their primary source of
Khalifa Sall challenged in corruption case
The involvement of the highly popular mayor of Dakar and
member of the Socialist Party (PS), Khalifa Sall, in a case of
misuse of city hall funds may be related to the growing
perception among members of his party that he may
challenge the broader Bennoo Bokk Yakkar (BBY) ruling
coalition, of which the PS is a part, in the forthcoming
revenue, artisanal gold mining. Abuses by said
authorities are often said to hinge on the confiscation of
found items for their own benefit. With this, the
legislative election in July, through the potential creation of
his own list. Indeed, the mayor of Dakar has toured in
many of Senegal’s outlying regions in the past month,
February 13 incident highlighted the inherent
challenges individual interests present to companies
operating in the area, as well as the government at
large. This takes the form of both the extraction of
resources which might otherwise be acquired by
seemingly evidencing his interest in developing nationwide
recognition. Such a course of action is liable to be to the
chagrin of members of the ruling coalition, including
President Macky Sall. In this context, and given existing
disputes between the different leaders within the coalition,
registered firms, thus limiting their ability and
willingness to operate in these areas and consequently
provide revenue to the government, as well as hostility
from locals faced with the closure of artisanal mining
sites. While additional security forces were recently
deployed to curb potential protests and secure the
growing mining sector in the region, the Kedougou area
remains a potential focal point for unrest in light of the
local population’s perceptions of having been excluded
from the region’s economic development, and the
benefits that this affords. As such, the transition from
an informal economy to a highly industrialized one, and
the potential integration of the local communities in the
amid perceptions of misplaced loyalty, it is plausible that
the allegations of corruption may be intended to
undermine his status. That said, given the proximity of the
legislative election, it is unlikely that Khalifa Sall will face a
concerted effort to ostracize him. Furthermore, there
remains the potential for members of his own party, and
elements of the BBY more broadly, will attempt to
bandwagon on his popularity and thus support him. We
therefore assess that Khalifa Sall will remain inside the
coalition in the coming months, whilst continuing to build
up his stature to create his own political platform for the
Presidential election slated for 2019.
process, is likely to be a significant challenge to the main
actors operating within Kedougou region in the coming
months.
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SOUTH AFRICA
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
9
EFF disrupt President Zuma’s
annual SONA, as EFF supporters
clash with security forces
22
24
NEHAWU, DENOSA National Day of Action
in Cape Town, Pretoria, as Finance
Minister gives annual budget speech
Police forcibly disperse anti-immigration protest
march in Pretoria CBD using stun grenades, tear
gas, rubber bullets, water cannons
Assessments & Forecast
Surge in xenophobic attacks in Johannesburg,
Pretoria
Opposition parties, unions, capitalize on government
events as means of protest
The February 24 anti-immigration protest was the
Both the Economic Freedom Fighter (EFF) opposition party
climax of several weeks characterized by xenophobic
protest against President Jacob Zuma, during the annual
attacks in Pretoria and Johannesburg, which included
State of the Nation Address (SONA), and the National
arson and looting of houses and businesses owned by
Education, Health, and Allied Workers Union (NEHAWU)
foreigners, predominantly Nigerians, Zimbabweans, and
and the Democratic Nursing Organization of South Africa
Pakistanis. Those involved in such attacks and protests
(DENOSA) joint protest ahead of the budget speech
typically accuse said foreigners of reducing employment
represent a similar trend. The opposition parties, as well as
opportunities for locals and being involved in crime. The
the unions, capitalize on events which are meant to be a
security forces, meanwhile, are regarded as not doing
show of strength for the government and attempt to
enough to address these supposed issues, creating
render them controversial, thus resulting in criticism and
impetus for the adoption of vigilante activity. Yet, whilst
pressure being directed towards government. We assess
a number of these targeted individuals may be involved
that this pressure is likely to escalate in the coming
in illicit activities, we assess the attacks to be more
months, both from EFF and the Democratic Alliance (DA)
reflective of the broader socioeconomic situation in the
opposition parties, as well as within the ANC and its
townships in which the incidents take place, rather than
affiliates, such as the unions. For the opposition, ongoing
a notable threat posed by foreigners. Whilst the
and significant corruption allegations represent a notable
government condemned the violence and protests, it is
opportunity to weaken the ruling African National Congress
largely unable to affect the underlying drivers in the
(ANC). Meanwhile, the unions, which are affiliated with the
short term, such as an unemployment rate of
ANC, are likely attempting to leverage their position ahead
approximately 26 percent, rampant insecurity, and
of the ANC National Conference slated to take place in
limited access to basic necessities. Thus, the potential
December 2017, at which the ANC presidential candidate
for unrest endures. In this context, and given the
will be selected, in order to extract concessions or
approaching elections, there exists some potential for
agreements that will benefit them and their members. In
the authorities to instead adopt measures which are
this context, public and high profile events will continue to
hostile towards these foreigners, in order to appease
represent opportunities for the various groups to win
locales. However, this is in turn is liable to spark counter
political capital in the coming months, and as such
protests, creating a separate source of unrest.
constitute focal points for protests, and possibly unrest.
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ZIMBABWE
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
1
8
15
Opposition activist, head of #ThisFlag movement,
Pastor Evan Mawarire, arrested upon return to
country, released on bail on February 8
Zim-PF leader, Joyce Mujuru, expels
seven core party members, claiming
they worked on ruling Zanu-PF’s behalf
Zimbabwe Hospital Doctors
Association (ZHDA) embarks on
indefinite strike
Assessments & Forecast
Return of Mawarire unlikely to reignite protests
Tensions within Zim-PF opposition party
On April 18, 2016, Pastor Evan Mawarire posted a video
Following the heavy loss of the Bikita West by-elections on
on social media, airing his frustrations about the
January 21, extensive fragmentation has been witnessed
political and financial situation in Zimbabwe and
within the Zimbabwe People First (Zim-PF), amid extensive
subsequently catalyzing a wave of protests that took
tensions between Mujuru and several of the founders of
place throughout the country for several months. In July
the party. Both sides claim to have relieved the other the
2016, following a failed abduction attempt, Mawarire
other as head of the organization. This division is likely to
left the country for the US. In the meantime, and
both undermine confidence among its own supporters,
despite ongoing economic decline and perceptions of
and weaken their capacity to establish the long-feted
government corruption, the momentum of the protest
coalition with the Movement for Democratic Change -
movement has practically vanished, amid a ban on
Tsvangirai (MDC-T), or indeed, any other opposition party.
demonstrations in Harare. Though Mawarire’s return
As such, the split poses a threat to the party and the
and subsequent arrest on charges of subverting a
Zimbabwean political opposition as a whole. Looking
constitutionally-elected government and inciting public
ahead, we note that by-elections are slated to take place in
violence appear to offer a platform for the resumption
in Mwenezi East on April 8, and as of the time of writing the
of protests, we assess that such an eventuality remains
Zim-PF candidate is reportedly set to be Kudakwashe
unlikely over the coming months. For one, the protest
Bhasikiti, who is one of the party members supposedly
ban is still in effect, and the established predilection of
expelled by Mujuru. As such, it remains unclear whether he
security forces to respond forcefully to such events will
will actually run, or be recognized by Mujuru as a legitimate
likely act as a notable deterrent. Furthermore,
candidate. In any case, the event will represent an
Mawarire’s months in exile outside of Zimbabwe are
important demonstration of the party’s capabilities. Should
liable to have diminished his popular appeal, and we
the party by unable to present united front and develop
anticipate that the authorities will take steps to limit his
public support, it is plausible that the party’s activists will
capacity to mobilize his remaining followers. Finally, the
migrate to other parties, most notably the MDC-T.
broader political opposition currently appears
fragmented, and unwilling to call for public displays of
opposition to Mugabe’s continue rule.
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SUDAN
Medium Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
15
16
Authorities crackdown
on University of
Khartoum, students
Unspecified militia
open fire in Al-Fashir
market
21
SPLM-N, army clash in
Nadugli, South
Kordofan
Assessments & Forecast
South Kordofan clashes, Darfur peace agreement,
point to fragmented rebel landscape
Crackdown points to persistent tensions between
authorities, students amid broader
Going into March, Sudan’s conflict zones, including South
The February 15 incident is emblematic of the strained
Kordofan and Darfur, will remain volatile. The February 21
relationship between Sudanese students and authorities,
clashes demonstrate the underlying potential for flare-ups
especially in the capital. This is further illustrated by the
between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army - North
cause of the protest, namely, the arrest of another student
(SPLM-N) and government forces despite respective
suspected of an arson attack on a police station. Looking
unilateral ceasefires. Indeed the absence of a bilateral
ahead, March is liable to see similar manifestations, as
truce, with mutually agreed-upon terms, likely underpins
students typically comprise a considerable portion of
this volatility. As such, despite tenuously calm episodes,
protests opposed to government policy. To this point, one
similar such clashes are liable over the coming weeks.
potential source of tensions in the education sector may be
Meanwhile, although the peace deal between the
a looming teachers’ strike over a Ministry of Finance
government and a Sudan Liberation Movement – Abdel
decision to cut holiday bonuses and school equipment
Wahid al-Nur (SLM-AW) splinter group is notable, it will not
allowances. While said labor action pertains to elementary
noticeably impact the security landscape in Darfur. Indeed,
and secondary school teachers, the stoppage may spur
while it remains unclear who perpetrated the February 16
demonstrations which may plausibly energize university
Al Bosra market attack, the incident nevertheless points to
students. Beyond that, popular dissatisfaction with the
the presence of multiple non-state armed actors and the
cancellation of fuel subsidies in November remains an
suddenness of violence in the region, including in its capital
overarching vector for demonstrations, providing the tense
l. Moreover, that the main SLM-AW contingent outright
atmosphere from which other demonstrations can be
denied the deal’s existence demonstrates the internal
galvanized.
fractures characterizing the various Sudanese rebel groups.
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA
Low Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
14
Ugandan Forces
deployed in Equatorial
Guinea for capacity
building proposes
Assessments & Forecast
Equatorial Guinea-Uganda security cooperation indicative of
challenges to his regime
In addition to an ongoing dispute with neighboring Gabon regarding the sovereignty over the oil rich Mbanie, Cocotiers,
and Congas Islands, which has been submitted for arbitration to the International Court of Justice, by mutual accord,
Equatorial Guinea is not particularly affected by external challenges, or notable tensions with neighboring countries that
may give rise to potential threats for the country or the regime. In this context, the reported deployment of between 100150 Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) forces to Equatorial Guinea for capacity building under a bilateral agreement
signed between both countries, is highly notable. This is especially true considering UDPF’s extensive experience facing
armed conflict not only in Uganda’s northern and western regions, but also through their involvement in several regional
conflicts, most notably the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The aforementioned deployment is unlikely to be
aimed to prepare Malabo’s forces for an eventual external confrontation, but mostly focused on training an inexperienced
Equatorial Guinean force vis-a-vis any potential internal challenges that may arise against the longstanding regime of
President Obiang. While Malabo has not faced any challenges since the attempted coup led by British mercenary Simon
Mann back in 2004, the aforementioned capacity building mission underscores Obiang’s continued concerns about any
internal opposition that may threaten his 38 year old regime. In this regard, we assess that the ongoing project to relocate
the capital from Malabo, located on Bata Island, to the under construction city of Djibloho in continental Rio Muni, is an
additional attempt to thwart potential challenges to the regime, by decentralizing the country’s centers of power.
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THE GAMBIA
Low Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
NOTABLE DATES
10
18
20
Government asks UN to
halt withdrawal process
from International
Criminal Court (ICC)
Adama Barrow’s
Presidential
inauguration in Banjul
Police arrest 51 pro-Jammeh
supporters in Kafenda, former
head of National Intelligence
Agency (NIA)
Assessments & Forecast
Adama Barrow officially inaugurated as president as former members of Jammeh administration arrested
The past month was marked by Adama Barrow‘s debut as President, with his official inauguration, and the notable
resumption of talks with members of the international community. Likewise, the government decided to reverse its
withdrawal from the International Criminal Court activated by former President Yahyah Jammeh, and commenced
dialogue regarding joining the Commonwealth. Yet whilst these steps are certainly positive, The Gambia faces significant
challenges over the coming months. Firstly, despite significant contributions from the international community, such as
the release of 35.6 million USD of aid previously frozen by the European Union, The Gambia’s economy is marred by a
lackluster agricultural sector, little production capability, and a heavy reliance on foreign support, which is liable to
continue over the coming months and years. Furthermore, the country’s coffers, which were already in a relatively poor
state prior to Jammeh’s departure, were allegedly raided by the former leader as he went into exile. Secondly, a lack of
political experience among Barrow and his compatriots within the ruling Coalition 2016 will have negative implications for
their capacity to put forth the effective policy The Gambia requires. Furthermore, it should be noted that the parties under
the Coalition 2016 umbrella were predominantly united by the prospect of removing Jammeh. Now that this has been
accomplished, few connections remain, and thus there exists the potential for splintering. Meanwhile, the waves of arrest
of pro-Jammeh supporters and more notably former members of the late National Intelligence Agency, including its
executive director, highlights the desire of Adama Barrow’s government to remove the remaining vestiges of his rule. Such
actions receive a wide support from the local population, and whilst there exists some small potential for the threat to any
remaining pro-Jammeh individuals to spur limited unrest, lingering pro-Jammeh sentiment is unlikely to catalyze any
significant risk to the newly elected ruler. Extensive public antipathy towards the former ruler, coupled with an ongoing
presence of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) forces, will likely serve as a significant deterrent to any
unrest. More broadly, the international community has thus far shown itself willing and able to support the fledgling
government, and will very likely continue to provide assistance as needed over the coming months and years, thus
reducing the potential for political or economic instability.
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GHANA
Low Risk
Current Situation
FEBRUARY
9
13 killed, scores injured, 17 arrested in
chieftaincy clashes in Bimbilla, Northern
Region, about appointment of sub-chief
NOTABLE DATES
11
16
12
One killed, four injured, 20 arrested
in chieftaincy clashes in Oshiee,
near Kokrobite in Greater Accra
Region
Seven security forces injured whilst preventing local
Kumawu-Bodomase Ashanti tribal faction from
entering funeral of former chief in Ashanti Region
Assessments & Forecast
Chieftaincy clashes take place throughout Ghana, localized, isolated incidents
Chieftaincy clashes remain relatively common throughout Ghana’s outlying areas, underscoring the significance of
tribalism in the country irrespective of the dynamics and tone, peaceful or otherwise, of the broader democratic system.
However, although the tribal system encompasses the whole of Ghana, such clashes take place predominately in the
outlying areas, where more traditional communities, often of lower socioeconomic status, typically reside, and security
force infrastructure is more limited. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that this unrest is typically intra-tribal rather
than inter-tribal, with the local chieftaincy representing a particular focal point for tensions, given the power and influence
it affords aspiring leaders. As a result of these dynamics, such incidents are almost universally localized affairs, with little
direct impact on neighboring locales. Furthermore, such disputes do not normally involve the higher leadership of the
tribes, and therefore have little influence on broader tribal politics which could impact political affairs at regional or
nationwide level. Security forces, whilst typically limited, do nevertheless make efforts to make arrests and stem the
violence once it has commenced. As such, the overall impact of these clashes is minimal. They are, however, recurrent, and
are liable to continue for the foreseeable future, given ingrained tribal identities and the benefits offered by positions of
power within these enduring political structures. Moreover, there is an enduring risk that the intervention of security
forces, which often necessary to restore calm, may be regarded by one faction as favoring another, thus increasing the
potential for additional localized unrest.
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Notable Dates
SUN
MON
TUE
WED
THU
Nigeria: Trial of IPOB
leader Nnamdi Kanu
Lubumbashi:
Lucha protest
Ghana:
Independence Day
Lubumbashi:
Lucha protest
Lubumbashi:
Lucha protest
Int. Women’s Day
Lubumbashi: Lucha protest
Liberia: National
Decoration Day
Nigeria: Abuja airport
closed for six-week period
Cameroon: Ghost Town
Zambia: Youth Day
Mauritius: Holi (Hindu
Holiday) &
Independence and
Republic Day
Zambia: Youth Day
Burkina Faso :
National Union of
Workers of Human and
Animal Health
(SYNTSHA) Strike
Burkina Faso :
National Union of
Workers of Human and
Animal Health
(SYNTSHA) Strike
Liberia: Joseph Jenkins
Roberts' Birthday
Ethiopia:
Adwa Victory Day
Malawi:
Martyrs’ Day
SAT
Douala:
March for Unity and
Federalism
Ghana:
District Elections
Lesotho:
Moshoeshoe's
Birthday
Burkina Faso :
National Union of
Workers of Human and
Animal Health
(SYNTSHA) Strike
Burkina Faso :
National Union of
Workers of Human and
Animal Health
(SYNTSHA) Strike
Cameroon: Trial of
CACSC leader Agbor
Balla
Namibia:
Independence Day
South Africa:
Human Rights Day
Mali: Martyrs’ Day
FRI
CAR: Barthelemy
Boganda Day
Mauritius: Ugaadi
Madagascar:
Martyrs’ Day
South Africa:
Anti-xenophobia protest
International Women’s Day: Not public holiday - Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia; Public holiday Angola, Eritrea, Uganda; Public holiday for women only - Madagascar
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