In the balance
An empirical test of competing Neo-Realist theories applied to the EU as an
actor in the global balance of power
Michael Kluth & Jess Pilegaard
Roskilde University & Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Correspondence: [email protected] or [email protected]
Abstract
The present paper seeks to make sense of recent EU naval capability changes by applying neorealist theory on the EU as an international actor in the global balance of power. The paper
compares three different strands of Neo-realist theory by deducting key predictions about the
expected defense posture of the Union and the expected changes in naval capabilities. The
predictions are subsequently held up against recent data on naval military build-up in the EU. The
paper argues that the observed patterns are best explained not as bandwagoning with the United
States, but as a long-term balancing strategy aimed at bolstering the autonomy and international
influence of the Union, vis-à-vis other major powers, including the United States.
1. Introduction
Following years of free-fall structural disarmament, Europe has witnessed an increase in selected
naval military capabilities. This pattern is not specific to European countries, but the European
efforts are particularly noteworthy in that they seem to be systematic, coordinated, and offensive in
character: The vessels that are currently leaving European shipyards are not only your standard
defensive patrol ships, but vessels that can be used to orchestrate military operations “beyond the
horizon”. Something out of the ordinary is happening in Europe, and the present paper seeks to
explain this development.
Instead of focusing exclusively on the major European member states, the present paper argues that
the EU can and should be analyzed as an actor in its own right. Different strands of neo-realist
theory are subsequently applied in an attempt to explain the observed behavior of the changes in EU
military naval capabilities.
The following section presents the theoretical argument for analyzing the EU as an international
actor, after which post cold war naval capability expansions in Europe are presented and discussed.
In section three it is argued that there is a distinct pattern in European capability changes; a pattern
which merits further theoretical analysis. The fourth section presents three different strands of neorealist theory, on the basis of which theoretically informed propositions about the expected EU
military posture are deducted. Section five subsequently discusses these propositions in the light of
the available empirical data. The final part of the paper offers some concluding thoughts on how
best to explain the naval build-up that is currently taking place in Europe.
In the Balance
2. Analyzing the common policies of an uncommon actor
As the title suggests, the present paper operates on the assumption that the EU can and should be
modeled as an actor in the global balance of power. The paper does not portend to prove that the EU
is an international actor in its own right, but rather to assess the merits and demerits of various
strands of neo-realist theory in explaining the empirically observable behavior of the EU and its
member states (for an illuminating account on the challenges of analyzing the EU as an actor please
see Andreatta, 2005). The first step is consequently to further develop the argument that our
explanandum – i.e. the empirically observable behavior of the EU – should be analyzed as coherent
actor behavior, and not just as the haphazard summary of the actions of the individual member
states.
The external policies of the EU can be analyzed in one of three different ways: 1) as the result of the
internal machinations of the EU member states, where the institutional setting is of minor
consequence; 2) as the result of deliberate choices made by a unified actor (in which case the EU
has merely become a new state-like actor with characteristics similar to the member states); or 3) as
the unique result of the interplay between logics 1) and 2) above. The present paper is firmly rooted
in the rather wobbly ground delineated by the third position above.
Starting from realist and neo-realist premises, the paper accepts the assumption that EU member
states are “defensive positionalists”, who jealously guard their relative autonomy and actively seek
to maintain and expand their freedom of maneuver (Hyde-Price, 2006:220-221; Layne, 2006). As
actors in an anarchic, self-help system, states have a relatively short horizon: they cannot afford to
be caught off-guard and are consequently continuously positioning themselves to protect their
relative autonomy.
EU member states often behave in ways that are decidedly “unrealistic”. They seem willing to
accept short-term losses for the prospect of long-term gains. They willingly adopt a long-term
perspective and have regularly attempted to actually limit their autonomy and freedom of maneuver
by entering into both de jure and de facto binding common agreements. However, as Posen and
other neo-realists point out, this type of behavior makes good sense in a neo-realist framework: The
reason Western European countries managed to cooperate their way out of international anarchy
was fundamentally that the United States imposed a security hierarchy as part of the global bipolar
balance of power (Posen, 2006; Hyde-Price, 2006). The East-West conflict lay over Europe as a
massive blanket, muffling existing lines of friendship and animosity, and focusing all attention on
the central axis of the conflict. Bipolarity created a non-anarchical subsystem, where states could
afford to focus on absolute rather than relative gains (Posen, 2006).
The end of bipolarity consequently spelled the end of the relatively benign, cooperative atmosphere
created by the American security overlay in Western Europe. This momentous series of events soon
raised the specter of anarchy (i.e. a return to the normal state of affairs in international relations),
but Europeans fortunately withstood the temptation, making an extraordinary effort to further
strengthen the institutional framework that had been developed during the Cold War. Again, this
effort to counterbalance the incentives of anarchy does not contradict neo-realist theory: In 1989,
the EU member states had 40+ years of relatively successful economic and political cooperation
behind them. History doesn’t just undo itself. The context of decision-making in 1989 was radically
different from the context of 1939, and the ‘return of anarchy’ did not prompt an immediate
offensive mobilization in the major EU powers. They had everything to lose and nothing much to
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In the Balance
win by following the logical self-help inclination that is engrained in the international system.
Given the complex interrelations between European societies and economies, EU member states
can ill afford to focus solely on relative gains. France has a fairly good idea of the military
capabilities of the United Kingdom, who – in turn – knows more or less exactly the weight
Germany can carry. Italy cannot make a major investment in military technology without DG
Competition filing a complaint, and none of the member states can mobilize anything out of the
ordinary without immediately attracting the attention of the others. The major EU member states are
arguably part of a very intricate European balance of power, but it is a balance that is rarely
disturbed: Everyone knows what everyone else is doing and more often than not, the major
challenges are states passing the buck (i.e. free-riding) rather that states attempting to gain a
significant offensive advantage.
While the European Union can be said to constitute a relatively closed and self-referential balance
of power (an example of balanced multipolarity, cf. Hyde-Price 2006:229) the Union is
simultaneously part of a global balance of power, where the EU is perceived as, and perceives itself
as a relatively capable, international actor. These actor characteristics began to take shape already in
the 1970’s with the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC), and further developed
up through the 1980’s and 1990’s, by means of successive alterations to the basic constitutional
setup of the Community/Union.
As argued by Barry Posen (Posen, 2006) and others, the turning points in the EU’s aspirations on
the international power scene were the Balkan wars, which made it painfully clear that the EU could
not rely on others to sort out problems in the neighborhood. The EU would have to carry its own
weight in international relations, and from 1998 onwards, the development of the European Security
and Defense Policy (ESDP) gained momentum (Posen, 2006:173-78). The development of a
military dimension to the EU’s global political aspirations was never a uniform or uncomplicated
process. On the contrary, the history of EU military cooperation is fraught with false starts and
missed opportunities.
The “high politics” of war and peace remains the prerogative of the national governments that
constitute the European Council, but it would be misleading to allow this technical detail to divert
attention from the fact that the EU is playing an increasingly important role in matters of
international security. Where the EU is incapable of reaching agreement, as in the run-up to the
2003 Iraq campaign, the member states have taken a national stand, but on a host of other, less
divisive issues, the EU plays a central role in the positioning of EU member states. The EU has
gradually become a net exporter of security (Posen, 2006: 178), a fact most recently demonstrated
in the Franco-British offer to let the EU patrol aid shipments into Gaza (June 2010). Where EU
member states can agree on a common position and a common course of action, they now have an
increasingly credible capacity to put action behind words.
The EU is an uncommon actor, but even for neo-realists this does not in itself preclude the
application of actor (or rather state) centered theories in trying to explain the common actions of the
EU (See e.g. Layne, 2006: 34-36) . The EU is a complex system in its own right, but that system
can simultaneously be seen as a unit in a much larger, global system. And while the individual
member states may have global interest or a national perspective on global issues, they
simultaneously have a strong and relatively well developed common perspective on international
security issues based on – among other things – a shared geography and a shared history.
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In the Balance
The EU is a contingent actor. It does not have the institutional solidity and cohesiveness of a nationstate, but it is certainly capable of articulating a common perspective and increasingly able to
actively pursue this perspective with the use of coercive power. Using Bretherton and Vogler’s five
basic requirements of actorness (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999:37ff.), few would dispute the EU has:
1. A shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles;
2. The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies;
3. The ability effectively to negotiate with other actors in the international system;
4. The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments;
5. Domestic legitimation of decision-processes, and priorities, relating to external policy.
Compared to classic state-centric theories of international relations, the EU can hardly be said to
have a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence; nor does it have a monolithic, authoritative
decision-maker. However, realist state theory is based on assumptions and not on empirical
accuracy. It is assumed that a given state can be analyzed as a relatively coherent unit, which
history clearly suggests is a fairly heroic assumption (cf. Allison, 1971). Still, for most purposes it
is a useful and meaningful assumption: At the end of day, decisions are made and actions are
carried out. They may be decisions not to make decisions or not to carry out any actions, but
decisions are made. So while the EU should be understood as a relatively complex and contingent
actor, there is nothing to suggest that actor theories should be precluded a priori.
Having made the argument that the EU can and should be analyzed as a relatively capable
international actor, the following sections focuses on the collective behavior of the EU and the
military priorities that are currently being implemented. It is argued that a distinct pattern of
expansion in naval capacity can be identified, and that this pattern is anything but trivial, and
therefore merits further theoretical analysis.
3. EU Naval Capability Shifts in the Post Cold War Era
The disintegration of the Warsaw pact instigated a profound realignment of West Europe’s naval
capabilities. German reunification, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the desires of newly
independent Baltic States to join Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria in a westward reorientation was
compounded by great uncertainty regarding the former Soviet Black Sea navy and a severe
deterioration of the Northern Fleet. European NATO navies were left with no enemy in sight!
Cold war doctrine called for West European navies to prevent Warsaw Pact vessels from breaking
out of the Baltic and Black Seas. In addition British, Dutch and Norwegian forces assisted by
Belgian, French and North Atlantic based Danish assets were to counter the Northern Fleet
operating out of Severomorsk with special emphasis on tracking and destroying Soviet nuclear
submarines. Similar tasks were envisioned for the Turkish, Greek, Italian, French and Iberian navies
in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic Ocean.
Accordingly the cold war left West European navies with considerable inventories of fast attack
crafts around the entrances of the Baltic and the Black Seas combined with mine laying assets and
ocean going vessels with Anti Submarine Warfare (ASuW) capabilities. A significant proportion of
this inventory was disposed off in efforts to harvest the peace dividend. Interestingly, however, this
trimming was complemented by efforts to boost blue water naval capabilities.
Hence the navies of Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark
have acquired new larger vessels to replace phased out fleets of fast attack crafts, coastal
submarines, corvettes and mine layers boosting amphibious landing and oceanic patrol capabilities.
4
In the Balance
Greece and Turkey have largely maintained their cold war posture in what can be interpreted as
mutual balancing while neutral Sweden and Finland have remained focused on coastal defense. The
new EU and NATO member states have due to budgetary constraints focused on attaining assets
which are interoperable with those of their new partners. Other than a serious downsizing of their
naval forces, no shift in posture can reasonably be deducted from procurement in the Baltic
Republics, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania. These changes reflect the availability of second hand
units for transfer rather than doctrinal considerations. But on the balance EU member states have
expanded their blue water capability since the cold war.
4. Making sense of the expansion patterns: Theoretical
perspectives on EU naval build-up
There is a distinct and significant pattern in EU naval capability development. The present section
seeks to make sense of the military posturing using neo-realist theory. How can we understand the
military build-up that is currently taking place? Is the EU balancing against US hegemony? Does it
balance against a specific threat? Could the patterns be explained as bandwagon behavior, i.e. the
EU developing assets that are complementary to the force structure of the Alliance or of the
strongest power, the United States? Or is the accumulation of new capabilities a consequence of
multipolarity, i.e. an attempt to strengthen the military position of the EU vis-à-vis other poles in
the system?
The choice of theory is both obvious and problematic. Obvious because we are trying to make sense
of military posturing, i.e. investment choices in the defense sector, which is prime realist territory;
problematic because the EU is an uncommon and highly contingent actor. Neo-realist theory
operates with a fairly simple unit model, where states are basically seen as rational actors. States
may differ in their history and constitution, but at the end of the day, they are all in the business of
surviving as autonomous units and maximizing their autonomy. Given the structural constraints and
opportunities offered by the international distribution of power, system units can be expected to
behave rationally. Following this line of reasoning, there is nothing inherent in neo-realist theory
which would exclude an actor like the European Union. If the theory is applicable to Switzerland as
well as the DRC, it should presumably also be able to cope with an actor like the EU.
The different strands of neo-realist theory that are compared in the following differ on a number of
counts, but they share the same realist epistemology: They operate on the assumption that there is
an observable reality which we can investigate and relate to (Little, 2009 p. 222). The object of our
studies is not directly influenced by the observers, and it is consequently possible to “test” theories.
Theories lead us to expect different outcomes. As observers, we are able to assess the different
theories and make meaningful judgments on the relative explanatory value. There are obviously still
a number of pitfalls. Even if the predictions of a given theory are proven wrong, this does not
necessarily indicate that the theory is wrong; it could well be our application of the theory that is
wrong. If the EU doesn’t behave as neo-realist would have it, this could mean either the neo-realist
theory is wrong or that the EU isn’t subsumed under the relevant neo-realist “laws”. Still, the
analyses will hopefully offer some ground on which to make an informed judgment as to the
relevance of neo-realist theory when applied to the EU as an international actor.
In the following, three different strands of neorealist theory are presented and discussed. An attempt
is made to extract relatively simple predictions on the type of capability build-up we should expect
5
In the Balance
from the EU using the different theoretical lenses. These predictions are subsequently held up
against empirical data of EU naval capability changes.
Waltz: Balancing against the hegemon
According to Waltz’ theory of international politics (Waltz, 1979), the anarchy of the international
system means that the units can rely on no one for their security and continued existence. The
fundamental incentive is consequently one of self-help: Trust no one and fend for yourself. The
security of any given unit will be at risk if the power of the other units in the system increases. Not
because the latter will necessarily want to harm the former, but because their relative power
advantage makes it possible for them to do so. Structural realism is concerned with capabilities
rather than intentions: What counts is the capacity of others to harm or coerce you. If you want to
avoid harm or coercion, you need to match or deter your opponents.
The basic explanans of the theory is the global power configuration, i.e. the number of poles in the
system. Waltz’ theory primarily deals with macro-patterns at the global level: How do units respond
to different global power configurations? States will behave differently depending on the number of
poles in the system. In systems characterized by multipolarity (more than 2 great powers), the basic
incentive is to balance against the stronger pole, either by internal or external means (resource
mobilization or alliance politics). In systems characterized by bipolarity, the basic incentive is to
bandwagon with one of the superpowers, and under unipolarity, the basic incentive is to balance
against the hegemon.
Under the present structural conditions, where the United States yields preponderant power vis-àvis any other unit in the system, the basic inclination of the EU would be to balance against the US.
Waltz himself is relatively clear on this prediction, arguing that there is no other “pole” in the
system that can match the capabilities of the US, and while the world may be moving towards
multipolarity (Waltz, 2000), the US maintains a position of overwhelming power. The US has the
capacity to coerce other states, which means other states have a clear incentive to balance against
the US, either by internal mobilization, which is unlikely to be sufficient, or through alliance
creation.
Waltz does not specify what type of behavior would count as balancing, but as a minimum we
should expect the EU to develop military capability that can be used to either defend Europe or
deter the US from using its coercive power. In terms of naval military capabilities, this would
presumably – as a minimum – imply a gradual build-up of defensive weapons systems, i.e. systems
that could be used to thwart US naval military ambitions in the European sphere of interests. This
development could be coupled with the simultaneously development of offensive naval capabilities,
but the prudent balancer would arguably build up defenses first, especially when the adversary one
balances against is so overwhelmingly powerful.
Walt: Balancing against the major threat
Stephen Walt’s balance-of-threat theory differs from Waltz in that it takes perceptions seriously.
States don’t just balance against power; they balance against perceived malign intentions, i.e.
threats (Walt, 1985). The addition of perceptions makes the theory somewhat more complex, in that
a host of different issues may impact on threat perceptions. Walt list three key threat variables:
aggregate capabilities, geographic proximity and offensive capabilities. (Walt, 1985 and 2005)
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In the Balance
In the present context, the important question is consequently by whom or what the EU feels
threatened? The simple answer is probably that the EU doesn’t feel particularly threatened by
anything in the present system. Judging from the 2004 Security Strategy, a secure Europe in a
better world, the Union is not currently faced with any overwhelming threats, but rather a host of
very dissimilar security challenges. However, if a threat must be singled out, Russian policies vis-àvis it’s near abroad is arguably a source of some concern in European capitals. The near abroad
covers the whole range of challenges from regional conflicts, to proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and organized crime. If provoked, Russia has the aggregate capability to wreak
considerable havoc in its western sphere of interest. Russia have vital security interests in close
geographic proximity of - and even within - the EU as evident in the Baltic States, the Kaliningrad
enclave, the Arctic region and Caucasus; all of these issues raise the specter of a direct or an
indirect confrontation with Russia. So while the EU’s relations with Russia are formally both strong
and cordial, the dangers of a confrontation certainly lurk beneath the surface as evidenced by the
suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty. Russian furthermore demonstrated
its offensive capabilities in the 2008 war with Georgia.
What would constitute an appropriate capability mix in the naval domain should the EU balance an
expansionist Russia? For a start we should expect to see a continuation of the defensive naval
posture that characterized the Cold War era. The EU would have a strong interest in hindering
Russian access to the North Sea and the Mediterranean. It would further maintain strong anti
submarine warfare capabilities to prevent Russian submarines of e.g. the Northern Fleet to disrupt
vital Atlantic supply lines. Finally faced with a threatening nuclear power, EU navies would
maintain a credible and secure nuclear deterrent – i.e. ballistic missile submarines.
Incidentally, the above of threat-balancing posture could simultaneously be interpreted as
bandwagoning with the US. Even for the unipole, Russia remains a source of considerable anxiety:
The nuclear arsenal is still a problem, and Russia retains the power to substantially thwart American
global strategic ambitions. While Russia is no longer a superpower, is still represents a real and
present danger: It is still a threat to be reckoned with. The EU and the US do not regard each other
as enemies and can consequently pool their resources to balance the residual threat from the East.
This interpretation would also suggest why NATO remains active, even after the collapse of the
Warsaw Pact.
But EU bandwagoning of the US is conceivable even without a perceived Russian threat. If the
European Union subdues itself to US global hegemony it can seek to attain a position of privileged
(junior) partnership by amassing naval capabilities complementing US Navy assets. The US Navy is
a decidedly blue water force featuring large units plowing the seven seas. It faces difficulties in
littoral operations around enemy shorelines as it has only now started to commission small
expeditionary frigates. This leaves a role for a bandwagoning navy! Backed up by the
overwhelming fire power of the US blue water navy, EU vessels could engage in surveillance,
policing and counter insurgency. Constructing such assets would be consistent with the skills
gained during the cold war in front line states such as Scandinavia and Germany – Sweden’s Visby
class corvettes are evidence of this legacy.
Mearsheimer: balancing for autonomy and influence
The offensive Neorealism associated with Mearsheimer has been formulated after the collapse of
the cold war order. In his book ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ Mearsheimer proposes a
structural realist account which – like Walt – invites considerations of geography on board.
7
In the Balance
Crucially, he emphasizes the ‘stopping power of water’ (Mearsheimer, 2001:114) in sketching an
international system composed of ‘insular’ and ‘continental’ great powers partaking in regional
balancing while simultaneously forming part of wider cross regional balancing. Interestingly, he
rejects the notion that the post cold war era is unipolar and that the US is a global hegemon
(Mearsheimer, 2001: 140, 381).
In his systemic depiction, all great powers strive for regional hegemony. Great powers attain their
status by merit of military capabilities (Mearsheimer, 2001: 55). The United States is the
preponderant military power in the world, but Mearsheimer identifies two other great powers in
Russia and China, which while unable to match US military might are nonetheless able to contest
and possibly thwart a US invasion of their homeland and in addition posses nuclear weapons and
limited power projection capability (Mearsheimer, 2001: 381).
Mearsheimer establishes a case for US balancing of China which by nature of its great power status
has regional hegemonic aspirations for Northeast Asia. Europe is by contrast presented as being
subject to stable bipolarity with Russia constituting one pole and the United States occupying the
other pole as an offshore balancer (Mearsheimer, 2001: 380). This description echoes the
bandwagoning argument from Walt’s balance of threat theory: Europe is basically counting on the
US to balance Russia.
Although Mearsheimer is highly critical of Europe’s ability to constitute a pole in its own right
(Mearsheimer, 2009), we nonetheless outline two possible scenarios on the basis of his theory. The
first scenario features the European Union aspiring to establish regional hegemony through
enlargement and military integration. It has already made substantial inroads on Russia’s power
sphere with the inclusion of all former Warsaw Pact members and the Baltic Republics. The
Ukraine remains contested ground but by most reasonable measures the Europeans have been
highly successful in its eastward expansion. As Russia is essentially an insular great power EU
expansion has limited bearing in the naval domain. This leaves the issues of dealing with the US
open. As a pole in the regional system, the US performs offshore balancing and would by virtue of
offensive structural realist thinking be inclined to block European aspirations. The EU
correspondingly would find it in its interest to amass capabilities which could offset the US’s
blocking capacity.
Alternatively we may speculate that in light of Russia’s eroding candidacy for regional hegemony
as witnessed by the accession of the Baltic States and the former Warsaw Pact countries to the EU
in 2004 and 2007 – respectively 3 and 6 six years after the publication of ‘The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics’ – Europe’s regional balance can no longer be captured by bipolarity in spite of
Mearsheimers claim for its enduring nature (Mearsheimer, 2009). In this instance the US ceases to
act as offshore balancer vis-à-vis Europe since the EU ascends to regional hegemony. Provided the
EU is categorized as a continental great power, and following the offensive base line in
Mearsheimer’s thinking, a regionally hegemonic EU would seek to fulfill a role as extraregional
power thus aspiring to conduct offshore balancing: The EU would aspire to gradually develop the
military muscle that is necessary to assert its interests abroad. Hence the EU will aim at preventing
rivals from achieving hegemony in other regions out of fear that a peer competitor might jeopardize
its hegemony by upsetting the balance of power in its backyard (Mearsheimer, 2001: 141).
In sum we can extract two opposing predictions from offensive structural realism. Either the EU
aims to amass naval capabilities that may assist it in barring the US from preventing its rise to
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In the Balance
regional hegemony. This would include surface combatants and submarines suitable for high sea
Atlantic cruising capable of disrupting sealift operations and hostile naval incursions. In view of the
‘stopping power of water’ axiom, capability shifts compared to the cold war posture would be
relatively modest although some response to the overwhelming aircraft carrier capability of the US
must be anticipated. This posture resembles predictions in relation to the ‘balancing US hegemony’
scenario! The second scenario entails an expansion of power projection capabilities such as large
surface combatants, oceanic long endurance submarines and particularly amphibious assault.
5. EU Capability Expansions
Blue water naval capability expansion is to some extend a global post cold war phenomenon. Japan
has commenced a notable expansion of its amphibious capability followed by South Korea,
Australia, China, India, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand. While the Asian buildup reflects mutual
balancing (Bitzinger, 2010), European acquisitions of such assets form part of institutionalized
coordinated efforts to address a shared capability need.
In line with the so called Petersberg tasks the European Security and Defense Policy “aims to
strengthen the EU’s external ability to act through the development of civilian and military
capabilities in conflict prevention and crises management (European Commission External
Relations website)”. Coordinating the development of required military capabilities was instigated
by setting out a force catalogue in relation to the Helsinki Headline Goals of 2003 and 2010.
Several of the resultant capability commitments put forth by member states to fill gaps in the 18 EU
Battlegroups conceptualized by the EU Military Staff are joint projects coordinated by the
collaborative procurement organization OCCAR. The industrial capacity to deliver manufacturing
and product development requires continuous cross border orchestration of production and R&D
networks which is managed by the European Defense Agency. Hence both the Horizon destroyers
and the FREMM frigates are joint Franco-Italian projects and Germany, The Netherlands and Spain
have jointly worked on the platform design of their latest commissioned frigates.
Further underscoring the coordinated nature of the European capability expansion, two of the
multinational EU Battlegroups employ newly fielded amphibious vessels. The Spanish Italian
Amphibious Battlegroup comprises both countries entire fleet of landing ships similarly the UKDutch Battlegroup employ amphibious assets from both the Royal Navy and the Koninklijke
Marine.
In the sections to come, we shall present data on capability changes in the EU navies. While a rich
methodological literature exists on the measurement of military balances (See e.g. Glaser &
Kaufmann, 1998 and Heng, 2007) we have resorted to the simplest of measurements: the naval
version of ‘bean counting’! We have relied the 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2010 issues of “The Military
Balance” published annually by the Institute of International Strategic Studies in London as our key
source. While mostly up to date, they list defense assets either primo of the year of publication or
stocks ultimo the preceding year. We have supplemented data for 2010 by using official online
sources such as the US Naval Vessel Register or naval websites of EU member states. Data on the
individual ships has been extracted from either ‘Jane’s Fighting Ships’ or authoritative sources like
“Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World”. When additional data such as tonnage is
listed, we have aspired to use standardized measures such as metric tons at full load. When
authoritative or official sources fail to categorize a specific vessel, we have designated surface
combatants below 1500 metric tons as either patrol boats or corvettes and hence coastal. We have
made a similar delineation for submarines below 1200 metric tons when submerged. We have
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In the Balance
included all EU member state navies in our data regardless of whether they are NATO members,
non-aligned or have opted out of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).
EU Naval Expansion as Balancing of the Hegemon
If the EU aims to balance a hegemonic USA, one would expect to see a gradual buildup of
defensive capabilities linked with some offensive expansion. The defensive naval posture of the
cold war emphasized coastal warfare. Up through the nineties, inventories of submarines and fast
attack crafts have declined. Hence Germany had a fleet of 40 fast attack missile crafts in 1990. This
has now been reduced to 10 vessels – all commissioned in the eighties and scheduled to be replaced
by fewer, bigger and more flexible Braunschweig corvettes. They have also cut their submarine
force by 50% reducing the inventory from 24 to 12. Italy has reduced its submarine force from 10 to
6 and retired its entire fleet of fast missile crafts. Denmark has decommissioned its entire fleet of
fast missile crafts and submarines! In 1995 the EU navies had, discounting the former Warsaw Pact
countries, a total fleet of 101 submarines. In 2010 the figure runs at 67 submarines.
But while the amount of oceanic submarines numbered 53 units in 1995, this figure has gone up to
56 oceanic vessels in 2010 clearly marking a shift away from coastal defense. EU submarines
include a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN’s) force of 8 vessels compared to 14 in the US Navy
inventory; this constitutes a historic move towards parity. Moreover, US Navy SSBN inventories
reflect a reduction from the 1990 stock of 34 units. Meanwhile Russia has reduced its force of
nuclear powered ballistic missile carrying submarines from 61 units in 1990 to the present fleet of
14 vessels. Yet European stocks of nuclear powered attack submarines (SSN’s) launched to track
down and kill SSBN’s have only been reduced from 21 units in 1990 to 14 units as of 2010. Vast
resources are being invested in maintaining an up-to-date fleet of European SSBN’s and SSN’s.
In view of the US being a continental power separated from Europe by the Atlantic, fielding large
submarines and surface combatants would enable the
New EU Frigates and Destroyers
EU to deter the approach of a hostile navy while
Commissioned since 1995 or at advanced level of completion
endeavoring to battle far from Europe’s densely
Country
Class
No. Tons full load Tonnage
Spain
Alvaro de Bazan
5
6250
31250 populated shoreline. European navies have launched
Italy
Horizon
2
6700
13400
FREMM
2
6000
12000 a high proportion of major surface combatants. Since
Artigliere
4
2986
11944 1995 alone 54 new vessels have joined the EU fleets.
France
Horizon
2
6700
13400
Table 1 lists the frigates and destroyers launched
FREMM
2
6000
12000
La Fayette
5
3600
18000 since 1995. Vessels in an advanced stage of
Gemany
F124 Sachsen
3
6000
18000
completion at the time of writing have been included.
F123 Brandenburg
4
4900
19600
Holland
De Zeven Provinciën
Karel Doorman
United Kingdom Type 45
Type 23
Denmark
Absalon
Iver Huitfeldt
Greece
Hydra class
4
1
6
6
2
3
3
6050
3373
8100
4900
6600
6645
3350
24200
3373
48600
29400
13200
19935
10050
All the vessels are evidently oceanic. Interestingly the
US Navy whose entire fleet of destroyers and frigates
number 77, have in the same period launched or
nearly completed 55 Arleigh Burke class destroyers!
Although the combined tonnage of US Navy major
Total
54
298352 surface combatants still exceeds that of the EU navies
– if we solely look at cruisers, destroyers and frigates and thus omits carriers – the gap is
narrowing! In 2010 a decline in US Navy displacement fielded since 1995 had in combination with
a modest EU drop reduced the difference in tonnage from nearly 40 % to 30 %. This crude
comparison disregards the fact the US Navy protects American shorelines in both the Atlantic and
Pacific oceans.
10
In the Balance
The most spectacular naval imbalance between the US and the EU is undoubtedly in the domain of
aircraft carriers. The Europeans are moving into the super carrier race with the addition of the
French Charles de Gaulle and Britain’s two Queen Elisabeth class mammoths under construction.
The former was commissioned in 2001 but constitutes a replacement of capabilities vested in the
Clemenceau class carriers. Although the size of air complements in the Charles de Gaulle and the
Clemenceau class is roughly similar, the former can embark AWACS and more formidable fighters.
Yet as the two Clemenceau class vessels have been replaced by only one Charles de Gaulle class
carrier, it hardly constitutes a capability boost. The Royal Navy currently has two light Invincible
class carriers in its inventory. Their replacements will displace three times as much as their
predecessors and embark more than double the aircrafts which have double the range, payload and
speed thus providing a significant expansion of Britain’s power projection assets. But in balancing
terms the EU’s pending force of three super carriers complemented by 4 light fixed wing carriers
leaves it trailing behind the US which have 11 on duty super carriers and a further 10 light
amphibious ships operating a small fixed wing squadron.
However, several of the new vessels launched in the EU
since 1995 are area air defense frigates and destroyers such
as the Horizon class (4 units), the Type 45 class (6 units),
Sachsen class (3 units), De Zeven Provinciën class (4),
F100 class (5), Iver Huitfeldt class (3) plus several of the
FREMM frigates currently under construction. This could
be a response to the capability shortfalls in the domain of
aircraft carriers.
In sum, when looking at changes in submarine assets and major surface combatants such as
cruisers, destroyers and frigates, there seem to be a case for the EU balancing hegemonic US power.
EU Naval Expansion as Bandwagoning
Two scenarios for bandwagoning have been put forth. One resembles the EU posturing in a balance
of threat scenario featuring a malign expansionist Russia. We shall treat this scenario later. In this
section we shall consider the other scenario presented which emphasize EU bandwagoning by
submission to US global hegemony.
However, first we shall hold this scenario up against institutional developments and stated European
policy intentions. Secondly we shall consider if naval capability expansion is a meaningful
bandwagoning response to present US needs. Finally we shall assess if EU naval capabilities
complement US Navy assets with a view to assist the Americans in policing the world – as a junior
partner.
NATO has instigated a capability coordination process similar to that observed in the context of the
European Union. This inevitably raises the question: are the European states bandwagoning
dominant NATO member USA? The Berlin Plus agreement which regulates EU access to NATO
infrastructure and command systems is offered as an example of the subordination of European
defense initiatives to US interests. It thus contain a ‘first right of refusal’ allowing independent
European action only in those instances when NATO – and the US – have been given a chance to
decline intervention.
11
In the Balance
Yet several observations challenge the case for bandwagoning. For a start public statements by
European leaders stress the need to develop autonomous European capabilities. While often
associated with French foreign policy doctrine, even traditionally pro-Atlanticist Germany has made
univocal proclamations to this end. Hence then German foreign minister Joschka Fischer announced
in 1999 “There should be a rapid build-up of common EU forces to master crises and conflicts in
Europe even without the participation of the United States” (Press conference at the Bremen WEU
summit May 10th 1999). This brought the country in line with the Anglo-French St. Malo
declaration of 1998 stating that the European Union ought to have the capability for “autonomous
action backed up by credible military forces”.
Secondly, NATO’s attempt of coordinating a capability reorientation was initiated after EU’s
Helsinki summit of 1999 which eventually lead to the European Capabilities Action Plan adopted at
the Laeken summit in 2001. Although the NATO Response Force was declared operational before
the European Rapid Reaction Force, the former is smaller and has struggled to attain the required
commitments. Interestingly the NATO Response Force (NRF) lacked ground troops as
contributions predominantly encompassed sailors and airmen. This problem persisted for the first
years of the NRF’s existence (Kugler, 2007 p. 8).
In line with the ‘imperial overstretch’ debate, the contributions of a bandwagoning Europe
responding to US needs should thus emphasize ground troops. Hence the US called upon the
Europe to commit the ground troops in Kosovo and wrangling over European ground troop
commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan are ongoing. Although the NATO capability documents does
point to needs for enhancing strategic air and sealift capabilities, a bandwagoning Europe would be
unlikely to please the hegemon when building up capability in the conventional areas where the US
is a preeminent power. The power projection capability of the US Navy and Marines has been
unrivalled up until now. On the basis of the experienced gained in relation to the war on terror, the
only branch of the American military in need of allied assistance is the US Army! Yet the
Europeans have boosted their blue water naval capability. At the onset, this hardly seems a strong
case for bandwagoning behavior.
A European naval buildup aiming at
Average size of Cruiser, Destroyers and Frigates
supplementing US naval power should focus
1995
2010 % change
on littoral warfare. This would entail
EU
4035
4725
17,10
acquiring assets suitable for overseas
US
7392
7685
3,97
deployment emphasizing coastal operations.
By contrast autonomous deployment has informed acquisition choices in Europe. This is reflected
in the increased size of European units. This trend is even more evident when looking exclusively
on vessels designed after the end of the cold war. Among the major surface combatants European
navies have launched a high proportion of area air defense frigates as mentioned previously. These
vessels can provide protection for amphibious assault ships and the European aircraft carriers which
due to their limited air wings compared to US super carriers have little offensive value if they must
dedicate planes for self defense. In keeping with the size argument, the displacement of these
vessels average 6500 tons and have considerably greater endurance than their predecessors. As
shown in the table above, EU frigates and destroyers are closing in on comparable US assets
measured in tonnage. If the cold war designed US Navy Ticonderoga class cruisers – of which
several units have already been decommissioned – is excluded, the gap would be even narrower.
12
In the Balance
The above finding contravenes the ‘complementary’ logic of fielding vessels with littoral
capabilities. In conclusion there is little support for the claim that EU naval capability shifts reflect
bandwagoning behavior.
EU Naval Expansion as Balancing Threat
Interpreting EU naval capability expansion in a balance of threat perspective requires identification
of the most immediate threat warranting investments in this scale. Russia for decades posed the key
threat to Western Europe.
As already argued an appropriate naval capability mix for European balancing of an expansionist
Russia would entail a continuation of the defensive posture from the Cold War era combined with
strong anti submarine warfare capabilities. Finally EU navies should maintain their fleets of ballistic
missile submarines.
Coastal defense capabilities have evidently been reduced. Surface combatant additions have
emphasized anti air and power projection capabilities over anti submarine warfare. The EU navies
have maintained and renewed a substantial SSBN fleet. Moreover, constructing blue water
capability seems an unlikely response to a Russian threat scenario. Since the disintegration of the
Soviet Union Russia has lost its Warsaw Pact allies and large chunks of its naval assets have either
fallen prey to corrosion and other perils of lacking maintenance or has been transferred to
independents republics such as the Baltic States and Ukraine. Armament Treaties has furthermore
reduced the mightiest asset in the Soviet maritime arsenal – the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN).
The Soviet Union had 227 principal surface combatants in 1990 compared with Russia’s 41 as
listed in 2010 edition of ‘The Military Balance’. Several vessels appear to be in reserve and 15
principal surface combatants are attached to the Pacific fleet leaving Europe facing the remaining
26. Most Russian vessels are furthermore of a dated design and their condition questionable.
Since 1995 Russia has launched or nearly completed 7 principal surface combatants as opposed to
the nearly 60 vessels in the EU when including carriers. The Russian additions include the
Steregushchy class corvettes (5) and the Admiral Sergey Gorshkov class frigates (2). Only the latter
are blue water capable vessels although dwarfed size wise by most of the new European units.
Russia has a single large carrier but otherwise no ‘over the horizon’ amphibious capability.
A perceived Russian threat should be responded by an anti submarine and coastal defense oriented
posture by EU navies. This is evidently not the case and accordingly the balance of threat
explanation can be dismissed.
EU Naval Expansion as Offshore Balancing
On the basis of offensive realist thinking we extracted two scenarios. One resembled anticipated
outcomes from the defensive realism of Waltz and has been addressed in the ‘hegemonic balancing’
section. In the present section we shall explore a regionally hegemonic EU seeking to fulfill a role
as extraregional power conducting offshore balancing. In a defiant act of ‘Leash-Slipping’ (Layne,
2006:29, 34-36) the EU increasingly assert its interests abroad. This scenario entails an expansion
of power projection capabilities such as large surface combatants and particularly amphibious
assault.
13
In the Balance
France, Great Britain, Spain, the Netherlands and Italy have boosted their amphibious capability
from 1990 to 2010. France is about to launch its third Mistral Class Landing Helicopter Dock
(LHD) with significant hangar facilities and a floodable well deck. Spain’s single Juan Carlos class
has the same facilities in addition to a ski jump supporting fixed wing aviation as a STOVL carrier.
Italy has commissioned the Cavour which resembles the Juan Carlos
albeit without a well deck. It still has capacity to transport heavy
land assets such as main battle tanks which can enter the ship
through access ramps. This is also the case of Britain’s HMS Ocean
which in addition can ferry aircraft but lack facilities to operate fixed
wing aviation. In all countries these vessels complement aircraft
carriers and do not merely replace similar capabilities. Only the
United Kingdom has previously operated ‘commando carriers’
supplementing its aircraft carriers. The vessel most immediately
preceding HMS Ocean which was commissioned in 1998 was the
HMS Hermes which decommissioned in April 1984!
Other then entirely new assets, Britain and France have replaced
existing Landing Platform Docks on a one-to-one basis. The French
Foudre class outsize the Ouragan class they replace with nearly
45%, while Britain’s Albion class vessels only weight 30% more than the Fearless class vessels
they substitute. But in addition the UK has replaced 5 Round Table class landing ships in the 6000
ton range with 4 Bay class landing platform docks (LPD) of 16000 ton each which have floodable
well decks.
The latter vessels are based on the Dutch ‘Enforcer’ design which has also been adopted by the
Spanish navy as the two ship Galicia class and the Netherlands navy as the two ship Rotterdam
class. In Dutch service the Rotterdam class represents an all new capability whereas the Spanish
LPD’s have some resemblance with ex Casa Grande class serving in the Spanish navy until 1989.
Yet they are to directly replace the smaller and less capable Tank Landing Ships (LST) of the
Newport class.
With the addition of these vessels European
navies have acquired ‘over the horizon’
amphibious capability. They are substantially
less vulnerable then Tank Landing Ships and
have greater endurance allowing them to stay
on station with their marines for prolonged
periods. They constitute important power
Replacements
projection assets as they can be dispatched
Country
Class
Number Tons full load
Net change Tonnage
and stay outside the territorial waters of a
France
Ouragan
2
8500
Foudre
2
12000
7000
potential foe sending a strong message
United Kingdom Fearless
2
16950
without resorting to aggression. By contrast
Albion
2
21500
9100
Tank Landing Ships beaching maneuvers
Total
19
285179
make them extremely vulnerable while
unloading their task force and they in addition suffer from impaired seaworthiness due to their flat
hulls which also affect their capacity for holding supplies and long term accommodation. This
severely constrains their utility for offshore power projection.
EU ‘over the horizon’ amphibious capability - Change 1990-2010
Country
Class
Number Tons full load
Spain
Galicia
2
12750
Juan Carlos
1
27079
Italy
Cavour
1
27910
San Giusto
1
8000
France
Mistral
3
21300
Holland
Rotterdam
2
14775
United Kingdom Ocean
1
22500
Bay
4
16160
Tonnage
25500
27079
27910
8000
63900
29550
22500
64640
14
In the Balance
Italy has two additional San Giorgio class LPD’s in their inventory launched in the second half of
the eighties. They displace 300 tons less than the post cold war vessel San Giusto listed above.
France furthermore has stationed the small LPD Bougainville displacing 4970 tons in the Pacific.
This brings the total ‘over the horizon’ amphibious ships in the EU inventory to 22 vessels
displacing roughly 356349 tons. By contrast the US Navy has 31 principal amphibious ships but
they displace a staggering 797000 tons. In relative terms, however, EU navies are closing in on the
US Navy. In 1990 the US Navy possessed 37 ‘over the horizon’ amphibious vessels totaling a
tonnage of 753000. In the same year EU navies had – by the most optimistic counts – 9 such ships
with a combined tonnage of 95535.
The figures exclude replenishments ships such
as Germany’s Berlin class, Holland’s
Amsterdam class or the Joint Logistic Support
Ships (JSS) recently order by the latter
(Defense Industry Daily – Feb. 7th 2010).
Moreover, the post cold war trend of chartering
logistical capacity is not included in the figures
either.
Another yet related trend in West European
naval capability reorientation is the
commissioning of large ocean going well
armed frigates and destroyers often having logistical capabilities. This is evident in the F125
frigates ordered by the German navy and the Danish Absalon class of flexible support ships which
are armed as frigates while having a flexible storage deck from where amphibious assaults can be
staged. Germany’s F124 Sachsen class frigate and its Dutch cousin De Zeven Provinciën class and
the slightly older F123 Brandenburg class carry helicopters, insertion crafts and can accommodate a
task force group.
This scenario is strongly supported by data! Although the EU’s carrier capability does not balance
the US Navy, developments in ‘over the horizon’ amphibious assault and other large surface
combatants reveals a convincing pattern pointing to the European Union ‘Leash-Slipping’ by
acquiring capabilities for conducting offshore balancing. These finding have some consistency with
the arguments forwarded, but not empirically tested, by both Barry Posen and Christopher Layne.
6. Conclusion
In conclusion we can dismiss the explanatory power of bandwagoning in accounting for EU naval
capability changes. Likewise, the balance of threat scenario featuring an expansionist Russia does
not come across as credible either. This leaves us with two scenarios. The first, featuring EU
seeking to balance US hegemony, found some support in our findings. Especially observed changes
in submarine assets and major surface combatants such as destroyers and frigates could be enlisted
as arguments for the EU balancing hegemonic US power. The final scenario posing the EU as an
offshore balancer is unequivocally backed by data particularly with regards to expanding ‘over the
horizon’ amphibious assault capability.
15
In the Balance
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In the Balance
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17